Loc Gov - Herrera and Cordora Orig

7/30/2019 Loc Gov - Herrera and Cordora Orig

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Contents

Contents ..................................................................................................................... 1

Herrera v Comelec ................................................................................................... 1

Cordora v Comelec .................................................................................................. 5

Herrera v Comelec

EN BANC

G.R. No. 131499 November 17, 1999

Hermie M. Herrera, Donabella T. Sorongon, Julio T. Tamayor, Edeljulio R. Romero, petitioners,vs.The Commission on Elections, respondent.

PURISIMA, J.:

This is a petition forcertiorarito annul and set aside Resolution No. 2950 promulgated on November3, 1997 by respondent Commission on Elections, which amended its Resolution Nos. 2379, 2396

and 2778 on the districting and adjustment of Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Panglungsod seats inconnection with the May 11, 1998 elections, on the alleged ground of grave abuse of discretiontainting the same. In particular, petitioners, as taxpayers, assail the portion of subject Resolutiondividing the Province of Guimaras into two provincial districts and apportioning eight (8) electiveSangguniang Panlalawigan seats therefor.

The facts that matter are as follows:

In view of the addition of the two (2) new municipalities, San Lorenzo and Sibunag, to the Provinceof Guimaras, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Guimaras decided to have the province subdividedinto two provincial districts. Conformably, on March 25, 1996, it passed Resolution No. 68 requestingthe Commission on Elections to bring about the desired division.

Acting upon the said Resolution, the Provincial Election Supervisor in the Province of Guimarasconducted two consultative meetings on August 21, 1996 and on October 2 of the same year, withdue notice to all elected provincial and municipal officials, barangay captains, barangay kagawads,representatives of all political parties, and other interested parties. Through secret balloting, aconsensus was reached unanimously in favor of a division as follows:


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1. First District shall be composed of the Municipalities of JordanBuenavista and San Diego with three (3) Sangguniang PanlalawiganMembers, and

2. The Second District shall be composed of the Municipalities ofJordan, Nueva Valencia and Sibunag with three (3) Sangguniang

Panlalawigan Members.

On October 3, 1996, guided by the result of the consultative meetings, the Provincial ElectionSupervisor issued a Memorandum recommending the division of the Province of Guimaras into two(2) provincial districts.

On April 30, 1997, the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department of Finance issuedMemorandum Circular No. 97-1 reclassifying several provinces including the Province of Guimaras,which was reclassified from fifth class to fourth class province.

In line with such reclassification, the Commission on Elections issued, on November 3, 1997, theResolution No. 2950 under attack, which allotted eight (8) Sangguniang Panlalawigan seats to the

Province of Guimaras, dividing it into two provincial districts in the following manner:

Region VI

1. GUIMARAS 126,470 (8 seats)

1st District 56,218 2nd District 70,252

(3 seats) (5 seats)

1. Buenavista 37,681 1. Jordan 25,321

2. San Lorenzo 18,537 2. Nueva Valencia 27,158

3. Sibunag 17,773

Resolution No. 2950 of the Commission on Elections is the subject of the present PetitionforCertioraribrought by the petitioners, as taxpayers and residents of the Province of Guimaras.

Petitioners question the manner in which the province was so divided into districts, pointing out that:1) the districts do not comprise a compact, contiguous and adjacent area; 2) the "consultativemeeting" upon which the districting was based did not express the true sentiment of the voters of theprovince; 3) the apportionment of the province into two districts is not equitable, and 4) there isdisparity in the ratio of the number of voters that a Board Member represents. Petitioners propose

that the province be redistricted as follows:

FIRST DISTRICT 63,002 voters

(4 seats)

Buenavista 37,681


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Jordan 25,321

resulting in a ratio of one (1) Board member per 15,000 voters

SECOND DISTRICT 63,468 VOTERS

(4 seats)

Nueva Valencia 27,158

Sibunag 17,773

San Lorenzo 18,537

resulting in a ratio of one (1) Board member per 15,696 voters, pointing out that suchredistricting is more in accordance with provisions of law and the Constitution.

The division of provinces into districts and the corresponding apportionment, by district, of thenumber of elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan are provided for by law. UnderRepublic Act No. 6636, 1 allotment of elective members to provinces and municipalities must bemade on the basis of its classification as a province and/or municipality. Section 4 of R.A. 6636provides:

Sec. 4 Provinces and Municipalities First and second class provinces shall eachhave ten (10) elective members; third and fourth class provinces, eight; and fifth andsixth class provinces, six to be elected at large by the qualified voters therein.

All other municipalities shall have the same number of elective members as providedin existing laws.

