Mac Vvc Base Camps

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f ~ajor US

Aaet

20 Ju ly 1968

HEADQUAHTERSu ~ T E STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND VIETNAM

APO 96222

MACJJ4JSUBJECT: Counter insurgency Lessons Learned No 68: Viet Cong Base

Camps ~ Supply Caches (U)

1 . Attached for your information a Lessons Learned from currentcounterinsurgency operations in South Vietnam.

2. The in fo rma t ion conta ined in the Lessons Learned may be of valuefor di rec t a pp li ca ti on t o t ra in ing , or to r e in f or ce e x is ti ng Goctrine,based on combat experience in South Vietnam.

J . Comments or questions concerning th e document, or requests for char.gesor addi t ions in th e dis t r ibu t ion of Le sson s L ea rn ed , sh oul d be addressedto t h i s headquarters, Attention: MACJJ43

FOR THE COMMANDER

J Incl1. Lessons Lea?hed No 82. Distr ibut ion3. Index Current Lessons Learned

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SECTION I VIET ONG BASE MPS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I I Source Material 2

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17

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Paragraph Page

SECTION I I VIET ONG SUPPLY HE S

APPENDICES

Extraction and Destruction of Caches 3

enera l

sU l l l l ~

Methods of Destroying or Rendering Base CampsUntenable 3

Sunnna y

I Translati ion of Viet Cong Document 22

Location and Detection of Base Camps

General

Location and Detection of Supply Caches


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RELEASABLE TOFWMAFV AND RVNAF

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at tacker. They ar e normally somewhat ci rcu lar in form with an outerrim of bunkers, a u t o ~ a t i cweapons f i r ing posi t icns , al arm systems andfoxholes. Within th e circle there i s a rather complete system ofcommand bunkers, kitchens, and l iving quarters constructed above theground from a wide variety of materials . (Figs. 1, 2 arid 3 i l l us t ra t ethe various types of VC base camps which have been encountered byt ac t ica l uni t s in South Vietnam). The exact shape of the camp wil lvary in order to take maximum advantage of natural te rra in featuresfor protection and to r e s t r i c t at tack on the camp to one or two avenues. Some of the camps, par t icu lar ly those used on ly fo r t rainingor way s ta t ions , have minimum defensive works . However, in a l l cases,the ~ i s prepared to defend his camp against a ground at tack. Eventhough natural terrain features may cause a given camp to resemble acul-de-sac there wil l be a t l eas t one prepared ex i t or escape routeopposite t he a nt ic ip at ed direct ion(s) of at tack . Tunnels connect thebunkers and f ir ing posit ions, enabling the defenders to move from one

point to another. This techn ique enhances th e effec t of the i r f i r epower and gives them a signif icant advantage over the at tacker. Anunfordable r iver may para l le l one f l a n k of a typ ical camp while openpaddy land b or de rs t he other. The apparent lack of escape routesmakes the position appear l ike an ideal t arget for ground at tack.However, un t i l bombardment has removed most of t he f ol ia ge , an y maneuver in to these areas on the ground i s a complex problem. Onelocal force squad has been kilown to withstand th e assaul t of two USArmy infantry companies, and a VC sn iper o r two, f i r ing from withina mined camp, can i n f l i c t numerous casual t ies on th e attacking force.

2. } HA) LOCATION ND DETECTION OF BASE CAMPS:

a. The 1s t Brigade, lOls t Airborne Division US), made a studyto determine p at te rn s e xi st ed for the establishment of ~ basecamps and defensive for t i f ica t ions . t was found early in the operat ion that j;JJe _ n ~ l l ; L i . r J : Y a r i a b l y _ . & j ; 3 : b l i ~ ~ < .h i : L Q a J 3 e s _ i n _ : t . h ~ L u p p e__

..:-eaches of -draws w h E . . e _ ~ t e rwas avai lable and dense f o 1 i ~ g - B r e . ;c l uded aer ia l 0 s r_vat;iPA FOI];ITXc.atiillis_.wer.e l o1jJ;ld on._the .. fingerscoven.ng the base camBs and were mutuallx_s_uPpoJ: ting. A comparisonwItIlliU ormation obtained fromother-sources such as agent reports ,t r i l studies, e tc . , indicated that a pat te rn di d exis t and tha t pot en t i a l base areas and bunkered posi t ions could be predicted withreasonable accuracy. Based on th is f inding, information obtainedfrom the Combined Intell igence Center, Vietnam CICV), photos, Red

Haze, visual reconnaissance and special agent reports was placed onoverlays and the density of act iv i ty plot ted . The plot was thent ransferred to maps using the color red to represent probable basecamp locations. A careful study of surrounding t e r r a in was then madeto determine l ikely defensive posi t ions and these were entered in blue

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on th e map. Thus, commanders were presented with a c lear indicat ionof th e most likelY ,f, eas which would be defended. This method ofidentifying probable base camps and defensive posit ions has provento be re la t ively accurate.

b. During OPERATION MAKALAPA, the 25th Infantry Division (US)found that V base camps were normally located a lo ng s tr ea ms andcanals and tha t extensive bunker complexes were bu i l t into th e banks.Bunkers were usual ly constructed of a combination of mud, logs andcement. The bunkers presented a low si lhouet te and had extensivelanes of f i r e along the main avenue(s) of approach. Excellent cam-ouflage negated the effect iveness of our aer ia l and ground observa-t ion .

c. In OPERATION WHEELER th e 1s t Brigade, 101st Airborne Divi-sion (US) found that People Sniffer missions effect ively producedin te l l igence in areas of heavy vegetation where visua l reconnaissancewas ineffec t ive . These missions were also invaluable in verifyingagent

reports aswell

as spec i f i ca l ly locating enemy uni t s , hospi ta l sor storage areas as revealed by d et ain ee s o r captured documents.

d. The After Action Report of the 25th Infantry Division US)for OPERATION JUNCTION .CIIT,. re f lec ts that of the sixteen base campsdiscovered, two were considered to be regimental size, te n bat ta l ionsize and four company size or s mal ler . All base camps were located200 m eters or c lo se r to a stream or other source of water. Each campwas encircled by a bunker system with interconnecting trench systems.The defensive positions showed evidence of careful planning of f ie ldsof f i r e and were well camouflaged and expertly organized. Enemyclaymore mine posit ions were marked on the enemy side of a t r ee , usu-a l ly with a single s t r ip of white cloth or an X cut into th e t ree .

