LTD 8th Batch

8/12/2019 LTD 8th Batch

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DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS IAC AND ACME PLYWOOD AND VENEER CO. INC

The Director of Lands has brought this appeal bycertiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming adecision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of Acme lywood ! "eneer Co#, Inc#of five parcels of land measuring $%&, '() s*uare meters, more or less, ac*uired by it from +ariano and Acer Infiel,members of the Dumagat tribe#

The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under ection $% of Commonwealth Act -o# &$& .The ublicLand Act/# as amended0 and the appealed judgment sums up the findings of the trial court in said proceedings in this wise1

2That Acme lywood ! "eneer Co# Inc#, represented by +r# 3odolfo -a4ario is a corporation dulyorgani4ed in accordance with the laws of the 3epublic of the hilippines and registered with the

ecurities and 56change Commission on December 7', &(8(0

7#That Acme lywood ! "eneer Co# Inc#, represented by +r# 3odolfo -a4ario can ac*uire realproperties pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation particularly on the provision ofits secondary purposes .paragraph .(/, 56hibit 9+:&9/0

'#That the land subject of the Land 3egistration proceeding was ancestrally ac*uired by Acmelywood ! "eneer Co#, Inc#, on ;ctober 7(, &(7 granting absolute ownership to members of the non:Christian Tribes on land occupied bythem or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within thepublic domain0

%#That applicant Acme lywood ! "eneer Co# Inc#, has introduced more than Forty:Five +illion. $8,))),)))#))/ esos worth of improvements, said improvements were seen by the Court duringits ocular investigation of the land sought to be registered on eptember &%, &(%70

(#That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the applicant was dulyrecogni4ed by the government when the +unicipal ;fficials of +aconacon, Isabela, have negotiatedfor the donation of the townsite from Acme lywood ! "eneer Co#, Inc#, and the negotiation came toreality when the ?oard of Directors of the Acme lywood ! "eneer Co#, Inc#, had donated a part ofthe land bought by the Company from the Infiels for the townsite of +aconacon, Isabela .56h# 9-9/on -ovember &8, &(>(, and which donation was accepted by the +unicipal @overnment of+aconacon, Isabela .56h# 9-:&9/, during their special session on -ovember 77, &(>(#2

The Director of Lands ta=es no issue with any of these findings e6cept as to the applicability of the &('8 Constitution tothe matter at hand# Concerning this, he asserts that, the registration proceedings have been commenced only on uly &>,

&(%&, or long after the &(>' Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicabsection && of its Article BI" prohibits private corporations or associations from holding alienable domain, e6cept by lease not to e6ceed &,))) hectares .a prohibition not found in the &('8 Constitutioforce in &(' Constitution other than ection && already referred to#

@iven the foregoing, the *uestion before this Court is whether or not the title that the Infiels had train &(


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had been possessed by the vendors and, before them, by their predecessor:in:interest, ;limpia 3amos, since prior to theoutbrea= of the acific Ear in &($ ;n December &, &(>$, amending Act -o# (7 of Act -o# 7%>$# legal fiction, "alentin usi had ac*uired the land in *uestion by a grant of the tate,it haalready ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least presumption, of "alentin usi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands# Conse*uenselling the land in *uestion of Angela 3a4on, the Director of Lands disposed of a land which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no and Angela 3a4on did not thereby ac*uire any right#<

ucceeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, li=e Lacaste vs# Director of Lands,> +esina

on4a, % +anarpac vs# Cabanatuan, ( +iguel vs# Court of Appeals&) and Herico vs# Dar,supra, by inaffirming theSusi doctrine have firmly rooted it in jurisprudence#

Herico, in particular, appears to be s*uarely affirmative1&&

2# # # econdly, under the provisions of 3epublic Act -o# &($7, which the respondenheld to be inapplicable to the petitioner9s case, with the latter9s proven occupatiocultivation for more than ') years since &(&$, by himself and by his predecessors:in:inttitle over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass o public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the ublic Land Act as bypatent# # # #

666 666 666

As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provare complied with, the possessor is deemed to have ac*uired,by operation of law, a right togrant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued# Ththerefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of to dispose of# he application for confirmation is mere formality, the lac! of which doesaffect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the orrtitle to be issued upon the strength of said patent #2&7

-othing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of publicthe character and duration prescribed by statute as the e*uivalent of an e6press grant from the dictum of the statute itself &' that the possessor.s/ 2# # # shall be conclusively presumed to have peconditions essential to a @overnment grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title # # #admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be lformality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the re*uired charof time0 and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recogni4e a title alrproceedings would notoriginally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm sualready affected by operation of law from the moment the re*uired period of possession became co

so well put inCario, 2# # # .T/here are indications that registration was e6pected from all, but nonethat, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost# The effect of the proof, wherever confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law#2

If it is accepted as it must be that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a leand transferable title on ;ctober 7(, &(


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5ven on the proposition that the land remained technically 2public2 land, despite immemorial possession of the Infiels andtheir ancestors, until title in their favor was actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the ublic Land Act, therecan be no serious *uestion of Acme9s right to ac*uire the land at the time it did, there also being nothing in the &('8Constitution that might be construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or ac*uiring interests in public land to whichthe vendor had already ac*uired that type of so:called 2incomplete2 or 2imperfect2 title# The only limitation then e6tant wasthat corporations could not ac*uire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in e6cess of &,)7$ hectares# The purelyaccidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought under the aegis of the &(>' Constitution whichforbids corporations from owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law came intoeffect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and proper, This Court has already held, in analogous circumstances,that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights#

2Ee hold that the said constitutional prohibition&$ has no retroactive application to the sales

application of ?i an Development Co#, Inc# because it had already ac*uired a vested right to theland applied for at the time the &(>' Constitution too= effect#

That vested right has to be respected# It could not be abrogated by the new Constitution# ection 7,Article BIII of the &('8 Constitution allows private corporations to purchase public agricultural landsnot e6ceeding one thousand and twenty:four hectares# etitioner9 prohibition action is barred by thedoctrine of vested rights in constitutional law#

666 666 666

The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights# A state may not impair vestedrights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subse*uent repeal of a municipalordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the tate, e6cept in a legitimate e6ercise of thepolice power9 .&< C# # # &&>>:>%/#

666 666 666

In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the &(>' Constitution the right ofthe corporation to purchase the land in *uestion had become fi6ed and established and was nolonger open to doubt or controversy#

Its compliance with the re*uirements of the ublic Land Law for the issuance of a patent had theeffect of segregating the said land from the public domain# The corporation9s right to obtain a patentfor the land is protected by law# It cannot be deprived of that right without due process .Director ofLands vs# CA, &7' hil# (&(/#2 &8

The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own name must be regarded as simplyanother accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the substanceand merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme9sentitlement to the land# As it is un*uestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the &('8 orthe &(>' Constitution, could have had title in themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservience to the letterof the law would deny the same benefit to their lawful successor:in:interest by valid conveyance which violates no

constitutional mandate#The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority ruling in"eralco must bereconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent# The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases alreadyreferred to, is that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors:in:interest, openly,continuously and e6clusively for the prescribed statutory period .') years under The ublic Land Act, as amended/ isconverted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period,ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basisof the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it was ac*uired from theInfiels by Acme# Acme thereby ac*uired a registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition against said corporation9s

holding or owning private land# The objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is not *ualified toconfirmation of title under section $%.b/ of the ublic Land Act is technical, rather than substantialits answer in the dissent in"eralco 1