Thus, a fourth class province under R.A. 6636 shall have eight Sangguniang Panlalawiganmembers.

In relation thereto, Republic Act No. 7166 2 reads:

Sec. 3 (b) For provinces with only one (1) legislative district, the Commission shalldivide them into two (2) districts for purposes of electing the members of theSangguniang Panlalawigan, as nearly as practicable according to the number ofinhabitants, each district comprising a compact, contiguous and adjacent territory,and the number of seats of elective members of their respective sanggunian shall beequitably apportioned between the districts in accordance with the immediatelypreceding paragraph;

xxx xxx xxx

A province with only one legislative district, such as Guimaras, should therefore be divided into twoprovincial districts.

It must be noted that on April 30, 1997, the Province of Guimaras was re-classified from a fifth classto a fourth class province under Memorandum Circular No. 97-1 issued by the Bureau of LocalGovernment Finance of the Department of Finance. Hence, the Province of Guimaras, having only


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one legislative district, has to be divided into two provincial districts with an allotment of eight electivemembers of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan by virtue of its reclassification into a fourth classprovince.

The rules and guidelines to be followed by the Commission on Elections in the apportionment, bydistrict, of the number of elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in provinces with only

one (1) legislative district is provided for by law. Under the above cited R.A. 7166, division ofprovinces into districts shall be done in a manner: (1) as nearly as practicable, (2) according to thenumber of inhabitants, (3) each district comprising a compact, contiguous and adjacent territory, and(4) the number of seats of elective members of the respective Sanggunian equitably apportionedbetween the districts.

Corollarily, COMELEC also promulgated Resolution No. 2131 which provides the rules andguidelines for the apportionment by district of members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan inprovinces with only one legislative district and Sangguniang Bayan of municipalities in the MetroManila area. The said Resolution provides, among others, that for provinces with only one (1)legislative district:

a) The province shall be divided into two (2) Sanggunian districts for provincialrepresentation, as nearly as practicable according to the number of inhabitantsbased on the 1990 census of population.

b) Each district shall comprise a compact, contiguous and adjacent territory;

c) A municipality shall belong to one (1) district ONLY, in no case shall a part thereofbe apportioned to another provincial Sanggunian district.

The same Resolution requires that (1) the 1990 census of population be secured from the provincialor municipal representative of the National Statistics Office concerned; (2) consultations, hearingsand meetings be conducted with elective local officials, representatives of political parties, non-

government organizations, civic and religious groups and other sectors of the community for theirsuggestions and proposals for possible incorporation into the project of apportionment, and (3) theproject of apportionment and the map of the province indicating the districts, the population of eachdistrict and showing the delineation of boundaries be submitted to the COMELEC for study andevaluation.

Petitioners aver that the apportionment of the Province of Guimaras into two districts is not equitabledue to disproportionate representation. It is claimed that the districting embodied in Resolution No.2950 results in a disparity of representation in that, in the first district, there is a ratio of one boardmember per 18,739 voters while in the second district, the ratio is one board member per 14,050voters.

Petitioners' contention is untenable. Under R.A. 7166 and Comelec Resolution No. 2313, the basis

for division into districts shall be the number of inhabitants of the province concerned and not thenumber of listed or registered voters as theorized upon by petitioners. Thus, Comelec did not actwith grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Resolution because clearly, the basis for thedistricting is the number of inhabitants of the Province of Guimaras by municipality based on theofficial 1995 Census of Population as certified to by Tomas P. Africa, Administrator of the NationalStatistics Office.


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Petitioners' next contention is that the consultative meetings upon which the districting was baseddid not express the true sentiment of the voters of the province as the inhabitants were not properlyrepresented during the said meetings.

Again, this contention of petitioners is bereft of any basis. As duly certified to by Mr. Romulo L.Lequisia, Provincial Election Supervisor of the Province of Guimaras, two consultative meetings

were held by the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, one on August 21 and another onOctober 2, 1996, in order to arrive at a consensus on the matter of the proposed districting ofGuimaras into two Sangguniang Panlalawigan districts. And, as shown by the documentary exhibits,all interested parties were duly notified and represented during the two consultative meetings asrequired by Comelec Resolution No. 2313. Appended to respondent Comelec's Comment are theattendance sheets where the names and signatures of those who attended the consultativemeetings and the corresponding barangay and/or group which they represented appear and whichbelie petitioners' allegation that there was no valid representation.

Finally, petitioners maintain that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it issuedResolution No. 2950 because thereunder, the municipalities which comprise each district do notembrace a compact, contiguous and adjacent area.

