Looking Behind the Increase in Custodial Remand Populations · of Corrections 2011: 22) In Canada the remand population increased as a rate from 12.6 per 100,000 to 39.1 in 2007 (Webster,

www.crimejusticejournal.comIJCJ20132(2):80‐99 ISSN2202–8005

©TheAuthor(s)2013

LookingBehindtheIncreaseinCustodialRemandPopulations

DavidBrownQueenslandUniversityofTechnology

Abstract

Numbers,ratesandproportionsofthoseremandedincustodyhaveincreasedsignificantlyinrecentdecadesacrossarangeofjurisdictions.InAustraliatheyhavedoubledsincetheearly1980s,suchthatclosetooneinfourprisonersiscurrentlyunconvicted.TakingNSWasacasestudyanddrawingontherecentNewSouthWalesLawReformCommissionReportonBail(2012),thisarticlewillidentifythekeydriversofthisincreaseinNSW,predominantlyaformof legislativehyperactivity involvingconstantchanges totheBailAct1978(NSW),changeswhichremoveorrestrictthepresumptioninfavourofbailforawiderangeofoffences.Thearticlewillthenexaminesomeoftheconceptual,culturalandpracticeshiftsunderlyingtheincrease. These include: a shift away from a conception of bail as a procedural issuepredominantly concerned with securing the attendance of the accused at trial and theintegrityofthetrial,totheuseofbailforcrimepreventionpurposes;thediminishingforceofthe presumption of innocence; the framing of a false opposition between an individualinterestinlibertyandapublicinterestinsafety;ashiftfromdeterminationoftheindividualcaseby reference to itsownparticular circumstances todeterminationby its classificationwithin pre‐set legislative categories of offence types and previous convictions; a doublejeopardyeffectarising in relation topeoplewithprevious convictions forwhich theyhavealreadybeenpunished;andanunacknowledgedpreventivedetentioneffectarisingfromtheincreasedemphasisonrisk.Manyoftheseconceptualshiftsareapparentintheexplosioninbail conditions and the KPI‐driven policing of bail conditions and consequent rise inrevocations,especiallyinrelationtojuveniles.The paperwill concludewith a note on theNSWGovernment’s response to theNSWLRCReportintheformofaBailBill(2013)andbriefspeculationastoitslikelyeffects.Keywords

Bail,remand,presumptions,risk,conditions,compliance,KPIs,revocations.Introduction

ImprisonmentratesacrossAustralianStatesandTerritorieshaveincreasedsignificantly,albeitvariably,overthelasttwotothreedecades,withthelift‐offpointoccurringroughlyinthemid1980s.From1984to2008thenationalimprisonmentraterosefrom86per100,000population

DavidBrown:LookingBehindtheIncreaseinCustodialRemandPopulations

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to175,anincreaseof206%(ABS2011;Cunneenetal.2013forthcoming:ch.3).Thishassincefallen to 168 per 100,000 adult population (ABS 2012: 8). Imprisonment rates varyconsiderably across the jurisdictions, from825.5per 100,000 in theNorthernTerritory (NT)followed by 267.3 in Western Australia (WA), 171.2 in New South Wales (NSW), 158.9 inQueensland(Qld)and111.7inVictoria(Vic)(ABS2012:Table3.3).A significant component of the increase in imprisonment rates has been the rise in peopleremandedincustody.Nationally,asat30June2012,23.4%ofprisoners(6,871outof29,381)were remanded in custody: that is, were unconvicted. (ABS 2012: Table 3.1) This figuresignificantlyunderstatesthepositionasitisbasedonthetraditionalsnapshotstyle,‘ononeday’prisoncensusfigures.Iftheproportionofremandprisonerswascalculatedasapercentageofprison receptions (a figure not provided in ABS or other national statistics), then the figurewould be far higher. InNSW in 2010, for example, remandprisonersmade up 10,342out of14,288prisonreceptions,or72.4%ofthetotal(NSWLRC2012:para.4.6).Nationally, the remand rateof unsentencedprisonersper100,000ofpopulationhasdoubledfrom18.9in1998to38.8in2011(NSWLRC2012:TableF.2,338).Therehavebeenincreasesinremandincustodyrates inall jurisdictionsoverthatperiodasfollows:NSW,22.2to49.1;Vic,12.9to19.6;Qld,18.4to33.4;SouthAustralia(SA),22.8to52.1;WA,21.3to46.8;Tasmania(Tas),8.8to21.5;NT,59.5to169(NSWLRC2012).Remandimprisonmenthasincreasedfasterthan the sentenced imprisonment rate. In2012unsentencedprisonersasaproportionof thetotalprisonpopulation rangedbetween roughlyone fifthandone thirdacross theAustralianjurisdictions as follows: NSW, 25.7%; Vic, 20.4%; Qld, 22.3%; SA, 31.3%; WA, 19.6%; Tas,17.8%; NT, 24.7%; Australian Capital Territory (ACT), 29.1 (ABS 2012: para. 3.1). Juvenileremandrateshavealsobeenincreasinginrecentyears,by17%nationallybetween2006‐7and2009‐10andby25%inNSWbetween2006‐7and2009‐10(NSWLRC2012:para.4.27;seealsoRichardsandLyneham2010).AsNSWisthemostpopulousStateandhasthelargestprisonpopulation,aroundone‐thirdthenationaltotal,NSWtrendshavethemostsignificantimpactonnationalfigures.In1970inNSW,unsentenced prisoners as a proportion of the total prison population comprised 11.5%,increasing to 22.7% by 2010 (NSW LRC 2012: para. 4.3). NSW remand in custody numbersincreased from711 in1995 to2502 in2010 (NSWLRC2012:Table4.1).NSWremand ratesincreasedfromaround16to45per100,000ofpopulationbetween1994and2010(NSWLRC2012:Figure4.3).ThepercentageofadultIndigenousremandeesinNSWincreasedfrom11.5%in 1994 to 26.4% in 2011 and, between 2001 and 2008, the proportion of Indigenousremandeesrose72%(Fitzgerald2009).Driversofremandrates

Theabove figures showageneralbutvariable increase inunsentencedremandnumbersandratesacrossAustralianjurisdictions.OtherjurisdictionssuchasNewZealandandCanadahaveshownsimilarincreases.InNewZealandtheremandpopulationiscurrentlyaround20%oftheprisonpopulation,increasingfrom700personsin1998toover1800in2011(NZDepartmentofCorrections2011:22) InCanada the remandpopulation increased as a rate from12.6per100,000 to 39.1 in 2007 (Webster, Doob and Myers 2009: 80), with half of all provincialprisonersonremand,whilethe imprisonmentrategenerallyremainedstableordecreased. In2009‐2010 adults on remand constituted 58% of the total prison population (Porter andCalverley2011:2).Youthonremandalsooutnumberedthoseinsentencedcustodyin2010forthe third year in a row (Porter and Calverley 2011: 11). Byway of contrast, in England andWales the prison remand population rose in the 1980s, dipped in the early 1990s and hasstabilisedinthe2000s(Hucklesby2009:4‐6).Between1993and2011theremandpopulationwas‘relativelystableataround12‐13,000’butbegantofallfromearly2012(MinistryofJustice


