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FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605 December 12, 2005

SEVERINO M. MANOTOK IV, FROILAN M. MANOTOK, FERNANDO M. MANOTOK, FAUSTO MANOTOK III, MA. MAMERTA

M. MANOTOK, PATRICIA L. TIONGSON, PACITA L. GO, ROBERTO LAPERAL III, MICHAEL MARSHALL V. MANOTOK, MARY

ANN MANOTOK, FELISA MYLENE V. MANOTOK, IGNACIO MANOTOK, JR., MILAGROS V. MANOTOK, SEVERINO MANOTOK

III, ROSA R. MANOTOK, MIGUEL A.B. SISON, GEORGE M. BOCANEGRA, MA. CRISTINA E. SISON, PHILIPP L. MANOTOK, JOSE

CLEMENTE L. MANOTOK, RAMON SEVERINO L. MANOTOK, THELMA R. MANOTOK, JOSE MARIA MANOTOK, JESUS JUDEMANOTOK, JR. and MA. THERESA L. MANOTOK, represented by their Attorney-in-fact, Rosa R. Manotok, Petitioners,

vs.

HEIRS OF HOMER L. BARQUE, represented by TERESITA BARQUE HERNANDEZ, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

These consolidated petitions for review assail, in G.R. No. 162335, the February 24, 2004 Amended Decision1 of the Third

Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cance

petitioners TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to reconstitute respondents TCT No

210177; and in G.R. No. 162605, the November 7, 2003 Amended Decision2 of the Special Division of Five of the Forme

Second Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners TCT No. RT-

22481, and the LRA to reconstitute respondents TCT No. T-210177 and the March 12, 2004 Resolution3 denying the

motion for reconsideration.

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

Petitioners, (respondents herein) as the surviving heirs of the late Homer Barque, filed a petition with the LRA fo

administrative reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 210177 issued in the name of Homer L. Barque, which was

destroyed in the fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall, including the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City

sometime in 1988. In support of the petition, petitioners submitted the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 210177, rea

estate tax receipts, tax declarations and the Plan FLS 3168 D covering the property.

Upon being notified of the petition for administrative reconstitution, private respondents (petitioners herein) filed thei

opposition thereto claiming that the lot covered by the title under reconstitution forms part of the land covered by their

reconstituted title TCT No. RT-22481, and alleging that TCT No. 210177 in the name of petitioners predecessors-in-interes

is spurious.

On June 30, 1997, Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos, as reconstituting officer, denied the reconstitution of TCT No. 2101775 on

grounds that:

1. Lots 823-A and 823-B, Fls-3168-D, containing areas of 171,473 Sq. Mtrs. and 171,472 Sq. Mtrs., respectively, covered

by TCT No. 210177, appear to duplicate Lot 823 Piedad Estate, containing an area of 342,945 Sq. Mtrs., covered by TCTNo. 372302 registered in the name of Severino M. Manotok, et. al., reconstituted under Adm. Reconstitution No. Q-213

dated February 01, 1991;

2. The submitted plan Fls-3168-D is a spurious document as categorically stated by Engr. Privadi J.G. Dalire, Chief, Geodetic

Surveys Division, Land Management Bureau, in his letter dated February 19, 1997.6

Respondents motion for reconsideration was denied in an order7 dated February 10, 1998 hence they appealed to the

LRA.


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The LRA ruled that the reconstituting officer should not have required the submission of documents other than the

owners duplicate certificate of title as bases in denying the petition and should have confined himself with the owners

duplicate certificate of title.8 The LRA further declared:

Based on the documents presented, petitioners have established by clear and convincing evidence that TCT NO. 210177

was, at the time of the destruction thereof, valid, genuine, authentic and effective. Petitioners duly presented the origina

of the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 210177 .... The logbook of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City lists TCT No.

210177 as among the titles lost .... The Register of Deeds of Quezon City himself acknowledged the existence and

authenticity of TCT No. 210177 when he issued a certification to the effect that TCT No. 210177 was one of the titlesdestroyed and not salvaged from the fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall on 11 June 1988 ....

It is likewise noteworthy that the technical description and boundaries of the lot reflected in TCT No. 210177 absolutely

conform to the technical description and boundaries of Lot 823 Piedad Estate ... as indicated in the B. L. Form No. 28-37-

R dated 11-8-94 and B. L. Form No. 31-10 duly issued by the Bureau of Lands ....

It therefore becomes evident that the existence, validity, authenticity and effectivity of TCT No. 210177 was established

indubitably and irrefutably by the petitioners. Under such circumstances, the reconstitution thereof should be given due

course and the same is mandatory.9

.

It would be necessary to underscore that the certified copy of Plan FLS 3168 D was duly issued by the office of Engr

Ernesto Erive, Chief, Surveys Division LMS-DENR-NCR whose office is the lawful repository of survey plans for lots situated

within the National Capital Region including the property in question. Said plan was duly signed by the custodian thereof

Carmelito Soriano, Chief Technical Records and Statistics Section, DENR-NCR. Said plan is likewise duly supported by

Republic of the Philippines Official Receipt No. 2513818 Q dated 9-23-96 .... Engr. Erive in his letter dated 28 Novembe

1996 addressed to Atty. Bustos confirmed that a microfilm copy of Plan FLS 3168D is on file in the Technical Records

and Statistics Section of his office. Engr. Dalire, in his letter dated 2 January 1997 addressed to Atty. Bustos even confirmed

the existence and authenticity of said plan.

.

The claim of Engr. Dalire in his letter dated 19 February 1997 that his office has no records or information about Plan FLS

3168-D is belied by the certified copy of the computer print-out duly issued by the Bureau of Lands indicating therein tha

FLS 3168D is duly entered into the microfilm records of the Bureau of Lands and has been assigned Accession Number

410436 appearing on Page 79, Preliminary Report No. 1, List of Locator Cards and Box Number 0400 and said computer

print-out is duly supported by an Offical Receipt .

The said Plan FLS 3168D is indeed authentic and valid coming as it does from the legal repository and duly signed by the

custodian thereof. The documentary evidence presented is much too overwhelming to be simply brushed aside and be

defeated by the fabricated statements and concoctions made by Engr. Dalire in his 19 February 1997 letter. 10

Nevertheless, notwithstanding its conclusion that petitioners title was fraudulently reconstituted, the LRA noted that it isonly the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which can declare that the same was indeed fraudulently reconstituted. It thus opined

that respondents title may only be reconstituted after a judicial declaration that petitioners title was void and should

therefore be cancelled.11

The dispositive portion of the LRAs decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 in the name of Home

L. Barque, Sr. shall be given due course after cancellation of TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) in the name of Manotoks upon

order of a court of competent jurisdiction.


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SO ORDERED.12

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by respondents with a prayer that reconstitution be

ordered immediately.

On June 14, 2001, petitioners motion for reconsideration and respondents prayer for immediate reconstitution were

denied.13

From the foregoing, respondents filed a petition for review14 with the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66700and praying that the LRA be directed to immediately reconstitute TCT No. 210177 without being subjected to the condition

that petitioners TCT No. RT-22481 [372302] should first be cancelled by a court of competent jurisdiction.15 Petitioners

likewise filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66642.

In CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, the Second Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision16 on September 13, 2002, the

dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered the assailed Resolution of the LRA dated June 24, 1998 is AFFIRMED in

toto and the petition for review is ordered DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.17

Respondents moved for reconsideration.18 On November 7, 2003, the Special Division of Five of the Former Second

Division rendered an Amended Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, our decision dated 13 September 2002 is hereby reconsidered. Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Quezon

City is hereby directed to cancel TCT No. RT-22481 of private respondents and the LRA is hereby directed to reconstitute

forthwith petitioners valid, genuine and existing Certificate of Title No. T-210177.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.19

Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the amended decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 was denied,20 hence, this

petition docketed as G.R. No. 162605.

Meanwhile, in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, the Third Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision21 on October 29,

2003, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Resolution of the LRA dated 24 June 1998 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.22

In so ruling, the Third Division of the Court of Appeals declared that the LRA correctly deferred in giving due course to thepetition for reconstitution since there is yet no final judgment upholding or annulling respondents title.23

Respondents motion for reconsideration was granted by the Third Division of the Court of Appeals on February 24, 2004

thus:

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of this Court dated 29 October 2003 is

RECONSIDERED and a new one is entered ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners TCT No. RT

22481 and directing the LRA to reconstitute forthwith respondents TCT No. T-210177.

SO ORDERED.24


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From the foregoing decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 and CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, petitioners filed

separate petitions for review before this Court docketed as G.R. No. 162605 and G.R. No. 162335, respectively.

