Lookout issue 2 - ukpandi.com Documents/2018/UK... · industry. Today, ships’ bridges are equipped with an array of electronic devices, including Today, ships’ bridges are equipped

ISSUE 2 / 2018

Avoiding fishing vessels at sea

“A collision can ruin your day”

Master/Pilot exchange

Gamification

LOOKOUTNavigating the complex world of P&I insurance for Japanese Members

EDITORIAL

2 Lookout Issue 2 – 2018

LOOKOUTLookout is a bi-annual newsletter fromthe UK P&I Club that collates the mostrelevant and topical content fromacross the Club’s global network andshares it with our Japanese Members.It covers subjects such as peopleclaims, loss prevention, defence andindustry specific items.

The information in this newsletter isnot legal advice and should not berelied upon as such.

CONTENTS

Welcome 2-3

Avoiding fishing vessels at sea 4-6

“A collision can ruin your day” 7-9

The Master/Pilot exchange 10-11

Gamification 12-13

Expertise and experience 14-15

Global network 16

George DevereeseSenior Loss Prevention Executive

George is ex Royal Navy with a certificate ofcompetency equivalent to that achieved in theMerchant Navy and has extensive ship handlingexperience in a number of RN hull types. He isqualified as Company Security Officer, ISM, ISPS &ISO 14001 lead auditor and prior to joining UKClub was employed as deputy safety and securitymanager. He also completed a 6 month training

contract in the London office with LS1 and Underwriting in 2013.

Articles: Avoiding fishing vessels at sea and Gamification

Captain David NicholSenior Loss Prevention Executive

David is a Master Mariner, joining Thomas Miller inJune 2014. After leaving the sea, he became aclaims manager with a Piraeus based P&Icorrespondent for two years before joining a marinesurveying consultancy. In 1997, David establishedhis own consultancy, with the majority of work beingP&I related. From 2010 until joining Thomas Miller,he was a claims executive with another P&I Club,

handling a wide variety of P&I and FD&D claims as well as being activelyinvolved in their Loss Prevention initiatives.

Article: “A collision can ruin your day”

Stuart EdmonstonLoss Prevention Director

Stuart, a Master Mariner, joined Thomas Miller’sLoss Prevention department in 2014. Prior to thishe worked as casualty investigator for a leadingshipping law firm and was at sea on a variety ofdifferent ship types including crude oil tankers,freight ferries, passenger ships and offshore drillingunits, where he sailed as Barge Master.

Article: The Master/Pilot exchange

THE AUTHORS

In one incident alone, the collisionbetween the 164,000-dwt Sanchi (built2008) and the 76,000-dwt CF Crystal(built 2011) claimed 32 seafarers’ lives.After weather, groundings and fires orexplosions, collisions are reported to bethe fourth most common cause ofships’ total losses.

An over-reliance on technology is oftencited as being responsible for collisions.In other cases, the hazards of fatigue,distraction or simple human error areoften identified and documented.Asthere is an increasing focus on crewsafety at sea, what is evident is yet morecan still and should be done in terms oftraining and keeping crews alert andsafe from collisions.

In this edition of Lookout, we examinethe subject of collision avoidance fromthree key aspects. Firstly, GeorgeDevereese, Senior Loss PreventionExecutive, highlights the wider probleminvolving navigation close to fishingvessels and gives some helpful guidance forMasters and their Bridge teams.Secondly,David Nichol, Senior Loss PreventionExecutive at UK P&I Club, assesses thelessons learnt from two reported collisionsthat were recently investigated by theUKMAIB.Thirdly, Stuart Edmonston,Loss Prevention Director at UK P&IClub,and Captain John Simpson,Directorat Solis Marine,discuss the need for goodPilot–Bridge communications,which areessential as of part of passage planning forthe ship to operate safely, particularly

Issue 2 – 2018 Lookout 3

when piloting waters where hazards areat close range and reaction times arelimited. It should be remembered thatthe presence of a pilot on board does notrelieve the master or the crew of theirresponsibility for the safe navigation ofthe ship, and therefore, all members ofthe bridge team contribute to effectiveBridge Resource Management.

Finally, in “Risk Ahoy”, we discuss how“gamification” has developed and isnow helping to raise risk awarenessamong seafarers and make the shippingindustry a safer working environment.