Petitioners' asseveration is equally erroneous. Under Comelec Resolution No. 2950, the towns ofBuenavista and San Lorenzo were grouped together to form the first district and the second districtis composed of the municipalities of Jordan, Nueva Valencia and Sibunag. R.A. 7166 requires thateach district must cover a compact, contiguous and adjacent territory. "Contiguous" and/or"adjacent" means "adjoining, nearby, abutting, having a common border, connected, and/or touchingalong boundaries often for considerable distances." 3 Not even a close perusal of the map of theProvince of Guimaras is necessary to defeat petitioners' stance. On its face, the map of Guimarasindicates that the municipalities of Buenavista and San Lorenzo are "adjacent" or "contiguous". Theytouch along boundaries and are connected throughout by a common border. Buenavista is at thenorthern part of Guimaras while San Lorenzo is at the east portion of the province. It would bedifferent if the towns grouped together to form one district were Buenavista and Nueva Valencia orBuenavista and Sibunag. In that case, the districting would clearly be without any basis because

these towns are not contiguous or adjacent. Buenavista is at the north while Nueva Valencia andSibunag are at the southern and southeastern part of the province, respectively.

Premises studiedly considered in proper perspective, the Court is of the irresistible conclusion, andso finds, that the respondent Comelec did not gravely abuse its discretion when it issued ResolutionNo. 2950.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit the petition under consideration is hereby DISMISSED. Nopronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cordora v Comelec

EN BANC

G.R. No. 176947 February 19, 2009


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GAUDENCIO M. CORDORA, Petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and GUSTAVO S. TAMBUNTING, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restrainingorder under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

In EO Case No. 05-17, Gaudencio M. Cordora (Cordora) accused Gustavo S. Tambunting(Tambunting) of an election offense for violating Section 74 in relation to Section 262 of the OmnibusElection Code. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Bancdismissed Cordoras complaintin a Resolution1dated 18 August 2006. The present petition seeks to reverse the 18 August 2006Resolution as well as the Resolution2 dated 20 February 2007 of the COMELEC En Bancwhich

denied Cordoras motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

In his complaint affidavit filed before the COMELEC Law Department, Cordora asserted thatTambunting made false assertions in the following items:

That Annex A [Tambuntings Certificate of Candidacy for the 2001 elections] and Annex B[Tambuntings Certificate of Candidacy for the 2004 elections] state, among others, as follows,particularly Nos. 6, 9 and 12 thereof:

1. No. 6 I am a Natural Born/Filipino Citizen

2. No. 9 No. of years of Residence before May 14, 2001.

36 in the Philippines and 25 in the Constituency where I seek to be elected;

3. No. 12 I am ELIGIBLE for the office I seek to be elected.3 (Boldface and capitalization inthe original)

Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local public office because Tambuntinglacked the required citizenship and residency requirements.

To disprove Tambuntings claim of being a natural-born Filipino citizen, Cordora presented a

certification from the Bureau of Immigration which stated that, in two instances, Tambunting claimedthat he is an American: upon arrival in the Philippines on 16 December 2000 and upon departurefrom the Philippines on 17 June 2001. According to Cordora, these travel dates confirmed thatTambunting acquired American citizenship through naturalization in Honolulu, Hawaii on 2December 2000. Cordora concluded:

That Councilor Gustavo S. Tambunting contrary to the provision of Sec 74 (OEC): [sic] Re:CONTENTS OF CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY: which requires the declarant/affiant to state,among others, under oath, that he is a Filipino (No. 6), No. 9- residence requirement which he
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lost when [he was] naturalized as an American Citizen on December 2, 2000 at [sic] Honolulu,Hawaii, knowingly and willfully affirmed and reiterated that he possesses the above basicrequirements under No. 12 that he is indeed eligible for the office to which he seeks to beelected, when in truth and in fact, the contrary is indubitably established by his ownstatements before the Philippine Bureau of Immigration x x x.4 (Emphases in the original)

Tambunting, on the other hand, maintained that he did not make any misrepresentation in hiscertificates of candidacy. To refute Cordoras claim that Tambunting is not a natural-born Filipino,Tambunting presented a copy of his birth certificate which showed that he was born of a Filipinomother and an American father. Tambunting further denied that he was naturalized as an Americancitizen. The certificate of citizenship conferred by the US government after Tambuntings fatherpetitioned him through INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) merely confirmed Tambuntingscitizenship which he acquired at birth. Tambuntings possession of an American passport did notmean that Tambunting is not a Filipino citizen. Tambunting also took an oath of allegiance on 18November 2003 pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), or the Citizenship Retentionand Reacquisition Act of 2003.