In G.R. No. 162605, petitioners argue that:

I

THE MAJORITY JUSTICES ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE CANCELLATION OF PETITIONERS EXISTINGTITLE, CONSIDERING THAT:

a. THEY ORDERED THE CANCELLATION OF TITLE DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME IS NOT PART OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT

IN A RECONSTITUTION PROCEEDINGS.

b. THEY ALLOWED A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON A TORRENS CERTIFICATE OF TITLE; and

c. THE COURT OF APPEALS, IN RESOLVING AN APPEAL OF THE DECISION OF THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, DOES

NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO ORDER THE CANCELLATION OF TITLE, SINCE ONLY A PROPER REGIONAL TRIAL COURT CAN

ORDER THE ANNULMENT/CANCELLATION OF A TORRENS TITLE. BY ALLOWING A "SHORT CUT", THE MAJORITY JUSTICES

DEPRIVED THE PETITIONERS OF THEIR PROPERTY AND THEIR CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF

LAW.

II

THE MAJORITY JUSTICES GRAVELY MISAPPLIED THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN ORTIGAS V. VELASCO,

CONSIDERING THAT:

a. IN THE ORTIGAS CASE, THERE WERE TWO TITLES EXISTING OVER THE SAME PARCEL OF LAND, AS A RESULT OF THE

RECONSTITUTED TITLE ISSUED IN THE NAME OF MOLINA. IN THE INSTANT CASE, ONLY PETITIONERS HOLD TITLE TO THE

PROPERTY IN QUESTION, AS RESPONDENTS ARE MERELY TRYING TO HAVE TITLE RECONSTITUTED IN THEIR NAMES.

b. IN ORTIGAS, THERE WERE SEVERAL DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT WHICH PREVIOUSLY RESOLVED THE ISSUE OFOWNERSHIP OF ORTIGAS PROPERTY. HENCE, THERE WAS SUFFICIENT GROUND TO ANNUL MOLINAS TITLE OUTRIGHT.

IN THE INSTANT CASE, THERE ARE NO SUCH DECISIONS IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY THE

CANCELLATION OF THE TITLE OF PETITIONERS WITHOUT ANY HEARING.25

In G.R. No. 162335, petitioners raise the following issues:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND GROSS

IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IN ORDERING THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY TO CANCEL TCT NO. RT-22481 OF

PETITIONERS MANOTOK NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SAID COURT WAS FULLY COGNIZANT THAT IT HAS NO

JURISDICTION TO EXERCISE SUCH AUTHORITY AND POWER AND THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY IS EQUALLY DEVOID

OF JURISDICTION ON THE MATTER BECAUSE UNDER THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980 SPECIFICALLYSECTION 19 (2) THEREOF, ONLY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVE EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL

ACTIONS WHICH INVOLVES TITLE TO, OR POSSESSION OF, REAL PROPERTY, OR ANY INTEREST THEREIN.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND GROSS

IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IN INVOKING EQUITABLE CONSIDERATION TO JUSTIFY ITS CHALLENGED AMENDED DECISION

DATED FEBRUARY 24, 2004 DIRECTING LRA TO CANCEL PETITIONERS MANOTOKS TITLE NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT,

AS STATED, THE LAW EXPLICITLY VESTS EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS OVER CIVIL

ACTIONS WHICH INVOLVES TITLE TO, OR POSSESSION OF, REAL PROPERTY, OR ANY INTEREST THEREIN.


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III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS

OF JURISDICTION IN FAILING TO ORDER THE SETTING ASIDE OF THE CHALLENGED RESOLUTION DATED JUNE 24, 1998 OF

RESPONDENT LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY IN LRC ADMIN. CASE NO. Q-547 [97] VIEWED FROM THE FACT THAT SAID

RESOLUTION OF LRA IS PATENTLY AT WAR WITH LAW AND CONTROLLING JURISPRUDENCE THAT PROHIBITS

RECONSTITUTION OF TITLE BY THIRD PARTY ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN LOST OR DESTROYED IF ANOTHER VALID TITLE IS

EXISTING COVERING THE LAND SUBJECT THEREOF.

IV. THE LRA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN

ORDERING THE RECONSTITUTION OF THE TITLE OF HOMER BARQUE, SR. SUBJECT ONLY TO THE CONDITION THAT THETITLE OF PETITIONERS MANOTOK SHOULD FIRST BE ORDERED CANCELLED BY COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION IN

THE FACE OF THE GLARING FACTS THAT SAID TITLE IS HIGHLY SUSPECT AND BEARS BADGES OF FABRICATION AND

FALSIFICATION AND THEREFORE NO OTHER LOGICAL AND CREDIBLE CONCLUSION CAN BE DRAWN EXCEPT THAT IT IS A

FAKE AND SPURIOUS TITLE.

V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF IN EXCESS

OF JURISDICTION IN ALLOWING RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WHICH WAS CLEARLY FILED OUT OF

TIME.26

On August 2, 2004, the petition in G.R. No. 162605 was consolidated with the petition in G.R. No. 162335.27

In sum, petitioners contend that (a) the LRA has no authority to annul their title; (b) the reconstitution of respondents

Torrens title would be a collateral attack on petitioners existing title; (c) they were not given the opportunity to be heard

specifically the chance to defend the validity of their Torrens title; (d) the Court of Appeals, in resolving the appeal from

the LRA, has no jurisdiction to order the cancellation of petitioners title; and (e) the ruling in Ortigas was misapplied.

The petitions must be denied.

The LRA properly ruled that the reconstituting officer should have confined himself to the owners duplicate certificate o

title prior to the reconstitution. Section 3 of Republic Act (RA) No. 2628 clearly provides:

Section 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be

available, in the following order:

(a) The owners duplicate of the certificate of title;

....

When respondents filed the petition for reconstitution, they submitted in support thereof the owners duplicate certificate

of title, real estate tax receipts and tax declaration. Plainly, the same should have more than sufficed as sources for the

reconstitution pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 26 which explicitly mandates that the reconstitution shall be made following

the hierarchy of sources as enumerated by law. In addition, Section 12 of the same law requires that the petition shall be

accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property only if the source of the reconstitution is Section 3(f)

of RA No. 26. Thus:

Section 12. Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in section 2(f

or 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall further be accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property duly

approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, or with a certified copy of the description taken from a

prior certificate of title covering the same property.29

Since respondents source of reconstitution is the owners duplicate certificate of title, there is no need for the

reconstituting officer to require the submission of the plan, much less deny the petition on the ground that the submitted

plan appears to be spurious. By enumerating the hierarchy of sources to be used for the reconstitution, it is the intent o

the law to give more weight and preference to the owners duplicate certificate of title over the other enumerated sources


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The factual finding of the LRA that respondents title is authentic, genuine, valid, and existing, while petitioners title is

sham and spurious, as affirmed by the two divisions of the Court of Appeals, is conclusive before this Court. It should

remain undisturbed since only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

Findings of fact of administrative bodies are accorded respect, even finality by this Court and, when affirmed by the Cour

of Appeals, are no longer reviewable except only for very compelling reasons. Basic is the rule that factual findings of

agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions are accorded not only respect but even finality, aside from the consideration

that this Court is essentially not a trier of facts.30

Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or weight, or rejected as feeble

or spurious, or whether or not the proofs on one side or the other are clear and convincing and adequate to establish a

proposition in issue, are without doubt questions of fact. Whether or not the body of proofs presented by a party, weighed

and analyzed in relation to contrary evidence submitted by adverse party, may be said to be strong, clear and convincing

whether or not certain documents presented by one side should be accorded full faith and credit in the face of protest

as to their spurious character by the other side; whether or not inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a party are of such

gravity as to justify refusing to give said proofs weightall these are issues of fact. Questions like these are not reviewable

by this court which, as a rule, confines its review of cases decided by the Court of Appeals only to questions of law raised

in the petition and therein distinctly set forth.31 A petition for review should only cover questions of law. Questions of

fact are not reviewable.32

In Dolfo v. Register of Deeds for the Province of Cavite,33 this Court categorically declared:

Second. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals made a factual finding that petitioners title to the land is of doubtfu

authenticity.

Having jurisdiction only to resolve questions of law, this Court is bound by the factual findings of the trial court and the

Court of Appeals....

In view of the foregoing, it is no longer necessary to remand the case to the RTC for the determination of which title

petitioners' or respondents', is valid or spurious. This has been ruled upon by the LRA and duly affirmed by the two

divisions of the Court of Appeals.

