LIVINGANDWORKINGINSPACE

ANASAHISTORYOFSKYLAB

W.DavidComptonCharlesD.Benson

IntroductiontotheDoverEditionbyPaulDickson

DoverPublications,Inc.Mineola,NewYork

NASA maintains an internal history program for two principal reasons. (1)Publication of official histories is one way in which NASA responds to theprovision of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 that requiresNASA to “provide for thewidest practicable and appropriate disseminationofinformation concerning its activities and the results thereof.” (2) ThoughtfulstudyofNASAhistorycanhelpmanagersaccomplishthemissionsassignedtothe agency. Understanding NASA’s past aids in understanding its presentsituationandilluminatespossiblefuturedirections.

One advantage of working on contemporary history is access to participants.During the research phase, the authors conducted numerous interviews.Subsequently they submitted parts of the manuscript to persons who hadparticipatedinorcloselyobservedtheeventsdescribed.Readerswereaskedtopoint out errors of fact and questionable interpretations and to providesupporting evidence. The authors then made such changes as they believedjustified. The opinions and conclusions set forth in this book are those of theauthors; no official of the agency necessarily endorses those opinions orconclusions.

CopyrightIntroductioncopyright©2011byPaulDicksonAllrightsreserved.

BibliographicalNoteThisDoveredition,firstpublishedin2011,isaslightlyalteredrepublicationoftheworkoriginallypublishedinNASAHistorySeries(NASASP—4208),WashingtonD.C.,in1983.Thecolorphotosoriginallyonpages355–360arenowinblackandwhitewithinthebook,andhavebeen

reproducedincolorontheinsidecovers.Thecolorartworkandinformationoriginallyontheinsidecovershasbeenmovedtopagexivandhasbeenreproducedinblackandwhite.AnewIntroductionbyPaul

Dicksonhasbeenaddedtothisedition.

LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationDataCompton,WilliamDavid,1927–Livingandworkinginspace:aNASAhistoryofskylabW.DavidCompton,CharlesD.Benson.—Dovered.introductiontothe

DovereditionbyPaulDickson.

p.cm.Originally published: Washington, D.C.: Scientific and Technical

InformationBranch,NationalAeronautics and SpaceAdministration: Forsale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O., 1983; in series: NASA HistorySeries;andNASASP;4208.Withnewintrod.Summary:“TheofficialrecordofAmerica’sfirstspacestation,thisbook

from the NASA History Series chronicles the Skylab program from itsplanning during the 1960s through its 1973 launch and its conclusion in1979.Itpresentsdefinitiveaccountsoftheproject’sgoalsandachievementsas well as its use of discoveries and technology developed during theApolloprogram.1983edition”—Providedbypublisher.Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.ISBN13:978-0-486-48218-7(pbk.)ISBN10:0-486-48218-9(pbk.)1.SkylabProgram.I.Benson,CharlesD.II.Title.

TL789.8.U6S55462011629.44'2—dc22

2011006734

ManufacturedintheUnitedStatesbyCourierCorporation48218901

www.doverpublications.com

Contents

INTRODUCTIONTOTHEDOVEREDITIONPREFACE

PARTI.FROMCONCEPTTHROUGHDECISION,1962–1969

1.WHATTODOFORANENCORE:POST-APOLLOPLANSDirectionsforMannedSpaceflightSpaceStationsafter1962SizingUpaSpaceStationAirForceSeeksRoleinSpacePresidentCallsforNASA’sPlansMuellerOpensApolloApplicationsProgramOffice

2.FROMSPENTSTAGETOORBITALCLUSTER,1965–1966EarlyProposalstoUseSpentStagesMarshallSponsorstheSpentStageConcepttoDesign:BoundingtheProblemConcepttoDesign:DefiningtheWorkshopTheClusterConcept

3.APOLLOAPPLICATIONS:“WEDNESDAY’SCHILD,”InitialPlansandBudgetsSeekingNewJustificationAAPvs.MOLCenterRolesandMissionsPresidentialApproval

4.ASCIENCEPROGRAMFORMANNEDSPACEFLIGHTScienceinSpaceto1965OrganizingforMannedSpaceScienceScientistsandManinSpaceSolarObservatoriesinOrbit

ExperimentsfortheWorkshopMoreAdvicefromtheScientificCommunity

5.YEARSOFUNCERTAINTY,1967–1969ImpactoftheFireProblemswiththeClusterMissionsAAPunderInternalAttackShrinkingBudgetsandShrinkingProgramTheWetWorkshopGoesDryRetrospectandProspect

PARTII.DEVELOPMENTANDPREPARATIONSTOFLY,1969–1973

6.MANAGINGTHEDESIGNPHASEMovingOutofApollo’sShadowASecondSkylabManagementToolsTheProblemofChangesTheProblemofReentry

7.LIVINGANDWORKINGINSPACEHabitabilityofEarlySpacecraftHabitabilityoftheWetWorkshopContributionofIndustrialDesignersHabitabilityoftheDryWorkshopTheFoodSystemMarshallCallsforaReassessment

8.THEMEDICALEXPERIMENTSDefiningtheExperimentsASpaceToiletBuildingtheMedicalHardwareASimulationandWhatCameofIt

9.STUDYINGTHESUNSolarInstrumentsApolloTelescopeMountMissionPlansandOperatingProceduresTechnicalProgressandProblems

10.LATEADDITIONSTOTHEEXPERIMENTSObservingtheEarthEarth-ResourceExperimentsSelectingtheInvestigatorsFlightPlanningandInstrumentDevelopmentStudentExperiments

11.PUTTINGTHEPIECESTOGETHERMoreWorkforContractorsTestProgramModuleDevelopment:AirlockandDockingAdapterTrainersandMockupsModuleDevelopment:TheWorkshopReentryReexamined

12.PREPARATIONSFORFLIGHTDefiningCenterResponsibilitiesOperationsPlanninginHoustonHuntsvilleOrganizesforMissionSupportTestPilotvs.Scientist-AstronautCrewTraining

13.LAUNCHINGSKYLABSelectingtheLaunchComplexTheMilkstoolPreparingaLaunchPlanFacilityModificationsHandlingtheExperimentsRelationswithHuntsvilleProblemsofNewHardwareFromCertificationReviewtoLiftoff

PARTIII.THEMISSIONSANDRESULTS,1973–1979

14.SAVINGSKYLABTheAccidentManeuveringforMinimumHeat,MaximumPowerAssessingtheHeat’sEffectDevisingaSunshade

PlanstoIncreaseSkylab’sPowerLaunchandDockingAccomplishingtheRepairInvestigationBoard

15.THEFIRSTMISSIONPrivateCommunicationsPhysicalFitnessinSpaceFlightPlanning:TheAstronauts’ViewFightPlanning:TheInvestigators’ViewTheLong-AwaitedSolarFlareCritiqueoftheFirstMission

16.THESECONDMISSIONMotionSicknessARescueMission?DeployingtheTwin-PoleSunshadeSolarViewingEarth-ResourceandCorollaryExperimentsMoreMechanicalProblemsARoutineDayinSpaceATeamofOverachievers

17.THELASTMISSIONChangestotheMissionAnErrorinJudgmentActivationGettingtoWorkFirstMonth’sAccomplishmentsACometforChristmasCarrCallsforanAssessmentAroundtheWorldfor84DaysComingBack

18.RESULTSMedicalFindingsSolarObservationsEarthObservationsNASA’sOwnExperimentsCometObservationsandStudentExperimentsSkylabScience:AnAssessment

19.WHATGOESUP…PlanstoSavetheWorkshopRegainingControlofSkylabLastdaysofSkylab

APPENDIXES

A.SummaryoftheMissionsB.MajorContractorsC.InternationalAeronauticalFederationWorldRecordsSetbySkylabD.ExperimentsE.Astronauts’BiographiesF.CometKohoutekG.JointObservingProgram2,ActiveRegions

SOURCENOTES

INDEX

THEAUTHORS

INTRODUCTIONTOTHEDOVEREDITION

Mention thewordSkylab to people of a certain age and their eyes will mostlikelylookskywardforafractionofasecond.Thisisbecauseduringthespringandearlysummerof1979theabandonedU.S.spacestationwasdriftingfromitsdecaying orbit and was heading back to earth. The cry went up: “Skylab isfalling!Skylabisfalling!”

On March 28, the Three Mile Island nuclear reactor near Harrisburg,Pennsylvaniahadapartialmeltdown.Comingtwoweeksafterthereleaseofthenuclear disaster film, The China Syndrome, the dream of nuclear power as apeaceful, environmentally soundoptionwasover.ThenSkylab crowdedThreeMile Island out of the headlines. People were initially afraid there would bedeathanddestruction.Technologysuddenlyseemeddemonic.

On July 11, over six years after it went into orbit, Skylab fell to earth,breakingupintheatmosphereandscatteringitsremainsacrosstheIndianOceanandtheAustralianoutback.Whiletherewasnodamagetolifeorproperty,therewas more than a little damage to NASA’s reputation, which in its post-lunarlandingphasewas, asTimemagazine laterput it, “starting to lookasadrift asSkylab itself.”Ninedaysafter thefallofSkylab theworldcelebrated the tenthanniversary of the Apollo 11 moon landing, suggesting backward rather thanforwardmovement.

If therewasanyonerejoicing, itwasaseventeen-year-oldbeer truckdriverwhofoundsomecharredSkylabfragmentsinhisbackyard.Hebaggedthemup,grabbedthenextflighttoCalifornia,andclaimedthe$10,000prize,whichaSanFrancisconewspaperhadofferedtothefirstpersontobringapieceofSkylabtoitsoffice.

TothisdaytherearemanywhoseonlyrecollectionofSkylabwasthefieryreturnofthelargestmachinemanhadputintospace.ThisisunfortunatebecausetherealstoryofSkylabismorecomplicated,heroic,andsuccessfulthanthat.

For starters, America’s first space station was something of a makeshiftthing. It was retrofitted from the enormous, nine-story tall, third stage of aSaturnV booster,whichwouldno longerbeneeded to sendmen to themoonafter the cancellation of the Apollo program. Skylab also picked up practical

technologydevelopedbytheAirForce,whichhaddecidedin1963todevelopaprogram to send crews into orbiting space stations called Manned OrbitingLaboratories (MOL). The purpose of these stationswas primarily formilitaryreconnaissance. But over the years that the MOL was being developed,unmannedsatellitesbecamemoreefficienteyesinthesky,andtheneedforthemdiminished and finally disappeared.When theMOL project was cancelled in1969, NASA picked up various contracts from the Air Force for Skylabincludingoneforthetechnologytofeedacrewintheweightlessnessofaspacestation.

TheunmannedSkylabwasfiredintoorbitonMay14,1973.Itimmediatelydevelopedtechnicalproblems,themostsignificantofwhichoccurredduringthelaunch.Theflowofaircausedameteoroidshieldtocomeoff,tearingoffoneoftwo solar panels and preventing the other from deploying in the process. Thedamageresulted in reducedpower for thestation.The firstcrew,PeteConrad,PaulWeitz, and JoeKerwin arrived eleven days later in anApolloCommandandServiceModuleandtheirfirst taskwastorepairthedamage.Oncerepairswere complete, full powerwas restored.That crew spent twenty-eight days inorbit.Thesecondcrew,AlanBean,JackLousma,andOwenGarriotspentfifty-ninedaysinspace,butonlyafterovercomingtheirownproblemsandsomeverytensemoments. First, a thruster leak caused rendezvouswith the station to bemorechallengingthanexpected,andthen,oncethecrewwasonboard,asecondthruster developeda leak.Plansweredrawnup for a rescuebut the crewwasabletomakeadjustmentsandcompletethemissionasplanned.ThefinalSkylabcrew,JerryCarr,BillPogue,andEdwardGibsonspenteighty-fourdaysinspace.

EachSkylabcrewsetnewspaceflightdurationrecords.Therecordsetbythefinal crew was not broken by an American astronaut until the Shuttle-Mirprogrammorethantwentyyearslater.SkylabwasdecommissionedinFebruary1974andthe$2.5billionhabitatwasnowdebris.Itwasthoughtthatifnothingwasdone,accordingtoearlyestimates,gravitywouldreturnittoearthin1983.The hopewas that a shuttle, then in the planning stageswould be sufficientlydevelopedsothatbeforethefallaboostercouldbeattachedtoSkylabtosendittoahigher,morepermanentorbit.Butsunspotactivitychangedthedynamicsofthe orbit. The estimate was lowered and the shuttle wasn’t ready. The rest ishistory.

Skylab had two objectives: to prove that humans could live and work inspaceforextendedperiodsandtoexpandourknowledgeofsolarastronomywellbeyond earth-based observations. Despite technical problems, it succeeded. Itservedasthegreatestsolarobservatoryofitstime,amicrogravitylab,amedical

lab, anearthobserving facility andaplatform formore than300experiments.The program also led to new technologies such as special showers, toilets,sleepingbags,exerciseequipmentandkitchenfacilitiesdesignedtofunctioninmicrogravity.

For the twenty-first century reader, the delight inW.David Compton andCharlesD.Benson’sLivingandWorkinginSpaceisinthedetails.Forexample,thereareproblemswith film for thecraft’scameraswhich seemquaint in thisdigitalera.Thecrew’sstrugglewithstaggeringworkloadsastheydealwiththeneeds of daily life is fascinating. There is an interesting section on thedevelopment of the space toilet which answers questions people had aboutbodilyfunctionsinspaceandrecounts thebattle that tookplacebetweenthoseplannerswhowantedtodrythecrew’surinevs.thosewhowantedtofreezeit.Thisisnottriviabutratherpartoftherhythmofthestory—whichistherhythmofeverydaylifealbeitinanewenvironment.

The book is a vivid reminder of the first human attempt to live in space,which is often overlooked. What was learned from Skylab displayed in thedeploymentoftheSpaceShuttle(STS)and,evenmoredirectly,theInternationalSpaceStation(ISS),whichisitsdirectdescendant.

—PAULDICKSON

Preface

TheprogramthatbecameSkylabwasconceivedin1963,whentheOfficeofManned Space Flight began to study options for manned programs to followApollo. Although America’s lunar landing program was a long way fromsuccessfulcompletion, itwasnot toosoontoconsiderwhatshouldcomenext.Thelongleadtimesrequiredforspaceprojectsdictatedanearlystartinplanningifmannedspaceflightwastocontinuewithoutamomentum-sappinghiatus.

Thecircumstancesinwhichthisplanningwasconductedin1963–1967werenotauspicious.Aconsensusseemedtoexistthatearth-orbitaloperationsofferedthemostpromisefor“exploitingtheinvestmentinApollohardware”—afavoritejustificationforpost-Apolloprograms.But firmcommitmentandsupportwereless evident. A minority opinion—strongly expressed—condemned the lunarlanding as an expensive and unnecessary stunt.NASA’s budget requestswererigorouslyscrutinizedandhadtobejustifiedasneverbefore.Tocompoundthespaceagency’sproblems,theAirForceembarkedonaprogramthatseemedtoduplicateOMSF’sproposals.AndNASA’spolicy-makersseemedtobewaitingforamandatefromthecountrybeforeproceedingwithpost-Apolloprograms.

Nonetheless, OMSF went ahead, developing both general plans and aspecific idea for manned earth-orbital operations. In 1965 the ApolloApplications Program office was opened to oversee programs using theimpressivecapabilitydevelopedforthelunarlandingtoproduceresultsusefultoclients outside the aerospace complex. Initial planswere grandiose; under thepressuresgeneratedby thecompletionofApollo, theyyieldeduntilby1969abare-bones,three-missionprogramremained.

Part I of the present volume details the background against which post-Apollo planning was conducted—the cross-currents of congressional doubt,public opposition, and internal uncertainty that buffeted Apollo Applicationsfrom1963tomid-1969.WhenApollo11returnedsafely,ApolloApplications—or Skylab, as it was soon renamed—emerged as a program in its own right,successor toApollo,whichwould laya foundation formannedspaceflight fortherestofthecentury.

AlthoughitusedApollohardwareandfacilities,Skylab’sresemblancetothelunar-landing program ended there; and in part II we examine how Apollo

components were modified for earth-orbital operations. The modification ofexistingspacecraft,themanufactureandcheckoutofnewmodules,thedesignofexperimentsforscienceandapplications,andthechangesinastronauttraining,flightcontrol,launchoperations,andinflightoperationsthathadtobemade,allcreated new problems. Coordination among NASA Headquarters, the fieldcenters,experimenters,andcontractorsmayhavebeenmorecomplexthanithadbeen inApollo, and programmanagement as a crucial part of the program isdiscussedinpartII.

Part III chronicles the missions and examines the program’s results. AnaccidentduringlaunchoftheworkshopverynearlykilledSkylababorning,andsaving the program called for an extemporaneous effort by NASA and itscontractors thatwasmatched,perhaps,onlybytheeffort thatsavedApollo13.Thatdone,thethreemannedmissionssetnewrecordsforsustainedorbitalflightandforscientificandtechnologicalproductivity.ApreliminaryassessmentoftheresultsfromSkylabandachapteronthelastdaysofthespacecraftconcludepartIII.

TreatmentofaprogramhavingasmanydifferentcomponentsandobjectivesasSkylab required a distinct divisionof labor between the authors.Generally,Charles Benson wrote the chapters dealing with program organization andmanagement, congressional and budgetary matters, astronaut training, andlaunchoperations.DavidComptonwasresponsibleforthechaptersdealingwiththe background to science in the manned spaceflight program, the scienceprojects, the development and testing of flight hardware, the results, and theworkshop’s reentry. Each of us wrote part of the mission operations story:Bensonthechaptersonlaunch,theaccidentandrepair,andthefirsttwomannedmissions,Comptonthechapteronthethirdmission.Theprincipaljointeffortischapter1,towhichwebothcontributedandwhichbothofusrevised.

A word on coverage is in order. While we believe our story is completethroughtheendof themannedmissions,weacknowledgethatcoverageof theprogram’sresultsisnot.Thisresultedfromtimelimitationsasmuchasanythingelse;ourcontractsexpiredbeforemostoftheresultswereavailable.Inviewofthis, the appearance of a chapter on Skylab’s demise may seem strange. It isincluded because while the manuscript was being reviewed and prepared forpublication, Skylab became an object of worldwide interest as it headed forreentry.Thisseemedtorequirecompletionoftheoperationalstory.

OurdebttoSkylabparticipantsisgreat.Nooneweapproached,inNASAoritsaerospacecontractors,wasanythingbuthelpful.Theygaveustheirtimeforpersonal interviews, assisted us in locating documents, and took the time to

review draft chapters and offer critical comments.NASA history personnel atHeadquarters,atJohnsonSpaceCenter,andatKennedySpaceCenter(MarshallSpaceFlightCenterhadnohistoryofficebythetimeweundertookthiswork)wereequallyhelpful.Withoutthehelpofall thesepeopleour taskwouldhavebeenmuchharder,andifwedonotsingleoutindividualsforspecialrecognitionit is because all deserve it. Responsibility for the story told in this book, ofcourse,isourown,andanyerrorsthatremainareoursaswell.

W.D.C.C.D.B.

November1981

PartI

FromConceptthroughDecision,1962–1969

Anearth-orbitingstation,equippedtostudythesun,thestars,andtheearth,is a concept found in the earliest speculation about space travel. During theformativeyearsoftheUnitedStatesspaceprogram,spacestationswereamongmanyprojectsconsidered.Butafterthenationaldecisionin1961tosendmentothemoon,spacestationswererelegatedtothebackground.

ProjectApollowas a firm commitment for the 1960s, but beyond that theprospects for space explorationwere not clear.As the first half of the decadeended,newsocialandpoliticalforcesraisedseriousquestionsaboutthenation’sprioritiesandbroughtthespaceprogramunderpressure.Atthesametime,thoseresponsibleforAmerica’sspacecapabilitysawtheneedtolookbeyondApolloforprojectsthatwouldpreservethecountry’sleadershipinspace.Thetimewasnot propitious for such a search, for the nationalmood that had sustained thespaceprogramwaschanging.

Inthesummerof1965,theofficethatbecametheSkylabprogramofficewasestablishedinNASAHeadquarters,andtheprojectthatevolvedintoSkylabwasformallycharteredasaconceptualdesignstudy.Duringtheyears1965–1969theformofthespacecraftandthecontentoftheprogramwereworkedout.AslongastheApollogoalremainedtobeachieved,Skylabwasastepchildofmannedspaceflight, achieving statusonlywith the first lunar landing.When itbecameclear thatAmerica’s spaceprogramcouldnot continue at the level ofurgencyand priority thatApollo had enjoyed, Skylab became themeans of sustainingmanned spaceflight while the next generation of hardware and missionsdeveloped.

The first fivechaptersof thisbook trace theoriginsof theSkylabconceptfromitsemergenceintheperiod1962–1965throughitsevolutionintofinalformin1969.

