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Macroeconomic Policy Objectives Internal balance Full employment…maximum output Stable prices “Overemployment” rising prices Less-than-full-employment falling prices Volatile aggregate demand and output lead to volatile prices. Price level volatility uncertainty inefficiency External balance: Current account not so much in deficit to be unable to repay foreign debt not so much in surplus that foreigners can’t repay their debts

Macroeconomic Policy Objectives

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Macroeconomic Policy Objectives. Internal balance Full employment…maximum output Stable prices “Overemployment”  rising prices Less-than-full-employment  falling prices Volatile aggregate demand and output lead to volatile prices. Price level volatility  uncertainty inefficiency - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Macroeconomic  Policy Objectives

Macroeconomic Policy Objectives

Internal balance• Full employment…maximum output• Stable prices

– “Overemployment” rising prices– Less-than-full-employment falling prices– Volatile aggregate demand and output lead to volatile prices.

– Price level volatility uncertainty inefficiency

External balance: Current account – not so much in deficit to be unable to repay foreign debt– not so much in surplus that foreigners can’t repay their debts

Page 2: Macroeconomic  Policy Objectives

Achieving Internal and External BalancePegged rates Fiscal policy effective Exchange rate can be changed

– Devaluation/revaluation Tools:

• Expenditure changing: fiscal policy• Expenditure switching: exchange rate setting

– Need as many tools as you have objectives

For external balance, XX– G up Y up CA down … unless E up (devaluation)

For internal balance, II– E down (revaluation) CA down Y down … unless G up

Page 3: Macroeconomic  Policy Objectives

Internal Balance (II), External Balance (XX) “Four Zones of Economic Discomfort”

Page 4: Macroeconomic  Policy Objectives

The Open-Economy TrilemmaThe Impossible Trilogy

Impossible for a country to achieve more than two items from the following list:

1. Exchange rate stability…fixed (or managed) rates2. Monetary policy for internal balance.3. Freedom of international capital movements.

Page 5: Macroeconomic  Policy Objectives

The Policy Trilemma for Open Economies

Page 6: Macroeconomic  Policy Objectives

Macroeconomic Policy Under the Classical Gold Standard: 1870–1914

Mechanisms keeping official gold flows (the balance of payments) from becoming too positive or too negative.Gold stock Money supply Price level Current account

Hume’s Specie Flow MechanismGold stock Money supply Output&income Current accountGold stock Money supply Interest rate Capital flowsCentral banks management of bank rate

– Keep private capital flows ≈ Current account“Rules of the game” not followedGold stock Financial influence Sterilize gold inflows

Central bank cooperation

– Lending to keep gold stocks stable

Page 7: Macroeconomic  Policy Objectives

The Gold Standard and Internal Balance• The US economy, 1873 – 1913

– Deflation– Frequent financial crises– Frequent recessions

– 1890 – 1913 unemployment: 6.8% on average– 1946 – 1992 unemployment: 5.7% on average

Page 8: Macroeconomic  Policy Objectives

WW I: Capital flight breakdown of gold standard Interwar turbulence

– Legacies of WW I– Redrawn borders disrupted trade patterns– Overhang of “Old Debts”:

» reparations/inter-allied loans– Labor empowered: The eight hour day

Excessive claims hyperinflation

Gold Standard Nostalgia• Restore London dominance

Page 9: Macroeconomic  Policy Objectives

$ Dominance/New York Dominance Classical gold standard, 1870 – 1914

• £ dominant despite US economic prowess– US banks couldn’t branch overseas– Bimetalism and its legacy $ looked risky

WW I £ instability $ denominated transactions w/Latin America, Asia

– Federal Reserve fostered market in int’l acceptances– Benjamin Strong and his legacy

– Post-war credit in $s– European government bonds denominated in $s

– National City Bank/Others/Branching Abroad US financial dominance: from mid-1920s

• International economy disrupted in depression, WWII

Page 10: Macroeconomic  Policy Objectives

‘20s Halting return to gold Prelude to depression– The Economic Consequences of Mr. Churchill