The LRA has the jurisdiction to act on petitions for administrative reconstitution. It has the authority to review, revise

reverse, modify or affirm on appeal the decision of the reconstituting officer. The function is adjudicatory in natureit

can properly deliberate on the validity of the titles submitted for reconstitution. Logically, it can declare a title as sham o

spurious, or valid on its face. Otherwise, if it cannot make such declaration, then there would be no basis for its decision

to grant or deny the reconstitution. The findings of fact of the LRA, when supported by substantial evidence, as in this

case, shall be binding on the Court of Appeals.34

In the reconstitution proceedings, the LRA is bound to determine from the evidence submitted which between or amon

the titles is genuine and existing to enable it to decide whether to deny or approve the petition. Without such authority,

the LRA would be a mere robotic agency clothed only with mechanical powers.

The Court of Appeals also properly exercised its appellate jurisdiction over the judgment of the LRA. Under Sections 1 and

3, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the appellate court has jurisdiction on appeals from judgments or final orders of the LRA

whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.

Indeed, it would be needlessly circuitous to remand the case to the RTC to determine anew which of the two titles is sham

or spurious and thereafter appeal the trial courts ruling to the Court of Appeals. After all, the LRA and the two divisions

of the appellate court have already declared that petitioners title is forged. In Mendoza v. Court of Appeals,35 we ruled

that:


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Now, technically, the revocation and cancellation of the deed of sale and the title issued in virtue thereof in de los Santos

favor should be had in appropriate proceedings to be initiated at the instance of the Government. However, since all the

facts are now before this Court, and it is not within de los Santos power in any case to alter those facts at any other

proceeding, or the verdict made inevitable by said facts, for this Court to direct at this time that cancellation proceeding

be yet filed to nullify the sale to de los Santos and his title, would be needlessly circuitous and would unnecessarily dela

the termination of the controversy at bar, .... This Court will therefore make the adjudication entailed by the facts here

and now, without further proceedings, as it has done in other cases in similar premises.

No useful purpose will be served if a case or the determination of an issue in a case is remanded to the trial court only tohave its decision raised again to the Court of Appeals and then to the Supreme Court. The remand of the case or of an

issue to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the Court is in position to resolve the

dispute based on the records before it and particularly where the ends of justice would not be subserved by the remand

thereof.36

The Register of Deeds, the LRA and the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to act on the petition for administrative

reconstitution. The doctrine laid down in Alabang Dev. Corp., et al. v. Hon. Valenzuela, etc., et al.37 does not apply in the

instant case. In Alabang, the Court stressed that:

[L]ands already covered by duly issued existing Torrens Titles cannot be the subject of petitions for reconstitution o

allegedly lost or destroyed titles filed by third parties without first securing by final judgment the cancellation of such

existing titles. The courts simply have no jurisdiction over petitions by such third parties for reconstitution of allegedl y

lost or destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by duly issued subsisting titles in the names of their duly

registered owners. The very concept of stability and indefeasibility of titles covered under the Torrens System o

registration rules out as anathema the issuance of two certificates of title over the same land to two different holders

thereof. 38

The Alabang ruling was premised on the fact that the existing Torrens title was duly issued and that there is only one title

subsisting at the time the petition for reconstitution was filed. In the instant case, it cannot be said that petitioners title

was duly issued much less could it be presumed valid considering the findings of the LRA and the Court of Appeals tha

the same is sham and spurious.

The Court of Appeals properly applied the doctrine laid down in Ortigas in refusing to remand the case to the trial courtAs expressly declared in Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco:39

Ordinarily, the relief indicated by the material facts would be the remand of the reconstitution case (LRC No. Q-5405) to

the Court of origin with instructions that Ortigas and the Solicitor Generals appeals from the judgment rendered therein

which were wrongly disallowed, be given due course and the records forthwith transmitted to the appellate tribunal. This

in fact, is a relief alternatively prayed for by petitioner Ortigas. Considering however the fatal infirmities afflicting Molina

theory or cause of action, evident from the records before this Court, such a remand and subsequent appeal proceeding

would be pointless and unduly circuitous. Upon the facts, it is not possible for Molinas cause to prosper. To defe

adjudication thereon would be unwarranted and unjust.

The same rationale should apply in the instant case. As already discussed, the validity of respondents and petitionerstitle have been squarely passed upon by the LRA and reviewed and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which factual finding

are no longer reviewable by this Court.

A careful examination of the case of Spouses Cayetano, et al. v. CA, et al.,40 where this Court, as claimed by petitioners

have affirmed their title over the disputed property, would reveal that the sole issue resolved therein is whether or not a

tenancy relationship exists between the parties.41 There was no adjudication on ownership. In fact, it cannot even be

discerned if the property subject of the Spouses Cayetano case refers to the property subject of the instant controversy.

There is no basis in the allegation that petitioners were deprived of "their property" without due process of law when the

Court of Appeals ordered the cancellation of their Torrens title, even without a direct proceeding in the RTC. As already


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discussed, there is no need to remand the case to the RTC for a re-determination on the validity of the titles of respondent

and petitioners as the same has been squarely passed upon by the LRA and affirmed by the appellate court. By opposing

the petition for reconstitution and submitting their administratively reconstituted title, petitioners acquiesced to the

authority and jurisdiction of the reconstituting officer, the LRA and the Court of Appeals, and recognized their authority

to pass judgment on their title. All the evidence presented was duly considered by these tribunals. There is thus no basis

to petitioners claim that they were deprived of their right to be heard and present evidence, which is the essence of due

process.

As held in Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian:42

Therefore, it appearing from the records that in the previous petition for reconstitution of certificates of title, the partie

acquiesced in submitting the issue of ownership for determination in the said petition, and they were given the ful

opportunity to present their respective sides of the issues and evidence in support thereof, and that the evidenc

presented was sufficient and adequate for rendering a proper decision upon the issue, the adjudication of the issue of

ownership was valid and binding.

The reconstitution would not constitute a collateral attack on petitioners title which was irregularly and illegally issued in

the first place.43 As pertinently held in Dolfo v. Register of Deeds for the Province of Cavite:44

The rule that a title issued under the Torrens System is presumed valid and, hence, is the best proof of ownership of a

piece of land does not apply where the certificate itself is faulty as to its purported origin.

In this case, petitioner anchors her arguments on the premise that her title to the subject property is indefeasible becaus

of the presumption that her certificate of title is authentic. However, this presumption is overcome by the evidence

presented, consisting of the LRA report that TCT No. T-320601 was issued without legal basis

.

Thus, petitioner cannot invoke the indefeasibility of her certificate of title. It bears emphasis that the Torrens system doe

not create or vest title but only confirms and records one already existing and vested. Thus, while it may be true, as

petitioner argues, that a land registration court has no jurisdiction over parcels of land already covered by a certificate o

title, it is equally true that this rule applies only where there exists no serious controversy as to the authenticity of thecertificate.

Under similar circumstances, this Court has ruled that wrongly reconstituted certificates of title secured through fraud

and misrepresentation cannot be the source of legitimate rights and benefits.45

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. In G.R. No. 162335, the February 24, 2004 Amended Decision of the Third Division

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners TCT

No. RT-22481 and directing the Land Registration Authority to reconstitute respondents TCT No. 210177; and in G.R. No

162605, the November 7, 2003 Amended Decision of the Special Division of Five of the Former Second Division in CA-G.R

SP No. 66700 directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners TCT No. RT-22481, and the Land

Registration Authority to reconstitute respondents TCT No. T-210177 and the March 12, 2004 Resolution denying themotion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.


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THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 111732 February 20, 1996

NEW DURAWOOD CO., INC.petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FELIX S. CABALLES, as Judge, RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71, WILSON M. GAW, ORLANDO S

BONGAT , DURAWOOD CONSTRUCTION AND LUMBER SUPPLY CO., INC., respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The main issue here is: does a court have jurisdiction to issue a new owner's duplicate of a Torrens certificate of title if

is shown that the existing owner's copy has not, in fact and in truth, been lost or destroyed? The Court resolved this issue

in the negative in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2

promulgated on May 31, 1993 and the subsequent Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. The said Rulings

dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 25434 and in effect affirmed the "order"3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXI

Antipolo, Rizal4 dated April 16, 1991 in LRC Case No. 91-924, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

(a) Declaring the owner's duplicate copy of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 140486, 15645 and 140485 which were

lost, null and void and of no further force and effect and in lieu thereof,

(b) Hereby orders and directs that new copy of the said titles be issued to the petitioner giving them the same fait

and credit and carrying over the same terms and conditions appearing on the originals thereof, upon payment of the

required fees.

SO ORDERED.

By Resolution of the First Division dated November 15, 1995, this case along with several others was transferred to THIRDDIVISION. After due consultation and deliberation, the Court assigned the undersigned ponente to write this Decision.

The Facts

On February 14, 1990, a "Petition for Judicial Reconstitution of the Lost Owner's Duplicate Certificates of TCT Nos. 140486

156454 and 140485"5 was filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXI, Antipolo, Rizal by petitioner-corporation

"represented by its Branch Manager, Wilson M. Gaw. . ." Attached to said petition was an "Affidavit of Loss" dated

December 31, 1990 6 of respondent Orlando S. Bongat, one of the stockholders of petitioner-corporation.