EDITORIAL

We welcome any comments anddiscussion you wish to share with uson the topics covered here, which wehope you will find of interest andbenefit.We would also be interestedto hear from you on topics that youwould like to read in future editions.You can email your suggestions [email protected] �

Masaki OiwaThe Representative in Japan

Paul SessionsUK P&I Club Regional Director for Japan

よよううここそそ

Modern technology has, in many ways, contributed to increased safety in the shippingindustry. Today, ships’ bridges are equipped with an array of electronic devices, including ARPA, AIS and ECDIS. Yet, in spite of all the sophisticated gadgetry, ‘collision at sea’remains one of the biggest risks to crew, property and the environment.


COLLISION FOCUS

The modern Bridge of a cargo vessel isdesigned for ease of use by the Officerof the Watch (OOW). All equipment isforward facing, enabling a constant lookout to be achieved at all times, however,recently the Club has seen a rise in thenumber of collisions with fishingvessels. To combat this trend the Clubhas produced a Risk Focus publication:Reducing the Risk of Collisions withFishing Vessels, which aims toreacquaint the Officer of the Watchwith the characteristics of the mostcommon type of fishing vessels seen.The booklet also includes case studiesof when incidents with fishing vesselsoccurred, which it is hoped willpromote lively on board discussions forcontinued education.

The range of equipment that fishermendeploy to catch fish is almost as variedas the fish themselves, but there are a number of common fishing methods that are used. These methods, together withthe lights and shapes that should beexhibited, the likely position of the gear in relation to the boat and typical fishing manoeuvres, are explained in detail inour Risk Focus. During the PassagePlanning process, it may be worthcontacting the vessel’s local agent or the local harbourmaster, to enquire whether there are any particular fishing-relateddangers to be considered whenapproaching a particular region or port.During calm weather, extra vigilance isrequired as this is the time when manysmall fishing vessels will go to sea.

The nature of fishing

• Fishing boats get their cargo at sea sotheir main focus is on catching fish

• Fishermen generally do not receive awage, but are paid a share of theproceeds of the voyage

• Fishing vessels often operate withminimal crew

• Fishermen are sometimes poorlyqualified

• Fishing vessels often do not showcorrect lights or day shapes

• Fishing vessels often operate inchannels and harbour approaches

How things should be

The International Regulations forPreventing Collisions at Sea (1972)(“COLREGS”) specify lights ordaytime signals that should be shownby fishing vessels engaged in differenttypes of fishing, and which vessels haveright of way under differingcircumstances. The term “vesselengaged in fishing” means any vesselfishing with nets, lines, trawls or otherfishing apparatus which restrictmanoeuvrability, but does not include avessel fishing with trolling lines orother fishing apparatus which does notrestrict manoeuvrability.

In general, both sailing boats and powerdriven vessels should give way to vesselsengaged in fishing. Exceptions to thisrule include:

• A vessel engaged in fishing shall notimpede the passage of any othervessel navigating within a narrowchannel or fairway

• For Traffic Separation Zones:

- A vessel engaged in fishing shallnot impede the passage of anyvessel following a traffic lane

- A vessel other than a crossing vesselor a vessel joining or leaving a lane, shall not normally enter a separation zone or cross a separation line,except to engage in fishing withina separation zone

• A vessel engaged in fishing whenunderway shall, so far as possible,keep out of the way of:

- A vessel not under command

- A vessel restricted in her ability to manoeuvre

How things often are

Although the COLREGS shouldtechnically apply to all vessels of allMember States, they are very oftenoverlooked or ignored. On small vesselsin some regions of the world, it iscommon to have an unqualified skipperand crew who know little about safenavigation. Remember, many of thesefishermen are poor, ill-educated anddesperate to make a living. Safety isoften a secondary concern.

What you may encounter is a numberof unlit or poorly lit small vessels, withno radar reflectors, no lookout, gearstretching out to an unknown distanceand unknown direction, and workingclose to or within the confines of achannel or harbour approach.

Fishing methods and gear

Following are some examples of thetype of vessels that may be encountered.A more exhaustive list is included inthe full Risk Focus publication –‘Reducing the Risk of Collisions withFishing Vessels’, available to downloadfrom the UK P&I Club’s website.

Avoiding fishing vessels at seaGeorge Devereese, Senior Loss Prevention Executive at UK P&I Club, looks atreducing the risks of collisions with fishing vessels.


COLLISION FOCUS

Day shape

Optionalunder 50m

AsternAhead

Warp length = approx3 x depth of water

5-150m

40-200m8-30m

15-60m

8-20m

Pursing wire

Floats

Purse rings

Day shape

Cone displayed ifgear extends >150m

AsternAhead

Mobile or towed gear

This category includes, among others,trawls and dredges. The primarycharacteristic is that the gear is draggedthrough the water and is not attached tothe sea bed.