2' CArticle BI", ection &&, was only tangential, limited to a brief paragraph in the main opinionconte6t, be considered as essentiallyobiter #"eralco , in short, decided no constitutional *uestion#

EH535F;35, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellasame is hereby affirmed, without costs in this instance#

; ;3D535D#

REPUBLIC VS IGLESIA NI CRISTO AND MANALO

The Case
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In this etition for 3eview onCertiorariunder 3ule $8, the 3epublic of the hilippines assails the ;ctober &&, 7))>Decision & of the Court of Appeals .CA/ in CA:@#3# C" -o# %8'$%, which affirmed the April 7, L#3#C# 3ec# -o# JJJJJJ/ situated in the ?arrio of ?aramban,+unicipality of Currimao, rovince of Ilocos -orte, Island of Lu4on# ?ounded on the 5#, along line&:7 by the -ational 3oad .7)#)) m# wide/0 on the E# ! -E#, along lines 7:':$ by lot '($), a Deed of ale was e6ecuted by ?adanguio in favor of I-C formally ceding to I-C the subject lot which still formed part of the TD of the bigger lot under his name# This wTeofilo Tulali who became a tenant of the bigger lot in &(, &(>)This was subse*uently replaced by TD -o# $), technical description of the subject lot, @eodetic 5ngineer9s Certificate, and 3City 5nvironment and -atural 3esources ;ffice special investigator showing that the subject lot is wand disposable public 4one, the +CTC found and appreciated the continuous possession by I-C of for over $) years after its ac*uisition of the lot# ?esides, it noted that ?adanguio and abuco, the printerest of I-C, were never disturbed in their possession of the portions they sold to I-C constituting

Aggrieved, the 3epublic seasonably interposed its appeal before the CA, doc=eted as CA:@#3# HA5DCT

The Ruli ! "# the CA

;n ;ctober &&, 7))>, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision affirming the April 7', and Dobserved that ec# $% .b/ of CA &$& and ec# &$ .&/ of D &87( are virtually the same,specifically operationali4ing the registration of lands of the public domain and codifying the variouthe registration of property# Ee cited$aguit and ratiocinated1

Despite the clear te6t of ection $%.b/ of the ublic Land Act, as amended and ectionof the roperty 3egistration Decree, the ; @ has adopted the position that for one to ac*the right to see= registration of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, ienough that the applicant and hisGher predecessors:in:interest be in possession und

bona fide claim of ownership since &7 une &($80 the alienable and disposable charathe property must have been declared also as of &7 une &($8# Following the approach, all lands certified as alienable and disposable after &7 une &($8 cannregistered either under ection &$.&/ of the roperty 3egistration Decree or ection $the ublic Land Act as amended# The absurdity of such an implication was discuss$aguit.

etitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the should have already been established since une &7, &($8 or earlier# This is not bornethe plain meaning of ection &$.&/# 2 ince une &7, &($82, as used in the provision,its antecedent phrase 2under a bonafide claim of ownership2# @enerally spea=ing, *u words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately assoand not those distantly or remotely located# %d pro'imum antecedents fiat relation nimpediatur sentencia .

?esides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioner9s poAbsent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the ; @9s view, that all lathe public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before une &7 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchalpossession by the occupant# uch interpretation renders paragraph .&/ of ection &$ vinoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decireclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable# The unreasonableness osituation would even be aggravated considering that before une &7, &($8, the hili
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was not yet even considered an independent state#

Accordingly, the Court in$aguit e6plained1

MTNhe more reasonable interpretation of ection &$.&/ is that it merely re*uires theproperty sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time theapplication for registration of title is filed# If the tate, at the time the application is made,has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, thepresumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utili4e the property0 hence,the need to preserve its ownership in the tate irrespective of the length of adversepossession even if in good faith# However, if the property has already been classified asalienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the partof the tate to abdicate its e6clusive prerogative over the property#

The Court declares that the correct interpretation of ection &$.&/ is that which was adopted in$aguit. The contrary pronouncement inHerbieto, as pointed out in $aguit, absurdly limits theapplication of the provision to the point of virtual inutility since it would only cover lands actuallydeclared alienable and disposable prior to &7 une &($8, even if the current possessor is able toestablish open, continuous, e6clusive and notorious possession under abona fide claim ofownership long before that date#cCaD A

+oreover, the $aguit interpretation allows more possessors under abona fide claim of ownership toavail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles than what would be feasible underHerbieto. Thisbalancing fact is significant, especially considering our forthcoming discussion on the scope andreach of ection &$.7/ of the roperty 3egistration Decree#

etitioners ma=e the salient observation that the contradictory passages fromHerbietoare obiter dicta since the land registration proceedings therein is voidab initioin the first place due to lac= ofthe re*uisite publication of the notice of initial hearing# There is no need to e6plicitly overturnHerbieto, as it suffices that the Court9s ac=nowledgment that the particular line of argument usedtherein concerning ection &$.&/ is indeedobiter.

Naguit as a##i%)e$ i Malabanan )"%e i acc"%$ 4ith the State&s '"lic+

+oreover, we wish to emphasi4e that our affirmation of$aguit in "alabanan as regards the correct interpretation ofec# &$ .&/ of D &87( relative to the rec=oning of possession vis:Q:vis the declaration of the property of the public

domain as alienable and disposable is indeed more in =eeping with the spirit of the ublic Land Act, as amended, andof D &87(# These statutes were enacted to conform to the tate9s policy of encouraging and promoting the distribution ofalienable public lands to spur economic growth and remain true to the ideal of social justice#7' The statutes9re*uirements, as couched and amended, are stringent enough to safeguard against fraudulent applications for registrationof title over alienable and disposable public land# The application of the more stringent pronouncement inHerbieto wouldindeed stifle and repress the tate9s policy#

Finally, the Court in"alabanan aptly synthesi4ed the doctrine that the period of possession re*uired under ec# &$ .&/ of

D &87> is not rec=oned from the time of the declaration of the property as alienable and disposable, thus1Ee synthesi4e the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows1

.&/In connection with ection &$.&/ of the roperty 3egistration Decree, ection $%.b/ of the ublicLand Act recogni4es and confirms that 2those who by themselves or through their predecessors ininterest have been in open, continuous, e6clusive, and notorious possession and occupation ofalienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of ac*uisition ofownership, since une &7, &($82 have ac*uired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands

based on the length and *uality of their possession#

.a/ ince ection $%.b/ merely re*uires possession since &7 une &($8 and does not rthat the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire periopossession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto asas it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by ection the ublic Land Act#

.b/The right to register granted under ection $%.b/ of the ublic Land Act is further coby ection &$.&/ of the roperty 3egistration Decree#

INC e title$ t" %e!ist%a(le %i!ht "5e% su(6ect l"t

Eith the resolution of the core issue, we find no error in the findings of the courtsa quo that I-C hsufficiently established its possession and occupation of the subject lot in accordance with the ubl

ec# &$ .&/ of D &87(, and had duly proved its right to judicial confirmation of imperfect title ov

As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court when affirmed by the CA are final and conclusive oreviewed on appeal by, this Court as long as they are borne out by the record or are based on substaThe Court is not a trier of facts, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only errors of law thacommitted by the lower courts#7$ This is applicable to the instant case#HCacD5

The possession of I-C has been established not only from &(87 and &(8( when it purchased the resof the subject lot, but is also tac=ed on to the possession of its predecessors:in:interest, ?adanguio anlatter possessing the subject lot way before une &7, &($8, as he inherited the bigger lot, of which a portion, from his parents# These possessions and occupation from abuco, including those ofI-C0 and from abuco to ?adanguio to I-C had been in the concept of owners1 open, continuous, notorious possession and occupation under abona fide claim of ac*uisition of property# Thesedisturbed as attested to by respondent9s witnesses#

W7EREFORE8 this petition is herebyDENIED. Accordingly, the ;ctober &&, 7))> CA Decision in CA%8'$% is herebyAFFIRMED IN TOTO.