Finding the petition "to be sufficient in form and in substance," respondent Judge set the case for hearing on March 18

1991. On April 16, 1991, respondent Judge issued the questioned order.

Sometime in May, 1991, petitioner discovered that the original TCT Nos. N-140485, N-140486 and 156454 on file with the

Register of Deeds of Rizal had been cancelled and, in lieu thereof, TCT Nos. 200100, 200101 and 200102 had been issued

in the name of respondent Durawood Construction and Lumber Supply, Inc. Surprised by this cancellation, petitioner

after investigation - found out about the reconstitution proceeding in the respondent trial court. So, on July 17, 1991

petitioner filed7 suit in the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. 25434 praying for the annulment of the assailed orde

in LRC Case No. 91-924 penned by respondent Judge. It also prayed for the cancellation of the new certificates (TCT Nos

200100, 200101 and 200102). On May 31, 1993, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision and on

August 30, 1993, the Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present recourse to the Supreme

Court.


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The Issues

Petitioner brought up the following ground as basis for its petition:

The Court of Appeals gravely abused its authority in not declaring the order of respondent Judge Caballes in LRC Case No

91-924 null and void for want of jurisdiction and in not declaring that the reconstitution of the owner's duplicate transfe

certificates of title Nos. N-140486, N-140485 and 156454 was obtained through fraud.

Petitioner argues that a reconstitution proceeding is one in rem and thus jurisdiction can be acquired only through

publication and notice sent pursuant to Section 13, Republic Act No. 26. It also alleges that fraud is manifest (1) from the

insufficient allegations of the petition filed before the trial court, as it (the petition) does not mention the names o

adjoining land owners and interested persons, as well as (2) from the affidavit of loss attached to the petition.

In their Comment, private respondents aver that in 1990, these three lots were sold by petitioner to Durawood

Construction and Lumber Supply, Inc. but the sale in their favor could not be registered because "the certificates of title

. . were lost." They also allege that the applicable law is Section 109 of R.A. No. 496, as amended by P.D. 1529, and no

Sec. 13 of R.A. No. 26, and that fraud, in order to serve as basis for the annulment of a judgment "must be extrinsic o

collateral in character", which is not the case in the action before the court a quo. They also fault "(t)he deliberate failur

of Dy Quim Pong (petitioner's board chairman) and his family, who constitute the majority of the stockholders and

directors of (herein petitioner-corporation), to disclose the whereabouts (of) there (sic) son, the President and Genera

Manager Francis Dytiongsee . . . " who allegedly executed the deed of sale of the lots and who allegedly claimed that the

owner's copies of the TCTs were lost.

In its Reply, petitioner contends that "the very procedure provided under Sec. 109, PD 1529, which they (private

respondents) insist is the applicable provision of law in the matter, was not strictly followed . . ." It also argues that the

owner's duplicate copies of the TCTs were all along in the custody of Dy Quim Pong, whom private respondents should

have sued to compel him to surrender the same in order that the alleged deed or sale in favor of private respondent coul

be registered.

Finally, petitioner claims that respondent Wilson Gaw had no authority to institute the petition for reconstitution in the

trial court because "(t)he Court of Appeals itself, in its questioned resolution stated that said board resolution (authorizingGaw) was passed without the required quorum."

From the foregoing, the issues may be summed up as follows:

(1) Which law governs the issuance of new owner's duplicate certificates of title in lieu of lost ones?

(2) Did the respondent trial court have jurisdiction to order the issuance of the new owner's duplicate certificates?

(3) Was the reconstitution of the said owner's duplicate certificates of title obtained through fraud?

The First Issue:Law Governing Issuance of

Lost Owner's Duplicate Titles

To resolve this issue, it is necessary to reexamine the following provisions referred to by the parties:

(1) Section 13, Republic Act No. 26:8

Sec. 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the preceding section, to be published, at the expense

of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the provincia

building and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land is situated, at least thirty days prior to


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the date of hearing. The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the

expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein whose address is known, at least thirty days prior to the date o

hearing. Said notice shall state, among other things, the number of the lost or destroyed certificate of title, if known, the

name of the registered owner, the names of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, the owners of the

adjoining properties and all other interested parties, the location, area and boundaries of the property, and the date on

which all persons having any interest therein must appear and file their claim or objections to the petition. The petitione

shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting and service of the notice as directed by the court,"

(2) Section 109 P.D. 1529 (amending R.A. 496):

Sec. 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate. In case of loss or theft of an owner's duplicate

certificate of title, due notice under oath shall be sent by the owner or by someone in his behalf to the Register of Deed

of the province or city where the land lies as soon as the loss or theft is discovered. If a duplicate certificate is lost o

destroyed, or cannot be produced by a person applying for the entry of a new certificate to him or for the registration of

any instrument, a sworn statement of the fact of such loss or destruction may be filed by the registered owner or othe

person in interest and registered.

Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, the court may, after notice and due hearing, direc

the issuance of a new duplicate certificate, which shall contain a memorandum of the fact that it is issued in place of the

lost duplicate certificate, but shall in all respects be entitled to like faith and credit as the original duplicate, and shal

thereafter be regarded as such for all purposes of this decree.

A reading of both provisions clearly shows that Section 109 of P.D. 1529 is the law applicable in petitions for issuance of

new owner's duplicate certificates of title which are lost or stolen or destroyed. On the other hand, R.A. 26 applies only in

cases of reconstitution of last or destroyed original certificates on file with the Register of Deeds. This is expressly provide

for under Section 110 of P.D. 1529 as follows:

Sec. 110. Reconstitution of lost or destroyed original of Torrens title. - Original copies of certificates of title lost o

destroyed in the offices of Registers of Deeds as well as liens and encumbrances affecting the lands covered by such title

shall be reconstituted judicially in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Republic Act No. 26 insofar as not

inconsistent with this Decree. The procedure relative to administrative reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificate

prescribed in said Act may be availed of only in case of substantial loss or destruction of land titles due to fire, flood orother force majure as determined by the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority: Provided, That the number o

certificates of titles lost or damaged should be at least ten percent (10%) of the total number in the possession of the

Office of the Register of Deeds: Provided, further, That in no case shall the number of certificates of titles lost or damaged

be less that five hundred (500).

Notice of all hearings of the petition for judicial reconstitution shall be furnished the Register of Deeds of the place wher

the land is situated and to the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority. No order or judgment ordering the

reconstitution of a certificate of title shall become final until the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt by the Register o

Deeds and by the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority of a notice of such order or judgment without any

appeal having been filed by any such officials." (As amended by R.A. 6732, emphasis supplied)

The Second Issue: Jurisdiction

In Demetriou vs. Court of Appeals, et al.9 this Court ruled:

In Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals (195 SCRA 482 [1991]), on facts analogous to those involved in this case, this Court

already held that if a certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of another person, the reconstituted

title is void and the court rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction. Consequently the decision may be attacked

any time.


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In the instant case, the owner's duplicate certificates of title were in the possession of Dy Quim Pong, the petitioner'

chairman of the board and whose family controls the petitioner-corporation. Since said certificates were not in fact "lost

or destroyed", there was no necessity for the petition filed in the trial court for the "issuance of New Owner's Duplicate

Certificates of Title: . . ." In fact, the said court never acquired jurisdiction to order the issuance of new certificates. Hence

the newly issued duplicates are themselves null and void.

It is obvious that this lapse happened because private respondents and respondent judge failed to follow the procedure

set forth in P.D. No. 1529 which, as already stated, governs the issuance of new owner's duplicate certificates of title.

Section 109 of said law provides, inter alia, that "due notice under oath" of the loss or theft of the owner's duplicate "sha

be sent by the owner as by someone in his behalf to the Register of Deeds . . ." (emphasis supplied). In this case, while a

affidavit or loss was attached to the petition in the lower court, no such notice was sent to the Register of Deeds.

Private respondents tried to convince the Court that by their failure to locate Francis Dytiongsee, they had no other

recourse but to file a petition for reconstitution. Sec. 107 of P.D. 1529, however, states that the remedy, in case of the

refusal or failure of the holder - in this case, the petitioner - to surrender the owner's duplicate certificate of title, is a

"petition in court to compel surrender of the same to the Register of Deeds", and not a petition for reconstitution.

The Third Issue: Fraud

The respondent Court of Appeals, in its own words, "confine(d) its discussion" 10 in the assailed Decision only to the

ground of fraud. It ruled that the Rte's decision could be annulled only where extrinsic or collateral fraud is shown - tha

is, when the fraudulent acts prevented a party "from exhibiting fully his side of the case . . .". Hence, petitioner could no

claim extrinsic fraud inasmuch as it was duly represented by Gaw in the reconstitution proceeding.