e . The 3r d Brigade, 1 st Infantry Division US) reported, af t e rthe completion of OPERATION JUNCTION CITY, tha t most base camps werelocated n ~ t r m sor roads. t appeared tha t the plan was to lo -cate a l l ins ta l la t ions close t o t ransportat ion routes. This Brigademade th e same comment in thei r After Act ion Repor t for OPERATIONBATTLE CREEK.

f The 3rd Battalion, 22nd n f a n t ~ J4th Division (US) AfterAotion Report for OPERATION BREMERTON, which was conducted in theJ ung Sat Special Zone, r ef le ct ed t ha t the most l ike ly base camps intha t a re a e xi st ed on th e high ground. Therefore, caution had to beexercised when entering dr y ground from th e swamps. Also, a l l basecamps encountered were within 150 meters of some type of waterway.Further, these camps, without exception, were well concealed and

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effect ively bunkered. Similari ty of Lhese ba1 i1 camps enabled uni t sto plan their method of approach to minimize f r ie n dl y c as u al ti es .

g. In th e conduct of . ? l E R A ; ~ O NBENE]. by the 196th Light Infant ry Brigade (US), i t was noted thar- rn almost l l cases th e enemyins ta l la t ions were within 1000 meters o f a val ley or actual ly in th evalley. This indicated tha t in th is area, the V avoided th e ruggedand more formidable higher elevat ions.

h. The 1st Brigade, lOls t Airborne i v ~ s i o n US) found in OPERATION HOOD RIVER, that th e V contL,ued to u t i l i z e mutually supportingdraws, each-cfiaracterized by a w at er s up pl y, dense fol iage and fo r t ified positions guarding accesses to base camp areas. This same uni tnoted in the i r After Action Report fo r OPERATION BENTON tha t the V~ r e _ h i _ ~base cam-Es with local forces. who were well t rained andvery capable of executing l l a spe cts o f guer r i l l a warfare.

Following OPEP.ATION YELLOWSTONE, th e 3rd Squadron, 17th Cav-a lry -) US) reported tha t sightings o f p re vi ou sl y unlocated base

camps were reported dai ly. As each sub-area was searched in detai l ,large bunker complexes were located along every large stream in th ej un gl e a re a. Enemy lines of connnunication interlacing th e fo r t i f i edbase camps were found and plotted. ny of the base camps were vaca nt but a large percentage proved to be occupied and well defended.

j The After Action Report of the 1 s t Brigade, 25th InfantryDivision US) for OfERATION LANIKAI r ef le ct ed t ha t during this operat ion V base camps were normally found along stream beds adjacentto buil t-up areas or in the midst of occupied vi l lages . Bunkers werefound in most homes, as t r ide or strung along roads and dikes and inth e co rne rs o f hedge rows. Pagodas are normally V meeting placesand were often p r o t e t ~ dby bunker complexes.

k. ThF ; se of th e Open Arms program to obtain intel l igence ofspecif ic areas and fo r guides to areas can be very effect ive . DuringOPERATION D N T M 81, conducted by th e 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment,the exact locations of V base camps were revealed by a Hoi Chanh.

1. The 1s t Battalion, 18th Infantry, 1 s t Infantry Division US)reported upon completion of OPERATION BATON ROUGE t ha t whenever auni t moved into an area where there are indicat ions that much woodhad been cut, th e unit c ou ld e xp ec t to f ind a base camp within 200to 500 meters of th e cut t ing area. Note: VC regulat ions prescribetha t wood cutting must be done a t l e a s t one hour s walk ing t ime fromsuch fac i l i t i e s . ) Upon completion of OPERATION LEXINGTON I I I , th issame uni t reported that base camps and f c i l i t i e s were generally

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p. Upon completion of OPERATION JUNCTION CITY, th e 196th LightInfantry Brigade reported that defol iat ion f l ights cleared away brushand effectively revealed the enemy s base camps and supply routes.

q. The 5 th S pe ci al Forces Group (Airborne) reported tha t th equestions most frequently asked local V PWs and r a l l i e r s , especially Hoi Chanhs, pertained to the location of the i r base camps and AOs.The 5th SFG found that the two frequently used methods of map studyand aer ia l observation were unsuccessful. Most PWs ar;d Hoi Chanhsdo no t know direction, cannot read a map and, when they are takena lo f t fo r Visual Reconnaissance VR), i t i s usually the i r f i r s t f l igh tso they cannot associate what they see from the a ir with what they sawon th e ground. However, most of these people wil l no t admit that theycannot read a map, t e l l direct ion or do a te rra in analysis from thea i r. As a consequence, they usual ly reply in t he a ff ir ma ti ve whenq ue st io ns a re asked. When detainees were re-interrogatect using thesame techniques, t he i nf or ma ti on received in the second in terrogationfrequently differed from the f i r s t interrogat ion. One method of

0 . t has long been thought tha t because of the i r superior knowl-edge of these areas, th e Viet Cong habitually es tabl i sh base areasdeep in th e in ter io r. Operations conducted by the 1s t Brigade, lOls tAirborne Division have tended to disprove t hi s b el ie f. Apparentlythe Viet Cong do no t r egu lar ly inh abi t the in te r ior of dense jungleareas unless they are accessible by t r a i l Instead, they operatefrom bases within two or three kilometers of the jung le pe riphe ry.

m. During OPERATIONS MANCHESTER, UNIONTOWN/STRIKE and UN ONTOWNI , th e 199th Brigade s 503rd Chemical Detachment conducted twelve People Sniffer miss ions during the period 17 December 1967 to 13January 1968, identifying 94 h ot sp ots o f probable enemy ac t iv i t i e s .The People Sniffers enjoyed several successes by identifying Vbase camps and supplementing other intel l igence means in locatingareas of enemy act iv i ty.

found near streams, indicating the need fo r easy access ib i l i ty in th etype of terrain encountered in th e area.

n. The After Action Report of the 199th Light Infantry Brigade US fo r OPERATIONS MANCHESTER, UNIONTOWN/STRIKE and UN ONTOWN Icontains th e comment t ha t. t he humane and considerate treatment of HoiChanhs reaps high dividends, saving countless manhours o f o p er at io n altime. Once th e confidence o f th ese r etu rn ee s i s gained and sincereconcern for the i r well being i s established, they will ingly provideinformation leading to iden t i f icat ion and destruction of Viet Cong

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cnterrogation which proved successful i s based on d ire ct te rra in o ri-enta t ion questions by th e interrogator. F i r s t t he d et ain ee i s askedth e direc t ion of th e sun when he l a s t l e f t the base camp. He i s thenaskedhOw-Yong- H -tOok him to walk to the point where he Chieu Hoi d

or was captured. Judging from th e type t e r r a in and heal th of the de-ta inee the distance to the camp can genera l ly be determined. The sub-j e c t i s then asked to enumerate s ign i f ican t t e r r a i n features he saw oneach day of h is journey e open areas rubber l o t s h i l l s r icepaddies swamps, etc. As th e subject speaks an d his memory i s joggedth e in terrogator finds these te r ra in fea tures on a current map andgradually plots th e subject s route and f in a l ly i den t i f i e s th e areain which th e base camp i s located .