Main safety issues

• Manoeuvrability is restricted during allparts of the operation

• Vessel should display a green light over awhite light

• Gear is generally astern of the vessel

• Safe passing distance (astern) is at least 250m and may be more for a large vessel

Encircling gear

These methods rely on surrounding the fisheither with a wall of netting which is thenclosed at the bottom and hauled in (purseseining), or with ropes that herd the fishacross the sea bed towards the net that scoops them up (anchor seining, fly dragging).

Main safety issues


• Vessel should display alternately flashingyellow lights

• Safe passing distance is at least 500mfrom the vessel and may be more for alarge vessel


COLLISION FOCUS

Marker buoy

Main line orback line

Snood or dropper

Anchor

2-3 x depthof water

Day shape


AsternAhead

Day shape


AsternAhead

200-2500m

5-15m

Passive mobile gear

Here the gear is mobile but is not towed byengine power, but drifts with the tide orwind. This category includes drift nets,surface longlines and squid jigging. Thesegears may extend very long distances fromthe boat.

Main safety issues


• Vessel should display a red light over awhite light

• Gear may extend on the surface for verylong distances from the vessel

• Gear will usually be astern of the vesselwhile being set and ahead of the vesselwhen being hauled

Fixed or static gear

These types of gear are generally fixed tothe seabed by anchors. They rely either onbait to attract the fish to the gear (hook andline, pots and traps), or on fish becomingentangled in the mesh of the nets (gill netsor tangle nets). These gears may extendvery long distances from the boat.

Main safety issues


• Vessel should display a red light over awhite light

• Gear will usually be astern of the vessel,while being set and ahead of the vesselwhen being hauled

• Vessel may move unpredictably andquickly between sets of gear

• Most of the length of the gear will beunderwater; however, buoy ropes mayextend a considerable distance aft whenthe gear is being set


COLLISION FOCUS

“A collision can ruin your day”David Nichol, Senior Loss Prevention Executive at UK P&I Club discusses thelessons to be learnt from two collision cases investigated by the UK MAIB.

The recent collision in the East ChinaSea between the tanker SANCHI andbulk carrier CF Crystal serves as a starkreminder that despite perceivedimprovements in ship design,technology and crew training standards,ship collisions continue to occur withrelentless regularity.

The old saying “a collision can ruinyour day” is, of course, a deliberateunderstatement for an event that canhave tragic and far reachingconsequences, not least in terms oftragic loss of life but also environmentalpollution, loss or damage to ship andcargo, which in turn may involve verycostly salvage or wreck removaloperations. In attempting to gauge thescale of the problem, it is instructive toconsider that of the high value poolclaims notified within the InternationalGroup of P&I Clubs during the 2017policy year, navigation related incidentspredominate, and include a number ofhigh profile ship on ship collisions.

Furthermore, a recent report by theinsurer Allianz, cites that in terms of theleading causes of notified shippingincidents during the period 2007 to2016, ship collisions rank second onlyto machinery damage1.

It is, therefore, apparent that collisionsconstitute a significant proportion ofmarine casualties, and the reasons forthis are not necessarily difficult toidentify. Ships operate in a verychallenging environment in terms ofweather and increasing traffic densitiesin the world’s shipping lanes. They arean assembly of complex systems andmachinery, which can malfunction andcontinue to be under the control ofhuman beings who are prone tomaking mistakes, no matter how welltrained or experienced they may be.However, it is broadly accepted that theroot cause of the great majority ofincidents can be attributed to humanerror and the following case studiesprovide a graphic illustration of this.

Collision between bulkcarrier “A” and refrigerated cargo vessel “B”2

This collision occurred in the earlymorning hours in open water, goodvisibility and in light traffic conditions.Leading up to the collision, the bulk carrier “A” was proceeding on a heading of 104 degrees at 11 knots with the Officer of the Watch (OOW) assisted byan ordinary seaman (OS) at lookout. The cargo vessel “B” was on a course of 041degrees at 19.5 knots with the OOWon the bridge as sole watch-keeper andlookout. At about 0515 hours, the OSon bulk carrier “A” reported sighting avessel just forward of the starboardbeam (cargo vessel “B”) and the OOWdetermined that it was an overtakingvessel and would pass about three orfour cables clear of the starboard side.This assumption was made despite theOOW not plotting the other vessel onthe radar or taking visual bearings. TheOS continued to point out the

1 Allianz Safety and Shipping Review 2017: http://www.agcs.allianz.com/assets/PDFs/Reports/AGCS_Safety_Shipping_Review_2017.pdf2 https://www.gov.uk/maib-reports/collision-between-bulk-carrier-seagate-and-refrigerated-cargo-vessel-timor-stream-off-the-dominican-republic


COLLISION FOCUS

presence of the other vessel until finally shouting at the OOW to ‘do something’.It was only then that the OOWrealised that collision was imminentwith insufficient time to take effectiveavoiding action. The OOW on thebridge of cargo vessel “B” first saw thebulk carrier “A” only when it was veryclose on the port bow at a time when itwas also too late to take any avoidingaction prior to the collision.