The appellate court explained that while there may not have been a quorum during the board meeting of petitioner

corporation on May 10, 1984 when a resolution authorizing Gaw to sue on its behalf was allegedly passed, this did "not

mean however, that New Durawood Co., Inc. cannot be bound by Gaw's action'' because "no howl of protest, complain

or denial came from (said corporation)", and that said corporation in fact had taken advantage of the benefits therefrom

Hence, petitioner is estopped from questioning Gawls acts. The appellate Court was of the belief that petitioner

corporation ratified Gaw's "authority" by acquiescence to his acts. The respondent Court thus concluded that petitioner

corporation's "claim of being a victim of extrinsic fraud is baseless."

We are appalled by this rather novel interpretation of corporate law. It is clear that, there having been no quorum presen

during the meeting in question, the board of directors could not have validly given Gaw any express authority to file the

petition. Upon the other hand, the doctrine of "apparent authority" cannot apply as to Gaw because, being a mere branch

manager, he could not be looked upon as a corporate officer clothed with the implied or "apparent" power to file suit fo

and in behalf of a corporation 11. Neither will estoppel prevent the corporation from questioning Gaw's acts. Precisely

these acts were hidden from the company and its top officers. How then can estoppel attach? 12

Suffice it to say then, that by his surreptitious filing of the petition for reconstitution without authority - express or implied

- of his employer, Gaw enabled respondent corporation to acquire the certificates of title in a manner contrary to law.

In petitions for issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of Torrens titles, it is essential - as provided under Sec. 109 o

P.D. 1529 as amended (supra) - that the trial court take steps to assure itself that the petitioner is the "registered owne

or other person in interest". Otherwise, new owner's duplicate certificates might be issued in favor of impostors who

could fraudulently dispose, hypothecate or otherwise deal in and with real estate in mockery of the Torrens system o

titling properties.

Be that as it may, in the case before us, whether Gaw was authorized to file the suit or not is of little significance in finally

resolving this case. Jurisdiction is and remains the main issue. Since we already concluded earlier that the trial court did

not have jurisdiction, necessarily its judgment must fall.


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WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the assailed decision SET ASIDE and REVERSED; the proceedings in LRC Case No

91-924 ANNULLED; and the order issued therein dated April 15, 1991 as well as the reconstituted Transfer Certificates o

Title issued pursuant thereto, namely, TCT Nos. 200100, 200101 and 200102 in the name of private respondent declared

NULL and VOID. Costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.


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SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-68303 January 15, 1988

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.

THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (now Court of Appeals), and PRINCESS EMME ATIK KIRAM

respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:

The Republic appeals from the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, * ordering the

reconstitution of title in favor of private respondent.

The properties in dispute number three undivided lots [Lot No. 465-A; Bsd-864, CAD-159, Lot No. 2408-A, Psd-864 (Lot

2457-Cad. 99), and Lot No. 2410-B, Psd-864 (Lot 2461 Cad 99)] altogether consisting of a total of 1,024 hectares of

ricelands. They are all located in Tiptipon, Panamao, Sulu. The title thereto stood allegedly in the name of Sultan Jamalu

Kiram, who died in 1936. The private respondent, a niece of the late Sultan, now claims that the original certificate of title

(No. P-133) thereto was destroyed as a consequence of a fire that gutted the office of the Register of Deeds of Sulu

sometime in February, 1974. She likewise alleges that the owner's copy thereof was lost on account of the same

misfortune. On October 18,1979, she went to the then Court of First Instance of Sulu, Branch I, at Jolo, now Regional Tria

Court, the Honorable Jainal D. Rasul, District Judge, presiding, for reconstitution.

The then Court of First Instance ruled for the private respondent, a ruling affirmed on appeal. The Republic would now

have the application dismissed on the grounds of: (1) lack of proper publication; (2) absence of proof that Origina

Certificate of Title No. P-133 was in force and in effect at the time of its alleged loss; and (3) failure to comply with the

provisions of Republic Act No. 26.

The then Court of First Instance granted reconstitution on the strength, among other things, of. (1) the sheriffs return o

service; (2) certificate of publication in the Official Gazette; (3) the respective survey plans and technical descriptions o

the properties; and (4) the tax declarations covering the same. The private respondent likewise presented a copy of AcNo. 3430, "An Act to provide for the reservation of certain lands of the public domain on the Island of Sulu, the usufruct

thereof to be granted to the Sultan of Sulu and his heirs," among them, those subject of the petition, as well as a copy o

proclamation No. 1530, "Reserving for resettlement purposes certain parcels of land situated in Panamao, Talipao and

Tiptipon, Province of Sulu, Philippines, under the administration and disposition of the Department of Agrarian Reform,"

including the three parcels aforementioned. According to the private respondent, Sultan Kiram acquired the properties in

question pursuant to these land grants.

The Solicitor General presented in the trial court no opposition to the application, and based on the evidence of the private

respondent, the assailed order was issued on June 4, 1980. The Solicitor General appealed to the then Intermediat

Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, which however affirmed in toto, on May 24, 1984, the order of the trial court

Hence, this petition.

We rule for the Republic.

It is not disputed, to begin with, that the notices (of hearing) were not posted on the main entrances of the provincial and

municipal halls of the locality in which the lands are located. Under Section 13, of Republic Act No. 26:

SEC. 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the preceding section, to be published, at the expense

of the petitioner, twice issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main of the municipality or city in which the

land is situated, at the provincial building and of the municipal building at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing

The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the


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petitioner, to every person named therein whose address is known, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. Said

notice shall state, among other things, the number of the lost or destroyed certificate of title, if known, the name of the

registered owner, the names of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, the owners of the adjoining

properties and all other interested parties, the location, area and boundaries of the property, and the date on which al

persons having any interest therein must appear and file their claim or objections to the petition. The petitioner shall, a

the hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting and service of the notice as directed by the court.

We have held that such a mode of publication is a jurisdictional requirement. The failure on the part of the applicant to

comply with it confers no jurisdiction upon the court. 1

Neither is there any showing that the adjacent owners or other interested parties were actually notified of the pending

application. This too taints the petition with a jurisdictional defect. 2

It is not enough that there is publication in the Official Gazette. Publication of the notice in the Official Gazette is but one

requirement. In addition, Republic Act No. 26 decrees that such a notice be posted "on the main entrance" of the

corresponding provincial capitol and municipal building, as well as served actually upon the owners of adjacent lands

Failure to comply with such requisites will nullify the decree of reconstitution.

It shall be noted that a judicial reconstitution of title partakes of a land registration proceeding. 3 Thus, notice of the

proceedings must be done in the manner set forth by the letter of the law.

It is futile for the private respondent, in connection with the charge that she failed to post the notice at the main entrance

of the municipal building, to invoke the fiction of "performance of duty." 4 The question that remains unanswered is

whether or not she had in fact complied with the requirement. The Court notes that all she presented was a certificate o

service prepared by the sheriff, embodying an order addressed to the Station Commander of Panamao, Sulu, to post the

proper notices and a certificate of publication in the Official Gazette. The order, however, of posting forwarded by the

sheriff to the local Station Commander is not proof that the Station Commander had in fact complied with such an order

The presumption of "performance of duty" cannot therefore apply. Republic Act No. 26 itself specifically calls upon the

applicant to submit proof of that posting. 5 He cannot rely on the presumption. In this case, fiction must yield to fact.

The Republic cannot be faulted for nursing doubts about the private respondent's assertions. In the first place, the private

respondent claims that two deeds have been lost, the original and the duplicate certificates of title. She furthermore relieon quite doubtful sources as bases for the reconstitution sought, i.e., certain statutes making references to the properties

In such a case, the courts are admonished to take utmost caution that the petition and the evidence presented to suppor

it can stand judicial scrutiny. 6

It is not sufficient, as in the case at bar, that the Solicitor General failed to interpose an opposition to the application. The

court must nonetheless convince itself that the petitioner's evidence is substantial enough to warrant reconstitution.