3. MH ) METHODS OF DESTROYING OR RENDERING BASE CAMPS UNTENABLE:~

a . The 1 s t Australian Task F or ce u sed t a c t i c a l a i r s t r i k es imme-diate and preplanned against occupied enemy base camps during OPER

ATION INGHAM. Assessment of damage revealed t ha t one s t r ike was onta rget and destroyed two underground rooms, collapsed 60 yards oftunnel and blew in several weapons p i t s . One s t r ike was n ot a ss es se das th e camp was not rev is i ted . The Task Force also repor ted tha ta i r s t r i ke s were d ir ec te d a ga in s t th e camps to force the enemy ou t ofoccupied camps during OPERATION PADDINGTON.

b. The 1 st Brigade lOls t Airborne Division s method of renderingbase camps untenable as reported in the i r After Action Report forOPERATION MAL1lliJ[ i was to contaminate them from the a i r u s ~The CS concentration remained effec t ive fo r a period of from four to

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s ix weeks.

c. During Q E f ; , ~ T I O NDALLf . the 2/2 Infantry Mech) conductedjungle clearing operations in th e Vinh Lo i Woods with tank dozers and om Plows. During jungle c l e a r i n g ~ i i h e i i c o n t a c twas made which in -dicated the p r ~ n of a V base camp, the mechanized elements devel-oped th e s i tua t ion by deploying l a t e r a l l y while di rec t ing supportinga i r and a r t i l l e ry f i res into the suspected base camp. The jungleclear ing vehicles immediately began clear ing a swath completely aroundthe base camp. When th e ci rc le was completed addit ional swaths wereprogressively cleared into the center of th e camp. The configurationof the c le ar ed j un gl e took on the appearance of a spoked wheel super-imposed on th e base camp. After occupation an d secur i ty of the basecamp by mechanized elements th e camp would be systemat ica l ly destroyedby dozers. The 2nd Brigade 1 s t Infantry Division also reported th e

us e of both Rome Plows and demolitions to destroy enemy base campsduring th i s same operation.

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d. The ut h Infantry Division ut i l ized t ac ti ca l a ir to destro ybunkers during OPERATION FRANCIS MARION. Bat t le damage assessment BDA indicated l w C l l l u i i k e r s - d e s - t r o y e < a ~and one or two bunkers damagedseverely, depending upon point of impact. Eight inch a r t i l l e r y didnot affect the bunkers unless there was a direct h i t and then onlythe bunker receiving a direct h i t was destroyed. The 3 rd B ri ga de ,uth Infantry Division reported af t e r OPERATION NISQUALLY tha t enemybase camps were destroyed by b ur ni ng b ut tha t during th e y seasoncaution must be exercised to p re ve nt t he f i r e from spreading to th ea dj ac en t j u ng l e.

e. The 1 st Infantry Division s t a c t i c fo r destroying basecamps during OPERATION TUCSON was that of backing o ff , destroyingthem with a ir and a r t i l l e r y an d then sweeping through th e base campwith troops. During OPERATION CEDAR FAIJ S th i s same division foundthat a dozer team of two tank dozers and s ix bulldozers was very effect ive, particularly when working in a j oi nt e ff or t with infantry.The infantry provided th e secur i ty and th e d oz er s d es tr oy ed the basecamps and fo r t i f ica t ions .

f . During OPERATION ATTLEBORO, elements of th e 2nd Brigade, 1 s tInfantry Division d iscovered n ine base camps a l l of which had th esame type fo r t i f ica t ions . These ranged from open trenches and foxholes to bunkers with overhead cover. The l a rges t base camp hadf i f t y bunkers with overhead cover. The most elaborate was a circularbunker See-.Eig.u). Overhead cover c on si st ed o f logs with a layer ofd i r t Destruction was d i f f i c u l t At times uni t s would physicallyremove th e overhead cover and f i l l in th e h ole s. When demolit ionswere avai lable they were used to destroy the bunkers. The primarymeans however of destroying the enemy ins ta l l a t ions was to ca l l fora i r and a r t i l l e r y af te r evacuating the area .

u. CMH SUMM RY OF SALIENT LESSONS LEARNED WITH RESPECT TO BASE CAMPS:

a. For t i f ied base camps are the pivots of m i l i t 9 Y _ 2 p e ~ ~ 9 P RDenied the i r use, operations suffe r s ign i f ican t ly.

b o When a base camp i s discovered, i t must be thoroughly searchedand a l l f a c i l i t i e s destroyed, even i f i t takes two or three days.

c. Offensive operations can be more successful i f uni t s knowwhere to search for differen t types of base camps in v ar yi ng t yp es ofte r ra in .

d. The normally re-en ter a base camp area af ter US forces

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THE BUNKER W S 5 METERS IN DIAMETER AND THE TRENCH W S 5 FEErDEEP N 2 FEET WIDE DUGOUT HOLES IN THE TRENCH W LARGEENOUGH FOR ONE NAN S PROTECTION AGAINST ARTILLERY 6 CLAYMORESWERE WIRED N IN THE TRENCH READY FOR GROUND EMPLACEMENTCONTROL TO FIRE THE CLAYMORES WAS LOCATED AT THE SOUTHERN EXIT

Figure

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Tactical a ir i s an effec t ive means of destroying enemy base~ i l lea.-iS-less_ l . if es1J :v e

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k. The detailed and painstaking compilation of in te l l igence andi t s dissemination in concise graphic form, wil l permit the smal les telements to plan t h e i r operations in de ta i l .

f . Base camps are norma lly gua rded by well t rained local forces. _ .... _ ~ _ . _ _ _ ~ _ _ _ _... _._._,_.-