-o costs#

SO ORDERED.

SUSI VS RA9ON

This acti" 4as c"))e ce$ i the C"u%t "# Fi%st I sta ce "# Pa)'a !a (+ a c")'lai t #ile$ (+ ValeSusi a!ai st A !ela Ra:" a $ the Di%ect"% "# La $s8 '%a+i ! #"% 6u$!)e t; a/ Decla%i ! 'laa $ a(s"lute "4 e% "# the 'a%cel "# la $ $esc%i(e$ i the sec" $ 'a%a!%a'h "# the c")'lai t< (/ athe sale )a$e (+ the Di%ect"% "# La $s i #a5"% "# A !ela Ra:" 8 " the !%"u $ that the la $'%"'e%t+< c/ "%$e%i ! the ca cellati" "# the ce%ti#icate "# title issue$ t" sai$ A !ela Rse te ci ! the latte% t" 'a+ 'lai ti## the su) "# P0== as $a)a!es8 4ith the c"sts.

For his answer to the complaint, the Director of Lands denied each and every allegatitherein and, as special defense, alleged that the land in *uestion was a property of the @overKnited tates under the administration and control of that of the hilippine Islands before its s
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3a4on, which was made in accordance with law#

After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by both parties, the Court of First Instance of ampangarendered judgment declaring the plaintiff entitled to the possession of the land, annulling the sale made by theDirector of Lands in favor of Angela 3a4on, and ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to her, withthe costs against Angela 3a4on# From this judgment the Director of Lands too= this appeal, assigning thereto thefollowing errors, to wit1 .&/ The holding that the judgment rendered in a prior case between the plaintiff and defendantAngela 3a4on on the parcel of land in *uestion is controlling in this action0 .7/ the holding that plaintiff is entitled torecover the possession of said parcel of land0 the annulment of the sale made by the Director of Lands to Angela3a4on0 and the ordering that the certificate of title issued by the register of deeds of the rovince of ampanga toAngela 3a4on by virtue of said sale be cancelled0 and .'/ the denial of the motion for new trial filed by the Director ofLands#

The evidence shows that on December &%, &%%), -emesio inlac sold the land in *uestion, then a fishpond, to Apolonio @arcia and ?asilio +endo4a for the sum of &7, reserving the right to repurchase the same .56hibit?/# After having been in possession thereof for about eight years, and the fish pond having been destroyed, Apolonio@arcia and ?asilio +endo4a, on eptember 8, &%((, sold it to "alentin usi for the sum of &7, reserving the right torepurchase it .56hibit A/# ?efore the e6ecution of the deed of sale, "alentin usi had already paid its price and sown2bacawan2 on said land, availing himself of the firewood gathered thereon, with the proceeds of the sale of which hehad paid the price of the property# The possession and occupation of the land in *uestion, first, by Apolonio @arciaand ?asilio +endo4a, and then by "alentin usi has been open, continuous, adverse and public, without anyinterruption, e6cept during the revolution, or disturbance, e6cept when Angela 3a4on, on eptember &', &(&',commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of ampanga to recover the possession of said land .56hibit C/, wherein after considering the evidence introduced at the trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of "alentin usiand against Angela 3a4on, dismissing the complaint .56hibit 5/# Having failed in her attempt to obtain possession ofthe land in *uestion through the court, Angela 3a4on applied to the Director of Lands for the purchase thereof onAugust &8, &(&$ .56hibit C/# Having learned of said application, "alentin usi filed an opposition thereto onDecember $, amending Act -o# (7$# If by a legal fiction, "alentin usi had ac*u*uestion by a grant of the tate, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had becproperty, at least by presumption, of "alentin usi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands# in selling the land in *uestion to Angela 3a4on, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over whlonger any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela 3a4on di

ac*uire any right#

The Director of Lands contends that the land in *uestion being of the public domainappellee cannot maintain an action to recover possession thereof#

If, as above stated, the land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already become, bof law, private property of the plaintiff, there lac=ing only the judicial sanction of his title, "alenright to bring an action to recover the possession thereof and hold it#

For the foregoing, and no error having been found in the judgment appealed from the saaffirmed in all its parts, without special pronouncement as to costs# o ordered#

REP VS CA AND NAGUIT

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari u $e% Rule -0 "# the ,22> Rules "# Ci5il P%"ce$u%%e5ie4 theDecision , "# the Si@th Di5isi" "# the C"u%t "# A''eals $ate$ ul+ ,18 1=== i CA0,21,. The a''ellate c"u%t a##i%)e$ the $ecisi" s "# ("th the Re!i" al T%ial C"u%t RTC/81 B%

ali("8 A?la $ate$ Fe(%ua%+ 1 8 ,2228 a $ the >th Mu ici'al Ci%cuit T%ial C"u%t MCTC/ "# I(aA?la $ate$ Fe(%ua%+ , 8 ,22 8 4hich !%a te$ the a''licati" #"% %e!ist%ati" "# a 'a%cel "# laNa!uit Na!uit/8 the %es'" $e t he%ei .

The facts are as follows1

;n anuary 8, &((', -aguit, a Filipino citi4en, of legal age and married to +anolito # -aguit, filed wiIbajay:-abas, A=lan, a petition for registration of title of a parcel of land situated in ?rgy# Knion, -aparcel of land is designated as Lot -o# &))$(, Cad# >8%:D, -abas Cadastre, A :)>(, aarea of '&,'>$ s*uare meters# The application see=s judicial confirmation of respondent9s imperfaforesaid land#aT5AC

;n February 7), &((8, the court held initial hearing on the application# The public prosecutor, apgovernment, and ose Angeles, representing the heirs of 3ustico Angeles, opposed the petition# ;however, the heirs of 3ustico Angeles filed a formal opposition to the petition# Also on February 7issued an order of general default against the whole world e6cept as to the heirs of 3ustico Angovernment#

The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel of land was originally declared for ta6ationname of 3amon Krbano .Krbano/ in &($8 under Ta6 Declaration -o# '%%% until &(($ ;n uly (, &(e6ecuted a Deed of uitclaim in favor of the heirs of Honorato +aming .+aming/, wherein he re
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rights to the subject property and confirmed the sale made by his father to +aming sometime in &(88 or &(8, the +CTC rendered a decision ordering that the subject parcel bebrought under the operation of the roperty 3egistration Decree or residential Decree . #D#/ -o# &87( and that the titlethereto registered and confirmed in the name of -aguit# <

