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Please read the following chapters/articles/extracts in advance of the relevant class, as listed below.
You should bring this reading pack with you to your class.
These items are available on the LSE 100 Moodle site if you wish to download or view an electronic copy.
Optional further reading is available on Moodle.
Are we witnessing a global shift in power from the West to the rest of the world? This week we will begin to consider this complex and contested issue from the perspective of International Relations. In the lecture and the first reading, Professor Michael Cox explores the importance of power in contemporary world politics and weighs in on the question of whether the US’ role as a hegemonic power is, in fact, waning. This week’s reading also includes a memo written by Jon Huntsman, then Ambassador to China, to the US Department of State. This document was classified and would normally have been available to the public only after 30 years or so, but it was published online in 2011 after Chelsea (then Bradley) Manning, a soldier in the US Army, leaked it to WikiLeaks. In class, we will critically assess both the context and content of this primary source, considering the value of such first-hand accounts for our understanding of complex social events. What are the strengths and limitations of this document as a piece of historical evidence?
1. Cox, Michael (2012) “Power shifts, economic change and the decline of the West?” in
, Vol. 26:4, pp. 369-381.
2. “Stomp around and carry a small stick: China’s new “global assertiveness” raises hackles, but has more form than substance,” Ambassador Jon Huntsman, U.S. Embassy Beijing to U.S. Secretary of State, February 10, 2010. Wikileaks.org: Reference ID: 10BEIJING383.
This week we will consider the impact of structural factors, such as economic issues and domestic politics, on states’ ability to wield power on the international stage. Professor Danny Quah (2015a and 2015b) makes an argument for the rise of China as an economic power, and calls for building explanations on evidence of economic power instead of military/geopolitical power. Trubowitz and Kupchan (2007) offer a complementary analysis that focuses on political polarisation within the US and argue that deepening political divisions in the US will lead to a decline in the “usable power” of the US, limiting its ability to take a coherent and credible approach to foreign policy. Nye (2015) analyses trends in the global economy and information technologies and critically assesses the ability of social scientists to make accurate predictions about the future of the US as a global power.
1. Quah, Danny (2015a) “How China’s rise is revealing the cracks in US claims to legitimacy as global leader” published by 19 August 2015.
2. Quah, Danny (2015b) “Economics might be a dismal field but try International Relations” published on www.dannyquah.com, 7 September 2015.
3. Trubowitz, Peter L. and Charles A. Kupchan (2007) “The demise of liberal internationalism in the United States” in Vol. 32:2, pp. 7-10.
4. Nye, Joseph S. (2015) “Power shifts and global complexity” in Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 94-105.
How are other parts of the world being affected by a possible shift in global power? This week we will focus on two specific regions: Africa and the European Union (EU). Boone (2009) explores the consequences of global power shifts on different development models, comparing the Western model of development utilised by international financial institutions to the Chinese model of development as it has been implemented in Nigeria, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Sudan and Kenya. The articles from the Financial Times and China Daily Asia provide current analyses of some of the implications of China’s economic growth, including for implementation of the UN’s sustainable development goals (SDGs) in different parts of the world (due to copyright restrictions, the China Daily Asia article is only available online. The link to the article is provided below and on Moodle). The FT article also highlights the close connections between the economies of China and Zambia, which is just one African nation in which China (among other countries) has invested heavily. Nye (2011) provides an overview of the ways in which a changing distribution of power has affected Europe. Kaldor (2012) explores the way in which the EU has wielded soft power to set international standards for issues such as human security, and discusses the role of the EU in offering an alternative form of global governance in a multipolar world.
1. Boone, Catherine (2009) “The China model in Africa: A new brand of developmentalism” in
Springborg, Robert, (ed.) , Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 2-5 and 8-13.
2. England, Andrew (2015) “Zambia bears the brunt of China’s economic slowdown” published by
, 9 September.
3. Kumar VR, Krishna (2015) “Constructing Asia’s route to growth” published by , 7 August. Available online: http://www.chinadailyasia.com/asiaweekly/2015-08/07/content_15301197.htm l
4. Nye, Joseph S. (2011) “Power transition: The question of American decline” in
, New York: Public Affairs, pp. 158-163.
5. Kaldor, Mary (2012) Europe in an Asian century: visions for Europe: a European conception of security. IDEAS report, pp. 30-32.
The lectures and readings for this week will pivot away from state-centric analyses to consider the importance of agency, or the ways in which individuals can influence social processes and
events. Although Hayek’s Nobel Prize Lecture (1974) and Schouten’s interview with James Scott (2010) have very different disciplinary and political starting points, they offer similar critiques of the types of analyses we have studied over the past three weeks. Hayek was an economist and philosopher and remains a significant figure in classic liberalism. By contrast, Scott is both an anthropologist and a political scientist, and he approaches his work from a more left-wing, anarchist perspective. Both offer interesting insights into the particular challenge of making predictions about social events.
1. “The Pretence of Knowledge”, Friedrich August von Hayek Nobel Prize Lecture (1974). 2. Schouten, P. (2010) “James Scott on Agriculture as Politics, the Dangers of Standardization and
Not Being Governed,” No. 38.
In the lecture this week, Professors Quah and Cox will return for a debate on whether we are in fact witnessing the “decline of the West and the rise of the rest.” As you finalise your essay for submission by noon on Wednesday, 28 October, be sure to think about the ways in which different theories, methods and kinds of evidence can lead social scientists to different conclusions about the causes, or likelihood, of complex events such as a global shift in power.
Inte
rnat
iona
l Rel
atio
ns26
(4)
369 –
388
© T
he A
utho
r(s)
201
2R
epri
nts
and
perm
issi
on: s
agep
ub.
co.u
k/jo
urna
lsPe
rmis
sion
s.na
vD
OI:
10.1
177/
0047
1178
1246
1336
ire.
sage
pub.
com
Po
wer
Shi
fts,
Eco
nom
ic
Cha
nge
and
the
Dec
line
o
f the
Wes
t?
Mic
hael
Co
xLo
ndon
Sch
ool o
f Eco
nom
ics
Abs
trac
tIt
has
beco
me
the
new
trut
h of
the
early
twen
ty-fi
rst c
entu
ry th
at th
e W
este
rn w
orld
we
have
kno
wn
is fa
st l
osin
g its
pre
-em
inen
ce t
o be
rep
lace
d by
a n
ew i
nter
natio
nal
syst
em s
hape
d ei
ther
by
the
so-c
alle
d BR
ICs
com
prisi
ng B
razi
l, R
ussia
, Ind
ia a
nd C
hina
, the
‘res
t’, o
r m
ore
popu
larly
by
that
ver
y br
oadl
y de
fined
geo
grap
hica
l ent
ity k
now
n as
Asia
. Thi
s at
leas
t is
how
man
y ec
onom
ists,
hist
oria
ns
and
stud
ents
of w
orld
pol
itics
are
now
vie
win
g th
e fu
ture
of t
he la
rger
inte
rnat
iona
l sys
tem
. Thi
s es
say
does
not
disp
ute
som
e se
lf-ev
iden
t ec
onom
ic fa
cts.
Nor
doe
s it
assu
me
that
the
wor
ld w
ill lo
ok t
he
sam
e in
50
year
s tim
e as
it d
oes
now
. It
does
, how
ever
, que
stio
n th
e id
ea t
hat
ther
e is
an ir
resis
tible
‘p
ower
shi
ft’ in
the
mak
ing
and
that
the
Wes
t an
d th
e U
nite
d St
ates
are
in s
teep
dec
line.
Spe
cific
ally
, it
mak
es a
num
ber
of c
ritic
al a
rgum
ents
con
cern
ing
the
new
nar
rativ
e. F
irst,
it su
gges
ts th
at th
is st
ory,
by
rea
sona
bly
focu
sing
on w
hat
is ob
viou
sly c
hang
ing
in t
he w
orld
, unf
ortu
nate
ly ig
nore
s w
hat
is no
t; as
a r
esul
t, it
unde
rest
imat
es w
hat
mig
ht lo
osel
y be
ter
med
the
con
tinue
d st
ruct
ural
adv
anta
ges
still
en
joye
d by
the
Uni
ted
Stat
es a
nd it
s m
ajor
Wes
tern
alli
es. S
econ
d, w
hile
it is
tru
e th
at m
any
new
st
ates
are
ass
umin
g a
bigg
er r
ole
in th
e w
orld
eco
nom
y, th
eir
rise
need
s to
be lo
oked
at m
ore
care
fully
th
an it
has
bee
n so
far;
inde
ed, w
hen
such
an
exam
inat
ion
is un
dert
aken
, it b
ecom
es in
crea
singl
y cl
ear
that
the
rise
of o
ther
s –
incl
udin
g C
hina
– is
stil
l hem
med
in b
y se
vera
l obs
tacl
es, i
nter
nal a
s w
ell a
s ex
tern
al. T
hird
, tho
ugh
the
Asia
n re
gion
, and
Chi
na a
s pa
rt o
f it,
is as
sum
ing
an e
ver
mor
e im
port
ant
role
in t
he w
ider
wor
ld e
cono
my,
thi
s de
velo
pmen
t sh
ould
not
be
seen
as
mar
king
the
beg
inni
ng o
f a
new
Asia
n C
entu
ry. T
his
now
pop
ular
idea
is n
ot o
nly
conc
eptu
ally
pro
blem
atic
, it
inev
itabl
y le
ads
to a
n un
dere
stim
atio
n of
oth
er k
ey a
reas
in t
he w
orld
incl
udin
g in
cide
ntal
ly t
he T
rans
atla
ntic
reg
ion.
Fi
nally
I su
gges
t tha
t if t
he d
ubio
us id
ea o
f a p
ower
shift
is ta
ken
to b
e tr
ue, t
his c
ould
ver
y ea
sily
lead
to
grea
ter
inte
rnat
iona
l ins
ecur
ity a
nd c
onfli
ct. U
nder
stan
ding
the
mod
ern
wor
ld b
ette
r th
an m
any
seem
to
be
doin
g rig
ht n
ow is
ther
efor
e no
t onl
y in
telle
ctua
lly im
port
ant;
it is
stra
tegi
cally
nec
essa
ry to
o.
Key
wo
rds
BRIC
s, p
ower
shi
ft, r
ise
of C
hina
, the
Tra
nsat
lant
ic r
elat
ions
hip,
US
decl
ine
Co
rres
pond
ing
auth
or:
Mic
hael
Cox
, ID
EAS,
Lon
don
Scho
ol o
f Eco
nom
ics,
Hou
ghto
n St
reet
, Lon
don,
WC
1 2A
E, U
K.
Emai
l: m
.e.c
ox@
lse.
ac.u
k
461336
IRE2
64
10
.11
77
/00
47
117
81
24
61
33
6In
tern
atio
nal
Rel
atio
nsC
ox
20
12
Kenn
eth
N W
altz
Lec
ture
370
Inte
rnat
iona
l Rel
atio
ns 2
6(4)
Intr
odu
ctio
n
Mem
ory
can
oft
en p
lay
tri
cks
on
ev
en t
he
mo
st h
isto
rica
lly
min
ded
in
div
idu
als,
par
ticu
-
larl
y t
ho
se w
ho
hav
e h
ad t
o l
ive
thro
ug
h t
he
last
10
tu
rbu
len
t y
ears
. In
dee
d,
it i
s al
mo
st
imp
oss
ible
no
w t
o r
ecal
l h
ow
sel
f-co
nfi
den
t so
man
y i
n t
he
Wes
t w
ere
du
rin
g t
he
dec
ade
imm
edia
tely
fo
llo
win
g t
hat
mo
st u
np
red
icte
d o
f w
orl
d-s
hat
teri
ng
ev
ents
kn
ow
n g
ener
i-
call
y a
s th
e ‘e
nd
of
the
Co
ld W
ar’.
To
be
fair
, so
me
ob
serv
ers
did
sen
se t
hat
th
ere
was
som
eth
ing
dis
tin
ctly
un
real
, p
oss
ibly
tem
po
rary
, ab
ou
t th
e n
ew p
ost
-Co
ld W
ar o
rder
.1 A
few
ev
en f
ore
cast
th
at w
e w
ou
ld a
ll s
oo
n b
e m
issi
ng
th
e C
old
War
.2 B
ut
that
is
no
t h
ow
mo
st c
om
men
tato
rs v
iew
ed t
hin
gs
at t
he
tim
e. O
n t
he
con
trar
y, h
avin
g w
itn
esse
d t
he
spee
dy
co
llap
se o
f th
e S
ov
iet
pro
ject
fo
llo
wed
by
a d
ecad
e o
f g
lob
al m
ark
et e
xp
ansi
on
(oth
erw
ise
kn
ow
n a
s g
lob
aliz
atio
n),
mo
st p
un
dit
s ca
me
to b
elie
ve
that
a s
ucc
essf
ul
mar
-
riag
e b
etw
een
fre
e m
ark
ets
dem
ocr
atic
en
larg
emen
t an
d U
S p
ow
er w
ou
ld g
uar
ante
e
ord
er w
ell
into
th
e n
ext
mil
len
niu
m.3
Cer
tain
ly,
the
Wes
t at
th
e ti
me
loo
ked
as
if i
t w
as
def
init
ely
in
th
e as
cen
dan
cy,
rest
ruct
uri
ng
on
ce p
lan
ned
eco
no
mie
s, o
pen
ing
up
pre
vi-
ou
sly
clo
sed
sy
stem
s, i
nco
rpo
rati
ng
fo
rmer
en
emie
s an
d s
mas
hin
g d
ow
n p
oli
tica
l an
d
eco
no
mic
do
ors
th
at h
ad a
t o
ne
tim
e b
een
clo
sed
. Ad
mit
ted
ly, it
so
met
imes
fai
led
to
act
,
as s
ay i
n R
wan
da;
an
d v
ery
oft
en i
t ig
no
red
th
e fa
ct t
hat
so
me
acto
rs (
wh
o l
ater
mad
e
thei
r n
ame
on
9/1
1)
wer
e cl
earl
y n
ot
bec
om
ing
so
cial
ized
in
to t
hat
fab
led
en
tity
kn
ow
n
as t
he
‘in
tern
atio
nal
co
mm
un
ity
’. B
ut
as o
ne
cen
tury
gav
e w
ay t
o a
no
ther
, it
ap
pea
red
as
if t
he
Wes
tern
wo
rld
fro
m t
he
Pac
ific
co
ast
of
the
Un
ited
Sta
tes
to t
he
mid
dle
of
a n
ewly
un
ited
Eu
rop
e co
uld
lo
ok
fo
rwar
d t
o d
ecad
es o
f se
lf-c
on
fid
ent
pro
sper
ity
an
d p
eace
.
No
wh
ere
was
th
is m
oo
d o
f o
pti
mis
m m
ore
pre
val
ent
than
in
th
e la
nd
of
the
last
rem
ain
ing
su
per
po
wer
. In
dee
d,
the
Un
ited
Sta
tes
app
eare
d t
o b
e in
an
esp
ecia
lly
en
vi-
able
po
siti
on
. S
om
e co
nti
nu
ed t
o w
on
der
wh
eth
er t
he
‘un
ipo
lar
mo
men
t’ w
as r
eall
y a
n
illu
sio
n.4
On
e o
r tw
o a
nal
yst
s ev
en s
pec
ula
ted
ab
ou
t th
e p
oss
ible
lim
its
of
US
po
wer
.5
An
d t
he
occ
asio
nal
mav
eric
k c
on
tin
ued
to
rep
eat
the
old
Pau
l K
enn
edy
lin
e th
at t
he
Un
ited
Sta
tes
was
in
dec
lin
e.6 H
ow
ever
few
bu
t th
e m
ost
pes
sim
isti
c en
vis
aged
th
at a
ny
oth
er p
ow
er w
ou
ld l
ikel
y r
ise
to b
alan
ce i
ts v
ast
po
wer
in
th
e fu
ture
. In
dee
d,
afte
r h
av-
ing
see
n o
ff t
he
US
SR
, an
d t
hen
hav
ing
ex
per
ien
ced
an
8-y
ear
eco
no
mic
bo
om
of
its
ow
n, A
mer
ica
and
Am
eric
ans
cou
ld r
easo
nab
ly l
oo
k f
orw
ard
to
an
oth
er v
ery
Am
eric
an
cen
tury
.7 I
n f
act,
so
bu
oy
ant
was
th
e m
oo
d b
y t
he
end
of
the
19
90
s th
at s
ever
al w
rite
rs
beg
an t
o t
alk
of
the
Un
ited
Sta
tes
as t
he
new
Ro
me
on
th
e P
oto
mac
, ev
en a
mo
der
n
‘em
pir
e’ p
oss
essi
ng
glo
bal
rea
ch,
an i
nfi
nit
e su
rplu
s o
f so
ft p
ow
er a
nd
a v
ast
mil
itar
y
mac
hin
e to
mat
ch. F
or
som
e o
f co
urs
e th
e U
nit
ed S
tate
s h
ad b
eco
me
the
gre
ates
t p
ow
er
in h
isto
ry w
ith
on
e v
ery
ob
vio
us
dis
tin
gu
ish
ing
fea
ture
: u
nli
ke
its
gre
at p
ow
er p
red
eces
-
sors
fro
m t
he
Ro
man
s to
th
e B
riti
sh,
this
on
e w
ou
ld n
ever
dec
lin
e.8
It is
oft
en s
aid
th
at b
efo
re e
ver
y g
reat
fal
l th
ere
is a
per
iod
of
gra
ce. S
o it w
as p
erh
aps
wit
h t
he
last
hu
bri
stic
dec
ade
of
the
twen
tiet
h c
entu
ry.
Bu
t th
e fa
ll w
hen
it
cam
e w
as
pro
fou
nd
no
net
hel
ess
– t
o s
uch
an
ex
ten
t th
at o
ne
Am
eric
an m
agaz
ine
was
lat
er f
orc
ed
to c
on
ced
e th
at th
e y
ears
bet
wee
n 2
00
0 a
nd
20
10
had
bee
n n
oth
ing
les
s th
an ‘
the
dec
ade
fro
m h
ell’
.9 I
t al
l b
egan
wit
h 9
/11
an
d th
e st
rate
gic
ally
in
ept re
spo
nse
to
th
is b
y th
e B
ush
adm
inis
trat
ion
.10 I
t co
nti
nu
ed w
ith
th
e g
rad
ual
ero
sio
n o
f ec
on
om
ic c
erta
inty
th
at f
inal
ly
culm
inat
ed w
ith
th
e g
reat
geo
po
liti
cal
setb
ack
of
the
Wes
tern
fin
anci
al c
risi
s.11
An
d i
t
wen
t fr
om
bad
to
wo
rse
in s
om
e ey
es w
hen
it
bec
ame
incr
easi
ng
ly c
lear
th
at t
he
Wes
t
Cox 2012
Week 1
Cox
371
itse
lf w
as f
acin
g a
mas
siv
e ch
alle
ng
e fr
om
oth
er n
on
-Wes
tern
pla
yer
s in
th
e w
orl
d c
api-
tali
st e
con
om
y. W
hen
Go
ldm
an S
ach
s la
un
ched
th
e id
ea o
f th
e ‘B
RIC
s’ c
om
pri
sin
g
‘Bra
zil,
Ru
ssia
, In
dia
an
d C
hin
a’ i
n 2
00
1, o
nly
eco
no
mis
ts (
and
no
t m
any
of
them
) to
ok
the
idea
ver
y s
erio
usl
y.1
2 B
ut
as t
he
yea
rs p
asse
d,
and
th
e ec
on
om
ic d
ata
beg
an t
o f
low
in,
it b
egan
to
lo
ok
as
if t
he
auth
or
of
the
ori
gin
al n
oti
on
, Ji
m O
’Nei
ll,
had
bee
n b
ril-
lian
tly
pre
scie
nt.
13 I
nd
eed
, h
is c
ore
id
ea b
ased
on
car
efu
l ec
on
om
ic s
tud
y –
nam
ely,
th
at
the
futu
re e
con
om
ic o
rder
wo
uld
be
less
do
min
ated
by
th
e W
est
than
it
wo
uld
be
by
gia
nt
eco
no
mie
s li
ke
the
BR
IC c
ou
ntr
ies
– s
eem
ed t
o p
rov
ide
irre
futa
ble
pro
of
that
th
e
wo
rld
was
in
th
e m
idst
of
a g
lob
al r
evo
luti
on
.14 T
he
cau
ses
of
this
wer
e m
ult
iple
. B
ut
on
e th
ing
was
ob
vio
us.
Th
e ax
is o
f th
e in
tern
atio
nal
sy
stem
th
at h
ad f
or
sev
eral
cen
tu-
ries
rev
olv
ed a
rou
nd
th
e A
tlan
tic
was
mo
vin
g e
lsew
her
e –
eit
her
to
war
ds
Asi
a as
a
reg
ion
15 o
r m
ore
gen
eral
ly t
ow
ard
s so
met
hin
g v
agu
ely
ref
erre
d t
o b
y t
he
infl
uen
tial
colu
mn
ist,
Far
eed
Zak
aria
, as
th
e ‘r
est’
.16 N
or
was
th
is Z
akar
ia o
r O
’Nei
ll’s
vie
w a
lon
e.
In 2
00
4,
the
then
ed
ito
r o
f F
orei
gn A
ffai
rs h
ad w
arn
ed t
he
Wes
t th
at t
her
e w
as a
po
ten
-
tial
ly d
istu
rbin
g ‘
po
wer
sh
ift
in t
he
mak
ing
’.1
7 A
few
yea
rs o
n a
nd
on
e o
f th
e m
ore
infl
uen
tial
lib
eral
wri
ters
on
wo
rld
po
liti
cs m
ade
mu
ch t
he
sam
e p
oin
t. I
t w
as n
o l
on
ger
a q
ues
tio
n o
f w
het
her
wea
lth
an
d p
ow
er w
ere
mo
vin
g a
way
fro
m t
he
Wes
t an
d t
he
No
rth
, ac
cord
ing
to
Jo
hn
Ik
enb
erry
. T
hat
mu
ch w
as s
elf-
evid
ent.
Th
e b
ig q
ues
tio
n n
ow
,
he
con
tin
ued
, w
as ‘
wh
at k
ind
of
glo
bal
po
liti
cal
ord
er’
wo
uld
em
erg
e as
a c
on
se-
qu
ence
.18 T
he
less
lib
eral
Nia
ll F
erg
uso
n c
on
curr
ed.
Bu
t in
his
vie
w,
it w
as n
ot
just
th
e
on
ce ‘
app
-lad
en’
Wes
t th
at w
as i
n r
etre
at.1
9 S
o t
oo
was
his
ad
op
ted
co
un
try
of
cho
ice.
Th
e ‘h
yp
er-p
ow
er’
was
hy
per
no
mo
re.2
0 A
mer
ica’
s b
est
day
s w
ere
beh
ind
it.
Th
e
emp
ire
was
on
th
e sl
ide.
21
Un
surp
risi
ng
ly,
thes
e se
ism
ic a
lter
atio
ns
gen
erat
ed m
uch
in
ten
se d
ebat
e ar
ou
nd
th
e
wo
rld
: n
ow
her
e m
ore
so
th
an i
n t
he
Wes
t it
self
.22 H
ere,
op
inio
n v
eere
d b
etw
een
th
e
dee
ply
pes
sim
isti
c –
all
po
wer
tra
nsi
tio
ns
it w
as a
ssu
med
co
uld
on
ly l
ead
to
in
ten
sifi
ed
glo
bal
co
nfl
ict2
3 –
th
rou
gh
to
th
ose
wh
o i
nsi
sted
th
at t
he
new
em
erg
ing
eco
no
mie
s co
uld
on
ly a
dd
to
th
e st
ock
of
the
wo
rld
’s w
ealt
h b
y b
rin
gin
g m
ore
sta
tes
wit
hin
th
e fo
ld o
f th
e
wo
rld
mar
ket
. It
was
th
e ri
se o
f C
hin
a, h
ow
ever
, th
at o
ccas
ion
ed t
he
gre
ates
t d
iscu
ssio
n
of
all,
an
d f
or
ver
y s
ou
nd
mat
eria
l re
aso
ns
as R
ob
ert A
rt h
as o
bse
rved
.24 I
n f
act,
alm
ost
ov
ern
igh
t, i
t se
emed
as
if e
ver
yb
od
y h
ad s
om
eth
ing
sig
nif
ican
t to
say
ab
ou
t C
hin
a.25
Op
inio
n d
iffe
red
sh
arp
ly w
ith
on
e o
r tw
o w
rite
rs c
laim
ing
th
at C
hin
a w
as f
ast
bec
om
ing
a re
spo
nsi
ble
sta
keh
old
er i
n i
nte
rnat
ion
al s
oci
ety,
26 a
few
th
at i
ts r
apid
eco
no
mic
ex
pan
-
sio
n w
as t
he
on
ly t
hin
g s
tan
din
g b
etw
een
th
e W
est
and
a g
lob
al d
epre
ssio
n, o
ther
s th
at i
t
con
stit
ute
d a
rea
l th
reat
to
US
heg
emo
ny
27 a
nd
man
y m
ore
th
at i
f it
co
nti
nu
ed t
o g
row
wh
ile
the
Wes
t lu
rch
ed f
rom
lo
w g
row
th t
o n
o g
row
th a
t al
l, i
t m
igh
t so
on
be
run
nin
g
Asi
a,28 o
r p
oss
ibly
ev
en t
he
wo
rld
.29 B
ut
ho
wev
er o
ne
asse
ssed
Ch
ina,
on
e th
ing
lo
ok
ed
star
tlin
gly
ob
vio
us.
Th
is ‘
rest
less
em
pir
e’30 h
ad a
t la
st b
een
aro
use
d f
rom
its
slu
mb
er
foll
ow
ing
a r
elat
ivel
y u
nev
entf
ul
dec
ade
(on
e w
rite
r in
19
99
ev
en s
ug
ges
ted
th
at w
e
sho
uld
no
t b
e ta
kin
g C
hin
a to
o s
erio
usl
y)3
1 a
nd
was
no
w s
et t
o t
ake
its
seat
at
the
top
of
the
wo
rld
’s t
able
. A g
rav
ity
sh
ift
was
tak
ing
pla
ce32 –
or
so i
t w
as a
rgu
ed –
an
d w
het
her
or
no
t o
ne
vie
wed
Ch
ina’
s ec
on
om
ic r
ise
as a
fo
reg
on
e co
ncl
usi
on
,33 a
nec
essa
ry c
orr
ec-
tiv
e to
its
nin
etee
nth
cen
tury
per
iod
of
hu
mil
iati
on
,34 w
orr
ied
ab
ou
t it
s im
pac
t o
n t
he
glo
bal
eco
no
mic
an
d p
oli
tica
l o
rder
,35 o
r as
sum
ed t
hat
its
ris
e w
as b
ou
nd
to
lea
d t
o
incr
ease
d
‘in
ten
se
secu
rity
co
mp
etit
ion
’,36
on
e th
ing
w
as
cert
ain
: th
e in
tern
atio
nal
372
Inte
rnat
iona
l Rel
atio
ns 2
6(4)
syst
em w
as u
nd
erg
oin
g w
hat
ev
en W
este
rn g
ov
ern
men
ts n
ow
bel
iev
ed w
as a
tra
nsf
orm
a-
tio
n t
hat
wo
uld
alt
er t
he
wo
rld
fo
rev
er.3
7
In w
hat
fo
llo
ws,
I w
ant
to a
dd
ress
th
e is
sues
rai
sed
by
wh
at m
any
are
no
w a
ssu
min
g
to b
e ir
rev
ersi
ble
ch
ang
es i
n t
he
wo
rld
ord
er. I
do
so
no
t b
y a
skin
g w
hat
all
th
is m
ean
s, i
f
any
thin
g,
for
inte
rnat
ion
al r
elat
ion
s (I
R)
theo
ry (
this
has
bee
n d
on
e el
sew
her
e)38 b
ut
rath
er b
y w
on
der
ing
wh
eth
er th
e n
ow
po
pu
lar
arg
um
ent th
at w
e h
ave
mo
ved
in
to a
‘p
ost
-
Wes
tern
wo
rld
’ is
in
fac
t tr
ue.
39 C
lear
ly,
I d
o n
ot
dis
pu
te s
om
e se
lf-e
vid
ent
eco
no
mic
fact
s.40 H
ow
ever
, as
Car
r note
d m
any y
ears
ago, th
e fa
cts
do n
ot
alw
ays
spea
k f
or
them
-
selv
es, a
nd
ev
en if
som
e se
em to
th
ink
th
ey d
o, t
hey
can
sti
ll b
e ar
ran
ged
in
a c
erta
in w
ay
to p
ain
t a
less
th
an c
om
ple
te p
ictu
re o
f th
e m
od
ern
wo
rld
.
I m
ake
sev
eral
arg
um
ents
in
wh
at f
oll
ow
s. O
ne
is t
hat
th
is m
od
ern
sto
ry,
exci
tin
g
and
in
tere
stin
g t
ho
ug
h i
t is
, te
nd
s to
fo
cus
alm
ost
en
tire
ly o
n w
hat
is
rap
idly
ch
ang
ing
bu
t sa
ys
litt
le a
bo
ut
wh
at i
s n
ot
– a
nd
wh
at i
s ch
ang
ing
mu
ch l
ess
than
so
me
are
no
w
sug
ges
tin
g i
s A
mer
ica’
s p
osi
tio
n i
n t
he
wo
rld
.41 T
her
e h
as a
lso
bee
n a
co
nfu
sio
n a
bo
ut
term
s. N
ob
od
y s
erio
us
wo
uld
wan
t to
den
y t
hat
th
ere
hav
e b
een
mea
sura
ble
ch
ang
es
in t
he
shap
e o
f th
e w
orl
d e
con
om
y o
ver
th
e p
ast
few
yea
rs.
Ho
wev
er,
too
man
y w
rit-
ers
hav
e ei
ther
ass
um
ed t
hat
a s
hif
t in
eco
no
mic
gra
vit
y i
s th
e sa
me
thin
g a
s a
po
wer
shif
t (i
t is
no
t),4
2 o
r th
at a
s th
ese
eco
no
mic
ch
ang
es c
on
tin
ue,
th
ey w
ill
eith
er l
ead
to
a tr
ansf
er o
f p
ow
er f
rom
on
e h
egem
on
to
an
oth
er (
this
is
qu
esti
on
able
)43 o
r to
th
e
crea
tio
n o
f so
met
hin
g n
ow
reg
ula
rly
(an
d d
ub
iou
sly
) re
ferr
ed t
o a
s a
new
‘A
sian
Cen
tury
’.4
4 A
s I
wil
l se
ek t
o s
ho
w,
thes
e as
sert
ion
s co
nta
in s
erio
us
anal
yti
cal
flaw
s.
Eq
ual
ly f
law
ed,
I w
ou
ld i
nsi
st,
is t
he
idea
th
at w
e ca
n m
ake
bo
ld p
red
icti
on
s ab
ou
t
wh
ere
the
wo
rld
wil
l b
e in
th
e fu
ture
. A
s w
e ca
n a
ll a
ttes
t g
etti
ng
th
e fu
ture
rig
ht
has
in t
he
pas
t p
rov
en t
o b
e a
foo
l’s
erra
nd
.45 T
his
, I
wo
uld
wan
t to
arg
ue,
has
im
po
rtan
t
less
on
s fo
r th
ose
no
w c
on
fid
entl
y p
red
icti
ng
a m
ajo
r p
ow
er s
hif
t o
ver
th
e co
min
g
dec
ades
.46 T
he
‘res
t’ m
ay n
ow
be
gro
win
g f
ast,
wh
ile
the
Un
ited
Sta
tes
and
th
e
Eu
rop
ean
Un
ion
(E
U)
lan
gu
ish
. H
ow
ever
, as
mo
re s
ob
er a
nal
yst
s h
ave
po
inte
d o
ut,
the
cris
is i
n t
he
Wes
t m
ay n
ot
last
fo
rev
er,
wh
ile
the
man
y p
rob
lem
s fa
cin
g s
om
e o
f
the
rest
– i
ncl
ud
ing
In
dia
47 a
nd
Ch
ina4
8 –
co
uld
der
ail
thei
r ap
par
entl
y i
rres
isti
ble
ris
e
up
th
e ec
on
om
ic l
eag
ue
tab
le.
No
thin
g o
f co
urs
e en
du
res
fore
ver
. A
nd
a n
ew w
orl
d
mig
ht
ind
eed
be
in t
he
mak
ing
. B
ut
it m
igh
t n
ot
be
the
on
e n
ow
bei
ng
tal
ked
ab
ou
t so
fev
eris
hly
aro
un
d t
he
wo
rld
to
day
.
Am
eric
an e
cono
mic
dec
line?
As
we
hav
e al
read
y s
ug
ges
ted
, a
larg
e p
art
of
the
case
in
fav
ou
r o
f th
e n
oti
on
th
at a
‘po
wer
sh
ift’
is
un
der
way
res
ts o
n t
he
assu
mp
tio
n t
hat
th
e le
adin
g W
este
rn p
lay
er –
th
e
Un
ited
Sta
tes
of
Am
eric
a –
fac
es a
n i
rres
isti
ble
eco
no
mic
dec
lin
e th
at w
ill,
if
it c
on
tin
-
ues
, ei
ther
all
ow
oth
ers
to t
ake
adv
anta
ge
of
its
wea
kn
ess
or
red
uce
its
ab
ilit
y t
o l
ead
.