1. When a base camp i s uncovered, un i t s must be given time toconduct a thorough dismounted search.

MO IFIE HANDLING AUTHORIZED

j Exploitation of hard in te l l igence ca n re su l t in disruption ofthe l o g i s t i ca l base and deny th e enemy the use of suppl ies .

i Prior to th e i n i t i a t ion of an operat ion, a clear in te l l igence

picture sh ou ld be obtained and presented to commanders to include, i fpossible , the exact location of base camps in the area of operations.

depart to remove items not located or destroyed.

g. The time-distance factor in planning operations should be suff i c i en t ly f lex ib le to permit ground commanders to fu lly exploit andsearch an y located base camp without having to conform to preplannedschedules.

h. A uni t moving in to a base camp must do so with a def in i t e plan.The plan must include a minimum force to locate the base, a secur i tyelement and a force to reac t to the enemy in the base camp

e. The camps are seldom found high in the mountains or fa rfrom supporting populated areas.

o. A mechanized bat ta l ion ca n effect ively destroy an enemy basecamp with armor and Rome Plows

m Spe ci al c o ns i de r at io n must be given to Hoi Chanhs from the mo-ment of surrender to expedi t iously cap i ta l ize on t h e i r knowledge andprev ious experiences ; t h e i r ideas and impressions.

. Plot t ing of known resupply routes ca n provide re l i ab le i n t e l -l igence fo r probable locat ions of base areas.

p.camps

q. Caution should be exerc ised when burning huts in enemy campsduring the y season so as to prevent f i r e s from spreading to thea dj ac en t j un gl e.


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r Hoi Chanhs and PWs when properly interrogated can be a pro-ductive source of i nf or ma ti on a s to base camp locat ions

s . Where there a re indicat ions tha t a o t of wood ha s been cutuni ts can expect to find_a b a ? e _ c ~ p w i t h i n 2to 500 meters

t People Sni ffe r missions ca n effect ively supplement otherin te l l igence means in locat ing areas of enemy ac t iv i t y including basecamps.

u. Defol ia t ion f l i g h t s clear away brush an d effect ively revealenemy base camps an d supply routes.

A supply of crater ing charges demolitions and blast ing de-vices held a t b a tt al io n l ev e l ready f or d eli ve ry by helicoptersproved to be of grea t value in the destruct ion of i ns ta ll at io n s i nth e Rung Sat Special Zone RSSZ

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SECTION I I

VIET CONG SUPPLY CACHES

1. CMBA) GENERAL:

a . Combat experience has shown th3.t supply ctches are the l i f e -blood of the enemy offensive. Without them, the Viet Cong's ,VC capab i l i ty to sustain operations i s ser iously impail-ed. Cache c;estruct ion has an adverse affec t upon the morale of the enemy individualsand uni ts , and has a s ign i f ican t mi l i t a ry impact on his opera t ionalplans and log is t ica l support. Loss of medical suppl ies fur ther com-pounds the VCI S problem of maintaining un i t effec t iveness and conducting propaganda and recru i tment operations.

b. Combined In te l l igence Center, Vietnam CICV) Study ST 63-09,Logist ics Fact Book, dated 14 April 1968, s t a t e s th a t the enemy usesan in t r i ca te system of caches and depots from which supplie are d ist r ibu ted to the un i t s . In the past , the enemy used large centra lcaches a t locations which provided quick and easy access to ~ ~ t inthe f ie ld . As al l ied opera t ions have uncovered and destroyed thesela rge depots and caches, the enemy has found i t necessary to dispersethem. The VC now appear to be s to r ing r i ce in homes of private c i t i -zens, but there are s t i l l instances when they maintain large centraldepots. Most caches serve as temporary consolidation points for outof-country supplies coming into SVN for dis t r ibu t ion to uni ts . I talso appears tha t highly accura te records are maintained of the suppl ies in the caches bu.t there i s normally l i t t l e reference to cachelocations

c. Caches vary in s ize as to t he i r content , and the uni t or opera t ion they support . One example of a VC di rec t ive on construction ofstorehouses (caches) and the maintenance of supplies and f a c i l i t i e sas pUblished by Doan 84 Group 84), Rear Service Unit, SV Libera t ionArmy Headquarters, i s a t Appendix 1 . The document was found in ahut by K/3/11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and t rans la ted by the Com-bined Document Exploitation Center, J2, MACV. Caches are usuallywell concealed or camouflaged and search operations must be thoroughand methodical. See Fig. ~

d. Emphasis must be placed on evacuation of r i c e and other foodcaches for use by the GVN since evacuation of captured food caches

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serves two important purposes. Fi rs t , i t denies t he VC a much neededstaple and second, i t increases th e food a va il ab le t o the loca l populace. However, evacuation i s not always feasible due to th e remote-ness of caches, lack of helicopter or ground t ransport , and opera-t ional considerations which preclude uni t s remaining in the area for

an extended period of time. As s ta ted by one commander, Under somesituations, i t would be l ess expensive and more feasible to ship r icefrom Louisiana than to extract the same amount from the jungle caches.Destruction or denial measures then become necessary to prevent enemyre t r i eva l of t h i s c r i t i ca l resource. The requirement ex is t s for al ightweight and effective system fo r contaminating or destroying largequanti t ies of r i ce in a s ho rt p er io d of time. The us e of chemicalcontaminants i s impractical fo r p o li ti cal /p sy ch o lo g ica l reasons.

2. CMHA LOCATION ND DErECTION OF SUPPLY CACHES:

a. On two o cc as io ns d ur in g OPERATION MANHATTAN, 1 s t InfantryDivision interrogat ion of VC PWs led to t he c ap tu re of two large VCweapons and munitions caches. One of these was the l a rges t discoveryof i t s kind of th e Vietnamese war. Two VC off icer PWs provided infor-mation concerning caches in th e division AO. The most signif icant waslocated inside a concrete lined warehouse, guarded by a double r ingof claymore mines. The caches contained 220 - 7.92 Mauser r i f l e s 147Chicom type 53 r i f l e s , 20 VC claymore mines, 500 r i f l e grenades, 7,500l2.7mm AP rounds, 1 R US), 1 VC type 7.62 SMG, 1500 - 60mm mortarrounds, 2,000 - 82mm mortar rounds, 250 radio tubes, 25 - 57mm rounds, 25 - 75mm rounds; 1600 mortar primers, 71,000 - 7.92 rounds,231,000 - 7.62mm rounds, 100 Ibs. TNT, 200 shoe box mines, 50 US Pmin es , 7,8 00 rounds of .50 caliber ammunition and a number of otheritems.