1

WhattoDoforanEncore:Post-ApolloPlans

The summer of 1965 was an eventful one for the thousands of peopleinvolved in the American space program. In its seventh year, the NationalAeronauticsandSpaceAdministration(NASA)washardatworkontheGeminiprogram, its second series of earth-orbiting manned missions. Mercury hadconcludedon16May1963.For22monthsafterthat,whilethetwo-manGeminispacecraftwas brought to flight readiness, noAmericanwent into space.TwounmannedtestflightsprecededthefirstmannedGeminimission,launchedon23March1965.1

Mercury had been used to learn the fundamentals of manned spaceflight.Even before the first Mercury astronaut orbited the earth, President John F.KennedyhadsetNASAitsmajortask:tosendamantothemoonandbringhimbacksafelyby1970.Muchhadtobelearnedbeforethatcouldbedone—nottomentiontherockets,groundsupportfacilities,andlaunchcomplexesthathadtobebuiltandtested—andGeminiwaspartofthetrainingprogram.Rendezvous—bringingtwospacecrafttogetherinorbit—wasapartofthatprogram;anotherwas a determination of man’s ability to survive and function in theweightlessnessofspaceflight.

That summer the American public was getting acquainted, by way ofnetwork television,with the sitewheremost of theGemini actionwas takingplace—theMannedSpacecraftCenter(MSC).LocatedontheflatTexascoastalplain 30 kilometers southeast of downtown Houston—close enough to beclaimedby that city and given to it by themedia—MSCwasNASA’s newestfieldcenter,andGeminiwasthefirstprogrammanagedthere.Mercuryhadbeenplannedandconductedby theSpaceTaskGroup, locatedatLangleyResearchCenter,Hampton,Virginia.CreationofthenewMannedSpacecraftCenter,tobestaffedinitiallybymembersoftheSpaceTaskGroup,wasannouncedin1961;by themiddle of 1962 its personnel hadbeenmoved to temporaryquarters in

Houston;andin1964itoccupieditsnewhome.The4.1-square-kilometercenterprovided facilities for spacecraft design and testing, crew training, and flightoperations or mission control. By 1965 nearly 5000 civil servants and abouttwice that many aerospace-contractor employees were working at the Texassite.2

HeadingthissecondlargestofNASA’smannedspaceflightcenterswas themanwhohadformeditspredecessorgroupin1958,RobertR.Gilruth.Gilruthhad joined the staff at Langley in 1937 when it was a center for aeronauticsresearchofNASA’sprecursor,theNationalAdvisoryCommitteeforAeronautics(NACA). He soon demonstrated his ability in Langley’s Flight ResearchDivision,workingwithtestpilotsinquantifyingthecharacteristicsthatmakeasatisfactory airplane. Progressing to transonic and supersonic flight research,Gilruthcamenaturallytotheproblemsofguidedmissiles.In1945hewasputincharge of the PilotlessAircraft ResearchDivision atWallops Island,Virginia,whereoneproblemtobesolvedwasthatofbringingamissilebackthroughtheatmosphereintact.Whenthedecisionwasmadein1958togivethenewnationalspaceagencythejobofputtingamanintoearthorbit,GilruthandseveralofhisWallopsIslandcolleaguesmovedtotheSpaceTaskGroup,aneworganizationchargedwithdesigningthespacecrafttodothatjob.3

TheSpaceTaskGrouphad,infact,alreadyclaimedthattaskforitself,anditwent at the problem in typical NACA fashion. NACA had been a design,research,andtestingorganization,accustomedtoworkingwithaircraftbuildersbut doing no fabricationwork itself.The samemode characterizedMSC.TheMercuryandGeminispacecraftowedtheirbasicdesigntoGilruth’sengineers,whosupervisedconstructionby theMcDonnellAircraftCompanyofSt.Louisandhelpedtestthefinishedhardware.4

In thesummerof1965theMannedSpacecraftCenterwasup to itsears inwork.BythemiddleofJunetwomannedGeminimissionshadbeenflownandathirdwasinpreparation.Thirty-threeastronauts, includingthefirstsixselectedas scientist-astronauts,*were in various stages of training and preparation forflight.Reflecting thegeneralbullishnessof themannedspaceprogram,NASAannouncedplansinSeptembertorecruitstillmoreflightcrews.5

Houston’sdesignengineers,meanwhile,werehardatworkonthespacecraftfortheApolloprogram.Theimportantchoiceofmissionmode—rendezvousinlunarorbit—hadbeenmadein1962;itdictatedtwovehicles,whoseconstructionMSCwas supervising.NorthAmericanAviation, Inc., ofDowney,California,was building the command ship, consisting of a command module and asupporting service module—collectively called the command and service

module—which carried the crew to lunar orbit and back to earth.A continentawayinBethpage,LongIsland,GrummanAircraftEngineeringCorporationwasworking on the lunarmodule, a spidery-looking spacecraft thatwould set twomen down on the moon’s surface and return them to the command module,waiting in lunar orbit, for the trip home to earth. Houston engineers hadestablished the basic designof both spacecraft andwereworking closelywiththecontractorsinbuildingandtestingthem.Alloftheimportantsubsystems—guidance and navigation, propulsion and attitude control, life-support andenvironmentalcontrol—wereMSCresponsibilities;andbeginningwithGemini4, control of allmissions passed toHouston once the booster had cleared thelaunchpad.6

Sincethedramaofspaceflightwasinherentintheriskstakenbythemeninthespacecraft,publicattentionwasmostoftendirectedattheHoustonoperation.Thissuperficialandnews-consciousview,thoughtrueenoughduringflightandrecovery, paid scant attention to the launch vehicles and to the complexoperationsat thelaunchsite,withoutwhichthecomparativelysmallspacecraftcouldneverhavegoneanywhere,letalonetothemoon.

TheSaturn launchvehicleswere the responsibilityofNASA’s largest fieldcenter,theGeorgeC.MarshallSpaceFlightCenter,10kilometerssouthwestofHuntsville in northern Alabama. Marshall had been built around the mostfamous cadre in rocketry—Wernher von Braun and his associates fromPeenemünde,Germany’scenterforrocketresearchduringWorldWarII.Drivensincehis schoolboydaysby thedreamof spaceflight, vonBraun in1965waswellonthewaytoseeingthatdreamrealized,fortheNASAcenterofwhichhewasdirectorwassupervisingthedevelopmentoftheSaturnV,themonsterthree-stagerocketthatwouldpowerthemoonmission.7

MarshallSpaceFlightCenterwasshapedbyexperiencesquiteunlikethosethat molded the Manned Spacecraft Center. The rocket research anddevelopmentthatvonBraunandhiscolleaguesbeganinGermanyinthe1930shad been supported by the German army, and their postwar work continuedunder the supervisionof theU.S.army. In1950 thegroupmoved toRedstoneArsenaloutsideHuntsville,where it functionedmuchasanarmyarsenaldoes,notonlydesigninglaunchvehiclesbutbuildingthemaswell.FromvonBraunall thewaydown,Huntsville’s rocketbuildersweredirty-handsengineers,andthey had produced many Redstone and Jupiter missiles. In 1962 von Braunremarkedinanarticlewrittenforamanagementmagazine,“wecanstillcarryanidea for a space vehicle… from the concept through the entire developmentcycleofdesign,development,fabrication,andtesting.”Thatwasthewayhefelt

his organization should operate, and so it did; of 10 first stages built for theSaturnI,8wereturnedoutatMarshall.8

The sheer sizeof theApollo task requiredadivisionof responsibility, andthe MSC and Marshall shares were sometimes characterized as “above andbelow the instrumentunit.”*To be sure, the booster and its payloadwere notcompletely independent, and the two centers cooperated whenever necessary.But on thewhole, asRobertGilruth saidof their roles, “Theybuilt a damnedgood rocket and we built a damned good spacecraft.” Von Braun, however,whosethinkinghadneverbeenrestrictedto launchvehiclesalone,aspiredtoalarger role for Marshall: manned operations, construction of stations in earthorbit, and all phases of a complete space program—which would eventuallyencroachonHouston’sresponsibilities.9

But as long asMarshallwas occupiedwith Saturn, that aspirationwas farfromrealization.Saturndevelopmentwasproceedingwellin1965.ThelasttestflightsoftheSaturnIwererunoffthatyearandpreparationswereunderwayforaseriesofSaturnIBshots.†InAugusteachofthethreestagesoftheSaturnVwas successfully static-fired at full thrust and duration.Not only that, but thethirdstagewasfired,shutdown,andrestarted,successfullysimulatingitsroleofinjectingtheApollospacecraftintoitslunartrajectory.Flighttestingremainedtobedone,butSaturnVhadtakenalongstride.10

Confidentthoughtheywereofultimatesuccess,Marshall’s7300employeescouldhavefeltapprehensiveabouttheirfuturethatsummer.AfterSaturnVtherewasnothingonthedrawingboards.Apollostillhadalongwaytogo,butmostoftheremainingworkwouldtakeplaceinHouston.VonBrauncouldhardlybeoptimistic when he summarizedMarshall’s prospects in a mid-August memo.Noting the trendof spaceflight programs, especially booster development, andreminding his coworkers that 200 positions were to be transferred fromHuntsville to Houston, von Braun remarked that it was time “to turn ourattention to the future role of Marshall in the nation’s space program.” As aheadquarters official would later characterize it, Marshall in 1965 was “atremendous solution looking for a problem.” Sooner than the other centers,Marshallwasseriouslywondering,“WhatdowedoafterApollo?”11

Some 960 kilometers southeast of Huntsville, halfway down the Atlanticcoast of Florida, the third of the manned spaceflight centers had no time forworryaboutthefuture.TheJohnF.KennedySpaceCenter,usuallyreferredtoas“theCape”fromitslocationadjacenttoCapeCanaveral,wasinrapidexpansion.WhathadstartedastheLaunchOperationsDirectorateofMarshallSpaceFlightCenterwas,by1965,abusycenterwithatotalworkforce(includingcontractor

employees)of20000people. InApril construction teams toppedoff thehugeVehicleAssemblyBuilding,wherethe110-meterSaturnVcouldbeassembledindoors.Twomonthslaterroadtestsbeganforthemammothcrawler-transporterthatwouldmove the rocket, complete andupright, tooneof two launchpads.TwelvekilometerseastwardontheCape,NASAlaunchteamswerewindingupSaturnIflightsandworkingGeminimissionswiththeAirForce.12

Under the directorship ofKurtDebus,who had come fromGermanywithvonBraunin1945,KSC’sresponsibilities includedmuchmore than launchingrockets.AtKSCalloftheboosterstagesandspacecraftfirstcametogether,andthough they were thoroughly checked and tested by their manufacturers,engineersattheCapehadtomakesuretheyworkedwhenputtogether.OneofKSC’slargesttaskswasthecompletecheckoutofeverysysteminthecompletedvehicle,verifying thatNASA’selaborate systemof“interfacecontrol”actuallyworked. If two vehicle components, manufactured by different contractors indifferentstates,didnotfunction togetheras intended, itwasKSC’s job tofindoutwhyandseethattheywerefixed.CheckoutresponsibilitybroughtKSCintoclosecontactnotonlywiththetwootherNASAcentersbutwithallofthemajorcontractors.13

Responsibilityfororchestrating theoperationsof thefieldcentersandtheircontractors lay with the Office of Manned Space Flight (OMSF) at NASAHeadquarters inWashington.Oneof threeprogramoffices,OMSF reported toNASA’s third-rankingofficial,AssociateAdministratorRobertC.Seamans, Jr.EversincetheApollocommitmentin1961,OMSFhadovershadowedtheotherprogramoffices(theOfficeofSpaceScienceandApplicationsandtheOfficeofAdvancedResearchandTechnology)notonlyinitsshareofpublicattentionbutinitsshareoftheagency’sbudget.

DirectingOMSFin1965wasGeorgeE.Mueller(pronounced“Miller”),anelectrical engineer with a doctorate in physics and 23 years’ experience inacademic and industrial research. Before taking the reins as associateadministratorformannedspaceflightin1963,MuellerhadbeenvicepresidentofSpace Technology Laboratories, Inc., in Los Angeles, where he was deeplyinvolvedin theAirForce’sMinutemanmissileprogram.Hehadspenthisfirstyear inWashington reorganizing OMSF and gradually acclimatizing the fieldcenters tohiswayofdoingbusiness.Consideringcentralizedcontrol tobe theprime requisite for achieving the Apollo goal, Mueller established anadministrative organization that gaveHeadquarters the principal responsibilityfor policy-making while delegating as much authority as possible to thecenters.14

Mueller had to pick his path carefully, for the centers hadwhatmight becalled a “States’-rights attitude” toward direction from Headquarters and hadenjoyedconsiderableautonomy.Earlyinhistenure,convincedthatApollowasnot going to make it by the end of the decade, Mueller went against centerjudgmenttoinstitute“all-up”testingfortheSaturnV.Thiscalledforcompletevehicles to be test-flown with all stages functioning the first time—a radicaldeparture from the stage-by-stage testing NASA and NACA had previouslydone,butaprocedure thathadworkedforMinuteman.Itwouldsave timeandmoney—if it worked—but would put a substantial burden on reliability andquality control.Getting the centers to accept all-up testingwas no small feat;when it succeeded,Mueller’s stock went up. Besides putting Apollo back onschedule,thispracticeincreasedthepossibilitythatsomeofthevehiclesorderedforApollomightbecomesurplusandthusavailableforotheruses.15

DIRECTIONSFORMANNEDSPACEFLIGHTIn an important sense the decision to shoot for the moon short-circuited

conventional schemes of space exploration. From the earliest days of seriousspeculationonexplorationoftheuniverse,theEuropeanswhohaddonemostofit assumed that the first stepwould be a permanent station orbiting the earth.Pioneers such as Konstantin Eduardovich Tsiolkowskiy and Hermann Oberthconceivedsuchastationtobeuseful,notonlyforitsvantagepointovertheearthbelow,butasastagingareaforexpeditionsoutward.WernhervonBraun,raisedintheEuropeanschool,championedtheearth-orbitingspacestationintheearly1950sinawidelycirculatednationalmagazinearticle.16

Thereweresoundtechnicalreasonsforsettingupanorbitingway-stationenroute to distant space destinations. Rocket technology was a limiting factor;buildinga station inorbitby launching its componentsonmany small rocketsseemedeasierthandevelopingthehugeonesrequiredtoleavetheearthinonejump. Too, a permanent station would provide a place to study many of theunknowns in manned flight, man’s adaptability to weightlessness being animportantone.Therewas,aswell,awealthofscientificinvestigationthatcouldbedoneinorbit.Thespacestationwas,tomany,thebestwaytogetintospaceexploration;allelsefollowedfromthat.17

The sense of urgency pervading the United States in the year followingSputnikwasreflectedinthecommonmetaphor,“thespacerace.”ItwasaraceCongresswantedverymuch towin,even if the locationof the finish linewas

uncertain.Inlate1958theHouseSelectCommitteeonSpacebeganinterviewingleading scientists, engineers, corporate executives, and government officials,seeking to establish goals beyondMercury. The committee’s report,TheNextTen Years in Space, concluded that a space station was the next logical step.WernhervonBraunandhisstaffattheArmyBallisticMissileAgencypresentedasimilarviewinbriefingsforNASA.Bothaspacestationandamannedlunarlandingwere included in a list of goals given to Congress by NASADeputyAdministratorHughDrydeninFebruary1959.18

Later that yearNASA created aResearch SteeringCommittee onMannedSpaceFlighttostudypossibilitiesforpost-Mercuryprograms.Thatcommitteeisusually identifiedas theprogenitorofApollo;butat its firstmeetingmembersplacedaspacestationaheadof the lunar landingina listof logicalstepsforalong-termspaceprogram.Subsequentmeetingsdebatedtheresearchvalueofastationversusamoonlanding,advocatedasatrue“endobjective”requiringnojustificationintermsofsomelargergoaltowhichitcontributed.Boththespacestationandthe lunarmissionhadstrongadvocates,andAdministratorT.KeithGlennandeclinedtocommitNASAeitherway.Earlyin1960,however,hedidagree that after Mercury the moon should be the end objective of mannedspaceflight.19

Still, there remained strong justification for themanned orbital station andplentyofdoubtthatrocketdevelopmentcouldmakethelunarvoyagepossibleatanyearlydate.RobertGilruthtoldasymposiumonmannedspacestationsinthespringof 1960 thatNASA’s flightmissionswere a compromisebetweenwhatspace officials would like to do and what they could do. Looking at all thefactorsinvolved,Gilruthsaid,“Itappearsthatthemulti-manearthsatellitesareachievable…,whilesuchprogramsasmannedlunarlandingandreturnshouldnot be directly pursued at this time.” Heinz H. Koelle, chief of the FutureProjectsOfficeatMarshallSpaceFlightCenter,offeredtheopinionthatasmalllaboratorywasthenextlogicalstepinearth-orbitaloperations,withalarger(upto18metric tons)andmorecomplexonecomingalongwhen rocketpayloadscouldbeincreased.20ThiswastheMarshallviewpoint,frequentlyexpressedupuntil1962.

During1960,however,mannedflighttothemoongainedascendancy.Inthefiscal1961budgethearings,verylittlewassaidaboutspacestations;thebudgetproposal, unlike the previous year’s, sought no funds for preliminary studies.Theagency’slong-rangeplanofJanuary1961droppedthegoalofapermanentstationby1969;rather, theSpaceTaskGroupwasconsideringamuchsmallerlaboratory—one that could fit into the adapter section that supported the

proposedApollospacecraftonitslaunchvehicle.21

Then, in May 1961, President John F. Kennedy all but sealed the spacestation’s fatewith his proclamation of themoon landing asAmerica’s goal inspace. It was the kind of challenge American technology could most readilyaccept: concise, definite, and measurable. Success or failure would be self-evident. It meant, however, that all of the efforts of NASA and much ofaerospaceindustrywouldhavetobenarrowlyfocused.Givenacommitmentfora20-yearprogramofmethodicalspacedevelopment,vonBraun’s1952conceptmighthavebeenacceptedasthebestwaytogo.Withonly8½yearsitwasoutofthequestion.TheUnitedStateswasgoingtopulloffitsbiggestactfirst,andtherewouldbelittletimetothinkaboutwhatmightfollow.