This Court agrees with the Republic that the private respondent, based on the evidence, has not sufficiently shown he

right to a reconstitution. Neither Act No. 3430 nor Proclamation No. 1530 confers title to any party over the properties

mentioned therein. On the other hand, Republic Act No. 26 entitled, "An Act Providing A Special Procedure For The

Reconstitution Of Torrens Certificates of Title Lost Or Destroyed," enumerates the sources on which the reconstitutedcertificate of title may be based. It should be noted that both Sections 2 and 3 thereof list sources that evidence title o

transactions affecting title to property. 7 When Republic Act No. 26 [Sec. 2(f)] therefore speaks of "[a]ny other document,

8 it must refer to similar documents previously enumerated therein. The statutes relied upon by the private respondent

so we hold, are not ejusdem generis as the documents earlier referred to. Furthermore, they do not contain the specific

required by Section 12(a) and (b) of the title reconstitution law. 9

We, therefore, hold that for reconstitution purposes, the two pieces of legislation earlier adverted to, Act No. 3430 and

Proclamation No. 1530, are not enough to support the petition for reconstitution. The private respondent must have

sufficient proof that her predecessor-in-interest had in fact availed himself of the benefits of the land grant the twin

statutes confer.


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Proclamation No. 1530, moreover, does not specifically name Sultan Kiram as the owner of the lands reserved for

resettlement. While Act No. 3430 does, this measure was enacted as far back as 1928. 10 Since then, the properties could

have undergone successive transfers. What is more, there is no showing that the title certificate sought to be

reconstituted, Original Certificate of Title No. P-133, stands, in fact, in the name of Sultan Kiram. The fact therefore tha

Act No. 3430 grants title to the Sultan (on the assumption that it does) does not yield the presumption that Origina

Certificate of Title No. P-133 refers to one and the same property.

The documents alluded to under Sections 2(f) and 3(f), finally, must be resorted to in the absence of those preceding inorder. There is no showing here that the private respondent had in fact sought to secure such prior documents (excep

with respect to the owner's duplicate copy of title, which she claims had been likewise destroyed) and failed to find them

This endangers doubts, indeed, about the existence of the alleged title itself.

The tampering of genuine certificates of title itself.

The tamppering of genuine certificates of title and the issuance of face ones are a widespread malaise that has seriously

threatened the very stability of the Torrens system. Worse, the courts have been at times unwitting accomplices in thes

acts of corruption. In Alabang, supra, we sounded this admonition:

... We can take judicial notice of innumerable litigations and controversies that have been spawned by the reckless and

hasty grant of such reconsitution of alleged lost or destroyed titles as well as of the numerous purchasers who have been

victimized only to find that the "lands" purchased by them were covered by forged or fake titles or their areas simply

"expanded" through "table surveys" with the cooperation of unscrupulous officials.

an admonition we find fitting and proper to reiterate here.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) dated May 24, 1984 and its

Resolution dated August 1, 1984 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition for Reconstitution of Title is ordered

DISMISSED. No costs.

Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.


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SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-55771 November 15, 1982

TAHANAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL E. VALENZUELA, THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, NICOLAS A. PASCUAL, CRISANTO F

PASCUAL, ANSELMO F. PASCUAL, MAMERTO F. PASCUAL, PASCUALA A. MEJIA, DAMIANA A. MEJIA, CIRILO S. PASCUAL,

and CATALINA S. PASCUAL, respondents.

Conrado B. Enriquez for petitioner.

Ramon S. Nievo for private respondents.

GUERRERO, J.:

There are three cases recently decided by the Supreme Court that are directly related to and squarely Identified with th

petition at bar, namely, (1) Director of Lands, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals, et al., respondents, Greenfield Developmen

Corporation, intervenor, Alabang Development Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing, intervenors, No. L-45168

September 25, 1979, 93 SCRA 238, (2) The Director of Lands, petitioner, vs. The Court of Appeals and Demetria Sta. Maria

Vda. de Bernal, respondents, Greenfield Development Corporation, intervenor, Alabang Development Corporation and

Ramon D. Bagatsing, intervenors, L-45168, January 27, 1981, 102 SCRA 370, and (3) Alabang Development Corp. and

Ramon D. Bagatsing, petitioner, vs. Hon. Manuel F. Valenzuela, et al., respondents, G.R. No. 54094, August 30, 1982.

In the first case, Our Resolution admitted the intervention of the intervenors filed before the Supreme Court at the stag

of the proceedings where trial of the petition for judicial reconstitution had already been concluded, the judgment thereo

granting the reconstitution had been promulgated and on appeal by the losing party, the same was affirmed by the Cour

of Appeals and the petition for certiorari to review said judgment was already submitted for decision in the Supreme

Court. The second case is Our decision on the merits of the certiorari petition wherein We ruled, among others, that the

judgment of the lower court granting the petition for judicial reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449 o

the Registry of Deeds of Rizal in the name of Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal covering two parcels of land located inBarrio San Dionisio, Municipality of Paranaque, Rizal (now Barrio Cupang, Municipality of Muntinlupa, Rizal) denominated

as Lots 1 and 3 of Plan II-4374 based on a survey approved July 25, 1911 with an area of 717,523 square meters and

717,539 square meters, respectively, was null and void for failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of Republi

Act No. 26. We further held that TCT No. 42449 was fake and spurious.

In the third case, the Supreme Court directly ruled that the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City,

Branch XXIX, in Reconstitution Case No. 504-P Land Registration Case No. 9368, Hon. Manuel E. Valenzuela, presiding,

ordering the reconstitution from Decree No. 15170 and the plan and technical descriptions, the alleged certificate of title

original and owner's duplicate copy over Lots 2 and 4 indicated in Plan II-4374 situated in Barrio San Dionisio, Paranaque

Rizal, now Barrio Cupang, Muntinlupa, Rizal, in the name of Manuela Aquial, was null and void.

The instant petition for review similarly assails the validity of the same judgment ordering the reconstitution of the

Certificate of Title, original and owner's duplicate copy, over the same lots, Lots 2 and 4, of the same plan, Plan 11-4374,

in the name of the said Manuela Aquial, promulgated in the same Reconstitution Case No. 504-P, Land Registration Case

No. 9368, Court of First Instance of Pasay City, Branch XXIX, Judge Manuel E. Valenzuela, presiding. The said case at bar

was brought by petitioner Tahanan Development Corporation while the third case was instituted by Alabang Developmen

Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing as petitioners.

Whereas the third case categorically ruled and decided the questions of law raised therein, the proceedings being th

special civil action of certiorari attacking the jurisdiction of the lower court, the petition at bar being a petition for review

a more extended discussion of the issues on the merits is necessary and more appropriate. Thus, We start by noting tha


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herein petition for review seeks to set aside the Resolution of the Court of Appeals promulgated April 30, 1980 reversing

an earlier decision of the same Court dated November 16, 1979 in C. A.-G.R. No. SP-08680-R entitled "Tahanan

Development Corporation, petitioner, versus Hon. Manuel E. Valenzuela, et al., respondents," as well as the subsequen

resolution dated December 8, 1980 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Petitioner Tahanan Developmen

Corporation, hereinafter referred to as TAHANAN, claiming grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Judge

further seeks the setting aside of the decision rendered by the latter in Reconstitution Case No. 504-P, Land Registratio

Case No. 9368, dated October 5, 1978 in favor of herein private respondents Nicolas A. Pascual and his co-heirs, the

dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, Makati Branch IV, is hereby ordered to

reconstitute from Decree No. 15170, Exhibit X, the plan and technical descriptions submitted to the Court-the certificate

of title, original and owner's duplicate copy, in the name of Manuela Aquial, single, Filipino, with residence at 307, 15th

Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, giving the certificate appropriate number which will not conflict with other titles already

issued upon payment of the prescribed fees. The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to forward a certified copy of thi

decision and all documents necessary for the reconstitution. (Rollo, p. 66).

The records of the case show that on October 5, 1977, private respondent hereinafter referred to as the Pascuals, claimin

as intestate heirs of Manuela Aquial who died on January 26, 1967, filed a petition for judicial reconstitution of lost

certificate of title under Republic Act No. 26 docketed as Reconstitution Case No. 504-P, Land Registration Case No. 9368

in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIX, Pasay City, presided by respondent Judge Manuel E. Valenzuela, alleging

that:

xxx xxx xxx

2. That Manuela Aquial, the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, while yet single and up to the time she got married

was the registered owner of those contiguous lands, Lots 2 and 4 as shown in Plan II-4374, situated in Bo. San Dionisio

Paranaque, Rizal now Bo. Cupang, Muntinlupa, Rizal, and more particularly bounded as follows:

1). A parcel of land (Lot 2 of Plan II-4374, L.R.C. No. ___), situated in the Barrio of San Dionisio, Municipality o

Paranaque, Province of Rizal (Now BO. CUPANG, Muntinlupa, Rizal) (.... containing an area of Three Hundred Seventy Five

Thousand Six Hundred and Twenty-Two (375,622) Square Meters. Bounded on the NE., NW., and W., along lines 1-2-3-4

5-6-7 by Pedro L. Flores who is in occupation of the same and of which notice maybe served at his office address at No959 C. Lerma Street, Sampaloc, Manila or at his residence at No. 707 A. Constancia Street, Sampaloc, Manila; and on the