At about 0540, the bow of cargo vessel“B” struck the starboard aft side of bulkcarrier “A” in way of the engine roomand accommodation with both vesselssustaining serious damage. Fortunatelythere were no injuries to crew althoughthere was oil pollution from rupturedtanks in the flooded engine room ofbulk carrier “A”.

Both watch-keeping officers involved were very experienced and appropriately qualified and yet both failed to complywith the most basic requirements ofkeeping a safe navigational watch. TheOOW of bulk carrier “A” upon beingalerted to the presence of another vesseltook no steps to determine if risk ofcollision existed but instead made acompletely erroneous assumption as tothe other vessel’s course and relativemovement. The OOW of cargo vessel

“B” should not have been sole lookoutat night and evidently failed tomaintain a proper lookout visually orby radar. Poor watch-keeping standards,driven by complacency, led to thecollision. Those in charge of thenavigational watch on both vesselsfailed to keep a proper lookout, did notassess the risk of, or take appropriateaction to avoid collision. In summary,both officers failed to comply withsome of the most fundamental elementsof the International Regulations forPreventing Collisions at Sea and thewritten navigational procedures issuedby their respective company managers.

Collision between cargoship “C” and a tug and towin the Dover Strait3

The cargo ship “C” was transiting thesouth-west bound traffic lane in theDover Strait Traffic Separation Schemeon the early morning 0000 to 0400watch. The vessel was making good acourse of 233 degrees at 15 knots inconditions of good visibility and amoderate to rough sea. At this time,cargo ship “C” was overtaking a tugtowing an unmanned crane barge, witha tow line about 250 m in length. TheOOW on the bridge of cargo ship “C”saw the lights being displayed by the

tug at close range very fine on thecargo ship’s port bow and in responsealtered his vessel’s course to port withthe intention of passing the tug on itsport side. At the time of the alterationof course, the cargo ship “C” was onlytwo cables astern of the tug. Secondslater, the cargo ship collided with thetowed crane barge and passed betweenthe tug and the barge, catching the towline as it did so. The tug immediatelymade a broadcast on the VHF radiowarning the cargo ship that there was awire and to slow down. However, thecargo ship proceeded to overtake thetug and with the towing line stillsnagged pulled the tug around 180degrees causing it to be towed sternfirst at 14 knots. The tow wire waspulled from the winch drum andeventually broke free, leaving the bargeadrift and the tug and its crew verylucky to have survived this verydangerous situation.

Investigation of the incident revealed anumber of deficiencies with respect to the navigational watch-keeping on board the cargo ship “C”. The OOW wasseated in one of the navigating consolechairs and appeared to be solely relianton the AIS information transmitted byother vessels overlaid onto the ECDISdisplay on the console in from of him.

3 https://www.gov.uk/maib-reports/collision-between-multipurpose-dry-cargo-vessel-rickmers-dubai-with-crane-barge-walcon-wizard-being-towed-by-tug-kingston-in-the-dover-strait-off-the-south-east-coast-of-england


COLLISION FOCUS

However, the tug was not transmittingan AIS signal as this equipment is notrequired to be carried on vessels under300 grt. Irrespective of this, the tug andtow would have been clearly visiblefrom the cargo ship and conspicuouslyindicated on the radar display well inadvance of the collision which, had hebeen paying attention, would haveenabled the OOW to take appropriateavoiding action in good time.Thepreserved VDR information revealed that the OOW had been largely inactive during his watch until the alteration ofcourse. It was also determined that thedesignated additional lookout was notpresent on the bridge at this time, theBridge Navigational Watch Alarm was switched off and music was being played on the bridge throughout the watch.There is no suggestion that the OOW was asleep or insufficiently rested but hisevident lack of alertness had contributed to his failure to keep an effectivelookout and make proper use of radar.