Cer
tain
ly, m
any
ord
inar
y A
mer
ican
s, a
nd
th
ose
wh
o c
om
men
t o
n th
e U
nit
ed S
tate
s to
day
,
bel
iev
e th
is t
o b
e th
e ca
se.4
9 O
f co
urs
e, t
he
sto
ry c
an b
e, a
nd
has
bee
n, t
old
in
ver
y d
iffe
r-
ent
way
s. F
or
som
e, t
he
pro
cess
is
lik
ely
to
be
slo
w a
nd
can
be
man
aged
rat
her
eas
ily,
‘po
lite
ly’ ev
en.5
0 F
or
oth
ers,
it
is b
ou
nd
to
hav
e en
orm
ou
s co
nse
qu
ence
s, n
ot
on
ly f
or
the
con
du
ct o
f U
S f
ore
ign
po
licy
bu
t al
so f
or
the
wo
rld
at
larg
e. I
nd
eed
if
on
e ac
cep
ts
the
theo
ry o
f h
egem
on
ic s
tab
ilit
y (
and
bel
iev
es th
at th
e h
egem
on
is
no
w in
dec
lin
e), t
hen
Cox 2012
Week 1
Cox
373
the
futu
re o
f th
e w
orl
d l
oo
ks
hig
hly
pro
ble
mat
ic.5
1 E
ith
er w
ay,
wit
h i
ts s
har
e o
f w
orl
d
trad
e fa
llin
g,
its
deb
t in
crea
sin
g,
its
eco
no
my
in
slo
wd
ow
n s
ince
20
08
an
d i
ts d
epen
-
den
cy o
n f
ore
ign
pu
rch
aser
s o
f it
s d
ebt
on
th
e ri
se, it
lo
ok
s to
man
y a
nal
yst
s at
lea
st a
s if
the
Un
ited
Sta
tes
wil
l ei
ther
‘n
eed
to
ret
ren
ch’5
2 o
r, m
ore
pro
ble
mat
ical
ly,
pas
s o
n t
he
bat
on
to
oth
er m
ore
cap
able
po
wer
s.53
Th
e d
ebat
e ab
ou
t U
S e
con
om
ic d
ecli
ne
is h
ard
ly a
new
on
e.5
4 I
n f
act
ever
sin
ce t
he
late
19
60
s, o
ne
pu
nd
it a
fter
an
oth
er h
as b
een
fo
reca
stin
g d
ire
thin
gs
for
the
Un
ited
Sta
tes
on
th
e g
rou
nd
s th
at i
t w
as b
eco
min
g, as
on
e w
rite
r p
ut
it i
n 1
97
7, a
ver
y o
rdin
ary
cou
ntr
y.5
5 A
dec
ade
late
r, P
aul
Ken
ned
y m
ade
mu
ch t
he
sam
e p
oin
t,5
6 a
s d
id I
mm
anu
el
Wal
lers
tein
in
20
02
,57 a
nd
th
en D
avid
Cal
leo
a f
ew y
ears
lat
er.5
8 I
nd
eed
, th
ere
has
har
dly
bee
n a
po
int
in t
ime
sin
ce t
he
late
19
60
s –
wit
h t
he
po
ssib
le e
xce
pti
on
of
the
‘un
ipo
lar
mo
men
t’ i
n t
he
19
90
s (a
nd
no
t ev
en t
hen
) –
wh
en t
her
e h
as n
ot
bee
n s
pec
ula
tio
n a
bo
ut
Am
eric
a’s
eco
no
mic
fu
ture
. B
ut
this
tim
e, w
e ar
e re
assu
red
, th
e d
ecli
ne
is f
or
‘rea
l’.
Wit
h a
n e
du
cati
on
sy
stem
no
lo
ng
er f
it f
or
pu
rpo
se,
a m
idd
le c
lass
in
ret
reat
, an
d a
po
liti
cal
syst
em i
n g
rid
lock
, th
e U
nit
ed S
tate
s, a
cco
rdin
g t
o o
ne
rece
nt
stu
dy
(w
ritt
en b
y
a B
riti
sh j
ou
rnal
ist)
, is
in
fre
e fa
ll w
ith
lit
tle
tim
e le
ft t
o r
eco
ver
.59
Th
ere
can
of
cou
rse
be
no
do
ub
tin
g A
mer
ica’
s m
any
eco
no
mic
pro
ble
ms.
No
r sh
ou
ld
ther
e b
e an
y d
ou
bt
eith
er t
hat
Am
eric
a’s
shar
e o
f w
orl
d g
ross
do
mes
tic
pro
du
ct (
GD
P)
is
mu
ch l
ess
tod
ay t
han
it
was
, sa
y, 2
5 y
ears
ag
o,
let
alo
ne
at t
he
end
of
the
Wo
rld
War
II
wh
en i
t w
as t
he
on
ly s
erio
us
pla
yer
in
th
e w
orl
d c
apit
alis
t sy
stem
.60 B
ut
this
is
har
dly
th
e
sam
e th
ing
as
sug
ges
tin
g th
at th
e U
nit
ed S
tate
s is
in
irr
ever
sib
le e
con
om
ic d
ecli
ne
– n
ow
a co
mm
on
vie
w –
or
that
Ch
ina
has
no
w o
ver
tak
en i
t –
an
eq
ual
ly p
op
ula
r v
iew
. E
ven
on
the
sim
ple
st o
f G
DP
mea
sure
s, t
he
Un
ited
Sta
tes
is s
till
wel
l ah
ead
of
Ch
ina.
Th
us,
wh
erea
s C
hin
a w
ith
a p
op
ula
tio
n o
f ar
ou
nd
20
per
cen
t o
f th
e w
orl
d’s
to
tal
gen
erat
es
som
eth
ing
bet
wee
n o
ne-
sev
enth
an
d o
ne-
ten
th o
f g
lob
al G
DP,
th
e U
nit
ed S
tate
s w
ith
on
ly 6
per
cen
t o
f th
e w
orl
d’s
po
pu
lati
on
sti
ll m
anag
es to
pro
du
ce b
etw
een
20
an
d 2
5 p
er
cen
t. I
nd
eed
, b
y a
sim
ple
GD
P m
easu
rem
ent,
th
e U
S e
con
om
y r
emai
ns
mo
re p
ow
erfu
l
than
th
e n
ext fo
ur
big
ges
t ec
on
om
ies
com
bin
ed: th
at is
to s
ay C
hin
a, J
apan
, Ger
man
y a
nd
the
Un
ited
Kin
gd
om
. C
om
par
iso
ns
bet
wee
n a
ver
age
liv
ing
sta
nd
ard
s ar
ou
nd
th
e w
orl
d
rev
eal an
ev
en g
reat
er g
ap, e
spec
iall
y w
hen
th
e co
mp
aris
on
is
mad
e w
ith
th
e B
RIC
co
un
-
trie
s. C
lear
ly,
life
is
imp
rov
ing
fo
r m
illi
on
s o
f p
eop
le i
n t
hes
e co
un
trie
s w
ith
po
ver
ty
fall
ing
, an
d a
new
mid
dle
cla
ss b
ein
g c
reat
ed.
Sti
ll,
in e
ach
of
the
BR
ICs
(In
dia
an
d
Bra
zil
mo
st o
bv
iou
sly
), t
her
e ar
e st
ill
vas
t p
oo
ls o
f p
ov
erty
. F
urt
her
mo
re, in
ter
ms
of
liv
-
ing
sta
nd
ard
s, t
he
Un
ited
Sta
tes
con
tin
ues
to
be
ahea
d b
y a
lo
ng
way
wit
h a
n o
ver
all
aver
age
4 t
imes
hig
her
th
an t
hat
of
Bra
zil,
6 t
imes
hig
her
th
an t
hat
in
Ch
ina
and
as
mu
ch
as 1
5 t
imes
hig
her
th
an i
n I
nd
ia.6
1
No
w,
no
ne
of
this
wo
uld
co
me
as a
ny
gre
at s
urp
rise
to
a d
evel
op
men
tal
eco
no
mis
t.
Od
dly
th
ou
gh
it
wo
uld
co
me
as s
om
eth
ing
of
a sh
ock
to
th
e A
mer
ican
pu
bli
c w
ho
by
20
12
had
co
me
to t
he
som
ewh
at b
izar
re c
on
clu
sio
n t
hat
th
e U
nit
ed S
tate
s h
ad b
een
eco
-
no
mic
ally
ov
erta
ken
by
Ch
ina
and
wo
uld
, p
resu
mab
ly, fa
ll f
urt
her
an
d f
urt
her
beh
ind
its
gre
at e
con
om
ic r
ival
on
th
e o
ther
sid
e o
f th
e P
acif
ic.6
2 I
nd
eed
, th
e g
ap b
etw
een
per
cep
-
tio
n o
n t
he
on
e h
and
, an
d t
he
fact
s o
n t
he
gro
un
d o
n t
he
oth
er, w
as c
lev
erly
ill
ust
rate
d i
n
a re
cen
t st
ud
y. I
n t
his
, th
e au
tho
r ch
alle
ng
ed t
he
‘dec
lin
ists
’ n
ot
by
co
mp
arin
g t
he
Un
ited
Sta
tes
wit
h o
ther
nat
ion
al e
con
om
ies,
bu
t b
y c
om
par
ing
oth
er n
atio
nal
eco
no
mie
s w
ith
spec
ific
sta
tes
wit
hin
the
Un
ion
. Th
e re
sult
s w
ere
tell
ing
. To
tak
e o
ne
exam
ple
: Cal
ifo
rnia
.
374
Inte
rnat
iona
l Rel
atio
ns 2
6(4)
In G
DP
ter
ms,
it
alo
ne
rem
ain
s sl
igh
tly
mo
re w
ealt
hy
th
an B
razi
l an
d R
uss
ia,
resp
ec-
tiv
ely,
an
d a
lmo
st t
wic
e as
wea
lth
y a
s b
oth
Tu
rkey
an
d I
nd
on
esia
(tw
o e
con
om
ies
no
w
dis
cuss
ed i
n i
ncr
easi
ng
ly g
low
ing
ter
ms)
. T
he
Tex
an e
con
om
y m
ean
wh
ile
is n
earl
y a
s
big
as
Ru
ssia
’s a
nd
ju
st s
lig
htl
y s
mal
ler
than
In
dia
’s. T
his
har
dly
so
un
ds
lik
e an
eco
no
my
on
th
e w
ane.
63
If t
he
Un
ited
Sta
tes
is h
ard
ly t
he
dec
lin
ing
eco
no
mic
su
per
po
wer
po
rtra
yed
in
mu
ch
of
the
lite
ratu
re t
od
ay, it
als
o c
on
tin
ues
to
be
able
to
do
th
ing
s th
at o
ther
s ca
n o
nly
dre
am
of.
In
par
t, t
his
is
a fu
nct
ion
of
its
size
; in
par
t, a
fu
nct
ion
of
geo
gra
ph
ical
lu
ck (
the
Un
ited
Sta
tes
po
sses
ses
eno
rmo
us
qu
anti
ties
of
oil
, g
as,
coal
an
d f
oo
d)
and
in
par
t, a
fun
ctio
n o
f it
s em
bed
ded
po
siti
on
in
th
e w
orl
d e
con
om
ic s
yst
em. A
s C
arla
No
rlo
ff h
as
rece
ntl
y s
ho
wn
, des
pit
e a
gra
du
al e
con
om
ic d
ecli
ne
sin
ce th
e en
d o
f th
e W
orl
d W
ar I
I, th
e
Un
ited
Sta
tes
stil
l p
oss
esse
s cr
itic
al f
eatu
res
that
giv
e it
wh
at s
he
call
s ‘p
osi
tio
nal
ad
van
-
tag
es’ o
ver
all
oth
er s
tate
s. S
he
even
ch
alle
ng
es th
e n
ow
fas
hio
nab
le v
iew
th
at A
mer
ica’
s
heg
emo
nic
bu
rden
s ar
e o
utw
eig
hin
g t
he
ben
efit
s. S
he
sug
ges
ts o
ther
wis
e: W
ash
ing
ton
actu
ally
rea
ps
mo
re t
han
it
pay
s o
ut
in t
he
pro
vis
ion
of
pu
bli
c g
oo
ds.
64 T
he
Un
ited
Sta
tes
also
has
on
e o
ther
, v
ery
sp
ecia
l, a
dv
anta
ge:
th
e d
oll
ar. A
s D
ou
g S
tok
es h
as c
on
vin
cin
gly
arg
ued
, th
is p
arti
cula
r fo
rm o
f ‘f
inan
cial
po
wer
aff
ord
s th
e U
nit
ed S
tate
s a
bro
ad r
ang
e
of
pri
vil
eges
’, a
by
-pro
du
ct,
in t
he
last
an
aly
sis,
‘o
f o
ther
s w
illi
ng
nes
s to
pu
rch
ase,
ho
ld
and
use
th
e d
oll
ar’.
Th
ey d
o t
his
of
cou
rse
no
t b
ecau
se t
hey
esp
ecia
lly
lo
ve
Am
eric
ans,
bu
t in
ord
er t
o h
old
up
an
eco
no
mic
sy
stem
up
on
wh
ose
hea
lth
th
eir
ow
n p
rosp
erit
y c
on
-
tin
ues
to
dep
end
. F
urt
her
mo
re,
as S
tok
es g
oes
on
to
arg
ue,
ev
en t
he
fin
anci
al c
risi
s h
as
no
t w
eak
ened
th
e p
osi
tio
n o
f th
e U
nit
ed S
tate
s an
yw
her
e n
ear
as m
uch
so
me
hav
e
assu
med
. In
dee
d,
in a
wo
rld
wh
ere
un
cert
ain
ty r
eig
ns
(mo
st o
bv
iou
sly
in
th
e E
U),
‘mo
ney
’ in
its
pu
rest
fo
rm h
as f
led
to
saf
ety,
an
d n
ow
her
e is
reg
ard
ed a
s b
ein
g a
s sa
fe a
s
the
Un
ited
Sta
tes.
To
th
is e
xte
nt,
th
e fi
nan
cial
cri
sis,
iro
nic
ally
, h
as o
nly
aff
irm
ed U
S
fin
anci
al p
ow
er r
ath
er t
han
wea
ken
ed i
t.65
We
also
hav
e to
ju
dg
e ec
on
om
ic p
ow
er n
ot
on
ly i
n t
erm
s o
f th
e si
ze o
f an
eco
no
my
bu
t al
so b
y t
he
qu
alit
ativ
e cr
iter
ia o
f ‘c
om
pet
itiv
enes
s’. E
con
om
ies
lik
e C
hin
a, I
nd
ia a
nd
Bra
zil
are
un
do
ub
ted
ly l
arg
e an
d w
ill
no
do
ub
t g
et l
arg
er o
ver
tim
e. B
ut
this
do
es n
ot
nec
essa
rily
mak
e th
em c
om
pet
itiv
e in
rel
atio
nsh
ip t
o m
ost
Wes
tern
co
un
trie
s o
r th
e
Un
ited
Sta
tes.
In
a 2
011
su
rvey
, in
fac
t, t
he
Un
ited
Sta
tes
cam
e fo
urt
h i
n t
he
wo
rld
in
a
gro
up
of
15
co
un
trie
s. M
ore
ov
er,
11 w
ith
in t
he
15
wer
e d
efin
ably
Wes
tern
, w
hil
e th
e
oth
er 4
in
clu
ded
Jap
an, T
aiw
an, H
on
g K
on
g a
nd
Sin
gap
ore
– c
ou
ntr
ies
all
clo
sely
tie
d t
o
the
Wes
t an
d t
o t
he
Un
ited
Sta
tes.
As
for
the
BR
ICs,
th
ey c
ame
wel
l d
ow
n t
he
list
. Th
us,
Ch
ina
cam
e in
at
27
, In
dia
at
51
, B
razi
l at
58
an
d R
uss
ia a
t 6
3.6
6 O
ther
stu
die
s h
ave
arri
ved
at
no
t d
issi
mil
ar c
on
clu
sio
ns
con
cern
ing
th
e q
ual
itat
ive
gap
th
at c
on
tin
ues
to
exis
t b
etw
een
a n
um
ber
of
the
‘ris
ing
’ eco
no
mie
s an
d m
any
of
the
mo
re e
stab
lish
ed o
nes
,
the
Un
ited
Sta
tes,
in
par
ticu
lar.
In
ter
ms
of
cutt
ing
-ed
ge
rese
arch
in
sci
ence
an
d t
ech
no
l-
og
y, f
or
exam
ple
, th
e U
nit
ed S
tate
s co
nti
nu
es t
o h
old
a c
lear
lea
d.
Ind
eed
in
20
08
, th
e
Un
ited
Sta
tes
acco
un
ted
fo
r 4
0 p
er c
ent
of
tota
l w
orl
d r
esea
rch
an
d d
evel
op
men
t (R
&D
)
spen
din
g a
nd
38
per
cen
t o
f p
aten
ted
new
tec
hn
olo
gy
in
ven
tio
ns.
Mo
re s
ign
ific
antl
y,
scie
nti
fic
rese
arch
pro
du
ced
in
th
e U
nit
ed S
tate
s ac
cou
nte
d f
or
49
per
cen
t o
f to
tal
wo
rld
cita
tio
ns
and
63
per
cen
t o
f th
e m
ost
hig
hly
cit
ed a
rtic
les.
Th
e U
nit
ed S
tate
s al
so c
on
tin
-
ued
to
em
plo
y a
rou
nd
70
of
the
wo
rld
’s N
ob
el P
rize
win
ner
s an
d c
ou
ld l
ay c
laim
to
tw
o-
thir
ds
of
its
mo
st c
ited
in
div
idu
al r
esea
rch
ers
in s
cien
ce a
nd
tec
hn
olo
gy.
67
Cox 2012
Week 1
Cox
375
Inn
ov
atio
n i
s al
so a
n A
mer
ican
str
eng
th.6
8 O
ther
co
un
trie
s ar
e cl
earl
y b
egin
nin
g t
o
catc
h u
p. T
he
Un
ited
Sta
tes,
ho
wev
er,
is s
till
a c
ou
ntr
y t
hat
co
nti
nu
es t
o i
nn
ov
ate
acro
ss
the
bo
ard
. Cri
tics
wo
uld
no
do
ub
t p
oin
t to
th
e fa
ct th
at th
e U
nit
ed S
tate
s is
sli
pp
ing
do
wn
the
leag
ue
tab
le. H
ow
ever
, it
sti
ll r
ank
s fo
urt
h i
n t
he
wo
rld
. C
hin
a m
ean
wh
ile
on
ly c
ame
in a
t 5
4th
in
20
09
, In
dia
at
56
th a
nd
Bra
zil
and
Ru
ssia
ev
en f
urt
her
beh
ind
. O
f co
urs
e,
this
do
es n
ot ta
ke
acco
un
t o
f ch
ang
e o
ver
th
e lo
ng
er ter
m, o
r o
f th
e fa
ct th
at a
co
un
try
lik
e
Ch
ina
is m
akin
g a
co
nce
rted
eff
ort
to
bu
ild
a m
ore
in
no
vat
ive
eco
no
my.
69 B
ut as
ev
en th
e
Ch
ines
e w
ou
ld a
ccep
t, i
t st
ill
has
ver
y l
on
g w
ay t
o g
o.
Ind
eed
, in
sp
ite
of
off
icia
l ef
fort
s
to e
nco
ura
ge
wh
at i
s te
rmed
in
Ch
ina
a ‘c
apac
ity
fo
r in
dep
end
ent
inn
ov
atio
n’,
th
ere
rem
ain
sev
eral
wea
kn
esse
s in
th
e C
hin
ese
po
liti
cal
eco
no
my.
Am
on
g t
he
mo
st s
ign
ifi-
can
t, i
t h
as b
een
no
ted
, ar
e ‘p
oo
r en
forc
emen
t o
f in
tell
ectu
al p
rop
erty
rig
hts
, an
ed
uca
-
tio
nal
sy
stem
th
at e
mp
has
izes
ro
te l
earn
ing
ov
er c
riti
cal
thin
kin
g,
and
a s
ho
rtag
e o
f
ind
epen
den
t o
rgan
izat
ion
s th
at c
an e
val
uat
e sc
ien
tifi
c p
rog
ress
’.70 T
her
e is
als
o w
ider
po
liti
cal
rest
rain
t as
wel
l. I
nn
ov
atio
n u
sual
ly r
equ
ires
op
en d
ebat
e, a
cap
acit
y t
o c
hal
-
len
ge
esta
bli
shed
tru
ths
and
in
cen
tiv
es t
o t
hin
k t
he
un
thin
kab
le;
and
no
ne
of
thes
e, t
o b
e
blu
nt,
are
mu
ch i
n e
vid
ence
in
mo
der
n C
hin
a to
day
.71
Fin
ally
, in
ter
ms
of
glo
bal
eco
no
mic
po
wer
, th
e U
nit
ed S
tate
s is
sti
ll w
ell
ahea
d i
n
on
e o
ther
vit
al r
esp
ect:
co
rpo
rate
str
eng
th.7
2 S
om
e o
f th
e em
erg
ing
eco
no
mie
s ar
e
beg
inn
ing
to
cat
ch u
p,
and
so
me
of
Am
eric
a’s
clo
sest
all
ies
in E
uro
pe
and
Asi
a ru
n i
t a
go
od
sec
on
d.7
3 B
ut
the
Un
ited
Sta
tes
clea
rly
rem
ain
s in
‘p
oll
po
siti
on
’ w
ith
Am
eric
an
com
pan
ies
in 2
011
co
nst
itu
tin
g 4
of
the
top
10
co
rpo
rati
on
s in
th
e w
orl
d,
14
of
the
top
30
an
d 2
5 o
f th
e to
p 5
0.
Wes
tern
co
mp
anie
s m
ore
gen
eral
ly s
till
ou
tper
form
all
oth
ers,
wit
h t
he
Un
ited
Sta
tes
and
th
e E
U t
og
eth
er r
epre
sen
tin
g 6
ou
t o
f th
e to
p 1
0 g
lob
al c
or-
po
rati
on
s, 2
2 o
ut
of
the
top
30
an
d 3
7 o
ut
of
the
top
50
. S
om
e o
f th
e B
RIC
eco
no
mie
s
do
hav
e so
me
ver
y l
arg
e co
mp
anie
s w
ith
Ch
ina,
un
surp
risi
ng
ly,
lead
ing
th
e w
ay w
ith
4
ou
t o
f th
e to
p 1
0,
8 o
ut
of
the
top
50
an
d 6
1 o
ut
of
the
top
50
0,
a re
mar
kab
le a
chie
ve-
men
t fo
r a
cou
ntr
y t
hat
on
ly 2
5 y
ears
ag
o w
as v
irtu
ally
irr
elev
ant
in t
he
wo
rld
eco
n-
om
y.7
4 S
till
, as
a r
ecen
t B
roo
kin
gs
stu
dy
has
sh
ow
n,
it d
oes
no
t fo
llo
w t
hat
th
ese
com
pan
ies
are
inte
rnat
ion
ally
act
ive
or
sho
uld
ev
en b
e re
gar
ded
as
‘mu
ltin
atio
nal
s’ i
n
the
tru
e se
nse
of
that
wo
rd.
Ind
eed
, 4
9 o
f th
e to
p 5
7 m
ain
lan
d c
om
pan
ies
in C
hin
a
rem
ain
un
der
sta
te c
on
tro
l; a
nd
wit
h a
ver
y f
ew e
xce
pti
on
s, t
he
ov
erw
hel
min
g m
ajo
rity
all
op
erat
e p
red
om
inan
tly
wit
hin
th
e co
un
try
– a
nd
fo
r se
ver
al g
oo
d r
easo
ns
incl
ud
ing
a
sho
rtag
e o
f m
anag
ers
wit
h t
he
nec
essa
ry l
ing
uis
tic
skil
ls a
nd
ex
per
ien
ce o
f w
ork
ing
abro
ad,
a la
ck o
f tr
ansp
aren
cy,
po
or
glo
bal
bra
nd
pre
sen
ce,
and
a v
ery
rea
l d
iffi
cult
y i
n
adap
tin
g e
asil
y t
o f
ore
ign
leg
al,
tax
an
d p
oli
tica
l en
vir
on
men
ts.7
5
Har
d po
wer
–so
ft p
ow
er
If t
he
Un
ited
Sta
tes
reta
ins
som
e v
ery
fo
rmid
able
eco
no
mic
ass
ets,
th
e sa
me
can
ju
st a
s
easi
ly b
e sa
id a
bo
ut it
s st
ill v
ery
po
wer
ful p
osi
tio
n w
ith
in th
e la
rger
in
tern
atio
nal
sy
stem
.
Th
is i
s n
o l
on
ger
a f
ash
ion
able
vie
w t
o d
efen
d o
f co
urs
e. I
nd
eed
, a
com
bin
atio
n o
f an
ill-
jud
ged
war
in
Ira
q,
the
use
of
tort
ure
in
th
e ‘w
ar o
n t
erro
r’,
the
nea
r m
eltd
ow
n o
f th
e
Am
eric
an f
inan
cial
sy
stem
in
20
08
, an
d t
he
slo
w r
eco
ver
y o
f th
e A
mer
ican
eco
no
my
sin
ce, h
as led
man
y to
qu
esti
on
Am
eric
a’s
cap
acit
y e
ith
er to
lea
d o
ther
s o
r g
arn
er s
up
po
rt
for
its
po
lici
es a
bro
ad.
Bu
zan
has
pro
bab
ly t
heo
rize
d t
his
bes
t. A
mer
ica’
s cl
aim
to
376
Inte
rnat
iona
l Rel
atio
ns 2
6(4)
rep
rese
nt th
e li
ber
al f
utu
re, h
e ar
gu
ed b
ack
in
20
08
, was
‘b
lig
hte
d’.
Th
e A
mer
ican
mo
del
no
lo
ng
er i
nsp
ired
ad
mir
atio
n,
he
insi
sted
. T
he
nu
mb
er o
f st
ates
th
at w
ante
d t
o f
oll
ow
it
was
fas
t d
ecli
nin
g.
Mo
re g
ener
ally
, h
e co
nti
nu
ed,
heg
emo
ny
had
bec
om
e in
crea
sin
gly
‘ill
egit
imat
e’ i
n i
nte
rnat
ion
al s
oci
ety.
As
a re
sult
, A
mer
ica’
s p
osi
tio
n i
n t
he
wo
rld
was
bec
om
ing
mo
re a
nd
mo
re ‘
frag
ile’
.76
Obvio
usl
y, th
ere
is s
om
ethin
g to
this
, whic
h is
one
of
the
reas
ons
why th
is k
ind o
f ar
gu-
men
t has
pro
ved
so p
opula
r am
ong those
who n
ow
hold
to the
vie
w that
we
are
now
in the
mid
st o
f a
‘pow
er s
hif
t’. B
ut one
of
the
pro
ble
ms
wit
h it,
cle
arly
, is
that
it se
riousl
y u
nder
-
stat
es h
ow
much
har
d p
ow
er t
he
Unit
ed S
tate
s ca
n s
till
mobil
ize,
even
aft
er t
he
ver
y l
im-
ited
cuts
pro
pose
d b
y P
resi
den
t O
bam
a.77 I
t m
ight
be
inte
llec
tual
ly f
ashio
nab
le t
o a
rgue
that
mil
itar
y p
ow
er i
s bec
om
ing l
ess
and l
ess
sali
ent
in a
n a
ge
of
asym
met
ric
war
wher
e
the
wea
k c
an d
o a
gre
at d
eal
of
dam
age
to t
he
stro
ng.
How
ever
, th
e ver
y f
act
that
the
Unit
ed S
tate
s is
able
to m
obil
ize
the
mil
itar
y m
anpow
er i
t ca
n (
curr
entl
y i
t has
more
men
and w
om
en u
nder
arm
s th
an it had
on the
eve
of
9/1
1),
78 c
an p
roje
ct p
ow
er to e
ver
y c
orn
er
of
the
eart
h, is
sti
ll t
he
mai
n p
rovid
er o
f se
curi
ty i
n A
sia
and E
uro
pe
and s
pen
ds
as m
uch
as i
t st
ill
does
on ‘
def
ence
’ – a
bout
45 p
er c
ent
of
the
worl
d’s
tota
l – s
ugges
ts t
hat
the
countr
y h
as a
ver
y l
ong w
ay t
o g
o b
efore
one
can t
alk a
bout
it b
ecom
ing l
ess
of
a su
per
-
pow
er. T
he
mil
itar
y p
ow
er o
f oth
er s
tate
s m
ore
over
does
not
com
par
e, e
ven
Chin
a’s
wit
h
its
huge
stan
din
g a
rmy (
whic
h h
as n
ot
fought
a w
ar s
ince
the
dis
astr
ous
invas
ion o
f
Vie
tnam
in 1
979)7
9 a
nd i
ts i
ncr
easi
ngly
lar
ge
blu
e w
ater
nav
y t
hat
now
incl
udes
one
air-
craf
t ca
rrie
r.80 I
ndee
d,
when
its
fir
st a
ircr
aft
carr
ier
was
fin
ally
giv
en i
ts f
irst
sea
tri
als
in
2011
, the
alar
m b
ells
wen
t up in the
regio
n.8
1 H
ow
ever
, Chin
a’s
one
airc
raft
car
rier
har
dly
com
par
es w
ith A
mer
ica’
s 11
car
rier
gro
ups.
Nor
has
the
ongoin
g m
oder
niz
atio
n o
f C
hin
a’s
mil
itar
y b
rought
it a
nyw
her
e cl
ose
to U
S l
evel
s. I
ndee
d t
he
most
rec
ent
figure
s sh
ow
that
the
Unit
ed S
tate
s not only
expen
ds
five
tim
es m
ore
on n
atio
nal
sec
uri
ty than
Chin
a. T
aken
toget
her
, it
s m
any a
llie
s in
the
regio
n (
incl
udin
g a
mong o
ther
s Ja
pan
, S
outh
Kore
a, I
ndia
and A
ust
rali
a) a
lso s
pen
d m
ore
on t
hei
r m
ilit
ary f
orc
es t
han
Chin
a, a
nd d
o s
o b
y a
sig
nif
i-
cant
mar
gin
– n
earl
y U
S$200bn c
om
par
ed t
o C
hin
a’s
$11
5bn.8
2
Th
is i
n t
urn
sh
ou
ld a
lert
us
to y
et a
no
ther
asp
ect
of
Am
eric
a’s
imp
ress
ive
po
siti
on
in
the
wo
rld
: it
s fo
rmid
ably
wid
e al
lian
ce s
yst
em.
Bu
zan
may
be
rig
ht.
Th
ere
mig
ht
be
few
er s
tate
s w
illi
ng
to
‘fo
llo
w’
the
Un
ited
Sta
tes
in w
ays
that
th
ey d
id d
uri
ng
th
e C
old
War
. T
her
e ar
e al
so a
few
‘p
rob
lem
’ co
un
trie
s li
ke
Pak
ista
n, T
urk
ey a
nd
Eg
yp
t th
at h
ave
incr
easi
ng
ly d
iffi
cult
rel
atio
ns
wit
h W
ash
ing
ton
. N
on
eth
eles
s, e
ven
th
ose
wh
o h
ave
do
ub
ts a
bo
ut A
mer
ican
lea
der
ship
sk
ills
, sti
ll f
ind
th
at th
ey h
ave
no
alt
ern
ativ
e b
ut to
all
y
them
selv
es w
ith
it.
Th
is is
ob
vio
usl
y tru
e o
f th
e E
uro
pea
ns
wh
o c
an s
ee n
o o
ther
sec
uri
ty
gu
aran
tor
than
th
e U
nit
ed S
tate
s. B
ut
it i
s al
so t
rue
of
key
sta
tes
in L
atin
Am
eric
a, A
fric
a
and
Asi
a. I
f an
yth
ing
, it
has
bec
om
e ev
en m
ore
tru
e in
Asi
a; i
n f
act,
as
Ch
ina
has
ris
en,
mo
st A
sian
co
un
trie
s (i
ncl
ud
ing
co
mm
un
ist-
led
Vie
tnam
) h
ave
dem
and
ed m
ore
, an
d n
ot
less
, of
an A
mer
ican
pre
sen
ce i
n t
he
reg
ion
. Ch
ina
as a
res
ult
no
w f
ind
s it
self
in
th
e p
ara-
do
xic
al p
osi
tio
n o
f h
avin
g g
reat
er e
con
om
ic in
flu
ence
in
Asi
a b
ut fe
wer
fri
end
s.83 T
o th
is
deg
ree,
its
gro
win
g e
con
om
ic p
ow
er h
as n
ot tr
ansl
ated
in
to it h
avin
g m
ore
po
liti
cal in
flu
-
ence
as
wel
l.84 N
or
hav
e it
s h
eav
y-h
and
ed p
oli
cies
in
Asi
a h
elp
ed.
On
th
e co
ntr
ary,
by
lay
ing
cla
im t
o t
he
So
uth
Ch
ina
Sea
s85 a
nd
rem
ain
ing
sil
ent
abo
ut
the
agg
ress
ive
beh
av-
iou
r o
f it
s si
ng
le a
lly
No
rth
Ko
rea,
it
has
act
ual
ly m
ade
Am
eric
a’s
po
siti
on
str
on
ger
rath
er t
han
wea
ker
.86 I
nd
eed
, p
reci
sely
bec
ause
Ch
ina
do
es n
ot
‘in
spir
e co
nfi
den
ce’,
it
Cox 2012
Week 1
Cox
377
has
bee
n p
oss
ible
fo
r th
e U
nit
ed S
tate
s to
be
vie
wed
by
mo
st c
ou
ntr
ies
in t
he
reg
ion
as
that
wel
l-k
no
wn
‘in
dis
pen
sab
le n
atio
n’ u
po
n w
ho
se c
on
tin
ued
pre
sen
ce t
hei
r o
wn
saf
ety
ult
imat
ely
dep
end
s.87
Am
eric
a’s
con
tin
ued
pre
sen
ce i
n A
sia
rais
es a
wid
er q
ues
tio
n a
bo
ut
wh
eth
er ‘
po
wer
’
in t
he
bro
ader
sen
se i
s in
fac
t ti
ltin
g a
way
fro
m t
he
Wes
t as
is
no
w s
o o
ften
cla
imed
.
Ch
ina
may
wel
l b
e th
e n
ew e
ng
ine
pu
llin
g a
lon
g t
he
wo
rld
eco
no
my.