SPACESTATIONSAFTER1962Thedecisiontogoforthemoondidnotinitselfruleoutaspacestation;it

madealargeorcomplexoneimprobable,simplybecausetherewouldbeneithertimenormoney for it.AtMarshall,vonBraun’sgrouparguedduring thenextyear for reaching the moon by earth-orbit rendezvous—the mission modewhereby amoon-bound vehiclewould be fueled from “tankers” put into orbitneartheearth.Comparedtotheothertwomodesbeingconsidered—directflightand lunar-orbit rendezvous*—this seemed both safer and more practical, andMarshall was solidly committed to it. In studies done in 1962 and 1963,Marshall proposed a permanent station capable of checkingout and launchinglunarvehicles.InJune1962,however,NASAchoselunar-orbitrendezvousforApollo, closing off prospects for extensive earth-orbital operations as aprerequisiteforthelunarlanding.22

Frommid-1962,therefore,spacestationswerepropersubjectsforadvancedstudies—exercisestoidentifytheneedsofthespaceprogramandpinpointareaswhere research and development were required. Much of this future-studieswork went to aerospace contractors, since NASA was heavily engaged withApollo.Thedoorofthespaceagehadjustopened,anditwasanerawhen,asone future projects official put it, “the sky was not the limit” to imaginativethinking.Congresswas generous, too; between1962 and 1965 it appropriated$70 million for future studies. A dozen firms received over 140 contracts tostudy earth-orbital, lunar, and planetary missions and the spacecraft to carrythem out. There were good reasons for this intensive planning. As a NASAofficialtoldacongressionalcommittee,millionsofdollarsindevelopmentcosts

couldbesavedbydeterminingwhatnottotry.23

LangleyResearchCenter took the lead in space-stationstudies in theearly1960s.Afterdevelopingaconceptforamodeststationinthesummerof1959—onethatforeshadowedmostofSkylab’spurposesandevenconsideredtheuseofa spent rocket stage—Langley’s planners went on to consider much biggerstations. Artificial gravity, to be produced by rotating the station, was one oftheirprincipal interestsfromthestart.Havingestablishedanoptimumrateandradius of rotation (4 revolutions per minute and 25 meters), they studied anumber of configurations, settling finally on a hexagonal wheel with spokesradiatingfromacentralcontrolmodule.Enclosingnearly1400cubicmetersofworkspaceandaccommodating24to36crewmen,thestationwouldweigh77metrictonsatlaunch.24

Getting something of this size into orbit was another problem. Designersanticipated severe problems if the station were launched piecemeal andassembled inorbit—aschemevonBraunhadadvocated10years earlier—andbegan to consider inflatable structures.Although testswere runon an8-meterprototype, the concept was finally rejected, partly on the grounds that such astructure would be too vulnerable to meteoroids. As an alternative Langleysuggested a collapsible structure that could be erected,more or less umbrella-fashion,inorbitandawardedNorthAmericanAviationacontracttostudyit.25

Langley’sfirsteffortsweresummarizedinasymposiuminJuly1962.Papersdealtwithvirtuallyalloftheproblemsofalargerotatingstation,includinglifesupport,environmentalcontrol,andwastemanagement.Langleyengineers felttheyhadmadeconsiderableprogresstowarddefiningtheseproblems;theyweresomewhat concerned, however, that their proposals might be too large forNASA’simmediateneeds.26

SimilarstudieswereunderwayinHouston,whereearlyin1962MSGbeganplanning a large rotating station to be launched on the Saturn V. As withLangley’sproposedstations,Houston’sobjectivesweretoassesstheproblemsofliving in space and to conduct scientific and technological research.ResupplymodulesandreliefcrewswouldbesenttothestationwiththesmallerSaturnIBand an Apollo spacecraft modified to carry six men, twice its normalcomplement. MSC’s study proposed to put the station in orbit within fouryears.27

Bythefallof1962theimmediatedemandsofApollohadeasedsomewhat,allowing Headquarters to give more attention to future programs. In lateSeptember Headquarters officials urged the centers to go ahead with their

technical studies even though no one could foresee when a stationmight fly.Furthermore,ithadbeguntolookasthoughrisingcostsinApollowouldreducethe money available for future programs. Responses from both MSC andLangley recognized theneed for simplicity and fiscal restraint; but the centersdiffered as to the station’s mission. Langley emphasized a laboratory foradvanced technology. Accordingly, NASA’s offices of space science andadvancedtechnologyshouldplayimportantrolesinplanning.MSCconsideredthestation’smajorpurposetobeabaseformannedflightstoMars.28

ThefollowingmonthJosephShea,deputydirectorforsystemsintheOfficeof Manned Space Flight, sought help in formulating future objectives formanned spaceflight. In a letter to the field centers and Headquarters programoffices, Shea listed several options being considered by OMSF, including anorbiting laboratory. Such a station was thought to be feasible, he said, but itrequiredadequatejustificationtogainapproval.Heaskedforrecommendationsconcerning purposes, configurations, and specific scientific and engineeringrequirements for the space station, with two points defining the context: theimportanceofaspacestationprogramtoscience,technology,ornationalgoals;and theuniquecharacteristicsofsuchastationandwhysuchaprogramcouldnot be accomplished by using Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, or unmannedspacecraft.29Publicstatementsand internalcorrespondenceduring thenextsixmonthsstressedtheagency’sintentiontodesignaspacestationthatwouldservenationalneeds.30

Bymid-1963,NASAhadadefiniterationaleforanearth-orbitinglaboratory.Theprimarymissiononearlyflightswouldbetodeterminewhethermancouldliveandworkeffectivelyinspaceforlongperiods.Theweightlessnessofspacewasapeculiarcondition thatcouldnotbesimulatedonearth—at leastnot formorethan30secondsinanairplane.Noonecouldpredicteitherthelong-termeffects of weightlessness or the results of a sudden return to normal gravity.These biomedical concerns, though interesting in themselves, were part of alarger goal: to use space stations as bases for interplanetary flight. A first-generationlaboratorywouldprovidefacilitiestodevelopandqualifytheVarioussystems, structures, and operational techniques needed for an orbital launchfacilityoralargerspacestation.Finally,amannedlaboratoryhadobvioususesintheconductofscientificresearchinastronomy,physics,andbiology.

SIZINGUPASPACESTATION

Although mission objectives and space-station configuration were related,theexperimentsdidnotnecessarilydictatea specificdesign.NASAcould testman’s reaction to weightlessness in a series of gradually extended flightsbeginningwithGeminihardware,a low-costapproachparticularlyattractive toWashington. An alternate plan would measure astronauts’ reaction to varyinglevelsofartificialgravitywithinalargerotatingstation.JosephSheaponderedthechoicesataconferenceinAugust1963:

IsaminimalApollo-typeMOL[MannedOrbitingLaboratory]sufficient for theperformanceofasignificant biomedical experiment?Or perhaps the benefits of a trulymulti-purposeMOL are sooverwhelming…thatoneshouldnotspendunnecessarytimeandeffort…buildingsmallstations,but,rather,proceedimmediatelywiththedevelopmentofalargelaboratoryinspace.31

WhateverchoiceNASAmade,itcouldselectfromawiderangeofspace-stationconceptsgeneratedsince1958bytheresearchcentersandaerospacecontractors.Thepossibilitiesfitintothreecategories:small,medium,andlarge.

Theminimumvehicle,emphasizingtheuseofdevelopedhardware,offeredthe shortest development time and lowest cost. Most often mentioned in thiscategory was Apollo, the spacecraft NASA was developing for the lunarlandings.Therewere threebasicparts toApollo:command, service,and lunarmodules.The conical commandmodule carried the crew from launch to lunarorbitandbacktoreentryandrecovery,supportedbysystemsandsuppliesinthecylindrical service module to which it was attached until just before reentry.Designedtosupport threemen, theCMwasroomybyGeministandards,eventhoughits interiorwasnolarger thanasmallelevator.Stowagespacewasatapremium,andnotmuchofitsinstrumentationcouldberemovedforoperationsinearthorbit.Onepartof the servicemodulewas left empty toaccommodateexperiments, but it was unpressurized and could only be reached byextravehicularactivity.Thelunarmodulewasanevenmorespecializedandlessspaciouscraft.Itwasintwoparts:apressurizedascentstagecontainingthelife-support and control systems, and a descent stage, considerably larger butunpressurized. The descent stage could be fitted with a fair amount ofexperiments; but like the service module, it was accessible only byextravehicularactivity.32

Theshortageofaccessiblespacewasanobviousdifficulty inusingApollohardware for a space station. Proposals had been made to add a pressurizedmodulethatwouldfitintotheadapterarea,betweenthelaunchvehicleandthespacecraft,but this tended tooffset theadvantagesofusingexistinghardware.Still, in July 1963, with the idea of an Apollo laboratory gaining favor,HeadquartersaskedHoustontosuperviseaNorthAmericanAviationstudyofan

ExtendedApollomission.33

NorthAmerican,MSC’sprimeApollocontractor,hadbrieflyconsideredtheSpaceTaskGroup’s proposal for anApollo laboratory two years earlier.Nowcompanyofficialsrevivedtheideaofthemoduleintheadapterarea,whichhadgrown considerably during the evolution of the Saturn design. Though thestudy’sprimaryobjectivewastoidentifythemodificationsrequiredtosupporta120-day flight, North American also examined the possibility of a one-yearmission sustained by periodic resupply of expendables. Three possibleconfigurations were studied: an Apollo command module with enlargedsubsystems; Apollo with an attached module supported by the commandmodule; andApollo plus a new, self-supporting laboratorymodule.A crewoftwowaspostulatedforthefirstconcept;theothersallowedathirdastronaut.34

Changingthespacecraft’smissionwouldentailextensivemodificationsbutno basic structural changes. Solar cells would replace the standard hydrogen-oxygen fuel cells, which imposed too great a weight penalty. In view of theadverseeffectsofbreathingpureoxygenforextendedperiods,NorthAmericanrecommended a nitrogen-oxygen atmosphere, and insteadof the bulky lithiumhydroxide canister to absorb carbon dioxide, the study proposed to use morecompact and regenerablemolecular sieves.*Drawing from earlier studies, thestudygrouppreparedalistofessentialmedicalexperimentsandestablishedtheirapproximateweights and volumes, aswell as the power, time, andworkspacerequiredtoconductthem.Itturnedoutthatthecommandmodulewastoosmalltosupportmore thanabareminimumof theseexperiments,andevenwith theadditional module and a third crewman there would not be enough time toperformallofthedesiredtests.35

NorthAmerican’s study concluded that all three conceptswere technicallysoundandcouldperformtherequiredmission.Thecommandmodulealonewasthe least costly, but relianceon a two-mancrewcreatedoperational liabilities.Addingalaboratorymodule,thoughobviouslyadvantageous,increasedcostsby15–30%andposedaweightproblem.Addingthedependentmodulebroughtthepayload very near the Saturn IB’s weight-lifting limit, while the independentmodule exceeded it. Since NASA expected to increase the Saturn’s thrust by1967,thiswasnoreasontorejecttheconcept;however,itrepresentedaproblemthatwouldpersistuntil1969:payloadsthatexceededtheavailablethrust.NorthAmericanrecommendedthatanyfollow-upstudybelimitedtotheApolloplusadependentmodule, since thishad thegreatestapplicability toall threemissionproposals. The findings were welcomed at Headquarters, where the fundingpictureforpost-Apolloprogramsremainedunclear.Thecompanywasaskedto

continue its investigation in 1964, concentrating on the technical problems ofextendingthelifeofApollosubsystems.36

Several schemes called for a largermanned orbiting laboratory thatwouldsupport four to sixmen for ayearwith ample room for experiments.Like theminimum vehicle, the medium-sized laboratory was usually a zero-gravitystation that could be adapted to provide artificial gravity. Langley’s MannedOrbitingResearchLaboratory,astudybeguninlate1962,wasprobablythebest-known example of this type: a four-man canister 4 meters in diameter and 7meters long containing its own life-support systems. Although the laboratoryitselfwouldhavetobedeveloped, launchvehiclesandferrycraftwereprovenhardware.ASaturnIBor theAirForce’sTitanIIIcouldlaunchthe laboratory,and Gemini spacecraft would carry the crews. Another advantage wassimplicity: the module would be launched in its final configuration, with norequirementforassemblyordeploymentinorbit.UseoftheGeminispacecraftmeanttherewouldbenonewoperationalproblemstosolve.Evenso,theinitialcostwasunfavorableandHeadquartersconsideredthecomplicatedprogramofcrewrotationadisadvantage.37

Large station concepts, likeMSC’s Project Olympus, generally required aSaturn V booster and separately launched crew-ferry and logistics spacecraft.Crewsizewouldvaryfrom12to24,andthestationwouldhaveafive-yearlifespan.Proposedlargelaboratoriesrangedfrom46to61metersindiameter,andtypically contained 1400 cubicmeters of space.Most provided for continuousrotation to create artificial gravity, with non-rotating central hubs for dockingand zero-gravity work. Such concepts represented a space station in thetraditional sense of the term, but entailed quite an increase in cost anddevelopmenttime.38

Despite the interest inApollo as an interim laboratory,Houstonwasmoreenthusiasticabouta largespacestation.InJune1963,MSCcontractedfor twostudies, one by Douglas Aircraft Company for a zero-gravity station and onewithLockheedforarotatingstation.StudyspecificationscalledforaSaturnVbooster,ahangar toenclosea12-manferrycraft,anda24-mancrew.Douglasproducedacylindricaldesign31meterslongwithpressurizedcompartmentsforliving quarters and recreation, a command center, a laboratory that included aone-man centrifuge to simulate gravity for short periods, and a hangar largeenoughtoservicefourApollos.Theconcept,submitted inFebruary1964,wasjudgedtobewithinprojectedfuturecapabilities,buttheworkwasdiscontinuedbecausetherewasnojustificationforastationofthatsize.39

Lockheed’s concept stood a better chance of eventual adoption, since it

provided artificial gravity—favored by MSC engineers, not simply forphysiological reasons but for its greater efficiency.As one of them said, “Forlongperiodsof time [suchasa trip toMars], itmight justbeeasierandmorecomfortable forman to live inanenvironmentwhereheknewwhere thefloorwas,andwherehispencilwasgoingtobe,andthatsortof thing.”Lockheed’sstation was a Y-shaped module with a central hub providing a zero-gravitystationandahangarforferryandlogisticsspacecraft.Outalongtheradialarms,48mencouldliveinvaryinglevelsofartificialgravity.40

Whilestudiesofmediumandlargestationscontinued,NASAbeganplansin1964toflyExtendedApolloasitsfirstspacelaboratory.GeorgeMueller’sall-uptestingdecisioninNovember1963increasedthelikelihoodofsurplushardwareby reducing the number of launches required in the moon program. Officialsrefused to predict how many flights might be eliminated, but 1964 plansassumed10ormoreexcessSaturns.

Dollar signs, however, hadbecomemore important than surplus hardware.Followingtwoyearsofgeneroussupport,CongressreducedNASA’sbudgetforfiscal 1964 from $5.7 to $5.1 billion. The usually optimistic von Braun toldHeinzKoelle inAugust1963, “I’mconvinced that inviewofNASA’soverallfundingsituation,thisspacestationthingwillnotgetintohighgearinthenextfewyears.MinimumC-IBapproach[SaturnIBandExtendedApollo]istheonlythingwecanaffordatthistime.”ThesameuncertaintyshapedNASA’splanningthe following year. In April 1964, Koelle told von Braun that AdministratorJames Webb had instructed NASA planners to provide management with“various alternative objectives and missions and their associated costs andconsequences rather than detailed definition of a single specific long termprogram.”VonBraun’swryresponsesummedupNASA’sdilemma:“Yes,that’sthe new line at Hq., so they can switch the tack as the Congressional windschange.”41

At the FY 1965 budget hearings in February 1964, testimony concerningadvanced manned missions spoke of gradual evolution from Apollo-Saturnhardwaretomoreadvancedspacecraft.NASAhadnotmadeupitsmindaboutapost-Apollo space station. Two months later, however, Michael Yarymovych,director for earth-orbital-mission studies, spelled out the agency’s plans to theFirst Space Congress meeting at Cocoa Beach, Florida. Extended Apollo, hesaid,wouldbeanessentialelementofanexpandingearth-orbitalprogram,firstasa laboratoryand laterasa logisticssystem.Sometimein thefuture,NASAwould select amore sophisticated space station from among themedium andlarge concepts under consideration.Mueller gave credence to his remarks the

following month by placing Yarymovych on special assignment to increaseApollo system capabilities.42 Meanwhile, a project had appeared that was tobecomeSkylab’schiefcompetitorforthenextfiveyears:anAirForceorbitinglaboratory.

AIRFORCESEEKSROLEINSPACEForadecadeafterSputnik, theU.S.AirForceandNASAviedforroles in

space.The initial advantage laywith the civilian agency, for theSpaceActof1958declaredthat“activitiesinspaceshouldbedevotedtopeacefulpurposes.”In linewith this policy, the civilianMercury projectwas chosen over theAirForce’s “Man in Space Soonest” as America’s first manned space program.43But the Space Act also gave DoD responsibility for military operations anddevelopmentofweaponsystems;consequentlytheAirForcesponsoredstudiesover the next three years to define space bombers, manned spy-satellites,interceptors,andacommandandcontrolcenter.Incongressionalbriefingsafterthe 1960 elections, USAF spokesmen stressed the theme that “military space,definedasspaceoutto10Earthdiameters,isthebattlegroundofthefuture.”44

For all its efforts, however, the Air Force could not convince its civiliansuperiors that space was the next battleground. When Congress added $86million to the Air Force budget for its manned space glider, Dyna-Soar,SecretaryofDefenseRobertS.McNamararefused tospendthemoney.DoD’sdirector of defense research and development testified to a congressionalcommittee, “there is no definable need at this time, ormilitary requirement atthis time” for a manned military space program. It was wise to advanceAmerican space technology, sincemilitaryusesmight appear; but “NASAcandevelopmuchofitorevenmostofit.”Budgetrequestsin1962reflectedtheAirForce’slossofposition.NASA’s$3.7billionauthorizationwasthreetimeswhattheAirForcegotforspaceactivities;threeyearsearlierthetwohadbeenalmostequal.45

Throughout the Cold War, Russian advances proved the most effectivestimuliforAmericanactions;soagaininAugust1962aSovietspacespectacularstrengthened the Air Force argument for a space role. Russia placed twospacecraft intosimilarorbitsfor thefirst time.Vostok3and4closed towithin6½kilometers,andsomeAmericanreportsspokeofarendezvousanddocking.Air Force supporters saw military implications in the Soviet feat, promptingMcNamaratoreexamineAirForceplans.Criticsquestionedtheeffectivenessof

NASA-USAF communication on technical and managerial problems. Inresponse,JamesWebbcreatedanewNASApost,deputyassociateadministratorfor defense affairs, and named Adm. Walter F. Boone (USN, ret.) to it inNovember1962. In themeantime,congressionaldemands foracrashprogramhad subsided,partlybecause successfulNASA launches*bolstered confidenceinAmerica’scivilianprograms.46

TheCubanmissilecrisisoccupiedthePentagon’sattentionthroughmuchofthe fall, but when space roles were again considered, McNamara showed asurprisingchangeofattitude.Earlyin1962AirForceofficialshadbeguntalkingabouta“BlueGemini”program,aplantouseNASA’sGeminihardwareinearlytrainingmissionsfor rendezvousandsupportofamilitaryspacestation.SomeNASAofficialswelcomedtheideaasawaytoenlargetheGeminiprogramandsecure DoD funds. But when Webb and Seamans sought to expand the AirForce’s participation in December 1962, McNamara proposed that hisdepartment assume responsibility for all America’s manned spaceflightprograms. NASA officials successfully rebuffed this bid for control, but didagree,atMcNamara’sinsistence,thatneitheragencywouldstartanewmannedprogram innear-earthorbitwithout theother’sapproval.47The issue remainedalive for months. At one point the Air Force attempted to gain control overNASA’s long-rangeplanning.An agreementwas finally reached inSeptemberprotecting NASA’s right to conduct advanced space-station studies but alsoproviding for better liaison through the Aeronautics and AstronauticsCoordinating Board (the principal means for formal liaison between the twoagencies). The preamble to the agreement expressed the view that, as far aspracticable, the two agencies should combine their requirements in a commonspace-station.48

McNamara’s efforts for a joint space-stationwere prompted in part byAirForce unhappiness with Gemini. Talk of a “Blue Gemini” faded in 1963 andDyna-Soarlostmuchofitsappeal.IfNASAheldtoitsschedules,Geminiwouldfly two years before the space glider could make its first solo flight. On 10DecemberSecretaryMcNamaraterminatedtheDyna-Soarproject,transferringapartofitsfundstoanewproject,aMannedOrbitingLaboratory(MOL).49

WithMOLtheAirForcehopedtoestablishamilitaryroleformaninspace;butsincetheprogrammetnospecificdefenseneeds,ithadtobeaccomplishedatminimumcost.Accordingly, theAirForceplanned touseprovenhardware:the Titan IIIC launch vehicle, originally developed for the Dyna-Soar, and amodified Gemini spacecraft. Only the system’s third major component, thelaboratory, and its test equipment would be new. The Titan could lift 5700

kilogramsinadditiontothespacecraft;abouttwo-thirdsofthiswouldgotothelaboratory, therest to testequipment. Initialplansprovided30cubicmetersofspace in the laboratory, roughly the volume of a medium-sized house trailer.Laboratory and spacecraft were to be launched together; when the payloadreachedorbit,twocrewmenwouldmovefromtheGeminiintothelaboratoryforamonth’soccupancy.AirForceofficialsprojectedacostof$1.5billionforfourflights,thefirstin1968.50

TheMOLdecision raised immediate questions about theNASA-DoDpacton cooperative development of an orbital station. Although some outsidersconsidered the Pentagon’s decision a repudiation of the Webb-McNamaraagreement, both NASA and DoD describedMOL as a single military projectratherthanabroadspaceprogram.TheyagreednottoconstrueitastheNationalSpaceStation,aseparateprogramthenunderjointstudy;andwhenNASAandDoDestablishedaNationalSpaceStationPlanningSubpanelinMarch1964(asanadjunctoftheAeronauticsandAstronauticsCoordinatingBoard),itstaskwasto recommend a station that would follow MOL. Air Force press releasesimpliedthatMcNamara’sapprovalgaveprimaryresponsibilityforspacestationsto the military, while NASA officials insisted that the military programcomplemented its own post-Apollo plans. Nevertheless, concern that the twoprogramsmightappeartoosimilarpromptedengineersatLangleyandMSCtoreworktheirdesignstolooklesslikeMOL.51

Actually,McNamara’s announcement did not constitute program approval,andforthenext20monthsMOLstruggledforrecognitionandadequatefunding.Planning went ahead in 1964 and some contracts were let, but the deliberateapproach toMOL reflectedpolitical realities. InSeptemberCongressmanOlinTeague (Dem.,Tex.), chairmanof theHouseSubcommittee onMannedSpaceFlight and of the Subcommittee onNASAOversight, recommended thatDoDadapt Apollo to its needs. Shortly after the 1964 election, Senate spacecommitteechairmanClintonAnderson (Dem.,N.M.) told thepresident thatheopposed MOL; he believed the government could save more than a billiondollarsinthenextfiveyearsbycancelingtheAirForceprojectandapplyingitsfunds to an Extended Apollo station. Despite rumors of MOL’s impendingcancellation, theFY1966budgetproposal includeda tentativecommitmentof$150million.52

TheBureauof theBudget, reluctant to approve twoprograms that seemedlikely tooverlap,allocatedfunds toMOLinDecemberwith theunderstandingthat McNamara would hold the money pending further studies and anotherreview in May. DoD would continue to define military experiments, while