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2013:19).ThisisdespitethefactthatbetweenJune1993andJune2012theprisonpopulationinEnglandandWales‘increasedby41,800prisonerstoover86,000’(MinistryofJustice2013:1).Researcherstendtoemphasisecomplexity,variation,insufficientresearch,poordatacollectionand the difficulty in identifying uniform drivers when attempting to explain increases (orstability) in remand rates. InCanada,Webster et al. (2009)note the significantdifferences inremandratesacrossdifferentprovinces; the fact that thebailprocess is taking longer than itdid,inpartthroughincreasedadjournments;thelargerproportionofdefendantsappearingincourt from custody; and increasing length of time on remand. While rejecting an ‘increasedpunitiveness’thesis,onthebasisthatimprisonmentrateshadremainedstable,theyarguedthat‘Canada’s growing remand population is largely the product of an increasing culture of riskaversionwhich is permeating the entire criminal justice system’ so that ‘decisions are eitherbeing continually passed along to someone else or simply delayed by those responsible forthem’(Websteretal.2009:99).The leading Australian research on factors influencing bail decision‐making noted that thelegislative framework in the two jurisdictions in the study (SouthAustraliaandVictoria)wasbroadly similar. The research identified lower remand rates in Victoria as ‘associated withenhanced police accountability for bail refusal, improved feedback loops between courts andpolice,highertransactioncostsforcustodialremand,andlongerbailhearings’(Sarre,KingandBamford2006:5).Theauthorssuggestedthat:‘thekeytoisolatingthecriticalfactorsaffectingremand in custody trends’ lay in ‘a focuson, andanalysesof, thedecisionsmadeby thenon‐judicialparticipantsintheprocess,especiallythepolicedecision‐makingandinformationtheybring to the courts’ (Sarre, King and Bamford 2006: 6). Later work identified the key tounderstanding the different patterns as ‘recognising the way that the discretion of remanddecision‐makers is shapedby the legislative, social andorganisational contexts inwhich theyoperate’ (King,BamfordandSarre2008:24‐5;2009seealsoBamford,KingandSarre1999a,1999b).Theauthorssuggestedthat:

… jurisdictions develop cultures around remand decision‐making as a result ofthe intersection of these contexts and that this culture is perpetuated by thebeliefs of the remand decision‐makers about their roles, and the processes ofremand decision‐making, specifically the speed and limited review of baildecisions.(King,BamfordandSarre2008:25).

Theynotedthat‘inSouthAustraliathemediantimeforcontestedbailhearingswasfiveminuteswhereas in Victoria it was 18 minutes’ (King, Bamford and Sarre 2008: 26; Sarre, King andBamford 2006: 4) and that the influence of therapeutic concerns in bail decisionswasmuchstrongerinVictoria.UsingNSWasacasestudy,thisarticlewilllookbehindtheremandincustodyincreaseforsomeof the key drivers; will posit some suggested conceptual, cultural and practice shifts, andexamine some of their effects. The article will draw heavily on the NSW Law ReformCommissionReport133,Bail(2012).1ImmediatedriversinNSW

TheNSWLRCidentifiedtheimmediatedriversofincreasingremandratesas:

increasing rates of bail refusal inbothLocal (5% in1995 to9% in2009) andHigherCourts(24.5%in1994to33.4%in2010);

anincreaseintheaverage(mean)timespentonremand;


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adecrease in the extent towhichbail is ‘dispensedwith’ (Ringland andWeatherburn2010);and

anincreaseinthefrequencyofbailrevocations(NSWLRC2012:paras4.8‐4.24).There isoneimportantfeaturewhich ismissing fromthispicture,stronglyemphasisedintheNSWLRCReport,andthatisthehighproportionofshorttermremandees,manyofwhomareinfactreleasedtobailinashorttime.TheCommissionnotedthat:

...ofthe10,342peopleonremandin2010inNSW,5,218or55%werereleasedas ‘unconvicted’ or not subject to further custodial sentence, that is, theywereeither released to bail, received a non‐custodial sentence, had already servedtheirfullsentencewhileonremand,hadallchargesdismissedorwereacquitted.(NSWLRC2012:para.4.13)

Nearly two‐thirds of the 5,218 people released to custody as unconvicted in 2010 spent lessthan one month in custody; 29.5% spent one day in prison and 40.3% 2‐7 days. As theCommissionnoted:‘thelargenumberofremandprisonershavingtobeprocessedforveryshortstaysistimeconsumingandcostly’(NSWLRC2012:para.4.14).Reformproposalsdirectedatthissubstantialgroupofpeoplechargedwithlessseriousoffences,whospendshortperiodsoftime before release on bail or who are discharged upon conviction, have the potential tosubstantiallyreducetheprisonreceptionrate;reducetheoverall imprisonmentrate;takethepressure off Corrective Services thus enabling them to concentrate on effective programs forconvictedoffenders;andsubstantiallyreducecosts.TheNSWpoliticalcontext:legislativehyperactivity

While theBamford,KingandSarrestudynotedabove found littledifference in the legislativeprovisionsgoverningbailinSouthAustraliaandVictoria,thefrequencyofamendmentstotheNSWlegislationsince1979whenthereform‐orientedBailAct1978cameintoforceconstitutesa form of legislative hyperactivity which is exceptional. The constant amendments havecontributed directly to the increased remand rates and to the shifting culture around baildecision‐making.TheNSWLRCnotedthatbetween1979and2011therehadbeen85separateamending Acts, some of which contained multiple amendments. The LRC classified theamendmentsintofourcategories.Firstlytherewere‘terminologicalortechnical’changeswhichincluded updating of references to offences and changes in criminal procedure, comprisingsome 41 amending Acts (NSW LRC 2012: para. 3.35). Secondly ‘machinery or procedural’changes, of which there were 19, dealt with issues such as appeal procedures, the mostsignificant of which were the restrictions on repeat bail applications (NSW LRC 2012: para.3.36).Thirdly‘therapeuticconcerns’comprisingthreeamendingActs,involvedschemessuchastheMagistratesEarlyReferralintoTreatment(MERIT)(NSWLRC2012:para.3.38).Thefourthandmost significant categorywasof 28Acts amending thepresumptions and considerationsoriginally set out in the 1978 Bail Act (NSW LRC 2012: para. 3.39). Included in theseamendmentswasexclusionofcertainoffencesfromthepresumptioninfavourofbailandtheintroductionofapresumptionagainstbailandacategoryof‘onlyinexceptionalcircumstances’.It is this fourth category, amendments to the presumptions and considerations, that wasidentifiedbytheNSWLRCashavingmosteffectandisthereforeofmostinterest.TheNSWLRCReportBailembarkedonadetailedlistingandanalysisofalltheamendingActs,whichdoesnotneedtoberepeatedhere.TheLRCnotedthat:

… some of these changes, such as provisions in relation to domestic violenceoffences, followedresearchanddetailedconsideration,consultationanddebate.Others were made after individual cases attracted media attention without


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evidenceoftheincidenceofoffencesoftheparticularkind.(2012:3.39;seealsoBoothandTownsley2009:41;Brownetal.2011:177‐191;Stubbs2010:485).