Its
eco
no
mic
ro
le
in A
fric
a, B
razi
l an
d A
ust
rali
a m
ay h
ave
bec
om
e cr
uci
ally
im
po
rtan
t. A
nd
its
new
mid
dle
clas
s m
ay b
e b
uy
ing
mo
re a
nd
mo
re o
f th
e h
igh
-en
d p
rod
uct
s th
at t
he
Wes
t is
on
ly t
oo
hap
py
to
sel
l it
. Y
et,
thu
s fa
r, C
hin
a h
as b
een
mu
ch l
ess
than
su
cces
sfu
l in
win
nin
g
frie
nd
s an
d b
uil
din
g r
elat
ion
s o
f tr
ust
wit
h o
ther
co
un
trie
s. I
t m
igh
t b
e an
ex
agg
erat
ion
to
say
th
at C
hin
a ‘i
s g
ener
ally
hel
d i
n s
usp
icio
n’
aro
un
d t
he
wo
rld
.88 B
ut
Ch
ina
do
es c
on
-
fro
nt
som
e se
rio
us
dif
ficu
ltie
s w
hen
in
tera
ctin
g w
ith
oth
ers.
In
par
t, t
he
pro
ble
m i
s cu
l-
tura
l. T
his
is
stil
l a
cou
ntr
y a
fter
all
th
at f
or
all
its
new
op
enn
ess
con
tin
ues
to
har
bo
ur
a
susp
icio
n o
f ‘f
ore
ign
ers’
. T
he
ov
erw
hel
min
g m
ajo
rity
of
its
peo
ple
mo
reo
ver
are
dee
ply
insu
lar
in o
utl
oo
k a
nd
hav
e li
ttle
ex
per
ien
ce, an
d h
ard
ly a
ny
un
der
stan
din
g, o
f th
e w
orl
d
ou
tsid
e o
f C
hin
ese
bo
rder
s.89 T
his
is
even
tru
e o
f m
any
of
its
sen
ior
po
licy
-mak
ers,
th
e
bu
lk o
f w
ho
m tra
vel
ab
road
in
freq
uen
tly,
do
no
t sp
eak
fo
reig
n lan
gu
ages
wit
h a
ny
deg
ree
of
flu
ency
an
d w
ho
hav
e b
een
bro
ug
ht
up
po
liti
call
y i
n t
he
hid
den
wo
rld
of
the
Ch
ines
e
Co
mm
un
ist
Par
ty. T
her
e is
als
o a
lar
ger
id
eolo
gic
al a
nd
po
liti
cal
issu
e. C
hin
a m
igh
t b
e a
trad
ing
su
per
po
wer
. B
ut
it h
as n
o v
isio
n a
nd
no
sen
se o
f w
hat
it
mig
ht
tak
e to
bec
om
e a
seri
ou
s su
per
po
wer
in
a l
ead
ersh
ip p
osi
tio
n w
ith
all
th
e re
spo
nsi
bil
itie
s an
d d
ang
ers
that
wo
uld
en
tail
. If
any
thin
g, C
hin
a is
ex
trao
rdin
aril
y i
ll-e
qu
ipp
ed t
o l
ead
wit
h i
ts d
efen
siv
e,
alm
ost
su
spic
iou
s v
iew
of
the
wo
rld
, an
d i
ts c
on
stan
t re
iter
atio
n o
f th
e o
ld W
estp
ahal
ian
man
tra
that
sta
tes
sho
uld
kee
p t
hei
r n
ose
s o
ut
of
oth
er p
eop
le’s
bu
sin
ess.
No
r is
th
ere
mu
ch s
ign
th
at i
t is
kee
n t
o d
o s
o.
In t
his
, o
f co
urs
e, t
he
Ch
ines
e th
emse
lves
hav
e b
een
per
fect
ly c
and
id.
Ou
r fo
reig
n p
oli
cy g
oal
, th
ey r
epea
t, i
s to
cre
ate
an i
nte
rnat
ion
al e
nv
i-
ron
men
t th
at w
ill
per
mit
us
to f
ocu
s o
n d
om
esti
c af
fair
s an
d e
con
om
ic g
row
th a
t h
om
e;
and
an
yth
ing
dis
turb
ing
th
at d
erai
ls u
s fr
om
th
is v
ery
lo
ng
-ter
m t
ask
str
etch
ing
ov
er
sev
eral
dec
ades
sh
ou
ld b
e av
oid
ed a
t al
l co
sts.
90 I
t is
no
t ev
en c
erta
in t
hat
Ch
ina
even
reg
ard
s it
self
as
a m
od
el f
or
oth
ers
to f
oll
ow
. In
dee
d, h
ow
co
uld
it d
o s
o in
a w
orl
d w
her
e
dem
ocr
acy
– h
ow
ever
im
per
fect
– h
as b
eco
me
the
po
liti
cal
no
rm?
Peo
ple
ab
road
may
adm
ire
Ch
ina
for
wh
at i
t h
as a
chie
ved
; a
few
may
ev
en h
op
e th
at i
ts r
ise
wil
l le
ad t
o a
deg
ree
of
bal
ance
in
th
e in
tern
atio
nal
sy
stem
. B
ut
wh
en i
t im
pri
son
s d
issi
den
t ar
tist
s,
rep
eate
dly
att
ack
s th
e m
uch
ad
mir
ed D
alai
Lam
a an
d t
hen
see
ks
to p
un
ish
an
oth
er s
ov
-
erei
gn
sta
te f
or
an e
nti
rely
in
dep
end
ent
com
mit
tee
awar
din
g a
pea
ce p
rize
to
on
e o
f it
s
citi
zen
s, t
his
is
har
dly
lik
ely
to
win
it
con
ver
ts i
n t
he
wid
er w
orl
d.9
1
If C
hin
a h
as a
rea
l p
rob
lem
in
pro
ject
ing
a p
osi
tiv
e an
d c
on
fid
ent
pic
ture
of
itse
lf o
r
of
the
wo
rld
it w
ou
ld lik
e to
bu
ild
, th
e sa
me
can
har
dly
be
said
of
the
Un
ited
Sta
tes.
92 T
he
US
may
hav
e lo
st g
oo
d d
eal o
f st
and
ing
in
th
e w
orl
d b
ecau
se o
f th
e Ir
aq W
ar; m
ean
wh
ile
the
Wes
t h
as c
lear
ly s
uff
ered
a s
etb
ack
bec
ause
of
the
eco
no
mic
cri
sis.
Ho
wev
er, t
he
firs
t
was
par
tial
ly v
itia
ted
by
th
e el
ecti
on
of
Ob
ama
in 2
00
8,
and
th
e se
con
d h
as n
ot
led
to
any
bo
dy
ser
iou
s p
rop
osi
ng
an
alt
ern
ativ
e. M
ore
ov
er,
the
‘Wes
t’ f
or
all
its
fau
lts
– g
row
-
ing
in
equ
alit
y, e
thic
al s
tan
dar
ds
in d
ecli
ne
and
all
th
e re
st –
sti
ll l
oo
ks
a m
ore
att
ract
ive
pro
po
siti
on
th
an a
ny
thin
g e
lse
on
off
er.
As
a re
cen
t st
ud
y h
as s
ho
wn
, ‘s
oft
po
wer
’ is
alm
ost
en
tire
ly th
e p
rese
rve
of
Wes
tern
, or
mo
re p
reci
sely
dem
ocr
atic
, co
un
trie
s w
ith
th
e
378
Inte
rnat
iona
l Rel
atio
ns 2
6(4)
Un
ited
Sta
tes
stil
l le
adin
g a
lea
gu
e ta
ble
th
at i
ncl
ud
es m
ost
Wes
t E
uro
pea
n c
ou
ntr
ies
as
wel
l as
tw
o c
ou
ntr
ies
fro
m A
sia
– J
apan
an
d S
ou
th K
ore
a. C
hin
a o
n th
e o
ther
han
d c
om
es
in 2
0th
, ju
st a
hea
d o
f B
razi
l at
21
st,
foll
ow
ed b
y I
nd
ia a
t 2
7th
an
d R
uss
ia 2
8th
ou
t o
f a
tota
l o
f 3
0 c
ou
ntr
ies
asse
ssed
.93
Th
ere
are
sev
eral
rea
son
s w
hy
th
e W
est co
nti
nu
es to
sco
re w
ell in
ter
ms
of
soft
po
wer
,
the
mo
st o
bv
iou
s b
ein
g t
hat
Wes
tern
co
un
trie
s h
ave
a p
lura
list
po
liti
cal
cult
ure
wh
ere
hav
ing
dis
sid
ent
vie
ws,
wil
l n
ot,
by
an
d l
arg
e, e
nd
up
wit
h o
ne
spen
din
g a
rat
her
lo
ng
term
in
pri
son
or
wo
rse.
Bu
t an
oth
er r
easo
n –
cle
arly
co
nn
ecte
d –
has
to
do
wit
h i
ts o
pen
syst
em o
f h
igh
er e
du
cati
on
. H
ere,
ev
en t
he
mu
ch-m
alig
ned
Un
ited
Sta
tes
con
tin
ues
to
hav
e g
reat
mag
net
ic p
ull
, no
wh
ere
mo
re s
o th
an in
Ch
ina
itse
lf, j
ud
gin
g b
y th
e en
orm
ou
s
nu
mb
er o
f C
hin
ese
stu
den
ts w
ho
ev
ery
yea
r se
ek a
pla
ce i
n U
S i
nst
itu
tio
ns
of
hig
her
lear
nin
g.
Man
y o
f th
em m
ay i
n t
he
end
ret
urn
to
Ch
ina.
Ho
wev
er,
they
cle
arly
bel
iev
e
that
get
tin
g a
n e
du
cati
on
in
a U
S c
oll
ege
wil
l im
pro
ve
thei
r jo
b p
rosp
ects
in
an
in
crea
s-
ing
ly t
ou
gh
Ch
ines
e jo
b m
ark
et.9
4 N
or
is t
his
tem
po
rary
‘b
rain
dra
in’
a m
ere
acci
den
t o
f
his
tory
. In
dee
d,
on
e o
f th
e m
ore
ob
vio
us
sig
ns
of
con
tin
ued
Wes
tern
an
d A
mer
ican
stre
ng
th i
s it
s u
niv
ersi
ty s
ecto
r.95 O
ther
co
un
trie
s an
d c
on
tin
ents
ob
vio
usl
y h
ave
un
iver
-
siti
es.
Bu
t v
ery
few
of
them
ran
k e
spec
iall
y h
igh
in
in
tern
atio
nal
ter
ms.
96 T
he
BR
IC
cou
ntr
ies
in p
arti
cula
r se
em t
o f
ace
alm
ost
in
sup
erab
le d
iffi
cult
ies
in r
aisi
ng
sta
nd
ard
s.
Bra
zil
and
In
dia
fo
r ex
amp
le h
ave
no
un
iver
siti
es i
n t
he
top 1
00,
Russ
ia o
nly
one
and
Chin
a a
mer
e fi
ve
– thre
e of
thes
e bei
ng in H
ong K
ong. T
he
Unit
ed S
tate
s, in 2
011
, mea
n-
wh
ile
rem
ain
ed h
om
e to
8 o
f th
e to
p 1
0 r
ank
ed u
niv
ersi
ties
in
th
e w
orl
d, 3
7 o
f th
e to
p 5
0
and
58
of
the
top
10
0.
Ev
en t
he
Un
ited
Kin
gd
om
do
es w
ell,
hav
ing
17
ran
ked
un
iver
si-
ties
co
mp
ared
to
a t
ota
l o
f 1
3 i
n t
he
wh
ole
of
Asi
a.97
If s
tan
dar
ds
in h
igh
er e
du
cati
on
are
sti
ll b
ein
g s
et i
n t
he
Wes
t, t
he
sam
e ca
n a
lso
be
said
ab
ou
t th
e ru
les
and
ass
oci
ated
in
stit
uti
on
s th
at g
ov
ern
th
e in
tern
atio
nal
sy
stem
mo
re g
ener
ally
. A
dm
itte
dly
, m
any
of
the
mo
st i
mp
ort
ant
inst
itu
tio
ns
in t
he
wo
rld
tod
ay a
re n
ot
fun
ctio
nin
g a
s w
ell
as t
hey
mig
ht
and
, o
ver
tim
e, c
han
ges
in
th
e in
ter-
nat
ion
al e
con
om
y w
ill
hav
e to
be
refl
ecte
d i
n t
he
way
th
e w
orl
d i
s m
anag
ed.
Th
e fa
ct
rem
ain
s, h
ow
ever
, th
at n
earl
y a
ll t
he
key
ru
les
go
ver
nin
g t
he
glo
bal
eco
no
my,
an
d
mo
st o
f th
ose
dea
lin
g w
ith
cri
tica
lly
im
po
rtan
t is
sues
su
ch a
s n
ucl
ear
no
n-p
roli
fera
-
tio
n,
trad
e li
ber
aliz
atio
n,
wo
men
’s r
igh
ts a
nd
th
e p
rote
ctio
n o
f in
tell
ectu
al p
rop
erty
rig
hts
, h
ave
bee
n l
aid
do
wn
by,
an
d a
re s
till
mo
re l
ikel
y t
o b
e u
ph
eld
by,
co
un
trie
s in
the
Wes
t.9
8 F
urt
her
mo
re,
wh
ile
man
y o
f th
e em
erg
ing
eco
no
mie
s m
igh
t h
ave
man
y
enti
rely
leg
itim
ate
com
pla
ints
ab
ou
t h
ow
th
e W
est
has
beh
aved
in
th
e p
ast
and
ho
w
the
Un
ited
Sta
tes
stil
l b
ehav
es n
ow
, n
on
e o
f th
em h
ave
eith
er t
he
des
ire
or
the
cap
abil
-
ity
of
real
ly c
hal
len
gin
g t
he
Wes
t in
an
y m
ean
ing
ful
way
. T
his
in
lar
ge
par
t h
as m
uch
to d
o w
ith
th
eir
stil
l v
ery
hig
h d
epen
den
cy o
n w
este
rn m
ark
ets
and
wes
tern
Fo
reig
n
Dir
ect
Inv
estm
ent.
Bu
t m
ore
im
po
rtan
tly,
it
is b
ecau
se t
hey
rea
lize
th
at t
hei
r o
wn
su
c-
cess
ov
er t
he
pas
t 2
5 y
ears
has
bee
n i
n s
om
e p
art
det
erm
ined
by
ad
op
tin
g b
road
ly
Wes
tern
eco
no
mic
ru
les.
Th
is i
s n
ot
to p
lay
do
wn
th
eir
ow
n c
on
trib
uti
on
to
th
eir
ow
n
succ
ess.
No
r sh
ou
ld w
e as
sum
e th
at c
ou
ntr
ies
lik
e C
hin
a an
d I
nd
ia h
ave
ado
pte
d a
pu
re W
este
rn m
od
el. T
hey
hav
e n
ot.
No
net
hel
ess,
th
eir
mu
ch h
eral
ded
ris
e o
nly
beg
an
in e
arn
est
wh
en t
hey
ab
and
on
ed o
ne,
rat
her
sel
f-su
ffic
ien
t w
ay o
f d
oin
g e
con
om
ics,
and
sta
rted
th
e lo
ng
jo
urn
ey t
ow
ard
s a
glo
bal
eco
no
my
th
at w
as w
este
rn i
n d
esig
n a
nd
mar
ket
-ori
ente
d i
n f
un
dam
enta
ls.
Cox 2012
Week 1
Cox
379
A n
ew A
sian
Cen
tury
?
If,
as I
hav
e su
gg
este
d,
the
Wes
t h
as f
ar m
ore
glo
bal
in
flu
ence
th
an m
any
wri
ters
of
late
hav
e su
gg
este
d, h
ow
, th
en, d
o w
e ex
pla
in w
hat
no
w s
eem
s se
lf-e
vid
ent to
man
y a
nal
yst
s:
that
we
are
mo
vin
g i
nto
a n
ew A
sian
Cen
tury
in
wh
ich
th
e W
est
as t
rad
itio
nal
ly u
nd
er-
sto
od
wil
l h
ave
far
less
wea
lth
an
d a
lto
get
her
les
s p
ow
er?9
9 I
s th
is m
erel
y a
mat
ter
of
ign
ora
nce
, w
ish
ful
thin
kin
g o
r si
mp
ly a
mis
un
der
stan
din
g?
Or
is i
t in
fac
t tr
ue
as w
rite
rs
lik
e P
aul K
enn
edy
hav
e in
sist
ed100 a
nd
the
Am
eric
an p
ub
lic
no
w s
eem
to b
elie
ve?
In
dee
d,
acco
rdin
g t
o a
t le
ast
on
e o
pin
ion
po
ll, t
he
maj
ori
ty o
f A
mer
ican
s n
ow
vie
w A
sia
as b
ein
g
of
mu
ch g
reat
er i
mp
ort
ance
th
an E
uro
pe.
101 T
his
to
o w
ou
ld s
eem
to
be
the
vie
w o
f m
any
US
po
licy
-mak
ers
– t
he
Ob
ama
adm
inis
trat
ion
in
par
ticu
lar,
wh
ich
wit
ho
ut
ign
ori
ng
Eu
rop
e al
tog
eth
er h
as s
ho
wn
a m
uch
gre
ater
deg
ree
of
acti
vis
m a
nd
in
tere
st i
n A
sia
than
pro
bab
ly a
ny
oth
er p
art
of
the
wo
rld
.
On
a n
um
ber
of
issu
es c
on
cern
ing
mo
der
n A
sia,
th
ere
can
be
no
ser
iou
s d
isag
reem
ent.
Its
wei
gh
t in
th
e w
orl
d e
con
om
y h
as c
lear
ly g
ot
big
ger
. It
can
bo
ast
two
of
the
BR
ICs
–
Ch
ina
and
In
dia
. It p
rese
nts
maj
or
inv
estm
ent o
pp
ort
un
itie
s. A
nd
it is
ho
me
to a
n in
crea
s-
ing
ly s
ign
ific
ant
reg
ion
al o
rgan
izat
ion
in
th
e sh
ape
of
Ass
oci
atio
n o
f S
ou
thea
st A
sian
Nat
ion
s (A
SE
AN
). A
sia’
s ra
pid
gro
wth
ov
er t
he
last
tw
o d
ecad
es h
as a
lso
bee
n a
cco
m-
pan
ied
by
a d
ram
atic
red
uct
ion
in
po
ver
ty.
In E
ast A
sia
and
th
e P
acif
ic r
egio
n a
lon
e, t
he
per
cen
tag
e o
f th
e p
op
ula
tio
n n
ow
liv
ing
on
les
s th
an U
S$
1.2
5 p
er d
ay h
as d
rop
ped
fro
m
55
per
cen
t in
19
90
to
on
ly 1
7 p
er c
ent in
20
06
. Ch
ina
alo
ne
has
tak
en n
earl
y 2
00
mil
lio
n
peo
ple
ou
t o
f p
ov
erty
ov
er t
he
last
25
yea
rs.1
02
Th
ese
ach
iev
emen
ts a
re a
ll r
eal
eno
ug
h.
Mo
reo
ver
, w
hen
set
alo
ng
sid
e th
e m
iser
able
eco
no
mic
sit
uat
ion
cu
rren
tly
per
tain
ing
in
man
y p
arts
of
Eu
rop
e, th
ey lo
ok
alm
ost
mir
ac-
ulo
us.
Bu
t o
ne
sho
uld
bew
are
hy
per
bo
le,
esp
ecia
lly
wh
en i
t co
mes
to
an
no
un
cin
g a
n
‘Asi
an C
entu
ry’
that
has
no
t y
et a
rriv
ed. A
sia’
s w
eig
ht
in t
he
wo
rld
has
cer
tain
ly r
isen
;
bu
t b
y m
uch
les
s th
an i
s co
mm
on
ly a
ssu
med
. In
dee
d,
a cl
ose
r lo
ok
at
the
fig
ure
s in
di-
cate
s th
at t
he
shif
t in
eco
no
mic
po
wer
fro
m W
est
to E
ast
can
be
ov
erst
ated
. In
19
95
, fo
r
inst
ance
, A
sia’
s to
tal
shar
e o
f w
orl
d G
DP
(in
no
min
al t
erm
s at
mar
ket
ex
chan
ge
rate
s)
was
alr
ead
y 2
9 p
er c
ent.
Fif
teen
yea
rs l
ater
, it
was
no
hig
her
. A
s fo
r th
e n
ow
wid
ely
acce
pte
d v
iew
th
at A
sian
pro
du
cers
wer
e fa
st a
cqu
irin
g a
n e
ver
-lar
ger
sli
ce o
f g
lob
al
exp
ort
s, t
he
fig
ure
s in
dic
ate
that
th
e re
gio
n a
s a
wh
ole
co
uld
lay
cla
im t
o 2
8 p
er c
ent
of
the
tota
l in
19
95
, b
ut
on
ly 3
1 p
er c
ent
by
in
20
09
, a
rise
of
on
ly 3
per
cen
t o
ver
15
yea
rs.
No
r d
o t
hes
e b
ase
fig
ure
s ta
ke
acco
un
t o
f o
ther
sig
nif
ican
t in
dic
ato
rs,
man
y o
f w
hic
h
po
int
to i
mp
ort
ant
flaw
s in
th
e A
sian
eco
no
mie
s. T
he
qu
alit
y o
f C
hin
ese
pro
du
cts,
fo
r
exam
ple
, d
oes
no
t m
atch
wo
rld
sta
nd
ard
s. A
nd
in
cru
cial
cu
ttin
g-e
dg
e ar
eas
such
as
har
dw
are
and
so
ftw
are
tech
no
log
ies,
th
e U
nit
ed S
tate
s st
ill
do
min
ates
.103 I
n s
ho
rt, A
sia
stil
l h
as l
on
g w
ay t
o g
o b
efo
re i
t w
ill
catc
h u
p w
ith
th
e W
est
– a
Wes
t b
y t
he
way
,
wh
ose
co
mb
ined
ou
tpu
t is
sti
ll d
ou
ble
th
at o
f th
e E
ast.
104
If w
e ar
e n
ow
her
e n
ear
arri
vin
g a
t a
so-c
alle
d A
sian
Cen
tury
, o
ne
of
the
oth
er r
easo
ns
for
this
is
that
th
e en
tity
we
call
Asi
a h
ard
ly e
xis
ts a
s a
coll
ecti
ve
acto
r. A
s m
any
ob
serv
-
ers
hav
e p
oin
ted
ou
t, o
ne
of
the
mo
st r
emar
kab
le f
eatu
res
of
Asi
an p
oli
tica
l la
nd
scap
e is
ho
w f
rag
men
ted
it
hap
pen
s to
be.
Th
us,
man
y i
n A
sia,
Ch
ina
in p
arti
cula
r, h
arb
ou
r d
eep
rese
ntm
ents
to
war
ds
Jap
an.
Jap
an i
n t
urn
bit
terl
y r
esen
ts C
hin
a’s
rise
. A
nd
In
dia
has
pro
ble
ms
wit
h n
earl
y a
ll o
f it
s A
sian
nei
gh
bo
urs
, C
hin
a es
pec
iall
y. M
ost
Asi
an n
atio
ns
380
Inte
rnat
iona
l Rel
atio
ns 2
6(4)
also
hav
e a
ver
y p
ow
erfu
l se
nse
of
po
st-c
olo
nia
l id
enti
ty.
Th
is n
ot
on
ly f
ost
ers
qu
ite
a
deg
ree
of
susp
icio
n o
f ea
ch o
ther
, b
ut
also
wea
ken
s an
y s
ense
of
com
mo
n p
urp
ose
.
Fin
ally
, b
efo
re w
e ca
n t
alk
of
a n
ew A
sian
Cen
tury
, w
e sh
ou
ld r
emin
d o
urs
elv
es t
hat
ther
e ar
e o
ther
par
ts o
f th
e w
orl
d w
her
e re
lati
on
s b
etw
een
sta
tes
are
a g
oo
d d
eal
mo
re
sett
led
an
d a
mic
able
– m
ost
no
tab
ly b
etw
een
tho
se c
ou
ntr
ies
mak
ing
up
the
Tra
nsa
tlan
tic
rela
tio
nsh
ip.
Asi
a m
ay b
e ri
sin
g a
nd
th
e B
RIC
s em
erg
ing
. H
ow
ever
, o
ne
sho
uld
no
t
un
der
esti
mat
e th
e m
any
str
eng
ths
po
sses
sed
by
th
e k
ey s
tate
s co
nst
itu
tin
g t
he
wid
er
Tra
nsa
tlan
tic
spac
e. E
ven
in
th
e m
idst
of
the
cris
is,
the
Un
ited
Sta
tes
and
th
e E
U s
till
acco
un
t fo
r w
ell
ov
er h
alf
of
Wo
rld
GD
P i
n t
erm
s o
f v
alu
e an
d 4
0 p
erce
nt
in t
erm
s o
f
pu
rch
asin
g p
ow
er.1
05 T
he
mo
st i
mp
ort
ant
inte
rnat
ion
al b
ank
s ar
e al
so t
o b
e fo
un
d i
n
Eu
rop
e an
d t
he
Un
ited
Sta
tes.
Eu
rop
e an
d t
he
Un
ited
Sta
tes
mo
reo
ver
pla
y h
ost
to
nea
rly
all
of
its
maj
or
bu
sin
ess
sch
oo
ls;
and
in
are
as s
uch
as
oil
ex
plo
rati
on
, av
iati
on
and
ch
emic
als,
th
ey s
till
lea
d t
he
way
. T
he
two
to
get
her
are
als
o t
he
wo
rld
’s m
ost
imp
ort
ant
sou
rce
of
Fo
reig
n D
irec
t In
ves
tmen
t, a
nd
by
far
an
d a
way
, th
e w
orl
d’s
mo
st
imp
ort
ant
mar
ket
s to
o. T
hey
als
o i
nv
est
in e
ach
oth
er’s
fu
ture
in
vas
t am
ou
nts
. In
dee
d,
in 2
01
0,
the
Un
ited
Sta
tes
inv
este
d f
ar m
ore
in
Eu
rop
e th
an i
t w
as e
ver
lik
ely
to
do
in
Asi
a o
r C
hin
a –
th
ree
tim
es m
ore
to
be
pre
cise
. M
ean
wh
ile,
th
e E
U h
ad i
nv
este
d e
igh
t
tim
es m
ore
in
th
e U
nit
ed S
tate
s th
an i
t h
ad i
n t
he
wh
ole
of
Asi
a. A
mer
ican
s to
day
may
no
t v
iew
Eu
rop
e as
bei
ng
ter
rib
ly e
xci
tin
g.
An
d n
o d
ou
bt
Eu
rop
ean
s w
ill
con
tin
ue
to
wo
rry
as
to t
hei
r cu
rren
t st
atu
s in
a W
ash
ing
ton
fix
ated
on
nea
rly
ev
ery
thin
g e
lse
exce
pt
the
EU
. B
ut
that
do
es n
ot
mak
e th
e ec
on
om
ic r
elat
ion
ship
an
y t
he
less
sig
nif
i-
can
t. A
s o
ne
wri
ter
has
pu
t it
, fo
r al
l th
e h
yp
e ab
ou
t th
e em
erg
ence
of
new
eco
no
mic
po
wer
s an
d t
alk
of
Asi
a’s
rise
, ‘t
he
tran
satl
anti
c ec
on
om
ic i
nte
r-re
gio
nal
lin
k r
emai
ns
easi
ly t
he
larg
est
… i
n t
he
wo
rld
’. T
he
auth
or
mig
ht
also
hav
e ad
ded
th
at w
ith
ou
t th
is
con
tin
ued
li
nk
an
d th
e p
rosp
erit
y it
h
as en
gen
der
ed,
the
‘res
t’ m
igh
t n
ever
h
ave
emer
ged
in
th
e fi
rst
pla
ce.1
06
Co
nclu
sio
n
I h
ave
mad
e a
stro
ng
cla
im i
n t
his
art
icle
. T
his
ch
alle
ng
es t
he
no
tio
n t
hat
we
are
in t
he
mid
st o
f so
me
larg
er p
ow
er s
hif
t. T
his
, in
my
vie
w,
no
t o
nly
mis
un
der
stan
ds
the
com
-
ple
x n
oti
on
of
wh
at c
on
stit
ute
s ‘p
ow
er’,
it
is e
mp
iric
ally
du
bio
us
too
. A
s I
hav
e tr
ied
to s
ho
w h
ere,
th
e U
nit
ed S
tate
s st
ill
has
a g
reat
dea
l o
f p
ow
er,
mu
ch m
ore
th
an a
ny
oth
er c
ou
ntr
y i
n t
he
wo
rld
, n
ow
an
d f
or
the
fore
seea
ble
fu
ture
. C
hin
a m
ean
wh
ile
con
-
fro
nts
sev
eral
bas
ic p
rob
lem
s at
ho
me
and
ab
road
(as
in
dee
d d
o t
he
oth
er m
emb
ers
of
the
so-c
alle
d B
RIC
fam
ily
). A
nd
th
e id
ea t
hat
we
are
mo
vin
g i
nel
uct
ably
in
to w
hat
som
e h
ave
term
ed a
n ‘
Asi
an C
entu
ry’
is u
nsu
stai
nab
le.
In m
akin
g t
his
cas
e, I
am
no
t
imp
lyin
g t
hat
th
e w
orl
d i
s an
en
tire
ly s
tati
c p
lace
. N
or
am I
mak
ing
a p
lea
for
the
stat
us
qu
o.
Rat
her
, I
hav
e tr
ied
to
go
beh
ind
th
e h
ead
lin
es a
nd
to
cal
l th
ing
s b
y t
hei
r
rig
ht
nam
e. N
ot
on
ly i
s th
is i
mp
ort
ant
for
pu
rely
in
tell
ectu
al r
easo
ns:
in
my
vie
w,
it i
s
stra
teg
ical
ly i
mp
ort
ant
too
. A
fter
all
, if
a c
ou
ntr
y l
ike
Ch
ina
real
ly d
oes
co
me
to
bel
iev
e th
at o
ne
day
it
real
ly w
ill
be
ruli
ng
th
e w
orl
d,
and
Am
eric
ans
see
no
alt
ern
a-
tiv
e b
ut
to c
om
bat
th
is i
n w
hat
ever
way
th
ey s
ee n
eces
sary
, th
is c
ou
ld v
ery
eas
ily
lea
d
to a
n i
ncr
ease
d,
and
in
my
vie
w,
a q
uit
e u
nn
eces
sary
esc
alat
ion
of
ten
sio
n b
etw
een
thes
e tw
o v
ery
po
wer
ful
stat
es.
Cox 2012
Week 1
Cox
381
I d
raw
tw
o o
ther
ver
y i
mp
ort
ant
con
clu
sio
ns
fro
m t
he
fore
go
ing
an
aly
sis.
Th
e fi
rst
con
cern
s th
e le
sso
ns
we
sho
uld
be
dra
win
g f
rom
th
e p
ast.
Her
e, t
he
Co
ld W
ar l
oo
ms
larg
e in
my
th
ink
ing
. I a
m n
ot n
aïv
e en
ou
gh
to
th
ink
th
at it w
ou
ld h
ave
bee
n e
asy
to
hav
e
avo
ided
so
me
form
of
com
pet
itio
n b
etw
een
th
e U
nit
ed S
tate
s an
d t
he
US
SR
aft
er W
orl
d
War
II.
Bu
t th
ere
is l
ittl
e d
ou
bt
eith
er t
hat
Wes
tern
wo
rst
case
th
ink
ing
bas
ed o
n e
xag
ger
-
ated
fea
rs o
f a
risi
ng
So
vie
t U
nio
n d
id m
ake
the
con
flic
t fa
r m
ore
in
ten
se a
nd
lo
ng
las
tin
g
than
it
mig
ht
hav
e b
een
oth
erw
ise.
In
th
e sa
me
way
, th
ou
gh
in
a v
ery
dif
fere
nt
con
tex
t
inv
olv
ing
a v
ery
dif
fere
nt k
ind
of
stat
e, th
ere
is a
ver
y r
eal d
ang
er to
day
th
at if
the
po
licy
-
mak
ers
and
an
aly
sts
beg
in t
o t
alk
up
Ch
ines
e st
ren
gth
s w
ith
ou
t re
cog
niz
ing
its
ver
y r
eal
lim
its,
th
ey c
ou
ld e
asil
y e
nd
up
cre
atin
g y
et a
no
ther
sec
uri
ty d
ilem
ma.
107
Th
is b
rin
gs
me
in t
urn
to
th
e fu
ture
. A
s I
earl
ier
sug
ges
ted
, to
o m
uch
of
wh
at h
as
bec
om
e th
e n
ew m
antr
a p
red
icti
ng
an
alm
ost
in
evit
able
rev
olu
tio
n in
wo
rld
po
liti
cs, w
ith
on
e p
art
of
wo
rld
dec
lin
ing
an
d a
no
ther
ris
ing
, is
bas
ed o
n t
he
alto
get
her
qu
esti
on
able
no
tio
n t
hat
we
can
eas
ily
kn
ow
wh
at t
he
wo
rld
an
d t
he
wo
rld
eco
no
my
is
go
ing
to
lo
ok
lik
e in
5, 1
0, 1
5 o
r n
earl
y 5
0 y
ears
tim
e. W
e n
eed
to
be
a b
it m
ore
cir
cum
spec
t. A
fter
all
,
on
ly a
few
yea
rs b
efo
re t
he
end
of
the
Co
ld W
ar,
it w
as p
red
icte
d t
hat
th
e U
SS
R w
ou
ld
rem
ain
th
e sa
me
– a
nd
it d
id n
ot.