General Strike– US monetary expansion – help to Britain Roaring ’20s– Capital flow reversal European downturn– Bubble and collapse

‘30s World in Depression: Who Leads? UK couldn’t …US wouldn’t Protection … beggar thy neighbor1931 European banking crises and contagion

– Creditanstalt German banks British investment banks Flight from the £

September 1931: Britain leaves gold – US defends gold standard Crisis and the Great Depression

Golden fetters– Halting recovery: monetary expansion/fiscal measures/rearmament

Page 11: Macroeconomic  Policy Objectives

Postwar: Restore Stability Bretton Woods System IMF a bank/World Bank a fund $ pegged to gold … N – 1 currencies pegged to an elastic $ IMF: International lender of last resort

• support pegs• allow devaluation when fundamental disequilibrium

Capital controls on international financial transactions• Protect financial account/Prevent balance of payments crisis

Currencies were convertible to encourage trade in goods and services Fiscal policy the principal tool for internal balance Principal tools for external balance

• borrowing from the IMF• restrictions on financial asset flows• infrequent changes in exchange rates.

Page 12: Macroeconomic  Policy Objectives

Policy Mix for Internal and External Balance: 2 Goals – 2 Tools

Starting with CA Deficit and Underemployment Fiscal stimulus + Devaluation

• Under the fixed exchange rates of the Bretton Woods system, devaluations were

supposed to be infrequent

– fiscal policy was supposed to be the main policy tool to achieve both

internal and external balance.

• In general, fiscal policy cannot attain both internal balance and external balance

at the same time.

• A devaluation, however, can move toward both internal balance and external

balance at the same time.

• Speculator anticipation of devaluation greater internal or external imbalances.

Page 13: Macroeconomic  Policy Objectives

Bretton Woods: $ Standard…more flexible than gold Each central bank fixed the dollar exchange rate of its currency through

foreign exchange market trades for $s• Exchange rates between any two currencies fixed by arbitrage.

The US could use M-policy for macroeconomic stabilization despite fixed rates.Purchase of domestic assets by the Federal Reserve leads to

– Excess US demand for foreign currencies in the foreign exchange market

– Purchases of $s by foreign central banks to keep $ from depreciating

Expansionary monetary policies by all other central banks– Higher world output … and/or INFLATION

Reserve Currencies in Int’l Monetary System

Page 14: Macroeconomic  Policy Objectives

Bretton Woods System

Problems/breakdown: – Speculative attacks against weak currencies– Gold & $ Shortage

Buildup of $ reserves > US gold stock– $ Glut

Vietnam era expansion Pus up overvalued $ Rush out of $s…try to redeem gold the US doesn’t have– Nixon Economic Program, August 15, 1971

– Close gold window…8% devaluation against gold in 12/71– Import surcharge– Wage/price controls

– 1973 Collapse of Bretton Woods system– Foreign central banks refused to buy overvalued $ assets

Page 15: Macroeconomic  Policy Objectives

Exporting US Inflation: 1966–1972

Page 16: Macroeconomic  Policy Objectives

Effect on Internal and External Balance of a Rise in the Foreign (US) Price Level, P*

The “simple” solution for the £, DM,

¥, FF, …

• Revalue against the $

Page 17: Macroeconomic  Policy Objectives

The Case for Floating Exchange Rates• Monetary policy autonomy…w/o capital controls

– Each country can choose “appropriate” long-run inflation rate• Symmetry

– $ can “devalue” as necessary…not constrained as leader– Other countries can use monetary tool

• Exchange rates as automatic stabilizers– Floating cushions output against real shocks

– Something’s gotta adjust…if not E, then Y– Depreciation in the face of reduced demand for a nation’s

exports restores equilibrium automatically– Unlike Bretton Woods

» there would be a “fundamental disequilibrium”» and ongoing CA deficit and loss of reserves » until price level fell or currency devalued