SE., along lines 7-8-9-10-1 (portion of Lot 1, Plan II-4374) by Maglana & Sons Management Corporation, a private

corporation existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines which is in occupation of the same and of which

notice may be served to it CIO Constancio B. Maglana, its President and Chairman of the Board at No. 513 Lafayette Street

Greenhills Subdivision, Mandaluyong, Rizal:

2). A parcel of land (Lot 4 of Plan 11-4374, L.R.C. Record No. ___), situated in the Barrio of San Dionisio, Municipality

of Paraaque, Province of Rizal (Now Bo. Cupang, Muntinlupa, Rizal) (.... containing an area of Fifty-Six Thousand Two

Hundred Ninety-Five (56,295) Square Meters. Bounded on the NW., and SW., along lines 1-2-3 (portion of Lot 1, Plan 11

4374) and on the SE., NE., and NW., along lines 3-4-5-1 (Portion of Lot 3, Plan II-4374), all by Maglana & Sons Managemen

Corporation, a private corporation existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines which is in occupation of thesame and of which notice may be served to it C/O Constancio B. Maglana, its President and Chairman of the Board, at No

513 Lafayette Street, Greenhills Subdivision, Mandaluyong, Rizal. The above lots are more particularly described in herein

attached Decree No. 15170 issued on March 4, 1914 with the same boundaries and description contained in the

corresponding original certificate of title (original and owner's duplicate copy) issued therefor in Land Registration Case

No. 9368 on file with the Land Registration Commission; that said lands have not been included in any cadastral survey;

3. That the petitioners, by themselves and thru their predecessors-in-interest Manuela Aquial have been and sti

are in the actual, public, exclusive, adverse, continuous and peaceful occupation of the afore-described lands as owner

in fee simple since time immemorial, devoting a small portion thereof to agriculture;


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4. That the said original certificate of title, original and owner's duplicate copies, covering said lands have been los

or destroyed in the last World War II and diligent efforts to locate the same have been all in vain; that said title was

subsisting and in force at the time it was lost or destroyed, free from liens and encumbrances of any kind and nature up

to the present; that the records of the land registration case of the same lots have likewise been lost and destroyed excep

such records as hereinafter set forth;

5. That there is no record of any sales patent, sales certificate or any land grant over said lands to any person o

entity; that no Co-owner's, Mortgagee's, Lessee's or any lien holder's copy of said Original Certificate of Title have ever

been issued; that Manuela Aquial as well as her first and second husbands, Esteban Pascual and Cornelio Mejia andpetitioners herein have not at any time delivered the Owner's Duplicate copy of subject certificate of title to any person

or entity to secure the payment of or performance of any obligation whatsoever nor any transaction entered into by them

by which certain deed or other instruments related to or affecting the subject lands presented for or pending registration

in the office of the Register of Deeds for Makati, Metro Manila;

6. That said Manuela Aquial died intestate in Cubao, Quezon City on January 26, 1967 leaning the aforementioned

estate to the herein petitioners as her heirs, without debts;

7. That for purposes of said inheritance, the petitioners desire in this petition to reconstitute the lost origina

certificate of title, Original and Owner's Duplicate copies, covering said Lots 2 and 4, Plan II-4374 herein above described

on the basis of: (1) Said Decree No. 15170 issued on March 4, 1914 (Annex "A") and the certification thereof by the Chief

Docket Division, Land Registration Commission (Annex "A-1 "); (2) Survey Plan II-4374 from microfilm Reel 560 unde

Accession No. 385657 on file with the Bureau of lands (Annex "B "); and certification thereof (Annex "B-1 "), and the

corresponding affidavit of the Chief, Reproduction Section, Bureau of Lands, attesting to such fact (Annex "B-2"); (3

Certified Technical Description of Lots 2 and 4 under said Plan 11-4374, by the Chief, Surveys Division, Bureau of Land

(Annexes "C" and "C-1 "); (4) Certification by the Acting Chief, Records Division, Bureau of Lands, that there is no record

of any Sales Patent, Sales Certificates or any land grant affecting or embracing the subject lands to any person (Annex "D

"); (5) Tax Declaration (Annexes "E", "E-1", "E- 2" and "E-3"); (6) Tax Receipts (Annexes "F" and "F-1 "); (7) Affidavit of

adjoining owner Pedro L. Flores executed before Notary Public Atty. F.S. Guanco for Quezon City (Annex "G"); (8) White

print copy of Relocation Plan dated July 7-12, 1974, with the certification of Geodetic Engineer Restituto L. Beltran who

conducted said relocation survey of Lots Nos. 2 and 4, Plan II-4374 in the presence of the adjoining owners (Annex " H ")

All of which are xerox copies and made integral parts of this petition but the originals thereof shall be presented at the

hearing.

On October 5, 1977, the Notice of Hearing was issued by the Court and likewise, for its materiality in resolving the issue

of jurisdiction, We quote the material portions thereof below:

NOTICE OF HEARING

A verified petition dated September 2, 1977 has been filed by petitioners, thru counsel, alleging, among others, that:

(Paragraphs 1 to 7 are omitted, being the same allegations in the Petition for Reconstitution hereinbefore quoted.)

Now, therefore, notice is hereby given that this petition will be heard before this Court, sitting on the 2nd floor, New CityHall Building, F.B. Harrison, Pasay City, Metro Manila, on the 18th day of November, 1977, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning

at which date, time and place, all interested parties are hereby cited to appear and show cause, if any why said petition

should not be granted.

Let copies of this Notice be published in the Official Gazette and in the Newspaper of general circulation in the Greate

Manila Area, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks at the expense of the petitioners, and likewise posted in the

bulletin board of the Court of First Instance of Pasay City.

Let the Office of the Land Registration Commission and the Bureau of Lands be furnished this Notice and copies of the

petition, together with its annexes.


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WITNESS the HON. MANUEL E. VALENZUELA, presiding Judge of the Court, this 5th day of October, 1977.

(SGD.) BASILIO B. BOLANTE Branch Clerk of Court

The above notice was published in the Official Gazette in the issues of November 14, 21 and 28 1977 (Exhibits "A", "B"

"B-I", "C", "D", "D-1", "E" and "E-1").Copies of the same notice were also posted by Deputy Sheriff Arsenio de Guzman o

Pasay City in the Bulletin Board of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch located at the Hall of Justice, City

Hall Building, Pasay City on October 5, 1977 (Exhibit "F"). On the same date, copies of the notice were served to the Officeof the Solicitor General and on November 9, 1977. to his Commissioner of Land Registration by Deputy Sheriff De Guzman

(Exhibit "F"), together with copies of the petition and its annexes. The proofs submitted of notice to the adjacent owners

indicated in the Petition and Notice of Hearing, namely, Pedro L. Flores with address at 959 C. Lerma Street, Sampaloc

Manila and Constancio B. Maglana as President and Chairman of the Board of Maglana & Sons Management Corporation

with office and postal address at 513 Lafayette Street, Greenhills Subdivision, Mandaluyong, Rizal, are their respective

affidavits dated July 17, 1974 and August 6,1974 (Exhibits "H" and "I").

The Director of Lands thru counsel, Atty. Daniel C. Florida, Special Attorney of the Office of the Solicitor General, filed on

April 14, 1978 an Opposition to the petition on the following grounds:

1. That the same petitioners in this Reconstitution Case No. 504-P, Nicolas A. Pascual, et al. claiming to be the heir

of the late Manuela Aquial, had previously filed a similar petition for reconstitution of the alleged lost original certificate

of title supposed to have been issued in Land Registration Case No. 9368 under Decree No. 15170 in the name of Manuel

Aquial over the same parcels of land, Lots 2 and 4, Plan II-4374 situated at Bo. San Dionisio, Paranaque, Rizal, which

previous petition, docketed as Reconstitution Case No. 77 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXVI, Makati

Rizal, appears to have been dismissed, Oppositor Director of Lands hereby reserves his right to present later a certifie

copy of the order of dismissal, as he has not yet received a reply of the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance, Branch

XXXVI, to our letter to him dated March 14, 1978, duplicate copy hereto attached as Annex "A", requesting for a certified

copy of the order or decision resolving said Reconstitution Case No. 77, which order or decision may be a dismissal with

prejudice and may thus be a bar to the filing of the instant Reconstitution Case No. 504-P based on the principle of res

judicata;

2. That contrary to the claim of petitioners that the aforementioned Lots 2 and 4, Plan II-4374 situated at Bo. SanDionisio, Paranaque, Rizal were issued Decree No. 15170 on March 4, 1914 in the name of Manuela Aquial in Land