It w
as th
en p
red
icte
d th
at J
apan
wo
uld
bec
om
e ‘n
um
ber
on
e’ i
n t
he
wo
rld
– a
nd
its
fin
anci
al s
yst
em c
oll
apse
d. A
nd
in
20
05
, th
e th
en h
ead
of
the
Fed
eral
Res
erv
e in
th
e U
nit
ed S
tate
s to
ld p
oli
cy-m
aker
s in
th
e U
nit
ed S
tate
s th
at t
he
mar
ket
co
uld
nev
er f
ail –
an
d it d
id, r
ath
er d
ram
atic
ally
on
ly 3
yea
rs lat
er. T
he
con
clu
sio
n
to b
e d
raw
n i
s o
bv
iou
s: w
hy
sh
ou
ld w
e b
e an
y m
ore
co
nfi
den
t to
day
wh
en e
con
om
ists
and
pu
nd
its
tell
us
that
th
e ri
se o
f th
e B
RIC
s is
a f
ore
go
ne
con
clu
sio
n a
nd
th
at i
t is
on
ly
mat
ter
of
tim
e b
efo
re C
hin
a (l
ike
Jap
an b
efo
re i
t) b
eco
mes
nu
mb
er o
ne?
Fin
ally
, I
wan
t to
mak
e a
ple
a h
ere
for
a fa
r m
ore
su
btl
e th
eory
of
the
mo
der
n i
nte
rna-
tio
nal
sy
stem
. T
oo
man
y w
rite
rs o
ver
th
e p
ast
few
yea
rs h
ave
talk
ed o
f th
e w
orl
d a
s if
it
wer
e li
ke
a se
ries
of
bil
liar
d b
alls
ban
gin
g u
p a
gai
nst
eac
h o
ther
in
so
me
zero
-lik
e co
nte
st
in w
hic
h s
tate
s an
d r
egio
ns
in o
ne
par
t o
f th
e w
orl
d r
ise,
wh
ile
oth
ers
in o
ther
par
ts o
f th
e
wo
rld
fal
l. T
his
mig
ht
mak
e p
erfe
ct s
ense
to
so
me
real
ists
.108 H
ow
ever
, it
ig
no
res
just
abo
ut
ever
yth
ing
els
e, i
ncl
ud
ing
th
e fa
irly
sel
f-ev
iden
t fa
ct t
hat
th
e m
od
ern
in
tern
atio
nal
eco
no
my
is
no
w s
o i
nte
rdep
end
ent
that
ev
en i
f w
e ac
cep
ted
th
e p
erfe
ctly
rea
son
able
id
ea
that
cer
tain
sta
tes
can
mak
e re
lati
ve
gai
ns
her
e at
th
e ex
pen
se o
f o
ther
sta
tes
ther
e, i
n t
he
end
, m
ost
sta
tes
– i
ncl
ud
ing
mo
st o
bv
iou
sly
th
e U
nit
ed S
tate
s an
d C
hin
a –
hav
e b
eco
me
enti
rely
dep
end
ent
on
eac
h o
ther
fo
r th
eir
pro
sper
ity
an
d s
ecu
rity
. T
o t
his
deg
ree,
we
no
lon
ger
liv
e in
a w
orl
d c
om
po
sed
of
clea
rly
sp
ecif
ied
fri
end
s an
d w
ell-
def
ined
en
emie
s,
bu
t ra
ther
in
on
e w
her
e p
artn
ersh
ip h
as b
eco
me
a n
eces
sity
. O
nce
up
on
a t
ime,
th
is w
ay
of
loo
kin
g a
t th
e w
orl
d w
as b
ran
ded
by
its
cri
tics
as
lib
eral
id
eali
sm.
In t
he
twen
ty-f
irst
cen
tury
, it
has
, in
my
vie
w,
bec
om
e th
e h
igh
est
form
of
real
ism
.
Fun
ding
This
res
earc
h r
ecei
ved
no s
pec
ific
gra
nt
from
any f
undin
g a
gen
cy i
n t
he
publi
c, c
om
mer
cial
or
not-
for-
pro
fit
sect
ors
.
Ack
now
ledg
emen
t
This
much
rev
ised
art
icle
is
adap
ted f
rom
the
Ken
net
h W
altz
Annual
Lec
ture
del
iver
ed t
o t
he
Dep
artm
ent
of
Inte
rnat
ional
Poli
tics
, A
ber
yst
wyth
Univ
ersi
ty,
on 9
Mar
ch 2
012 e
nti
tled
‘T
he
382
Inte
rnat
iona
l Rel
atio
ns 2
6(4)
dec
line
of
the
Wes
t an
d t
he
rise
of
the
rest
: m
yth
s of
pow
er s
hif
ts a
nd e
conom
ists
’. I
would
lik
e to
than
k K
en B
ooth
for
invit
ing m
e to
giv
e th
e le
cture
and t
o d
evel
op m
y t
houghts
above.
No
tes
1 M
ichae
l C
ox,
Ken
Booth
and T
im D
unne
(eds.
), T
he I
nter
regn
um:
Con
trov
ersi
es i
n W
orld
P
olit
ics
(Cam
bri
dge:
Cam
bri
dge
Univ
ersi
ty P
ress
, 1999).
2 Jo
hn M
ears
hei
mer
, ‘W
hy W
e W
ill
Soon M
iss
the
Cold
War
’, A
tlan
tic
Mon
thly
, August
1990.
pp.3
5-5
0.
3 I
dis
cuss
ed th
is v
isio
n o
f th
e post
-Cold
War
worl
d m
any y
ears
ago in
Mic
hae
l Cox, U
S F
orei
gn
Pol
icy
afte
r th
e C
old
War
: Su
perp
ower
Wit
hout
a M
issi
on?
(London:
Chat
ham
House
, P
inte
r
Pre
ss, 1995).
4 C
hri
stopher
Lay
ne
chal
lenged
what
he
term
ed the
illu
sion o
f unip
ola
rity
as
earl
y a
s 1993 in a
n
arti
cle
publi
shed
in I
nter
nati
onal
Sec
urit
y (‘
The
Unip
ola
r Il
lusi
on:
Why N
ew G
reat
Pow
ers
wil
l A
rise
’) a
nd r
eturn
ed t
o t
he
sam
e th
eme
over
10 y
ears
lat
er i
n h
is ‘
The
Unip
ola
r Il
lusi
on
Rev
isit
ed’,
Int
erna
tion
al S
ecur
ity,
32(2
), F
all
2006, pp. 7–41.
5
Char
les
Kupch
an,
‘Aft
er
Pax
Am
eric
ana:
B
enig
n
Pow
er,
Reg
ional
In
tegra
tion,
and
the
Sourc
es o
f a
Sta
ble
Mult
ipola
rity
’, I
nter
nati
onal
Sec
urit
y, 2
3(2
), F
all
1998.
6 D
onal
d W
. W
hit
e, T
he A
mer
ican
Cen
tury
: T
he R
ise
and
Dec
line
of
the
Uni
ted
Stat
es a
s a
Wor
ld P
ower
(N
ew H
aven
, C
T: Y
ale
Univ
ersi
ty P
ress
, 1999).
7 B
ruce
Cum
min
gs,
‘S
till
the
Am
eric
an C
entu
ry’,
Rev
iew
of I
nter
nati
onal
Stu
dies
, 25(5
), 1
999.
8 I
trie
d
to
captu
re
this
tu
rn-o
f-th
e-ce
ntu
ry
mood
in
the
Unit
ed
Sta
tes
in
Mic
hae
l C
ox,
‘What
ever
Hap
pen
ed t
o A
mer
ican
Dec
line?
Inte
rnat
ional
Rel
atio
ns
and t
he
New
Unit
ed
Sta
tes
Heg
emony’
New
Pol
itic
al E
cono
my,
6(3
), 2
001, pp. 311
–40.
9 S
ee t
he
front
cover
of
Tim
e m
agaz
ine,
7 D
ecem
ber
2009.
The
arti
cle
insi
de
was
unam
big
u-
ousl
y c
lear
about
‘the
firs
t 10 y
ears
of
this
cen
tury
… T
hey
wil
l ver
y l
ikel
y g
o d
ow
n a
s th
e
most
dis
pir
itin
g a
nd d
isil
lusi
onin
g d
ecad
e A
mer
ican
s hav
e li
ved
thro
ugh i
n t
he
post
-Worl
d
War
II
er
a’.
Avai
lable
at
: htt
p:/
/ww
w.t
ime.
com
/tim
e/m
agaz
ine/
arti
cle/
0,9
171,1
942973,0
0.
htm
l#ix
zz23JZ
V3iu
O
10 O
n 9
/11 a
nd i
ts i
mpac
t se
e K
en B
ooth
and T
im D
unne
(eds)
, W
orld
s in
Col
lisi
on:
Terr
or a
nd
the
Fut
ure
of G
loba
l Ord
er (
Bas
ingst
oke:
Pal
gra
ve
Mac
mil
lan, 2002).
11
R
oger
C.
Alt
man
, ‘T
he
Gre
at C
rash
, 2008:
A G
eopoli
tica
l S
etbac
k f
or
the
Wes
t’,
For
eign
A
ffai
rs, 2009, pp. 2–14.
12 S
ee J
im O
’Nei
ll,
Bui
ldin
g B
ette
r G
loba
l E
cono
mic
BR
ICs.
Glo
bal
Eco
nom
ics
Pap
er N
o.
66
(Gold
man
Sac
hs,
30 N
ovem
ber
2001).
13
See
‘G
old
man
S
achs
Jim
O
’Nei
ll R
efle
cts
10 Y
ears
af
ter
Coin
ing B
RIC
’, 27 N
ovem
ber
20
11
. A
vai
lab
le at
: h
ttp
://a
rtic
les.
bu
sin
essi
nsi
der
.co
m/2
011
-11
-27
/mar
ket
s/3
04
46
41
7_
1_bri
c-co
untr
ies-
india
-and-c
hin
a-gdp
14 D
anny Q
uah
sum
med
this
vie
w u
p m
ost
succ
inct
ly:
‘As
late
as
1980’
he
note
d,
‘Nort
h
Am
eric
a an
d W
este
rn E
uro
pe
pro
duce
d m
ore
than
tw
o-t
hir
ds
of
this
pla
net
’s i
nco
me.
Not
unex
pec
tedly
then
, th
e w
orl
d e
conom
ic c
ente
r of
gra
vit
y 3
0 y
ears
ago w
as a
poin
t dee
p i
n t
he
mid
dle
of
the
Atl
anti
c O
cean
, 900 m
iles
wes
t of
Moro
cco.
By 2
008,
how
ever
, bec
ause
of
the
conti
nuin
g r
ise
of
India
, C
hin
a an
d t
he
rest
of
Eas
t A
sia,
that
cen
ter
of
gra
vit
y h
ad s
hif
ted t
o
a poin
t ju
st o
uts
ide
Izm
ir T
urk
ey,
east
of
Hel
sinki
and B
uch
ares
t – a
dri
ft o
f 3000 m
iles
, or
about
thre
e quar
ters
of
the
Ear
th’s
rad
ius.
My p
roje
ctio
n h
as i
t th
at t
his
move
east
wil
l co
n-
tinue
unti
l 2050 w
hen
the
worl
d e
conom
ic c
ente
r of
gra
vit
y w
ill cl
ust
er o
n the
bord
er b
etw
een
India
and C
hin
a, 4
00 m
iles
eas
t of
Kat
man
du’.
See
his
anal
ysi
s, ‘
Worl
d’s
Cen
ter
of
Eco
nom
ic
Gra
vit
y S
hif
ts E
ast’
, in
CN
N W
orld
Apri
l 2011
. Avai
lable
at:
htt
p:/
/glo
bal
publi
csquar
e.blo
gs.
cnn.c
om
/tag
/dan
ny-q
uah
/
Cox 2012
Week 1
WikiLeaks 2010
Week 1
WikiLeaks 2010
Week 1
WikiLeaks 2010
Week 1
WikiLeaks 2010
Week 1
The
capa
city
topr
ovid
e th
e w
orld
its
glob
al p
ublic
good
s is
no
long
er u
niqu
e to
the
US,
nor
is it
obvi
ousl
yA
mer
ica'
s to
wie
ld
Com
men
t›
Insi
ght &
Opi
nion
How
Chi
na's
ris
e is
rev
ealin
g th
e cr
acks
in U
S cl
aim
s to
legi
timac
y as
glob
al le
ader
PU
BLI
SH
ED
: W
edne
sday
, 19
Aug
ust,
2015
, 4:3
0pm
UP
DA
TED
: Th
ursd
ay, 2
0 A
ugus
t, 20
15, 1
2:36
pm
Dan
ny Q
uah
Dan
ny Q
uah
says
Chi
na c
an p
rovi
de a
new
nar
rativ
e to
lead
, with
out e
ven
need
ing
to m
entio
n po
wer
Chi
na's
cur
renc
y re
calib
ratio
ns h
ave
jolte
d gl
obal
mar
kets
, as
did
Am
eric
a's
2013
"tap
erta
ntru
m",
whe
n th
en U
S F
eder
al R
eser
ve c
hairm
an B
en B
erna
nke
said
the
fed
mig
ht s
low
the
rate
of b
ond
purc
hase
s. C
hina
is s
eeki
ng in
clus
ion
of it
s cu
rren
cy in
the
Inte
rnat
iona
lM
onet
ary
Fund
's S
peci
al D
raw
ing
Rig
hts
on th
e w
ay n
ot o
nly
to re
nmin
bi in
tern
atio
nalis
atio
n,bu
t als
o to
cha
lleng
ing
the
US
dol
lar a
s w
orld
rese
rve
curr
ency
. As
if th
is w
eren
't en
ough
,C
hina
has
als
o se
t up
the
Asi
an In
frast
ruct
ure
Inve
stm
ent B
ank
(AIIB
) and
was
key
in p
uttin
gto
geth
er th
e B
RIC
S d
evel
opm
ent b
ank.
Take
n to
geth
er, t
hese
refle
ct th
e la
rges
t dis
rupt
ion
yet t
o an
inte
rnat
iona
l fin
anci
alar
chite
ctur
e in
pla
ce s
ince
the
early
195
0s. Y
et a
gain
, Chi
na's
risi
ng p
ower
is p
lain
.
For s
ome
obse
rver
s, th
is s
ets
off a
larm
bel
ls, a
nd th
ey a
re p
uzzl
ed w
hy th
e re
st o
f the
wor
ldis
n't m
ore
conc
erne
d: "C
hina
's ri
se d
irect
ly c
halle
nges
Am
eric
a. C
ompe
titio
n be
twee
n th
etw
o is
inev
itabl
e. J
ust a
s A
mer
ica
dom
inat
es th
e W
este
rn H
emis
pher
e, C
hina
will
aim
todo
min
ate
Asi
a, a
nd A
mer
ica
and
Chi
na w
ill e
ach
seek
to c
onta
in th
e ot
her.
As
Chi
naco
ntin
ues
its a
scen
t, th
e lik
elih
ood
of w
ar w
ith A
mer
ica
only
eve
r gro
ws.
"
Suc
h ob
serv
ers
are
not u
niqu
e to
one
sid
e or
the
othe
r, bu
tin
clud
e bo
th C
hine
se -
Yan
Xue
tong
- an
d A
mer
ican
(Joh
nM
ears
heim
er) w
riter
s, a
nd I
para
phra
se th
em, b
ut o
nly
just
.
Wha
teve
r ide
alis
ts m
ight
sug
gest
, a b
attle
for w
orld
lead
ersh
ipis
set
and
has
bee
n in
trai
n fo
r a w
hile
.
In h
is b
ook
Is th
e A
mer
ican
Cen
tury
Ove
r?, J
osep
h N
yede
scrib
ed h
ow th
e "A
mer
ican
cen
tury
" em
erge
d in
the
1940
spa
rtly
from
its
uniq
ue c
apac
ity to
pro
vide
the
glob
al p
ublic
good
s th
e w
orld
nee
ded.
Nye
mas
terfu
lly s
how
ed u
s th
ede
vast
atin
g re
ach
of h
is c
once
pt o
f sof
t pow
er: t
hat i
nflu
ence
ism
ore
impo
rtant
than
mili
tary
pow
er a
nd th
at d
omin
atio
n do
esn'
tm
ean
lead
ersh
ip. H
e re
min
ded
us h
ow S
inga
pore
's L
ee K
uan
Yew
had
onc
e to
ld h
im th
at A
mer
ica
wou
ld a
lway
s be
ahe
ad o
fC
hina
: whi
le C
hina
mig
ht b
oast
a p
opul
atio
n of
1.3
bill
ion
peop
le, A
mer
ica
coul
d dr
aw o
n th
e ta
lent
s an
d go
odw
ill o
f mor
e th
an s
even
bill
ion.
But
, in
oppo
sitio
n to
Nye
's a
rgum
ent,
that
cap
acity
to p
rovi
de th
e w
orld
its
glob
al p
ublic
good
s is
no
long
er u
niqu
e to
the
US
, nor
is it
obv
ious
ly A
mer
ica'
s to
wie
ld. T
he w
orld
'sec
onom
ic c
entre
of g
ravi
ty u
sed
to s
it of
f the
eas
tern
sea
boar
d of
the
US
, but
no
long
er.
Man
y of
the
wor
ld's
pro
blem
s re
quire
glo
bal c
oope
ratio
n: n
o si
ngle
nat
ion
by it
self,
cer
tain
lyno
t the
US
, can
take
on
the
prob
lem
of g
loba
l clim
ate
chan
ge, c
yber
secu
rity
or in
tern
atio
nal
pand
emic
s. T
hat u
niqu
e ca
paci
ty th
at s
tarte
d th
e A
mer
ican
cen
tury
is n
o m
ore.
If th
e ce
ntur
yis
to re
mai
n A
mer
ican
, the
US
will
hav
e to
be
a ge
nuin
e le
ader
, not
just
a u
nila
tera
l doe
r.
Am
eric
a fa
ces
two
optio
ns. I
t can
lead
the
wor
ld b
y in
sist
ing
it w
ield
s fe
arso
me
pow
er -
in it
sm
ilita
ry, i
n its
tech
nolo
gy, i
n th
e st
reng
th o
f its
eco
nom
y, in
its
owne
rshi
p of
the
wor
ld's
rese
rve
curr
ency
, in
its c
reat
ivity
and
in th
e N
obel
priz
es it
win
s.
Or i
t can
lead
the
wor
ld b
y be
ing
a fo
rce
for g
ood.
Tim
e w
as, i
t did
bot
h po
wer
and
legi
timac
y. B
ut if
the
US
now
wie
lds
only
the
first
- as
Nye
desc
ribes
so
conv
inci
ngly
- ca
n it
still
dra
w o
n th
e go
odw
ill o
f the
sev
en b
illio
n pe
ople
on
earth
that
Lee
Kua
n Y
ew p
rom
ised
? W
ithou
t con
vict
ion
and
clar
ity o
n th
e gl
obal
pub
licgo
ods
it de
liver
s, is
US
sof
t pow
er o
nly
ordi
nary
pow
er?
The
idea
is n
eith
er fa
ncifu
l nor
whi
msi
cal t
hat l
eade
rshi
p co
mes
with
doi
ng g
ood
for t
hose
who
are
led.
It is
, afte
r all,
a p
rinci
ple
of e
cono
mic
s th
at u
nder
free
-mar
ket c
apita
lism
the
only
nee
d a
soci
ety
has
for g
over
nmen
t is
whe
n go
vern
men
t pro
vide
s pu
blic
goo
ds.
Dem
ocra
cy h
as a
s on
e of
its
mos
t che
rishe
d pr
inci
ples
that
a s
ocie
ty s
houl
d se
lect
lead
ers
who
are
acc
ount
able
, com
pete
nt a
nd e
ffect
ive,
and
who
wor
k fo
r tha
t soc
iety
. The
phr
ase
"con
sent
of t
he g
over
ned"
shi
nes
a lig
ht in
the
seco
nd p
arag
raph
of t
he A
mer
ican
Dec
lara
tion
of In
depe
nden
ce. T
rue,
the
com
mun
ity o
f nat
ions
has
no
wor
ld g
over
nmen
t, an
dth
e pe
ople
in th
ose
natio
ns a
re c
erta
inly
not
citi
zens
of t
he U
nite
d S
tate
s. B
ut if
Am
eric
ado
es n
ot s
eek
thei
r con
sent
, per
haps
nei
ther
sho
uld
it se
ek to
lead
them
.
Con
vers
ely,
Chi
na c
an p
rovi
de a
new
nar
rativ
e to
lead
the
wor
ld, o
ne a
vaila
ble
to it
with
out
even
nee
ding
to m
entio
n po
wer
. With
the
AIIB
hel
ping
bui
ld in
frast
ruct
ure
in e
nerg
y,te
leco
ms
and
trans
port
thro
ugho
ut A
sia,
Chi
na c
an ju
st s
ay: "
We
are
far f
rom
per
fect
. But
we
unde
rsta
nd h
ow h
ard
it is
to d
evel
op a
nd g
row
an
econ
omy.
We
don'
t alw
ays
get i
t rig
ht, a
ndw
e m
ight
cer
tain
ly n
ot g
et it
righ
t for
you
. But
we'
re h
ere
to h
elp.
" Chi
na h
as re
ache
d ou
t with
AIIB
, the
BR
ICS
dev
elop
men
t ban
k an
d a
host
of o
ther
initi
ativ
es.
The
AIIB
's b
alan
ce s
heet
, whi
le s
ubst
antia
l, pa
les
com
pare
d w
ith th
ose
of th
e In
tern
atio
nal
Mon
etar
y Fu
nd a
nd th
e W
orld
Ban
k; it
is e
ven
smal
ler t
han
the
Asi
an D
evel
opm
ent B
ank'
s.Th
is is
no
Chi
na m
achi
ne o
ut to
con
quer
the
glob
al e
cono
my
thro
ugh
shee
r pow
er. T
his
isbu
ildin
g an
incl
usiv
e in
tern
atio
nal o
rder
, the
sam
e th
ing
Am
eric
a ha
d do
ne. T
his
narr
ativ
eco
uld
wel
l end
up
win
ning
ove
r the
wor
ld's
peo
ple
who
don
't liv
e al
ong
the
trans
atla
ntic
axi
s,an
d w
ho n
ever
qui
te g
ot to
be
part
of th
e A
mer
ican
cen
tury
.
In c
ontra
st, m
any
acco
unts
of t
he A
mer
ican
cen
tury
now
sou
nd a
s if
they
rely
mor
e on
Am
eric
a's
pow
er, a
nd le
ss o
n A
mer
ica'
s do
ing
good
in th
e w
orld
.
If w
e co
ntin
ue d
own
this
road
and
app
ly th
e N
ye-L
ee K
uan
Yew
crit
erio
n, C
hina
is g
oing
tow
in. W
hat's
at s
take
? Th
at w
hich
Lee
Kua
n Y
ew p
rom
ised
: the
tale
nts
and
good
will
of t
hepl
anet
's s
even
bill
ion
peop
le.
Dan
ny Q
uah
is p
rofe
ssor
of e
cono
mic
s an
d in
tern
atio
nal d
evel
opm
ent,
and
dire
ctor
of
the
Saw
Sw
ee H
ock
Sout
heas
t Asi
a C
entr
e at
the
Lond
on S
choo
l of E
cono
mic
s
Sour
ce U
RL:
http
://w
ww
.scm
p.co
m/c
omm
ent/i
nsig
ht-o
pini
on/a
rticl
e/18
5083
7/ho
w-c
hina
s-
Quah 2015a
Week 2
Econ
omic
s m
ight
be
a di
smal
fie
ld b
ut t
ry I
nter
nati
onal
Rel
atio
ns
Econ
omic
s m
ight
be
a di
smal
soc
ial s
cien
ce. B
ut in
its
norm
ativ
e an
alys
is e
cono
mic
s as
ks p
olic
y-m
aker
s to
do w
hat i
s in
the
publ
ic g
ood
– ev
en if
eco
nom
ists
mig
ht d
isag
ree
on e
xact
ly h
ow to
ach
ieve
that
soc
ial
adva
ncem
ent.
(Som
e re
ader
s ha
ve a
ccus
ed m
e of
atta
ckin
g th
e en
tire
field
of I
nter
natio
nal R
elat
ions
in w
hat f
ollo
ws
–
whi
ch I
cer
tain
ly d
o no
t int
end
and
that
I fe
el w
ould
be
a to
tally
rid
icul
ous
thin
g to
do
anyw
ay. I
’ve
title
d
this
blo
g en
try
wha
t I h
ave,
not
bec
ause
that
title
is e
xhau
stiv
ely
desc
riptiv
e. I
nste
ad, i
t is
beca
use
I
coul
dn’t
put i
n th
e tit
le a
ll th
e qu
alify
ing
stat
emen
ts th
at m
ake
wha
t I’m
abo
ut to
say
coh
eren
t and
use
ful,
at le
ast i
n m
y vi
ew.
To b
e cl
ear,
the
key
wor
d in
the
title
, “di
smal
”, in
eco
nom
ics
does
n’t m
ean
bad
or
disa
ppoi
ntin
g. I
t jus
t mea
ns ta
king
a r
ealis
tic v
iew
of h
uman
ity. I
t mea
ns h
ypot
hesi
sing
that
indi
vidu
als
in
soci
ety
are
mot
ivat
ed to
do
wha
t’s g
ood
for
them
selv
es, t
hat n
o on
e is
altr
uist
ic. B
oth
econ
omic
s an
d
Inte
rnat
iona
l Rel
atio
ns [
in R
ealis
m]
shar
e th
is fe
atur
e as
a b
adge
of h
onou
r. B
ut if
, as
a re
ader
, you
do
feel
offe
nded
by
the
title
and
by
wha
t you
thin
k th
is b
log
entr
y is
goi
ng to
go
on to
say
, stil
l ple
ase
bear
with
me,
and
let m
e tr
y to
cla
rify
in w
hat f
ollo
ws.
)
Econ
omic
s ap
plie
s th
is p
rinci
ple
of n
orm
ativ
e an
alys
is r
uthl
essl
y, in
eve
ry p
robl
em a
nd s
ituat
ion
it
exam
ines
, whe
neve
r it
cons
ider
s po
licy-
mak
ers
and
polic
y-m
akin
g. T
he fi
eld
of I
nter
natio
nal R
elat
ions
, in
man
y pa
rts,
use
s th
e sa
me
lens
of a
naly
sis.
The
mag
nific
ent w
ork
of R
ober
t Keo
hane
, for
inst
ance
, dea
ls
with
fost
erin
g co
oper
atio
n in
the
com
mun
ity o
f nat
ions
, to
achi
eve
good
inte
rnat
iona
l out
com
es, w
heth
er
thro
ugh
bene
vole
nt h
egem
ony
or e
xplic
it in
stitu
tions
. Joh
n Ik
enbe
rry
spea
ks e
loqu
ently
of t
he U
S bu
ildin
g
an in
clus
ive,
rul
es-b
ased
, dem
ocra
tic, a
nd tr
ansp
aren
t wor
ld o
rder
, ope
n to
all
natio
ns w
ho s
hare
its
nobl
e id
eals
. Hen
ry K
issi
nger
des
crib
es h
ow H
arry
Tru
man
and
suc
cess
ors
in th
e U
S w
ere
prou
dest
of
thei
r ha
ving
put
toge
ther
a c
omm
unity
of n
atio
ns “
obse
rvin
g co
mm
on r
ules
and
nor
ms,
em
brac
ing
liber
al
econ
omic
sys
tem
s, fo
rsw
earin
g te
rrito
rial c
onqu
est,
resp
ectin
g na
tiona
l sov
erei
gnty
, and
ado
ptin
g
part
icip
ator
y an
d de
moc
ratic
sys
tem
s of
gov
erna
nce.
” I
nter
natio
nal R
elat
ions
car
ries
a va
st a
nd g
row
ing
subf
ield
on
glob
al c
limat
e ch
ange
, in
man
y w
ays
mor
e de
eply
em
bedd
ed th
an in
eco
nom
ics.
In
all t
his,
Inte
rnat
iona
l Rel
atio
ns a
naly
sis
puts
at i
ts c
ore
adva
ncin
g th
e w
ell-b
eing
of t
he w
orld
.
But t
hat i
sn’t
alw
ays
the
norm
. Ind
eed,
in w
hat m
any
wou
ld a
gree
to b
e th
e ke
y is
sue
of th
e 21
st c
entu
ry
– th
e ris
e of
Chi
na a
nd th
e po
ssib
le e
mer
genc
e of
a n
ew w
orld
ord
er –
the
pers
pect
ive
is q
uite
diff
eren
t.
On
this
impo
rtan
t pro
blem
, som
e of
the
wor
ld’s
lead
ing
Inte
rnat
iona
l Rel
atio
ns s
chol
ars
seem
com
plet
ely
com
fort
able
arg
uing
not
for
the
good
of g
loba
l soc
iety
, but
for
who
sho
uld
be th
e nu
mbe
r 1
coun
try
(sur
pris
e, y
es, t
heir
own)
. Thi
s is
so
even
if th
at s
omet
imes
ent
ails
set
ting
up m
ultip
le, i
ncon
sist
ent
stan
dard
s fo
r th
e co
nduc
t of d
iffer
ent n
atio
n st
ates
– th
e U
S, C
hina
, Eur
ope,
all
the
othe
r co
untr
ies
on
Eart
h –
with
out t
he s
light
est a
ckno
wle
dgm
ent o
f cog
nitiv
e di
sson
ance
. Dis
agre
emen
t is
over
whe
ther
bein
g nu
mbe
r 1
invo
lves
eith
er c
onfli
ct b
etw
een
the
grea
t pow
ers
or, i
nste
ad, p
eace
ful c
o-ex
iste
nce.
Post
ed b
y D
anny
Qua
h on
201
5.07
.09
Leav
e a
com
men
t (1
2)G
o to
com
men
ts
DQ
-en
Mak
ing
Larg
e Th
ings
Vis
ible
to
the
Nak
ed E
ye –
Eng
lish
As a
n ex
ampl
e, ta
ke th
e ex
celle
nt a
nd th
ough
t-pr
ovok
ing
docu
men
tary
film
by
my
LSE
colle
ague
Bill
Cal
laha
n. T
his
wor
k fe
atur
es tw
o ic
onic
Int
erna
tiona
l Rel
atio
n th
eoris
ts.
John
Mea
rshe
imer
, the
ext
rem
e re
alis
t, is
con
vinc
ed C
hina
cann
ot c
ontin
ue it
s cl
aim
ed p
eace
ful r
ise.
Con
fron
tatio
n
with
the
US
is in
evita
ble.
In
the
vide
o at
07:
00
Mea
rshe
imer
say
s “F
rom
Chi
na’s
poi
nt o
f vie
w, i
t mak
es
perf
ect s
ense
to w
ant t
o do
min
ate
Asia
, the
way
the
US
dom
inat
es th
e W
este
rn H
emis
pher
e.”
At 1
6:22
he
says
, of
cour
se, “
The
US
has
a de
ep-s
eate
d in
tere
st in
doi
ng e
very
thin
g it
can
to p
reve
nt C
hina
from
dom
inat
ing
Asia
.”
Mea
rshe
imer
is s
crup
ulou
sly
even
-han
ded
in h
is d
iscu
ssio
n of
bot
h th
e U
S an
d Ch
ina.
Chi
na w
ill w
ant t
o
dom
inat
e As
ia, e
xact
ly a
s th
e U
S ha
s do
min
ated
the
US.
The
uns
poke
n im
plic
atio
n by
sym
met
ry is
that
Chin
a w
ill s
eek
to d
islo
dge
the
US
from
its
dom
inat
ion
of th
e W
est.
The
vist
a is
ent
irely
gre
at-p
ower
cent
red.
The
re is
no
reco
gniti
on w
hats
oeve
r th
at th
e 5b
n pe
ople
who
live
out
side
the
US
and
Chin
a co
unt,
or th
at th
ey to
geth
er w
ith m
any
Amer
ican
s an
d Ch
ines
e th
emse
lves
mig
ht s
eek
a vi
sion
that
asp
ires
to
nobl
e, u
nive
rsal
ist i
nstin
cts.
Whe
re n
ow a
re th
e id
eals
Keo
hane
and
Ike
nber
ry s
ough
t? W
hat h
as
happ
ened
to th
e in
clus
ive
inte
rnat
iona
l ord
er in
whi
ch U
S Pr
esid
ents
sin
ce T
rum
an to
ok p
ride,
that
Kiss
inge
r de
scrib
ed?
I’m n
ot s
ugge
stin
g th
ere
is a
nyth
ing
uniq
uely
Am
eric
an to
this
. Th
e Ch
ines
e ac
adem
ic X
ueto
ng Y
an
prov
ides
, in
mirr
or im
age,
exa
ctly
the
sam
e di
scou
rse:
bot
h
in th
e ev
en-h
ande
dnes
s w
ith w
hich
he
thin
ks th
roug
h th
e
posi
tion
of th
e U
S an
d Ch
ina,
and
in h
is in
sist
ence
that
conf
lict i
s in
evita
ble:
“Ch
ina’
s qu
est t
o en
hanc
e its
wor
ld
lead
ersh
ip s
tatu
s an
d Am
eric
a’s
effo
rt to
mai
ntai
n its
pre
sent
posi
tion
is a
zer
o-su
m g
ame.
” (
How
Chi
na C
an D
efea
t
Amer
ica,
New
Yor
k Ti
mes
, 21
Nov
embe
r 20
11).
One
will
gain
onl
y to
the
exte
nt th
e ot
her
lose
s.
The
only
sig
nific
ant d
iffer
ence
I s
ee m
ight
be
in th
at
how
ever
the
Wes
tern
Hem
isph
ere
feel
s ab
out b
eing
dom
inat
ed b
y th
e U
S, A
sia
has
not h
ad th
e sa
me
deca
des
to w
ork
thro
ugh
its fe
elin
gs o
n its
imm
inen
t Chi
na d
omin
atio
n. A
wes
tern
obs
erve
r m
ight
say
this
stru
ctur
e of
dom
inat
ion
is o
nly
to b
e ex
pect
ed o
f the
aut
ocra
cy th
at is
Chi
na. I
t’s h
arde
r to
squ
are
with
the
Lock
ean
idea
l of “
cons
ent b
y th
e go
vern
ed”
that
is r
efer
red
to in
the
beau
tiful
sec
ond
para
grap
h of
the
US
Dec
lara
tion
of I
ndep
ende
nce.