The 3epublic of the hilippines .3epublic/, thru the ;ffice of the olicitor @eneral .; @/, filed a motion forreconsideration# The ; @ stressed that the land applied for was declared alienable and disposable only on ;ctober &8,&(%), per the certification from 3egional 56ecutive Director 3aoul T# @eollegue of the Department of 5nvironment and-atural 3esources, 3egion "I# > However, the court denied the motion for reconsideration in an order dated February &%,&((%#%

Thereafter, the 3epublic appealed the decision and the order of the +CTC to the 3TC, Ralibo, A=lan, ?ranch %# ;nFebruary 7 3ules of Civil rocedure# ;nuly &7, 7))), the appellate court rendered a decision dismissing the petition filed by the 3epublic and affirmedin toto the

assailed decision of the 3TC#

Hence, the present petition for review raising a pure *uestion of law was filed by the 3epublic on eptember $, 7)))#&)

The ; @ assails the decision of the Court of Appeals contending that the appellate court gravely erred in holding thatthere is no need for the government9s prior release of the subject lot from the public domain before it can be consideredalienable or disposable within the meaning of #D# -o# &87(, and that -aguit had been in possession of Lot -o# &))$( inthe concept of owner for the re*uired period#&&

Hence, the central *uestion for resolution is whether it is necessary under ection &$.&/ of the roperty# 3egistrationDecree that the subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable before the applicant9s possession under abonafide claim of ownership could even start#

The ; @ invo=es our holding in+irector of -ands v. #ntermediate %ppellate Court &7 in arguing that the property which isin open, continuous and e6clusive possession must first be alienable# ince the subject land was declared alienable onlyon ;ctober &8, &(%), -aguit could not have maintained abona fide claim of ownership since une &7, &($8, as re*uiredby ection &$ of the roperty 3egistration Decree, since prior to &(%), the land was not alienable or disposable, the ; @argues#

ection &$ of the roperty 3egistration Decree, governing original registration proceedings, bears close e6amination# Ite6pressly provides1

5CTI;- &$#0ho may apply # The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instancean application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authori4edrepresentatives1

.&/those who by themselves or through their predecessors:in:interest have been in open,continuous, e6clusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and

disposable lands of the public domain under abona fide claim ownership since une &7, &($8, or earlier#

.7/Those who have ac*uired ownership over private lands by prescription undeprovisions of e6isting laws#A 5cHI

666 666 666

There are three obvious re*uisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under ecthe property in *uestion is alienable and disposable land of the public domain0 that the applicants bthrough their predecessors:in:interest have been in open, continuous, e6clusive and notorious poccupation, and0 that such possession is under abona fide claim of ownership since une &7, &($8 o

etitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land shouldbeen established since une &7, &($8 or earlier# This is not borne out by the plain meaning of ec

une &7, &($8,2 as used in the provision, *ualifies its antecedent phrase 2under a bonafide clai@enerally spea=ing, *ualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which theyassociated, and not those distantly or remotely located#&' %d pro'imum antecedents fiat relation nissentencia#

?esides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioner9s position# Abamendment, the rule would be, adopting the ; @9s view, that all lands of the public domain declared alienable or disposable before une &7, &($8 would not be susceptible to original registthe length of unchallenged possession by the occupant# uch interpretation renders paragraph .&virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to agricultural lands as alienable and disposable# The unreasonableness of the situation would even considering that before une &7, &($8, the hilippines was not yet even considered an independent

Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of ection &$.&/ is that it merely re*uires the prope

registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is fiat the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienatiothe presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utili4e the property0 hence, theits ownership in the tate irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith# property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then thereintention on the part of the tate to abdicate its e6clusive prerogative over the property#

This reading aligns conformably with our holding in(epublic v. Court of %ppeals# &$ Therein, the Cou2to prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant mue6istence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an e6ecuadministrative action0 investigation reports of ?ureau of Lands investigators0 and a legislative act othat case, the subject land had been certified by the D5-3 as alienable and disposable in &(%), tconcluded that the alienable status of the land, compounded by the established fact that therein reoccupied the land even before &(7>, sufficed to allow the application for registration of the said proat bar, even the petitioner admits that the subject property was released and certified as withindisposable 4one in &(%) by the D5-3# &<

This case is distinguishable from*racewell v. Court of %ppeals, &> wherein the Court noted that whilehad been in possession since &()%, it was only in &(>7 that the lands in *uestion were classified adisposable# Thus, the bid at registration therein did not succeed# In*racewell , the claimant had filed hin &(


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does not apply#

A different rule obtains for forest lands, &% such as those which form part of a reservation for provincial par= purposes&(the possession of which cannot ripen into ownership#7) It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forestland cannot be owned by private persons# As held in)alomo v. Court of %ppeals, 7& forestland is not registrable andpossession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands are reclassified andconsidered disposable and alienable# 77 In the case at bar, the property in *uestion was undisputedly classified asdisposable and alienable0 hence, the ruling in)alomo is inapplicable, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals# 7'

It must be noted that the present case was decided by the lower courts on the basis of ection &$.&/ of the roperty3egistration Decree, which pertains to original registration through ordinary registration proceedings# The right to file theapplication for registration derives from abona fide claim of ownership going bac= to une &7, &($8 or earlier, by reason ofthe claimant9s open, continuous, e6clusive and notorious possession of alienable and disposable lands of the public

domain#A similar right is given under ection $%.b/ of the ublic Land Act, which reads1

ec# $%#The following described citi4ens of the hilippines, occupying lands of the public domain orclaiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but those titles have not been perfected orcompleted, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located forconfirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land3egistration Act, to wit1

666 666 666

.b/Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,continuous, e6clusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the publicdomain, under abona fide claim of ac*uisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediatelypreceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title e6cept when prevented by war orforce

majeure# These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a@overnment grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter#

Ehen the ublic Land Act was first promulgated in &('' preclude the application forregistration of alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which commenced only after une &7, &($8P It didnot, considering ection &$.7/ of the roperty 3egistration Decree, which governs and authori4es the application of 2those who have ac*uired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of e6isting laws#2

rescription is one of the modes of ac*uiring ownership under the Civil Code# 78 There is a consistent jurisprudential rulethat properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous

and e6clusive possession of at least thirty .')/ years#7< Eith such conversion, such property may nthe contemplation of 2private lands2 under ection &$.7/, and thus susceptible to registration byac*uired ownership through prescription# Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land cdate later than une &7, &($8, and such possession being been open, continuous and e6clupossessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of ection &$.7/ of the roperty 3egistrat

The land in *uestion was found to be local in nature, it having been planted with coconut trees nowold#7> The inherent nature of the land but confirms its certification in &(%) as alienable, hence agrno impediment to the application of ection &$.&/ of the roperty 3egistration Decree, as correctlythe lower courts#

The ; @ posits that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that -aguit had been in possession in towner for the re*uired period# The argument begs the *uestion# It is again hinged on the assertion

be unfounded:that there could have been nobona fide claim of ownership prior to &(%), when the sudeclared alienable or disposable#

Ee find no reason to disturb the conclusion of both the 3TC and the Court of Appeals that -aguit happly for registration owing to the continuous possession by her and her predecessors:in:interest of&($8# The basis of such conclusion is primarily factual, and the Court generally respects the factuby lower courts# -otably, possession since &($8 was established through proof of the e6istence of 8trees at the time -aguit purchased the property as well as ta6 declarations e6ecuted by Krbano in &ta6 declarations and realty ta6 payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, neare good indicia of the possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paproperty that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession# They constitute at least proohas a claim of title over the property# The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for tmanifests not only one9s sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces hisagainst the tate and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed re@overnment# uch an act strengthens one9sbona fideclaim of ac*uisition of ownership#7%