Thekeychanges thathad themostsignificanteffects, theLRCsaid,were theBailAmendment(RepeatOffenders)Act2002(NSW)andtheBailAmendment(FirearmsandPropertyOffenders)Act2003(NSW).TheformerActcreatedthreeexceptionstothepresumptioninfavourofbail:anyoneaccusedofanoffencewhilstonbailorparole;anyonepreviouslyconvictedoffailuretoappear;andanyoneaccusedofanindictableoffencewhohaspreviouslybeenconvictedofoneormore indictable offences. The stated intention of the legislationwas to reduce the rate ofabsconding on bail following a NSW BOCSAR study (Chilvers, Allen and Doak 2002) whichshowedhigherabscondingratesamongpersonswithpriorconvictionsandmultipleconcurrentoffences.ABOCSARevaluationof thesechangesshowedthat theyhadtheeffectof increasingtherateofbailrefusalby10.3%forthosewithpriorconvictions,7.3%forthoseappearingwithan indictable offence with a prior indictable conviction; 15.5% for defendants who hadpreviously failed to appear; and 14.4% for Indigenous adults (Fitzgerald and Weatherburn2004:1).The laterAct targeting repeatpropertyoffendersextendedthepresumptionagainstbail to include firearms related offences and people chargedwith serious firearmoffences (s8B);andpeoplechargedwithtwoormoreseriouspropertyoffenceswhohadpreviouslybeenconvictedofsimilaroffenceswithintheprevioustwoyears(s8C).Seriouspropertyoffencesaredefinedtoincluderobbery,breakingandentering,andcartheft.The ‘exceptional’ nature of NSWdevelopmentswas noted by Steel (2009)who compiled thefollowing table of what he called ‘punitive’ changes to bail legislation across the Australianjurisdictions.Table1:Numberof‘punitive’changestobaillegislation,1992‐2008

Statejurisdiction Number

Tasmania 1

Queensland 3

SouthAustralia 4

Victoria 6

WesternAustralia 7

NorthernTerritory 7

AustralianCapitalTerritory 9

NewSouthWales 25Source:Steel(2009)ThecumulativeeffectsofthemanychangestotheBailAct1978(NSW)weresummarisedbythethenNSWAustralianLaborPartyAttorneyGeneral,JohnHatzistergos,in2007inthecourseofintroducingyetanotheramendmentbill.

NewSouthWalesnowhasthetoughestbail lawsinAustralia.Overthe last fewyearswehavecrackeddownonrepeatoffenders–peoplewhohabituallycomebefore our courts time and again. Part of those changes includes removing thepresumption in favour of bail for a large number of crimes. We have alsointroduced presumptions against bail for crimes including drug importation,firearm offences, repeat property offences and riots, and an even moredemanding exceptional circumstances test for murder and serious personalviolence,includingsexualassault.


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Thosetypesofoffendersnowhaveamuchtoughertimebeinggrantedbailunderourrigoroussystem.Theseextensivechangeshavedeliveredresults.Thereisnodoubt that the inmate population, particularly those on remand, has risenconsiderablyasaresultofthechanges.Infact,thenumberofremandprisonershasincreasedby20percentinthelastthreeyearsaloneandnewjailsarebeingopenedtoaccommodate the increase.The latest figures fromNewSouthWalesre‐offendingdatabaseonbaildecisionshaveshownthatfrom1995to2005bailrefusals intheDistrictCourtandSupremeCourtshavealmostdoubled,withanincreasefrom25.8percentto46.4percent.(Hatzistergos2007:2670;quotedinNSWLRC2012:para.3.68)

Shiftingconceptionsofbail:Fromensuringattendanceandintegrity,tocrimeprevention

TheprevioussectionoutlinedthelegislativehyperactivityinNSW,evidentinthesheerscaleofamendments to theBailAct 1978 (NSW).While similar trendswere apparent inother statesand Territories, NSW was exceptional, particularly in relation to what Steel (2009) calls‘punitive’amendments.Theeffectsoftheseamendmentswerespeltoutinunapologetictermsby the NSWAttorney General in 2007, quoted above. These effects have not come about byaccident or as a side effect; they have largely been intended consequences of the desire torestrictaccess tobail in relation toawide rangeofallegedoffencesandallegedoffenders, inparticularthosewitharecordofpreviousoffences.Whilethepoliticaldriversandtheeffectsoflegislativehyperactivityareclear,lesscleararetheaccompanyingshiftsinconceptualunderstandingsofthepurposesofbail.Thissectionwillofferabriefoverviewofsomesuggestedshifts.Itwillbearguedthatconceptionsofbailhaveshiftedfromthatofabasicallyproceduralmechanismtoensuretheattendanceoftheaccusedattrialand protect the integrity of the trial process against interference with witnesses or thedestructionof evidence, toa substantive, independent forum inwhichcrimepreventionaimsarepursued.Whileoftennotexplicit,crimepreventionispursuedthroughtheriseofrisk‐basedmentalities, manifested for example in the increased legislative emphasis on categories ofoffenceandonpreviousconvictions,asgroundsforbailrefusal.Thesecategoriesofoffenceandpriorconvictionsstandinasverygeneralmarkersofriskinanumberofsenses.Firstthereisthe actual risk of absconding, interfering with witnesses or evidence, orreoffending/threatening community safety; second the risk to broad notions of communityfears andanxieties; and third thepolitical risk togovernmentsof seriousoffences committedwhilst on bail. While the first of these forms of risk is ostensibly focused on the individualaccused, the elaborate legislative schema of presumptions based on offence type serves todeflectthatfocusontotheaccused’smembershipofpre‐set, legislativelydefinedcategoriesorpopulations. The second and third forms of risk are not specifically within the realm oflegitimatelegalconsiderationsinacourtroomsetting.Neverthelesstheyconceivablyoperateatamorenebulous contextual level in relation to thementalities andpracticesofbaildecision‐makers suchaspolice,magistratesand judges, tending toproducemorecautious, riskaverseand pre‐emptive decision‐making. (The increasingly theoretically sophisticated researchliteratureonrisk,bothwithincriminaljustice(forexampleZedner2007,2009,2011)andmorebroadly(forexampleBakerandSimon2002;Beck1992;O’Malley2000,2004,2013)hasbeenlittledeployedinthebailfield(butseeHannah‐MoffatandMaurutto2013)andisnotenteredintohere).ThecomplexNSWbailschemebasedonspecificcategoriesofoffenceandpreviousconvictionswhichhasemerged fromaprocessofconstant legislativeamendment involves fivesignificantreconceptualisationsofbail:


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1. Ashiftoffocusfromtheindividualcasetothecategoryofoffence;2. Anerosionofthepresumptionofinnocence;3. Theframingofafalseoppositionbetweenindividuallibertyandthepublicinterest;4. Thecreationofdoublejeopardyeffectthroughthefocusonpreviousconvictions;5. Thedevelopmentofanunacknowledgedschemeofpre‐trialpreventivedetention.