Tru
e, th
e W
este
rn H
emis
pher
e do
es n
ot c
ompr
ise
citiz
ens
of th
e U
S.
But t
hat c
uts
both
way
s in
this
nar
rativ
e: if
the
US
does
not
hav
e to
see
k th
eir
cons
ent,
perh
aps
neith
er
shou
ld it
dom
inat
e th
em.
Man
y ec
onom
ists
rec
ogni
se e
asy
kins
hip
in th
is h
ypot
hesi
sing
that
the
acto
rs u
nder
stu
dy lo
ok o
ut fo
r on
ly
them
selv
es.
That
fram
ewor
k is
the
one
in w
hich
eco
nom
ists
wor
k, a
nd h
ave
done
eve
r si
nce
Adam
Smith
. Ye
s, o
bvio
usly
, it’s
the
natio
n st
ate
here
; w
hile
it’s
con
sum
ers
and
busi
ness
es in
eco
nom
ics
– bu
t
it’s
not t
he id
entit
ies
that
mat
ter.
It’s
the
idea
that
pla
yers
are
sel
f-se
ekin
g th
at b
oth
econ
omis
ts a
nd
Quah 2015b
Week 2
inte
rnat
iona
l rel
atio
ns s
chol
ars
shar
e co
mfo
rtab
ly. W
e do
n’t d
o al
trui
sm.
But a
n ec
onom
ist –
who
und
erst
ands
bas
ic th
eory
and
thin
ks a
bout
thes
e ac
tions
as
polic
y-m
akin
g –
wou
ld a
sk fu
rthe
r, W
here
is th
e m
arke
t fai
lure
that
wor
ld o
rder
sho
uld
now
, in
light
of C
hina
’s r
ise
and
curr
ent U
S he
gem
ony,
see
k to
sol
ve?
How
doe
s Ch
ina’
s gr
owin
g w
eigh
t in
the
wor
ld a
ffect
the
calc
ulat
ion
of g
loba
l wel
l-bei
ng?
Wha
t are
thes
e la
rge
stat
e ac
tors
doi
ng to
pro
mot
e th
e gl
obal
pub
lic g
ood?
Inte
rnat
iona
l Rel
atio
ns s
chol
ars
who
I d
eepl
y ad
mire
and
res
pect
ofte
n as
k m
e w
hat t
heor
y un
derli
es
my
obse
rvat
ions
abo
ut w
orld
ord
er.
Thos
e qu
estio
ns I
’ve
just
pos
ed?
That
’s th
e th
eory
. An
d, to
be
clea
r,
as e
cono
mic
s al
so h
ypot
hesi
ses
that
pla
yers
are
sel
f-se
ekin
g an
d no
t altr
uist
ic, t
hese
cha
lleng
es r
aise
d
are
not f
or a
ny o
ne n
atio
n to
sol
ve –
they
are
for
the
glob
al s
yste
m w
e de
sign
to ta
ckle
.
Joe
Nye
, who
I h
old
in th
e hi
ghes
t est
eem
and
with
who
m I
hav
e be
en lu
cky
enou
gh to
eng
age
on a
num
ber
of o
ccas
ions
, is
iden
tifie
d in
Bill
’s fi
lm a
s be
ing
in th
e op
posi
te c
orne
r fr
om M
ears
heim
er.
In th
e
film
, Joe
arg
ues
that
pea
cefu
l co-
exis
tenc
e is
pos
sibl
e th
roug
h di
plom
acy
and
inte
rnat
iona
l org
anis
atio
ns –
as h
e ha
s do
ne c
onsi
sten
tly, g
ently
, and
per
suas
ivel
y in
his
pro
fess
iona
l life
. Ca
llaha
n de
scrib
es N
ye’s
view
s as
a m
ixtu
re o
f Rea
lism
and
Lib
eral
ism
.
That
’s it
. Mea
rshe
imer
ver
sus
Nye
: th
ose
are
the
two
oppo
site
s id
entif
ied
in th
e fil
m, w
ith Y
an a
nd o
ther
s
arra
yed
arou
nd th
em.
I th
ink
that
if, o
n th
is q
uest
ion
of w
orld
ord
er –
the
plac
e of
the
US,
the
rise
of C
hina
– a
naly
sis
took
mor
e
on b
oard
the
less
ons
of e
cono
mic
s –
wel
fare
eco
nom
ics
and
mec
hani
sm d
esig
n –
the
disc
ours
e on
wor
ld
orde
r m
ight
wel
l tur
n ou
t diff
eren
t. W
e al
l rec
ogni
se th
ere
is a
col
lect
ive
actio
n pr
oble
m:
indi
vidu
al
natio
ns a
re s
elf-
seek
ing;
all
wan
t to
free
-rid
e; n
one
wan
ts to
und
erta
ke th
e co
stly
act
ion
to p
rovi
de g
loba
l
publ
ic g
oods
. The
que
stio
n fo
r sc
hola
rs a
nd r
esea
rche
rs is
, do
we
then
say
, fin
e, le
t’s ju
st d
o th
e be
st w
e
can,
taki
ng th
e sy
stem
as
give
n? T
here
is c
erta
inly
a n
eed
to a
ddre
ss th
is q
uest
ion,
and
man
y of
Inte
rnat
iona
l Rel
atio
ns’s
mos
t out
stan
ding
sch
olar
s do
exa
ctly
that
on
this
que
stio
n of
the
rise
of C
hina
and
glob
al p
ower
shi
ft.
Or
inst
ead
we
mig
ht a
sk, h
ow c
an w
e pu
t in
plac
e a
bette
r-de
sign
ed s
yste
m, s
o th
at e
ven
thou
gh th
at
syst
em a
sks
indi
vidu
al n
atio
ns o
nly
to lo
ok o
ut fo
r th
emse
lves
, and
no
one
need
s to
be
altr
uist
ic,
none
thel
ess,
the
syst
em g
ener
ates
a s
urpr
isin
g, e
mer
gent
out
com
e th
at a
dvan
ces
the
wel
l-bei
ng o
f all
hum
anity
? In
a d
iffer
ent s
ettin
g an
d fo
r a
diffe
rent
pur
pose
, eco
nom
ists
do
know
exa
ctly
suc
h a
mec
hani
sm:
it’s
calle
d Ad
am S
mith
’s I
nvis
ible
Han
d, o
r th
e Fu
ndam
enta
l The
orem
of W
elfa
re E
cono
mic
s.
Wha
t is
the
coun
terp
art o
f tha
t fun
dam
enta
l the
orem
for
wor
ld o
rder
? Su
ch a
n ec
onom
ics-
driv
en d
esig
n
for
wor
ld o
rder
mig
ht b
ette
r se
rve
all o
f hum
anity
than
tryi
ng to
det
erm
ine
who
rem
ains
or
has
just
beco
me
num
ber
1.
Quah 2015b
Week 2
Doe
sG
eorg
eW
.Bus
h’s
pres
iden
cym
ark
the
dem
ise
ofth
eer
aof
liber
alin
tern
atio
nalis
min
the
Uni
ted
Stat
es?
Acc
ord
ing
tom
any
anal
ysts
,itd
oes
not.1
The
prev
ailin
gw
isd
omis
that
the
Bus
had
min
istr
atio
n’s
asse
rtiv
eun
ilate
ralis
m,i
tsav
ersi
onto
inte
rnat
iona
lin
stit
utio
ns,
and
its
zeal
ous
effo
rts
tosp
read
dem
ocra
cyin
the
Mid
dle
Eas
tre
pres
ent
ate
mpo
rary
dep
artu
refr
omth
eU
nite
dSt
ates
’tr
adit
iona
lfo
reig
npo
licy.
Out
ofst
epw
ith
both
publ
ican
dex
pert
opin
ion,
the
Bus
hre
volu
tion
was
orch
estr
ated
bya
smal
lgr
oup
ofne
ocon
serv
ativ
eof
ªci
als
who
,wit
hth
ehe
lpof
the
Sept
embe
r11
terr
oris
tatt
acks
,man
aged
tow
rest
cont
rolo
fth
efo
r-ei
gnpo
licy
appa
ratu
s.2
Thi
sac
coun
tim
plie
sth
atth
eB
ush
adm
inis
tra-
tion
’sfo
reig
npo
licy
isan
aber
rati
onan
dth
atth
eU
nite
dSt
ates
’co
mm
itm
ent
toth
efo
rmul
aof
liber
alin
tern
atio
nalis
m—
U.S
.po
wer
plus
inte
rnat
iona
lco
oper
atio
n—w
illbe
rest
ored
afte
rB
ush
leav
esof
ªce
.Ind
eed
,inº
uent
ialt
hink
tank
san
dfo
reig
npo
licy
grou
psar
eal
read
ych
urni
ngou
tac
tion
plan
sfo
rre
-vi
ving
liber
alin
tern
atio
nalis
m.3
Cha
rles
A.K
upch
anis
Prof
esso
rof
Inte
rnat
iona
lA
ffair
sat
Geo
rget
own
Uni
vers
ity,S
enio
rFe
llow
atth
eC
ounc
ilon
Fore
ign
Rel
atio
ns,
and
Hen
ryA
.K
issi
nger
Scho
lar
atth
eLi
brar
yof
Con
gres
s.Pe
ter
L.Tr
ubow
itzis
Ass
ocia
teP
rofe
ssor
ofG
over
nmen
tat
the
Uni
vers
ityof
Texa
sat
Aus
tinan
dSe
nior
Fello
wat
the
Rob
ert
Stra
uss
Cen
ter
for
Inte
rnat
iona
lSe
curi
tyan
dLa
w.
Ear
lier
vers
ions
ofth
isar
ticl
ew
ere
pres
ente
dat
the
Cen
ter
for
Am
eric
anPr
ogre
ss,P
rinc
eton
Uni
-ve
rsit
y,th
e20
06an
nual
mee
ting
ofth
eA
mer
ican
Polit
ical
Scie
nce
Ass
ocia
tion
,the
Uni
vers
ity
ofV
irgi
nia,
Geo
rget
own
Uni
vers
ity,
the
Woo
dro
wW
ilson
Inte
rnat
iona
lC
ente
rfo
rSc
hola
rs,
the
Uni
vers
ity
ofTe
xas
atA
usti
n,an
dth
eC
ounc
ilon
Fore
ign
Rel
atio
ns.T
heau
thor
sw
ish
toac
know
l-ed
geth
em
any
help
ful
sugg
esti
ons
they
rece
ived
from
dis
cuss
ants
and
part
icip
ants
atth
ese
ses-
sion
sas
wel
las
from
the
anon
ymou
sre
view
ers.
The
auth
ors
than
kJo
hnE
lliot
tfo
rhi
sas
sist
ance
wit
hre
sear
ch.
1.Se
e,fo
rex
ampl
e,Iv
oH
.Daa
lder
and
Jam
esM
.Lin
dsa
y,A
mer
ica
Unb
ound
:The
Bush
Rev
olut
ion
inFo
reig
nP
olic
y(W
ashi
ngto
n,D
.C.:
Bro
okin
gs,
2003
);Fr
anci
sFu
kuya
ma,
Am
eric
aat
the
Cro
ssro
ads:
Dem
ocra
cy,P
ower
,and
the
Neo
cons
erva
tive
Lega
cy(N
ewH
aven
,Con
n.:Y
ale
Uni
vers
ity
Pres
s,20
06);
Gar
yH
art,
The
Four
thPo
wer
:AG
rand
Stra
tegy
for
the
Uni
ted
Stat
esin
the
Twen
ty-ª
rst
Cen
tury
(New
York
:Oxf
ord
Uni
vers
ity
Pres
s,20
04);
Kur
tM.C
ampb
ella
ndM
icha
elE
.O’H
anlo
n,H
ard
Pow
er:T
heN
ewP
olit
ics
ofN
atio
nalS
ecur
ity
(New
York
:Bas
icB
ooks
,200
6);G
.Joh
nIk
enbe
rry,
“The
End
ofth
eN
eo-C
onse
rvat
ive
Mom
ent,”
Surv
ival
,Vol
.46,
No.
1(S
prin
g20
04),
pp.7
–22;
and
Josh
uaB
usby
and
Jona
than
Mon
ten,
“Wit
hout
Hei
rs:T
heFa
llof
Est
ablis
hmen
tInt
erna
tion
alis
min
U.S
.For
eign
Pol-
icy,
”pa
per
pres
ente
dat
the
annu
alm
eeti
ngof
the
Inte
rnat
iona
lSt
udie
sA
ssoc
iati
on,S
anD
iego
,C
alif
orni
a,M
arch
22–2
5,20
06.
2.O
nth
epe
rson
alit
ies
and
ideo
logi
cal
lean
ings
ofB
ush’
sfo
reig
npo
licy
advi
sers
,se
eJa
mes
Man
n,R
ise
ofth
eV
ulca
ns:T
heH
isto
ryof
Bush
’sW
arC
abin
et(N
ewYo
rk:V
ikin
g,20
04);
and
Daa
lder
and
Lin
dsa
y,A
mer
ica
Unb
ound
,pp.
17–3
4.3.
Law
renc
eJ.
Kor
ban
dR
ober
tO.B
oors
tin,
Inte
grat
edP
ower
:AN
atio
nalS
ecur
ity
Polic
yfo
rth
e21
stC
entu
ry(W
ashi
ngto
n,D
.C.:
Cen
ter
for
Am
eric
anPr
ogre
ss,2
005)
;and
G.J
ohn
Iken
berr
yan
dA
nne-
Inte
rnat
iona
lSe
curi
ty,V
ol.3
2,N
o.2
(Fal
l20
07),
pp.7
–44
©20
07by
the
Pres
iden
tan
dFe
llow
sof
Har
vard
Col
lege
and
the
Mas
sach
uset
tsIn
stit
ute
ofTe
chno
logy
.
7
Dea
dC
ente
r
De
adC
en
ter
Cha
rles
A. K
upch
anan
dPe
ter
L. T
rubo
wit
zT
heD
emis
eof
Lib
eral
Inte
rnat
iona
lism
inth
eU
nite
dSt
ates
We
chal
leng
eth
isvi
ewan
dco
nten
din
stea
dth
atth
eB
ush
adm
inis
trat
ion’
sbr
and
ofin
tern
atio
nale
ngag
emen
t,fa
rfr
ombe
ing
anab
erra
tion
,rep
rese
nts
atu
rnin
gpo
inti
nth
ehi
stor
ical
traj
ecto
ryof
U.S
.for
eign
polic
y.It
isa
sym
ptom
,as
muc
has
aca
use,
ofth
eun
rave
ling
ofth
elib
eral
inte
rnat
iona
list
com
pact
that
guid
edth
eU
nite
dSt
ates
for
muc
hof
the
seco
ndha
lfof
the
twen
tiet
hce
n-tu
ry.
Tha
tco
mpa
ctw
assu
bsta
ntiv
eas
wel
las
polit
ical
.Su
bsta
ntiv
ely,
iten
-ta
iled
aco
mm
itm
ent
tobo
thpo
wer
and
coop
erat
ion:
the
Uni
ted
Stat
esw
ould
proj
ect
its
mili
tary
stre
ngth
topr
eser
vest
abili
ty,b
utit
wou
ldse
ekto
exer
cise
its
lead
ersh
ipth
roug
hm
ulti
late
ralp
artn
ersh
ipra
ther
than
unila
tera
lini
tiat
ive.
Itw
asth
eco
uplin
gof
U.S
.pow
eran
din
tern
atio
nalp
artn
ersh
ipth
atga
veth
ena
tion
’sfo
reig
npo
licy
such
ad
isti
ncti
vech
arac
ter
inth
ed
ecad
esfo
llow
ing
Wor
ldW
arII
.Pol
itic
ally
,lib
eral
inte
rnat
iona
lism
dre
wbr
oad
supp
ort
from
re-
gion
sof
the
coun
try
that
had
rare
lyag
reed
onm
atte
rsof
eith
erd
omes
tic
orfo
reig
npo
licy.
Wor
king
toge
ther
,D
emoc
rats
and
Rep
ublic
ans
fash
ione
da
bipa
rtis
anco
nsen
sus
behi
nda
new
type
ofU
.S.e
ngag
emen
tin
wor
ldaf
fair
s.B
ipar
tisa
nshi
pw
asto
prov
ecr
ucia
lto
the
emer
genc
ean
dlo
ngev
ity
ofa
U.S
.gr
and
stra
tegy
that
twin
ned
pow
eran
din
tern
atio
nal
part
ners
hip.
Lib
eral
inte
rnat
iona
lism
’sri
sew
asth
epr
oduc
tof
both
geop
olit
ical
and
do-
mes
tic
dev
elop
men
ts.T
heth
reat
pose
dby
Naz
iGer
man
y,im
peri
alJa
pan,
and
the
Sovi
etU
nion
com
bine
dw
ith
the
fad
ing
ofid
eolo
gica
ld
ivis
ions
inth
eU
nite
dSt
ates
toen
able
Dem
ocra
tsan
dR
epub
lican
sto
coal
esce
arou
nda
com
-m
onst
rate
gy.
Abr
oad
,th
eU
nite
dSt
ates
used
its
supe
rior
mili
tary
pow
erto
chec
kpo
tent
ial
chal
leng
esto
stab
ility
and
anop
enin
tern
atio
nal
econ
omy.
But
atth
esa
me
tim
e,it
turn
edto
mul
tila
tera
lin
stit
utio
nsto
attr
act
and
reas
-su
reth
epa
rtne
rsit
need
edto
def
eat
fasc
ism
and
com
mun
ism
.A
tho
me,
the
polit
ical
envi
ronm
ent
was
ripe
for
the
emer
genc
eof
a“c
entr
ist”
coal
itio
n.T
hefo
rmat
ion
ofa
Nor
th-S
outh
allia
nce,
the
easi
ngof
clas
ste
nsio
nsd
ueto
econ
omic
grow
than
dri
sing
inco
mes
,th
eon
set
ofpo
litic
alpr
agm
atis
man
did
eolo
gica
lm
oder
atio
n—th
ese
wer
eth
eco
ndit
ions
that
led
Dem
ocra
tsan
dR
epub
lican
sal
ike
tofo
rge
wha
tArt
hur
Schl
esin
ger
dub
bed
the
“vit
alce
nter
.”4
Thu
sbe
gan
the
era
oflib
eral
inte
rnat
iona
lism
.T
heco
ndit
ions
that
sust
aine
dlib
eral
inte
rnat
iona
lism
have
ofla
tebe
enra
p-id
lyd
isap
pear
ing,
dra
mat
ical
lyw
eake
ning
its
grip
onth
ena
tion
’spo
litic
s.Si
nce
the
dem
ise
ofth
eSo
viet
Uni
on,U
.S.p
rim
acy
has
red
uced
the
ince
ntiv
es
Inte
rnat
iona
lSe
curi
ty32
:28
Mar
ieSl
augh
ter,
Forg
ing
aW
orld
ofLi
bert
yun
der
Law
:U
.S.
Nat
iona
lSe
curi
tyin
the
21st
Cen
tury
(Pri
ncet
on,N
.J.:P
rinc
eton
Proj
ect
onN
atio
nal
Secu
rity
,Pri
ncet
onU
nive
rsit
y,20
06).
4.A
rthu
rM
.Sc
hles
inge
rJr
.,Th
eV
ital
Cen
ter:
The
Polit
ics
ofFr
eedo
m(B
osto
n:H
ough
ton
Mif
ºin
,19
49).
Kupchan and Trubowitz 2007
Week 2
for
Rep
ublic
ans
and
Dem
ocra
tsal
ike
toad
here
toth
elib
eral
inte
rnat
iona
list
com
pact
.Uni
pola
rity
has
heig
hten
edth
ege
opol
itic
alap
peal
ofun
ilate
ralis
m,
atr
end
that
even
the
thre
atof
tran
snat
iona
lte
rror
ism
has
not
reve
rsed
.U
nipo
lari
tyha
sal
solo
osen
edth
epo
litic
ald
isci
plin
een
gend
ered
byth
eC
old
War
thre
at,l
eavi
ngU
.S.f
orei
gnpo
licy
mor
evu
lner
able
togr
owin
gpa
rtis
an-
ship
atho
me.
“Red
”an
d“B
lue”
Am
eric
ad
isag
ree
abou
tthe
natu
reof
U.S
.en-
gage
men
tin
the
wor
ld;g
row
ing
dis
pari
ties
inw
ealt
hha
vere
awak
ened
clas
ste
nsio
ns;
and
polit
ical
prag
mat
ism
has
been
losi
nggr
ound
toid
eolo
gica
lex
trem
ism
.T
hepo
lari
zati
onof
the
Uni
ted
Stat
esha
sd
ealt
ase
vere
blow
toth
ebi
-pa
rtis
anco
mpa
ctbe
twee
npo
wer
and
coop
erat
ion.
Inst
ead
ofad
heri
ngto
the
vita
lce
nter
,the
coun
try’
sel
ecte
dof
ªci
als,
alon
gw
ith
the
publ
ic,a
reba
ckin
gaw
ayfr
omth
elib
eral
inte
rnat
iona
list
com
pact
,sup
port
ing
eith
erU
.S.p
ower
orin
tern
atio
nal
coop
erat
ion,
but
rare
lybo
th.
Pres
iden
tB
ush
and
man
yR
epub
lican
sha
veab
and
oned
one
sid
eof
the
liber
alin
tern
atio
nalis
tco
mpa
ct:
mul
tila
tera
lism
has
rece
ived
littl
ebu
tco
ntem
pton
thei
rw
atch
.M
eanw
hile
,th
eD
emoc
rats
have
negl
ecte
dth
eot
her
sid
e:m
any
part
yst
alw
arts
are
unea
syw
ith
the
asse
rtiv
eus
eof
U.S
.pow
er.A
sth
epa
rtis
angy
rein
Was
hing
ton
wid
-en
s,th
epo
litic
alce
nter
isd
ying
out,
and
supp
ortf
orlib
eral
inte
rnat
iona
lism
isd
ying
wit
hit
.Acc
ord
ing
toJi
mL
each
,one
ofth
eR
epub
lican
mod
erat
esto
lose
his
Hou
sese
atin
the
2006
mid
term
elec
tion
s,“[
The
Uni
ted
Stat
es’]
mid
dle
has
virt
ually
colla
psed
.A
ndho
wto
reco
nstr
uct
apr
inci
pled
cent
er,
ace
nter
ofgr
avit
yin
Am
eric
anpo
litic
s,m
aybe
the
hard
est
sing
leth
ing
atth
ispa
rtic
ular
tim
e.”5
Prom
inen
tvo
ices
from
acro
ssth
epo
litic
alsp
ectr
umha
veca
lled
for
the
res-
tora
tion
ofa
robu
stbi
part
isan
cent
erth
atca
npu
tU
.S.g
rand
stra
tegy
back
ontr
ack.
6A
ccor
din
gto
Dem
ocra
tic
Sena
tor
Hill
ary
Clin
ton,
“For
mor
eth
ana
half
ace
ntur
y,w
ekn
owth
atw
epr
ospe
red
beca
use
ofa
bipa
rtis
anco
nsen
sus
ond
efen
sean
dfo
reig
npo
licy.
We
mus
td
om
ore
than
retu
rnto
that
sens
ible
,co-
oper
ativ
eap
proa
ch.”
Rep
ublic
anpr
esid
enti
alca
ndid
ate
Mit
tR
omne
yec
hoes
this
sent
imen
t:“I
tsee
ms
that
conc
ern
abou
tWas
hing
ton’
sd
ivis
iven
ess
and
ca-
pabi
lity
tom
eet
tod
ay’s
chal
leng
esis
the
one
thin
gth
atun
ites
usal
l.W
ene
ed
Dea
dC
ente
r9
5.Q
uote
din
Kw
ame
Hol
man
,“M
idte
rmE
lect
ions
Ous
tSe
vera
lM
oder
ate
Rep
ublic
ans,
”O
nlin
eN
ewsh
our,
Nov
embe
r24
,20
06,
http
://
ww
w.p
bs.o
rg/
new
shou
r/bb
/po
litic
s/ju
ly-d
ec06
/go
p_11
-24
.htm
l.6.
On
the
need
tore
stor
ebi
part
isan
ship
,see
Nan
cyE
.Rom
an,“
Bot
hSi
des
ofth
eA
isle
:AC
allf
orB
ipar
tisa
nFo
reig
nPo
licy,
”Sp
ecia
lR
epor
t,N
o.9
(New
York
:Cou
ncil
onFo
reig
nR
elat
ions
,Sep
-te
mbe
r20
05);
the
web
site
ofPa
rtne
rshi
pfo
ra
Secu
reA
mer
ica,
anor
gani
zati
onca
lling
for
“res
pon-
sibl
efo
reig
npo
licy
thro
ugh
bipa
rtis
anac
tion
,”ht
tp:/
/w
ww
.psa
onlin
e.or
g;an
dth
ew
ebsi
teof
Uni
ty08
,an
orga
niza
tion
com
mit
ted
tore
build
ing
bipa
rtis
ansh
ip,a
tht
tp:/
/w
ww
.uni
ty08
.com
/.
new
thin
king
onfo
reig
npo
licy
and
anov
erar
chin
gst
rate
gyth
atca
nun
ite
the
Uni
ted
Stat
esan
dit
sal
lies.
”7
The
seex
hort
atio
nsar
ein
vain
.The
halc
yon
era
oflib
eral
inte
rnat
iona
lism
isov
er;t
hebi
part
isan
com
pact
betw
een
pow
eran
dpa
rtne
rshi
pha
sbe
enef
fec-
tive
lyd
ism
antl
ed.I
flef
tuna
tten
ded
,the
polit
ical
foun
dat
ions
ofU
.S.s
tate
craf
tw
illco
ntin
ueto
dis
inte
grat
e,ex
posi
ngth
eco
untr
yto
the
dan
gers
ofan
erra
tic
and
inco
here
ntfo
reig
npo
licy.
Toav
oid
this
fate
,U.S
.lea
der
sw
illha
veto
fash
-io
na
new
bran
dof
inte
rnat
iona
lism
—on
eth
atw
illne
cess
arily
enta
ille
sspo
wer
and
less
part
ners
hip
ifit
isto
have
ach
ance
ofse
curi
ngbr
oad
dom
esti
csu
ppor
t.To
ªnd
ane
weq
uilib
rium
betw
een
the
nati
on’s
com
mit
men
tsab
road
and
its
pola
rize
dpo
litic
sat
hom
e,th
eU
nite
dSt
ates
will
need
agr
and
stra
tegy
that
isas
sele
ctiv
ean
dju
dic
ious
asit
ispu
rpos
eful
.T
his
arti
cle
isor
gani
zed
into
thre
em
ain
sect
ions
.We
begi
nby
des
crib
ing
the
rise
oflib
eral
inte
rnat
iona
lism
,ex
plor
ing
how
geop
olit
ical
and
dom
esti
cfa
c-to
rsw
orke
din
unis
onto
fash
ion
abi
part
isan
cons
ensu
sbe
hind
the
Uni
ted
Stat
es’
post
war
gran
dst
rate
gy.
We
then
turn
tolib
eral
inte
rnat
iona
lism
’sd
e-m
ise,
agai
nex
amin
ing
the
role
spl
ayed
bybo
thin
tern
atio
nal
and
dom
esti
cfo
rces
iner
odin
gth
epo
litic
alfo
und
atio
nsof
the
liber
alin
tern
atio
nalis
tco
m-
pact
.W
eco
nclu
de
byco
nsid
erin
gth
eim
plic
atio
nsof
our
anal
ysis
for
U.S
.gr
and
stra
tegy
.
The
Ris
eof
the
Libe
ral
Inte
rnat
iona
list
Com
pact
Scho
lars
and
polic
ymak
ers
alik
ete
ndto
asso
ciat
elib
eral
inte
rnat
iona
lism
wit
hm
ulti
late
ralis
man
din
tern
atio
nal
inst
itut
ions
. 8L
iber
alin
tern
atio
nalis
md
oes
enta
ila
com
mit
men
tto
mul
tila
tera
lism
,bu
tit
also
invo
lves
aco
mm
itm
ent
toth
eus
eof
U.S
.m
ilita
ryfo
rce.
Ind
eed
,it
was
the
dua
lco
mm
itm
ent
topo
wer
proj
ecti
onan
din
tern
atio
nal
coop
erat
ion
that
dis
ting
uish
edlib
eral
inte
rnat
ion-
alis
mfr
omea
rlie
rU
.S.s
trat
egie
s.Fr
omth
eU
nite
dSt
ates
’em
erge
nce
asa
grea
tpo
wer
atth
een
dof
the
nine
-te
enth
cent
ury
unti
lthe
1940
s,it
spo
litic
alcl
ass
favo
red
pow
eror
coop
erat
ion,
but
not
the
two
toge
ther
.The
odor
eR
oose
velt
pref
erre
dpo
wer
,tak
ing
adva
n-ta
geof
ast
reng
then
edpr
esid
ency
topu
rsue
anim
peri
alis
tag
end
a—bu
ton
ew
hose
ambi
tion
quic
kly
outs
trip
ped
polit
ical
supp
ort
for
such
expa
nsio
nism
.
Inte
rnat
iona
lSe
curi
ty32
:210
7.H
illar
yC
linto
n,qu
oted
inPa
rtne
rshi
pfo
ra
Secu
reA
mer
ica,
“Quo
tes
onB
ipar
tisa
nshi
p,”
http
://
ww
w.p
saon
line.
org/
user
dat
a_d
ispl
ay.p
hp?m
odin
�52
;and
Mit
tRom
ney,
“Ris
ing
toa
New
Gen
erat
ion
ofG
loba
lC
halle
nges
,”Fo
reig
nA
ffair
s,V
ol.8
6,N
o.4
(Jul
y/A
ugus
t20
07),
pp.1
7–18
.8.
On
U.S
.m
ulti
late
ralis
man
dth
ero
leof
inte
rnat
iona
lin
stit
utio
nsin
shap
ing
wor
ldor
der
,se
eJo
hnG
erar
dR
uggi
e,W
inni
ngth
ePe
ace:
Am
eric
aan
dW
orld
Ord
erin
the
New
Era
(New
York
:Col
um-
bia
Uni
vers
ity
Pres
s,19
96).
Kupchan and Trubowitz 2007
Week 2
6
Pow
er S
hift
s an
d G
lob
al
Com
ple
xity
The
re a
re t
wo
grea
t po
wer
shi
fts
occu
rrin
g in
thi
s ce
ntur
y; p
ower
tra
nsit
ion
amon
g st
ates
fro
m W
est
to E
ast,
an
d p
ower
dif
fusi
on f
rom
gov
ernm
ents
to
non-
stat
e ac
tors
as
a re
sult
of
the
glob
al i
nfor
ma
tion
rev
olut
ion.
1 I
argu
ed a
bove
th
at t
he f
irst
shi
ft
-po
wer
tran
siti
on a
mon
g st
ates
-w
ill p
roba
bly
no
t en
d A
mer
ican
cen
tral
ity
to t
he g
loba
l ba
lanc
e o
f po
wer
in t
he n
ext
30
yea
rs.
It i
s le
ss
clea
r w
heth
er
this
sh
ift
wil
l de
stro
y th
e in
stit
utio
ns t
hat
Am
itav
Ach
arya
, ci
ted
earl
ier,
ca
lls
"the
Am
eric
an w
orld
ord
er."
His
met
apho
r o
f a
mul
tipl
ex
thea
ter
wit
h m
ulti
ple
narr
ativ
es
and
regi
onal
dia
logu
es a
ssum
es a
n ar
chit
ectu
re b
ut
incl
udes
lit
tle
deta
il a
bo
ut
how
it
will
be
prov
ided
an
d m
aint
aine
d.
Wil
l C
hina
st
ep
in
to
prov
ide
the
publ
ic
good
s th
at
hege
mon
ic
stab
ilit
y th
eo
rist
s se
arch
fo
r?
Cer
tain
ly
Chi
na
has
bene
fite
d
94
Pow
er S
hift
s an
d G
loba
l C
ompl
exit
y
grea
tly
from
li
bera
l in
stit
utio
ns
like
the
Wor
ld
Tra
de O
rgan
izat
ion
and
the
Inte
rnat
iona
l Mon
etar
y F
und,
bu
t C
hina
's r
ecor
d is
far
fro
m p
erfe
ct.
Lik
e th
e U
nite
d S
tate
s in
the
int
erw
ar p
erio
d o
f th
e la
st
cent
ury,
Chi
na e
njoy
s th
e te
mpt
atio
n o
f fr
ee-r
idin
g as
lon
g as
som
eone
els
e is
dri
ving
the
bus
. N
or
are
we
likel
y to
see
glo
bal
publ
ic g
oods
pro
vide
d by
ot
her
emer
ging
pow
ers.