b. The 199th Light Infantry Brigade, upon completion of OPERA-TIONS MANCHESTER, UNIONTOWN/STRIKE and UNIONTOWN reported t h a t theVC had ~ ~ n o u s yused an th i l l s to provide caches fo r small arms,munitions grenades and claymore mines. On numerous occasions, nat -ural an th i l l s were found to be hollowed out in a manner not v i s ib l efrom th e exterior. Each h i l l housed a cache from which individualdefenders could replenish t he i r ammunition stores as they e i ther de -fended or withdrew. The 1 s t Infantry Division rendered a similarreport upon completion of OPERATION CEDAR FALLS. Their observationswere tha t weapons and munitions caches were general ly located inbunkers resembling th e anthi l l s tha t a re f re qu en tl y found in thejungle. The bunkers had two entrances, were not booby trapped, and

were located within 75 meters 'of a t r a i l large enough to allowpassage of an ox car t .

16

MO IFIE H N LING UTHORIZE


20/36

17

3. CMHA EXTRACTION AND DESTRlJCTION OF CACHES:

cMODIFIED HANDl ING AUTHORIZED

MODIFIED HANDl ING AUTHORIZE }

a . The 5 th Special Forces Group Airborne , 1 s t Special Forces ,repor ted t h a t during a t h r e e month period when the bulk o f the r i c eharves t ha d taken place with in a province , u n i t s conducting combatoperations have discovered l a rge numbers of r i c e caches . Because ofd is tances involved , agd th e loc a t i on of these caches , was d i f f i c u l tto e x t r a c t or destroy t h i s r i c e

:i


21/36

cMODIFIED HA1 J ) ..lNG 1 , iTIIORIZri:D

c. The 1s t Brigade, 1 0 l s t A.irborne Division reported that V r i cecaches, particularly th e la rger ones of twenty to one hundred tons ormore, a re often located in inaccessible areas and are extremely d i f -f i cu l t to extract . One possible solut ion i s to arrange with the Dis-t r i c t Chief or Province C hief before an o p era ti on b eg in s to have twoh1L,dred to three hundred por ters under the p ro te ct io n o f militaryforces , available and ready. Evacuation by helicopters has sometimesbeen accomplished, bu t the SUitabi l i ty of employing th i s method toremove large quanti t ies of r ice i s questionable .

d. Upon completion of O P ~ T I O NWHEELER, the 1 s t Brigade, lOls tAirborne Division reported t ha t of the t o t a l r i ce tonnage 198.7 tonscaptured by t ac t i ca l elements of the brigade, 49.6 tons were locatedin areas tha t were inaccess ib le to hel icopters o r, due to the t a c t i c a lsi tuation, could not be extracted. This r i ce was destroyed by engi-neer and chemica l personnel by s e e d i r ~the caches with S and thenscat ter ing i t throughout the area using crater ing charges. A to ta lof eight hundred and ninety three pounds of bulk CS powder was u t i -l ized in these operations.

e. During OPERATION MALHEUR, an e ig hty to n rock sa l t cache wasdiscovered by A Co, 2nd Bn Airborne , 502nd Infantry. t was nott ac t i ca l ly f ea si bl e t o e A ~ r a c tthe sa l t and therefore, i t was decidedto destroy th e sa l t in place . Twenty, eight pound bags of CS weredispersed throughout the. cache ~ d blown s imu l taneously wi th a cra-ter ing c ha rg e, s pr ea di ng the s a l t and CS t hr ou gh ou t t he area . Thenext day an additional fcur hundred and eighty pounds of CS wasdropped on th e cache from the a i r A low l eve l f l i g h t was made overth e area seven days la te r and the CS concentration was s t i l l heavy;there were no signs of ac t iv i t y in the area or t ha t any of the sa l thad been removed.

f u r i ~,OPERATION CEDAR FALLS, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regi-ment ACR captured a considerable quant i ty of r i ce from widely dis-persed caches in th e IRON TRIANGLE. Since the 11th ACR could notex tract or evacuate th e r i ce , due to i t s combat mission, a l l possib lemeans of evacuation were considered. Consideration was given to th eus e of surf e t r ~ 3 p o r t a t i o n~ ~ c h s tru king companieso owevera t the time there was insuff ic ient t r an spor t at i on a vai l ab l e to moveth e r i c e . Effor ts were made to h v the r i ce t ranspor ted by thetrucks organic to an RVN Division. Although th e request was notdenied outr ight , t he D iv is io n se t a pickup date so fa r in the futureas to be unacceptable. The 11th ACR then appealed to Province. Afterconsiderable pressure had been applied through advisory channels, th er i ce was par t i a l ly extracted from the 11th ACR c e nt r al i ze d c o l le c t ionpoint .

18

MO IFI HANDLING ,\lJTHOruZED


22/36

MODIFIED HA,NDLING AUTHORIZED

19

g. Operational planning must inc lude methods of extract ing r i c eo r d es tr oy in g i t place .

f wben searching fo r caches opera t ions should be methodicaldel ibera te and thorough.

e. A na ly si s o f the disposi t ion of booby t raps in an area can leadto the d isc ov er y o f valuable VC s tores an d mater ia l .

d. F lo cks of birds are a f requent ind icato r of th e p ro xi mi ty o fr i ce caches.

c. Caches are more e as il y i d en t if i ed i f un i t s r ec og ni ze t he keyp r o t e c t i ~ ~ : m e a s u r e sused by the VC.