NASAidentifiedApolloconfigurationsthatmightsatisfymilitaryrequirements.AjointstudywouldconsiderMOL’sutilityfornon-militarymissions.ANASA-DoDnewsreleaseon25January1965saidthatoverlappingprogramsmustbeavoided.Forthenextfewyearsbothagencieswouldusehardwareandfacilities“already available or now under active development” for their mannedspaceflightprograms—atleast“tothemaximumdegreepossible.”53

InFebruaryaNASAcommitteeundertookathree-monthstudytodetermineApollo’s potential as an earth-orbiting laboratory and define key scientificexperiments forapost-Apolloearth-orbital flightprogram.Although thegrouphadworkedcloselywithanAirForce team, thecommittee’srecommendationsapparentlyhadlittleeffectonMOL,thebasicconceptforwhichwasunalteredby the review.More important, the study helped NASA clarify its own post-Apolloplans.54

Since late1964, advocatesof amilitary spaceprogramhad increased theirsupportforMOL,theHouseMilitaryOperationsSubcommitteerecommendinginJunethatDoDbeginfull-scaledevelopmentwithoutfurtherdelay.Twoweekslater amember of theHouseCommittee on Science andAstronautics urged acrashprogramtolaunchthefirstMOLwithin18months.RussianandAmericanadvances with the Voskhod and Gemini flights—multi-manned missions andspacewalks—made amilitary rolemoreplausible.On25August 1965,MOLfinally received President Johnson’s blessing.55 Asked if the Air Force hadclearlyestablishedaroleformaninspace,aPentagonspokesmanindicatedthatthe chances seemed good enough to warrant evaluating man’s ability “muchmorethoroughlythanwe’reabletodoontheground.”NASAcouldnotprovidethe answers because the Gemini spacecraft was too cramped. One newsmanwanted to knowwhy theAirForce had abandonedApollo; the replywas thatApollo’slunarcapabilitieswereinmanywaysmuchmorethanMOLneeded.Ifhindsight suggests that parochial interests were a factor, the Air Forcenevertheless had good reasons to shun Apollo. The lunar landing remainedAmerica’schiefcommitmentinspace.Untilthatgoalwasaccomplished,anAirForceprogramusingApollohardwarewouldsurelytakesecondplace.56

PRESIDENTCALLSFORNASA’SPLANS

Inearly1964NASAundertookyetanotherdetailedexaminationofitsplans,this time at the request of the White House. Lyndon Johnson had played animportant role in theU.S.spaceprogramsincehisdaysas theSenatemajority

leader. Noting that post-Apollo programs were likely to prove costly andcomplex,thepresidentrequestedastatementoffuturespaceobjectivesandtheresearchanddevelopmentprogramsthatsupportedthem.57

Webb handed the assignment to an ad hoc Future Programs Task Group.Afterfivemonthsofwork, thegroupmadenostartlingproposals.Theirreportrecognized thatGemini andApolloweremaking heavy demands on financialandhumanresourcesandurgedNASAtoconcentrateonthoseprogramswhiledeferring“largenewmissioncommitments for further studyandanalysis.”Bycapitalizingon the “size, versatility, and efficiency”of theSaturn andApollo,theU.S.shouldbeabletomaintainspacepreeminencewellintothe1970s.Earlydefinition of an intermediate set of missions using proven hardware wasrecommended. Then, a relatively small commitment of funds within the nextyearwouldenableNASAtoflyworthwhileExtendedApollomissionsby1968.Finally,long-rangeplanningshouldbecontinuedforspacestationsandmannedflightstoMarsinthe1970s.58

ThereportapparentlysatisfiedWebb,whouseditextensivelyinsubsequentcongressional hearings. It should also have pleased Robert Seamans, since hewasanxioustoextendtheApollocapabilitybeyondthelunarlanding.Othersinand outside of NASA found fault with the document. The Senate spacecommittee described the report as “somewhat obsolete,” containing “lessinformation than expected in terms of future planning.” Committee membersfaulteditsomissionofessentialdetailsandrecommendeda50%cutinExtendedApollo funding, arguing that enough studies had already been conducted.Elsewhere on Capitol Hill, NASA supporters called for specificrecommendations.Withinthespaceagency,someofficialshadhopedforamoreambitiousdeclaration,perhapsarecommendationforaMarslandingasthenextmannedproject.AtHuntsville,afutureprojectsofficialconcludedthattheplanofferedno real challenge toNASA (andparticularly toMarshall) onceApollowasaccomplished.59

In thinking of future missions, NASA officials were aware of how littleexperiencehadbeengainedinmannedflight.ThelongestMercurymissionhadlasted less than 35 hours. Webb and Seamans insisted before congressionalcommittees that the results of the longer Gemini flights might affect futureplanning, and a decision on anymajor new program should, in any event, bedelayeduntilafterthelunarlanding.Thematteroffundingweighedevenmoreheavilyagainststartinganewprogram.NASAbudgetshadreachedaplateauat$5.2 billion in fiscal 1964, an amount just sufficient for Gemini and Apollo.Barring an increase in availablemoney, newmannedprogramswould have to

waitforthedownturninApollospendingafter1966.Therewaslittlesupportinthe Johnson administration or Congress to increase NASA’s budget; indeed,Great Society programs and the Vietnam war were pushing in the oppositedirection. The Air Force’s space program was another problem, since somemembersofCongressandtheBudgetBureaufavoredMOLasthecountry’sfirstspacelaboratory.60

MUELLEROPENSAPOLLOAPPLICATIONSPROGRAMOFFICE

Equally compelling reasons favored an early start of Extended Apollo. Afollow-onprogram,evenoneusingSaturnandApollohardware,wouldrequirethree to four years’ lead time.Unless a new program started in 1965 or early1966, the hiatus between the lunar landing program and its successor wouldadversely affect the 400 000-member Apollo team. Already, skilled designengineers were nearing the end of their tasks. The problem was particularlyworrisometoMarshall,forSaturnIB-Apolloflightswouldendearlyin1968.Inthe fall of 1964, a Future Projects Group appointed by von Braun beganbiweeklymeetingstoconsiderMarshall’sfuture.InWashington,GeorgeMuellerponderedwaysofkeeping theApollo team intact.By1968or1969,when theU.S.landedonthemoon,thenation’saerospaceestablishmentwouldbeabletoproduce and fly 8Apollos and12Saturns per year; butMueller faced a cruelparadox:thebuildupoftheApolloindustrialbaselefthimnomoneytoemployiteffectivelyafterthelunarlanding.61

Untilmid-1965ExtendedApollowasclassifiedasadvancedstudyplanning;that summerMuellermoved it into the second phase of project development,projectdefinition.ASaturn-ApolloApplicationsProgramOfficewasestablishedalongside the Gemini and Apollo offices at NASA Headquarters. Maj. Gen.David Jones, anAir Force officer on temporary dutywithNASA, headed thenewoffice;JohnH.Disherbecamedeputydirector,aposthewouldfillforthenexteightyears.62Littlefanfareattendedtheopeningon6August1965.ApolloandGemini held the spotlight, but establishment of the program officewas asignificantmilestonenonetheless.Behind lay sixyearsof space-station studiesandthreeyearsofpost-Apolloplanning.Aheadloomedseverallargeproblems:winningfiscalsupportfromtheJohnsonadministrationandCongress,definingnewrelationshipsbetweenNASAcenters,andcoordinatingApolloApplicationswithApollo.Mueller had advanced the newprogram’s cause in spite of theseuncertainties,confident intheworthofExtendedApollostudiesandmotivatedby the needs of his Apollo team. In the trying years ahead, the Apollo

Applications Program (AAP)would need all the confidence andmotivation itcouldmuster.

*AllthreeoftheSkylabscientist-astronautswereinthisfirstgroup,selectedon27June1965.

*Theinstrumentunitwastheelectronicnervecenterofinflightrocketcontrolandwaslocatedbetweenthebooster’suppermoststageandthespacecraft.

†TheSaturnibor“upratedSaturni”wasatwo-stagerocketlikeitspredecessorbutwithanimprovedandenlargedsecondstage.

*Indirectflightthevehicletravelsfromtheearthtothemoonbytheshortestroute,brakes,andlands;it returns the sameway. This requires taking offwith all the stages and fuel needed for the round trip,dictating a very large booster. In lunar-orbit rendezvous two spacecraft are sent to themoon: a landingvehicleandanearth-returnvehicle.While the former lands, the latter stays inorbitawaiting the lander’sreturn;whentheyhaverejoined,thelanderisdiscardedandthecrewcomeshomeinthereturnship.VonBraunandhisgroupadoptedearth-orbitrendezvousasdoctrine.

*Molecularsievescontainahighlyabsorbentmineral,usuallyazeolite(apotassiumaluminosilicate),whose structure is a 3-dimensional lattice with regularly spaced channels of molecular dimensions; thechannelscompriseuptohalfthevolumeofthematerial.Molecules(suchascarbondioxide)smallenoughto enter these channels are absorbed, and can later bedrivenoff byheating, regenerating the zeolite forfurtheruse.

*Mariner2waslaunchedtowardVenuson27August1962;inOctobercametwoExplorerlaunchesandtheMercuryflightofWalterM.Schirra;on16NovemberNASAconducteditsthirdsuccessfulSaturnItestflight.

2

FromSpentStagetoOrbitalCluster,1965–1966

Within amonth after establishing theApolloApplicationsOffice,Muellertookitspreliminaryplanstocongressionalcommittees.Hefoundnoenthusiasmfor the program, even though committee members agreed that mannedspaceflight should continue after the lunar landing. The straightforwardextension of Apollo’s capability smacked toomuch of busywork—of “boringholes in the sky”with frequent long-duration flights,marking time rather thanadvancing American preeminence in space. Mueller had no better luckconvincingNASA’stopofficialsoftheintrinsicmeritofAAP.JamesWebbwasparticularly cautious about starting a costly new program before he wasabsolutelycertainthatApollowasgoingtoachieveitsgoal.Mueller’sconcernwastwofold:hewantedsomeoptions,andheneededaworthwhileprogramtokeep themannedspaceflightorganization together.Wellaware thatSaturnandApollo could encounter unexpected delays, he wanted a parallel program tomaintainthemomentumofmannedspaceflight.Conversely,ifallwentwell,hewantedtoexploitthetremendouscapabilityApollowassoexpensivelybuildingup.ThiswasanimmediateprobleminthecaseofMarshallSpaceFlightCenter,sinceafterSaturnnomajornewlaunchvehicleswereplanned.1

VonBraunsawasclearlyasanyonethatMarshallmusthaveabroaderbasethan just launch vehicles, and in the period 1962–1965 Huntsville’s FutureProjects Office studied a number of ideas. When Mueller conceived ApolloApplicationsasawaytousedevelopedhardwarefornewpurposes,oneoftheseideaswasalreadyunderconsideration.Calledthe“spent-stagelaboratory,”thisideawas based on converting, in orbit, an empty rocket stage into living andworking space. A conceptual design study started at Marshall scarcely twoweeks before Mueller formally established the AAP office at Headquarters.AlthoughHeadquarters’studiesprovidedthematerialforMueller’spresentations

toCongressin1965and1966,theMarshallconceptquicklygottheinsidetrack.Within thenextyear itbecame thecoreonwhichAAPwasbuilt—thevehicleforcarryingouttheAAPplansof1964–1965.

EARLYPROPOSALSTOUSESPENTSTAGESEveryorbitingspacecraftisaccompaniedbythelaststageoftherocketthat

launchedit.Theemptyupperstageisusuallyinashort-livedorbit,butasmalladjustmenttoitsfuel-burningprogramcanstabilizethatorbit.AsfarbackasthePeenemündedays,vonBraunandhiscolleagueshadspeculatedonconvertinganemptystageintoashelterforasmallcrew.In1959theideawasputforthinthe reportof a studycalledProjectHorizon, carriedoutby theArmyBallisticMissile Agency. Horizon was the Army’s last bid for a role in mannedspaceflight:aproposaltoestablishandmaintainanarmedoutpostonthemoon.HeinzKoelle andFrankWilliamswereHorizon’s principal architects, and thereportreflectedtheiragency’sstrongattachmenttoearth-orbitrendezvousastheprincipalmodeforspaceoperations.2

TheHorizonstudyassumedthatby1965theU.S.wouldhaveapermanentstationinearthorbitandthat itcouldserveas thebasefor launchingthelunarmissions. If no permanent station existed, however,minimum facilitieswouldhave to be provided in earth orbit for the crew that refueled themoon-boundrockets.Thebasicstructureforthisminimumorbitalshelterwastobetheemptythirdstageof the rocket that launched thecrew’sspacecraft. Inorbit, thecrewwould dockwith the empty stage, empty the residual hydrogen from the fueltank, and fit it out for occupancy with equipment brought along in theirspacecraft.Asmorepayloadswereorbitedinpreparationforthelunarmission,moreemptystageswouldbebundledaround the first,providingstoragespaceandprotectingthecrew’squartersfrommeteoroidsandcosmicradiation.Later,spentstagesmightbeassembledintoalargerstationofthefamiliarwheelshape.TheHorizonreportincludedsketchesofastationbuiltfrom22emptystages.3

The report was as far as the Army’s lunar outpost ever got. Von Braun’sgroupwas transferred toNASA;Koellebecamedirectorof theFutureProjectsOfficeatMarshallSpaceFlightCenter,withWilliamsashisdeputy.Forthetimebeing the spent-stage orbital shelterwas forgotten in the press ofmore urgentbusiness.

The next proposal to use a spent stage came from the Douglas AircraftCompany, builder of the Saturn S-IV stage. Douglas had been in the rocket

businesssincetheendof theSecondWorldWar; itsbiggest jobbeforeSaturn,anditsbiggestsuccess,wasthecrashprogramundertakenin1957tobuildtheThormissile system.*When the Saturn stages were put up for bids in 1960,DouglaswonthecontractfortheS-IVstage.S-IVwasthefirstbigstagetousecryogenicpropellants(liquidhydrogenandliquidoxygen),andDouglasbrokeagooddealoftechnologicalgroundinbuildingit.*

TheS-IVcontractwasmanagedbyMarshall,anddevelopmentofthestagebroughtDouglasandMarshallintoacloseworkingrelationship.Whendesignorproductionproblemswerebeingworkedout,engineersfrombothorganizationspitched in side by side; if Saturn was in trouble, Douglas’s problems wereMarshall’s problems too. Engineers andmanagers built close professional andpersonal relationships over the years. It was no different at Houston; MSG’sMercury and Gemini people built similar relationships with their oppositenumbers at McDonnell Aircraft Corporation, prime contractor for both theMercuryandGeminispacecraft.

Forallitssuccesswithlaunchvehicles,Douglashadnotbeenabletobreakintothemannedspacecraftbusiness.Itwasnotforlackoftrying:thecompanyhadbidonMercury,on theApollocommandmodule (inaconsortiumof fourcompanies), and on the lunarmodule, butwithout success. In the early 1960sDouglasmanagement determined to change this. They set up a future-studiesprogram to seek “targets of opportunity” inmanned spaceflight programs andsoonidentifiedsmallspacestationsandorbitinglaboratoriesaspromisingareasfor the company to enter.By the endof 1963Douglas hadwon several studycontractsfromNASAandwascompetingfortheAirForce’sMannedOrbitingLaboratory.4

Douglasgot intoApolloApplications,however,byadifferentroute.WhentheS-IVwas supersededby theS-IVB,Douglaswon thecontract for thenewstage,but theS-IVbecameobsolete. In1962, thechiefengineer forDouglas’sSaturnprogramwasput inchargeofastudygroup toseewhatmightbedonewiththeS-IV.Thegroupsuggestedmakingitintoasmallorbitinglaboratory.

Exactly how the spent-stage idea jumped the gap between Marshall andDouglas—ifitdid—isnotclear.Therewereplentyofopportunities.VonBrauntraced the origin of Skylab to this first S-IV study, believing it resulted fromprodding byMarshall engineerswho “were thinking along similar lines at thetime.”HeinzKoelleremembereddiscussingaspent-stage ideawithvonBraunin 1960 and thought von Braun discussed the idea with Douglas engineers,probablyin1961.5

TheDouglasgroupcomparedexistingNASAprogramswiththemostlikely

long-termgoalsofspaceexplorationandperceivedagap.Gemini andApollowerenarrowly focusedprograms;neither seemed likely toproduce much fundamental information about orbital operations, especiallyaboutman’s ability to function for long periods in zero gravity. Further, therewere no specific plans to qualify hardware components in a true spaceenvironment.Soonerorlater,bothmenandsystemswouldhavetobequalified,andthestudygrouparguedthatanorbitinglaboratorywasthebestwaytocarryout this essential research.Excludingexperimenthardware,datahandling, andadministrativeoverhead,anS-IVcouldbeoutfittedasalaboratoryfortwomenandputinorbitby1965atacostof$220million.6

The S-IV would need very little modification to make it habitable. Ameteoroid shield would be fitted around the hydrogen tank before launch. Astoragemoduleontopofthestagewouldcarryequipmentthatcouldnotsurviveimmersioninliquidhydrogen.Arrivinginorbit,twocrewmenwoulddocktheirGeminispacecrafttothestoragemodule,emptythefueltank,pressurizeitwitha nitrogen-oxygen atmosphere, andmove equipment from the storagemoduleintotheemptystage.Inthenexthundreddaystheywouldconductmorethan70experiments inphysiology, space technology, andorbital operations.TheS-IVlaboratory carried medical monitoring equipment, including a one-mancentrifugetoprovideartificialgravityandassesstheeffectofweightlessnessonthehumancirculatory system. If seriousdeteriorationwasobservedduring themission, the centrifuge could also be used to recondition themen before theirreturn.7

Douglas submitted the studies to the Future ProjectsOffice atMarshall asunsolicitedproposals,afterwhichthemainideaswerepublishedinprofessionaljournals.ForseveralyearsDouglascontinuedtoproposenovelapplicationsforthecompany’sfavoritepieceofrockethardware.8

The S-IV study group was not aware of it, but the basic idea of a spacelaboratory had been anticipatedwithin their own company three years earlier.While the first squadronofThorswasbeingdeployed inEngland, theLondonDailyMaildecided tocapitalizeonpublic interest inspacefor itsannualIdealHome Exhibition. The “Home Show” is one of London’s major springtimeexhibitions,andtheMailchose“AHomeinSpace”asitsthemefor1960.ThepaperaskedAmericanaerospacecontractorstosubmitconcepts,andDouglas’sproposalwaschosen.Thecompany’sAdvancedDesignSectionatSantaMonicaproduced blueprints for a full-scale model and numerous posters. The projectintriguedmanyengineers in the section, and theyprobablybootleggedat leasttwiceasmuchengineeringtimeintoitasthebudgetallowed.9

TheDouglasentrywasaspacelaboratorybuiltintotheemptyupperstageofahypotheticallaunchvehicle.Thelaboratorywasequippedforacrewoffourtostay 30 days in earth orbit, making astronomical observations above theatmosphere.ThemockupwasbuiltinsideLondon’sOlympiaExhibitionHallinMarch1960,wherepromoters estimated that over amillionpeople saw it andprobably 150000walked through it.Back at home it attracted little attention,andthereportwasfiledawayandforgottenuntilSkylabwaslaunched.10

MARSHALLSPONSORSTHESPENTSTAGEDouglas’sproposalsdrewnoimmediateresponsefromHuntsville.Marshall

was less involved in space-station studies than either MSC or Langley, andbesides,thekindofstationNASAmighteventuallybuildwasnotatallclearin1963.BothKoelleandvonBraunsensedthatalargestationwasbecominglesslikelyas thenextstep inspace.Moneywasgoingtobeaproblem,andonlyasmallstationwaslikelytobewithinNASA’smeans.MSC’sstudycontractwithNorth American on extending Apollo’s time in orbit reflected the trend inthinking,asdidLangley’sMannedOrbitalResearchLaboratorystudies,kickedoffinJune1963withtheawardofstudycontractstoDouglasandBoeing.11

An important new factor was GeorgeMueller’s desire to have a programrunningparalleltoApollo—somethingthatcouldmaintainthemomentumofthemannedspaceflightprogramincaseApollogotsnaggedonunforeseenproblemsor succeeded ahead of schedule.12 Too, public opinion about Apollo waschanging. When Mueller came into NASA, criticism of space spending wasreachingapeak.Scientists,amongothers,wereincreasinglyunhappy;themoonprojectwasabsorbingvastsumsthatwouldbemoreproductive,intheirview,inthe unmanned satellite program. Using Apollo hardware to conduct scientificinvestigationsinspacewouldbepoliticallyattractive.

