Long-term Management Options

Literature Review: Long-term Management Option 1

Long-term Management Options

Experiences from around the world

CemareDiana Tingley


Basic concepts and information:

• Factors contributing to overexploitation and unsustainability• Paths to solution• Capacity management• Cost of fisheries management

Experiences of countries:

• Canada • Australia • Faroes • Iceland• New Zealand

Outline


Basic Concepts and Information


Overexploitation and unsustainability

Four components of sustainability:

• Bio-ecological; Economic; Social; Institutional

Six factors of unsustainability

• Inappropriate incentives• High demand for limited resource• Poverty and lack of alternatives• Complexity and lack of knowledge• Lack of good governance• Interactions of fisheries sector with other sectors and environment

FAO/Japan 2003 International Workshop: on the Implementation of International Fisheries Instruments and Factors of Unsustainability and Overexploitation in Fisheries


Paths to solution

1. Inappropriate incentives2. High demand for limited

resource3. Poverty and lack of

alternatives4. Complexity and lack of

knowledge5. Lack of good governance6. Interactions of fisheries

sector with other sectors and environment

Factors of unsustainabilityPaths to solution

• Rights (1)

• Transparent, participatory management (1,2,5)

• Support – science, enforcement, planning (4,5)

• Benefit distribution (1,3)

• Integrated policy (1,3)

• Precautionary approach (4,6)

• Capacity building, public awareness (5)

• Market incentives (1,2)


Capacity management

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Fishing capacity management activities undertaken by Member States (source: FAO, 2004)


Incentive-blocking instruments

Incentive-blocking programmes are only effective in reducing capacity in the short-term

• Limited entry programmes (i.e. days at sea)• Buyback / decommissioning programmes• Gear and vessel restrictions • Aggregate quotas (i.e. TACs)• Non-transferable vessel catch limits• Individual effort quotas (IEQs)

FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 433/1. Measuring and assessing capacity in fisheries. Basic concepts and management options. (2004).


If management is changed to allow a fisher to internalise the social cost of exploiting the resource – by establishing cooperatives, co-management or rights-based fisheries – the consequences of overcapacity in the form of overfished stocks should be corrected

• Individual transferable quotas (ITQs)• Taxes and royalties - different to cost recovery• Group fishing rights (i.e. community quotas/community-based management)• Territorial use rights (i.e. Several/Regulating Orders)

Incentive-adjusting instruments


Cost of management

‘Subsidies in the Fishing Sector in Third Countries: Australia, New Zealand, Iceland, Norway, Canada, USA, Korea and Japan.’ (Studies and Support Services Related to the Common Fisheries Policy Group 2, 1999, Lot 11).

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Experiences of countries


Canada

Overview

• collapse of Atlantic groundfish & decline in Pacific salmon• increasing public awareness of marine health• fisheries now use species/area licensing• IQs/ITQs/IVQs for majority of groundfish/pelagics

Impact

• huge sums of money spent restructuring and diversifying employment• fishing capacity and demand still high as in 1992 • slow recovery of groundfish stocks• despite initial optimistic 3-4 yrs expected recovery


Canada

Developments

• introduction of quotas in Pacific salmon hot topic• 3 fishing interests: commercial, sports, ‘first-nation’• improved communication between scientists & fishers = improved compliance• Fisheries Sustainable Development Strategy – ecosystems, improved stakeholder involvement, facilitation, shared decision-making.

Relevance

• lessons to be learned from cod collapse• much improved stakeholder dialogue


Australia

Overview

• AFMA manages 20 Commonwealth fisheries >3nm• State/Territory’s manage costal and rec. fisheries <3nm• 20 ITQ fisheries (single species except south-east trawl)• but majority managed using input controls• public Fishery Management Plans & cost recovery

Impact

• strict management• some highly profitable fisheries in late 1990s• tradeable access licences valuable assets• concentration of ownership and entry-cost barrier


Australia

Developments

• management highly participatory: incl. community, conservation & recreational interests• increasing coastal sea area set aside for MPAs and restrictions to w.r.t biodiversity / recreational issues• AFMA ‘one-off’ decommissioning planned for 2006: objective to reduce fleet by 50%• overfishing / risk of overfishing / displacement from MPAs

Relevance

• mix of fisheries, interest groups and management tools• increasing role of environment


Faroes

Overview

• disastrous stock collapse in early 1990s• imposed system in 1994 ‘rejected’ by industry• switch to tradeable days-at-sea instead of catch limits 1996• closed areas to protect stocks (e.g. spawning & juveniles)

Impact

• industry management choice adopted• Catch per day increased by 25-30% over 1996-2001• Total Allowable Effort reduced 17% over 5 years• cause = new investment, technical creep, input substitution


Faroes

Developments• system required many revisions over time• 2005 government proposal on tighter effort transfer restrictions between industrial and artisanal fleet• “The original intention was….. never that money should decide which groups would survive” (Min. of Fisheries & Maritime Affairs)

Relevance• isolated and small group of islands• sector of huge importance to national economy• reactive and speedy decisions about Total Allowable Effort• solves problem of discards and improves reporting• but introduces others problems (i.e. creep)


Iceland

Overview

• cod fishery decline warning signals in 1976• effort quotas 1977-83: encouraged ‘race-to-fish’• IVQs (limited transferability) 1984• full ITQs 1990• retrospective industry-funded decommissioning 1990-97

Impact

• collapse of groundfish stocks halted • profitable, concentrated fleet• explicit treatment of by-catch problem (discard ban, roll-over quota)

• disagreement over who should benefit from fishery


Iceland

Relevance

• isolated island, but successful fishing sector• sector of huge importance to national economy• ability of Ministry to react quickly and independently • ITQs and cost-recovery appear successful • but arguments over who shares the economic benefits


New Zealand

Overview

• license limits & other input controls led to excess capacity• ITQs introduced in 1986• 1996 Fisheries Act – sustainable utilisation & strong environmental obligations

Impact

• stocks, profit, investment increased• jobs at sea down, but onshore jobs up• strict enforcement system• bycatch issues explicitly addressed (i.e. deemed value)• criticism of complexity, but fishers pay for management


New Zealand

Developments

• stakeholders want more control over their activities• MoF developing ‘Fisheries Plans’ – co-mangement• new / innovative options possible, tailored for individual fisheries, recreational interests included• Strategy to Manage Environmental Effects of Fishing• draft Marine Protected Area Strategy

Relevance

• isolated island - few commercial interests in some fisheries• but ITQs and cost-recovery appear successful incentives


Final thoughts?


Final thoughts

• incentives and good governance

• tailored solutions – not one size for all

• ‘whole’ system approach

• focus on the good examples

• fisheries are slow crisis?

• crisis can turn good if people think outside the norm

• risk management: robust, adaptive, flexible

Documents

Long-term Management Options