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Machine Teaching and Security Jerry Zhu University of Wisconsin-Madison Workshop on Reliable Machine Learning in the Wild ICML 2016 NYC

Machine Teaching and Securitypages.cs.wisc.edu/~jerryzhu/pub/ICML16WS.pdf · Application: Data-Poisoning Data-poisoning attack on regression min ; ~ k k p s.t. ~ 1 0 ~ = argmin k(y

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Page 1: Machine Teaching and Securitypages.cs.wisc.edu/~jerryzhu/pub/ICML16WS.pdf · Application: Data-Poisoning Data-poisoning attack on regression min ; ~ k k p s.t. ~ 1 0 ~ = argmin k(y

Machine Teaching and Security

Jerry Zhu

University of Wisconsin-Madison

Workshop on Reliable Machine Learning in the WildICML 2016 NYC

Page 2: Machine Teaching and Securitypages.cs.wisc.edu/~jerryzhu/pub/ICML16WS.pdf · Application: Data-Poisoning Data-poisoning attack on regression min ; ~ k k p s.t. ~ 1 0 ~ = argmin k(y

Dθ0→ A(D, θ0)→ θ

Page 3: Machine Teaching and Securitypages.cs.wisc.edu/~jerryzhu/pub/ICML16WS.pdf · Application: Data-Poisoning Data-poisoning attack on regression min ; ~ k k p s.t. ~ 1 0 ~ = argmin k(y

“It didn’t take users long to learn that the Tay chatbot contained a

‘repeat after me’ command, which they promptly took advantage of.”

[CNN]

Page 4: Machine Teaching and Securitypages.cs.wisc.edu/~jerryzhu/pub/ICML16WS.pdf · Application: Data-Poisoning Data-poisoning attack on regression min ; ~ k k p s.t. ~ 1 0 ~ = argmin k(y

Dθ0→ A(D, θ0)→ θ

Data:D ∈ D := ∪∞n=1(X × Y)n

I constructive, can lie: X = Rd,Y ∈ {−1, 1}I constructive, honest: support(p(x, y))

I pool-based: X = {x1, . . . , xN} ∼ p(x) candidate set

Page 5: Machine Teaching and Securitypages.cs.wisc.edu/~jerryzhu/pub/ICML16WS.pdf · Application: Data-Poisoning Data-poisoning attack on regression min ; ~ k k p s.t. ~ 1 0 ~ = argmin k(y

Dθ0→ A(D, θ0)→ θ

Learning algorithm:

A(D, θ0) = argminθ′

n∑i=1

`(θ′, xi, yi) + λ‖θ′ − θ0‖2

Page 6: Machine Teaching and Securitypages.cs.wisc.edu/~jerryzhu/pub/ICML16WS.pdf · Application: Data-Poisoning Data-poisoning attack on regression min ; ~ k k p s.t. ~ 1 0 ~ = argmin k(y

Machine teaching

Given?θ0→ A(D, θ0)→ θ

Find D.

I Note: θ is given!

I Who would know θ? Attackers, teachers, etc.

Page 7: Machine Teaching and Securitypages.cs.wisc.edu/~jerryzhu/pub/ICML16WS.pdf · Application: Data-Poisoning Data-poisoning attack on regression min ; ~ k k p s.t. ~ 1 0 ~ = argmin k(y

Machine teaching (special)

minD∈D

|D|

s.t. {θ} = argminθ′

n∑i=1

`(θ′, xi, yi) + λ‖θ′ − θ0‖2

Page 8: Machine Teaching and Securitypages.cs.wisc.edu/~jerryzhu/pub/ICML16WS.pdf · Application: Data-Poisoning Data-poisoning attack on regression min ; ~ k k p s.t. ~ 1 0 ~ = argmin k(y

Machine teaching (general)

minD∈D

TeachingLoss(A(D, θ0), θ) + TeachingEffort(D)