1. FromindividualcasetocategoryofoffenceFirstly,theschemeinvolvesashiftfromassessmentoftheindividualbeforethecourt,andthespecificcircumstancesoftheaccusedandofthecaseallegedagainstthem,toassessmentbasedonprior legislativelydeterminedcategoriesofoffenceandoffender. Inshort it isa shift fromapproachingtheaccusedasaspecificindividualbeforethecourt(whatwemightcallindividualjustice) to treating the individual as a member of a legislatively determined category orpopulation. The alleged offender is judged or assessed, not against their individualcircumstances, but as amember of a population or category that is legislatively, rather thanjudicially,assumedtopresentahigherriskofnon‐attendanceandofreoffendingwhilstonbail.Ina fundamental sense, thisapproach isadeparture fromthebasic ruleof lawprinciple thatjusticemustbedoneintheindividualcase.Itisnotstrictlyaformofactuarialriskassessmentastheoffencecategoriesattractingarestrictionorremovalinthepresumptioninfavourofbailarebroadlyframedandtheirselectionreflectsaconcernwithallthreeformsofriskhighlightedabove,namelyriskofreoffending,risktocommunityfearsandanxieties,andpoliticalrisk.Theshiftfromjudicialadjudicationtolegislativecategorisationismostobviouslydemonstratedin forms of mandatory or grid sentencing, but is also apparent in lesser forms of legislativeprescriptionofthetypeseenintheconstantlegislativeamendmentstobaillegislationoutlinedabove.InarobustearlychapteroftheBailreport,Bailandthecriminaljusticesystem,theNSWLRCoutlinedasetofprinciples‘thatprotectlibertyandfairnessinthecriminaljusticesystem’(NSWLRC2012:paras2.9‐2.35),arguingthat‘baillegislation,beingpartofthecriminaljusticesystem,shouldbeconstrainedbythesameprinciples’(NSWLRC2012:para.2.11).Oneoftheseprinciplesis ‘individualisedjusticeandconsistencyindecision‐making’(NSWLRC2012:para.2.10).TheCommissionnotedthattoachieveadecisionappropriate‘inallthecircumstancesofthe case’ involves the exercise of ‘a broad discretion. An overly prescriptive approach to bailcreates complexity and inflexibility for decision‐makers’ (NSW LRC 2012: para. 2.28). TheCommissionagreedwithanearlierVictorianLawReformCommissionReport(VLRC2007)that‘a simpler Bail Act based on fundamental principleswould best accommodate the importantvalues of individual individualised justice and consistent decisionmaking’ (VLRC 2007: para.2.32).2. ErodingthepresumptionofinnocenceSecondly,theschemeinvolvesasignificantdownplayingoftheimportanceofthepresumptionofinnocence.Themorebailisapproached,notasaproceduralstageinthecriminalprocessoramechanism for assuring the integrity of the forthcoming trial at which culpability will bedeterminedbutasaplatformofadjudicationinitsownright,wherecrimepreventionandothersentencing, control and therapeutic aims can be pursued, the more the presumption ofinnocenceisundermined.ThisdiminutioninawarenessofandcommitmenttothepresumptionofinnocenceisexemplifiedintheNSWAttorneyGeneral’sparliamentaryspeechquotedabovewherehe states ‘those typesof offendersnowhave amuch tougher timebeing grantedbail’.Thesecommentsconcernpersonswhoareyettostandtrialbutwhoareconfidentlyassertedtobe ‘typesofoffenders’,onthebasisof thetypesofoffencetheyhavebeenchargedwith.Suchcommentscontributetotheerosionofthepresumptionofinnocence.Noristhiseffectpeculiarto NSW. In a study of policing bail conditions in Victoria, police persistently referred to theaccusedasthe‘offender’(Colvin2009:51)Theseexamplesoftheerosionofthepresumptionofinnocence in daily practice and language underscores the important discussion in the NSW


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LRC’sBail report of the fundamental principlesunderlying the criminal justice system.Thesewere seen as including: the right to personal liberty; the presumption of innocence; nodetentionwithout legal cause;nopunishmentwithoutdueprocess;a fair trial; individualisedjusticeandconsistency indecision‐making;andspecialprovisionforyoungpeople(NSWLRC2012:9).3. Framingafalseopposition:individuallibertyvpublicinterestThirdly,theriseinriskanalysishascontributedtoacommonframingofbailintermsof,ontheone hand, ‘balancing’ the personal interests of the accused person against, on the other, thecollective, public or societal interest in safety or protection from crime. This is a seriousmisconceptionwhichhassignificanteffectsonpublic,media,politicalandlegaldebateandthepotential outcomes of reform processes. Following the lead of Judge Cross in R vWakefield(1969:300)whonotedthat‘suchanapproachwillinevitablyleadtoerror’(RvWakefield1969:325)theNSWLRCReportusefullyhighlightedthisconceptualmistake.

The error lies in seeing the interest in liberty, and indeed in the otherfundamentalprinciplesofthelawsuchasthepresumptionofinnocenceandtherighttoafairtrial,asinterestsoftheindividualandinparticulartheindividualdefendant.Conceivingtheminthisway,withinthefamiliarmetaphorofbalance,rendersonefarmorelikelytoseethemasoflessweightthansocial,communityor public interests. [But] the interest in liberty and fundamental principles iscorrectly seen as a collective, social, public interest. The issue then is one ofreconciling or evaluating the strengthof competingpublic interests. (NSWLRC2012:para.3.12)

4. FocusonpreviousoffencescreatesadoublejeopardyeffectFourthly,anelementofdoublejeopardyarisesinthatpeoplearebeingdeniedbailonthebasisofpreviousoffencesforwhichtheyhavealreadybeenpunished.Thedoublejeopardyeffectisevenmoremarkedinthe lightofbailresearchwhich followsfromFeeley(1979)onwards, tothe effect that ‘the process is the punishment’. Certainly it is clear that there is a range ofadverseconsequencesthatflowfrombeingremandedincustodyasdistinctfrombeinggrantedbail, themostsevereofwhich isdeath incustody(seegenerallyBrownetal.2011:166‐191)alongwitharangeofeffectsonhealth,physicalandmental(Indigetal.2010,2011).While itmightbearguedthatpunishment isnot theaimor intentionof remandincustody, it is likelythattheaccused,whoisyettobefoundortopleadguilty,maywellexperienceremandcustodyas a form of punishment, particularly those 5,218 remandees (55%) who are subsequentlyfoundnotguilty,discharged,orfoundguiltyandsentencedtoanon‐custodialpenalty(NSWLRC2012:para.4.16).TheNSWLRCReportlistedtheeffectsofcustodialremandas:noopportunitytoprepareforprison;ahigherrateofassaultsthansentencedprisoners;deleteriouseffectsonthe ability to secure a fair trial; increasing the likelihood of guilty pleas, conviction and asentenceofimprisonment;thecriminogeniceffectofmixingwithsentencedprisonersandhighrisk remandees; and the unavailability of rehabilitation programs to remandees (Grunseit,Forell and McCarron 2008; NSW LRC 2012: paras 5.35‐5.50). These were in addition to asubstantiallistofhardshipsofimprisonmentmoregenerally,suchasphysicalandpsychologicalhardshipsandeffectsonfamilyandchildren,whicharenotspecifictoremandprisoners(NSWLRC2012:paras65‐69).Inadditiontherearethesignificantfinancialcoststothecommunityofhighremandratesgiventheaveragedailycostofimprisonmentof$276perdayforadultsand$589perdayforjuveniles(NSWLRC2012:para.5.51).5. Unacknowledgedpre‐trialpreventivedetentionFifthly, the legislative structuring of differential rules for defendants according to offencecategories and previous offences, togetherwith the shift from concern about attendance and


