Major Cross-Infrastructure Survivability

Prepared for: Telcordia Contact:

Maneck J. Master, Ph.D.Vice PresidentGovernment & Public Sectormmaster@telcordia.com+1 732 699-8100

May 14, 2009

CQR 2009

Learning from HEMP Studies

Four Classifications of Threats:

1. Natural – Flood, Fire, Wind, Ice, Lightning, Corrosion, Solar Magnetic Storms, and Earthquake

2. Man-made Accidents – Construction, Vibration, Electromagnetic Interference, Exposure to AC Power, and Gamma Radiation

3. Individual Acts of Sabotage – EM Attacks, Gamma Radiation (Dirty Bomb), Dig-ups, Fire, and Power Faults/Outages

4. General Acts of War – HEMP, Bombings

Industry normally protects the Public Telecommunications Network (PSTN) from Threats 1 and 2 through National “Baseline Standards”, (e.g., see www.ATIS.T1.org )Threats 3 and 4 are handled differently

Threats to Telecom Infrastructure

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Electromagnetic EnvironmentsImpact Civilian Infrastructures

Distributed Networks

Power Grid /Telecommunications

Nuclear EMP

EM Terrorism

Individual Systems

Nuclear EMP attack affects a wide area andmany Infrastructure nodes simultaneously

EM terrorist attackaimed at a specificinfrastructure node

Geomagnetic

Solar Flare

3

Individual Systems

Early Time (E1)Intermediate Time (E2)Late Time (E3)Prompt Gamma Signal

Scattered Gamma Signal

Neutron Gamma Signal

MHD Signal

10-10 10-8 10-6 10-4 10-2 100 102 104

101

10-1

10-3

10-5

10-7 Time (s)

E(t)

[kV/

m]

Distributed NetworksPower Grid

Telecommunications

103

Lightning at 10 meters

HEMP Threat Components

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AC Power Grid Outages Provide the Most Significant Threat to Telecommunications Links Along with Potential Fire Hazards atVulnerable Telecommunications Locations, e.g., Canadian Power Grid Failure due to Solar Flare and Satellite (for Pagers) Failure Due to Solar Radiation

Primary Issue• Power Grid near Capacity – may not handle solar induced outage• Prediction of Solar Flares needs to be improved to allow for Power

Grid Capacity Management

Secondary Issue• Loss of Environmental Controls can lead to

Telecommunications/Computer Contamination and Failure• Loss of Transportation Continuity• Standards Requiring Battery Reserve Time and Standby Engine-

Alternators and /or Generator Connectors exist

Vulnerability from Solar Magnetic Storms

Reference: NCS TIB 94-1, Protection of Telecommunication Links from Radiation Effects and ATIS T1.328-1999

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Threats MagnifiedInterdependencies & Technology Evolution

Compressor Station

Fuel Supply

Oil / Gas

Substation

Power Plant

Power Supply Electric Power

End Office

Switching Office

Communications

Transport

TrafficLight Transportation

Water

EmergencyCall Center

HospitalAmbulance

Emergency Services

Bank

FederalReserve

ATM

MilitaryInstallations

Government Services

CheckProcessing

Center

ReservoirSubstation

Banking & Finance FireStation

Pension/Service Payments Treasury Dept.

Legislative Offices

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Threats are Magnified by Changing Technologyand EnvironmentIn the current competitive environment, existing protection standards and practices are not uniformly applied by both large and small service providers and they both rely on reactive maintenance

There is no consensus in industry on new threat characterizations for portable EMP devices

New generation network elements and configurations are moving away from the traditional protected central offices

The need for PSTN “service continuity” is rapidly changing with the nature of the network. Pass/fail criteria applied to network elements (EMP Tested in the 1980s) accepted outages over “days” to restore processors (and plug-ins) and this criteria does not apply in today’s network

Threat mitigation consensus will be necessary in the standards process and coordinated with multiple disciplines (e.g., corrosion vs. bonding and grounding)

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Pulse Impact

Network Topology

Network Restoration

Select geographic area and associated contours

ID equip in geographic area

Augment equipment to reflect network evolution scenarios

Compute metrics from Network Effects Model

Network Metrics:• Blocked/Dropped Calls• Reconstitution Shortfalls

Review Reconstitution Plan Documents/Processes

Develop restoration times based on Reconstitution Plan processes

Network Service Impact

Network Impact and Network Restoration Process Analysis

Iterate over time

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Telecom Results

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

0.00001 0.0001 0.001 0.01 0.1 1 10 100

Days After Event

Prob

abili

ty o

f Blo

ckin

g

NCS High Level w/5dB Shielding

HEMP Contour w/5dB Shielding

HEMP Contour w/10dB Shielding

4 Hours30 min30 sec

-50% of network visible through EMS in 6 hours, Remainder to be assessed within 24 hours

- 70% of workforce available

- No negative impacts from power loss on restoration

- 20% NGN

Primary Results of Reconstitution Assessment – Less than 10 Days to Reconstitute

Blk Level

NCS High

Contour -5dB

Contour -10 dB

50% 5 days 2 days <1 day30% 6 days 4 days 2 days5% 9 days 5 days 3 days

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Interdependence between Power and Telecommunications

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EMP Report Recommendations

Expand the respective roles of NCS and DTRA within the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 215 (Federal Focal Point for EMP Information) to address infrastructure interdependencies related to NS/EP telecommunications servicesEnsure that emergency telecommunications services continue to operate as new technologies are introducedImplement a comprehensive and continuing testing program for different types of equipment and facilitiesImprove the ability of the telecommunications system to survive a loss of electrical powerConduct exercises to refine contingency operations (e.g., LTO)Prepare other critical infrastructure systems for potential losses of telecommunications and power and other SACDA supported systems

References: [i]http://armedservices.house.gov/calendar_past_hearings.shtml, July 10, 2008, Dr. William R. Graham (pdf) Chair Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack

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What’s Next

Definition of “Long Term Outage” for Telecoms

Mitigation Strategies – Decoupling?

Protection of Control Layer / Network Management / Data Centers

Modeling/Simulation for Interconnectivity

Exercise/Operations Training

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