Page 18: Macroeconomic  Policy Objectives

AA1

DD1

Effects of a Temporary Fall in Export Demand

AA2

DD2

AA1

DD2

DD1

E2

2

Y2

Y2

Output, Y

Exchange rate, E

(a) Floating

exchange rate

Output, Y

Exchange rate, E

(b) Fixed

exchange rate

Y1

E1 1

Y1

E1

1

Y3

3

The Case for

Floating Exchange Rates

Depreciation

leads to higher

demand for and

output of

domestic products

Fixed exchange

rates mean output

falls as much as

the initial fall in

aggregate demand

Page 19: Macroeconomic  Policy Objectives

The Case Against Floating Exchange Rates

Lack of discipline… but a floating exchange rate bottles up inflation in a country whose government is “misbehaving”.

Destabilizing speculation • Hot money

…but “fundamental disequilibrium” one-way bet under fixed rates• Countries can be caught in a “vicious circle” of depreciation and

inflation. E deprec Pim up CoL up W up P up E deprec

• Floating exchange rates make a country more vulnerable to money market disturbances: L up R up E-apprec. CA & Y down– Fixed rates cushion output against monetary shocks

L up M up nothing shifts under fixed rates

Page 20: Macroeconomic  Policy Objectives

AA1

DD

Output, Y

Exchange

rate, E

E1

Y1

1

A Rise in Money Demand Under a Floating Exchange Rate

AA2

E2

Y2

2

The Case Against Floating Exchange Rates

Page 21: Macroeconomic  Policy Objectives

What really matters? Recall:

• With fixed rate, monetary policy is ineffective (given free capital flows)–Similarly, monetary shocks have no real effect

• With floating rates, fiscal policy is ineffective–Similarly, temporary real shocks [like drop in demand

for exports] have little real effect–Permanent real shocks have “no” real effects

Page 22: Macroeconomic  Policy Objectives

Injury to International Trade and Investment• Exporters and importers face greater exchange risk.

– But forward markets can protect traders against foreign exchange risk.• International investments face greater uncertainty about payoffs

denominated in home country currency. Uncoordinated Economic Policies

• Countries can engage in competitive currency depreciations.…under Bretton Woods, policies “coordinated” via US privilege

• A large country’s fiscal and monetary policies affect other economies…aggregate demand, output, and prices become more volatile across countries if policies diverge.

Free Float Really Managed Float• Fear of depreciation – inflation spiral intervention

The Case Against Floating Exchange Rates

Page 23: Macroeconomic  Policy Objectives

The Case Against Floating Exchange Rates• Speculation and volatility in the foreign exchange market

• If traders expect a currency to depreciate in the short run, they may quickly sell the currency to make a profit,

even if it is not expected to depreciate in the long run.

• Expectations of depreciation lead to actual depreciation in the short run.

• The assumption we’ve been using that expectations do not change when temporary economic changes

occur is not valid if expectations change quickly in anticipation of even temporary economic changes.

• In fact, exchange rate volatility has increased since 1973

Page 24: Macroeconomic  Policy Objectives

Macroeconomic Data for Key Industrial Regions, 1963–2009

Page 25: Macroeconomic  Policy Objectives

Floating and Discipline:

Inflation Rates in Major Industrialized Countries, 1973-1980 (percent per year)

The Case Against Floating Exchange Rates

Page 26: Macroeconomic  Policy Objectives

Nominal and Real Effective Dollar Exchange Rate Indexes, 1975–2006

Purchasing Power Parity???

Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Studies.

Page 27: Macroeconomic  Policy Objectives

Due to contractionary monetary policy (Volcker disinflation) and expansive fiscal policy (Reagan tax cut and military buildup, the $ appreciated by about 50% relative to 15 currencies from 1980–1985.

growing US CA deficit & rest-of-world capital shortage Major efforts to influence exchange rates:

• The 1985 Plaza Accord reduced the value of the dollar relative to other major currencies… “bringing down dollar”

• The 1987 Louvre Accord: intended to stabilize exchange rates– Specified zones of +/- 5% around which current exchange

rates were allowed to fluctuate.– Quickly abandoned

– The October 1987 stock market crash made production, employment and price stability the primary goals for the U.S.