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integrityof the trialprocess to crimeprevention,hasarguablyproduceda systemofmassiveand largely unacknowledged, or backdoor, pre‐trial preventive detention, which in numbersdwarfs the formal systems of preventive detention such as those which provide for post‐sentencedetentionorsupervisionofserioussexoffenders.Between2003and2009,acrossthefiveAustralianStatesthatprovidedforpost‐sentencedetentionorsupervision,165applicationswere granted out of 205made. In NSW the vast bulk of thesewere supervision rather thandetentionorders(Baldryetal.2011:33).While25%oftheNSWprisonpopulation,orroughly2,500 persons, are unconvicted, as at 2011, only two persons in NSW were serving post‐sentencedetentionorders(Baldryetal.2011).Thedifferencesdonotendthere.Thehearingsofapplications by the Crown for post‐sentence detention orders involve high quality legalrepresentation, the adducing of extensive evidence, including from psychologists andpsychiatrists and often involving risk assessment instruments, full forensic argument anddetailed judicial considerationby a SupremeCourt judge. In contrast, inmany bail decisions,accusedpersonsareunrepresentedorrepresentedbybusydutysolicitors,decisionsaremadeon little evidence, mainly police submissions from the bar table, and are made in hearingslastingafewminutes,largelybymagistrates,andindeedinsomecasesbythepoliceinthefirstinstance.Further,thedecisionsare,asseenabove,oftenstronglydeterminedbythelegislativeframeworkofpresumptions,soheavilyinflectedbyrecentlegislativehyperactivityandframedaround categoriesof offence chargedandprioroffences, rather than full considerationof theindividualcircumstancesoftheindividualcase.Illustrations of the conceptual shifts outlined above can be seen in a significant developmentwhichhascontributedindirectlytotheriseinremandpopulations,namelytheexplosioninbailconditionsandtheconsequentriseinrevocationsbroughtaboutbymoreintensivepolicingofbailconditions.Theexplosioninconditionalbail

Therehasalsobeenanexplosionintheextentandnumberofbailconditionsimposedbypoliceandcourtsinrecentyears.Commonconditionsincludetherequirementofreportingtopolice,curfews, non‐association conditions, conditions that specify where the person must reside,wheretheycango,whatreasonabledirectionstheymustobserve,andnottoconsumealcoholand drugs. While these are commonly referred to as ‘conditions’, the NSW LRC sought todistinguishbetweenconditionsasarequirementthatmustbemetbeforereleasecantakeplace(for example financial conditions, provision of a surety, surrender of passport) and ‘conductrequirements’whichareconditionsembodiedinabailagreement(NSWLRC2012:paras12.4‐12.5).Theattachingofconditionshasbecomesomethingofaproformapractice,achecklistor‘tickthebox’approach,withminimalconsiderationoftheappropriatenessoftheconditionsortheireffects,particularlyinrelationtoyoungpeopleandthosewithmentalhealthorcognitiveimpairments. Young people, in particular, are being set up to fail. The current position wassuccinctlysummarisedby theChiefMagistrateof theNSWLocalCourt inasubmission to theNSWLRC.

Overly complex or onerous reporting requirements that go beyond thosereasonably necessary to secure an accused person’s attendance at court arecommonlyseeninconditionsofpolicebailorarebeingsoughtinapplicationsforbailbeforethecourt,notwithstandingtherequirementofsection37(2)thattheconditionsimposedonagrantofbailaretobenomoreonerousthanappeartobe required. The Court is exposed to constant applications for review of bailconditionsandobservesthatinthemajorityofcasessuchapplicationsarewhollyorpartiallysuccessful,inmostcaseswiththeconsentoftheprosecutingagency.(NSWLRC2012:para.12.7)


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This submission was strongly supported by submissions from a wide range of legal andadvocacyservices,whichprovidedtheLRCwithnumerousexamples,suchasthefollowing.Example1

LAwaschargedwithresistpoliceandpossessionofanillicitsubstance.Shewasapprehended in Kings Cross. Police released her on bail, with one of herconditionsbeingthatshewasrestrictedfromgoingwithin1000metresofKingsCrossrailwaystation.She was subsequently arrested in Kings Cross again sharing needles, and wastaken into custody.Anapplication forbailwasmadebefore the court, andbailwas granted with the same conditions, namely that she not go within 1000metresofKingsCrossrailwaystation.The bail condition presented considerable difficulties for LA as she needed toentertheKingsCrossareatoaccessherdoctorandhermethadoneclinic.Anapplicationforvariationofthebailconditionswasmade,withtheconditionsbeingvaried.(NSWLRC2012:Example12.1)

Example2ALegalAidChildren'sLegalServiceclientwaschargedwithcommittingaffray.IntheexperienceofLegalAidsolicitors it isstandardpracticeatBiduraCourt formagistrates in such cases to impose a place restriction encompassing a 2 kmradius from Sydney Town Hall. The magistrate accordingly imposed thiscondition,givingnoconsiderationtothefactthatthedefendantwouldbreachtheconditionevery timeshe travelled toschool,visited theDepartmentof JuvenileJusticeinaccordancewithanotherbailcondition,orvisitedhersister,wholivedinRedfern.

Example3Anotherexample involvedacasewhere fourco‐accusedchildrenwerechargedwithenteringenclosedlandsandputonbailtonotassociatewitheachotherandtoobeyastrictcurfew.Threeof thechildrenwerecousinsandtwolivedinthesamehouse.Threeweresubsequentlyarrestedforbreachingtheirbaillessthanseven days after police bail was granted. Two out of the four were first timeoffenders.(NSWLRC2012:para.12.21)

TheNSWLRC’sconclusionwasthat:

Conductrequirementsappeartobeimposedroutinelyandunnecessarilywithouttailoring to the situation of the individual.Monitoring for compliancebypolicehasbecomemoreactiveandintenseinrecenttimes.Arrestforfailuretocomplyhasbeen increasing.Wehavenostatisticallysignificantevidenceofareductionincrimeasaresult.…Intensiveenforcementofroutinelyimposedconditionsiscreating unnecessary public costs and unnecessary hardship, particularly foryoungpeople,withoutapparentbenefittothecommunity.(NSWLRC2012:paras12.73,12.75)

Eatyourdinnerorhaveyourbailrevoked

Many of the examples set out by the NSW LRC or provided by legal services in the field,illustratethewaythatbailisbeingpressedintoserviceasanewformorleverofcontrolwhich


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extends far beyond crime or crime prevention. Despite the criticism of Freiberg andMorganthat: ‘the concepts of “conviction” and “sentence” have been eroded by the proliferation ofdispositions intheformofdiversionprogramsandorders’ (2004:221)andthat ‘the limitsofbail are difficult to determine’ (Freiberg andMorgan 2004: 223), the use of bail to anchor arangeofsemi‐coercedtherapeuticprocesses,suchasdrugandalcoholrehabilitationprogramsunders36AoftheBailAct1978(NSW),hasgenerallybeenviewedaslargelybenign(seeNSWLRC2012:paras13.24‐13.34).Suchinitiativesarelinkedtonotionsoftherapeuticjustice,whichseektoshiftconceptionsofthecourt,especiallyLowerCourts,awayfromcrimecontroltothatofcasualtywardortriagestation,apointofinterventionand‘leverage’wherearangeofsocial,medical andwelfare services can be deployed.While it is recognised that there is a level ofcoercioninusingbailasaconditionofprogramparticipation,theissuesofproblematicconsent,lackof ‘legalandmoralfoundationsofguiltandconviction’(FreibergandMorgan2004:221),andof‘conceptualconfusion’andthe‘distortionoflegalstructures’(FreibergandMorgan2004:234)highlightedbyFreibergandMorgantendtobeskirtedoverintheinterestsofmanagingorgoverning individuals towards safer and healthier lifestyles and living conditions,which it ishopedwillalsoreduceoffending.Theheavyweight thatbail is increasinglyasked tobearandthesignificantdistance travelledfrom the principle of no punishment without due process are exemplified in the followingexamplecitedbytheNSWLRC.