Tambunting further stated that he has resided in the Philippines since birth. Tambunting has imbibed

the Filipino culture, has spoken the Filipino language, and has been educated in Filipino schools.Tambunting maintained that proof of his loyalty and devotion to the Philippines was shown by hisservice as councilor of Paraaque.

To refute Cordoras claim that the number of years of residency stated in Tambuntings certificates ofcandidacy is false because Tambunting lost his residency because of his naturalization as an

American citizen, Tambunting contended that the residency requirement is not the same ascitizenship.

The Ruling of the COMELEC Law Department

The COMELEC Law Department recommended the dismissal of Cordoras complaint againstTambunting because Cordora failed to substantiate his charges against Tambunting. Cordorasreliance on the certification of the Bureau of Immigration that Tambunting traveled on an Americanpassport is not sufficient to prove that Tambunting is an American citizen.

The Ruling of the COMELEC En Banc

The COMELEC En Bancaffirmed the findings and the resolution of the COMELEC Law Department.The COMELEC En Bancwas convinced that Cordora failed to support his accusation againstTambunting by sufficient and convincing evidence.

The dispositive portion of the COMELEC En Bancs Resolution reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency ofevidence to establish probable cause.

SO ORDERED.5

Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento (Commissioner Sarmiento) wrote a separate opinion whichconcurred with the findings of the En BancResolution. Commissioner Sarmiento pointed out thatTambunting could be considered a dual citizen. Moreover, Tambunting effectively renounced his
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American citizenship when he filed his certificates of candidacy in 2001 and 2004 and ran for publicoffice.

Cordora filed a motion for reconsideration which raised the same grounds and the same argumentsin his complaint. In its Resolution promulgated on 20 February 2007, the COMELEC EnBancdismissed Cordoras motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

The Issue

Cordora submits that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack orexcess of jurisdiction when it declared that there is no sufficient evidence to support probable causethat may warrant the prosecution of Tambunting for an election offense.

Cordoras petition is not an action to disqualify Tambunting because of Tambuntings failure to meetcitizenship and residency requirements. Neither is the present petition an action to declareTambunting a non-Filipino and a non-resident. The present petition seeks to prosecute Tambuntingfor knowingly making untruthful statements in his certificates of candidacy.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit. We affirm the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc.

Whether there is Probable Cause to Hold Tambunting for Trial for Having Committed anElection Offense

There was no grave abuse of discretion in the COMELEC En Bancs ruling that there is no sufficientand convincing evidence to support a finding of probable cause to hold Tambunting for trial forviolation of Section 74 in relation to Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Probable cause constitutes those facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet

and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed. Determining probable cause is anintellectual activity premised on the prior physical presentation or submission of documentary ortestimonial proofs either confirming, negating or qualifying the allegations in the complaint.6

Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code reads as follows:

Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall state that the personfiling it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office;x x x the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post officeaddress for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend theConstitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey thelaws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a

permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath isassumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated inthe certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.

x x x

The person filing a certificate of candidacy shall also affix his latest photograph, passport size; astatement in duplicate containing his bio-data and program of government not exceeding onehundred words, if he so desires.
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Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other hand, provides that violation of Section 74,among other sections in the Code, shall constitute an election offense.

Tambuntings Dual Citizenship

Tambunting does not deny that he is born of a Filipino mother and an American father. Neither does

he deny that he underwent the process involved in INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) because ofhis fathers citizenship. Tambunting claims that because of his parents differing citizenships, he isboth Filipino and American by birth. Cordora, on the other hand, insists that Tambunting is anaturalized American citizen.

We agree with Commissioner Sarmientos observation that Tambunting possesses dual citizenship.Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for Tambunting to undergo thenaturalization process to acquire American citizenship. The process involved in INS Form I-130 onlyserved to confirm the American citizenship which Tambunting acquired at birth. The certification fromthe Bureau of Immigration which Cordora presented contained two trips where Tambunting claimedthat he is an American. However, the same certification showed nine other trips where Tambuntingclaimed that he is Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to the filing of his

certificate of candidacy before the 2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship didnot disqualify him from running for public office.7

Requirements for dual citizens from birth who desire to run for public office

We deem it necessary to reiterate our previous ruling in Mercado v. Manzano, wherein we ruled thatdual citizenship is not a ground for disqualification from running for any elective local position.

To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a resultof the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneouslyconsidered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a personwhose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle ofjus sanguinis is born in a state

which follows the doctrine ofjus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on hispart, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV)of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possessdual citizenship:

(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow theprinciple ofjus soli;

(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of theirfathers country such children are citizens of that country;

(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are consideredcitizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippinecitizenship.