Considering that the possession of the subject parcel of land by the respondent can be traced bac=predecessors:in:interest which commenced since &($8 or for almost fifty .8)/ years, it is indeed beof doubt that she has ac*uired title thereto which may be properly brought under the operationsystem# That she has been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner, open, continuous without any opposition from any private person and the government itself ma=es her right thesettled and deserving of protection under the law#

EH535F;35, foregoing premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated uhereby AFFI3+5D# -o costs#

; ;3D535D#

REPUBLIC VS 7ERBIETOBe#"%e this C"u%t is a Petiti" #"% Re5ie4 "Certiorari 8 u $e% Rule -0 "# the ,22> Rules "# Ci5isee?i ! the %e5e%sal "# the Decisi" "# the C"u%t "# A''eals i CA G.R. CV N". > 108 $ate$1==18 , 4hich a##i%)e$ the u$!)e t "# the Mu ici'al T%ial C"u%t MTC/ "# C" s"laci" 8 CeDece)(e% ,2228 1 !%a ti ! the a''licati" #"% la $ %e!ist%ati" "# the %es'" $e ts.

3espondents in the present etition are the Herbieto brothers, eremias and David, who filed with eptember &((%, a single application for registration of two parcels of land, Lots -o# %$77 and
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Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu . ubject Lots/# They claimed to be owners in fee simple of the ubject Lots, which theypurchased from their parents, spouses @regorio Herbieto and Isabel ;watan, on 78 une &(> with only petitioner3epublic opposing the application for registration of the ubject Lots# The respondents, through their counsel, proceededto offer and mar= documentary evidence to prove jurisdictional facts# The +TC commissioned the Cler= of Court to receivefurther evidence from the respondents and to submit a 3eport to the +TC after ') days#

;n 7& December &(((, the +TC promulgated its udgment ordering the registration and confirmation of the title ofrespondent eremias over Lot -o# %$77 and of respondent David over Lot -o# %$7'# It subse*uently issued an ;rder on)7 February 7))) declaring its udgment, dated 7& December &(((, final and e6ecutory, and directing the Administrator ofthe Land 3egistration Authority .L3A/ to issue a decree of registration for the ubject Lots#&%

etitioner 3epublic appealed the +TC udgment, dated 7& December &(((, to the Court of Appeals#,2 The Court ofAppeals, in its Decision, dated 77 -ovember 7))7, affirmed the appealed +TC udgment reasoning thus1

In the case at bar, there can be no *uestion that the land sought to be registered has been classifiedas within the alienable and disposable 4one since une 78, &(


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#

urisdiction

Addressing first the issue of jurisdiction, this Court finds that the +TC had no jurisdiction to proceed with and hear theapplication for registration filed by the respondents but for reasons different from those presented by petitioner 3epublic#

A# he misjoinder of causes of action and parties does not affect the jurisdiction of the " C to hear and proceed withrespondents2 application for registration#

3espondents filed a single application for registration of the ubject Lots even though they were not co:owners#3espondents eremias and David were actually see=ing the individual and separate registration of Lots -o# %$77 and%$7', respectively#C 5HcT

etitioner 3epublic believes that the procedural irregularity committed by the respondents was fatal to their case, depriving

the +TC of jurisdiction to proceed with and hear their application for registration of the ubject Lots, based on this Court9spronouncement in+irector of -ands v. Court of %ppeals, 77 to wit1

# # # In view of these multiple omissions which constitute non:compliance with the above:citedsections of the Act, Ee rule that said defects have not invested the Court with the authority or jurisdiction to proceed with the case because the manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction asprescribed by the statute which is mandatory has not been strictly followed, thereby rendering allproceedings utterly null and void#

This Court, however, disagrees with petitioner 3epublic in this regard# This procedural lapse committed by therespondents should not affect the jurisdiction of the +TC to proceed with and hear their application for registration of the

ubject Lots#

The roperty 3egistration Decree7' recogni4es and e6pressly allows the following situations1 .&/ the filing of a singleapplication by several applicants for as long as they are co:owners of the parcel of land sought to be registered07$ and .7/the filing of a single application for registration of several parcels of land provided that the same are located within thesame province# 78 The roperty 3egistration Decree is silent, however, as to the present situation wherein two applicantsfiled a single application for two parcels of land, but are see=ing the separate and individual registration of the parcels ofland in their respective names#

ince the roperty 3egistration Decree failed to provide for such a situation, then this Court refers to the 3ules of Court todetermine the proper course of action# ection '$ of the roperty 3egistration Decree itself provides that, 2MtNhe 3ules ofCourt shall, insofar as not inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree, be applicable to land registration and cadastralcases by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient#2

Considering every application for land registration filed in strict accordance with the roperty 3egistration Decree as asingle cause of action, then the defect in the joint application for registration filed by the respondents with the +TCconstitutes a misjoinder of causes of action and parties# Instead of a single or joint application for registration, respondents

eremias and David, more appropriately, should have filed separate applications for registration of Lots -o# %$77 and%$7', respectively#

+isjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a *uestion of jurisdiction of the court to hear and proceed with thecase#7< They are not even accepted grounds for dismissal thereof#7> Instead, under the 3ules of Court, the misjoinder ofcauses of action and parties involve an implied admission of the court9s jurisdiction# It ac=nowledges the power of thecourt, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or on its own initiative, to order the severance of the misjoined causeof action, to be proceeded with separately .in case of misjoinder of causes of action/0 andGor the dropping of a party andthe severance of any claim against said misjoined party, also to be proceeded with separately .in case of misjoinder of

parties/#

The misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present etition may have been corrected by propio or on motion of the petitioner 3epublic# It is regrettable, however, that the +TC failed to dete when the application for registration was still pending before it0 and more regrettable that the petitnot call the attention of the +TC to the fact by filing a motion for severance of the causes of actraising the issue of misjoinder only before this Court#

?#(espondents, however, failed to comply with the publication requirements mandated by th(egistration +ecree, thus, the " C was not invested with jurisdiction as a land registration c

Although the misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present etition did not affect the ju+TC over the land registration proceeding, this Court, nonetheless, has discovered a defect in the pu

-otice of Initial Hearing, which bars the +TC from assuming jurisdiction to hear and proceed wapplication for registration#A DT5a

A land registration case is a proceedingin rem, 7% and jurisdictionin rem cannot be ac*uired unleconstructive sei4ure of the land through publication and service of notice#7(

ection 7' of the roperty 3egistration Decree re*uires that the public be given -otice of the Initial application for land registration by means of .&/ publication0 .7/ mailing0 and .'/ posting# ublicatInitial Hearing shall be made in the following manner1

?y publication#

Kpon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the CommissiLand 3egistration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the ;ff@a4ette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the hilippines1)rovided, howevethat the publication in the ;fficial @a4ette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction up

court# aid notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in theinvolved including the adjoining owners so far as =nown, and 2to all whom it may coaid notice shall also re*uire all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date

time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted#C5DHTa

5ven as this Court concedes that the afore*uoted ection 7'.&/ of the roperty 3egistration Decprovides that publication in the ;fficial @a4ette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon thecourt, it still affirms its declaration in+irector of -ands v. Court of %ppeals = that publication in a ngeneral circulation is mandatory for the land registration court to validly confirm and register the tior applicants# That ection 7' of the roperty 3egistration Decree enumerated and describere*uirements of publication, mailing, and posting of the -otice of Initial Hearing, then all sucincluding publication of the -otice in a newspaper of general circulation, is essential and imperativstrictly complied with# In the same case, this Court e6pounded on the reason behind the compulsothe -otice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation, thus