Carl is twelve years old and has a cognitive impairment that means he oftenmisbehavesandisdifficulttocontrol.Asaresulthelivesinsupportedhousing,where those caring for him find him hard to discipline. Carl was arrested forassaultand,attherequestofhiscarer,oneoftheconditionsofhisbailwasthatheeathisdinnereverynight.IfCarlfailstodoso,hebreacheshisbailandcouldbeplacedonremand.(NSWLRC2012:para.12.29)

While having every sympathy for those charged with assisting and managing cognitivelyimpairedandunrulyyoungpeople,thereisafundamentalquestionabouttheappropriatenessofthethreatofremandincustodyfornoteatingyourdinner.TheLRCdescribedsuchcasesasexamples of ‘inappropriate, welfare oriented or overly onerous conditions’ (NSW LRC 2012:para.12.29).Inthisexamplelawisbeingdeployedfarbeyonditssphereofcompetence,amovewhichunderminesitslegitimacyandcredibility.Anylinktocrimeorevencrimepreventionhasbeen lost here; bail law is being drafted in to assist in the mundane management of social,welfare and medical problems for which it is ill equipped and inappropriate (see generallyBargen2009‐2010;Boyle2009;McFarlane2010;cfHannah‐MoffatandMaurutto2013).Bailrevocation:Breachingconditions,policingpracticesandtheroleofKPIs

Theproliferationofbailconditionscoupledwithmoreaggressivemonitoringofcompliancebythepolicehasproducedasignificant increaseinrevocationsofbail,particularly inrelationtoyoung persons. In NSW in 2001, there were 6% of detentions for breach relative to totaldetentions of juveniles pending completion of proceedings. That figure had increased tobetween 20% and 23% from 2007 onwards. Greater levels of police enforcement are alsoincreasingbail revocations for adults.Between2001and20011therewasanaverageannualpercentagechangeof16.7%(NSWLRC2012:para.12.68).Itisinstructivetolookbehindthesebreachfigurestoalargelyunacknowledgedshiftinpolicingpractices which has produced them. The shift in strategies has come about in a ratherroundaboutway. InNSWin2006anALPStatePlan identifiedreducingrecidivismasamajorpriorityandsetthetargetofareductioninrecidivismby10%by2016.OtherpartsoftheNSWStatePlanpromote‘widening’oftheapplicationofearlyinterventionprograms,inadditionto


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reducing court appearances for young people by ‘better use ofwarnings, cautions andYouthJusticeConferencing’(NSWGovernment2010:56).Onemechanismforreducingrecidivismwasidentifiedasstrictermonitoringofbailcompliance,ontheassumptionthatthoseonbailwereagroupofhighriskoffendersespeciallylikelytore‐offend.ThisconcernwastranslatedintoanewsetofpoliceKeyPerformanceIndicators(KPIs),which required the police to step up compliance checks, of bail conditions such as curfew,residence,place,non‐association,educational,work,alcoholanddrugconditions.Theconductofspecificcompliancecheckshasbecomeincorporatedintodailypolicingroutinesinawaythatiseasilymeasurablecomparedtothemoregeneralised,discretion‐based,routinepolicepatrolorcommunity liaisonwork.ThenewKPIsarepopularwithpoliceas theyprovideaclearcutmeasure of their work rate which can be counted and thus readily applied to ‘productivityrates’,localareacommandassessments,andpromotionprospects.Inthissomewhatbackhandway, without explicit amendment to the bail legislation or clear parliamentary debate, crimeprevention through significantly increased policemonitoring of bail conditions has become anewpartofthefunctionofbailThe police have taken to this enhanced task and the KPIs by which they themselves areincreasingly evaluated, with evident relish. Police Annual Reports refer to ‘nightly bailcompliancechecks,particularlyonjuveniles’andtheallocationof‘BailComplianceOperations’as a ‘key outlook’ (NSW Police Force 2008: 15; Young 2010: 8). Specific police targetingoperations such as ‘Operation Avert’, a bi‐annual program which targets outstanding arrestwarrants and bail compliance, have drawn high police and political praise. For example theresults of one weekend state‐wide operationwhich resulted in 89 arrests for breach of bailwere described by Deputy Commissioner Owens as demonstrating ‘an effective strategy inputtingoffendersbeforethecourts’(NSWPoliceForce2010:1‐2,citedinYoung2010:8).ThenMinister for Police, Michael Daley, expressed similar sentiments about earlier operationsdeclaring,‘[p]olicearen’tsittingontheirhands…they’rewellandtrulyonthefrontfoot,takingknown criminals off the street’ (Daley 2009: 1). The ‘high visibility’ OperationAvert in 2013conductedoverthreedays,included1903bailcompliancecheckswhichcontributedtochargesfor940 ‘offences, including…breachofbail’,andwas judgedbyAssistantCommissionerAlanClarke as an ‘effective strategy’ ‘to take repeat offenders off the streets’ (NSW Police Force2013).Suchclaimsaremadedespitethefactthatthoseonbailarenot,atleastonthecurrentcharge,proven‘repeatoffenders’;thatbreachofabailconditionisnotacriminaloffence(BailAct1978(NSW)ss50,51);andthatpolicearrestpowersregardingbreachofbailconditionsrequirethearrestedpersontobebroughtbeforeacourtsotheissueofbailcanbere‐determined(BailAct1978(NSW)s50(1)(a)).Further there isnoevidence thathigherremandrates translate intosafercommunities(NoeticSolutions2011:78;Vingnaendraetal.2009:4).FishwickandBolithonote the inconsistency of pursuing the objective of ‘keep[ing] the community safe throughtightenedmonitoring of those at high risk of offending’ and reducing recidivism, when ‘it iswidelyrecognisedthatputtingyoungpeopleintocustodywillnotreducerecidivism,nomatterhowitismeasured’(FishwickandBolitho2010:173;seealsoStubbs2009:253).Pre‐sentencepunishment

ArecentstudyconductedbyCourtneyYoungbasedonin‐depthinterviewsinanunnamedNSWcountrytownrevealedwidespreaddisquietamong local lawyersaboutpolicebailcompliancetactics, especially in relation to Aboriginal children (Young 2010). One judicial officerinterviewed referred to a case of a defendant who breached his daily reporting conditionbecause he was bailed to an address 30km out of town, despite having no history ofunreliability, saying the police ‘were just narking him, that’s all they were doing … it’s


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transparent that they put conditions of bail in place… to create hardship for people’ (Young2010: 14‐15). One local legal practitioner stated that there is an ‘awful lot of extra curialpunishment inbailconditions’but ‘you’renotallowedtosay that’ (Young2010:16).Curfewswerethemostcomplainedaboutconditionwithmanystoriesofyoungpeoplebeingbreachedin circumstanceswhere their parentswere responsible for taking them out after the curfew(Young2010:17).Onepractitionerasked:whatwashisclient‘Karina’,a13yearoldAboriginalgirltodo;‘walkbackhome...inthehoursofdarkness…placingheronthevulnerablelist…orwas she to stay there safewith family and run the gauntlet that the police do not go to herresidence’(Young2010:17).Anotherpractitionerhighlightedthecaseof‘Sarah’,a13yearoldgirl who allegedly stole a lipstick from a supermarket. Sarahwas bailed subject to a curfewwhichconfinedhertoherhome,excepttoattendschool. Inthepractitioner’sview, ‘it’shousearrest. It’spunishmentpre‐sentence’ (Young2010:18).Night curfewswereoften imposed inrelationtominoroffencessuchasshopliftingwhichwereallegedtohaveoccurredduringtheday. One practitioner claimed that 10pm and 2am curfew checks are ‘all the Night Shift aredoing’. Many of the participants recounted incidents of police ‘knocking on doors at 3am’,‘shiningtorchesthroughwindows’and‘wanderingaroundyards’(Young2010:19).ThispatternofbailcompliancepolicingwasconfirmedinnumeroussubmissionsmadetotheNSWLawReformCommissionfromawiderangeoffrontlinecommunityagencies,fromwhichthefollowingexamplesaredrawn.Example4