4. (CERA) S J1.il lAKi OF SALlEiIT LESSONS LEARNED WITH RESPECT TC VCSUPPLI CAC} .E3:

,A

:,lODlflED I - A N n L t J ~,\ )T - ::),llLl.(O

b. The VC us e natural an d man made a n t h i l l s as caches for weapons

an d munitions.

a. The us e of in format ion prov ided by PWs an d Hoi Chanhs canmaterial ly as s i s t uni t s i n l oc at in g caches. Information provided bysuch people must always be considered and whenever possib le explo i ted to th e u ~ ~ s t

g. During OPERATION I lASTIFF, t heL3; , Infant:-y D iv is io n rep o rt edtha t an effec t ive means of dest roy; r; r; r i. ee by bur71ing had been found.G as o l ine d i e se l o i l an d unused a : ~ j _ 1 ~ 2 T 7powder i n c r e m e n t s were mixedwith the ~ i c eto insure a hot f i Te :_ t h i s same ope ra t ion the 2ndBat ta l ion 2nd Infan t r J discovered a 50 to n :-ic e cache which had beenbooby traDped. This r i ce was destroyed by pushing i t into th e SaigonRiver w ~ t ha tank dozer. One o the r 75 ton r i ce cache was also dest royed by throwing in to the sErle r I . v e l ~ During t h i s same operat i o n a medical t e c l mi ca l in te l l i ence team was a t t a c h e d t o the . )rdB:-igade to examine and obtain sar T les c f VC medical supplies takenfrom one of the base carnps destrn;r2d ie:. the area . The team l a t e rrepor ted that the ant ib io t i cs wer of ~ t}pe an d b:-and tha t could bepurchased on th e open market in the Republic of Vietnam. The vitamin (Ampoule K) found a t the base ca:;rp Has manufactured by laboratoriesTEVETE Saigon. Large quan t i t ies of t h i s i tem had been reportedsecretly captured by the VC in severa l places The major i ty of theo the r drugs found were of the type nor:nally found in VC captured medi ca l supplies. The l o t numbers and othe: - information obtained fromthese medical supplies are of valuable ass is tance in determining an deliminating sources of supply to th e VC.


23/36

~MODIfIED -lANOLING AUTHORIZED

20

k. Sngineer ~ u l l d o z 8 r C ~ lb3 effec t ive ly u ti l i z ed in the des t ruct i o n / e _ ~ : : t : - - c L : : t i o : J .o f r : : - : ~caches by pustj.ng them i n t o r i v e r s or cons t ruct ing s l ~ i ~ a b l e Z s c10:>8 to the caches to a ll ow e v ac u at io n a i r

Rice c8.ches a r c i requ8nt:L:.r bO.Jhy t r apped .

The fnoquently place grenade tY,:Je booby t raps ins ide bagsOJ. - : i .C9. T h e r e f o r e ; a l l r i c e bag; should be s a n i t i z e d EOD and~ I s ; : i . ; , c e rpersoDD81 p r i o r t o ha... 1diing. 3 88 Fi g . 6

: 1 ~ c ecaches can lloma.Lly Y s f f e c t i v e l y s c a t t e r e d the usec . C , : : a , ~ J T i : ~ g: : - _ : 1 a r g ~ : : ;a, id 9 f f e c . = . i ~ I 8 1 ~ y - , - : O : ; ~ ~ a n . i i l d . t e c :\-rith CS.

1. C ~ c h e sare usual ly w e ll c on ce al ed , locatec in th e proximity oft ransportat ion routes , and are not placed in any discernible pa t te rns .

Q Extraction of r i ce caches are ideal missions fo r RVNAF s organict r anspor ta t ion u n i t s an d Prov ince /Dis t r i c t Headquarters i n c ar ry in g o utC iv ic A cti on P r o g r ~ ~ s

o. r1edical supplies should be evacuated through in te l l igence channels rather than being destroyed in place .

:0 . The use of probes and mine detectors in locat ing b ur ie d c ac he shas p rov en to be effect ive .

.. . Nipa palQ t rees have been used by th e to store equipment.The fo l iage of these t r ee s o ff ers excel lent concealment for caches.

2 Appendic ,p1 . T Y a n s l a i ~ o nof a Captured Enemy Document2. Source Material


24/36

21

THIN WIRE

M GRENADE TYPEBODY

WIRE IS TIED TOSTRING IN THE SEAM THE INSIDE OFTHE BAG

TUBULAR NECK

RI

UNCL SSIFIED

RICE G OO Y TR

UNCL SSIFIED

Figure 6

FUZE: PULL FRICTIONQUICK RK OR STRONGPULL REQUIRED

BODY: STEEL FRAGAPPROX 4 B OF

EXPLOSIVE


25/36


26/36

ONFIOENTI LMODIFIED HANDLINu AUTIIORIZED

appropriate to th o gooda. I or c;::.IInp18:

-Sa l t caches must be b u i l t wlderr,round. The f loor should be l inedwith nylon sheets or straw.

Only a small amount of G al t s hou ld be stocked in the above grounds torages .

-Sa l t f i sh should 1 0 k 'pt In 'Ioode n i r t i e h t bar re l s s e t on s t l t sThey should be shaded with n roof .

- Ri ce d ep ot s: Cache frames must be se t on s t l t s

-Clothing equipment s torage: High, f loored an d with safe roof .T his s to ra ge must be covered ~ ~ cu rta ins to sh ield l i g h t . Next tothese curtains should be a layer of nylon or thatch used to preventra in damage. Equipment must be c t en the s t l t s The blind must bet i g h t so tha t mice cannot creep into th e storage.

-Gasoline must be kept in ce l l a r s .

Drug storages must be b u i l t as carefully as r i ce depots. Drugsshould be set on a high and r y place.

Due to the great number of s t o r ~ e sthe maintenance o f sto rag esmust be concentrated. Ks (Dis t r ic t s ) :

-Know the number of s torages , and th e goods held in each store.

Make a clear regi s te r in order to control i ssues and receip ts .

-Unit leaders mtlst control t h e i r storages and provide guidancefo r the ' ;[< ell s.

Requisition and purchasing, t ranspor ta t ion , an d storage are threeimportant tasks. Especia l ly, in th e s to ra ge t a sk , the maintenance ofgoods s most important.

n th e p a st , t r an sp o rt at io n was carried out well , but maintenancewas s t l l def ic ien t

You should t ry to step up t h i s task because in the near fu ture ,provis ions wil l be continuously sent to your uni t in large quanti ty.

12 May 1966Commander oLD.oan.. 8

s NGUYEN: VAN HUE

23

ONFIDENTI LMODIFIED HANDLING AUTHORIZED


27/36

MODIFIID H NDI ING UTHORIZED

ALUMINUM

GIRDER

4

Bury th e p i l l a r in the so i l so i l mixed with s a l t ) .

c

Floor of beatenearth. s a l t soil

MODIFIED H NDLING UTHORIZED

-Set a girder on the pla te .

Method of preventing damage by termites:

th e maintenance task , some p la ce s a pp li ed an anti- termitemethod by using an aluminum plate . This method o b ta in e d fa vo rab ler esu l t s . Now we disseminate i t to you fo r study and use:

-Put the aluminum pla te on the end of th e p i l l a r . The perimeterof the plate must be a t l e a s t two t imes la rger than the p i l l a r.