Page 9: Machine Teaching and Securitypages.cs.wisc.edu/~jerryzhu/pub/ICML16WS.pdf · Application: Data-Poisoning Data-poisoning attack on regression min ; ~ k k p s.t. ~ 1 0 ~ = argmin k(y

Application: Data-Poisoning

Identifying optimal data-poisoning attacks

minδ

TeachingEffort(δ,D0)

s.t. TeachingLoss(A(D0 + δ, θ0), θ) ≤ ε

Page 10: Machine Teaching and Securitypages.cs.wisc.edu/~jerryzhu/pub/ICML16WS.pdf · Application: Data-Poisoning Data-poisoning attack on regression min ; ~ k k p s.t. ~ 1 0 ~ = argmin k(y

Application: Data-Poisoning

Data-poisoning attack on regressionLake Mendota, Wisconsin (x, y)

1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 200040

60

80

100

120

140

YEAR

ICE

DA

YS

Page 11: Machine Teaching and Securitypages.cs.wisc.edu/~jerryzhu/pub/ICML16WS.pdf · Application: Data-Poisoning Data-poisoning attack on regression min ; ~ k k p s.t. ~ 1 0 ~ = argmin k(y

Application: Data-PoisoningData-poisoning attack on regression

minδ,β̃

‖δ‖p

s.t. β̃1 ≥ 0

β̃ = argminβ‖(y + δ)−Xβ‖2

1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 200040

60

80

100

120

140

YEAR

ICE

DA

YS

original, β1=−0.1

2−norm attack, β1=0

1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 20000

50

100

150

200

250

300

YEAR

ICE

DA

YS

original, β1=−0.1

1−norm attack, β1=0

minimize ‖δ‖22 minimize ‖δ‖1

[Mei, Z 15a]

Page 12: Machine Teaching and Securitypages.cs.wisc.edu/~jerryzhu/pub/ICML16WS.pdf · Application: Data-Poisoning Data-poisoning attack on regression min ; ~ k k p s.t. ~ 1 0 ~ = argmin k(y

Application: Data-Poisoning

Data-poisoning attack on latent Dirichlet allocation

[Mei, Z 15b]

Page 13: Machine Teaching and Securitypages.cs.wisc.edu/~jerryzhu/pub/ICML16WS.pdf · Application: Data-Poisoning Data-poisoning attack on regression min ; ~ k k p s.t. ~ 1 0 ~ = argmin k(y

Application: Defense

I Defender wishes to truthfully evaluate f(x),

I Attacker can replace x with x′ ∈ S ⊂ X, the attack set

I Defender can choose S ∈ {S1, . . . , Sk}

mini∈[k]

maxx′∈Si,x

DefenderLoss(f(x′), f(x))

[Alfeld, Barford, Z. This workshop]

Page 14: Machine Teaching and Securitypages.cs.wisc.edu/~jerryzhu/pub/ICML16WS.pdf · Application: Data-Poisoning Data-poisoning attack on regression min ; ~ k k p s.t. ~ 1 0 ~ = argmin k(y

Application: Data repair

Data repair to satisfy logical constraints

minδ

‖δ‖

s.t. A(D0 + δ) |= φ.

[Ghosh, Lincoln, Tiwari, Z. This workshop]

Page 15: Machine Teaching and Securitypages.cs.wisc.edu/~jerryzhu/pub/ICML16WS.pdf · Application: Data-Poisoning Data-poisoning attack on regression min ; ~ k k p s.t. ~ 1 0 ~ = argmin k(y

Application: Debugging Machine Learning

Training set debugging: test item x∗ misclassified A(D0)(x∗) 6= y∗

minδ

‖δ‖

s.t. A(D0 + δ)(x∗) = y∗.