Gre
ater
com
plex
ity
At
the
sam
e ti
me,
th
e di
ffus
ion
of p
ower
fro
m
gove
rnm
ents
to
non-
stat
e ac
tors
, bo
th W
est
and
E
ast,
is p
utti
ng a
num
ber
of t
rans
nati
onal
issu
es li
ke
fina
ncia
l st
abil
ity,
cli
mat
e ch
ange
, te
rror
ism
, an
d pa
ndem
ics
on t
he g
loba
l ag
enda
at
the
sam
e ti
me
that
it te
nds
to w
eake
n th
e ab
ilit
y of
all
gove
rnm
ents
to
res
pond
. Si
nce
no o
ne s
tate
can
dea
l su
cces
sful
ly
wit
h th
ese
tran
snat
iona
l is
sues
act
ing
alon
e, e
ven
a su
perp
ower
wil
l ha
ve t
o w
ork
wit
h ot
hers
. A
fter
the
col
laps
e of
Col
d W
ar b
ipol
arit
y, p
ower
in
this
glo
bal i
nfor
mat
ion
age
beca
me
dist
ribu
ted
in a
pa
tter
n th
at re
sem
bles
a c
ompl
ex th
ree-
dim
ensi
onal
ch
ess
gam
e. O
n t
he t
op c
hess
boar
d, m
ilit
ary
pow
er
is l
arge
ly u
nipo
lar
and
the
Uni
ted
Sta
tes
is l
ikel
y to
ret
ain
prim
acy
for
quit
e so
me
tim
e. B
ut o
n th
e
95
Nye 2015
Week 2
Pow
er S
hift
s an
d G
loba
l C
ompl
exit
y
mid
dle
ches
sboa
rd,
econ
omic
pow
er a
mon
g st
ates
ha
s be
en m
ulti
pola
r fo
r m
ore
than
a d
ecad
e (w
ell
befo
re t
he 2
008
fina
ncia
l cr
isis
), w
ith
the
Uni
ted
Sta
tes,
Eur
ope,
Jap
an,
and
Chi
na a
s th
e m
ajor
pla
yer
s, a
nd o
ther
s ga
inin
g in
im
port
ance
. T
he b
otto
m
ches
sboa
rd i
s th
e re
alm
of
tran
snat
iona
l re
lati
ons
that
cro
ss b
orde
rs o
utsi
de g
over
nmen
t co
ntro
l. I
t in
clud
es n
on-s
tate
act
ors
as d
iver
se a
s ba
nker
s el
ec
tron
ical
ly t
rans
ferr
ing
fund
s, t
erro
rist
s tr
ansf
erri
ng
wea
pons
, ha
cker
s th
reat
enin
g cy
ber
secu
rity
, an
d th
reat
s su
ch a
s pa
ndem
ics
and
cli
mat
e ch
ange
. O
n
this
bot
tom
boa
rd,
pow
er is
wid
ely
diff
used
, an
d it
m
akes
no
sen
se t
o sp
eak
of u
nipo
lari
ty,
mul
tipo
la
rity
, o
r he
gem
ony.
Man
y o
f th
ese
issu
es a
re n
ot
susc
epti
ble
to m
ilit
ary
solu
tion
s an
d n
etw
orks
of
coop
erat
ion
will
bec
ome
esse
ntia
l. N
iall
Fer
guso
n ar
gues
th
at h
isto
ry
has
alw
ays
seen
a s
trug
gle
betw
een
netw
orks
and
~ hie
rarc
hies
. C
entr
aliz
ed t
otal
itar
ian
gove
rnm
ent
may
hav
e be
en
the
supr
eme
mom
ent
for
hier
arch
y in
the
tw
enti
eth
cent
ury,
bu
t ne
twor
ks a
re b
ecom
ing
mor
e im
por
tant
in
th
is
cent
ury.
2 A
nd
whi
le
netw
orks
an
d em
pow
ered
ind
ivid
uals
wil
l ca
use
prob
lem
s fo
r al
l go
vern
men
ts,
they
may
cau
se f
ewer
pro
blem
s fo
r th
e U
nite
d S
tate
s th
an f
or C
hina
or
othe
r au
thor
ita
rian
sta
tes.
A
mer
ica'
s cu
ltur
e o
f op
enne
ss
and
inno
vati
on w
ill
keep
it
cent
ral
in
a w
orld
whe
re
96
Pow
er S
hift
s an
d G
loba
l C
ompl
exit
y
netw
orks
sup
plem
ent,
if n
ot fu
lly r
epla
ce, h
iera
rchi
cal
pow
er.3
Com
plex
ity
is g
row
ing.
Ran
dall
Sch
wel
ler
argu
es
that
rat
her
than
wor
ryin
g ab
ou
t be
ing
pass
ed b
y an
othe
r co
untr
y,
a "l
aw
of
incr
easi
ng
entr
opy
mea
ns t
hat
ord
er in
the
uni
vers
e is
bei
ng r
elen
tles
sly
repl
aced
by
inc
reas
ing
diso
rder
."
He
argu
es t
hat
th
e re
leva
nt m
odel
for
the
fut
ure
is n
ot
grea
t pow
er
conf
lict
or c
once
rt, b
ut "
info
rmat
ion
entr
opy.
"4 T
he
answ
er t
o t
he q
uest
ion
"wh
o's
nex
t?"
is "
no
one
."
Whi
le t
his
answ
er i
s to
o si
mpl
e, i
t do
es i
ndic
ate
impo
rtan
t tr
ends
th
at m
ay n
ot e
nd t
he A
mer
ican
ce
ntur
y, b
ut w
ill
cert
ainl
y ch
ange
it.
The
wor
ld i
n 20
30
The
Nat
iona
l In
tell
igen
ce C
ounc
il,
whi
ch p
repa
res
esti
mat
es f
or t
he A
mer
ican
Pre
side
nt,
rece
ntly
pub
li
shed
a r
epor
t on
the
yea
r 20
30 i
n w
hich
it f
orec
ast
that
the
Uni
ted
Sta
tes
wou
ld b
e th
e m
ost
pow
erfu
l co
untr
y in
the
wor
ld,
but
ther
e w
ill
be n
o "h
egem
on
s."
The
"u
nipo
lar
mom
ent"
is
ov
er,
and
the
Uni
ted
Sta
tes
will
no
t be
as
pow
erfu
l as
in
the
past
.5
But
a d
egre
e of
rela
tive
dec
line
is n
ot th
e sa
me
as th
e
end
of
the
Am
eric
an e
ra.
Alt
houg
h th
ere
is
no
one
"f
utur
e" t
o pr
edic
t,
97
Nye 2015
Week 2
Pow
er S
hift
s an
d G
loba
l C
ompl
exit
y
cert
ain
tren
ds a
re v
isib
le n
ow
and
can
be
proj
ecte
d to
con
tinu
e, "
othe
r th
ings
bei
ng e
qual
" (w
hich
the
y so
met
imes
will
not
be.
) F
or e
xam
ple,
dem
ogra
phic
tr
ends
ten
d to
be
mor
e pr
edic
tabl
e th
an p
olit
ical
ev
ents
, an
d it
is
likel
y th
at t
he U
nite
d S
tate
s w
ill
grow
in
popu
lati
on,
whi
le E
urop
e, R
ussi
a, J
apan
, an
d C
hina
will
shr
ink.
Equ
ally
int
eres
ting
, ho
w
ever
, is
th
at th
e po
pula
tion
of
the
Afr
ican
con
tine
nt
will
mor
e th
an l
ikel
y do
uble
. A
ltho
ugh
this
doe
s no
t m
ean
that
an
Afr
ican
cou
ntry
will
cha
llen
ge
the
pre-
emin
ence
of
the
Uni
ted
Sta
tes,
it
does
sug
ge
st t
hat
cer
tain
are
as o
f th
e w
orld
will
pre
sent
m
ore
com
plex
pro
blem
s, p
arti
cula
rly
whe
n a
risi
ng
popu
lati
on
is
com
bine
d w
ith
rapi
d ur
bani
zati
on
and
inad
equa
te e
duca
tion
al i
nsti
tuti
ons
and
soci
al
secu
rity
sys
tem
s.
One
can
als
o pr
ojec
t ec
onom
ic t
rend
s, t
houg
h,
as w
e ha
ve s
een,
one
sho
uld
be l
ess
conf
iden
t ab
out
the
pred
icti
ons
they
yie
ld.
For
exa
mpl
e, t
he U
nite
d S
tate
s en
tere
d th
e tw
enty
-fir
st c
entu
ry w
ith
a 23
pe
rcen
t sh
are
of w
orld
GD
P a
nd,
even
bef
ore
the
Gre
at R
eces
sion
, th
is w
as g
radu
ally
dec
lini
ng n
ot
beca
use
of A
mer
ican
fai
lure
, bu
t be
caus
e o
f th
e ra
pid
grow
th in
the
res
t of
the
wor
ld,
incl
udin
g no
t on
ly C
hina
but
man
y ot
her
emer
ging
eco
nom
ies.
C
ontr
ary
to
som
e as
sert
ions
th
at
the
Am
eric
an
shar
e o
f w
orld
ou
tpu
t re
mai
ns u
ncha
nged
, it
has
98
Pow
er S
hift
s an
d G
loba
l C
ompl
exit
y
actu
ally
sli
pped
.6 P
roje
ctin
g fo
rwar
d to
201
8, t
he
Inte
rnat
iona
l M
onet
ary
Fun
d es
tim
ates
th
at
the
Uni
ted
Sta
tes
wil
l the
n re
pres
ent a
bout
17.
7 p
erce
nt
of
the
wor
ld e
cono
my.
7 T
he d
imin
ishi
ng A
mer
ican
sh
are
is n
ot
uniq
ue.
Fro
m 2
001
to 2
010,
the
Wes
t's
shar
e o
f th
e w
orld
eco
nom
y sh
rank
by
10.3
3 pe
rce
ntag
e po
ints
, m
ore
than
the
com
bine
d lo
ss o
f th
e pr
evio
us 4
0 y
ears
. W
hile
par
t o
f th
is w
as a
pro
duct
of
the
rece
ssio
n, i
t al
so r
epre
sent
ed f
aste
r gr
owth
in
othe
r pa
rts
of
the
wor
ld e
cono
my.
And
sin
ce t
hese
in
clud
e A
mer
ica'
s cl
oses
t al
lies,
it
repr
esen
ts a
los
s fo
r A
mer
ican
net
wor
ks.
Eve
n th
ough
thi
s gr
owth
in
emer
ging
mar
kets
is
unli
kely
to
crea
te a
sin
gle
chal
leng
er t
hat
will
ove
rta
ke t
he U
nite
d S
tate
s, t
he "
rise
of
the
rest
" cr
eate
s a
mor
e co
mpl
ex w
orld
to
be f
aced
. In
con
tras
t, i
n th
e 19
60s,
the
Uni
ted
Sta
tes
and
Eur
ope
toge
ther
re
pres
ente
d tw
o-th
irds
of
the
wor
ld e
cono
my,
wit
h Ja
pan
addi
ng a
fur
ther
10
perc
ent.
8 M
oreo
ver,
the
nu
mbe
r of
cou
ntri
es in
the
wor
ld h
as m
ore
than
tre
bled
ove
r th
at p
erio
d. T
here
are
mor
e de
man
ds f
or
seat
s at
the
tab
le,
and
that
mea
ns t
hat
nego
tiat
ing
trad
e st
anda
rds,
avi
atio
n ag
reem
ents
, te
leco
mm
uni
cati
ons
regu
lati
ons,
en
viro
nmen
tal
agre
emen
ts,
and
othe
rs
beco
mes
m
ore
com
plex
to
m
anag
e.
New
org
aniz
atio
ns l
ike
the
Gro
up o
f 20
can
hel
p,
but
they
lea
ve o
ut
mos
t st
ates
and
eve
n 20
is
an
99
Nye 2015
Week 2
Pow
er S
hift
s an
d G
loba
l C
ompl
exit
y
unw
ield
y nu
mbe
r.
One
co
uld
call
th
ese
tren
ds
"rel
ativ
e de
clin
e,"
bu
t th
at d
escr
ipti
on c
onfu
ses
the
situ
atio
n w
ith
the
rise
of
iden
tifi
able
cha
llen
gers
, an
d it
see
ms
mor
e us
eful
to
refe
r si
mpl
y to
the
ris
e of
the
rest
. S
ome
obse
rver
s se
e th
is e
ntro
py s
pell
ing
chao
s in
th
e gl
obal
eco
nom
y, a
nd a
rgue
th
at a
ltho
ugh
the
Uni
ted
Sta
tes
will
be
hurt
, it
will
be
bett
er p
lace
d to
cop
e w
ith
entr
opy
than
oth
er n
atio
ns.9
But
thi
s ex
agge
rate
s th
e pr
oble
m o
f en
trop
y, a
nd
und
eres
ti
mat
es t
he r
emai
ning
Am
eric
an r
ole.
For
exa
mpl
e, in
th
e ec
onom
ic c
risi
s co
ndit
ions
of
2008
, ag
reem
ent
amon
g th
e G
20 l
eade
rs h
elpe
d to
res
trai
n pr
otec
ti
onis
m,
bu
t th
e U
S F
eder
al
Res
erve
's
info
rmal
ne
twor
k o
f ag
reem
ents
to
sw
ap d
olla
rs a
mon
g ce
ntr
al b
anks
pro
ved
esse
ntia
l. T
he f
inan
cial
cri
sis
was
da
mag
ing
to A
mer
ican
har
d an
d so
ft p
ower
, bu
t the
U
S re
mai
ned
cruc
ial
to i
ts m
anag
emfo
t.10
The
pro
blem
of
lead
ersh
ip i
n su
ch a
w
orld
is
how
to
get
eve
ryon
e in
to t
he a
ct a
nd s
till
get
act
ion.
A
nd t
he A
mer
ican
rol
e in
gal
vani
zing
ins
titu
tion
s an
d or
gani
zing
inf
orm
al n
etw
orks
rem
ains
cru
cial
to
ans
wer
ing
that
puz
zle.
As
we
saw
ear
lier
, th
ere
has
ofte
n be
en s
elf-
serv
ing
exag
gera
tion
ab
ou
t th
e A
mer
ican
pro
visi
on o
f pu
blic
goo
ds i
n th
e pa
st,
but
a ca
se c
an b
e m
ade
for
Gol
iath
. A
s M
icha
el
Man
delb
aum
des
crib
es
the
Am
eric
an
role
, ot
her
100
Pow
er S
hift
s an
d G
loba
l C
ompl
exit
y
coun
trie
s w
ill c
riti
cize
it, b
ut
"the
y w
ill m
iss
it w
hen
it is
gon
e."11
Mor
e im
port
ant,
it
is n
ot
yet g
one.
Eve
n in
iss
ues
whe
re it
s pr
e-em
inen
ce in
res
ourc
es h
as d
imin
ishe
d,
Am
eric
an l
eade
rshi
p of
ten
rem
ains
cri
tica
l to
glo
bal
coll
ecti
ve a
ctio
n. T
ake
trad
e an
d no
n-pr
olif
erat
ion
of n
ucle
ar
wea
pons
as
tw
o ex
ampl
es
of i
mpo
rta
nt
econ
omic
and
sec
urit
y is
sues
whe
re A
mer
ican
dom
inan
ce is
no
t w
hat
it o
nce
was
. In
tra
de,
the
Uni
ted
Sta
tes
was
by
far
the
larg
est
trad
ing
nati
on w
hen
the
GA
TT
(G
ener
al A
gree
men
t on
Tar
iffs
and
Tra
de)
was
cre
ated
in
19
47,
an
d
the
Uni
ted
Sta
tes
deli
bera
tely
acc
epte
d tr
ade
dis
crim
inat
ion
by E
urop
e an
d Ja
pan
as
part
of
its
Col
d W
ar s
trat
egy.
Aft
er t
hose
cou
ntri
es r
ecov
ered
, th
ey
join
ed t
he U
nite
d S
tate
s in
a c
lub
of l
ike-
min
ded
nati
ons
wit
hin
the
GA
TT
.12 I
n th
e 19
90s,
as
othe
r st
ates
' sh
ares
of
glob
al t
rade
inc
reas
ed,
the
Uni
ted
Sta
tes
supp
orte
d th
e ex
pans
ion
of
GA
TT
int
o th
e W
orld
Tra
de
Org
aniz
atio
n an
d
the
club
m
odel
be
cam
e ob
sole
te.
The
U
nite
d S
tate
s su
ppor
ted
Chi
nese
acc
essi
on t
o th
e W
orld
Tra
de O
rgan
izat
ion
and
Chi
na p
asse
d th
e U
nite
d S
tate
s as
the
wor
ld's
la
rges
t tr
adin
g na
tion
. W
hile
glo
bal
roun
ds o
f tr
ade
nego
tiat
ions
bec
ame
mor
e di
ffic
ult
to a
ccom
plis
h an
d va
riou
s fr
ee t
rade
agr
eem
ents
pro
life
rate
d, t
he
rule
s of
the
Wor
ld T
rade
Org
aniz
atio
n co
ntin
ued
101
Nye 2015
Week 2
Po
wer
Sh
ifts
and G
lob
al C
om
ple
xit
y
to p
rovi
de
a ge
ner
al s
tru
ctu
re w
her
ein
th
e n
orm
of
mo
st f
avo
red
nat
ion
sta
tus
and r
ecip
roci
ty c
reat
ed
a fr
amew
ork
in
wh
ich
par
ticu
lar
clu
b d
eals
co
uld
be
gen
eral
ized
to
a
larg
er
nu
mb
er
of
cou
ntr
ies.
Mo
reo
ver,
n
ew
entr
ants
li
ke
Ch
ina
fou
nd
it
in
thei
r in
tere
sts
to o
bse
rve
even
ad
vers
e ju
dgm
ents
of
the
Wo
rld
Tra
de
Org
aniz
atio
n d
isp
ute
set
tlem
ent
pro
cess
.
Sim
ilar
ly w
ith
th
e n
on
-pro
life
rati
on
reg
ime:
in
the
19
40
s, w
hen
the
Un
ited
Sta
tes
had
a n
ucl
ear
mo
no
po
ly,
it
pro
po
sed
the
Bar
uch
p
lan
fo
r U
N
con
tro
l, w
hic
h t
he
Sovi
et U
nio
n r
ejec
ted i
n o
rder
to p
urs
ue
its
ow
n n
ucl
ear
wea
po
ns
pro
gram
. In
the
195
0s,
th
e U
nit
ed St
ates
use
d
the
Ato
ms
for
Peac
e p
rogr
am,
cou
ple
d w
ith i
nsp
ecti
on
s by
a n
ew
Inte
rnat
ion
al
Ato
mic
E
ner
gy
Age
ncy
, to
tr
y to
sep
arat
e th
e p
eace
ful
fro
m t
he
wea
po
ns
pu
rpo
ses
of n
ucl
ear
tech
no
logy
as
it s
pre
ad.
lrf
the
19
60
s,
the
five
sta
tes
wit
h n
ucl
ear
wea
po
ns
neg
oti
ated
th
e
no
n-p
roli
fera
tio
n
trea
ty,
wh
ich
p
rom
ised
p
eace
ful
assi
stan
ce t
o s
tate
s th
at a
ccep
ted a
leg
al s
tatu
s
of
no
n-w
eap
on
s st
ates
. In
th
e 1
97
0s,
aft
er I
nd
ia's
exp
losi
on
of
a n
ucl
ear
dev
ice
and t
he
furt
her
sp
read
of
tech
no
logy
fo
r en
rich
men
t an
d r
epro
cess
ing
of
fiss
ile
mat
eria
ls,
the
Un
ited
Sta
tes
and l
ike-
min
ded
stat
es c
reat
ed
a N
ucl
ear
Sup
pli
ers
Gro
up
, w
hic
h
agre
ed
"to
ex
erci
se
rest
rain
t"
in
the
exp
ort
o
f
10
2
Po
wer
Sh
ifts
an
d G
lob
al C
om
ple
xit
y
sen
siti
ve t
ech
no
logi
es,
as w
ell
as a
n I
nte
rnat
ion
al
Nat
ion
al
Nu
clea
r Fu
el
Cyc
le
Eva
luat
ion
, w
hic
h
call
ed in
to q
ues
tio
n t
he
op
tim
isti
c p
roje
ctio
ns
abo
ut
the
use
o
f p
luto
niu
m fu
els.
W
hile
no
ne
of
thes
e
inst
itu
tio
nal
ad
apta
tio
ns
was
per
fect
, an
d p
rob
lem
s
per
sist
wit
h N
ort
h K
ore
a an
d I
ran
to
day
, th
e n
et
effe
ct
of
the
no
rmat
ive
stru
ctu
re
and
A
mer
ican
lead
ersh
ip w
as t
o s
low
th
e gr
ow
th i
n t
he
nu
mb
er
of
nu
clea
r w
eap
on
s st
ates
fro
m t
he
25
ex
pec
ted
in
the
19
60s
to t
he
9 t
hat
ex
ist
tod
ay. 1
3 In
2003
, th
e
US
lau
nch
ed t
he
Pro
life
rati
on
Sec
uri
ty I
nit
iati
ve,
a
loo
sely
str
uct
ure
d g
rou
pin
g o
f co
un
trie
s th
at s
har
es
info
rmat
ion
an
d c
oo
rdin
ates
eff
ort
s to
sto
p t
raffi
ck
ing
in n
ucl
ear
pro
life
rati
on
rel
ated
mat
eria
ls.
Sim
ilar
qu
esti
on
s ar
ise
tod
ay a
bo
ut
the
gove
rn
ance
of
the
inte
rnet
an
d
cyb
er
acti
viti
es.
In
its
earl
y day
s,
the
inte
rnet
w
as
larg
ely
Am
eric
an,
bu
t to
day
Ch
ina
has
tw
ice
as m
any
use
rs a
s th
e
Un
ited
Sta
tes.
Wh
ere
on
ce o
nly
Ro
man
alp
hab
et
char
acte
rs w
ere
use
d o
n th
e in
tern
et,
now
th
ere
are
top
-lev
el d
om
ain
n
ames
in
C
hin
ese,
Ara
bic
, an
d
Cyr
illi
c sc
rip
ts,
wit
h m
ore
alp
hab
ets
exp
ecte
d.
An
d
in 2
01
4,
the
Un
ited
Sta
tes
ann
ou
nce
d t
hat
it
wo
uld
rela
x t
he
Co
mm
erce
Dep
artm
ent'
s su
per
visi
on
of
the
inte
rnet
's
"ad
dre
ss
bo
ok
,"
the
Inte
rnat
ion
al
Co
rpo
rati
on
fo
r A
ssig
ned
N
am
es
and
Nu
mb
ers
(IC
AN
N).
So
me
ob
serv
ers
wo
rrie
d t
hat
th
is w
ou
ld
103
Nye 2015
Week 2
Po
wer
Sh
ifts
an
d G
lob
al C
om
ple
xit
y
op
en t
he
way
for
auth
ori
tari
an s
tate
s to
try
to
ex
ert
con
tro
l an
d c
enso
r th
e ad
dre
sses
of
op
po
nen
ts.
Such
fea
rs s
eem
ex
agge
rate
d b
oth
on
tec
hn
ical
gro
un
ds
and
in
th
eir
un
der
lyin
g p
rem
ises
. N
ot
on
ly w
ou
ld s
uch
cen
sors
hip
be
dif
ficu
lt,
bu
t th
ere
are
self
-in
tere
sted
gro
un
ds
for
stat
es t
o a
void
su
ch
frag
men
tati
on
o
f th
e in
tern
et.
In
add
itio
n,
the
des
crip
tio
ns
in t
he
dec
lin
e in
Am
eric
an p
ow
er i
n
the
cyb
er i
ssu
e ar
e o
vers
tate
d.
No
t o
nly
do
es t
he
Un
ited
St
ates
re
mai
n
the
seco
nd
la
rges
t u
ser
of
the
inte
rnet
, but
it i
s th
e hom
e of
eigh
t o
f th
e te
n
larg
est
glob
al i
nfo
rmat
ion
co
mp
anie
s.14
Mo
reo
ver,
wh
en o
ne
loo
ks
at th
e co
mp
osi
tio
n o
f im
po
rtan
t
no
n-s
tate
vo
lun
tary
co
mm
un
itie
s (l
ike
the
Inte
rnet
En
gin
eeri
ng
Tas
k F
orc
e),
on
e se
es a
dis
pro
po
rtio
n
ate
nu
mb
er o
f A
mer
ican
s p
arti
cip
atin
g b
ecau
se o
f
thei
r ex
per
tise
. T
he
loo
sen
ing
of
US"
go
vern
men
t
infl
uen
ce o
ver
ICA
NN
co
uld
be
seen
as
a st
rate
gy
for
stre
ngt
hen
ing
the
inst
itu
tio
n a
nd
rei
nfo
rcin
g th
e
Am
eric
an m
ult
ista
keh
old
er p
hil
oso
ph
y ra
ther
th
an
as a
sig
n o
f d
efea
t.15
So
me
cyb
er s
tab
ilit
y n
ow
ex
ists
,
bu
t th
e fa
ct t
hat
cyb
er i
nse
curi
ty c
reat
es i
nh
eren
t
risk
s fo
r b
oth
the
Un
ited
Sta
tes
and
its
op
po
nen
ts
pro
vid
es a
bas
is f
or
po
ssib
le a
gree
men
ts.1 6
In s
ho
rt,
pro
ject
ion
s b
ased
on
th
eori
es o
f h
egem
on
ic d
eclin
e
can
be
mis
lead
ing
abo
ut
the
real
itie
s o
f A
mer
ican
lead
ersh
ip
in
inte
rnat
ion
al
inst
itu
tio
ns
and
n
et-
104
Pow
er S
hif
ts a
nd
Glo
bal
Co
mp
lex
ity
wo
rks.
E
ven
w
ith
d
imin
ish
ing
po
wer
re
sou
rces
,
Am
eric
an l
ead
ersh
ip r
emai
ns
esse
nti
al i
n c
reat
ing
pu
bli
c go
od
s.
The
info
nn
ati
on
revo
luti
on
an
d p
ow
er d
iffu.si
on
Th
e gr
ow
th i
n t
he
nu
mb
er a
nd
wea
lth
of
stat
es i
s
not
the
on
ly s
ou
rce
of
incr
ease
d c
om
ple
xit
y in
th
is
cen
tury
. T
he
pro
ble
m f
or
all s
tate
s in
to
day
's g
lob
al
info
rmat
ion
age
is
that
m
ore
th
ings
are
hap
pen
ing
ou
tsid
e th
e co
ntr
ol
of
even
th
e m
ost
po
wer
ful
gove
rnm
ents
, or
wh
at I
hav
e ca
lled
th
e d
iffu
sio
n
of
po
wer
. M
ois
es N
airn
ref
ers
to t
he
rise
of
"mic
ro
po
wer
s" a
nd
say
s "t
he
dec
ou
pli
ng
of
the
cap
acit
y
to u
se p
ow
er e
ffec
tive
ly f
rom
th
e co
ntr
ol
of
a la
rge
Web
eria
n b
ure
aucr
acy
is c
han
gin
g th
e w
orl
d."
17
In
an i
nfo
rmat
ion
-bas
ed w
orl
d,
po
wer
dif
fusi
on
is
a
more
dif
ficu
lt p
rob
lem
to m
anag
e th
an p
ow
er t
ran
siti
on
. C
on
ven
tio
nal
wis
do
m h
as a
lway
s h
eld
th
at
the
gove
rnm
ent
wit
h t
he
larg
est
milit
ary
pre
vails,
bu
t in
an
in
form
atio
n a
ge i
t m
ay b
e th
e st
ate
(or
no
n-s
tate
s) w
ith
th
e b
est
sto
ry th
at w
ins.
So
ft p
ow
er
bec
om
es a
mo
re i
mp
ort
ant
par
t o
f th
e m
ix.
Go
vern
men
ts h
ave
alw
ays
wo
rrie
d a
bo
ut
the
flo
w
and
co
ntr
ol
of
info
rmat
ion
, an
d t
he
curr
ent
per
iod
is n
ot
the
firs
t to
be
stro
ngl
y af
fect
ed b
y d
ram
atic
105
Nye 2015
Week 2
Boone 2009
Week 3
Boone 2009
Week 3
Boone 2009
Week 3
Boone 2009
Week 3
Boone 2009
Week 3
S
hare
A
utho
r al
erts
Pri
nt
Clip
Com
men
ts
Sep
tem
ber 9
, 201
5 8:
34 a
m
Andr
ew E
ngla
nd in
Joh
anne
sbur
g
A m
iner
dire
cts
a tru
ck c
arry
ing
ore
from
a Z
ambi
an c
oppe
r min
e
Zam
bia
was
one
of A
fric
a’s
mai
n be
nefic
iari
es w
hen
Chi
na’s
eco
nom
y w
as e
xpan
ding
at f
ull
tilt
. Wit
h co
pper
its
key
expo
rt, C
hina
’s th
irst
for
min
eral
s he
lped
the
sout
hern
Afr
ican
nati
on e
njoy
a d
ecad
e of
eco
nom
ic b
oom
.
But
as
conc
ern
over
Chi
na’s
slo
wdo
wn
trig
gers
a w
ave
ofem
ergi
ng m
arke
t tur
bule
nce,
Zam
bia
finds
itse
lf at
the
cent
re o
f a s
torm
.
Its
curr
ency
, the
kw
acha
, has
plu
mm
eted
to a
ll-ti
mes
low
s ag
ains
t the
dol
lar
in r
ecen
t day
s,an
d ha
s de
prec
iate
d m
ore
than
30
per
cent
sin
ce J
anua
ry —
mak
ing
it th
e w
orld
’s w
orst
perf
orm
er a
fter
the
Bel
arus
rou
ble,
acc
ordi
ng to
Blo
ombe
rg.
Zam
bia’
s w
oes
deep
ened
on
Mon
day
whe
n G
lenc
ore,
the
min
ing
and
com
mod
ity
grou
p,an
noun
ced
it w
as s
uspe
ndin
g pr
oduc
tion
at i
ts M
opan
i min
e fo
r 18
mon
ths.
Chi
nese
-ow
ned
Luan
shya
Cop
per
Min
es h
as a
lso
said
it w
ould
sus
pend
ope
rati
ons
and
cut
Zam
bia
bear
s th
e br
unt o
f Chi
na’s
eco
nom
icsl
owdo
wn
©B
loom
berg
jobs
at i
ts B
alub
a m
ine
in Z
ambi
a be
caus
e of
the
copp
er p
rice
and
a p
ower
cri
sis.
The
situ
atio
n hi
ghlig
hts
the
vuln
erab
ility
of A
fric
a’s
reso
urce
-dep
ende
nt n
atio
ns to
the
fort
unes
of C
hina
. The
tim
ing
coul
d no
t be
wor
se fo
r Za
mbi
a, w
ith
the
turb
ulen
ce c
oinc
idin
gw
ith
seve
re p
ower
sho
rtag
es a
nd p
olit
ical
unc
erta
inty
ahe
ad o
f ele
ctio
ns n
ext y
ear
— th
eco
untr
y’s
seco
nd p
oll i
n 18
mon
ths.
“It’s
a v
ery
vola
tile
env
iron
men
t . . .
it r
efle
cts
seve
ral t
hing
s co
min
g to
geth
er,”
say
s To
bias
Ras
mus
sen,
the
Inte
rnat
iona
l Mon
etar
y Fu
nd’s
rep
rese
ntat
ive
in Z
ambi
a. “
Zam
bia
has
had
aw
hole
str
eam
of b
ad n
ews
— b
eing
ver
y ex
pose
d to
the
gene
ral C
hina
sit
uati
on th
roug
hco
pper
pri
ces,
a p
ress
ing
elec
tric
ity
shor
tage
and
als
o a
smal
ler
[agr
icul
tura
l] h
arve
st th
isye
ar.”
Zam
bia
is A
fric
a’s
seco
nd b
igge
st c
oppe
r pr
oduc
er a
nd d
epen
ds o
n th
e m
etal
for
abou
t 70
per
cent
of i
ts fo
reig
n ex
chan
ge e
arni
ngs
and
25-3
0 pe
r ce
nt o
f gov
ernm
ent r
even
ue.
Chi
na a
ccou
nts
for
mor
e th
an 4
0 pe
r ce
nt o
f the
met
al’s
glo
bal c
onsu
mpt
ion.
Cop
per
pric
esha
ve fa
llen
18 p
er c
ent t
his
year
, slid
ing
to a
six
-yea
r lo
w o
f les
s th
an $
5,00
0 a
tonn
e la
stm
onth
on
fear
s th
at C
hina
’s e
cono
my
coul
d sl
ow fu
rthe
r.
As
a re
sult
, the
Lon
don-
base
d Fa
thom
Con
sult
ancy
ran
ked
Zam
bia
top
of a
n in
dex
ofA
fric
an n
atio
ns m
ost e
xpos
ed to
Chi
na’s
slow
dow
n. I
n 20
12, Z
ambi
an e
xpor
ts to
Chi
naam
ount
ed to
4.3
per
cen
t of g
ross
dom
esti
cpr
oduc
t, w
hile
Chi
nese
fore
ign
dire
ctin
vest
men
t was
7.5
per
cen
t of G
DP,
it s
aid.
Dur
ing
the
boom
yea
rs, m
inin
g at
trac
ted
billi
ons
of d
olla
rs o
f inv
estm
ent.
The
sect
or w
asa
key
driv
er o
f Zam
bia’
s ec
onom
y as
it e
njoy
edav
erag
e an
nual
GD
P gr
owth
of 6
.4 p
er c
ent o
ver
the
last
dec
ade
— o
ne o
f the
wor
ld’s
fast
est
grow
th r
ates
.
But
as
wel
l as
the
copp
er p
rice
slu
mp,
min
ing
com
pani
es h
ave
been
hit
by
polic
y un
cert
aint
yaf
ter
the
gove
rnm
ent m
ore
than
dou
bled
min
ing
roya
ltie
s fo
r op
enca
st m
ines
, bef
ore
redu
cing
them
follo
win
g in
dust
ry p
ress
ure.
The
gove
rnin
g Pa
trio
tic
Fron
t par
ty —
in o
ffic
e si
nce
2011
— w
ooed
vot
ers
by p
ledg
ing
todi
stri
bute
the
coun
try’
s m
iner
al w
ealt
h m
ore
equi
tabl
y, r
aise
wag
es a
nd im
prov
ein
fras
truc
ture
. But
now
it is
str
uggl
ing
to b
alan
ce th
e bo
oks.
Stan
dard
& P
oor’
s do
wng
rade
d Za
mbi
a’s
cred
it r
atin
g in
Jul
y to
B, s
ayin
g it
exp
ecte
d th
e20
15 fi
scal
def
icit
to w
iden
to a
bout
10
per
cent
of G
DP
com
pare
d to
its
prev
ious
est
imat
e of
England 2015
Week 3
6 pe
r ce
nt.
The
gove
rnm
ent h
as p
ledg
ed to
tigh
ten
its
belt
, but
the
kwac
ha’s
wea
knes
s pu
ts p
ress
ure
ona
wid
enin
g cu
rren
t acc
ount
def
icit
, rai
ses
impo
rt c
osts
and
ris
ks fe
edin
g th
roug
h in
toin
flati
on. I
t als
o in
crea
ses
the
cost
of t
he g
over
nmen
t’s d
ebt s
ervi
ce o
blig
atio
ns in
loca
lte
rms.