Thus when climbing up to the pla te , the termites ca n not reach th egirder, and must climb down.

Tree str ipped of i t s . . bark and coated with


28/36


29/36

UN L SSIFIED

15 . 1s t Infantry Division Combat Operations After Act ion Hepor t26 March 1967

16 . 1s t Infantry Division Combat Operations After Act ion Hepor t6 April 1967

17 . Department of the Army Pamphlet No 525 2 Lessons LearnedVietnam Primer 2 April 1967

18 . 1 96 th L ig ht Infantry Brigade Combat Operations After ActionReport 4 y 1967

19 . 1st Infantry Division Combat Operations After Action Repor t8 May 1967

20 . USARV Bat t lef ie ld Reports A Summary of Lessons Learned Volume

No.3 2 May 196721 25th Infantry Division Combat Operations After Action Report26 May 1967

22 3r d Brigade 4th Infantry Division Combat Operations AfterAction Report 6 June 1967

23 . 1st Infantry Division Combat Operations After Action Report2 June 1967

24 25th Infantry Division Combat Operations After Action Report19 June 1967

25 . 1 st Infantry Division Combat Operations After Act ion Repor t28 June 1967

6. 1s t Australian Task Force Vietnam Combat Operations AfterAction Report 30 August 1967

27 . 1s t Brigade 101st Airborne Division Combat Operations AfterAction Report 2 September 1967.

28 1 96 th L ig ht Infantry Brigade Combat Operations After ActionReport 10 September 1967

29 1s t Brigade 101st Airborne Division Combat Operations AfterAction Report 11 September 1967.

30 . 1s t Brigade 101st Airborne Division Combat Operations AfterAction Report 28 September 1967.

26

UN L SSIFIED


30/36

UNCLASSIFIED

31. 25th Infantry Division Operational Report for Quarterly PeriodEnding 31 October 1967.

32. 199th Light Infantry Brigade Sep Operational Report forQuarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967.

33 . 4 th I nf an tr y Division, Combat Operations After Action Report,25 Novem ber 1967.

34 . 1 s t Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, Combat Operations AfterAction R eport, 11 December 1967.

35 . 4 th I nf an tr y Division, Combat Operations After Action Report,16 December 1967.

36 . 1st Australian Task Force, Vietnam, Combat Operations AfterAction Report, 19 Decem ber 1967.

37. 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, Combat Operations AfterAction Report, 28 December 1967.

38. 5th Special Forces Group Airborne Operational Report forQuarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968.

39 . 199th Light Infantry Brigade Sep , Combat Operations AfterAction Report, 8 February 1968.

4 3r d Squadron, 17th Cavalry - , Combat Operations After ActionReport, 2 March 1968.

41 CICV Study, ST 68-09, Logistics Fact Book, 14 April 1968.

42 5th Special Forces Group Airborne , Lessons Learned, 2 April1968. .

27

UNCLASSIFIED


31/36

100 - Each SA, I I ICorps 1 toeach Sr Advdown to and including Bnand sub-sector level

10 - Each SA, CMR, Abn Div,RF/FF Marine Adv Gp 1 toeach Sr Adv Down to andincluding Bn and Sub-sectorlevel

1 - Each SA, I I I I I I IV V ALC5 - COMNAVFORV

15 - CO, 5th SFG Abn5 - JGS, J31 - JGS, J52 - JGS, Central Training Agency2 - Dir CORDS/ICEY

10 - Chairman, JCS10 - CofSA

5 - CSAF10 - O10 - CM C10 - ACSI

5 - DCSOPS25 - SACSA

1 - CTIV Ln Off, ACSFOR5 - CINCPAC5 - CINCPACAF14 - CINCAL5 - CINCLANT1 - CINCNJR2 - CINCSTRIKE2 - CINCSOUTH5 - CINCLANT FLT

10 - CINaJSARNJR5 - CINCUSARPAC2 - HQ USARSTRIKE

10 - US Army Forces Southern Command14 - CG, USARAL

2 - CG, 1 st US Army2 - CG, 3r d US Army2 - CG, 4th US Army2 - CG, 5th US Army2 - CG, 6t h US Army

UN L SSIFIEDnclosure 2

UN L SSIFIED

DISTRIBUTION:

S

2 - SJS2 - J l

14 - J21 - J311 - J321 - J33

150 - J342 - COC3 - coc JOD for JGS2 - COC-3 EOD2 - coc-52 - J42 - J52 - J61 - MACDC4 - Science Advisor

25 - MACT 012 - MACSOO2 - FWMAO

12 - FWMAO AFVFWMAO ROK-V

2 - FWMAO NZV Force)2 - FWMAO MACROCV2 - FWMAO RMTAGOV

2 - FWMAO PHILCAG1 - Combined Studies4 - CTIV

10 - OSD/AaPA1 - Mil History2 - AFTU2 - NRDU1 - DODSPECREP1 - USAHAC

100 - Cdr, 7thAF6 - MATTLO

150 - CG, MAF360 - CG, USARV 150 each to

I FFORCEV and FFORCEV5 - Each Chief, AF Adv Gp;

Chief, US Naval Adv Gp;Railway Security Adv Det

= = ~ = _ : = =


32/36

UN L SSIFIED

UN L SSIFIED

DISTRIBUTION:

2 - CG, 7th US Army2 - CG, 8th US Army5 - CG, XVIII Abn Corps

5 - CG, CORPS45 - DIA DIACO-35 - CG, 82d Abn Div5 - CG, s t Armd Div5 - CG, 2d Armd Div5 - CG, 5th Mech Div3 - CG, USAMC

10 - CG, USACDC2 - CG, USACDEC1 - CO, USACDClA3 - COMPHIBPAC3 - COMPHIBTRAPAC3 - COMPHIBTRALANT5 - COMUSMACTHAI2 - COMUSJAPAN

20 - CIlMAAGCHlNA2 - CIlMAAGJAPAN2 - CHPROVMAAGKOREA2 - CHMILTAGINDONESlA2 CHMEDTBURMA5 - Chief R D2 - Chief ARPA RDFU THAI