There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act,be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutionalprovisions on citizenship.


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Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, bysome positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegianceis the result of an individuals volition.

x x x

[I]n including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was notwith dual citizensper se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countriesof origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d)and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance."Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under thisdisqualification.Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strictprocess with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, itshould suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippinecitizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that theircondition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As JoaquinG. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out:"[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on

citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she isconsidered a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our control."

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the othercountry of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may bethat, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectivelyrenounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the following discussion on 40(d)between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows:

SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17: "Any personwith dual citizenship" is disqualified to run for any elective local position. Under the presentConstitution, Mr. President, someone whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines but his father is aforeigner is a natural-born citizen of the Republic. There is no requirement that such a natural-born

citizen, upon reaching the age of majority, must elect or give up Philippine citizenship.

On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the country of his orher father and one belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, may such a situation disqualify theperson to run for a local government position?

SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment when he wouldwant to run for public office, he has to repudiate one of his citizenships.

SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of origin or thecountry of the father claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen,? No one can renounce. Thereare such countries in the world.1avvphi1

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in effect, be anelection for him of his desire to be considered a Filipino citizen.

SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require an election.Under the Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines is, at birth, a citizenwithout any overt act to claim the citizenship.


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SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the Gentlemansexample, if he does not renounce his other citizenship, then he is opening himself to question. So, ifhe is really interested to run, the first thing he should do is to say in the Certificate of Candidacy that:"I am a Filipino citizen, and I have only one citizenship."

SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr. President. He will

always have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested upon him or her in the Constitutionof the Republic.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will prove that healso acknowledges other citizenships, then he will probably fall under thisdisqualification.8 (Emphasis supplied)

We have to consider the present case in consonance with our rulings in Mercado v.Manzano,9Valles v. COMELEC,10andAASJS v. Datumanong.11Mercado and Valles involve similaroperative facts as the present case. Manzano and Valles, like Tambunting, possessed dualcitizenship by the circumstances of their birth. Manzano was born to Filipino parents in the UnitedStates which follows the doctrine ofjus soli. Valles was born to an Australian mother and a Filipino

father in Australia. Our rulings in Manzano and Valles stated that dual citizenship is different fromdual allegiance both by cause and, for those desiring to run for public office, by effect. Dualcitizenship is involuntary and arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the differentlaws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states.Thus, like any other natural-born Filipino, it is enough for a person with dual citizenship who seekspublic office to file his certificate of candidacy and swear to the oath of allegiance contained therein.Dual allegiance, on the other hand, is brought about by the individuals active participation in thenaturalization process.AASJS states that,under R.A. No. 9225, a Filipino who becomes anaturalized citizen of another country is allowed to retain his Filipino citizenship by swearing to thesupreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines. The act of taking an oath of allegiance is animplicit renunciation of a naturalized citizens foreign citizenship.

R.A. No. 9225, or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, was enacted years after

the promulgation ofManzano and Valles. The oath found in Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 reads asfollows:

I __________ , solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of theRepublic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constitutedauthorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authorityof the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligationupon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

In Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenshipper se,but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origineven after their naturalization.12Section 5(3) of R.A. No. 9225 states that naturalized citizens who

reacquire Filipino citizenship and desire to run for elective public office in the Philippines shall "meetthe qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and,at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any andall foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" aside from the oathof allegiance prescribed in Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. The twin requirements of swearing to an Oathof Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship served as the bases for ourrecent rulings in Jacot v. Dal and COMELEC,13Velasco v. COMELEC,14 and Japzon v.COMELEC,15 all of which involve natural-born Filipinos who later became naturalized citizens ofanother country and thereafter ran for elective office in the Philippines. In the present case,
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Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did not subsequently become a naturalized citizen of anothercountry. Hence, the twin requirements in R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to him.

Tambuntings residency

Cordora concluded that Tambunting failed to meet the residency requirement because of

Tambuntings naturalization as an American. Cordoras reasoning fails because Tambunting is not anaturalized American. Moreover, residency, for the purpose of election laws, includes the twinelements of the fact of residing in a fixed place and the intention to return there permanently,16 and isnot dependent upon citizenship.

In view of the above, we hold that Cordora failed to establish that Tambunting indeed willfully madefalse entries in his certificates of candidacy. On the contrary, Tambunting sufficiently proved hisinnocence of the charge filed against him. Tambunting is eligible for the office which he sought to beelected and fulfilled the citizenship and residency requirements prescribed by law.

WHEREFORE,we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolutions of the Commission onElections En Bancdated 18 August 2006 and 20 February 2007 in EO Case No. 05-17.

SO ORDERED.

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