Mueller’s thinking dovetailed neatly with the situation developing atMarshallin1964,wheretheSaturnprogramwasmovingsmoothlyandnonewvehicleswere insight.MarshallmanagementwasparticularlyconcernedabouttheSaturnIB—anexcellentvehicleforearth-orbitaloperations,butonewithalimitedfuture.ConcernwasintensifiedwhentheAirForcechosetheTitanIIItolaunchitsMannedOrbitingLaboratory.Koellespentconsiderabletimein1964trying to identify uses for the Saturn IB that would justify keeping it inproduction. Mueller’s interest in developing alternative uses for existinghardwarepromptedKoelletoresurrectthespent-stageplanandgiveitacloser

look. Seeking a second opinion, Marshall awarded a nine-month, $100 000contract to North American Aviation to study the utility of spent stages inNASA’scontemplatedspaceprograms,especiallyorbitaloperationsandorbitinglaboratories.13

NorthAmerican’sstudyconsideredseveralschemes, includingrefuelingS-IVBstagesinorbitandlaunchingthemtothemoonoroneoftheplanets,fittingoutanS-IIstage(thesecondstageofSaturnV)asanorbitalhangarforApollospacecraft,andassemblingemptyS-IVBsintoalargestation.Afterthemidtermreviewof thestudy in January1964,Marshalladdedaconceptcalled“ApolloSupportModule,”whichcalledforusinganemptyS-IVBfueltankasworkingspace. The final report in April 1965 recommended this concept for furtherstudy. “The large volume of work space,” the report said, “can be practicallyutilized in near-term missions for accomplishing a large quantity ofexperimentationrequiredfororbitaloperationssupport.”14

Koelle’s office had already considered one or two schemes for adaptingSaturn hardware, such as using the oxygen tank of the S-IC (SaturnV’s firststage)asthestructuralshellforalaboratory,andsomethingthatKoellereferredto as “a minimum space laboratory [growing out of] the Apollo program.”15Now,withtheNorthAmericanreportinhand,theFutureProjectsOfficetookitandsomeofMarshall’sownideasandbegantoassembleaspent-stageproposaltotaketoHeadquarters.

Initially the ideawas a simple undertaking in which anApollo spacecraftwoulddockwithaspentS-IVB.Thecrewwouldgoinsidetoexperimentwithextravehicular mobility techniques in a protected environment. This could bedonewithoutmajorchangetotheS-IVBandwithoutpressurizingit;twosuitedastronauts with cameras and portable lights could gather the necessary data.Therewas interest indoingmore,however:pressurizing the tankandusing its281-cubic-metervolumeforlivingquarters.Ideallyacontinuingprogramcouldbestarted,withlaterflightsbuildingonandaddingtotheresultsofearlierones.MarshallsawconsiderablepotentialinspentstagesandregardedthemaslogicalcandidatesforExtendedApollo—candidatesforwhichMarshallshouldlogicallyhavetheresponsibility.

It fell to FrankWilliams to see this proposal through.At the end of June1965Koelleendedhis10-yearassociationwiththeAmericanspaceprogramandtookaprofessorshipintheTechnicalUniversityofBerlin.Williams,whosincelate 1963 had been von Braun’s special assistant for advanced programs,returned to his old shop as its director. At the same time the Future ProjectsOfficewasrechristenedtheAdvancedSystemsOffice.16Williams’sfirstjobwas

to finish pulling together the material on the spent-stage proposal forpresentationtoHeadquarters.

Von Braun and Williams took the plans to the Manned Space FlightManagementCouncilon20July,proposingtobeginaconceptualdesignstudytoworkoutdetails.Muellersupportedtheideaandfound$150000forafour-monthstudy.WilliamspresentedtheplanstoMarshall’sFuturePlanningPolicyBoardon10August,andonthe20thcalledthefirstmeetingoftheconceptualdesignstudygroup.17

CONCEPTTODESIGN:BOUNDINGTHEPROBLEM

Thefirstorderofbusinessattheorganizationalmeetingon25Augustwastofamiliarize the group with the project and to review the plan that had beenpresentedtoManagementCouncil.Threeconfigurationsofanorbitalworkshopweretobestudied.Orbitalworkshopwas theofficialdesignationfor thespentstage.Astheprogramprogresseditcametoincludeaground-equipped,Saturn-V-launched,S-IVBworkshop;theoriginalconceptwastheninformallyreferredto as the wet workshop to distinguish it from the ground-equipped version,whichwould never contain fuel—thedry workshop.Only the latterwould bebuilt.)The“minimumconfiguration”was simply the empty tank, fittedwith adocking port but having no power or life-support systems. An “intermediateconfiguration”wouldhaveanairlock,power,andoxygen(butnocarbondioxideremoval),andthecrewcouldworkwithoutpressuresuits.Finally,the“baseline*configuration”would have a complete environmental control system, asmanyexperiments asweight and space limitations allowed, a power system sized tosupport the experiments, and positive attitude control. The first two versionscould be used in missions 3 to 14 days long and would have only a fewexperiments; the third could support flights of 14–28 days with a substantialexperimentprogram.18

The studypickedupmomentumslowly.Manyquestions requiredanswers,which called for a great deal of information. Howwould power be supplied?Whatexperimentscouldbe ready for the first flight?Whatwould theyweigh,and howmuch power and attitude-control fuel would they require?Howwasexcesspropellanttoberemovedfromthetank,andhowcouldthetankopeningsbe sealed? What was the risk from micrometeoroids and how could it beminimized?

Somesolutionswouldbedictatedbythelimitationsofthelaunchvehicle—

orbital altitude and inclination, for example. Some would be settled by fiat(“ground rules”).Otherswouldhave tobeworkedout by a complex series oftradeoffs involving Marshall’s Saturn Program Office, Houston’s ApolloProgram Office, and Douglas. All of this, of course, was simply the kind ofsystemsmanagement thatMarshallhadbeendoing foryears,and itwas justamatterofgettingonwithit.

Douglashadnotbeenidleinthesmallspace-stationfield.During1963thecompany had won a contract from Langley for theManned Orbital ResearchLaboratorystudyandonefromMSCforastudyofa24-man“SaturnVClass”laboratory.Thecompanyhaddesigned,built,andtestedaflight-weightairlockundercontracttoLangley,deliveringitinMayof1965.InAugustofthatyearDouglas became the prime contractor for the Air Force Manned OrbitingLaboratory. Besides this contract work, the company’s Saturn PayloadApplicationsGrouphadkeptaneyeonExtendedApollo,maintaininga fileofpublishedinformationonit.Thatgrouphadassembledadocumentdetailingtheuse of an empty S-IVB for mobility and maneuvering experiments, withproposals that closely resembled the three workshop configurations beingstudiedatMarshall.ThemostadvancedDouglasversionwasapressurizedstageremarkably similar to Marshall’s most sophisticated workshop. Von Braun,visitingDouglas inSeptember1965, gave companymanagement anunofficialbriefingontheorbitalworkshopconcept(thesamepresentationFrankWilliamshadmade toManagementCouncil in July) and for the first timeDouglas andMarshalllearnedhowcloselytheirideasparalleledeachother.19

TheMannedSpacecraftCenterwasbroughtintothepictureon20October,whenWilliamsandadelegationfromHuntsvilleflewtoHoustontobriefMSConthestudyandwhatithadaccomplishedsofar.WilliamsreturnedtoMarshallfeeling that his center had stolen a march on MSC with its studies onextravehicular activity; the Houston people, he told von Braun, “seemedsurprisedat thedataand thevigorwithwhichwewereworkingon thatarea.”Much less gratifying was MSC’s insistence that extended operations in zerogravitywereundesirable.MSCwantedaminimumof0.1g tobeprovidedbyrotating theworkshopona radiusof20 to30meters.20This issuewould longnag theworkshopstudy,disappearing into limbosome time in1966under thepressureofschedule,funding,anddesignproblems.

Asthelabscametogripswiththevariousaspectsoftheworkshopmission,Williams and vonBraun grewmore confident that they had themakings of asubstantial program.At theNovemberManagementCouncilmeeting,MuellerencouragedvonBraun topressonwith thestudy,andat theendof themonth

Marshall got a chance to sell the program when Mueller and DeputyAdministrator Robert Seamans visitedHuntsville.Among other briefings theyheard a summary of the workshop concept and the results of the conceptualdesignstudy,whichatthattimewasconcentratingonaminimum-configurationworkshopforflightonSaturn-Apollomission211,scheduledforAugust1968.Morethanmildlyinterested,MuelleraskedforapresentationattheManagementCouncilmeetingthreeweeksaway,showingwhatMarshallcoulddoonSA-209and how soon a pressurized workshop could be made ready. He wanted apressurized version to fly on 209, six months ahead of 211, if possible. VonBraun,sensingarealopportunityforhiscenter,promisedthepresentationwouldbeready.Hesuggestedmovingthespent-stagestudyintotheprojectdefinitionphase,andMuellerconcurred.21

This unexpected surge of interest and the short time available producedimmediate action. Williams announced the following day that the workshopmust be ready for SA-209. Unfortunately there would be almost no moneyavailable from Headquarters; this would mean, among other things, that anairlock would have to be built in-house and financed out of current budgets.Williamswantedahalf-daypresentation,anhonestappraisalofwhatMarshallcoulddo,readyforvonBraunintwoweeks.22

ThenextdayWilliams’sofficepromulgatedanewsetofguidelinesforthestudy.Theprimarygoalwasto“design,fabricate,andtesttoflightqualificationsapressurizedversionoftheS-IVBworkshopforSaturnIBflights209or211.”A secondary effort to develop an unpressurized versionwas to be undertakensimultaneously. An airlock, an environmental control system, and a set ofexperimentswere tobedesigned anddeveloped, togetherwithground-supportequipment, mockups, training hardware—everything needed to support themission. Marshall would be wholly responsible for the pressurized version,Douglasfortheunpressurized.Flight209wasthetargetunlesscosts,productionschedules, or a technological hitch dictated otherwise. Emphasis was onmaximumuseofflight-qualifiedhardware,minimummodificationoftheS-IVB,andminimum cost. The environmental control system should function for 14days, but a lifetime of 2–6 days was acceptable if necessary to meet theschedule. A pure oxygen atmosphere would be used rather than a mixture ofoxygen andnitrogen, because thehardwarewas simpler.ConnectionsbetweentheApollospacecraftandthespentstagewouldbekepttoanabsoluteminimum.TheS-IVBwouldmaintain itsattitudeuntil thespacecraftdocked,afterwhichtheApollosystemswouldtakeover.Thepriorityofexperimentcategorieswaslaid down: first, basicmaneuvering experiments and biomedical observations;

second,maintenance, repair, and inspection of spacecraft systems, rescue, andcargo transfer; third, prepackaged experiments where the astronaut functionedprimarilyasamonitor.23

In a follow-up memo, Williams stressed the importance of preparing aproposalthatMarshallcouldexecutewithconfidence.Thecenterwasstakingitsreputationontheworkshop.Notonlywasitimportanttoproposeaworthwhileprogram;itmustalsobeonethatthecentercouldaccomplish.24

CONCEPTTODESIGN:DEFININGTHEWORKSHOP

Thelabsrespondedwithgratifyingspeed,andafterthereviewbyvonBraun,WilliamstooktheproposaltoManagementCouncilon21December.Asithaddeveloped, the plan required an additional piece of hardware, a “Spent StageExperimentSupportModule,”anairlockthatwouldalsocarrycertainequipmentandexpendables.Forthismodule,MarshallintendedtomakeuseofDouglas’sexperienceinbuildingtheLangleyairlock,butapparentlythiswasnotstressed.After thepresentationMueller suggested thatMarshallconferwithMcDonnellAircraft Corporation to see if any Gemini components could be used in theairlock. Gemini production was about to end; Mueller thought that time andmoneymightbesavedifanyusefulhardwarecouldbeadapted.25

Williams wrote immediately to Charles W. Mathews, Gemini programmanager at MSC, asking his help in coordinating talks with McDonnell.Williamswanteda technicalbriefingatHuntsville as soonaspossible, so thatMarshallandMcDonnellcouldgetacquaintedandcomparenotes.ThemeetingwasheldatHoustoninstead,on4–5January1966,andproducedasetofgroundrulesfortheproposalsMarshallandMcDonnellweretomaketoHeadquarters.Themost important ruleswere to useGemini-qualified environmental controlandelectricalpowersystemsandtokeeptheairlockfunctionallyindependentofthe S-IVB instrument unit and the Apollo command module. Williams’sunderstandingwasthatMcDonnellwouldfurnishqualifiedsystemstoMarshall,which would do the actual fabrication; this would make the best use ofHuntsville’s civil service personnel andwould be in linewithMueller’s zero-costdictum.26

The introduction of McDonnell complicated the picture unexpectedly.Marshall was comfortable with Douglas, which had experience designing anairlock.But that airlock, though itwas flightweight andhadbeen extensivelytestedon theground,wasnot fully flight qualified.MSCengineers concluded

that upgrading it to flight standards would increase its cost considerably.27McDonnellhadtheadvantageofbeingabletousecomponentsalreadyqualifiedintheGeminiprogram,atasignificantcostsaving.ButMcDonnellandMarshallwere strangers, while MSC had worked with the St. Louis firm since thebeginning ofMercury.WithMcDonnell involved in the airlock project, therewasastrongargumentforMSCtomanageit.Andsincethemodulewouldcarrytwo important crewsystems (environmental control and life support),Houstoncouldmakeacasefor takingcompleteresponsibilityformanagingtheairlock.MSC’sdepthofexperienceincrewsystemswasunrivaled.

AnadvancedairlockconceptbyP.M.Chapman,DouglasAircraftCo.,20August1966.

Logicallyenough,MSCdidmakethiscase,andHeadquarterslistened.MSC,infact,seemedtobeassumingthatitwouldgettheprojectasamatterofright.More than onceFrankWilliams had the feeling thatMSCwas not anxious tohelp him work with McDonnell. By early February the matter requiredresolution,andonthe11th,duringadaylongseriesofmeetingsatHouston,von

Braun sought it. In Gilruth’s office, von Braun argued at length that NASA’sinterestswould be best served if the projectwent toHuntsville.Unfortunatelyforhiscasehewentfurtherthanthat,sketchingoutplanshehadforMarshall’sfuture—plans that included trainingmen to assemble large structures in orbit.Sharing the responsibility for training was something that MSC could neveraccept, and in the endvonBraun, sensing thathehadpressedmatters too far,conceded the airlock project to MSC rather than provoke a disruptiveconfrontation.28

EarlysketchofanorbitalworkshoppreparedatMannedSpacecraftCenter.

Thisdisagreementovermanagementoftheairlockindicatedthatthespent-stage project posed a new problem for manned spaceflight: that of roles andmissionsforthetwofieldcenters.Theconversionofanemptyrocketstageintoa manned workshop blurred the distinction between launch vehicles andspacecraft.Nolongerdideachcenterhaveaclearlydemarcatedterritorytoworkin.AnewrelationshipofthecenterstoeachotherandtoHeadquarterswasinthemaking,anditwasnotgoingtobeeasytoworkitout.

AfterMarshall took itselfoutofcontentionformanagementof theairlock,Douglasstillwantedachancetobuildit.On9MarchaDouglasdelegationwenttoWashington to briefMueller on their proposal for an airlock.Mueller was

interestedinwhattheyhadtosay,eventhough,ashetoldthem,thespent-stageprojectwasnotyetanapprovedprogramandhestill“hadsomesellingtodo”athigherlevelsinNASA.HesaidhehadnotknownabouttheairlockDouglashadbuiltforLangley,andhewasimpressedbywhat theyshowedhim—especiallyby theirproposal tobuild twounits for$4million.Hesuggested thatDouglassubmitproposals.29

On 11 March Houston’s planners submitted a procurement plan for theairlock, proposing sole-source procurement from McDonnell. Headquarters,however,couldnotjustifysole-sourceprocurementafterDouglas’spresentationtoMueller; so at the 22Marchmeeting ofManagementCouncil both centerswere directed to conduct studies to define the airlock and establish cost andscheduleprojectionsforitsconstruction.30

Marshall,withsomuchatstake,begantofear that theairlock’scostmightsend the whole project down the drain. As a fall-back position to save theworkshopproject,shouldthatbecomenecessary,thecenterdefinedabare-bonesairlock that was just adequate to support their intermediate-configurationworkshop. MSC granted three 60-day, $50 000 study contracts to Douglas,McDonnell, and Grumman (prime contractor for the lunar module). Eachcompany was to define an airlock based on its own hardware or concepts:DouglasontheLangleyairlock,McDonnellonGeminisystems,andGrummanonmodifyingthelunarmoduletoserveasanairlock.Asourceevaluationboardchaired by Kenneth S. Kleinknecht, deputy program manager for Gemini atMSC,beganconsideringproposalsfromthethreecontractorsinlateJune.31On19 August, Headquarters announced that McDonnell had been selected fornegotiationofanairlockcontract.Withsomefeaturesaddedduringnegotiation,thefinalagreedpricewas$10509000.Marshall’sprecautionarystudyprovedunnecessaryandwasimmediatelyterminated.32

Whiletheairlockissuewasbeingthrashedout,theTechnicalWorkingGroupwas busy with modifications to the S-IVB. Before astronauts could enter thehydrogen tank it had to be “passivated”—hydrogen and oxygen tanks vented,high-pressureheliumbottlesemptied,andthestage’spyrotechnics*deactivated.Hazards inside the tankhad tobeeliminated.The internal insulationhad tobepaintedauniformcolor foragoodphotographicbackground.Provisionhad tobemadeforequipmenttobemountedonthewalls;restraintsandmobilityaidshadtobeadded.By15December1965alistofstagemodificationswasdrawnupandMarshallaskedDouglasforaquick-responseestimateoftheircost.Thereplywas$1.5milliontomodifystage209.ThiswasmorethanMarshallcouldafford,andnegotiationsensued.Asecondestimateforaslightlydifferentsetof

changeswas$4.5millionforchangestofiveS-IVBs.Satisfiedthatthiswasthebestprice theyweregoing toget—at least in time forSA-209—Marshall sentthe figure to George Mueller on 20 January 1966. He found the quotationdisappointinglyhighandputoffalldecisionsforamonthbecausehestillhadnobudget forApolloApplications.He toldMarshall to determine if the changescould be made in-house and asked for a list of no-cost experiments to beassembledbymid-February.33

Justafterthenewyear,FrankWilliamshadsaidthespent-stageprojectwas“inhighgear,”butattheendofJanuaryitwasstalledbytheunsettledfundingsituation.TheS-IVBmodificationsidentifiedbeforeChristmaswerebeingmadeatasnail’space.On21February,Williamswastoldthatnomoremoneycouldbe spent for changes until the workshop was officially approved. To fly theworkshoponSA-209,approvalwasrequiredimmediately.34

FortunatelyonemajorchangetotheS-IVBhadalreadybeenmade.Earlyon,vonBraunhadnotedthatthe“manhole,”a71-centimetercircularopeningintheforward dome,was too small to permit a suited astronaut to pass through.Hewasunabletofindfundstomakeachange,however.TheninJuly1965Douglasengineers discovered cracks in welds around the manhole on stage 203;subsequent tests disclosed a structural weakness in the dome design.When itturnedout thatonesolutionwas toenlarge theopening,MarshallandDouglasopted for that solution—with the workshop project in mind. The change,effectiveonstages211,507,andallsubsequentS-IVBs,cost$600000andwasfinancedout ofSaturn funds.VonBraun also urged that themanhole cover—heldonby72bolts—bereplacedbyaquick-openinghatch,buttheestimateforthatwas$400000,andthosefundscouldnotbefound.35Ayearlater,however,when Houston raised the same objection on operational grounds, the changewouldbequicklyadopted.

Anothertroublesomequestionwaswhattodoaboutmicrometeoroids—thosetinyparticles,nomore thanoneor twomillimeters in size, that speed throughspaceatenormousvelocities.ThreePegasussatellites,payloadsonthelastthreeSaturnIflights,wereinearthorbitmeasuringthenumberandpenetratingpoweroftheseparticles.Theinformationtheyweresendingbackindicatedasmallbutnotnegligiblechancethat theS-IVBwouldbestruckbyamicrometeoroid.Toassess possible damage,Marshall arranged for tests at theAir Force’sArnoldEngineeringDevelopmentCenteratTullahoma,Tennessee,whichhadfacilitiesforproducinghigh-speedprojectiles.ResultsofpreliminarytestsonS-IVBskinand insulation, reported in February 1966, were worrisome: micrometeoroidspenetrating the metal skin could ignite the polyurethane insulation. Two

solutionscametomind:anexternalshieldtoreducethevelocityofimpact,oracoating on the insulation to retard the spread of combustion. A quick look atprobablecostssenttheengineersinsearchofacoating.Testsbeganimmediatelyandcontinuedfortherestoftheyear.36

Late in November Douglas was testing one coating, MSC wasrecommending another, andMarshallwas reviewing thewhole problem.BothMarshall and the contractor were reevaluating the risk of micrometeoroiddamageandgettingdifferentanswers.Dependingon thedataused, thechancethe workshop would be penetrated in a 30-day mission was calculated byDouglastobeashighas1in3oraslowas1in40.Marshall’sownestimatewas1 in 50. Douglas engineers were beginning to think about an external shield;accordingtotheirstudy,thiswouldreducethechanceto1in200.37

The fire hazard was also a function of the pressure of oxygen in theworkshop’s atmosphere, which was primarily a medical question. A medicalstaffpaperpreparedforMuellerinDecember1966recommendedanatmosphereof69%oxygenand31%nitrogen,atatotalpressureone-thirdthatatsealevel,for long-duration missions, but indicated that other compositions wereacceptable. Marshall engineers then analyzed the micrometeoroid problemtakingintoaccountthecompositionoftheatmosphere,andconcludedthattherewasanetadvantageinusingamixturelessrichinoxygenatapressurehalfthatat sea level—plus the addition of an external shield. The question remainedunresolvedfortwomoremonths.38

InSeptember1966,MSC,havingbeguntoexaminetheworkshopmissioninsomedetail,objectedto theplanforactivatingtheworkshop.Asit thenstood,thatplanrequiredtwosuitedastronautstoremovethe72boltsfromtheforwardtankdomecover.ExperienceonthreeGeminimissionshadshownHoustonthatextravehicular activity was not to be taken lightly. In zero-g simulations, twomentooksixhours toremovethebolts,anintolerableworkload.VonBraun’sforesightwasconfirmed,butthistimemoneywasfoundtohaveDouglasdesignand manufacture a full-scale operating model of a quick-opening hatch forevaluationand toprovidecostandscheduleestimatesso thedecisioncouldbemadeasquicklyaspossible.39

An early cluster concept sketched by Willard M. Taub, Manned Spacecraft Center. The spent S-IVBworkshopisattheright.TheApollotelescopemountisattachedbelowthemultipledockingadapter,andanexperimentmoduleabove.Solarcellarraysprovidethepower.