In
July
, Zam
bia
laun
ched
a $
1.25
bn b
ond,
its
thir
d su
ch is
suan
ce s
ince
late
201
2.
Lusa
ka tu
rned
to th
e IM
F fo
r he
lp la
st y
ear,
but
the
deat
h of
Pre
side
nt M
icha
el S
ata
inO
ctob
er a
nd s
ubse
quen
t pre
side
ntia
l ele
ctio
n m
eant
dis
cuss
ions
wit
h th
e fu
nd n
ever
gai
ned
mom
entu
m. W
ith
the
coun
try
gear
ing
up fo
r ge
nera
l ele
ctio
ns n
ext y
ear,
ther
e ar
e co
ncer
nsab
out w
heth
er th
e go
vern
men
t will
mee
t its
pro
mis
es o
f fis
cal d
isci
plin
e.
Cha
nda
Mut
oni,
man
agin
g di
rect
or a
t Sto
ckbr
oker
s Za
mbi
a, s
ays
conc
ern
amon
g Za
mbi
ans
abou
t the
kw
acha
’s s
lide
is te
mpe
red
by th
e vi
ew th
at it
is c
augh
t up
in a
glo
bal
phen
omen
on.
But
he
adds
: “W
hat i
s m
aybe
of c
once
rn is
we
go in
to e
lect
ions
aga
in n
ext y
ear,
so
will
ther
ebe
the
fisca
l dis
cipl
ine?
“Will
the
gove
rnm
ent s
tick
to it
s bu
dget
exp
endi
ture
?”
The
kwac
ha is
free
-flo
atin
g an
d th
e ce
ntra
l ban
k ha
s ac
know
ledg
ed th
at w
ith
fore
ign
rese
rves
of a
bout
$4b
n —
if th
e re
cent
bon
d is
incl
uded
— it
lack
s th
e re
sour
ces
to in
terv
ene
to p
rop
it u
p.
Mr
Ras
mus
sen
says
the
cent
ral b
ank
has
done
a “
com
men
dabl
e jo
b” o
f att
empt
ing
to te
mpe
rth
e kw
acha
’s v
olat
ility
ove
r th
e pa
st y
ear,
tigh
teni
ng li
quid
ity
via
open
mar
ket
oper
atio
ns a
nd r
aisi
ng th
e st
atut
ory
rese
rve
requ
irem
ents
of b
anks
.
Zam
bia’
s au
thor
itie
s ca
n m
anag
e th
e ec
onom
ic tu
rbul
ence
if th
ey im
plem
ent m
easu
res
tore
assu
re m
arke
ts, s
uch
as c
utti
ng e
xpen
ditu
re a
nd r
aisi
ng r
even
ue, h
e sa
ys: “
They
can
man
age
if th
ey ta
ke th
e ne
eded
dec
isio
ns.”
Edg
ar L
ungu
, the
pre
side
nt, a
ttem
pted
to a
ddre
ss s
ome
of th
e co
ncer
ns in
a s
tate
men
t las
tw
eek,
say
ing
he h
ad d
irec
ted
all g
over
nmen
t ins
titu
tion
s to
“ra
tion
alis
e an
d m
inim
ise
in a
llar
eas
that
eng
ende
r fo
reig
n ex
chan
ge c
osts
”, a
s w
ell a
s ci
ting
mea
sure
s to
add
ress
the
pow
ercr
isis
.
He
also
spo
ke o
f the
nee
d fo
r ec
onom
ic d
iver
sific
atio
n to
red
uce
the
coun
try’
s de
pend
ence
on c
oppe
r —
a to
ugh
task
that
Chi
na’s
slo
wdo
wn
has
thru
st to
the
fore
for
man
y re
sour
ce-
rich
Afr
ican
nat
ions
.
“Diff
icul
t as
the
situ
atio
n is
, it i
s an
idea
l tim
e to
act
ualis
e th
is s
truc
tura
l tra
nsfo
rmat
ion,
”M
r Lu
ngu
said
. “Th
e ch
alle
nges
the
coun
try
face
s to
day
are
real
and
unp
rece
dent
ed.”
England 2015
Week 3
Nye 2011
Week 3
Nye 2011
Week 3
Nye 2011
Week 3
30
A E
uro
pea
n C
on
cep
tio
n
of
Secu
rity
Mar
y K
aldo
r
Ther
e is
gen
eral
ag
reem
ent
that
Eu
rop
e h
as t
o g
o f
orw
ard
s o
r it
will
go
bac
kwar
ds.
Th
ere
are
con
cern
s th
at a
po
litic
al u
nio
n,
wh
ich
mig
ht
be
nec
essa
ry t
o s
ave
the
euro
, w
ou
ld
mea
n a
fu
rth
er l
oss
of
nat
ion
al s
ove
reig
nty
, an
d t
hat
th
e Eu
rop
ean
Un
ion
mig
ht
bec
om
e a
new
su
per
po
wer
. W
ith
in n
atio
nal
cap
ital
s, p
olit
icia
ns
hav
e fo
r so
lo
ng
bla
med
Eu
rop
e fo
r d
iffi
cult
dec
isio
ns,
th
at t
hey
fee
l u
nab
le t
o m
ob
ilise
po
litic
al s
up
po
rt f
or
any
new
ste
ps
tow
ard
s in
teg
rati
on
.
Ther
e is
cur
rent
ly m
uch
hand
wrin
ging
abo
ut t
he d
eclin
e of
Eur
ope.
Of
cour
se, i
t is
tru
e th
at t
he r
apid
gr
owth
of
Chi
na a
nd In
dia
has
shift
ed t
he e
cono
mic
cen
tre
of g
ravi
ty.1
Nev
erth
eles
s, E
urop
e re
mai
ns
the
bigg
est
econ
omic
blo
c an
d a
cont
inui
ng s
ourc
e of
eco
nom
ic, c
ultu
ral a
nd p
oliti
cal i
nnov
atio
n. B
ut
its e
cono
mic
wei
ght i
s no
t mat
ched
by
an a
bilit
y to
act
pol
itica
lly b
ecau
se o
f the
wid
espr
ead
relu
ctan
ce
to f
urth
er t
he E
urop
ean
polit
ical
pro
ject
.
In th
is e
ssay
, I a
rgue
that
fear
s ab
out E
urop
e be
com
ing
a su
perp
ower
and
ove
rrid
ing
natio
nal s
over
eign
ty
are
unfo
unde
d be
caus
e th
e Eu
rope
an U
nion
is a
new
non
-sta
te fo
rm o
f pol
itica
l aut
horit
y, a
new
type
of
polit
y, t
hat
coul
d of
fer
a m
odel
for
glo
bal g
over
nanc
e. G
oing
for
war
d is
, the
refo
re, c
ritic
al n
ot ju
st f
or
Euro
pe, b
ut it
cou
ld a
lso
cont
ribut
e to
the
deve
lopm
ent o
f new
pol
itica
l mec
hani
sms
capa
ble
of a
ddre
ssin
g th
e gl
obal
cha
lleng
es o
f ou
r tim
e. In
par
ticul
ar, I
sug
gest
tha
t Eu
rope
’s di
stin
ctiv
e se
curit
y ap
proa
ch, i
f ta
ken
serio
usly,
cou
ld h
elp
to e
stab
lish
a co
nstr
uctiv
e Eu
rope
an r
ole
in t
he w
orld
. Eur
opea
ns in
vent
ed
the
natio
n st
ate
mod
el –
a m
odel
tha
t ha
d hu
ge a
dvan
tage
s in
ter
ms
of e
cono
mic
dev
elop
men
t, b
ut
whi
ch a
lso
culm
inat
ed in
tw
o w
orld
war
s an
d th
e H
oloc
aust
. The
Eur
opea
n U
nion
has
bee
n de
velo
ped
thro
ugh
tria
l and
err
or in
reac
tion
to th
at e
xper
ienc
e, a
nd th
at is
why
it c
onst
itute
s a
new
type
of p
olity
.
THE
EU A
S A
MO
DEL
FO
R G
LOB
AL
GO
VER
NA
NC
E
In a
cel
ebra
ted
artic
le in
200
2, Ia
n M
anne
rs d
escr
ibed
the
Eur
opea
n U
nion
as
a no
rmat
ive
pow
er.2
This
te
rm s
eem
ed t
o co
ntai
n th
ree
mea
ning
s. F
irst,
the
EU
is a
nor
mat
ive
acto
r, ac
ting
in g
loba
l aff
airs
in
supp
ort
of n
orm
s ra
ther
tha
n in
tere
sts.
Sec
ond,
the
EU
relie
s, in
Man
ners
’ wor
ds, o
n id
eatio
nal p
ower
, w
hat
Jose
ph N
ye c
alls
sof
t po
wer
rat
her
than
mat
eria
l (ec
onom
ic)
or p
hysi
cal (
mili
tary
) po
wer
. Th
ird,
and
intr
igui
ngly,
it r
efer
s to
‘th
e ab
ility
to
defin
e w
hat
is n
orm
al in
inte
rnat
iona
l rel
atio
ns.’3
It is
thi
s th
ird a
spec
t th
at h
as m
ost
rele
vanc
e in
und
erst
andi
ng t
he s
igni
fican
ce o
f th
e EU
’s ro
le in
glo
bal a
ffai
rs.
The
deba
te a
bout
nor
ms v
ersu
s int
eres
ts is
par
alle
led
by th
e de
bate
abo
ut g
eopo
litic
s ver
sus c
osm
opol
itani
sm
or, i
n IR
term
s, re
alis
m v
ersu
s id
ealis
m. I
t can
be
illus
trat
ed b
y th
e de
bate
abo
ut h
uman
itaria
n in
terv
entio
n in
the
aft
erm
ath
of t
he C
old
War
. Th
ose
who
opp
ose
hum
anita
rian
inte
rven
tion
on t
he l
eft
argu
e th
at c
once
rn a
bout
hum
anit
aria
n is
sues
is
not
mot
ivat
ed b
y un
iver
sal
valu
es b
ut i
s ra
ther
a w
ay
1 D
anny
Qua
h, ‘T
he G
loba
l Eco
nom
y’s
Shift
ing
Cen
tre
of G
ravi
ty’ G
loba
l Pol
icy
2(1)
, (20
11),
3-9.
2
Ian
Man
ners
, ‘N
orm
ativ
e Po
wer
Eur
ope:
A C
ontr
adic
tion
in t
erm
s?’ J
ourn
al o
f C
omm
on M
arke
t St
udie
s 40
(2),
(200
2), 2
35 -
58.
3 Ib
id.
31
to l
egiti
mis
e ge
opol
itica
l in
tere
sts.
4 Th
is i
s an
em
piric
al c
laim
abo
ut t
he w
ay g
reat
pow
ers
beha
ve.
Thos
e w
ho o
ppos
e hu
man
itaria
n in
terv
entio
n on
the
rig
ht m
ake
a no
rmat
ive
clai
m t
hat
stat
es o
ught
to
act
in t
he
natio
nal i
nter
est,
that
they
sho
uld
not i
nter
fere
in th
e af
fairs
of o
ther
cou
ntrie
s un
less
doi
ng s
o ca
n fu
lfil s
ome
geop
oliti
cal g
oal.
Wha
t th
e de
bate
illu
stra
tes
is t
he d
ifficu
lty o
f di
stin
guis
hing
nor
ms
from
inte
rest
s, s
ince
in
tere
sts
are
alw
ays
fram
ed in
ter
ms
of n
orm
s. T
hus
the
dom
inan
t U
S fo
reig
n po
licy
narr
ativ
e is
exp
ress
ed in
te
rms
of a
mor
al s
tory
abo
ut t
he U
nite
d St
ates
act
ing
in s
uppo
rt o
f fr
eedo
m. F
orei
gn p
olic
y m
ay o
r m
ay n
ot
be s
hape
d by
inte
rest
s bu
t th
ose
inte
rest
s ar
e gi
ven
mea
ning
in t
erm
s of
wha
t is
wid
ely
view
ed a
s go
od o
r ev
il. T
he q
uest
ion
is t
here
fore
not
nor
ms
vers
us in
tere
sts
but
the
rath
er w
ay n
orm
s ar
e de
fined
.
Both
the
US
and
the
EU s
hare
a c
omm
itmen
t to
dem
ocra
cy a
nd h
uman
rig
hts.
Whe
re t
he E
U d
iffer
s fr
om
the
US
in t
erm
s of
nor
ms
is in
its
over
ridin
g co
mm
itmen
t to
pea
ce a
nd t
he s
prea
d of
inte
rnat
iona
l law
. Thi
s di
ffer
ence
der
ives
fro
m d
iffer
ent
hist
oric
al e
xper
ienc
es. F
or t
he U
nite
d St
ates
the
vic
tory
in W
orld
War
II w
as
a fo
unda
tiona
l mom
ent
ushe
ring
in a
gol
den
age
of A
mer
ican
heg
emon
y ai
med
, at
leas
t in
the
ory,
at
the
spre
ad o
f de
moc
racy
and
pro
sper
ity.
Acc
ordi
ng t
o th
is v
iew
of
the
wor
ld,
mili
tary
pow
er i
s an
im
port
ant
inst
rum
ent
for
the
prom
otio
n of
dem
ocra
cy a
nd h
uman
rig
hts.
For
mos
t m
embe
rs o
f th
e EU
, th
e Se
cond
W
orld
War
is re
mem
bere
d w
ith s
ham
e an
d ho
rror
. The
foun
ders
of t
he E
U w
ere
prim
arily
con
cern
ed w
ith th
e co
nstr
uctio
n of
a m
ultil
ater
al s
yste
m t
hat
coul
d pr
even
t w
ar, g
enoc
ide
and
impe
rialis
m in
the
fut
ure.
Hen
ce
the
inte
rest
of
the
EU is
fra
med
in t
erm
s of
pre
vent
ing
war
and
fos
terin
g in
terd
epen
denc
e an
d, a
s I s
hall
argu
e, t
he d
omin
ant
fore
ign
polic
y na
rrat
ive
is c
osm
opol
itan
rath
er t
han
geop
oliti
cal.
Ther
e is
a p
aral
lel h
ere
with
the
beha
viou
r of w
hat A
sle
Toje
cal
ls s
mal
l pow
ers.
Sm
all p
ower
s do
not
hav
e th
e ca
pabi
litie
s of
gre
at p
ower
s bu
t ar
e ne
vert
hele
ss ‘s
yste
m-in
fluen
cing
’ sta
tes.
Pre
cise
ly b
ecau
se t
hey
lack
the
capa
bilit
ies
of g
reat
pow
ers
they
defi
ne th
eir i
nter
est i
n te
rms
of in
tern
atio
nal n
orm
s, o
r to
put i
t ano
ther
way
, si
nce
they
cou
ld n
ever
win
in a
war
with
a g
reat
pow
er, t
heir
inte
rest
is t
he p
reve
ntio
n of
war
. Sm
all p
ower
s co
ntrib
ute
disp
ropo
rtio
nate
ly t
o th
e co
nstr
uctio
n of
inte
rnat
iona
l ins
titut
ions
, to
pea
ce b
uild
ing
and
glob
al
deve
lopm
ent;
the
y fa
vour
the
str
engt
heni
ng o
f in
tern
atio
nal l
aw. T
he E
urop
ean
Uni
on a
cts
in a
sim
ilar
way
, no
t so
muc
h be
caus
e of
lack
of
capa
bilit
y bu
t be
caus
e ‘o
f fe
ars
of W
estp
halia
n so
vere
ignt
y an
d ba
lanc
e of
po
wer
and
of t
he c
onse
quen
ces
they
had
for E
urop
ean
stab
ility
prio
r to
1945
.’5 In
oth
er w
ords
, if U
S in
tere
sts
are
expr
esse
d in
nor
mat
ive
term
s, t
he E
U p
rom
otio
n of
nor
ms
is s
een
as b
eing
in t
he E
urop
ean
inte
rest
.
A s
imila
r an
d re
late
d di
fficu
lty a
rises
with
the
defi
nitio
n of
nor
mat
ive
pow
er a
s co
mm
unic
ativ
e po
wer
(H
aber
mas
) or
sof
t po
wer
(N
ye)
or p
ower
ove
r op
inio
n (E
.H.C
arr)
. Bo
th e
cono
mic
and
mili
tary
pow
er a
re
form
s of
com
mun
icat
ion.
The
per
cept
ion
of A
mer
ican
mili
tary
pow
er s
tem
s la
rgel
y fr
om t
he m
emor
y of
th
e A
mer
ican
vic
tory
in 1
945.
The
hug
e m
ilita
ry a
rsen
al s
erve
s to
rem
ind
us o
f th
at v
icto
ry; i
t is
mea
nt a
s a
sign
al. T
he c
once
pt o
f de
terr
ence
is a
com
mun
icat
ive
conc
ept.
The
act
ual u
se o
f m
ilita
ry p
ower
in V
ietn
am,
for e
xam
ple,
or m
ore
rece
ntly
in Ir
aq a
nd A
fgha
nist
an, h
as h
ugel
y de
nted
the
perc
eptio
n of
mili
tary
str
engt
h an
d do
ne g
reat
dam
age
to t
he r
eput
atio
n on
whi
ch A
mer
ican
pow
er r
ests
.
Thos
e w
ho o
ppos
e th
e ac
quis
ition
of m
ilita
ry c
apab
ilitie
s by
the
EU fe
ar th
at th
e EU
will
bec
ome
a su
perp
ower
on
the
Am
eric
an m
odel
. Thi
s pr
esup
pose
s th
at m
ilita
ry p
ower
con
sist
s of
the
type
of c
apab
ilitie
s po
sses
sed
by
the
Uni
ted
Stat
es, d
esig
ned
for fi
ghtin
g a
war
aga
inst
oth
er s
tate
s. B
ut a
s I s
hall
elab
orat
e in
the
next
sec
tion,
th
ere
is a
rol
e fo
r m
ilita
ry c
apab
ilitie
s in
enf
orci
ng p
eace
and
uph
oldi
ng h
uman
rig
hts
that
is v
ery
diff
eren
t fr
om c
lass
ic w
ar fi
ghtin
g. In
oth
er w
ords
the
issu
e is
not
mili
tary
ver
sus
com
mun
icat
ive
pow
er ,
even
tho
ugh
ther
e is
a s
hift
in t
he b
alan
ce b
etw
een
coer
cive
and
per
suas
ive
inst
rum
ents
, but
wha
t ki
nd o
f po
wer
, tha
t is
to
say
, wha
t is
bei
ng c
omm
unic
ated
thr
ough
the
use
of
mili
tary
too
ls.
4 F
or e
xam
ple
see
Noa
m C
hom
sky,
Mili
tary
Hum
anis
m, (
1999
) and
Mah
mou
d M
amda
ni, S
avio
urs
and
Surv
ivor
s, (2
009)
.5
Asl
e To
je, ‘
The
Euro
pean
Uni
on a
s a
Smal
l Pow
er’,
Jour
nal o
f C
omm
on M
arke
t St
udie
s 49
(1),
(201
1), 5
5
Kaldor 2012
Week 3
32
A p
aral
lel a
rgum
ent c
an b
e m
ade
with
resp
ect t
o ec
onom
ic p
ower
. In
the
first
two
deca
des
afte
r Wor
ld W
ar II
, th
e U
S us
ed it
s m
assi
ve e
cono
mic
pow
er to
spr
ead
mar
kets
and
pro
sper
ity th
roug
h its
insi
sten
ce o
n an
ope
n in
tern
atio
nal t
radi
ng s
yste
m a
nd g
ener
ous
aid.
As
the
US
bega
n to
lose
it c
ompe
titiv
e ed
ge, i
t in
crea
sing
ly
bega
n to
act
uni
late
rally
, suc
king
in re
sour
ces
from
the
rest
of t
he w
orld
thro
ugh
grow
ing
inde
bted
ness
mad
e po
ssib
le b
ecau
se o
f the
priv
ilege
d ro
le o
f the
dol
lar.
Mos
t of t
he w
orld
now
con
side
rs th
at A
mer
ican
eco
nom
ic
pow
er is
use
d fo
r th
e so
le b
enefi
t of
Am
eric
ans,
whe
reas
ear
lier
it ha
d be
en p
erce
ived
as
a co
ntrib
utio
n to
gl
obal
dev
elop
men
t, e
spec
ially
in E
urop
e, t
he r
ecip
ient
s of
Mar
shal
l aid
.
So w
hat
dist
ingu
ishe
s th
e Eu
rope
an U
nion
fro
m t
radi
tiona
l gre
at p
ower
s is
not
nor
ms
vers
us in
tere
sts
nor
hard
ver
sus
soft
pow
er,
rath
er i
t is
the
nat
ure
of i
ts p
oliti
cal
auth
ority
and
how
thi
s in
fluen
ces
the
way
in
tere
sts
and
pow
er a
re f
ram
ed.
Man
ners
cal
ls t
he E
U a
hyb
rid p
olity
, a
new
for
m o
f re
gion
al g
over
nanc
e de
sign
ed n
ot t
o di
spla
ce t
he n
atio
n-st
ate
but
to c
onst
rain
its
dang
erou
s te
nden
cies
for
bot
h ec
onom
ic a
nd
mili
tary
uni
late
ralis
m; i
t add
s a
new
laye
r of p
oliti
cal a
utho
rity
rath
er th
an e
stab
lishi
ng a
new
pol
e of
pol
itica
l au
thor
ity.
It is
a m
ultil
ater
al i
nstit
utio
n bu
t go
es b
eyon
d in
tern
atio
nalis
m (
betw
een
stat
es)
to p
osse
ss a
n el
emen
t of
sup
rana
tiona
lism
(be
yond
sta
tes)
. Th
is n
ew f
orm
of
auth
ority
nec
essa
rily
acts
in s
uppo
rt o
f th
e sp
read
of
sim
ilar
type
s of
aut
horit
y an
d th
eref
ore
it ha
s an
inte
rest
in p
reve
ntin
g w
ars
and
stre
ngth
enin
g in
tern
atio
nal l
aw. T
his
type
of
auth
ority
als
o de
pend
s m
ore
on e
cono
mic
and
com
mun
icat
ive
tool
s th
an o
n m
ilita
ry c
apab
ilitie
s, b
ecau
se it
s in
tere
st is
dam
peni
ng d
own
and
prev
entin
g vi
olen
ce r
athe
r th
an w
inni
ng.
As
Man
ners
put
s it,
‘th
e di
ffer
ent
exis
tenc
e, t
he d
iffer
ent
norm
s, a
nd t
he d
iffer
ent
polic
ies
the
EU p
ursu
es
are
real
ly p
art
of r
edefi
ning
wha
t ca
n be
‘nor
mal
’ in
inte
rnat
iona
l rel
atio
ns.’6
THE
RO
LE O
F C
SDP
From
the
beg
inni
ng o
f th
e Eu
rope
an p
roje
ct,
ther
e w
as a
ten
sion
bet
wee
n th
e co
ncep
tion
of t
he E
U a
s a
futu
re s
uper
pow
er, a
big
ger
natio
n-st
ate,
abl
e to
cha
lleng
e A
mer
ican
heg
emon
y an
d th
e co
ncep
tion
of t
he
EU a
s a
new
typ
e of
glo
bal a
ctor
. A
t th
e he
art
of t
hat
tens
ion
was
the
acq
uisi
tion
of m
ilita
ry c
apab
ilitie
s.
The
prop
osal
to
crea
te a
Eur
opea
n de
fenc
e co
mm
unity
195
4 w
as d
efea
ted
by a
com
bina
tion
of t
hose
who
w
ante
d to
pre
serv
e th
e na
tion-
stat
e an
d th
ose
who
opp
osed
mili
taris
m.
This
unh
oly
allia
nce
betw
een
old-
fash
ione
d na
tiona
lists
and
ant
i-war
act
ivis
ts h
as b
een
repr
oduc
ed in
rec
ent
year
s in
the
Fre
nch
and
Dut
ch
no-v
otes
in t
he r
efer
endu
m o
n a
Euro
pean
con
stitu
tion.
The
Euro
pean
Sec
urity
and
Def
ence
Pol
icy
(ESD
P),
now
the
Com
mon
Sec
urity
and
Def
ence
Pol
icy
(CSD
P),
has
been
in e
xist
ence
sin
ce 2
003.
It w
as p
ropo
sed
at t
he A
nglo
-Fre
nch
sum
mit
in S
t M
alo
in 1
998,
dur
ing
the
Kos
ovo
cris
is, w
hen
the
Briti
sh w
ithdr
ew th
eir o
ppos
ition
to th
e ac
quis
ition
of m
ilita
ry c
apab
ilitie
s by
the
Euro
pean
Uni
on b
ecau
se o
f fru
stra
tion
at A
mer
ican
unw
illin
gnes
s to
com
mit
grou
nd tr
oops
. Fro
m it
s in
cept
ion
ESD
P w
as d
iffer
ent
from
a c
lass
ic n
atio
nal s
ecur
ity s
trat
egy.
It w
as c
onfin
ed t
o th
e so
-cal
led
St P
eter
sbur
g ta
sks
– hu
man
itaria
n an
d re
scue
, pe
ace-
keep
ing
and
cris
is m
anag
emen
t –
as o
ppos
ed t
o cl
assi
c te
rrito
rial
defe
nce,
whi
ch w
as s
een
as t
he p
rese
rve
of N
ATO
and
of
indi
vidu
al n
atio
n-st
ates
. Th
e Eu
rope
an S
ecur
ity
Stra
tegy
of
Dec
embe
r 20
03 e
mph
asis
ed t
he m
ultil
ater
al a
ppro
ach
of t
he E
urop
ean
Uni
on a
nd in
sist
ed t
hat
in ‘c
ontr
ast
to t
he v
isib
le t
hrea
ts o
f th
e C
old
War
, non
e of
the
new
thr
eats
are
pur
ely
mili
tary
; nor
can
any
be
tac
kled
by
pure
ly m
ilita
ry m
eans
.’7 Si
nce
its in
cept
ion,
ESD
P ha
s in
volv
ed m
ilita
ry-c
ivili
an c
oope
ratio
n; it
es
tabl
ishe
d ha
s a
mili
tary
-civ
ilian
pla
nnin
g ce
ll an
d it
has
pion
eere
d ci
vilia
n cr
isis
man
agem
ent.
6 M
anne
rs, ‘
Nor
mat
ive
Pow
er E
urop
e’, 2
53.
7 h
ttp:
//ww
w.c
onsi
lium
.eur
opa.
eu/u
edoc
s/cm
sUpl
oad/
7836
7.pd
f
Kaldor 2012
Week 3
Prize Lecture
Lecture to the memory of Alfred Nobel, December 11, 1974
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic‐sciences/laureates/1974/hayek‐lecture.html
The Pretence of Knowledge
The particular occasion of this lecture, combined with the chief practical problem which economists
have to face today, have made the choice of its topic almost inevitable. On the one hand the still
recent establishment of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science marks a significant step in
the process by which, in the opinion of the general public, economics has been conceded some of
the dignity and prestige of the physical sciences. On the other hand, the economists are at this
moment called upon to say how to extricate the free world from the serious threat of accelerating
inflation which, it must be admitted, has been brought about by policies which the majority of
economists recommended and even urged governments to pursue. We have indeed at the moment
little cause for pride: as a profession we have made a mess of things.
It seems to me that this failure of the economists to guide policy more successfully is closely
connected with their propensity to imitate as closely as possible the procedures of the brilliantly
successful physical sciences ‐ an attempt which in our field may lead to outright error. It is an
approach which has come to be described as the "scientistic" attitude ‐ an attitude which, as I
defined it some thirty years ago, "is decidedly unscientific in the true sense of the word, since it
involves a mechanical and uncritical application of habits of thought to fields different from those in
which they have been formed."1 I want today to begin by explaining how some of the gravest errors
of recent economic policy are a direct consequence of this scientistic error.
The theory which has been guiding monetary and financial policy during the last thirty years, and
which I contend is largely the product of such a mistaken conception of the proper scientific
procedure, consists in the assertion that there exists a simple positive correlation between total
employment and the size of the aggregate demand for goods and services; it leads to the belief that
we can permanently assure full employment by maintaining total money expenditure at an
appropriate level. Among the various theories advanced to account for extensive unemployment,
this is probably the only one in support of which strong quantitative evidence can be adduced. I
nevertheless regard it as fundamentally false, and to act upon it, as we now experience, as very
harmful.
This brings me to the crucial issue. Unlike the position that exists in the physical sciences, in
economics and other disciplines that deal with essentially complex phenomena, the aspects of the
events to be accounted for about which we can get quantitative data are necessarily limited and
may not include the important ones.
Hayek 1974
Week 4
While in the physical sciences it is generally assumed, probably with good reason, that any important
factor which determines the observed events will itself be directly observable and measurable, in
the study of such complex phenomena as the market, which depend on the actions of many
individuals, all the circumstances which will determine the outcome of a process, for reasons which I
shall explain later, will hardly ever be fully known or measurable. And while in the physical sciences
the investigator will be able to measure what, on the basis of a prima facie theory, he thinks
important, in the social sciences often that is treated as important which happens to be accessible to
measurement. This is sometimes carried to the point where it is demanded that our theories must
be formulated in such terms that they refer only to measurable magnitudes.
It can hardly be denied that such a demand quite arbitrarily limits the facts which are to be admitted
as possible causes of the events which occur in the real world. This view, which is often quite naively
accepted as required by scientific procedure, has some rather paradoxical consequences. We know:
of course, with regard to the market and similar social structures, a great many facts which we
cannot measure and on which indeed we have only some very imprecise and general information.
And because the effects of these facts in any particular instance cannot be confirmed by quantitative
evidence, they are simply disregarded by those sworn to admit only what they regard as scientific
evidence: they thereupon happily proceed on the fiction that the factors which they can measure
are the only ones that are relevant.
The correlation between aggregate demand and total employment, for instance, may only be
approximate, but as it is the only one on which we have quantitative data, it is accepted as the only
causal connection that counts. On this standard there may thus well exist better "scientific" evidence
for a false theory, which will be accepted because it is more "scientific", than for a valid explanation,
which is rejected because there is no sufficient quantitative evidence for it.
Let me illustrate this by a brief sketch of what I regard as the chief actual cause of extensive
unemployment ‐ an account which will also explain why such unemployment cannot be lastingly
cured by the inflationary policies recommended by the now fashionable theory. This correct
explanation appears to me to be the existence of discrepancies between the distribution of demand
among the different goods and services and the allocation of labour and other resources among the
production of those outputs. We possess a fairly good "qualitative" knowledge of the forces by
which a correspondence between demand and supply in the different sectors of the economic
system is brought about, of the conditions under which it will be achieved, and of the factors likely
to prevent such an adjustment. The separate steps in the account of this process rely on facts of
everyday experience, and few who take the trouble to follow the argument will question the validity
of the factual assumptions, or the logical correctness of the conclusions drawn from them. We have
indeed good reason to believe that unemployment indicates that the structure of relative prices and
wages has been distorted (usually by monopolistic or governmental price fixing), and that to restore
equality between the demand and the supply of labour in all sectors changes of relative prices and
some transfers of labour will be necessary.
But when we are asked for quantitative evidence for the particular structure of prices and wages
that would be required in order to assure a smooth continuous sale of the products and services
offered, we must admit that we have no such information. We know, in other words, the general
conditions in which what we call, somewhat misleadingly, an equilibrium will establish itself: but we
Hayek 1974
Week 4
never know what the particular prices or wages are which would exist if the market were to bring
about such an equilibrium. We can merely say what the conditions are in which we can expect the
market to establish prices and wages at which demand will equal supply. But we can never produce
statistical information which would show how much the prevailing prices and wages deviate from
those which would secure a continuous sale of the current supply of labour. Though this account of
the causes of unemployment is an empirical theory, in the sense that it might be proved false, e.g. if,
with a constant money supply, a general increase of wages did not lead to unemployment, it is
certainly not the kind of theory which we could use to obtain specific numerical predictions
concerning the rates of wages, or the distribution of labour, to be expected.
Why should we, however, in economics, have to plead ignorance of the sort of facts on which, in the
case of a physical theory, a scientist would certainly be expected to give precise information? It is
probably not surprising that those impressed by the example of the physical sciences should find this
position very unsatisfactory and should insist on the standards of proof which they find there. The
reason for this state of affairs is the fact, to which I have already briefly referred, that the social
sciences, like much of biology but unlike most fields of the physical sciences, have to deal with
structures of essential complexity, i.e. with structures whose characteristic properties can be
exhibited only by models made up of relatively large numbers of variables. Competition, for
instance, is a process which will produce certain results only if it proceeds among a fairly large
number of acting persons.
In some fields, particularly where problems of a similar kind arise in the physical sciences, the
difficulties can be overcome by using, instead of specific information about the individual elements,
data about the relative frequency, or the probability, of the occurrence of the various distinctive
properties of the elements. But this is true only where we have to deal with what has been called by
Dr. Warren Weaver (formerly of the Rockefeller Foundation), with a distinction which ought to be
much more widely understood, "phenomena of unorganized complexity," in contrast to those
"phenomena of organized complexity" with which we have to deal in the social sciences.2 Organized
complexity here means that the character of the structures showing it depends not only on the
properties of the individual elements of which they are composed, and the relative frequency with
which they occur, but also on the manner in which the individual elements are connected with each
other. In the explanation of the working of such structures we can for this reason not replace the
information about the individual elements by statistical information, but require full information
about each element if from our theory we are to derive specific predictions about individual events.