Although these two incidents involvequite different circumstances, they bothshare features which are commonlyreported to have caused or contributed to ship collisions. Undoubtedly, the most important is the fundamental failure tokeep a proper visual lookout and notmaking full and effective use of radar aswell as other aids to navigation. All of these assets are not to be used in isolationas single means of navigating a vessel but instead should all be utilised togethereffectively and judiciously in order thatthe OOW may build up in this mind a full appraisal of the navigational situation and risk of collision. It is this situationalawareness that enables the OOW to“look ahead” by anticipating potentiallyhazardous situations and to be able topromptly recognise and respond to changing circumstances. Traditional triedand tested navigational practice and new technology are not mutually exclusivebut should instead complement eachother. A good example of this is the useof AIS information for collisionavoidance purposes which can provideuseful heading and speed informationfor other vessels. As highlighted in theprevious case studies, it is importantthat the OOW uses this information tosupplement, not substitute, input fromhis own senses and radar. The essential

element of training and familiarisationin the proper use of navigational aids isto develop both a full understanding oftheir operational advantages and limitations. In the case of AIS, this would include OOW being aware of the factthat not all vessels may be fitted with or transmit AIS data and that such data maypossibly be discrepant. Another recurrent issue in ship collision casualty reports iswhy otherwise well trained andexperienced deck officers neglect goodnavigational practice or fail to observeestablished procedures? Frequentlythere is a disconnection between theirbehaviour and the high standards theywould normally expect of themselves aswell as the ship managers intentions for how the ship is to be run. The reasons forthis may be varied and complex but often include complacency arising from a lack of motivation, boredom with the routine of watch-keeping, fatigue, becomingdistracted with tasks not related to keeping a navigational watch, deficiencies in bridge resource management or evenpersonal mental health issues affectingthe performance of individuals.

Due to the nature of ship operations, shore side management have traditionally been largely reliant upon the masterensuring that standards of goodnavigational practice are maintained at ahigh level of efficiency. It is recognisedthat conducting navigational auditswhilst a vessel is in port, as is usually thecase, is no substitute for being able toassess the actual performance of themaster and officers at sea. However, amore robust approach to monitoringperformance could be to engage

professional navigational auditors asdiscrete sea riders as well as periodicscrutiny of VDR data. It is importantthat the reasons for inadequateperformance are identified and that thenecessary corrective action is taken,whether by way of improvingprocedures, additional crew training oraddressing any issues with the personalwelfare considerations of the personsinvolved. However ship managersshould also be prepared to removeindividuals assessed as incapable ofperforming to the required standard.

In the first case study, investigation ofthe incident was hampered to a degreeby the master’s failure on board one ofthe vessels to preserve the VDR data. Itis, therefore, of the utmost importancethat masters and officers are fullyfamiliarised with procedures for savingand retrieving this data which shouldbe practiced on a regular basis. Inaddition, other items of navigationalequipment also have electronic datastorage which may be retrieved,including the ECDIS, AIS, NAVTEXand GPS. Collating this automaticallygenerated data with additional evidencefrom witnesses and shore based vesseltraffic service records will all contributeto constructing a full picture of theincident. Having this information fullyaccessible to marine investigatorsgreatly assists in being able todetermine what happened, not onlywith the aim of apportioning blame butalso for the vital purpose of derivingimportant lessons to be learnt whichmay be shared within the fleet or thewider shipping community.


COLLISION FOCUS

The Master/Pilot exchange A joint study by UK P&I Club and Solis Marine Consultants found that ‘human error’and particularly a breakdown of communications on the bridge is a major contributingfactor in claims. Stuart Edmonston, Loss Prevention Director at UK P&I Club, andCaptain John Simpson, Director at Solis Marine, examine the issues raised.

When the mandatory berth-to-berthpassage plan for a voyage is being prepared, it is often the information that is needed to complete the transit, with the pilot onboard, to or from the berth, that is the most difficult to obtain in advance.

Even with the onboard sailing directionsand port guides, together with what may have been provided by the local agent,there will still be areas where furtherdetail is required by the bridge team.

There has been much discussion in theindustry on the development of a portpassage plan that can be provided to themaster in advance of arrival, but it willbe some time before it becomesstandard practice, if ever. Every transit isdifferent and the passage plan underpilotage must be considered a dynamicprocess and capable of being updatedquickly as it is required.

There are times when the master may be asked to bring the vessel closer to theport entrance, perhaps due to badweather, or because the pilot is still on the way.Whatever the reason, one of the first considerations must be to ensurethat there is still adequate time for the master/pilot exchange to be carried out.

The master/pilot exchange is themissing piece of the passage plan puzzleand a crucial one.