It may be as=ed why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be demandatory when the law already re*uires notice by publication in the ;fficial @a4ette aas by mailing and posting, all of which have already been complied with in the case at The reason is due process and the reality that the ;fficial @a4ette is not as widely read circulated as newspaper and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the nopublished therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all# Additionallyparties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any otheestate# In sum, the all encompassingin rem nature of land registration cases, t
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conse*uences of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective of disseminatingthe notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the re*uirementsfor publication, mailing and posting#,

In the instant etition, the initial hearing was set by the +TC, and was in fact held, on )' eptember &((( at %1') a#m#Ehile the -otice thereof was printed in the issue of the ;fficial @a4ette, dated )7 August &(((, and officially released on&) August &(((, it was published in he 1reeman *anat $ews , a daily newspaper printed in Cebu City and circulated inthe province and cities of Cebu and in the rest of "isayas and +indanao, only on &( December &(((, more than threemonths after the initial hearing#

Indubitably, such publication of the -otice, way after the date of the initial hearing, would already be worthless andineffective# Ehoever read the -otice as it was published inhe 1reeman *anat $ews and had a claim to the ubject Lots was deprived of due process for it was already too late for him to appear before the +TC on the day of the initial hearing

to oppose respondents9 application for registration, and to present his claim and evidence in support of such claim# Eorse,as the -otice itself states, should the claimant:oppositor fail to appear before the +TC on the date of initial hearing, he would be in default and would forever be barred from contesting respondents9 application for registration and even theregistration decree that may be issued pursuant thereto# In fact, the +TC did issue an ;rder of pecial Default on )'

eptember &(((#

The late publication of the -otice of Initial Hearing in the newspaper of general circulation is tantamount to no publicationat all, having the same ultimate result# ;wing to such defect in the publication of the -otice, the +TC failed toconstructively sei4e the ubject Lots and to ac*uire jurisdiction over respondents9 application for registration thereof#Therefore, the +TC udgment, dated 7& December &(((, ordering the registration and confirmation of the title ofrespondents eremias and David over Lots -o# %$77 and %$7', respectively0 as well as the +TC ;rder, dated )7 February7))), declaring its udgment of 7& December &((( final and e6ecutory, and directing the L3A Administrator to issue adecree of registration for the ubject Lots, are both null and void for having been issued by the +TC without jurisdiction#

##

)eriod of )ossession

(espondents failed to comply with the required period of possession of the Subject -ots for the judicial confirmationor legali3ation of imperfect or incomplete title#

Ehile this Court has already found that the +TC did not have jurisdiction to hear and proceed with respondents9application for registration, this Court nevertheless deems it necessary to resolve the legal issue on the re*uired period ofpossession for ac*uiring title to public land#TA5Dc

3espondents9 application filed with the +TC did not state the statutory basis for their title to the ubject Lots# They onlyalleged therein that they obtained title to the ubject Lots by purchase from their parents, spouses @regorio Herbieto andIsabel ;watan, on 78 une &(>'N#

.b/Those who by themselves or through their predecessors:in:interest have beeopen, continuous, e6clusive, and notorious possession and occupatioagricultural lands of the public domain, under abona fide claim ac*uisition of ownership, since une &7, &($8, or earlier, immepreceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title, when prevented by war orforce majeure# These shall be conclusivpresumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a @overngrant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisiothis chapter#TIA5ac

.c/+embers of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or throughpredecessors:in:interest have been in open, continuous, e6clusive notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domsuitable to agriculture whether disposable or not, under abona fide claiof ownership since une &7, &($8 shall be entitled to the rights gransubsection .b/ hereof#

-ot being members of any national cultural minorities, respondents may only be entitled to judicialegali4ation of their imperfect or incomplete title under ection $%.b/ of the ublic Land Act, as
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$%.b/, as amended, now re*uires adverse possession of the land since &7 une &($8 or earlier# In the present etition, theubject Lots became alienable and disposable only on 78 une &((7, Cad# &8&, containing an area of >,)$>,' s*uare meters .subject property/, situated Cagayan# ;n &( uly &('%, pursuant to said Decree, the 3egister of Deeds of Cagayan issued ;rigiof Title -o# &&8%8 8 .;CT -o# &&8%8/ in the name of spouses Carag#DcIC5a

;n 7 uly &(87, ;CT -o# &&8%8 was cancelled to discharge the encumbrance e6pressly stated'%&(7%# Two transfer certificates of title were issued1 Transfer Certificate of Title -o# T:&7>>,< issued iof the rovince of Cagayan, covering Lot 7$>7:? consisting of &)),))) s*uare meters and TransfeTitle -o# T:&7>%, > issued in the name of the private respondents, covering Lot 7$>7:A consistins*uare meters#

;n &( +ay &(($, ?ienvenida Taguiam "da# De Dayag and others filed with the 3egional ;ffice Department of 5nvironment and -atural 3esources .D5-3/, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, a letter:petition reD5-3 to initiate the filing of an action for the annulment of Decree -o# '%&(7% on the ground that not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property which was allegedly still classifat the time of the issuance of Decree -o# '%&(7%#5HTAC

The 3egional 56ecutive Director of the D5-3 created an investigating team to conduct ground vocular inspection of the subject property#

The investigating team reported that1

A/The portion of Lot 7$>7 Cad:&8& as shown in the lan prepared for spouses Caracovered under LC roject ':L of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, was found to be still withitimberland area at the time of the issuance of the Decree and ;#C#T# of the spouses AnCarag and "ictoria Turingan, and the same was only released as alienable and disposableFebruary 77, &(%7, as certified by K 5C ose @# olis of the -A+3IA on 7> +ay &(($

?/ etitioner ?ienvenida Taguiam "da# De Dayag and others have possessed and occupby themselves and thru their predecessors:in:interest the portion of Lot 7$>7 Cadcovered by LC roject ':L of LC +ap 7(((, since time immemorial#%

Thus, the investigating team claimed that 2a portion of Lot 7$>7 Cad:&8&2 was 2only released disposable on 77 February &(%72#

In a +emorandum dated ( eptember &((


14/23

the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate a'"%ti" of the subject property, which portion consists of 7,' and &(%> Constitutions#

Finally, it is clear that the issues raised in the Amended Complaint as well as those in the +otion todismiss are factual in nature and should be threshed out in the proper trial court in accordance with

ection &)& of the ublic Land Act# &$ .Citations omitted/

etitioner filed a motion for reconsideration# In its 78 eptember 7))7 3esolution, the Court of Appealsdenied the motion for reconsideration#Ic ADC

Hence, this petition#

The Issues

etitioner raises the following issues1

Ehether the allegations of the complaint clearly stated that the ordinary remedies of new trial,appeal, petition for relief and other appropriate remedies are no longer available0

7#Ehether the amended complaint clearly alleged the ground of lac= of jurisdiction0

'#Ehether the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the amended compand in the motion to dismiss0