DespiteBen’slackofcriminalrecordorpriorcontactwithpolice,hewasplacedononerousbailconditionsincludingnon‐associationwith8ofhisfriends,andacurfewfrom8pmto6am.Notonlywasthecurfewunwarrantedinthecircumstances(theallegedoffencewas committed in the afternoon), it had aparticularlyharsh impactbecauseofthepolicepracticeof‘bailcompliancechecks’.For several weeks, police turned up almost every night (sometime between11.30pmand 3am) at Ben’s house to check that hewas abidingbyhis curfew.ThiscausedBenandhisfosterfamilymuchdistress.Thereisa4‐year‐oldchildinthefamilyhomewhowasawokeneachnightandwhohadtroublegettingbacktosleep.Theneighbourswerealsobecomingupsetwith thevoicesandpolicecarlights interrupting their sleepalmosteverynight. (NSWLRC2012:para.12.22,Example12.3)

Example5A 16‐year‐old Legal Aid client named Kristy was charged with aggravatedrobberyandassaultoccasioningactualbodilyharmforanincidentwhereitwasallegedthatsheandafriendrobbedthevictimofamobilephone.Priortothesecharges,Kristyhadhadnodealingswithpolice.Oneofthebailconditionssetforherwasthatshebehomebetween7pmand7am.Kristylivedwithherfatherandher9‐year‐oldsister.PoliceconductedbailcompliancechecksonKristyoverathreemonthperiodonaveragefivenightsaweek.ThiswasdespitethefactthatduringthistimeKristyattendedallofhercourtappearancesanddidnotcommitanyoffences.Thetimesthe checks were carried out varied: for example, 8.45pm, 3.10am and 6.50am.ThebailcompliancecheckswerenoticedbyotherresidentsoftheunitblockinwhichKristy'sfamilylivedandcausedsignificantembarrassmenttothefamily.


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KristyappliedtotheSupremeCourtforabailvariation.TheCourtremovedthecurfewcondition.(NSWLRC2012:para.12.36,Example12.6)

Example6ALegalAidclientwhowasayoungsinglemotherwasallegedtohavecommittedaminoroffenceunlikelytoattractacustodialsentence.Asaconditionofherbailshewas required to report daily to the police. On one particular day her one‐year‐old child was very sick, vomiting so much as to suffer dehydration. As aresult, she was unable to report that day. She reported the next day and toldpolicewhathadhappened.Policearrestedherandkeptherincustodyformostofthedayuntilshewasgrantedbail,despitethefactthattheydidnotdisputeherexplanation or the fact that the charges were minor and unlikely to attract acustodialsentence.(NSWLRC2012:para.12.39,Example12.7)

Julie Stubbs notes that ‘data indicate a 250% increase in arrests for outstanding warrantsand/orbreachofbailfrom2003‐04to2007‐08’acrossbothadultsandjuveniles(Stubbs2010:496‐7).ThePolice submission to theNSWLawReformCommission inquiry strongly justifiedthis pattern of compliance checking as being ‘in line with [NSW Police Force] strategies ofpredominantly targetinghigh‐risk (being recidivist, serious andviolent)offenders’ (NSWLRC2012: para. 12.44) and as securing deterrence from offending, ‘building rapport with youngpeopleandtheirfamilies’,reinforcingcommunityexpectationsandpreventingvictimisationofyoungpeople(NSWLRC2012:para.12.41).Inaddition:

Commandsalsoviewedbailcompliancechecksasaninvestigativetool[emphasisadded]. Juveniles on conditional bail known for offenceswith a similarmodusoperandi had curfew checks conducted on them as soon as the incident wasreportedtorulethemoutaspossiblesuspects.Targeting is risk based. It considers the juvenile’s profile as well as the crimeenvironment[emphasisadded]inthelocalarea.(NSWLRC2012:para.12.40).

TheLRCnotedthat:

The NSW Police Force … states that the number of bail compliance checksconductedpermonthonyoungpeoplehasincreasedapproximately400%fromJanuary 2007 to September 2010. (In the 2007/08 financial year, there were25,712bailcompliancechecksonyoungpeoplerecordedinthepolicecomputersystem.Inthe2009/10financialyear,thereweremorethan40,799suchchecks).(NSWLRC2012:para.12.43)Revocationsofbailforbreachesofconditionsiscontributingsignificantlytotherise in remand rates in relation to young people. Briefly, the number of youngpeople remanded for breach of bail conditions only has increased from193 in2000‐01to1142in2010‐11.Theaveragelengthofstayforayoungpersonwhois bail refused for breachof bail conditions is 14hours 46minutes. (NSWLRC2012:59,para.4.47)

AftermathtotheNSWLRCReport

As the discussion above has drawn heavily on the NSW LRC ReportBail (2012), it is worthbrieflynotingitsaftermath.BeforethefinalversionwassettledandtheReportreleasedinApril2012,apreemptiveattackwasmadeonboththeprospectiveReportandtheAttorneyGeneral,


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byprominenttalkbackradiohostRayHadleyandtheDailyTelegraph (Clennell2012,2012a,2012b;cfClennell2012(‘HowDPPGregSmithwentfromRambotocreampuff’),2012b(‘Gaysand lesbianswill begivenaget‐out‐of‐jail‐free cardunderproposals to soften the state’sbaillawscurrentlybeforeAttorneyGeneral’);MediaWatch2012).TheseattackscontinuedoncetheReport had been released (Clennell 2012c, 2012d (‘Accusedmurderers and rapistswould beallowedoutof jailwhileawaitingtrial,underanoverhaulofNSWbail laws’);cfAkland2012;Humphries2012;Patty2012,2012a).InNovember2012theAttorneyGeneralGregSmithreleasedtheNSWGovernment’sresponseto theReport (NSWGovernment2012).Theresponse indicated thatanewBailActwouldbeintroduced in 2013 that will do away with offence‐based presumptions andmove to a risk‐basedassessment requiring thebail authority to assess the riskposedby anaccusedperson.The NSW LRC Report had recommended a uniform presumption in favour of bail for alloffences.Theresponsestatedthat:

The Government anticipates that dispensing with the system of presumptionswill not only simplify the bail decision making process, but will also result infewer amendments to the legislation enabling it to remain simple and clear, aswas intended when the original bail laws were codified in 1978 (NSWGovernment2012:7).