Amongst other things, the bridge teamwill need to know the following:

Transit to and from the berth

• Route agreed with waypoints andcourses, adequate charts

• Speed and timing for the transit

• Local weather and tidal conditionsexpected

• Vessel movements, any congestion off the berth

• Local traffic regulations

• Location of turning areas, including those needed for a berthing manoeuvre

• Abort points

• Emergency or standby anchorage areas

Tugs

• Number of tugs, their type and power?

• Time of arrival at the vessel?

• Where will the tugs be made fast?

• Ship’s line or tug’s line to be used?

The birth

• Any limitations such as themaximum/minimum size of vessel,number of bollards, fender capacity

• Turning areas are of sufficient size

• Mooring plan

• Any berthing speed limits

• Time required to order pilot/tugs inan emergency

• Departure procedures for letting gomoorings

With the pilot onboard it is theopportunity for the master and bridgeteam to confirm arrangements andensure that they are satisfied with the planned transit and berthing/unberthing manoeuvre. This is the first and bestopportunity to talk to the pilot and toclarify any issues that have beenidentified during preparation of theonboard plan. However, it is importantto prioritise this process, so that thelimited time available at the start of the pilotage can be addressed directly and less urgent matters discussed once on route.

As far as is possible, the pilot needs tobe part of the bridge team, not outsideit, but also has to get on with the vitaltask of familiarising him/herself withthe immediate situation, checking andsetting radars, headings and speed andgetting in contact with the port control,berth/terminal and tugs.

The co-operation of the master andbridge team includes confirmation ofthe language to be used throughout, sothat helm and engine orders can bequickly and properly acknowledgedand carried out.

The pilot will be familiar with mosttypes of vessel and what to expect inballast or loaded condition, however, notwo ships behave in the same way, evensister vessels. It is, therefore, importantto familiarise the pilot as quickly aspossible with any manoeuvring featureswhich might be unusual, vessel-specificor unexpected. It is also essential thatthe pilot is told immediately if there areany difficulties for the helmsman inmaintaining the heading or delays withengine movements.

In the first instance, the pilot will wantto confirm the draught of the vesseland the trim, as this will give him a firstappreciation of how the vessel will beexpected to respond to the wheel andwhat under keel clearance will beencountered on passage. For example,some vessels with even a slight trim bythe head do not steer as easily as one oneven keel or with stern trim.

An accurately completed pilot cardgives the pilot all the essential basicinformation to build his own picturefor the passage and any manoeuvresthat will be carried out. It can then besupplemented in discussion with themaster/bridge team.


COLLISION FOCUS

For the master, access to a local chart,perhaps due to recent changes in theport, additional hydrographicinformation or inadequate scale of thechart onboard may be a priority. Withadvance communication with the localagent, these are issues that can beresolved before arrival.

It should not take long to confirm theroute to be taken, the areas of leastdepth, which might require a reductionin speed and positions where the vesselmight be anchored in an emergency, orturned around if the passage has to beaborted. The pilot will need to knowwhat squat to expect on passage.

If there are areas where the direction ofthe current is not in line with the channel and the bridge team is informed in advance, then they are prepared forwhat might appear to be unusual helmorders or courses to steer. This avoidsunnecessary questions at what might bea critical part of the passage.

It is important that both the master andpilot are both clear about the status ofthe vessel and the planned passage. It isnot the time to rely on assumptions, asexpectations can be very different toreality.

However competent the pilot, the bridge team must monitor the progress of thevessel on the chart or ECDIS. A pilot

should never mind being asked questions about the position of the vessel in the channel or unexpected depth soundings.

During any pilotage transit, the anchorsshould be ready to be used in theshortest possible time. However, whenthere are tugs located at the bow itshould never be forgotten to ensurethat they are confirmed as being clearfirst, even in an emergency.

When tugs are to be used, the master must be satisfied that those provided havesufficient power to manoeuvre the vessel and also know what types they are. It isimportant to know when using morethan one tug whether they are similarin their manoeuvring characteristicsand have the same, or different, power.

The master should also consider whether ship’s lines should be used to make thetugs fast. There are occasions where itmight be necessary, but generally it ispreferable to use the tug’s equipment,particularly on larger vessels.

The instructions given to a tug by thepilot are often in a different language tothat used onboard. It is up to the masterto ensure that the pilot at least providesan overview of how the tugs will beused, without expecting a word byword translation of every conversation.If it feels like the speed of approachingthe berth or going alongside is too high

it probably is, and those concernsshould be passed to the pilot, so thataction can be taken by using the engineand/or tugs moved into position tostart to slow the vessel down.