Allthesechanges,however,wereimpededbylackofmoney.NASA’sfiscal1967 budget request had been slashed by the budget bureau, and ApolloApplications finally received only $42 million, just enough to maintain theprogramatsurvival level.*Untilwell into1967 theactualdevelopmentof theorbitalworkshopremainedprettymuchwhereitwasinmid-1966.

THECLUSTERCONCEPT

Parallel to the efforts to define theworkshop, theOffice ofSpaceScienceandApplications(OSSA)wasdevelopingamajorscientificproject thatwouldcause a major change in Apollo Applications. Called the Apollo telescopemount, this would be the first astronomical facility to useman as an in-orbitobserver.*Oneofitsmajorpurposes,infact,wastodeterminehowusefulamancouldbeatthecontrolsofasophisticatedsetofinstrumentsinorbit.40Asthingsturnedout,thetelescopemountwouldassumeconsiderablescientificimportanceaswell:itwouldbetheonlysetofinstrumentswithachancetocollectdataonthe sun during the next period ofmaximum solar activity, expected in 1969–

1970.OSSA’shead,HomerNewell,begantalkswithGeorgeMuellerearlyin1966

about working the Apollo telescope mount into the Apollo ApplicationsProgram.Theyagreedon themeritsof theproject,butdifferedaboutwhere itshould be carried. OSSA planned to install it in the experiments bay of theApolloservicemodule,whileOMSFintendedtouseamodifiedlunarmoduletocarrybulkyexperimentslikethetelescopemount.AttheendofAugust,DeputyAdministrator Robert Seamans authorized the project and opted forMueller’sproposal.41

There were both technical and management difficulties in working thetelescopemountintoamannedspacecraft.Anelaborateandcostlystabilizationsystem seemed necessary to counteract the unavoidable motion of crewmen,whichwould disturb the instruments’ alignment. Effluents from the spacecraftcould create a cloud of contamination in the vicinity of the telescopes,interferingwithobservationsandpossiblydepositingmaterialondelicateopticalsurfaces, degrading the results. MSC disliked using the lunar module as anexperimentscarrier,particularlysinceMuellerwantedMarshalltointegratethetelescopemountwiththespacecraft.42HoustontoldMuelleritcouldnotsupportthisidea,buthepersisted;onpaper,atleast,thelunarmodule-Apollotelescopemountcombinationwastheofficialconfigurationforthreeyears.

MissionplanscomingoutofHeadquartersasearlyasMarch1966includedsolar astronomy flights both as single-purpose missions and as part of long-duration workshop flights. As the months passed and some of the problemsassociated with the lunar module became apparent, Mueller began to seeadvantages inoperating the telescopesfromtheworkshop.The lunarmodule’ssystemswerenotdesigned tosustain itasa free-flyingspacecraft for28days.Besides,Houstonwasdeadsetagainstflyingitindependentlyinearthorbit;ifitbecame disabled, rescue would be extremely difficult, and reentry in a lunarmodule was impossible. It had no heat shield. The problems were given athoroughgoing-overatabriefingforMuelleratHuntsvilleon19August.Attheendofthedayhesuggestedthattheobservatorymodulemightbeoperatedwhiletethered to the workshop, drawing power, coolant, and oxygen through anumbilical. Marshall ran a quick feasibility study and reported the results toManagement Council on 7 October, but the idea seemed to create as manyproblems as it solved and it gained no real support. Still, for several monthsMuellerkeptitasabackupconcept.43

AsketchbyAssociateAdministratorforMannedSpaceFlightGeorgeE.MuellerindicateshisthinkingontheconfigurationoftheS-IVBworkshopinAugust1966.

AftertheOctobermeetingitseemedthattheonlysolutionwastoprovideawayforthetelescopemoduletodockwiththeworkshop.BackinMay,whiletheairlockstudieswereinprogress,MuellerandtheHeadquartersstaffhadagreedthattheairlockmustbekeptsimpleandinexpensive,andtheyhadspecificallyruled out double docking;44 now that appeared to be necessary. But with theairlock contract negotiations completed, it was too late to change the designwithout losing several months and possibly having to go through anothercompetition.

Theonlyanswerwas tomanufactureanewpieceofhardware. It couldbevery simple: all that was needed was a shell—a cylindrical extension of theairlock—capable of withstanding launch and docking loads, but serving nopurpose other than to provide two or more docking ports. It was literally amultipledockingadapter,anamethatwassoonmadeofficial.Thedetailsofitsdesignchangedseveraltimesduringitsfirstfewweeks,butthebasicideawasacylinder, to be mounted above the airlock, carrying four radial tunnels at itsupper end. The main structure and each radial tunnel would carry Apollodockinggear.Thenewmodulewouldhavenoactivesystems;powerrequiredat

thedockingportswouldcomefromtheairlock.With the addition of the multiple docking adapter to the workshop and

airlock,thenatureofApolloApplicationsmissionswasfundamentallychanged.Planners began to speak of the “orbital cluster” as a core that could sustain avariety ofmissions.Multiple docking allowed the attachment of one ormorespecialized mission modules and permitted resupply for very long missions.Crews could be rotated without closing down the workshop. If a spacecraftbecamedisabled,rescuewaspossible.Withthebirthoftheclusterconcept,whathadbeenasimpleexperimenttouseemptyrocketstageslookedagreatdeallikeasmallspacestation.

Two airlock mission configurations sketched by Wade W. Wilkerson of McDonnell Aircraft Corp., 22December1966.

ByNovember,GeorgeMuellerhaddecidedtopresent theorbitalclusterasOMSF’smainpost-ApolloplanwhenhediscussedfutureprogramswithWebbandtheDirectoroftheBudget.Hefeltthathehadacoherentprogramthatcouldbe clearly defined for planning purposes and that he could now campaignvigorouslyforfunds.45

One thing that still had to be done was to design the multiple dockingadapter. Originally it had been intended to letMarshall fabricate the dockingadapter,but themodule’s interfacewith theairlockjustifiedaskingMcDonnellandMSCtoseeiftheycoulddoitequallywellandequallycheaply.McDonnelldrewupa$9-milliondesignthatMarshallconsidered“rathersophisticated[and]‘unsellable’”;Marshall,inturn,modifieditsowndesignsothattheadapterhad

room to carry experiment equipment into orbit. Experiments were beingconsidered that could not be put into theworkshop before launch. In the end,Houston’s design was similar to Huntsville’s, but it involved a number ofsubstantial changes to the airlock, which would cost $21.8 million and delaydeliveryby sixmonths.Before themonthwasout,HeadquartershadassignedresponsibilityforthemultipledockingadaptertoMarshall.46

Allofthemissionplansmadeearlierintheyearwerenowobsolete.Attheendof1966, theApolloApplicationsProgramOffice issuedprogramdirective3A,basedontheclusterconcept,definingthefirstfourmissions.Thefirsttwolaunches would set up the cluster, determine the feasibility of the workshopconcept,andextendman’stimeinspaceto28days.ThethirdandfourthwouldrevisittheworkshopandbringuptheApollotelescopemounttogatherdataonthe sun. A first launch in 1968 was still contemplated, but the schedule hadslipped threemonths.After ayear andahalf, however,GeorgeMuellerhadaprogramandperhapsalittlebreathingroom.47

*Thorwasthefirstintermediate-rangemissiledeployedbyaWesternpower;thefirstsquadronreachedEngland in 1959. Superseded by the intercontinental Atlas and Titan, Thor went on to a long careerlaunchingsatellitesandspaceprobes.Delta,aThorwithanaddedupperstage,launchedsatellitesthroughthe1970s.

*Centaurwasthefirst,butitwasmuchsmaller.DevelopedbyConvairasanupperstagefortheAtlas,Centaurhelpedtolaunchanumberofpayloads.SeeRogerE.Bilstein,StagestoSaturn:ATechnologicalHistory of the Apollo/Saturn Launch Vehicles, NASA SP-4206 (Washington, 1980), and John L. Sloop,LiquidHydrogenasaPropulsionFuel,1945–1959,NASASP-4404(Washington,1978).

* Baseline means a point of departure—for hardware, mission, or program—to which subsequentchangesarerelated.

*A“commanddestructsystem”—explosivechargesdetonatedbyradiosignal—wasbuilt into theS-IVBincasetherangesafetyofficerhadtodestroyitintheearlystagesofflight.

*Seechap.3forApolloApplications’fiscalproblemsin1966.

*DevelopmentoftheApollotelescopemountistreatedinchap.4.

3

ApolloApplications:“Wednesday’sChild”

WhilevonBraun’sengineersdealtwiththetechnicalproblemsoftheS-IVBworkshop,Mueller and his Headquarters staff applied themselves to planningand funding problems. They had much to encourage them in the summer of1965. EdwardWhite had capped the secondmannedGeminimission in Junewithaspectacularspacewalk,rekindlingpublicinterest.ProgressintheApolloprogramwas equally satisfying: the last three Saturn Iswere launched in lessthansixmonths,andworkmovedalongrapidly toward thefirstApollo-SaturnIBflightinearly1966.EventheSovietadvancesduringthepreviousyearhadtheir bright side. The three-manVoskhod 1 mission the previous October andAlekseiLeonov’sexcursionoutsideVoskhod2inMarchhelpedNASA’sbudgetthrough the executive branch and Congress with only minor reductions. Theagency’s appropriation for fiscal 1966 would keep Gemini and Apollo onschedule.1

But there were portents of trouble as well. America’s involvement inVietnam increased sharply in 1965; as theU.S. assumed a combat role, troopcommitments rosefrom23000 to184000.Athome, theWatts riot inAugustrevealed deep-seated unrest among urban blacks. That summer PresidentJohnsonannouncedhisintenttostaywithina$100billionbudgetwhilefundingthe new Medicare and War on Poverty programs. His Great Society putbudgetarypressuresonestablishedprograms,includingthespaceeffort.ApolloApplications became an early casualty when the White House declined tosupportitadequatelyinfiscal1967.Whiletheshortageofmoneywasaprincipalreason, administration critics considered AAP overly ambitious and ill-conceived.Muellerwasundeterred,andhisfaithseemedtobeconfirmedwhenJohnson expressed firm support for a large post-Apollo program in the fiscal1968budget.2

INITIALPLANSANDBUDGETS

The Apollo Applications Program Office started off on the run with adetailedplanningguideline for themanned spaceflight centers.The first flightschedule,oneofhundredstobecrankedoutoverthenextfouryears,calledfor13SaturnIBand16SaturnVflights.Fourofthemissionswerescheduledtoflyexcesshardwarefromthelunar landingprogram;theremaining25representednew Saturn-Apollo purchases. The missions fell into four categories (earthorbital,synchronous,lunarorbital,andlunarsurface)andtwophases.Thefirst8missionswouldemployastandardApollocommand-servicemodulefor14-dayflights;onlatermissionsanextendedApollowouldallowflightsof45days.3

A major new challenge was the integration of experiment payloads.Integration entailed fitting the spacecraft and experiment hardware together—ensuring the two were compatible mechanically, electrically, and in all otherways.Italsoinvolvedgroupingexperimentssothattheoperationofonewouldnot distort another’s results. The program office divided payload integrationbetweenthetwomannedspaceflightcentersatHoustonandHuntsville.HoustonhandledallexperimentsintheApollocommand-servicemodule,thebiomedical-behavioralexperimentsrelatingtotheastronauts,andexperimentsforadvancedspacecraft subsystems. Lunar surface work, astronomy-astrophysics, and thephysicalscienceswenttoHuntsville.TheflightschedulegaveHoustonprimaryresponsibility for17missions, including the initial flight that focusedonearthresources.Marshallwouldintegrate12missionpayloads,amongthemthefinal2flightsdestinedforlunarexploration.4

Withplanningguidelinesontheirwaytothefieldcenters,theHeadquartersstaff turned to briefings for the congressional space committees. During theprevious year, several congressmen had expressed concern about the future ofAmerica’s space programs. The space committees, chaired by Sen. ClintonAndersonandRep.GeorgeMiller,werewelldisposedtowardNASA’sprogramsandrealizedthatunlessanewmannedprogramstartedin1966,NASAfacedaperiod of inactivity after the lunar landing. The chairmen publicized NASA’splans and boosted them if possible. Their concern coincided with GeorgeMueller’s.Facinga toughbattle ingettinghisAAPbudgetrequest throughtheJohnson administration, Mueller needed all the congressional support that hecouldmuster.5

On23August,MuellergaveAnderson’scommitteeabroadviewofprogramobjectives,experiments,andproposedflighthardware.Thetestimonyindicateda change of emphasis.WhereasNASA officials had previously played up the

technologicalaspectsofearth-orbitaloperations,AAPplacedmoreattentiononspace science. The AAP office had identified 150 experiments, grouped bygeneral field of interest and experiment area. Nearly half that number wereclassifiedas“spacescience/applications,” including24medicalexperiments totest the physiological effects of extended stays in space. The scientificcommunity’sinterestinthemoonaccountedfor35lunar-surfaceexperiments.*6

The hearings revealed differences among NASA’s leaders regarding thescopeofAAP.Muellerwaseagertopushaheadwiththeprogram,envisioning29flightsbetween1968and1971;WebbandSeamansspokemoreofAAPasaninterim program for the early 1970s. Mueller’s plan called for an annualproductionand launchof6SaturnIBs,6SaturnVs,and8Apollos;WebbandSeamansseemedlessconcernedabouttheexactnumbers.AccordingtoMueller,thedifferences representedanattemptbyhissuperiors toplaydown thecosts.Other NASA officials have suggested that Mueller’s enthusiasm for AAP farexceededhisbosses’.7

Althoughthepresentationstothetwocommitteeswerewellorganized,AAPobviously neededmorework.NASA’s systematic approach to increased flighttimeswasmissing.Theagency’sruleof thumbhadbeentodouble the longestpreviousflightwhentestingman’senduranceinspace,butAAP’s14-and45-daymissionswere set by hardware constraints rather thanmedical considerations.AAP’s experiment package resembled a long shopping list. The House staffreportnotedthatonlythreeoftheexperimentshadactuallybeenassignedtotheprogram. The report criticized NASA on other counts: “At no time did anyNASAwitnesssayhowmuchtheApolloApplicationsprogramwouldcost,nordidanywitnessdefinetheparametersoftheprogramorsetoutexactlywhattheprogram would seek to accomplish.” The criticism was not entirely justified,since Mueller had told the Senate group that parameters and costs for AAPwould be established during the project definition phase; AAP was not an“approved”program,althoughhehopedforadecisionsoon.8

IntheFY1967budgetrequest,NASA’spreliminaryestimatesforafull-scaleAAP program totaled $450 million, with over $1 billion being required thefollowingyear.BureauoftheBudgetofficials,thinkingintermsof$100millionfor AAP in FY 1967, were taken aback. They agreed, however, to listen toarguments for $250 million. Mueller considered the compromise figureinsufficientandsetouttoincreaseit.HisfirsttaskwaswinningoverNASA’stopadministrators.Todoso,Muellermarshaledfivearguments:

1.IfGeminihadgivenAmericaanyadvantageinthespacerace,itwasslimat

bestandcoulddisappeariffundingwasinadequate.

2. The scientific and technological communities, in conjunctionwithNASA,hadidentifiedseveralhundredexperimentsforAAP;a$450millionprogramwouldincludeonlyhalfofwhatwasneededfor150ofthemostpromising.

3. While the esprit de corps of NASA’s manned spaceflight team was wellknown,aslowdownintheprogramwouldlowermorale.

4.TheBureauoftheBudget’sproposalrepresentedpooreconomicpolicysinceit would cause significant unemployment and leave America’s Apolloinvestmentlargelyunusedfrom1968through1971.

5. Italso representedpoorpolitical strategy.The resultingunemploymentandmisuseoftheApolloinvestmentcouldbecomeapoliticalissuein1968.9

TheargumentsfailedtoconvinceSeamans.On15Septemberherecommendeda$250millionbudget;Webbsubsequentlyconcurred.*

Ifthatbattleendedinadraw,amoredifficultonelayahead:gettingthe$250million request through the Bureau of the Budget. Work on several programoptionsduringthenextfewweekswouldultimatelyprovetobeanexercise infutility. In November, NASA presented the Budget Bureau with two fundinglevelsforFY1967:adesired$5.76billionandaminimumof$5.25billion.Thebureau countered with $5.1 billion, slightly below the agency’s FY 1966appropriation. Budget officials reduced manned spaceflight’s share by $222million;andsinceApollowasinviolable,AAPabsorbedtheloss.Webbappealedthe decision at the LBJ ranch in December but to no avail. In theadministration’s final budget request, NASA’s $5.012 billion included $42millionforAAP—justenoughtokeepsomeoptionsopen.10

SEEKINGNEWJUSTIFICATIONTheBudgetBureau’slackofenthusiasmforAAPwassharedbytheSenate

space committee. On 27 January 1966 Senator Anderson told AdministratorWebb his committee saw merit in building a post-Apollo program around amajornewgoalrather than“looselyrelatedscientificexperiments.”Theywereconcerned that theextendeduseofApollohardwaremightstunt thegrowthofnew technology.BecausemanyAAPgoalsmightbeattainedearlierbyDoD’sMannedOrbiting Laboratory, he urged close coordinationwith theAir Force.GiventhelikelihoodofexcessApollohardware,thecommitteesupportedinitial

planning and experimentwork, butwould not fund additional launch vehiclesand spacecraft. “The Committee expects additional justification and specificrecommendations for theApolloApplicationsProgram if suchaprogram is toproceed.”11

HavinganticipatedattacksonAAPobjectives,MuellerturnedtomembersoftheimmediateApollofamilyforhelp.HeaskedseniormanagersfromthemajorApollocontractorstoevaluatefiveAAPgoals:

1.Exploreandutilizeworldresourcesforthebenefitofmankind;

2. Define and develop the operational capabilities for the next generation ofspacevehiclesbeyondtheSaturn-Apollosystems;

3.Expandman’sknowledgeofthenear-earthandlunarenvironments;

4.IncreasethesecurityoftheUnitedStatesthroughspaceoperations;

5. Develop a capability to provide a livable, usable environment for man tooperateeffectivelyinspaceforoneyear.

Theexecutivesgenerallyfavoredthefirstgoalbecauseofitspublicappeal,butsaw serious difficulties in implementing such a program. One responded, “Alaudable objective but we do not know how to do it. Beyond the purview ofMSF.”MostfearedthatgoalfourwouldconfusetheAmericanpublicastotheroles of NASA and DoD. While the other objectives drew varying levels ofsupport, no consensus emerged. Mueller concluded that, “just as there is no‘averageU.S.citizen,’therealsoappearstobeno‘averageApolloexecutive.’”12

IntheFebruary1966issueofAstronauticsandAeronautics,columnistHenrySimmonslikenedtheflounderingApolloApplicationsProgramtoWednesday’schild, “full ofwoe.”He acknowledged as sound the reasons for an ambitiousprogram:theneedtokeeptheApolloorganizationintactandsecureanadequatereturn from the huge Apollo investment. FY 1967 budget cuts suggested,however, that NASA might have to accept a smaller program, limited to thehardware left over from the lunar landing. The development of sophisticatedexperiments and the procurement of additional Saturns and Apollos seemedunlikely.AccordingtoSimmons,spacescientistswereparticularlyunhappywithAAP, considering many of its experiments “make-work.” Deferral of AAPfunding had probably prevented an “outright rebellion in the scientificcommunity,andpossiblyaninternalexplosionwithinNASAaswell.”SimmonsfaultedAAP on two counts:NASA’s failure tomeasure theworth ofmannedversusunmannedspacescience;and,ifmannedflightswere“cost-effective,”theagency’s reluctance to fly earth-orbital missions on the Manned Orbiting

Laboratory.Nevertheless,SimmonsconcludedthatNASAhadnoalternativebuttopressonwithAAPinsomeform.Otherwise,itsApolloteamwouldscattertothefourwinds.13

AAP’sfuturelookednobetterfrominsideNASA,wherekeyofficialsheldserious reservations. Simmons’s reference to a possible “internal explosion”probablyoverstated thecase,but therewasconsiderableresentmentofAAPintheOfficeofSpaceScienceandApplications.Therewasalsostrongoppositiontotheprogramwithinthemannedspaceflightfamily,mostofitemanatingfromHouston.MSCofficialshadquestionedbasicaspectsofAAPsinceitsinceptionand, during the winter of 1965–1966, voiced their objections on severaloccasions.InMarch1966,RobertGilruthformalizedhiscenter’soppositioninaneight-pagelettertoMueller.