Without such specific information about the individual elements we shall be confined to what on
another occasion I have called mere pattern predictions ‐ predictions of some of the general
attributes of the structures that will form themselves, but not containing specific statements about
the individual elements of which the structures will be made up.3
This is particularly true of our theories accounting for the determination of the systems of relative
prices and wages that will form themselves on a well functioning market. Into the determination of
these prices and wages there will enter the effects of particular information possessed by every one
of the participants in the market process ‐ a sum of facts which in their totality cannot be known to
the scientific observer, or to any other single brain. It is indeed the source of the superiority of the
market order, and the reason why, when it is not suppressed by the powers of government, it
Hayek 1974
Week 4
regularly displaces other types of order, that in the resulting allocation of resources more of the
knowledge of particular facts will be utilized which exists only dispersed among uncounted persons,
than any one person can possess. But because we, the observing scientists, can thus never know all
the determinants of such an order, and in consequence also cannot know at which particular
structure of prices and wages demand would everywhere equal supply, we also cannot measure the
deviations from that order; nor can we statistically test our theory that it is the deviations from that
"equilibrium" system of prices and wages which make it impossible to sell some of the products and
services at the prices at which they are offered.
Before I continue with my immediate concern, the effects of all this on the employment policies
currently pursued, allow me to define more specifically the inherent limitations of our numerical
knowledge which are so often overlooked. I want to do this to avoid giving the impression that I
generally reject the mathematical method in economics. I regard it in fact as the great advantage of
the mathematical technique that it allows us to describe, by means of algebraic equations, the
general character of a pattern even where we are ignorant of the numerical values which will
determine its particular manifestation. We could scarcely have achieved that comprehensive picture
of the mutual interdependencies of the different events in a market without this algebraic
technique. It has led to the illusion, however, that we can use this technique for the determination
and prediction of the numerical values of those magnitudes; and this has led to a vain search for
quantitative or numerical constants. This happened in spite of the fact that the modern founders of
mathematical economics had no such illusions. It is true that their systems of equations describing
the pattern of a market equilibrium are so framed that if we were able to fill in all the blanks of the
abstract formulae, i.e. if we knew all the parameters of these equations, we could calculate the
prices and quantities of all commodities and services sold. But, as Vilfredo Pareto, one of the
founders of this theory, clearly stated, its purpose cannot be "to arrive at a numerical calculation of
prices", because, as he said, it would be "absurd" to assume that we could ascertain all the data.4
Indeed, the chief point was already seen by those remarkable anticipators of modern economics, the
Spanish schoolmen of the sixteenth century, who emphasized that what they called pretium
mathematicum, the mathematical price, depended on so many particular circumstances that it could
never be known to man but was known only to God.5 I sometimes wish that our mathematical
economists would take this to heart.
I must confess that I still doubt whether their search for measurable magnitudes has made
significant contributions to our theoretical understanding of economic phenomena ‐ as distinct from
their value as a description of particular situations. Nor am I prepared to accept the excuse that this
branch of research is still very young: Sir William Petty, the founder of econometrics, was after all a
somewhat senior colleague of Sir Isaac Newton in the Royal Society!
There may be few instances in which the superstition that only measurable magnitudes can be
important has done positive harm in the economic field: but the present inflation and employment
problems are a very serious one. Its effect has been that what is probably the true cause of extensive
unemployment has been disregarded by the scientistically minded majority of economists, because
its operation could not be confirmed by directly observable relations between measurable
magnitudes, and that an almost exclusive concentration on quantitatively measurable surface
phenomena has produced a policy which has made matters worse.
Hayek 1974
Week 4
It has, of course, to be readily admitted that the kind of theory which I regard as the true
explanation of unemployment is a theory of somewhat limited content because it allows us to make
only very general predictions of the kind of events which we must expect in a given situation. But the
effects on policy of the more ambitious constructions have not been very fortunate and I confess
that I prefer true but imperfect knowledge, even if it leaves much indetermined and unpredictable,
to a pretence of exact knowledge that is likely to be false. The credit which the apparent conformity
with recognized scientific standards can gain for seemingly simple but false theories may, as the
present instance shows, have grave consequences.
In fact, in the case discussed, the very measures which the dominant "macro‐economic" theory has
recommended as a remedy for unemployment, namely the increase of aggregate demand, have
become a cause of a very extensive misallocation of resources which is likely to make later large‐
scale unemployment inevitable. The continuous injection of additional amounts of money at points
of the economic system where it creates a temporary demand which must cease when the increase
of the quantity of money stops or slows down, together with the expectation of a continuing rise of
prices, draws labour and other resources into employments which can last only so long as the
increase of the quantity of money continues at the same rate ‐ or perhaps even only so long as it
continues to accelerate at a given rate. What this policy has produced is not so much a level of
employment that could not have been brought about in other ways, as a distribution of employment
which cannot be indefinitely maintained and which after some time can be maintained only by a rate
of inflation which would rapidly lead to a disorganisation of all economic activity. The fact is that by a
mistaken theoretical view we have been led into a precarious position in which we cannot prevent
substantial unemployment from re‐appearing; not because, as this view is sometimes
misrepresented, this unemployment is deliberately brought about as a means to combat inflation,
but because it is now bound to occur as a deeply regrettable but inescapable consequence of the
mistaken policies of the past as soon as inflation ceases to accelerate.
I must, however, now leave these problems of immediate practical importance which I have
introduced chiefly as an illustration of the momentous consequences that may follow from errors
concerning abstract problems of the philosophy of science. There is as much reason to be
apprehensive about the long run dangers created in a much wider field by the uncritical acceptance
of assertions which have the appearance of being scientific as there is with regard to the problems I
have just discussed. What I mainly wanted to bring out by the topical illustration is that certainly in
my field, but I believe also generally in the sciences of man, what looks superficially like the most
scientific procedure is often the most unscientific, and, beyond this, that in these fields there are
definite limits to what we can expect science to achieve. This means that to entrust to science ‐ or to
deliberate control according to scientific principles ‐ more than scientific method can achieve may
have deplorable effects. The progress of the natural sciences in modern times has of course so much
exceeded all expectations that any suggestion that there may be some limits to it is bound to arouse
suspicion. Especially all those will resist such an insight who have hoped that our increasing power of
prediction and control, generally regarded as the characteristic result of scientific advance, applied
to the processes of society, would soon enable us to mould society entirely to our liking. It is indeed
true that, in contrast to the exhilaration which the discoveries of the physical sciences tend to
produce, the insights which we gain from the study of society more often have a dampening effect
on our aspirations; and it is perhaps not surprising that the more impetuous younger members of
our profession are not always prepared to accept this. Yet the confidence in the unlimited power of
Hayek 1974
Week 4
science is only too often based on a false belief that the scientific method consists in the application
of a ready‐made technique, or in imitating the form rather than the substance of scientific
procedure, as if one needed only to follow some cooking recipes to solve all social problems. It
sometimes almost seems as if the techniques of science were more easily learnt than the thinking
that shows us what the problems are and how to approach them.
The conflict between what in its present mood the public expects science to achieve in satisfaction
of popular hopes and what is really in its power is a serious matter because, even if the true
scientists should all recognize the limitations of what they can do in the field of human affairs, so
long as the public expects more there will always be some who will pretend, and perhaps honestly
believe, that they can do more to meet popular demands than is really in their power. It is often
difficult enough for the expert, and certainly in many instances impossible for the layman, to
distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate claims advanced in the name of science. The
enormous publicity recently given by the media to a report pronouncing in the name of science on
The Limits to Growth, and the silence of the same media about the devastating criticism this report
has received from the competent experts6, must make one feel somewhat apprehensive about the
use to which the prestige of science can be put. But it is by no means only in the field of economics
that far‐reaching claims are made on behalf of a more scientific direction of all human activities and
the desirability of replacing spontaneous processes by "conscious human control". If I am not
mistaken, psychology, psychiatry and some branches of sociology, not to speak about the so‐called
philosophy of history, are even more affected by what I have called the scientistic prejudice, and by
specious claims of what science can achieve.7
If we are to safeguard the reputation of science, and to prevent the arrogation of knowledge based
on a superficial similarity of procedure with that of the physical sciences, much effort will have to be
directed toward debunking such arrogations, some of which have by now become the vested
interests of established university departments. We cannot be grateful enough to such modern
philosophers of science as Sir Karl Popper for giving us a test by which we can distinguish between
what we may accept as scientific and what not ‐ a test which I am sure some doctrines now widely
accepted as scientific would not pass. There are some special problems, however, in connection with
those essentially complex phenomena of which social structures are so important an instance, which
make me wish to restate in conclusion in more general terms the reasons why in these fields not
only are there only absolute obstacles to the prediction of specific events, but why to act as if we
possessed scientific knowledge enabling us to transcend them may itself become a serious obstacle
to the advance of the human intellect.
The chief point we must remember is that the great and rapid advance of the physical sciences took
place in fields where it proved that explanation and prediction could be based on laws which
accounted for the observed phenomena as functions of comparatively few variables ‐ either
particular facts or relative frequencies of events. This may even be the ultimate reason why we
single out these realms as "physical" in contrast to those more highly organized structures which I
have here called essentially complex phenomena. There is no reason why the position must be the
same in the latter as in the former fields. The difficulties which we encounter in the latter are not, as
one might at first suspect, difficulties about formulating theories for the explanation of the observed
events ‐ although they cause also special difficulties about testing proposed explanations and
therefore about eliminating bad theories.
Hayek 1974
Week 4
They are due to the chief problem which arises when we apply our theories to any particular
situation in the real world. A theory of essentially complex phenomena must refer to a large number
of particular facts; and to derive a prediction from it, or to test it, we have to ascertain all these
particular facts. Once we succeeded in this there should be no particular difficulty about deriving
testable predictions ‐ with the help of modern computers it should be easy enough to insert these
data into the appropriate blanks of the theoretical formulae and to derive a prediction. The real
difficulty, to the solution of which science has little to contribute, and which is sometimes indeed
insoluble, consists in the ascertainment of the particular facts.
A simple example will show the nature of this difficulty. Consider some ball game played by a few
people of approximately equal skill. If we knew a few particular facts in addition to our general
knowledge of the ability of the individual players, such as their state of attention, their perceptions
and the state of their hearts, lungs, muscles etc. at each moment of the game, we could probably
predict the outcome. Indeed, if we were familiar both with the game and the teams we should
probably have a fairly shrewd idea on what the outcome will depend. But we shall of course not be
able to ascertain those facts and in consequence the result of the game will be outside the range of
the scientifically predictable, however well we may know what effects particular events would have
on the result of the game. This does not mean that we can make no predictions at all about the
course of such a game.
If we know the rules of the different games we shall, in watching one, very soon know which game is
being played and what kinds of actions we can expect and what kind not. But our capacity to predict
will be confined to such general characteristics of the events to be expected and not include the
capacity of predicting particular individual events.
This corresponds to what I have called earlier the mere pattern predictions to which we are
increasingly confined as we penetrate from the realm in which relatively simple laws prevail into the
range of phenomena where organized complexity rules. As we advance we find more and more
frequently that we can in fact ascertain only some but not all the particular circumstances which
determine the outcome of a given process; and in consequence we are able to predict only some but
not all the properties of the result we have to expect. Often all that we shall be able to predict will
be some abstract characteristic of the pattern that will appear ‐ relations between kinds of elements
about which individually we know very little. Yet, as I am anxious to repeat, we will still achieve
predictions which can be falsified and which therefore are of empirical significance.
Of course, compared with the precise predictions we have learnt to expect in the physical sciences,
this sort of mere pattern predictions is a second best with which one does not like to have to be
content. Yet the danger of which I want to warn is precisely the belief that in order to have a claim
to be accepted as scientific it is necessary to achieve more. This way lies charlatanism and worse. To
act on the belief that we possess the knowledge and the power which enable us to shape the
processes of society entirely to our liking, knowledge which in fact we do not possess, is likely to
make us do much harm. In the physical sciences there may be little objection to trying to do the
impossible; one might even feel that one ought not to discourage the over‐confident because their
experiments may after all produce some new insights. But in the social field the erroneous belief
that the exercise of some power would have beneficial consequences is likely to lead to a new power
to coerce other men being conferred on some authority. Even if such power is not in itself bad, its
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exercise is likely to impede the functioning of those spontaneous ordering forces by which, without
understanding them, man is in fact so largely assisted in the pursuit of his aims. We are only
beginning to understand on how subtle a communication system the functioning of an advanced
industrial society is based ‐ a communications system which we call the market and which turns out
to be a more efficient mechanism for digesting dispersed information than any that man has
deliberately designed.
If man is not to do more harm than good in his efforts to improve the social order, he will have to
learn that in this, as in all other fields where essential complexity of an organized kind prevails, he
cannot acquire the full knowledge which would make mastery of the events possible. He will
therefore have to use what knowledge he can achieve, not to shape the results as the craftsman
shapes his handiwork, but rather to cultivate a growth by providing the appropriate environment, in
the manner in which the gardener does this for his plants.
There is danger in the exuberant feeling of ever growing power which the advance of the physical
sciences has engendered and which tempts man to try, "dizzy with success", to use a characteristic
phrase of early communism, to subject not only our natural but also our human environment to the
control of a human will. The recognition of the insuperable limits to his knowledge ought indeed to
teach the student of society a lesson of humility which should guard him against becoming an
accomplice in men's fatal striving to control society ‐ a striving which makes him not only a tyrant
over his fellows, but which may well make him the destroyer of a civilization which no brain has
designed but which has grown from the free efforts of millions of individuals.
From Nobel Lectures, Economics 1969‐1980, Editor Assar Lindbeck, World Scientific Publishing Co.,
Singapore, 1992
Copyright © The Nobel Foundation 1974
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JAMES SCOTT ON AGRICULTURE AS POLITICS, THEDANGERS OF STANDARDIZATION AND NOT BEING
GOVERNED
How are agriculture or foot-dragging the core of the political? What if messy villages and myriads of local measures are rational? Can the well-intentioned state we take for granted as our point of departure be just as shortsighted as we are? Sometimes International Relations (IR) and political science more generally get challenged in unexpected ways. The work of James C. Scott, Marxist inclined towards
anarchism by conviction and something between agrarian specialist and political scientist in training, inspires many not only to reconsider what the realm of politics was about—but also makes resistance to state-driven schemes understandable—even for political scientists. As such, he helps political scientists seeing the state differently. In this comprehensive Talk , Scott—amongst others— gives a comprehensive overview of his ideas on ‘the political’; engages the politics of political science; and explains why despite globalization the state is still very much alive.
What is, according to you, the biggest current challenge or principal debate in politically oriented social sciences? What is your position or answer to this challenge / in this debate?
This is not a question I pose to myself often. About the only time I did was, however, some years ago. I don’t know if you know about the Perestroika Movement in Political Science? Some time ago, an anonymous manifesto signed by Mr. Perestroika appeared. It started out with the observation that Benedict Anderson and I had never read the American Political Science Review, and it proceeded to ask why—arguing that perhaps this journal and the hegemonic organization that backed it were irrelevant and indeed inhibitive of progress. Now the Perestroika Movement connected with the European Post-Autistic Economics Movement, which propagates heterodox economics as a challenge to all-consuming mainstream neoclassical economics. I was on the Executive Council of the Political Science Association because they invited me as a result of the Perestroika insurgency, and that was the only time I got actively involved in trying to think about what political science ought to do. By and large, I do what I do and let the chips fall where they
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may; I prefer not to spend my time in the methodological trenches of the fights are swirling around me. As you can see, I haven’t thought deeply about how political science ought to be reformed; but I do believe that in political science, the people who do have pretentions to ‘scientificity’ are actually very busy learning more and more about less and less. There is an experimental turn in political science, consisting of people conducting what they call ‘natural experiments’ and that are carefully organized the way a psychology experiment would be organized, with control groups and so on. But the questions they ask are so extraordinarily narrow! They imagine that you answer as many of these questions as possible and you are slowly constructing a kind of indestructible edifice of social science, while I think all you have then is a pile of bricks that doesn’t add up to anything. I am actually more impressed by people who make modest progress on questions of obvious importance than people who make decisive progress on questions that aren’t usually worth even asking. I have always tried to focus my own work on the questions I saw as having an obvious importance, such as the origins of the state or the dynamics of power-relations, whether between the state and its population or in general. Two of my books (Domination and the Arts of Resistance and Weapons of the Weak), for instance, were efforts to understand power-relations in a micro-setting (rather than in a macro-setting). Today, we are interested in what the political conditions are of non-catastrophic macro-economic policy, and that indeed seems an important question to me. Not only social scientists, but laymen too, would recognize the difference between an important question and a trivial question. How did you arrive at where you currently are in your thinking? Before I began graduate school—a long time back—a friend of mine said: ‘before you go to graduate school, you must read Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation.’ I read it the summer before I went to graduate school, and I think it is, in some ways, the most important book I’ve ever read. The other book that greatly influenced me a great deal was E.P. Thomson’s The Making of the English Working Class (1963)—I can actually remember the chair I sat in when I read the whole hefty 1000 pages. This book digs into the naissance of the working class consciousness in the same period that Polanyi zooms into to describe the disembedding of the economy from society. Another book that influenced me was Eric Hobsbawm’s Primitive Rebels, because he pointed to forms of social banditry as political phenomena and should be understood as such in terms of methodology, where they are normally analyzed as something else. Why do I like these scholars? They have taught me that it is an important contribution to the social sciences to bring in a novel concept that changes people’s way of looking at things. You know these hand-held kaleidoscopes, that when you shake them, they change colors and show you a different world? All works that made an impact on me, had that effect on how I saw the world: if I look at the world through the kaleidoscope this author proposes, I see a fascinatingly different world, and understand things I didn’t understand before. Now in terms of real-world events that impacted me, the Vietnam War—going on while I took my first job working on South East Asia at the University of Wisconsin in 1967—was certainly one of them. I found myself in the midst of demonstrations and so forth, giving talks and lectures on that phenomenon. I also realized in that period, that I had done a boring dissertation, that sank without a trace. I decided about that time, that since peasants were the most numerous class in world history, it seemed to me that you could have a worthy life studying the peasantry. If
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development is about anything, it ought to be about peasant livelihoods and the improvement of peasant lives more generally. They also stand at the origins of wars of national liberation, as the Vietnam War was for the Vietnamese. My book The Moral Economy of the Peasant came directly out of the Vietnam War struggles—it was my effort to understand peasant rebellion. What would a student need to become a skillful scholar or understand the world in a global way? Here I have a definite opinion. We can assume, in the kind of trade-union sense of the word, that everyone who becomes a scholar is going to be trained in their specialties and disciplines, so I take that for granted. But what I’m fond of telling students these days, is that if 90% of your time is spent reading mainstream political science, sociology, anthropology, and if most of your time is spent talking to people who read the same stuff, then you are going to reproduce mainstream political science, sociology and anthropology. My idea is that if you were doing it right, at least half of the things that you should be reading would be things from outside of your discipline, as most interesting impulses come from the margins of a discipline or even externally. Interesting scholarship in social sciences arises when you see a foreign concept as applicable and adding something to your field. Now I give that advice as a theoretization of my practice. When I was working on The Moral Economy of the Peasant, I read all the peasant novels I could get my hands on; all the oral histories; in short, as much as I could stuff from outside of political science. If you look at the works that have been influential historically, you can tell by the index or bibliography that the author has been reading a lot of things that are outside the normal range of standard, mainstream work. But if you decide to do something broad and challenging, you’ll face some difficulties and resistance from the established academic machine. Take Barrington Moore’s The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, again one of those great works. This book was turned down six times by publishers, because specialists on each of the fields he covered had problems with the chapters about those subjects. On the other hand: how important is it to publish articles? A colleague of mine reported how many people actually read academic articles—and the number on average was less then three. So the majority of article publishing is essentially a vast anti-politics machinery put together to help people get tenure, and that holds even for peer-reviewed articles. Professional advancement depends increasingly on a kind of audit system for number of peer-reviewed articles et cetera, a kind of mechanical system that is an anti-politics machine, an effort to avoid making qualitative judgments about how good something is. It is something particularly common to democracies, where you have to convince people you are objective, you’re not playing favors, there are no qualitative judgments, and it’s just comparing the numbers. So, if you are producing an article, and it’s going to be read by three people, then why are you doing this in the first place? You should find another line of work, where you have a little impact on the world. If you’re doing it to please the discipline looking over your shoulder, it’s going to be alienated labor, and I fully grant it is more difficult to make your way if you want to do it otherwise. It’s easy for me to say, because I came along at a time when there was this romance about the third world—anything on the third world was likely to get published. So I am conscious of the fact that life was easier for me than it is for students today. But on the other hand: unless you prefer a clerical nine-to-five job in which you put in your hours, you might as well be doing something exciting even if it’s harder to sell.
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You are an agrarian by training; yet all of your texts are decisively political. What’s so political about agriculture? And what are the policy implications for state-making and development in the 3rd world? This came to me in the middle of the Vietnam Wars, as people were fighting wars of national liberation. At that point, people began to see for the first time the Vietnamese peasant, the Algerian peasant, the Mexican peasant, as the carrier of the national soul. While it may have been incorrect, the idea was that the peasant as the ordinary Vietnamese stood for the Vietnamese nation in some way. That brought me to agriculture: if you wanted to understand insurrections in Vietnam, you had to understand peasants; and if you wanted to understand peasants, you had to understand things like land tenure, crops, and so forth. It has gone so far that I started out with political violence thirty-some years ago, and now I am studying the domestication of plants and animals! I think that as the major way of sustenance, as the major resource over which people struggle—questions of land and irrigation water and food supply and famine—are at the very center of the history of political struggles. They are the elementary version of politics and that’s why it seems to me that a concern with such issues as farming is directly and immediately a concern with politics. Back to the ‘modern, developed world’: in Western Europe and the US, the agricultural section makes up typically 5% of the population. Yet they tend to be heavily overrepresented politically in respect to their demographic weight in many respects because of questions of rural policy, political districting, subsidies… Smallholders and petty bourgeoisie are very important for right-wing parties. They are protected and subsidized to a point where surpluses accumulate and we actually make it difficult for the Third World to export. In a truly neoclassical world, we wouldn’t be subsidizing agriculture and we’d be getting most of our agricultural supplies from poor countries on the periphery of Europe and Latin America. Even in a place like India, which is industrializing and urbanizing rapidly, the fact is that the rural population and the people that live off of agriculture and related activities has never been higher than it is today—even though the proportion is declining, the population is growing at such a rate that this tendency can be marked. Your book Seeing l ike a s tate (Google preview) focuses on legibility and standardization efforts for purposes of taxation and political order. Do you see the same principle hold for the establishment of commodities and markets and are the same ‘interests’ involved, or does the market philosophy require different inscriptions? In other words, what is the difference between legibility for commercial and state purposes, and, in the end, between market power and state power? It seems to me that large-scale exchange and trade in any commodities at all require a certain level of standardization. Cronon’s book Nature’s metropolis, which is a kind of ecological history of Chicago, has a chapter on the futures market for grain. There exists a tremendous natural variety in the kind of corn, soya and wheat that were grown, but they all have to be sorted into two or three grades in the great granaries, and to be shipped abroad in huge cargo ships–the impetus to
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standardize in the granaries found its way back to the landscape and diversity of the surroundings of Chicago, reducing the entire region to monocropping. It’s the same principle at work as I describe in Seeing like a state with regards to the Normalbaum in German scientific forestry. Agricultural commodities become standardized as they move and bulk in international trade. If you build a McDonalds or Kentucky Fried Chicken franchise, they tell you architecturally exactly how to construct it, you have to buy the equipment that is standardized, it all has to be placed in the same relationship to the other things in the floor plan, so it’s all worked out in detail, and it is worked out in such detail to produce a standardized burger or standardized fried chicken. And because it is standardized, the person who comes from the corporate headquarters can come with a kind of checklist in which every place is more or less the same, and they can check on cleanliness, quality, productivity and conformity to the corporate standard. This is the kind of control over distance that is required for industrial purposes. In the end, what is the assembly line? It is an effort to standardize the unit of labor power. The processes are not so different for grain production, burgers, or cars—as are the effects on diversity. Contract farming is then an instance to adapt agriculture to post-Fordist conditions with a higher emphasis on demand. You can be labeled as a critic of the modernizing project inherent in states. Can you give an example of a contemporary form of governing you do endorse or would promote? The degree to which a planning process is inflected at every level by democratic processes—for all the messiness that it introduces—seems to me to lead in the long run to more satisfactory outcomes for everybody concerned, and it also results in the kind of commitment to the results in which people felt that they had an adequate part in shaping. Examples are rife of successfully designed plans thought up from above, that fail because the people for whom this planning was designed, have had no stake in it. I don’t want to get rid of the modernization project, I just want to tame the rule of experts. I remember that I was in Berlin at the Wissenschaftskolleg, and there was a woman, Barbara Lane, there who was an architectural historian. We went to a housing area, where two types of Seidlungen or housing were to be found together: Bauhaus housings and a competing housing project by National Socialist architects. It was interesting to me, that the Bauhaus architects had figured out exactly how many square meters people needed, how much water they needed, how much sunlight, playground space… They had planned for an abstract human being; and the architecture could have been executed anywhere in the world. Whereas the Nazi architects had build genuine homes, with little chimneys, small front steps in brick—all these references to vernacular architecture that was part of the German cultural tradition. I realized that in a sense, the international aspiration of the Bauhaus school was to be placeless and universal, as IKEA does now. I found myself a little embarrassed that I would rather have lived in a dwelling designed by the Nazis than a Bauhaus home, but it does illustrate my point of governing: how is it executed? With what level of ambition in mind?
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In that vein, your work is cited as a big inspiration to something called resistance studies, which aim to promote the interests of the subaltern/repressed, exactly those who you give a voice, face, and comprehensible outlook. What is your take on such emancipatory resistance studies? All I have done in books such as Weapons of the Weak is to consider behavior we commonly label ‘apolitical’ or ‘irrational’ as forms of politics that were previously not given the dignity of considering them consciously political. For most of the world most of the time, the possibility of publicly assembling, creating organizations, having demonstrations, creating open democratic processes simply does not exist. The late (great) Charles Tilly and I disagreed about this. For him to consider something a political movement it had to have a durable public presence and have large public goals. I, on the other hand, tried to identify a zone of political action where it was considered inexistent before. About all these situations in which a formal and restricted definition of politics does not apply, I simply asked the question: ‘What happens if we consider this politics?’ And in fact foot-dragging, not complying, and other such tactics that people deploy when faced with brutal or authoritarian power, are often the only political tools available for the most of the world’s population for most of the world’s history. It is powerful institutions that have most to conceal about the operations of power and about how the world actually works. I thought that the emancipatory potential of social science was actually simply doing your work honestly, showing how things really operate, that this would always have a subversive effect because it was the powerful institutions that had the most to hide and conceal. Good social science, I thought, would by its nature be emancipatory and have a kind of resistance function. I have less confidence nowadays about the motives of people who want to unearth how things work; they bring their own powerful prejudices to bear, and their motives are not always motives I find worthy. How important is Marxism for you in explaining how the world works? When I used to be asked about my relation to Marxism I used to say that I’m a crude Marxist, with the emphasis on ‘crude’, in the sense that I look at the material basis of any political struggle, and I think class and material basis are the best points of departure for analysis. And what I add to that—and that’s why I was so taken with Karl Polanyi’s Great Transformation—is that it seems to me a powerful argument about the way the economy was embedded historically in other social relations and could not be extracted from it until the early 19th century when the laissez-faire ideology was elaborated. The struggle that Polanyi points to is a struggle that we’re still engaged in, and certainly after the Washington Consensus we’re going to have to invent forms of social protection of the kind Polanyi talked about. Whether we call them socialism or not, it is the kind of self-defense of people’s life chances and subsistence. How to protect ordinary human beings against market excesses is a classical socialist question still very much to the fore. In a strange way, I find myself nostalgic for the Cold War, in two senses. First, I think you could argue, as my colleague Roger Smith argued, if you want to understand the success of the civil rights movement in the US, one major reason during the Kennedy era was the fact that the US
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was losing the Cold War in part—they thought—because of the fact that we were a racist society. So winning the Cold War became premised upon reforms I fully endorsed, to make society more equitable. Secondly, when it was a bipolar world, the US and the West were interested in land reform in places where the land distribution was wildly unequal. After 1989, the IMF and the World Bank have never talked about land reform again. So while the mechanical teleological Marxist class struggle discourse has simply been proven wrong historically, the Polanyi kind of socialist questions are all alive and well. In your latest book, you argue that we’re witnessing a definitive expansion and entrenchment of the nation-state over the globe, a sort of final enclosure and you mention liberal political economy as a constraint on high modernist aspirations that can lead to catastrophe. But according to many contemporary observers, this would be contested, with rather the market expanding excessively, which ought to be curbed by states. I note somewhere in Seeing like a state that the French trade unions were defending social security and the safety net in France against a set of liberal policies of the IMF and the World Bank, and in that respect, the nation-state was one of the few obstacles against markets. Henry Bernstein reminds me every time I argue against the state that it is the only institution that stands between the global liberal economy and the individual or the family. But in most of the world, the third world anyway, the effective leaver of the world economy has been the state; and often, it is the state that is then checked by a liberal appeal to private space which the expansive state cannot appropriate and regulate. We might agree that the more truly democratic a state is, which means minimizing the distortion of structural advantages in the accumulation of wealth and property, the degree to which those distortions of wealth, power and property are curbed by the state, indicate the extent to which a state can become something that restrains the completely unimpeded operation of the market. The only state that is likely in the long run to serve as a vehicle for the self-protection of citizens against market failures is a democratic system that is open enough and that negates, mediates or minimizes the structural advantages of concentrations of power, property and wealth. What is neoliberalism in your definition? In a sense, the pervasiveness of neoliberal ways of talking has the effect of turning people into calculators of advantages. There is this book, Everything I learned about love I learned in business school, and it’s about ‘cutting your losses’, about having a ‘mission statement’, about ‘measuring performance’… In a curious way, in terms of classical political economy, Hobbes thought we needed a state to restrain our appetites, and it may be that the neoliberal state has so colonized our way of decision-making (stimulating our appetites), that the neoliberal state has in fact created the human actor that now does have to be restrained by the state.
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In your last book, The art o f not be ing governed (Google preview), your focus is on places and peoples in South-East Asia that were reluctant to be incorporated into the nation-state system. It is a historical book; does it, despite of that, have any lessons for the present? Next to what I mentioned earlier about recognizing the choice not to be incorporated into the state as a consciously evasive political choice, I would argue that since the Second World War, these place have been incorporated into the nation-state, albeit not everywhere and unevenly. We need to invent ways of association and cooperation across state boundaries and forms of limited sovereignty like Catalonia. The only alternative today is somehow taming this nation-state, because it can’t be held at bay—it is increasingly usurping these frontier regions—the movie Avatar, which pretends you can burn bridges and keep ‘modernity’ away is simply utopian. So I think the task for indigenous peoples is to somehow slow down and domesticate the advance of the nation-state in ways that will make their absorption more humane. You stated earlier you are a ‘crude Marxist’, yet in your recent book you adopt a constructionist take on collective identity, by showing how easily social formations can change. If the material basis is so important, what do you mean with constructionism? The number of things that can function as markers of distinctive identities. If you think about the potential commonalities that groups of people share, any one or any combination of these commonalities can be made the basis for an identity. In South-East Asia, some people bury their dead in jars; they can choose to take that as a boundary sign confirming some sort of group identity; then, all of a sudden, social mobilization occurs on the basis of the way in which the dead are buried—those who bury them in jars versus those who don’t. The question is always: which of these almost endless series of cultural or economic features are the bases for social mobilization? There are material conditions; if in fact a whole series of small landholders all find themselves subject to the same conditions of debt and if there’s an economic crisis and they’re all losing their land at the same time, then it is likely that this kind of pain will crystallize itself as a peasant movement for the reduction of debt. The same goes, of course, for mobilizing French farmers who suffer from the same European regulations; whereas they support different local soccer teams and as such have little in common, when a new regulation targets their industry, they’ll mobilize around that material fact. On the other hand, you can get poor farmers in Michigan, as in the Michigan militias, who decide to mobilize around the fact that the government is the enemy of poor white people. It seems to me that some features are more likely to serve as the point of crystallization around which group identities will rally, but there is no way of predicting which one it will be in a given situation. Your last book in a way makes an argument similar to that of Rousseau, namely, that outside the state, there is not anarchy but also—and consciously different—political order. What do you think of the philosophical idea of the ‘state of nature’, which by
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realists in international relations is extrapolated into the unsafe anarchy that ‘surrounds’ states? My answer would be a historical one. The state, or centralized political organization, has been with us for the last 4000 years. Even when this state was not all-pervasive or all-powerful everywhere, it was always there. So even if certain spaces or people were ‘outside’ the state—in the so-called state of nature—they always coexisted with the state and interacted with it dialectically. So saying that there are people living inside and with the state, and others outside and without it, and that supposedly they will behave completely different, is a difficult hypothetical. I have, for instance, the idea that life was not ‘brutish, nasty and short’ outside of the state as Hobbes argued, partly because the population levels were so low that the way of dealing with conflict was simply moving out of the way. A lot of the things people struggled and died over, were essentially commodities. So if by the state of nature we mean people living outside the state in a world in which states already exist so they are at the periphery of states, then this is a completely different thing. We know, for instance, that pastoralism is in fact always organized in order to trade with agrarian states; it is not some previous form of subsistence that is superseded by agriculture. Another example: in the 9th century the people in Borneo were considered to be very backward and they were a typical example of a hunting and gathering society. What were they gathering? Certain kinds of feathers and resins and the gall bladders of monkeys, all stuff hugely valuable in China at the time! So they were gathering these things for international trade with an already existing state; their hunting and gathering is a hunting and gathering performed in the shadow of states. So which ‘state of nature’ are we referring to? When Rousseau speaks of the savages he has met, he sees people that strategically respond to representatives of an organized state, pursuing their interests and behaving politically. So the concept, perhaps, hides more than it reveals. James Scott is Professor of Political Science and Professor of Anthropology at Yale and is Director of the Agrarian Studies Program. His research concerns political economy, comparative agrarian societies, theories of hegemony and resistance, peasant politics, revolution, Southeast Asia, theories of class relations and anarchism.
Related links
• Faculty Profile at Yale • Read the Introduction of Seeing Like a State (1998) here (pdf) • Video in which James Scott tells the story of The art of not being governed at Cornell
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