Although the pilot is expected to bethe local expert, it is possible thathe/she might not have manoeuvred avessel of the same type or size before. Itcannot be assumed that the pilot knowseverything, but the more thatinformation is exchanged, the moreeffectively the transit and manoeuvrewill be carried out. It should also beremembered that the pilot has not onlygained personal knowledge andexperience whilst working at the port,but also has access to that of all theother pilots and that is considerableback-up for any pilot.

The master should have information about the berth from the agent, however,the pilot should be able to provide morepractical detail. That will include whether line handling boats will be used, whichlines to be put ashore first, theconfiguration of the mooring lines andwhether the anchor will be required.

During any pilotage transit, the keypriorities are efficient and timelycommunication, in order to ensure asafe passage, and not to overload thebridge team and pilot with unnecessaryinformation and questions.


COLLISION FOCUS

“Gamification” – developmentin communicationGamification is a way to add fun and competitiveness to a subject that might typicallybe difficult to communicate. George Devereese, Senior Loss Prevention Executiveat UK P&I Club explains how this technique could be used to improve safety at sea.

When the Maritime LabourConvention was introduced in 2006 itmade provisions that the access to ship-shore telephone, email andinternet facilities at a reasonable chargewere to be part of the responsibility ofthe ship operator. However, in theeleven years since the introduction ofthis convention there has been aquantum shift in the means by whichpeople communicate and this changehas been reflected in the modernseafarer’s approach to their contract.

In the 2015 Crew Connectivity Surveyby Futurenautics Research 73% ofrespondents, of which there were over3,050 from more than 30 countries,said the level of crew communicationservices provided onboard influencedtheir decisions about which shippingcompany they worked for. Thecommunication type that was mostdesired by seafarers was free internetaccess, receiving 70%.

The primary reason for wanting freeinternet access was to enable the use ofvideo chat services between crewmembers and their family and friends.When asked what their preferredmeans of accessing communicationsservices was the majority of crewmembers picked mobile phones.

With such resources becoming moreand more commonplace ship operatorsare responding to the wishes of theircrew in providing greater access aboardtheir vessels. It would appear we arenow entering a new age wherecommunication to seafarers is no longer via the shore side office, but directly to theseafarer through such media as LinkedIn, Snapchat, Twitter and WhatsApp.

By working alongside what is alreadypublished from shore side and engagingwith the seafarer by this rapidlyemerging medium at the grassroots, isthere a new and expanding way toinfluence training aboard vessels? Bydelivering media directly to the seafarerin a modern and appealing way can weas an industry disrupt ourselves intoimproving safety aboard vessels by usingone of the tools that is often sighted asa major distraction aboard ships, themobile phone?

Gamification is a word that enteredmodern parlance in 2003 but did notgain widespread usage until 2010 andnow finally in 2017 it is starting toenter the maritime consciousness.Gamification is, among other things, away for businesses to add fun andcompetitiveness to a subject matter thatmight typically be difficult tocommunicate to a chosen audience.

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

InternetSMSVoIP/Video chatChat/Instant messaging

Email

Free satellite television 4%

Free video chat 11%

Other 1%

Free email 7%

Free voice calls 7%

Free internet access 70%

If ship operators could provide one freeservice, what should it be?

How do crew want access to communications?

Shared PC Laptop on LAN Laptop via WIFI Smartphone Tablet


COLLISION FOCUS

technology on which it is founded doesnot stand still. This again is part of therational of using this medium, as newtechnologies and regulations enter themaritime environment it will be easy toupdate and modify the game to reflectthese changes ensuring that theawareness it promotes remains current and at no additional cost to the enduser. By moving into this new medium the UK Club is trying at agrass roots level to re-engage theseafarer with safety and anunderstanding of the importance ofcontinued through contract educationand skill set maintenance.

In 2012, Metro Trains in Melbournelaunched “Dumb Ways to Die” topromote rail safety and have since said the campaign contributed to a more than 30% reduction in “near-miss” accidents.

With its dispersed employee base andlong lines of management from ship toshore the maritime industry is uniquelyplaced to exploit the potentialgamification offers. Companies alreadyemploy computer-based training andvideo-based learning to enhance thetraining experience received by itsemployees. Using games to supplementlearning would help ensure thecontinued training of the industry’spersonnel and bring awareness to topics that may otherwise seem dull and tedious.

It can also be seen as a cost-savingmeasure as a game will transcendlanguage and cultural barriers andengage all ranks, removing the need fortranslation of documents, rank specific seminars, cost of printing documentation or the cost of transporting crew to acentral location to receive a briefing.