» Did tightening to support $ trigger “Black Monday”?» After Black Monday, exchange rate stability became less

important.– New targets were (secretly) made after October 1987, but central banks

had abandoned these targets by the early 1990s.

Page 28: Macroeconomic  Policy Objectives

Macroeconomic Interdependence Under Floating RateThe Large Country Case

• Effect of a permanent monetary expansion by US–$ depreciates, US output rises–Foreign output may rise or fall.

– Foreign’s currency appreciates Foreign’s output falls– US economy expands Foreign sells more to US

• Effect of a permanent fiscal expansion by US–US output rises, US currency appreciates–Foreign output rises

– Foreign’s currency depreciates Foreign’s output rises– US economy expands Foreign sells more to US

Large Country => Locomotive

Page 29: Macroeconomic  Policy Objectives

Exchange Rate Trends andInflation Differentials, 1973–2009

Source: International Monetary Fund and Global Financial Data.

High-inflation countries have tended

to have weaker currencies than their

low-inflation neighbors.

Page 30: Macroeconomic  Policy Objectives

Global External Imbalances, 1999–2009

Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook database.

• The U.S. has run a current account deficit for many years due to its low saving and high

investment expenditure.

Rebalancing: As foreign countries spend more and lend less to the U.S.,

• interest rates may rise

• the U.S. dollar will depreciating

• the U.S. current account will improve (becoming less negative).

Page 31: Macroeconomic  Policy Objectives

Long-Term Real Interest Rates for the United States, Canada, and Sweden, 1999–2010

Source: Global Financial Data and Datastream. Real interest rates are six-month moving averages of monthly interest rate observations on ten-year inflation-indexed government bonds.

Page 32: Macroeconomic  Policy Objectives

Macroeconomic Interdependence Under Floating RateUnemployment Rates in Major Industrialized Countries,

1978-2000 (percent of civilian labor force)

Page 33: Macroeconomic  Policy Objectives

• After 1973 central banks intervened repeatedly in the foreign exchange market to alter currency values.– To stabilize output and the price level when certain

disturbances occur– To prevent sharp changes in the international competitiveness

of tradable goods sectors• Monetary changes had a much greater short-run effect on the

real exchange rate under a floating nominal exchange rate than under a fixed one.

• The international monetary system did not become symmetric until after 1973.– Central banks continued to hold dollar reserves and intervene.

• The current floating-rate system is similar in some ways to the asymmetric reserve currency system underlying the Bretton Woods arrangements … exorbitant privilege

What Has Been Learned Since 1973?

Page 34: Macroeconomic  Policy Objectives

The Exchange Rate as an Automatic Stabilizer• Experience with the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 favors

floating exchange rates.• The effects of the U.S. fiscal expansion after 1981 provide

mixed evidence on the success of floating exchange rates. Discipline

• Inflation rates accelerated after 1973 and remained high through the second oil shock.

• The system placed fewer obvious restraints on unbalanced fiscal policies.– Example: The high U.S. government budget deficits of the

1980s.

What Has Been Learned Since 1973?

Page 35: Macroeconomic  Policy Objectives

Destabilizing Speculation• Floating exchange rates have exhibited much more day-to-

day volatility.– The question of whether exchange rate volatility has been

excessive is controversial.• In the longer term, exchange rates have roughly reflected

fundamental changes in monetary and fiscal policies and not destabilizing speculation.

• Experience with floating exchange rates contradicts the idea that arbitrary exchange rate movements can lead to “vicious circles” of inflation and depreciation.

International Trade and Investment• For most countries, the extent of their international trade

shows a rising trend after the move to floating.

What Has Been Learned Since 1973?

Page 36: Macroeconomic  Policy Objectives

Many fixed exchange rate systems have developed since 1973.• European monetary system and euro zone• The Chinese central bank currently fixes the value of its currency.• ASEAN countries have considered a fixed exchange rates and

policy coordination.