GilruthagreedwiththebasicintentofAAP:thecontinueduseofApollotoconduct scientific work in earth orbit and on the moon. NASA had failed,however, to tie the program to a “definite goal or direction for the future ofmannedspaceflight.”MSCconsideredthat theunrealisticallyhigh launchratebeingplannedwasdictating“thatweselectmissionsandexperiments thatcanbedonebyacertain time, rather than those thatshouldbedone.”Asa result,space technology was not being advanced. AAP’s timing and content shouldthereforebeorientedmoretowardNASA’snextmajorprogramafterApollo.14

Houston strongly opposed AAP’s proposed modifications to Apollohardware.Inparticular,changingthelunarmoduleupsetcenterengineers.Theyconsidered its interior unsuitable as either a laboratory or a lunar shelter.Convertingthelunarmoduletoaspacelaboratoryinvolvedtheremovalofmanysubsystemsandtheinstallationofnewonesforwhichithadnotbeendesigned.Gilruth concluded that the proposed uses of the lunar module “representmodification of the very expensive special-purpose vehicle for use in placeswhere another module would be more suitable.” Gilruth considered AAP apossibledetriment to theApolloprogram.Supportof theproposed launch ratewould requireadditional trainers, simulators,andoperationalequipment.SincelittleAAPmoneywasavailable,GilruthfearedthepossibleuseofApollofunds.AlreadythemanychangesinAAPplans,causedmainlybythelackoffunding,haddivertedmanagement’sattention.15

Having laid out Houston’s objections to AAP, Gilruth proposed analternative.NASAshoulddefine itsmannedspaceflightgoals for thenext twodecades;herecommendedapermanent,mannedorbitalstationandaplanetaryspacecraft.AAPcould thenbeorganized insupportof thesegoals,andApollohardware used for tasks that involved no redesign. He noted that his

recommendations were more in line with available funds. Gilruth’s closingremarkssummedupNASA’sdilemmainearly1966:

Theserecommendationsarepromptedbyadeepconcernthatatthistimeacriticalmismatchexistsbetween thepresentAAPplanning, the significant opportunities formanned space flight, and theresourcesavailableforthisprogram.…AAP,asnowconstrained,willdolittlemorethanmaintainthe rate of production and flights ofApollo hardware.Merely doing this,without planning for amajorprogram, andwithout doing significant research anddevelopment as part ofAAP,will notmaintainthemomentumwehaveachievedinthemannedspaceflightprogram.16

Mueller’sresponseisnotrecorded.However,subsequentAAPdevelopmentsshow little impact fromGilruth’s letter. The program office pursued a coursegenerally antithetical toMSC’s views, andHoustonwould raise objections onsubsequentoccasions.

AAPvs.MOLMueller’seffortstogroomAAPasApollo’sheirwerejeopardizedbyclaims

oftherivalMannedOrbitingLaboratory(pp.15–19).AlthoughNASAofficialsspokeofthetwoasunrelatedprograms,membersofCongressandtheexecutivebranchconsideredthemcompetitors.Infact,NASAandtheAirForcesupportedeach other at a technical level, while competing for political support. Theprograms interacted in a number of ways: Houston provided support to theGemini portion ofMOL,NASA andAir Force personnelworked together onjoint panels and coordinated experiments of mutual interest, and each agencylent key officials to the other. In shaping its post-Apollo plans, NASA gavefrequent consideration to MOL’s merits; Webb and other agency officialsdisplayedasurprisingobjectivitytowardNASA’suseofMOL.Itwasdifficult,however,fortheOfficeofMannedSpaceFlighttoviewtheAirForceprogramwith charity. AAP andMOL were vying for limited space funds, and it wasunlikely that both would survive. AAP might have fared no better inMOL’sabsence,butthecompetitionseemedfinanciallydetrimental.17

Presidential approval of MOL in August 1965 proved less a boon thanexpected, and the Air Force’s Space Systems Division continued to want formoney.By the fall of 1965, the launch vehicle forMOLhad been selected: aTitanIIICwithstrap-onsolid-fuelboosters.Atthesametimealaunchcomplexat theWesternTestRange inCaliforniawasdesigned. InNovemberAirForceofficers prepared a position paper on the proposed expansion of the SatelliteControl Facility at Sunnyvale, California, a move opposed by congressionalcritics who thought the military should use Houston’s mission-control center.

Shortly after the new year, bulldozers began clearing ground for the launchfacility at Vandenberg AFB. By June 1966 the long-lead-time items for thelaunchvehiclewereonorder.18

BeforeAugust1965,NASAandDoDhadworkedoutmattersof commoninterest through ad hoc groups or through the Aeronautics and AstronauticsCoordinatingBoardanditspanels.MOL’sapprovalpromptednewarrangementstohandlethesubstantialincreaseincoordination.Bymid-OctoberMuellerandGen.BernardSchriever,headofAirForceSystemsCommand,hadsigned thefirstagreementcoveringexperiments.Duringthefollowingyear,aseriesofjointagreements defined relationships at the working level. Coordination betweentop-ranking officials was assured with the creation in January 1966 of theManned Space Flight Policy Committee. Membership included Seamans,Mueller, Newell, and their DoD counterparts. In congressional testimony,programofficialsmaintainedacommonfront:MOLandAAPwereindependent,servingunrelatedbutworthygoals.19

TheNASA-DoDpositionfailedtoconvincethosecriticsinCongressandtheJohnsonadministrationwhowanted tounite the twoprograms.On27January1966, legislators from both houses took aim at the NASA program. SenatorAnderson’slettertoWebbthatdayrecommendeduseofMOL;intheHouse,theMilitaryOperationsSubcommitteeconcludedthreedaysofhearingsonMissileGroundOperationswith some caustic remarks about overlappingprograms.Asubsequent report called AAP “unwarranted duplication” and an unapprovedprogramthat“couldcostfrom$1to$2billionayear.”Thesubcommitteecitedthesupportof“eminentspacescientists”forajointprogramandconcludedthatamergerwouldsavebillionsofdollars.Furthermore,themilitaryshouldruntheshow.20

For several years, theBudgetBureauhadquestioned theneed for separateearth-orbiting laboratories. In discussions on the FY 1968 budget, bureauofficialssupportedacommonprogram,withNASAflyingexperimentsonMOLmissions or at least using the cheaper Titan III rocket. In September thePresident’s Scientific Advisory Committee joined the chorus of critics. Thecommitteewasunhappywiththespent-stageconcept;theextensiveconstructionitrequiredearlyinthemissionwouldlikelydistortthemedicalresults.Itsreportconcluded that NASA should examine MOL closely before committing largesumstoAAP.21

NASA’sresponsetothecriticismwastwofold:itaskedDouglasAircrafttoevaluate MOL’s usefulness in meeting early AAP objectives, and it began adetailedin-housecomparisonofthetwoprograms.TheOfficeofMannedSpace

Flight’sfirstconsiderationwas theuseofTitanforAAP.EvenNASAofficialsadmitted that theSaturn IBwas anuneconomical launchvehicle; its costs perlaunchwereroughlytwicethoseoftheTitanIII.ByusingtheAirForcerocket,NASA could save about $15million permission. TheOMSF team found theTitan-Apollocombinationtechnicallyfeasible,althoughthepayloadinloworbitmight drop by 10%. Far more important was the time and money needed tointegratetheTitanandApollo.OMSFestimatedthatsystemsintegration,launchfacility modifications, additional checkout equipment, and two qualificationflightswouldtakeatleast3½yearsandcostabout$250million.Atthatrate,useof the Titan would delay the first AAPmission by two years and require 17launchesbeforethesavingssurpassedtheinitialcostsofconversion.Changinglaunch vehicles would also render useless all the work accomplished on theSaturnworkshop.The telling point, however,was the large cost of combiningtheTitanandApollosystems.22

OMSF found equally good reasons for not conducting its AAP programaboardtheAirForcelaboratory.ThebasicMOLconfigurationwasinadequatetomeetAAPgoals,whileaDoDproposalforalargerMOLwouldtakefouryearsto develop and cost an additional $480million in facilitymodifications. Eventhen, OMSF calculated that, to achieve the same results, an uprated MOLprogramwouldcostmoreannuallythantheSaturnIBandApollo.Armedwiththese figures,NASAofficials, in testifying at congressional hearings, held outforanindependentApolloApplicationsProgram.23

CENTERROLESANDMISSIONS

DuringNASA’sbriefhistory, tasks inmanned spaceflighthadbeenclearlydefined:vonBraun’s teaminHuntsvillehadresponsibilityfor launchvehicles,RobertGilruth’sengineersdirectedspacecraftdevelopment fromHouston.Thetwo organizations first worked together on the Mercury-Redstone flights.GeminiwaslargelyMSC’sshow,withtheAirForceprovidingtheTitanlaunchvehicleandHoustonholdingtheoperationsincloserein.Apollowastoobigforone center, but its work load divided into reasonably distinct areas: Saturnlaunch vehicle,Apollo spacecraft, launch operations (Kennedy SpaceCenter),and communications (Goddard Space Flight Center). Several jurisdictionaldisputes arose, along with scores of minor disagreements; but by and large,parochialinterestsweresubordinatedtothelunarlanding.

Possibilities for conflict were more numerous with AAP. While Apollo

offeredsomethingforeveryone,post-Apolloappearedlesspromising,especiallyforHuntsville.TherewouldbenosuccessortotheSaturnVforatleastadecade,and the Saturn IB would be phased out in 1968 unless AAP got under way.When Mueller seized upon the wet workshop as an inexpensive approach tolong-durationflights,Marshall’sfuturebrightenedperceptibly,andnodoubtthecenter’sneedshadweighedheavilyinMueller’sdecision.Thechoice,however,rankledHoustonofficialswhoviewedspacestationsastheirrightfulprerogative.ThewetworkshopalteredMSC-MSFCrelations;theywerenowcompetitorsaswellascollaborators.24

Inanotheragency,theheadquartersmighthavedictatedadivisionofeffort;but NASA’s field centers enjoyed considerable autonomy. Historically, theNACAcentershadpursuedtheirworkindependently.Duringtherapidgrowthofmannedspaceflightintheearly1960s,OMSFlackedthemanpowertosupervisethe centers closely.Aplan to contractwithGeneralElectricCompany for thatpurpose had been rebuffed by the field centers. In identifying U.S. spaceachievements with Houston, Huntsville, and the Cape, the American publicstrengthenedthecenters’position.DespiteMueller’seffortstodirectthemannedspace program fromOMSF, the centers still displayedmuch independence in1965.25

AAP’splanningguidelineofAugust1965assigned integration tasks to thecentersinlinewithApolloduties:Houstonwasgivenspacecraftresponsibilitiesand Huntsville the launch vehicle. After informal discussions with centerrepresentatives, Mueller amended the assignments in September. Besidesdeveloping all standard andmodified spacecraft,MSCwould direct astronauttraining,missioncontrol,andflightoperations.Inadditiontoitslaunchvehicleresponsibilities,Marshallwouldintegrateexperimentsintothelunarmodule.26

Sincelunar-moduledevelopmentwasunderHouston’spurview,thedecisionrepresented a significant step away fromApollo assignments and upset somepeopleinTexas.On14October1965theHoustonPostreported,“MarshallMayTake2ndApolloControl.”QuotinganOMSFspokesman,thearticlestatedthatHuntsville would integrate AAP payloads and Headquarters would probablymanagetheprogram.ThePostacknowledgedthatmissioncontrolandastronauttrainingwouldremaininHouston.Thearticlecausedaminortempest.Rep.OlinTeague, theTexasDemocrat chairingNASA’soversight subcommittee, lookedinto the matter. Until the air cleared, OMSF officials treated the issuediscreetly.27

Initial proposals of roles and missions were understood to be tentative.Before formalizing them—including Huntsville’s responsibility for the lunar

module—MuellersoughttoconvinceWebbandSeamansthathisproposalswereappropriate.Itwaseasytodemonstratethattheentireresponsibilityforpayloadintegration would be too great a burden on any one center. Splitting the LMintegrationwork betweenHouston andHuntsville would exceedMSC’s 1968personnel limit while leaving Marshall with excess people. Dividing the LMresponsibility also resulted induplicationofmock-upsand support equipment.Placing the entireLMpayload integration inHuntsville, however,wouldkeepboth centers below their personnel ceilings. Further, activity at both centerswould increase underMueller’s proposal.He assured his bosses thatMarshallhad the proper mix of engineering skills to handle LM integration. Webbapprovedthedivisionofresponsibilitieswithoneproviso:Huntsville’sprogramofficewastohavethetitle“LMApplications”or“LMIntegrationOffice”ratherthan “Apollo Applications.” The administrator wanted to make clear thatNASA’s“manned flightprogramactivity isnot shifting its centerof focusbutratherthatweareusingeffectivelyallouravailableresources.”28

Huntsville quickly seized the opportunity, opening an Experiments andApplications Office in mid-December. In March 1966 Leland F. Belew,*MSFC’s former manager for Saturn engines, became director of Marshall’sSaturn-AAP Office (Webb’s proviso apparently being forgotten). Belew andotherAAPengineerswereembarkedonaneight-yearenterprise.29

Payloadintegrationwasamongthefirstitemsofbusiness.ByMay,Marshallhad given parallel, one-year, $1-million contracts to Lockheed and theMartinCompany of Denver. The contractors were to examine experiment hardware,installation and integration of equipment, crew requirements, launch facilityrequirements, tracking, andmission analysis. InSeptember the twocompaniesconducted independent reviews ofOMSFplans for flights 1–4.The followingmonthBelewenlistedMartin’saidinmoredetailedplanningofthespent-stagemission, while Lockheed’s team provided a similar service for the Apollotelescopemountmissions.Huntsvillehadearlierconsideredpayloadintegrationwithoutcontractorsupport,buttheLockheedandMartinworkconvincedthemotherwise.InNovember1966,Marshallbeganpreparingaworkstatementforanintegrationcontract.30

AAPorganizationatHoustonproceededataslowerpace.OfficialstherehadlittleenthusiasmforAAPandlessfortheproposeduseofthelunarmodule.Inlight of Grumman’s problems with the lunar landing mission, HoustonconsideredAAPrequirementsanuntimelydiversion.Mueller’srecommendationthatMarshallintegratepayloadsintothelunarmoduleraisedfewobjections,buthis subsequent suggestion thatMarshall supervise LMmodifications forAAP

encountered strong opposition: it seemed to threatenMSC’s responsibility forflightsafety.Infact,GilruthconsideredanyuseoftheLMinAAP“sounsoundtechnically and financially that it [could] seriously weaken the Nationalprogram.”Mueller,inturn,accusedMSCofnonsupport.Gilruthinsistedthathiscenter was providing AAP with “a very large engineering and managementeffort.”He argued thatMSC’s delay in establishing a program office had notharmed AAP; indeed, it would be difficult to set up an AAP office untilHeadquarters defined the program. He still believed AAP lacked specificgoals.31

MuellerandGilruthdiscussedtheirviewsfranklyinmid-April,andaweeklaterGilruthappointedhisdeputydirector,GeorgeLow,asHouston’s“pointofcontact” forAAP.Houston’sAAPOfficeopened forbusinesson6 July1966.OthercenterdutiesoccupiedmuchofLow’stime,however,andhisdeputywaslefttotaketheleadinmanyAAPmatters.32

MSCofficialsfearedalossofauthorityinareasotherthanthelunarmodule.Some saw the broad scope of Marshall’s payload integration tasks as raisingfundamental questions about MSC’s role in mission planning and flightoperations.OthersfearedadilutionofMSC’scontrolofastronauttraining.Thelatter issue led to anagreementbetween the twocenters that astronautswouldtrainwithparticularexperimentsduringintegrationworkatHuntsville,butthatMarshall“wouldnotinanywayestablishan‘AstronautTrainingCenter.’”33

Some progress was made toward settlement of the roles and missionsquestion inearly1966whenOMSFand the twocentersdivided responsibilityfor the spent-stage mission. Huntsville would design the workshop,implementing an experiment program that incorporated items fromMSC andothersources.Houston’sGeminiofficewoulddirectworkontheairlockmodule.Theagreementcoveredonlyonemission,however,anddisputesonotherAAProles continued to surface.34 Mueller sought to resolve the differences at theAugustsessionofOMSF’sManagementCouncil,athree-dayhideawaymeetingatLakeLogan,NorthCarolina.

Thedeputydirectorsofthethreemannedspaceflightcenters(Low,EberhardReesofMarshall,andAlbertSiepertofKennedy)startedwiththeassumptionsthataspacestationrepresentedalogicalgoalbetweenearlyAAPmissionsandcomplexplanetary flights and that any space stationdesign could bemodular,withacommandpost,amissionmodule,andoneormoreexperimentmodules.The command module, providing guidance, navigation, control, andcommunicationsforthestation,wouldbedevelopedbyMSC.MSFCwouldberesponsibleforthemissionmoduleinwhichthecrewlived,slept,andperformed

someexperiments.Bothcenterswouldworkonexperimentmodules.TheLakeLogan accord applied the space-station model to AAP, defining the Apollocommand-servicemoduleandairlockmodule* as a commandpost, the orbitalworkshop as a mission module, and the Apollo telescope mount as anexperiment module under Marshall’s direction. Although the agreement gaveHuntsville the primary role in early AAP launches, it reaffirmed Houston’sresponsibilityforflightoperations,astronautactivities,life-supportsystems,andmedicalresearch.35

GilruthandvonBraunsignedtheLakeLoganagreementinlateAugust,buttheHoustonPostcontinued toholdout.On10Octobera front-pagearticlebyJimMaloneywasheaded, “VonBraun aPersuasiveVoice—SomeMSCTasksBeingMoved.”While praisingHuntsville’s rocketwork,Maloney viewed thepayloadintegrationandApollo telescopemountassignmentsasencroachmentsonHouston’sspacecraftrole.“Wherearethosewhoshouldarguethatyoucan’tbreakupthegroupthatdevelopedtheMercury,Gemini,andApolloandshoulddevelop the spacecraft for Mars and beyond?” The Post article brought newcongressional inquiries for Mueller to answer. His response, focusing on theAugust agreement, apparently satisfiedNASA’s congressional committees, butnot Maloney, who in subsequent articles attacked the spent-stage missionthroughunidentifiedMSCsourcesandaccusedthecenterleadersofkowtowingtoheadquarters.Maloneyoverstated theproblem,buthis fearswere sharedbysomeengineers.TheLakeLoganagreementwasaconvenientformula,butdidnoteliminatethecompetitionbetweencentersforpost-Apollowork.36

PRESIDENTIALAPPROVAL

TheJohnsonadministrationhaddeferreddecisiononAAPin1965,hopingforbettertimesthefollowingyear.Instead,mattersgrewworse.TroopstrengthinVietnamincreasedfrom184000to385000andthecostsofwarsoaredfrom$6billion to$20billion.PresidentJohnsonbelieved thathecoulddefendU.S.interests in Southeast Asia without sacrificing Great Society programs—ascritics said, that he could have both guns and butter. Many congressmendisagreed, however, and landslide Republican victories in 1966 indicatedwidespreaddissatisfaction.37

Johnson’stroublesweretoalargeextentNASA’s,afactreadilyappreciatedbyJamesWebb.Atamanagementreviewshortlyaftertheelection,Webbspokeabout thehard times.Spaceprogramswereunder increasingattack, the critics

focusingonApollo’ssizeandthepossibilityoflargepost-Apolloprograms.AttheBureauoftheBudget,officialswerepressingWebbtoeliminatethelastfiveSaturnVsfromtheApolloprogram.ThebureauhadlittleenthusiasmforAAP,and Webb doubted that the administration or Congress would approve theprogram until NASA established definite goals for it. Webb admonished hismanagersnottopushApollo-Saturnhardware,buttoemphasizenationalneedsthat could be met with the Apollo capability. Internal considerations such asNASA’sdesiretokeeptheApolloteaminbusinesswereimportant,butshouldbeleftoutofthesalespitch.Hewarnedagainstcenterparochialism.Continueddivisivenesswithin theagencycouldseriouslyharmpost-Apolloprograms.HeurgedhisassociatesnottounderestimatethesevereconditionsfacingAAP.38