- Chief JUSMAG, PHIL2 - JFK Center SW5 - Defense Document Center

2 - CO, NIOTC1 - CO, BOATSUPPU ON1 CO, U T L V N1 CO, UDT;:TWELVE3 - CO, USA Lim War Lab3 - CO, Seal Tm 13 - CO, Seal Tm 21 - PAC Msl Range1 - NAV Ops Sp t Gp LANT7 - COMRIVFLOT ONE6 - COMCOSRONONE5 - COMRIVRONFIVE2 - COM NAV Ops Spt Gp PAC1 - COM NAV Const Bn LANT2 - COMDT NWC5 - COMDT AFSC2 - COMDT lCAF5 - COMDT USAWC2 - COMDT Air War College2 - President Naval War College5 - COMDT USAINTS5 - COMDT USAARMS

2

10 - OOMDT USAIS5 - COMDT USAAVNS2 - COMDT USA Jungle Warfare Sch

2 - COMDT PMG Sch2 - OOMDT USA Trans Sch2 - COMDT USA Si g Sch2 - COMDT USMC Sch2 - COMDT USN Amph Sch

12 - COMDT USA CA Sch2 - COMDT USAPHS2 - COMDT USAQMS6 - COMDT USASWS2 - COMDT USAAD Sch5 - OOMDT USAAMS2 - COMDT USACMLCS2 - COMDT USAES5 - COMDT USACGSC5 - COMDT USARPAC In t e l Sch2 - Supt USNA2 - Supt USNPGS3 - Supt USMA2 - Supt USAFA5 - USA Sch of Americas2 - CO, NAVPHIBSCOL CORa2 - CO, USA Cbt Surv Sch1 - CO, USNOTS5 - MAl1 - Hq, Foreign Tech Dir AFSC

2 - Hq, APGC PGFS5 - PACAF IGSL4 - USAF AFlGSL-45 - Dept Air Police Tng1 - Dir Ai r Univ Library1 - Dir Special Air Warfare Sch1 - DIA DIAAP-10A21 - ATC ATOPT-S1 - 3636 CCTG CCT-OT2 - CO, 1041 USAF Sec Pol Sqdn1 - General Research Corp

10 - Hq, USASA1 - Det 2 39 Ai r Div2 - 39th A ir Div10 - DA, ACofS, FD1 - ASD ASBEE-101 - ClNCPACREP PHIL1 - USN Mine Def Lab5 - CGUSARHAW1 - JCB Library USMC1 - FTD TID1 - USA Combat Dev Com


33/36

M CV LESSONS LE RNED INDEX

UN L SSIFIED

UN tJSSIFIED

Operation JUNGLE JIM

Ranger Ta3k Force Operation in Vinh BinhSector

Multi Battal ion Operation in Northern TayNinh Province

Operations in Phuoc Thanh Sector toRelocate Civi l ians

SU JE T

Operation D N TIEN VIII

Operation C CHEP

Operation in Kien Roa Sector

Heliborne Operation Cai Ngay An XuyenProvince

Airmobile Operation in I Corps

VC Ambush Trung Lap Binh Duong ProvinceOperation TIGER HUNT

Operation NGUYEN U

Operation RAINDROP

Operation SON

Ambu3h Techniques

Review of Lessons Learned 15

Tips and Combat Experiences

Teclmiques Dealing with Airmobile.AS3aults

11 Apr 62

11 Apr 62

30 Mar 62

11 Apr 62

11 Apr 62

DATE

3 Mar 62

8 Apr 62

23 Apr 62

27 Apr 62

May 62

62

May 62

16 May 62

Unda ced

24 Jul 62

5 Jun 62

19 Ju n 62

25 Ju n 62

6

9

5

3

4

7

8

2

11

NUM ER

2

3

14

15

16

7

8

Inclosure 3


34/36

UN L SSIFIED

UN L SSIFIED

9

2

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

4

4

3 Jul 62

27 Aug 62

28 Aug 628 Sep 62

5 Oct 62

3 Nov 62

7 Dec 62

8 Jan 63

28 Feb 63

8 Apr 63

7 May 63

7 Aug 63

27 Sep 63

19 Oct 63

29 Oct 63

30 Nov 63

10 Jan 64

4 Feb 64

10 Feb 64

Mar 64

Mar 64

23 Mar 64

28 Ju l 64

Operation SUNRISE

Indiscriminate Use of Firepower

Ambush TechniquesOperations of US Army Helicopters

Operation BINH T Y

Airmobile Raids Against Superior Forces

Search Techniques

Ml 3 Operations

Ambushes

Guidelines fo r Advisors

Ambush in BINH H N H

Ps rwar and Civic Act ion Opera tions

Art i l le ry Organization Employment inCounterinsurgency

Eagle Fl igh t Operations

Utilization of Mili tary Dogs

Railway Security

Clear and Hold Operations

Fire and Maneuver

Vehicle Convoy Organization and Control

Area Saturat ion Operations

Ambush Operations

Corps Ps rwar/CA Operations Center

Operations of Seabee Technical AssistanceTeams

2


35/36

UN L SSIFIEn

42

43

44

45

46

47

48

49

55

53

54

55

56

8

59

6

6

62

7 Oct 64

22 Dec 64

23 Ja n 65

12 Feb 65

3 Mar 65

3 Mar 65

7 Apr 65

13 Apr 65

13 Apr 65

24 Apr 65

22 Nov 65

29 Sep 66

27 Ja n 66

5 Mar 66

18 Apr 66

y 66

2 JW 66

13 Jul 66

5 Oct 66

27 Ja n 67

Mar 67

VC Employment of Land Mines

Combat Tips I

Elimination of Viet Cong In fras t ructu re

Viet Cong TW1llels

Recent Operations

River Assault Group Operations

Combat Tips

Operation HOAI AN

Naval Conduct of Amphibious Operations

Operational Employment of Riot ControlMW1i tions

Operational Employment of th e Mity MitePortable Blower

Viet Cong Improvised Explosive Mines andBooby Traps

The Battle of Ky Phu

The Battle o f A n ni hi la ti on

Operations Against Tunnel Complexes

Pursui t

Operation HAPPY VALLEY

Employment of Image In tens i f i ca t ionDevices

Defense Against Mortar Recoilless Rifle

Attacks

Sal ien t Lessons Learned

Salient Lessons Learned

3


36/36

UN L SSIFIED

63 25 Apr 67 Search and Rescue perations

64 5 Sep 67 mitat ive Communications Deception

5 2 Oct 67Population and Resources Control

66 Nov 67 Countermeasures for 1 2mm 122mm and14Qnm Rockets

67 4 Apr 68 Defense

68 i t Cong Base Camps and Supply Caches

4

Documents

Mac Vvc Base Camps