[Cadamuro, Gilad-Bachrach, Z. This workshop]

Page 16: Machine Teaching and Securitypages.cs.wisc.edu/~jerryzhu/pub/ICML16WS.pdf · Application: Data-Poisoning Data-poisoning attack on regression min ; ~ k k p s.t. ~ 1 0 ~ = argmin k(y

Application: Education

I Human categorization 1D threshold θ∗ = 0.5

I A = kernel density estimator

I Optimal D:

θ =0.5∗0 1

y=−1 y=1

teaching human with human test accuracy

optimal D 72.5%random items 69.8%

(statistically significant)

[Patil, Z, Kopec, Love 14]

Page 17: Machine Teaching and Securitypages.cs.wisc.edu/~jerryzhu/pub/ICML16WS.pdf · Application: Data-Poisoning Data-poisoning attack on regression min ; ~ k k p s.t. ~ 1 0 ~ = argmin k(y

Application: Interactive machine learning

TD := minD∈D

|D|

s.t. {θ} = A(D)

Teaching dimension TD ≤ active learning query complexity

[Suh, Z, Amershi 16]

Page 18: Machine Teaching and Securitypages.cs.wisc.edu/~jerryzhu/pub/ICML16WS.pdf · Application: Data-Poisoning Data-poisoning attack on regression min ; ~ k k p s.t. ~ 1 0 ~ = argmin k(y

Open research question: Finding TD

TD := minD∈D

|D|

s.t. {θ} = A(D)

TD (size of minimum teaching set) bounds “hacking difficulty”

I property of hypothesis space Θ (and A)

I distinct from VC-dim

I known for intervals, hypercubes, monotonic decision trees,monomials, binary relations and total orders, linear learners,etc.

Page 19: Machine Teaching and Securitypages.cs.wisc.edu/~jerryzhu/pub/ICML16WS.pdf · Application: Data-Poisoning Data-poisoning attack on regression min ; ~ k k p s.t. ~ 1 0 ~ = argmin k(y

TD of Linear Learners

A(D) = argminθ∈Rd

n∑i=1

`(θ>xi, yi) +λ

2‖θ‖22

attack ↓ homogeneousridge SVM logistic

parameter 1⌈λ‖θ‖2

⌉ ⌈λ‖θ‖2τmax

⌉boundary - 1 1

[Liu, Z 16]

Page 20: Machine Teaching and Securitypages.cs.wisc.edu/~jerryzhu/pub/ICML16WS.pdf · Application: Data-Poisoning Data-poisoning attack on regression min ; ~ k k p s.t. ~ 1 0 ~ = argmin k(y

TD of d-dim Octagon

Conjecture: TD = 2d2 + 2d [w. Jha, Seshia]

Page 21: Machine Teaching and Securitypages.cs.wisc.edu/~jerryzhu/pub/ICML16WS.pdf · Application: Data-Poisoning Data-poisoning attack on regression min ; ~ k k p s.t. ~ 1 0 ~ = argmin k(y

Open research question: Optimizing teaching set

Karush-Kuhn-Tucker relaxation

minD∈D

|D|

s.t. {θ} = argminθ′

n∑i=1

`(θ′, xi, yi) + λ‖θ′ − θ0‖2

n∑i=1

∂`(θ, xi, yi) + 2λ(θ − θ0) = 0

Page 22: Machine Teaching and Securitypages.cs.wisc.edu/~jerryzhu/pub/ICML16WS.pdf · Application: Data-Poisoning Data-poisoning attack on regression min ; ~ k k p s.t. ~ 1 0 ~ = argmin k(y

More open questions

I sequential learnerI e.g. TD = 1 for linear perceptron [w. Ohannessian, Alfeld, Sen]

I uncertainty in learnerI e.g. A(D, θ0) = argminθ

∑ni=1 `(θ, xi, yi) + λ‖θ − θ0‖2 only

knowing λ ∈ [a, b]. [w. Lopes]

I εTD

I Teaching by features as well as items

Page 23: Machine Teaching and Securitypages.cs.wisc.edu/~jerryzhu/pub/ICML16WS.pdf · Application: Data-Poisoning Data-poisoning attack on regression min ; ~ k k p s.t. ~ 1 0 ~ = argmin k(y

Thank you

http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~jerryzhu/machineteaching/