As previously mentioned, majorcompanies ashore have already adoptedthis style of training with much successand with a similar widespread networkof employees spanning many countries.As such, the idea has a proven route tosuccess which could easily be migratedto any shipping company using existinglines of communications, againreducing any inherent costs over andabove the design of the game.

By utilising such emerging technologies and engaging with our seafarers, in away that they have already stated is

important to them, we should be ableto re-energise learning, awareness andcommunication within our industryand bring it into the 21st century.

With this in mind, the UK P&I ClubLoss Prevention team has produced amobile game app called “RISKAHOY!” which takes players throughmultiple levels of increasinglychallenging difficulty, working throughvarious mini games, while identifyingand avoiding common on boardhazards. The idea of the game is not as ateaching aid but to highlight commonareas of risk which if not properlymitigated often lead to expensive claimsfor the shipowner.

By ultilising this technology, it is hopedto promote a new level of engagementwith the seafaring community, byadding social media sharing to thegame it is envisaged that, like previouslycited examples, it will go viralthroughout the community and in afun and novel way promote anunderstanding of some of the everydayrisks that some may, by virtue of time,take for granted. For those new to thesea or considering a career at sea itcould also serve to highlight some ofthe challenges of the various vesseltypes trading the world’s oceans.

By its very nature this is also a dynamicplatform, where ideas and the very

CONTACT JAPAN


UNDERWRITING

Matthew Bayman Underwriting Director +44 20 7204 2076 [email protected]

Claire Adams Senior Underwriting Technician +44 20 7204 2260 [email protected]

LOSS PREVENTION

Stuart Edmonston Loss Prevention Director +44 20 7204 2341 [email protected]

Petar Modev Senior Loss Prevention Executive +44 20 7204 2329 [email protected]

George Devereese Senior Loss Prevention Executive +44 20 7204 2342 [email protected]

SINGAPORE

Yiah Soon Ng Director +65 6309 9681 [email protected]

Capt Anuj Velankar Senior Loss Prevention Advisor +65 6309 9687 [email protected]

Lee Wai Pong Regional Advisor +65 6309 9689 [email protected]

Luke Lane Senior Claims Executive +65 6309 9680 [email protected]

Ruo Lin Lim Claims Executive +65 6309 9681 [email protected]

JAPAN – TOKYO

Masaki Oiwa Representative in Japan +81 3 5442 6114 [email protected]

Masato Nishizawa General Manager +81 3 5442 6106 [email protected]

Fumiaki Izawa Senior Claims Executive +81 3 5442 6101 [email protected]

Masaaki Hishiki Claims Executive +81 3 5442 6106 [email protected]

Masako Kodaki Manager, Finance and Admin +81 3 5442 6102 [email protected]

Yuzuki Aihara Underwriting Assistant +81 3 5442 6113 [email protected]

Yuka Yamauchi Assistant [email protected]

JAPAN – IMABARI

Hironobu Bekku Manager +81 898 34 3586 [email protected]

Expertise and experienceP&I claims are often complex incidents involving a range of stakeholders from valued customers and trade partners to regulatory authorities. Quick and equitable resolution is key if those relationships are to be preserved. The Club’s global network of localoffices enables the delivery of Club service in a Member’s own language and timezone. Our team are here to help you navigate the complex world of P&I insurance.

LONDON – J1

Paul Sessions Japan Regional Director +44 20 7204 2211 [email protected]

Aki Tsukui Syndicate Manager +44 20 7204 2136 [email protected]

Lance Hebert Senior Claims Director +44 20 7204 2490 [email protected]

Philippa Langton Senior Claims Executive +44 20 7204 2524 [email protected]

Jacqueline Tan Senior Claims Executive +44 20 7204 2118 [email protected]

David Perks Senior Claims Executive +44 20 7204 2209 [email protected]

Yvonne Vail Senior Claims Executive +44 20 7204 2501 [email protected]

Caroline Coutts Claims Executive +44 20 7204 2240 [email protected]

Alexander Geoghegan Claims Executive +44 20 7204 2409 [email protected]

Karolina Bieganska Claims Executive +44 20 7204 2170 [email protected]

Debbie Wood Administrator +44 20 7204 2517 [email protected]

CREW HEALTH

Sophia Bullard Programme Director +44 20 7204 2417 [email protected]


CONTACT JAPAN

Maritime Intelligence PortalThe Club’s loss prevention team has been working with Geollect, the UK- and US-based Geospatial Intelligence Company, to provideMembers with cutting edge data feeds with geospatial analysis, providing essential information on ports and locations across the globe.Members can access the portal here: www.ukpandi.com/loss-prevention/maritime-intelligence-portal/

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