InMay2013theNSWAttorneyGeneralintroducedtheBailBill2013intotheNSWparliament.As foreshadowedby theAttorneyGeneral, theBill abolishes the systemofpresumptionsandmoves to an ‘unacceptable risk’ test. A bail authority is to consider whether there is any‘unacceptablerisk’thatanaccusedpersonwillfailtoappear;commitaseriousoffence,whichisnot specifically defined but includes sexual or violent offences or offences where there wasallegeduseofanoffensiveweapon;endangerthesafetyofvictims;orinterferewithwitnesses.Bail can only be refused if there is an unacceptable risk that cannot be mitigated by theimpositionofbailconditions.Bailconditionscanonlybeimposedforthepurposeofmitigatinganunacceptablerisk.A flowchartoutlining thebasic ‘unacceptablerisk’baildecision‐makingprocessisincludedintheBill.A bail authority is required to have regard to the presumption of innocence and the generalright to be at liberty. There is a right to release for minor offences, including all fine‐onlyoffencesandmostoffencesundertheSummaryOffencesAct1988(NSW),butconditionscanstillbeimposed.Conditionsgenerallymustbe‘reasonable,proportionatetotheallegedoffenceandappropriatetoaddresstheunacceptableriskinrelationtowhichtheyareimposed’, ‘mustnotbemore onerous than is necessary tomitigate that risk’ and compliancewith the conditionsmustbe‘reasonablypractical’(Smith2013).ThetypesofconditionmirrorthoseintheexistingAct.TheBillspecifiestheactionsapoliceofficercantakeinrelationtofailuretocomplywithabail acknowledgement or bail conditions. The officer may ‘decide to take no action, issue awarning,issueanapplicationnoticeorcourtattendancenoticetothepersonrequiringthemtoattendcourt,arresttheperson,orapplyforanarrestwarrant’(Smith2013).TheBillretainsthecontroversial provision, s 22A, which restricted second or subsequent release applicationsmade to the same court, but exempts juvenileswhere the previous applicationwasmade ontheirfirstappearance.InhissecondreadingspeechtheAttorneyGeneralnotedthattheGovernmentexpectsthenewAct to commence operation approximately 12 months from the date of its assent. This isbecause ‘its new bailmodel is a paradigm shift’ thatwill require ‘an education campaign forpolice, legalpractitionersandcourtsregardingthenewlegislation’andchanges intechnologyinformationsystemsand forms(Smith2013).TheproposedBilldrewamixedresponse fromcommentators(seePatty2013;Taylor2013).


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Conclusion

TheaimofthisarticlehasbeentolookbehindtheincreaseinremandincustodyratesinNSW,although that increase has been common across a number of Australian jurisdictions and isreflectedinnationalfigures.TheimmediatedriversoftheNSWincreasewereidentifiedbytheNSWLRCasincreasingratesofbailrefusalinbothLocalandHigherCourts;anincreaseintheaveragetimespentonremand;adecreaseintheextenttowhichbailis‘dispensedwith’;andanincrease in the frequencyofbail revocations (NSWLRC2012:paras4.8‐4.31).WhereNSW isdistinctive is that the predominant driver of the increases has been a form of legislativehyperactivity involving constant changes to the Bail Act 1978 (NSW), changes which haveremovedorrestrictedthepresumptioninfavourofbailforawiderangeofoffences.As well as charting these developments the article has attempted to delineate some of theunderlyingprocessesthathaveaccompaniedincreasingremandrates.Theseincludeanumberofconceptualshiftsinthewaybailisconceived,includingtheuseofbailforcrimepreventionpurposes and an increasing emphasis on risk. These conceptual shifts are observable in theexplosioninbailconditions,manyofwhichareonerousandinappropriate,andtheKPI‐drivenpolicingofbailconditionsandconsequentriseinrevocations,especiallyinrelationtojuveniles.The article has drawnon theNSWLawReformCommissionReport to illustrate and supportsomeof thesearguments.This raises the issueof theextent towhich theNSWGovernment’sproposed Bail Bill 2013, based partly on the NSW LRC Report, will address, alleviate oracceleratethevariousprocessesandconceptualshiftsarguedabove.The simplest answer to that question is: it remains to be seen. It seems likely that such asignificantchangeinthelegislativeframework,inparticularsweepingawaythecomplexsystemofpresumptions infavourofan ‘unacceptablerisk’model,willhavebothdirectconsequencesandwill feed intomore complex andmediated cultural andorganisational changes.Howevertheexactrelationshipbetweenlegislativeprovisionsandthesocialandorganisationalcontextsand cultural dispositions surrounding remand decision‐making and trends are difficult todelineate,astheSarre,KingandBamford(2006)researchcitedearlier,demonstrates.Astudyofoffendingonbail inEnglandfoundthat ‘thechanges inremanddecisionmaking…seemtoreflectbroaderpolitical andmediadebateaboutoffendingonbail rather thanchanges in thelegislation’(HucklesbyandMarshall,2000:167).(ForanattempttoelaborateonthenotionofpenalcultureanditsrelationshiptorisingimprisonmentratesinAustraliaandelsewhere,seeCunneen et al. 2013.) The NSW Attorney‐General’s reference to the Bill as constituting a‘paradigmshift’andthedelaytoenableaneducationcampaignsignifies thatmore thanmerecosmeticchangesareintended.Thereisclearlyanattempttoaddresscertainoftheconceptualshifts identifiedabove; forexample, in the requirement that thebail authorityhave regard tothe presumption of innocence and the general right to be at liberty. There is also a clearintention to wind back the explosion in bail conditions and to reduce bail revocations bydirecting police to consider a range of options short of arrest for breach of conditions. Thesweepingawayofthecomplexsystemofpresumptionspotentiallyreturnstheattentionofbaildecision‐makersawayfrompre‐determinedlegislativecategoriesbasedonoffencetypetofactsandcircumstancesoftheindividualcase,enlargingjudicialdiscretion.Thebigunknown isexactlyhowthesimplified ‘unacceptablerisk’modelwilloperate.Clearlyriskwillbemorecentraltothenewschemeandexactlyhowthatplaysoutisdifficulttopredict.Apessimisticreadingisthat‘unacceptablerisk’willlicenseanexpansionofwhatO’Malleycalls‘speculative pre‐emption’ (O’Malley 2013: 187) on the basis of ever more imaginative fearsaboutanaccused’spropensitytocommitfutureoffencesandtothreatencommunitysafetyandfearsofthefalloutshouldsuchcasesoccur.Anoptimisticreadingisthatthenewschememayfocuslessonspeculativefearsandmoreonactualevidenceofrisk,atthesametimeasfosteringwhatO’Malleycallsgreater’resilience’(O’Malley2013:187)inbaildecision‐making.Thetaskis


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todistinguishrealthreatsthataccusedpeoplemayabscond(asdistinctfromfailingtoturnupfor amyriad of reasons),may interferewithwitnesses or evidence, andmay commit furthervery serious crimes, from generalised fears of the various repercussions of such occurrencesand from the plethora of technical, administrative breaches of bail conditions that are non‐threatening. Itmaybe that thedebate surrounding the LawReformCommission Inquiry andReportandtheAttorneyGeneral’sresponsehasalreadyhadaneffectonbaildecision‐makersand on the complex organisational and cultural climate, in the direction of amore ‘resilient’attitude to the grant of bail. In that regard it is interesting that the average daily number ofyoungpeopleincustodyinNSWhasdroppedfromahighpointof434in2009‐10to307inMay2013(NSWDJJ2013)priortoanylegislativechanges.Correspondence: David Brown, Professor, Crime and Justice Research Centre, Faculty of Law,QueenslandUniversityofTechnology,BrisbaneQld4000.Email:[email protected] Theauthorwasapart‐timeLawReformCommissioneronthisreference.Allthematerialreliedoninthearticleis

publicallyavailableinthepublishedReportorinsubmissionstotheLRCbyarangeofgroupsandorganisations,submissionsavailableontheNSWLRCwebsite.Theauthorwishestothanktwoanonymousreviewersfortheirhelpfulcommentsonanearlierdraft.

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Legislation

BailAct1978(NSW)SummaryOffencesAct(NSW)1988BailBill(NSW)2013

Cases

RvWakefield(1969)83WN(Pt1)(NSW)300

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Looking Behind the Increase in Custodial Remand Populations · of Corrections 2011: 22) In Canada the remand population increased as a rate from 12.6 per 100,000 to 39.1 in 2007 (Webster,