$#Ehether the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan had jurisdiction to adjudicate a trtimberland in favor of respondent spouses Antonio Carag and "ictoria Turingan

8#Ehether the fact that the Director of Lands was a party to the original proceedings chthe nature of the land and granted jurisdiction to the then Court of First Insover the land0 AHaTc

#Ehether ection '% of Act -o# $(< is applicable in this case#

The Ruli ! "# the C"u%tEhile the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on procedural grounds, we will still because the complaint for annulment of decree has no merit#

Petitioner Complied wit Rule !" of t e Rules of Court

First, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to allege either of the grounds of e6trinsic jurisdiction in the complaint for annulment of decree#&8

Ee find otherwise# In its complaint and amended complaint, petitioner stated1

&In view of the fact that in &(') or in &('%, only the 56ecutive ?ranch of the @ovehad the authority and power to declassify or reclassify land of the public domain,the C"u%$i$ "t8 the%e#"%e8 ha5e the '"4e% a $ auth"%it+ t" a$6u$icate i #a5"% "# the s'"A t" i" Ca%a! a $ Vict"%ia Tu%i !a the sai$ t%act "# ti)(e%la $8 '"%ti" "# the1->1 Ca$ ,0,8 at the ti)e "# the issua ce "# the Dec%ee a $ the O%i!i al Ce%ti#icateTitle "# the sai$ s'"uses 0 and such adjudication andGor Decree and Title issued coveritimberland area is null and void ab initio considering the provisions of the &('8, &(>&(%> hilippine constitution#

666 666 666

&8#The issuance of Decree -o# '%&(7% and ;#C#T# -o# &&8%8 in the name ofAntonio Carag and "ictoria Turingan, and all the derivative titles thereto in the name Heirs and said spouses, specifically with respect to the inclusion thereto of timberlandby the then Court of First Instance .now the 3egional Trial Court/, and the 3egister of Dof Cagayan is patently illegal and erroneous for the reason that saidC"u%t a $ "%Re!iste% "# Dee$s "# Ca!a+a $i$ "t ha5e a + auth"%it+ "% 6u%is$icti" t" $ec%a$6u$icate the sai$ ti)(e%la $ a%ea "# L"t 1->1 Ca$ ,0, , conse*uently, the same are nand voidab initio, and of no force and effect whatsoever#&< .5mphasis supplied0 citatioomitted/CHDT5A

etitioner clearly alleged in the complaint and amended complaint that it was see=ing to annul Deon the ground of the trial court9s lac= of jurisdiction over the subject land, specifically over the which petitioner maintained was classified as timber land and was not alienable and disposable#

econd, the Court of Appeals also dismissed the complaint on the ground of petitioner9s failure 2ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longe
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In %ncheta v. %ncheta, &> we ruled1

In a case where a petition for annulment of judgment or final order of the 3TC filed under 3ule $> ofthe 3ules of Court is grounded on lac= of jurisdiction over the person of the defendantGrespondent orover the nature or subject of the action, the petitioner need not allege in the petition that the ordinaryremedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final order or judgment or appeal therefrom are nolonger available through no fault of her own# This is so because a judgment rendered or final orderissued by the 3TC without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any time eithercollaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action orproceeding whenever it is invo=ed, unless barred by laches#&%

ince petitioner9s complaint is grounded on lac= of jurisdiction over the subject o f the action, petitioner need not allege thatthe ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through

no fault of petitioner#Third, the Court of Appeals ruled that the issues raised in petitioner9s complaint were factual in nature and should bethreshed out in the proper trial court in accordance with ection &)& of the ublic Land Act#&(

ection of the 3ules of Court provides1

5C# ,' s*uaremeters of the subject property, outside of the disputed portion, were alienable and disposable in &(')# etitioner arguesthat in &(') or in &('%, only the 56ecutive ?ranch of the @overnment, not the trial courts, had the power to declassify orreclassify lands of the public domain#I5AHca

Lac= of jurisdiction, as a ground for annulment of judgment, refers to either lac= of jurisdiction over the person of thedefending party or over the subject matter of the claim#7) urisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and isdetermined by the statute in force at the time of the filing of the action#7&

Knder the panish regime, all Crown lands were per se alienable# In %ldecoa v. #nsular Government, 77 we ruled1

From the language of the foregoing provisions of law, it is deduced that, with the e6ception of thosecomprised within the mineral and timber 4one,all la $s "4 e$ (+ the State "% (+ the s"5e%ei!

ati" a%e 'u(lic i cha%acte%8 a $ 'e% se alie a(le and, provided they are not destined to theuse of the public in general or reserved by the @overnment in accordance with law, they may beac*uired by any private or juridical person # # #7' .5mphasis supplied/

Thus, unless specifically declared as mineral or forest 4one, or reserved by the tate for some public purpose inaccordance with law, all Crown lands were deemed alienable#

In this case, petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had been declared as mineral or reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law, during the panish regime or thereaclassification maps 7$ petitioner attached to the complaint also do not show that in &(') the disputepart of the forest 4one or reserved for some public purpose# The certification of the -ationa3esources Information Authority, dated 7> +ay &(($, contained no statement that the disputedeclared and classified as timber land#78 HcD aT

The law prevailing when Decree -o# '%&(7% was issued in &(') was Act -o# 7%>$,7< which provides1

5CTI;- $#

It is true that ection % of Act -o# 7%>$ opens to disposition only those lands which have been decdisposable# ection % provides1

5CTI;- %#;nly those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which hbeen officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which habeen reserved for public or *uasi:public uses, not appropriated by the @overnment,"%a + )a e% (ec")e '%i5ate '%"'e%t+8 "% th"se " 4hich a '%i5ate %i!ht auth"%i:ea $ %ec"! i:e$ (+ this Act "% a + "the% 5ali$ la4 )a+ (e clai)e$ , or which, having bereserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so# However, the @overnor:@eneral mareasons of public interest, declare lands of the public domain open to disposition beforsame have had their boundaries established or been surveyed, or may, for the same reasosuspend their concession or disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act Legislature# .5mphasis supplied/I5HDAT

However, ection % provides that lands which are already private lands, as well as lands on whicmay be made under any law, are not covered by the classification re*uirement in ection % fdisposition# This e6clusion in ection % recogni4es that during the panish regime, Crown laalie a(le unless falling under timber or mineral 4ones, or otherwise reserved for some puaccordance with law#

Clearly, with respect to lands e6cluded from the classification re*uirement in ection %, trial courtsadjudicate these lands to private parties# etitioner has not a lleged that the disputed portion had notproperty prior to the enactment of Act -o# 7%>$# -either has petitioner alleged that the disputed poron which a private right may be claimed under any e6isting law at that time#

In (epublic of the )h ilippines v. Court of %ppeals, 7> the 3epublic sought to annul the judgment of theInstance .CFI/ of 3i4al, sitting as a land registration court, because when the application for land rfiled in &(7> the land was alleged to be unclassified forest land# The 3epublic also alleged that theno jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was forest or agricultural land since the aulands was then vested in the Director of Lands as provided in Act -os# (7$# The Court ru
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Ee are inclined to agree with the respondent that it is legally doubtful if the authority of the @overnor@eneral to declare lands as alienable and disposable would apply to lands that have becomeprivate property or lands that have been impressed with a private right authori4ed and recogni4edby Act 7%>$ or any valid law# ?y e6press declaration of ection $8 .b/ of Act 7%>$ which is *uotedabove, those who have been in open, continuous, e6clusive and notorious possession andoccupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ac*uisition ofownership since uly 7% years ago, is nowfinal and beyond review#