Registration Case No. 9368 and that the corresponding original certificate of title for said Decree were registered and

issued under the said Decree, the truth is that said Decree No. 15170 in Land Registration Case No. 9368 was issued in

favor of Eugenio Tuason, married to Maximina Geronimo, and Eugenio T. Changco, married to Romana Gatchalian

covering a parcel of land with an area of 422 square meters situated at Bambang; Pasig, Rizal, and not for Lots 2 and 4

Plan 11-4374 with a total area of 431,917 square meters situated at Bo. San Dionisio, Paranaque, Rizal. These facts are

evidenced by the letter dated February 28, 1978 of the Acting Register of Deeds of Rizal, the letter dated March 9, 1978

of the same Acting Register of Deeds of Rizal, and the Report dated November 11, 1974 of the then Register of Deeds o

Rizal submitted to him as required by the court in the previous Reconstitution Case No. 77 filed with Branch XXXVI of thi

Honorable Court at Makati, Rizal, xerox copies of said letters and report are hereto attached as ANNEX "B", ANNEX "C"

and ANNEX "D", respectively;

3. That from the documents ANNEXES "B", "C", and "D", it is very clear that no original certificate of title had or has

been issued to Manuela Aquial covering Lots 2 and 4, Plan II-4374, situated at Bo. San Dionisio, Paranaque, Rizal; tha

consequently, no original certificate of title in the name of Manuela Aquial has been lost; and that therefore, this instan

petition for reconstitution of an alleged lost original certificate of title has no basis in fact and in law, there being no title

to be reconstituted under Republic Act No. 26;

4. That the applicants for land registration in Land Registration Case No. 9368, Decree No. 15170, of the then Cour

of Land Registration were Eugenio Tuason, married to Maximina Geronimo, and Eusebio T. Changco, married to Romana


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Gatchalian, and not Manuela Aquial; and that the land subject thereof was a parcel of land in Bambang, Pasig, Rizal, and

not a parcel of land in San Dionisio, Paranaque, Rizal;

5. That the same Decree No. 15170 in Land Registration Case No. 9368 issued in favor of Eugenio Tuason, et al. fo

a parcel of land in Bambang, Pasig, Rizal could not have been also issued in the name of Manuela Aquial for a parcel o

land in San Dionisio, Paranaque, Rizal;

6. That the genuineness or authenticity of ANNEX "A" of the petition in this case which is alleged to be a copy o

Decree No. 15170 issued in the name of Manuela Aquial is very questionable on the following grounds and points:

(a) ANNEX "A" is a xerox copy not of the original of Decree No. 15170 or of an authenticated copy thereof but only o

an unauthenticated true copy of said decree as indicated by the typewritten words 'A true copy:' at the bottom of the lef

hand corner of page (2) of said document;

(b) The said typewritten words 'A true copy:' is not signed or even initiated by any competent officer of the court o

the Land Registration Commission to give it authenticity;

(c) That ANNEX "A" is a xerox copy of the original of Decree No. 15170 of an authenticated copy thereof but only o

a true copy is also seen from the first line on top of the document on page 1 which reads: 'Copy of Decree No. 15170'. An

original of a Decree is issued without the words 'Copy of' prefixed before the Decree Number;

(d) ANNEX "A" being a mere xerox copy of an authenticated 'true copy', it is very questionable why the true copy

which was reproduced by the xerox copy marked ANNEX "A" bears the written signature of the Clerk of Court, Enrique

Altavas by way of attestation of the decree. It is well known that a mere true copy of any document, public or private

does not bear the written signature of the party or officer signing or issuing the document. Only the original or duplicate

of the document may bear the written signature of the party or officer signing or issuing the document;

(e) In ANNEX "A-1" of the petition in the instant case, alleged to be a certification of Decree No. 15170, what appear

to have been certified by the Chief, Docket Division of the Land Registration Commission is that the document (Decree

No. 15170) 'is a true and correct reproduction of a true copy of Decree No. 15170.' Where is the original or an authentic

signed duplicate of Decree No. 15170?

(f) ANNEX "F", either the xerox copy of a true copy, or the true copy reproduced by the xerox copy, is a

UNAUTHENTICATED copy of the alleged decree, and therefore, it cannot be the valid basis for reconstitution under Section

2 of Republic Act No. 26;

7. That contrary to the allegation in paragraph 3 of the petition, petitioners by themselves and thru thei

predecessor-in-interest Manuela Aquial have not been in the actual, exclusive and continuous occupation of the lands

subject of their petitions since time immemorial, the truth of the matter being that their alleged occupation is only o

recent vintage, having declared the lots for taxation only in 1973, beginning with the year 1970 (ANNEXES "E", "E-1", "E

2", and "E-3"), and paid the taxes for 1970 to 1973 in lump sum on September 6,1973 (ANNEXES "F " and "F-11');

8. That Lots 2 and 4, Plan II-4374 have never been applied for and registered under the Land Registration Law, AcNo. 496, the same being lands of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines and are portions of the

adjoining public land as indicated in Plan II-4374, subject to disposition only under the pertinent and applicable provisions

of the Public Land Act, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended;

9. That not all the jurisdictional facts of the instant case have been established and therefore, this Honorable Cour

has not acquired jurisdiction to hear and resolve the case under Republic Act No. 26, for the reason that petitioners thru

counsel have failed to serve notice of the petition in this case to the owners of the adjoining properties. The affidavits of

the alleged adjoining owners,, Constancio B. Maglana and Pedro L. Flores submitted by petitioners as Exhibits " H " and

I " respectively, and which were executed in 1974 before the petition in the instant case was filed on November 15, 1977


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cannot be validly admitted as substitute for service of notice of the petition to the adjoining owners as required unde

Section 13 of Republic Act No. 26; and

10. That the instant petition for reconstitution should be dismissed outright for lack of factual and legal basis, the

Decree No. 15170 involved by petitioners having been issued in favor of other persons named Eugenio Tuason, et al. fo

a different parcel of land located in another barrio and municipality.

On November 18, 1977, the date scheduled for the hearing as indicated in the Notices, the Court re-set the hearing of the

case to February 27, 1978, it appearing that the Notice of Hearing had not been published in the Official Gazette as peinformation relayed to the Court by the petitioners. Again, the hearing set on February 27, 1978 was re-scheduled to Apr

14, 1978 in view of the manifestation of the representative of the Bureau of Lands that they have not received copy of th

petition. Once more, the latter setting was cancelled and re-set to June 2, l978 on the ground that the counsel fo

petitioner informed the Court that they have just received the Opposition dated April 11, 1978 filed by Solicitor Danie

Florida.

Meanwhile, the Pascuals filed their Reply to the Opposition alleging, among others, that they had filed a previous petition

docketed as Reconstitution Case No. 77 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXVI, Makati, Rizal which was

voluntarily withdrawn by them on grounds stated by their counsel in his Motion to Withdraw without prejudice and

granted by the Court in its Order dated May 30, 1975; that the report of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal mentioning

that Decree No. 15170 appears in the name of Eugenio Tuason and Eusebio T. Changco in Original Certificate of Title No

724 does not preclude the existence of Decree No. 15170 issued in the name of Manuela Aquial in Land Registration Cas

No. 9368 since, assuming the report of the Register of Pasig to be accurate, it could have been a clerical error or mistake

of the clerk in the office of the Register of Deeds in typing on the Original Certificate of Title No. 724 the same Decree No

and the same Registration No. as that issued in favor of Manuela Aquial; and that there may be two decrees bearing the

same number but involving different parcels of land is nothing unusual or surprising, in the same manner that there may

be two or three certificates of titles bearing the same number but in the names of different owners covering properties i

different places and issued at different periods of time.

The trial court granted the petition for reconstitution in its decision dated October 5, 1978. The court said:

The documents presented by the petitioners to establish the existence of the prerequisites to reconstitution of the title i

the name of their predecessor-in-interests were either admitted or not objected to by Atty. Rodolfo J. Flores inrepresentation of the Director of Lands, except Exhibits O and P on Plan II-4374 on the alleged ground that they were

reproduced from a microfilm reel and not from available approved records, as well as Exhibits X, X-1 and X-2 (Decree No

15170), on the ground that they were mere xerox copies not of the original of the Decree or an authenticated copy thereof

Counsel for oppositor overlooks the realities that forced the petitioners to seek reconstitution of the title of their

predecessor-in-interests. The original of the Decree was sent to the register of deeds for the issuance of the certificate o

title. It was in the latter office that it was lost. The copy left in the Land Registration Commission is authenticated by the

signature of the Clerk of Court of the Land Registration Court, Enrique Altavas. To limit the bases of reconstitution to

originals of the official documents is to defeat the purpose of the law. Reason and the law would not justify private

properties to remain forever with their titles unreconstituted.

The grounds for the objection disregards the destruction of many government records during the last world war and

defeats the purpose of

Documents

Ltd October 4