The finality of the trial court9s decision is further recogni4ed in ection &, Article BII of the &('8 Constitution which

provides15CTI;- All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,

petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of thehilippines belong to the tate, and their disposition, e6ploitation, development, or utili4ation shall

be limited to citi4ens of the hilippines, or to corporations or associations at least si6ty per centumof the capital of which is owned by such citi4ens,su(6ect t" a + e@isti ! %i!ht8 !%a t8 lease8 "%c" cessi" at the ti)e "# the i au!u%ati" "# the G"5e% )e t esta(lishe$ u $e% thisC" stituti" . .5mphasis supplied/

Thus, even as the &('8 Constitution declared that all agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain belong tothe tate, it recogni4ed that these lands were*su(6ect t" a + e@isti ! %i!ht8 !%a t8 lease "% c" cessi" at the ti)e "#the i au!u%ati" "# the G"5e% )e t esta(lishe$ u $e% this C" stituti" *# 7( Ehen the Commonwealth @overnment was established under the &('8 Constitution, spouses Carag had already an e6isting right to the subject land, includingthe disputed portion, pursuant to Decree -o# '%&(7% issued in &(') by the trial court#IaA5HD

EH535F;35, we D5-O the petition# Ee DI +I petitioner 3epublic of the hilippines9 complaint for reversion,annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles for lac= of merit#

; ;3D535D#

DIA9 VS REPUBLIC

This is a lette% )"ti" '%a+i ! #"% %ec" si$e%ati" #"% the thi%$ ti)e/ "# the u e , 8 1==C"u%t $e +i ! the 'etiti" #"% %e5ie4 #ile$ (+ 'etiti" e% Fl"%e cia G. Dia:.

etitioner9s late mother, Flora @arcia .@arcia/, filed an application for registration of a vast tract oLaur, -ueva 5cija and alayan City in the then Court of First Instance .CFI/, ?ranch &, -ueva 5cija &(>/' in &(88# Thus, it was inalienable as it formed part of the p

ignificantly, on -ovember 7%, &(>8, this Court already ruled in+irector of -ands v. (eyes $ that tsubject of @arcia9s application was inalienable as it formed part of a military reservation# +oreoveossessory Information Title -o# 7&< .allegedly registered in the name of a certain +elecio adi

&%(8/, on which therein respondent ara a*ue Investment and Development Corporation anchoreland, was not proven# Accordingly, the decree of registration issued in its favor was declared null an

(eyes notwithstanding, the CFI ruled in @arcia9s favor in a decision8 dated uly &, &(%

The 3epublic eventually appealed the decision of the CFI to the Court of Appeals .CA/# In its February 7 the appellate court rset aside the decision of the CFI# The CA found that 3eyes was applicable to petitioner9s case asame property#

The CA observed that @arcia also traced her ownership of the land in *uestion to ossessory Infor7&


17/23

the tract of land subject of the amicable settlement was still within the military reservation#

;n April &, the CA issued an amended resolution .amended resolution/&' annulling the compromise agreemententered into between the parties# The relevant part of the dispositive portion of the resolution read1

ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolves to1

.&/# # #

.7/# # #

.'/# # #

.$/# # #

.8/# # #

.


18/23

I only as= that the upreme Court endeavor to ensure that cases such as mine do not happenagain, so that the ne6t person who see=s justice will not e6perience the pain and frustration that Isuffered under our judicial system#

Than= you, and more power to you, I3# .5mphasis in the original/#

The language of petitioner9s letterGmotion is unmista=able# It is a thinly veiled threat precisely worded and calculated tointimidate this Court into giving in to her demands to honor an otherwise legally infirm compromise agreement, at the ris=of being vilified in the media and by the public#

This Court will not be cowed into submission# Ee deny petitioner9s letterGthird motion for reconsideration#HCa5A

#PP$IC#%I$IT& O' R(&()

The Court agrees with the 3epublic9s position that(eyes is applicable to this case#

To constituteres judicata, the following elements must concur1

.&/the former judgment or order must be final0

.7/the judgment or order must be on the merits0

.'/it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties0 and

.$/there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and ofcauses of action#7$

The first three re*uisites have undoubtedly been complied with# However, petitioner ta=es e6ception to the fourth re*uisite,particularly on the issue of identity of parties# In her petition for review filed in this Court, she contends that since theapplicants in the two cases are different, the merits of the two cases should, accordingly, be determined independently ofeach other#78

This contention is erroneous#

The facts obtaining in this case closely resemble those in %quino v. +irector of -ands. 7< In that case, uintin Ta edoendeavored to secure title to a considerable tract of land by virtue of his possession thereof under CA &$ Ehen the caseeventually reached this Court, we affirmed the trial court9s decision to dismiss the proceedings as the property in *uestion was part of the public domain# uintin9s successor:in:interest, Florencia Ta edo, who despite =nowledge of theproceedings did not participate therein, thereafter sold the same property to ?enigno # A*uino# The latter sought to haveit registered in his name# The *uestion in that case, as well as in this one, was whether our decision in the case in whichanother person was the applicant constitutedres judicata as against his successors:in:interest#

Ee ruled there, and we so rule now, that in registration cases filed under the provisions of the ublic Land Act for the judicial confirmation of an incomplete and imperfect title, an order dismissing an application for registration and declaringthe land as part of the public domain constitutesres judicata, not only against the adverse claimant, but also againstallpersons#7>

Ee also declared in %quinothat1

From another point of view, the decision in the first action has become the 2law of the case2 or atleast falls within the rule ofstare decisis. That adjudication should be followed unless manifestlyerroneous# It was ta=en and should be ta=en as the authoritative view of the highest tribunal in the

hilippines# It is indispensable to the due administration of justice especially by a court of last resortthat a *uestion once deliberately e6amined and decided should be considered as settled and closedto further argument# # # #7% aIcCTA

?e that as it may, the fact is that, even before the CFI came out with its decision in favor of petit&(%&, this Court, in(eyes, already made an earlier ruling on -ovember 7%, &(>8 that the dispuinalienable as it formed part of a military reservation# Thus, petitioner9s argument that the findingscourt on her registrable title are binding on us on the principle that findings of fact of lower courgreat respect and bind even this Court is untenable# 3ather, it was incumbent upon the courta quothis Court9s ruling in 3eyes, and not the other way around#

However, despite having been apprised of the Court9s findings in(eyes .which should have been a matnotice in the first place/, the trial court still insisted on its divergent finding and disregarded the C(eyes , declaring the subject land as forming part of a military reservation, and thus outside the comm

?y not applying our ruling in(eyes, the trial judge virtually nullified the decision of this Court and with grave abuse of discretion#7( -otably, a judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion is void

e6ist in legal contemplation# ') All lower courts, especially the trial court concerned in this case, ought to be reminded that it is ththe decisions of the upreme Court# A conduct becoming of inferior courts demands a conscious aposition they occupy in the interrelation and operation of our judicial system# As elo*uently declarL# 3eyes, 2There is only one upreme Court from whose decision all other courts should ta=e their

ACHUISITION PRIVATE RIG7TS

etitioner, however, argues that roclamation 7'> itself recogni4es that its effectivit

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