AAPappearedmuchhealthierbymid-December,atleasttoGeorgeMueller.InameetingofOMSFstaffandcenter representatives,MuelleracknowledgedthatafewmonthsearliermostoutsidershadviewedAAPas“littlemorethanabill of goodies,” and there had been serious doubts aboutman’s role in spacescience. At August briefings, neither the Budget Bureau nor the president’sscientific advisers had shown interest in a post-Apollo program. Since then,however,Webb’semphasisontheworkshopclusterasalow-costmeansoflong-duration flight and effective science (particularly solar astronomy with thetelescopemount)hadimprovedAAP’sstandingwiththeadministration.39

The best evidence for that new standing lay in NASA’s FY 1968 budgetproposalforAAP.Severalaspectsof theprogramstill troubledBudgetBureauofficials: its lack of clear goals, possible duplication with the Air Force’sMannedOrbitingLaboratory, themeritsofmannedversusunmannedmissionsfor space science, and the timingofAAP flights andApollomissions;but theadministrationwasnotlookingtoendmannedspaceflight.Afterlengthydebate,NASA’sAAPrequesthadbeenparedfrom$626millionto$454million.Whilethe reductionmeant a slowdown, the figure represented the first large sumsetasideforAAP.Moreimportant,thedecisionreflectedLyndonJohnson’sformalcommitment to AAP. As his budget message said, “We have no alternativeunlesswewishtoabandonthemannedspacecapabilitywehavecreated.”40

During themid-1960s,AAPwas frequently described as a bridge betweenApollo and NASA’s next major manned program. When President JohnsonapprovedAAP in a time of severe funding problems, it became a bridge overtroubledwaters. For 18months theAAP office had struggled for recognition.Theprogramhadfirstbeendeferredandthenscaleddownward.ByAugust1966supporters had feared for its life. Following Johnson’s approval, there againseemed to be a reasonable chance of success. (Mueller remained the optimist:

AAP’s1966schedulecalledfor37flightsthrough1973atacostof$7billion.)Stillneededwasfirmpublicandcongressionalsupport.AmajoropportunitytogetitcamewiththereleaseofthebudgetmessageinJanuary1967.41

RobertSeamanssketchedtheoutlinesofAAPfundingatNASA’sFY1968budget briefing on the 23d. NASAwas seeking $263.7million for additionalSaturn-Apollohardware (fourSaturn IBsandfourSaturnVsperyear),$140.7milliontocoverexperiments,and$50.3millionformissionsupport.Theamountformission support pointed up the short time remaining before the firstAAPmission in June 1968. In the question-and-answer period, Mueller providedfurtherdetails.NASAplanned to launch itsorbitalworkshop inmid-1968andfollowwithasolarobservatory(thetelescopemount)sixmonthslater.Revisitstotheworkshopwouldcomein1969.AdministratorWebbemphasizedthelatterpoint:“Thisbudgetmakesthetransitionfromthetimewhenwehadtocountonsendingup things, andusing themonce, towherewe expect basically toparklarge systems in orbit and go back anduse them time after time.”42 AAP hadbeensoldtothepresidentlargelyfromthisstandpoint.

Press representatives asked for a more detailed presentation on AAP, andMueller obliged on 26 January. AAP plans showed considerable maturity,comparedtoapresentationinAugust1965.Theearlierschedulehadseemedaloosecollectionof individualmissions, filling thegapbetweenApolloand thenext major program. In the intervening 18 months, the orbital cluster hadbecome a focal point for program activities and a test bed for future spacestations. During the briefing,Mueller referred to the cluster as an embryonicspacestation.43

AAP1&2,OrbitalConfiguration,abriefingchartusedatNASAHeadquarters inMarch1967.ML67-6426.

MuellerconcentratedonthefourAAPflightsthatwereconsideredfirm.Thefirst mission consisted of two launches: an Apollo command-service modulefollowedbytheworkshop,airlock,andmultipledockingadapter.Theworkshopwouldremainina510-kilometerorbitforatleastthreeyears.Afterlinkingtheirspacecraftwiththedockingadapter,astronautswouldoccupythespentstagefor28days, twice the lengthof the longestGeminiflight.Fourdayswereallottedfor construction of the rudimentary two-story workshop in the spent S-IVBstage. The bottom floor would serve as living quarters, with fabric curtainsseparatingareasforsleeping,foodpreparation,wastemanagement,andexercise.Similar partitionswould dividework stations on the upper level. The airlock,underdevelopmentbyMcDonnellCorporation,wouldprovide theoxygenandnitrogen for a shirtsleeve atmosphere, electrical power, and most of theexpendablesforthe28-daymission.Thenewsmenseemedimpressedbythesizeof the workshop, perhaps mentally contrasting it with the narrow confines ofGeminiandApollo.Onereporteraskediftheworkshopequaledthespaceofanaverage ranch house. Mueller replied: “A small ranch house. The kind I canaffordtobuy.”44

Medical concerns headed the list of experiments on the first mission.Physiological tests included a vectorcardiogram and studies of metabolicactivity,boneandmusclechanges,andthevestibularfunction.Thecrewwouldalsoconduct18engineeringandtechnologyexperiments,rangingfromatestofjet shoes to an investigation of howmaterials burned in space. The jet shoes,developedatLangleyResearchCenter,resembledskateswithgasjetsattached.Intheclosedconfinesoftheworkshop,astronautscouldsafelyevaluatetheiruseasmaneuveringaids for futureextravehicular activity.Since thiswouldbe thefirst of many lengthy flights, several experiments evaluated aspects of crewcomfort such as sleeping arrangements, getting in and out of suits, and thehabitabilityoftheworkshop.45

Threetosixmonthsafterthefirstmission,thesecondwouldbelaunchedfora56-daystayinorbit.OneSaturnIBwouldcarryamannedApolloplusasupplymodule. Another would lift the telescope mount. By any measure, the solarapparatuswascomplex.Thetelescopecanistermeasuredtwometersindiameterbynearly fourmeters in length andweigheda ton; it housed adozendelicateinstruments.*Formostobservations, thetelescopemountwouldbeattachedtothe workshop; but under certain conditions, the crew might tether it a shortdistance from the cluster.Normal operationswould require one astronaut; theother crewmen would eat, sleep, or perform other experiments. Muellerdescribedthepackageas“themostcomprehensivearrayofinstrumentsthathaseverbeenassembledforobservingtheSun.”NASAhopedtohaveitinoperationbyearly1969whensunspotactivitypeaked.46

Although plans beyond the first two missions were indefinite, Muellerbrieflyreviewedthetotalprogram.Fourcrewswouldvisittheclusterin1969toconductnewexperimentsandmoresolarobservations.Specificexperimentsfortheseflightswereasyetundefined,butlikelypayloadsincludedearth-resourcecamerasandweatherinstruments.In1970NASAwouldlaunchasecondSaturnIBworkshop, followed by another telescopemount in January 1971. Throughresupplyandcrew-transferflights,NASAhopedtoachieveayear-longmissionby 1971. Plans to monitor the effects of space included a 1970 launch of anApollo biomedical laboratory. The first lunar-mapping flight was set forDecember 1969; two-week visits to the moon would follow in 1971.Anticipatinglargelogisticalrequirements,plannerswereschedulingtwoSaturnV launches for each extendedmission on themoon. (Much of the equipmentlater used for Apollo lunar exploration, such as the rover, was underconsiderationforAAP.)Inlate1971NASAwouldlaunchthefirstoftwoSaturnV workshops. Four Apollo flights were programmed to visit each of these

laboratories.Itwas,asaNASAofficialnoted,“quiteanambitiousprogram.”47

During FY 1967 and FY 1968, theAAPOffice expected to initiate sevenmajorprojects:theairlockandworkshop,thetelescopemount,alunarmappingandsurveysystem,Apollomodificationsforlong-durationflights,alunarshelterbased on the lunar module, experiment payloads, and an Apollo land-landingcapability.ThelastprojectwouldpermitthereuseofApollospacecraft,therebysupplementing the savings of workshop revisits. Three years earlier, Houstonhad ruled out land recovery for Apollo because the problems of braking thecraft’s descent had outweighed its advantages. The AAP Office believed theland-landing feature worthwhile, however; besides permitting reuse, it wouldallowtheApollotocarrysixmen.Inasoftlanding,astronauts’coucheswouldrequirelessspacetoabsorbshock.48

Thepositivetoneofthepresentationwas,perhaps,moreimportantthanthecontent.WhatGeorgeMuellerhadsoughtfor18monthsseemednowwithinhisgrasp. But events would prove otherwise—the next two years would confirmthatAAPwas,indeed,Wednesday’schild.

*UntilDec.1967,whenaLunarExplorationsofficewasestablishedunderApollo, lunarexplorationwasassignedtoAAP.

*AAP’searly funding isaconfusingmatter.Since itwasnota recognizedprogram, the initialworkcameunderAdvancedMissionsandsubsequentlyApolloMissionSupport.AseparateAAPlineitemdidnotappearuntilFY1968.InadditiontotheappropriationsforAAP($26millioninfy1966andeventually$71millioninFY1967),experimentfundsalsocameoutofOSSAandOART.NASA’soperatingbudgetforFY1966 showed$51.2million forAAP, including$40million for experiments and$8.5million forspace vehicles.AAP’s share of the FY 1967 operating budget increased to $80million, ofwhich $38.6millionwenttovehiclehardwareand$35.6milliontoexperiments.NASABudgetBriefingsforFY1966throughFY1968.

* Belewwas born in Salem,Mo., in 1925. He received a B.S. inmechanical engineering from theUniversity of Missouri-Rolla in 1950 and went to work for the Redstone Arsenal the next year. Hetransferred to NASA along with the Development Operations Division of the Army Ballistic MissileAgencyin1960.In1975hebecamedeputydirectoroftheScienceandEngineeringDirectorateatMSFC.

* In the next 18 months, the workload at MSC increased, while that at Marshall declined. WhenHeadquartersproposedtomovetheairlockcontracttoMSFC,GilruthagreedandaddedthatMSFCshouldalsomanagesystemsengineering for theentirecluster, including the lunarmodule (by that timemannedrendezvouswiththeLMhadbeendropped).HeevenofferedtoprovideMSFCwithformaltrainingincrewsystems.GilruthtoMathews,“ProposedManagementResponsibilities—ApolloApplicationsProgram,”29Mar.1968.SomeoneannotatedthefilecopyintheHoustonAAPoffice:“thegiveaway.”

*Thetelescopemountwillbedescribedindetailinthenextchapter.

4

AScienceProgramforMannedSpaceflight

In his press briefing on 26 January 1967, George Mueller described anApollo Applications Programwith a large scientific component.Most of thatscientific work had been defined only in the preceding year; late in 1965,MarshallSpaceFlightCenter’sspacesciencedirectorhadnoted tovonBraun,“ThelistofscientificexperimentsavailableforearlyAAPflightsisremarkablyshort.”1AlthoughNASAhad assembled a long list of scientific studies for anearth-orbiting laboratory (pp. 18, 77), only three experiments* were actuallyunderdevelopment.

ConsideringthetenuousstateofAAPatthetime,thatwashardlysurprising.But since AAP missions would use hardware that was already moving intoproduction, while scientific projects existed mostly on paper, experimentsdemandedattention—especiallyafterMuellerorderedaccelerationoftheorbitalworkshop project in December 1965. Early in 1966 Headquarters begancanvassingthefieldcentersforexperimentsthathadbeendevelopedenoughtobeflownearlyatminimumadditionalcost.

Thefactwasthatexperimentswerenewtomannedspaceflight.TheOfficeofManned Space Flight and its field centers, loaded with Saturn and Apollowork,had little time togive toperipheral concerns,while theOfficeofSpaceSciencehadonlyrecentlyworkedupreal interest in themannedprogram.Thetwoofficeswouldhavetolearntoworktogether;andbecausetheyhaddifferenthistories, objectives, and approaches to their work, there would be some lostmotionwhiletheylearned.

SCIENCEINSPACETO1965In theU.S., scientific research in spacebeganwith thepostwarV-2 flights

andcontinuedwithorbitingsatellites, thefirstofwhich(Explorer1)went into

orbit on 31 January 1958. Under the auspices of NASA’s Office of SpaceSciences (OSS), researchers in astronomy and space physics gathered vastquantities of data and designed increasingly sophisticated instruments to pushthefrontiersofknowledgestill further.2NASA’sOfficeofApplicationsmovedforwardwithcommunications,navigation,andweathersatellites.From1963to1971 the two offices were combined as the Office of Space Science andApplications (OSSA), which by 1965 had a well organized programencompassinglaunchvehicles,atrackinganddata-acquisitionnetwork,acenterresponsibleforscienceandapplicationsprograms(GoddardSpaceFlightCenter,Greenbelt,Md.), and a clientele of scientists. OSSA also supported universityresearch programs and provided research fellowships for individual graduatestudents. By FY 1965 this support had reached a level of $46million—smallcomparedtowhatsomeagenciesspentonresearch,butnonethelesssignificanttotheacademiccommunity.3

The chief of OSS and later OSSA was Homer E. Newell, who came toNASA in 1958 from theU.S.NavalResearchLaboratory,where he had beencoordinator of the science program for the Vanguard satellite project. Amathematics Ph.D., Newell had investigated radio propagation and upper-airphenomena before becoming involved in satellite work. In 1961 he wasappointed director of the Office of Space Sciences, responsible for all of thespaceagency’sscienceprograms.*4

InthatpositionNewellhadtobalancetheappetiteofscientistsforresearchsupport against the funds provided by a generally practical-minded Congress.Spaceresearch,thoughithadalongjumponmannedspaceflight,wasneitherasglamorousas themannedprogramsnorasobviouslypracticalas, say,medicalresearch.Newell found this regrettable, because he felt that the explorationofthesolarsystemwaspotentiallymorecomprehensibletotheaveragecitizenthansome other sciences.5 But an unmanned satellite, crammed with miniaturizedelectronics, silently transmittingmeasurements fromorbit to other instrumentsontheground,wasnotsomethingtostirtheimagination.Fromthatstandpoint,notevensomeofOSS’sdramatic“firsts”—photographsoftheearthfromorbitor of the moon from its surface—could match the challenges of mannedspaceflight: human challenges, easily understood, which naturally drew thelion’sshareofpublicattention.

The technological challenges of Apollo drew the lion’s share of NASA’sresearch and development funds, too. In FY 1960, before the first mannedMercury flight, OMSF got 45.5% of those funds to OSS’s 34.6%; four yearslatertheproportionswere69.7%and17.6%.Scientistsoftencomplainedabout

what they sawasadisastrous imbalance inNASA’spriorities. It tookyears toconvincesomeof themthatApollowasanationalgoalwhoseimportancewasnotdeterminedbyitsscientificvalue.6

Committedtoabroadscientificprogram,OSSwasmuchlesssingle-mindedthan OMSF. By its very nature, scientific research is less goal-oriented thanengineering. Programs in astronomy or space physics are intrinsically open-ended, although individual projects usually have limited objectives within alargerframework.Constrainedbyfundsratherthantime,scientistswhoworkedwithOSSwerecontentwithamoredeliberatepacethantheonethatprevailedinOMSF.Theyalsoacceptedalowerdegreeofreliabilityintheirlaunchvehiclesthan manned spaceflight could afford, because in the long run that policyproducedmorescientificresultsforthemoney.7

Manned spaceflight was different. The problems defined by Apollo weremostlyengineeringproblems,andOMSFwasstaffedlargelybyengineers,fromGeorgeMueller on down. Driven by the time deadline for accomplishing themannedlunarlanding,theywereinterestedonlyinanswerstotheirspecificandusuallyimmediatequestions.ThemannedprogramsdrewonresultsfromOSS’swork—for information about the radiation environment in cislunar space, forexample—butOMSF engineerswere not interested in conducting that kind ofresearchunlesstheinformationwasnototherwiseavailable.8

The one thingOMSF could not toleratewas operational failure. From thebeginning, the survival of the astronaut and the completion of all missionobjectives were the primary concerns. Elaborate test programs ensured thateverypartofamannedspacecraftoritsboostermetrigorousstandardsofsafetyand reliability. Every test, every inspection was thoroughly documented forpossibleanalysisincaseoffailure.ItwasonethingifaDeltaboosterfailedandanastronomysatellitewaslost;itwassomethingelseagainifaTitanexplodedwithtwomeninitsGeminispacecraft.

ORGANIZINGFORMANNEDSPACESCIENCEAmerica’sfirstmannedspaceprogram,ProjectMercury,wasanengineering

andoperationalprogramthathadnoplansforscienceuntillateintheprogram.Littletimeormoneycouldbesparedforactivitythatdidnotcontributedirectlyto the lunar landing. After the first orbital mission, when it appeared thatscientistswanted to conduct some experiments in orbit,MSCDirectorRobertGilruth formalized procedures to ensure that experiments were properly

conceivedand integrated into themission.HeestablishedaMercuryScientificExperiments Panel (later the MSC InFlight Experiments Panel), made up ofrepresentatives of 11 MSC divisions and program offices plus an ex officiomemberfromOSS’sMannedSpaceSciencesDivision.Thepanel’s jobwas toreviewandevaluateproposedexperiments,takingintoaccountscientificmerit,relevance to manned spaceflight, impact on the spacecraft, and operationalfeasibility.9Though thedirectiveestablishing theexperimentspanel stated that“the Center encourages the development of worthwhile investigations,” MSCacquired a reputation for being uninterested in scientific experiments, if notdownrighthostile towardthem.Somescientistscomplainedthat thepaperworkrequired to prove the experiments safe and reliablemade them too expensive;somesimply felt thatengineersdidnotunderstandscientific investigation.Fortheir part, engineers found the scientists somewhat casual about schedules,changes,andtheimpactoftheirexperimentsonoperations.Still,thetwogroupsfound enough common ground to get a few simple visual and photographicobservationsperformedontheMercuryflights.10

Thoseexperimentswereofsmallimportanceinthemselves,buttheyshowedthatmancouldmakeusefulobservationsfromorbit.DeterminedtodobetterinGemini,HomerNewellin1963establishedaMannedSpaceSciencesDivisiontoworkwith theSpaceSciencesSteeringCommittee (theOSSAreviewboardforexperiments),scientificinvestigators,andMSC’sexperimentcoordinatorstobring together the scientific and engineering objectives of NASA. Its directorreportedbothtoNewellandtohisOMSFcounterpart,BrainerdHolmes.ForthetimebeingOMSFmadenoorganizationalchangesforexperimentmanagement;itwaslefttotheInFlightExperimentsPanelinHouston.11

UndertheHeadquartersadministrativestructureworkedoutaftertheApollodecisionin1961,OSSAhadresponsibilityforalltheagency’sscienceprograms,butOMSFhad full controlofmanned flights.ThusOMSFhad themoney forexperimentsinthemannedprogram,butOSSAwassupposedtooverseethem.Itwas an awkward arrangement, but thoughNewell pointedout the difficulty toAssociateAdministratorRobertSeamans,SeamanswouldneitherchangeitnorreallocateexperimentfundstoOSSAafterCongresshadapprovedthebudget.Inmid-1963deputiesforNewellandHolmessignedanagreementmeanttodefineaworkable relationship.OSSAwas to solicit, evaluate, and select experimentsforflightanddevelopexperimenthardwaretothe“breadboard”stage.*OMSFthen would select a center to develop the flight hardware, contract withexperimenters and equipment developers, and carry the experiment throughtesting and development to flight. OSSA would also plan and develop the

science training program for astronauts, but OMSF would conduct it. Thearrangement was workable, if not ideal for either office, and early in 1965NewellandGeorgeMuellerreneweditwithonlyminorchanges.12

In August 1963 Newell formally initiated the Gemini science program,sendingout600letterstoscientistsdescribingthespacecraftandmissionplansand soliciting proposals for experiments. A Panel on InFlight ScientificExperiments then screened about 100 proposals, rejecting those having littlescientific value or poor flight feasibility and passing the rest to the MannedSpace Science Division of the Space Sciences Steering Committee. After theproposals were reviewed by appropriate disciplinary subcommittees withinOSSA,thesteeringcommitteerecommended12experimentstoOMSFforflightontheGeminimissions.13

MeanwhileBrainerdHolmeswasencounteringcomplicationswithNASA’sagreement to fly Air Force experiments on Gemini spacecraft wheneverpossible.TheinvolvementofDoDmadetheprogramcomplicatedandsensitiveenough that Holmes sent several OMSF observers to participate in Houston’sreview of experiments; the InFlight Experiments Panel would report itsrecommendations to Headquarters, and the joint NASA-Air Force GeminiProgram Planning Board would assign experiments to flights. Holmes alsoprescribedpriorities forGeminiexperiments: first,NASAexperimentsdirectlysupporting the objectives of Apollo (including medical experiments); second,DoDexperiments;third,otherexperiments.14Sincemostscientists’experimentsfellintothethirdcategory,theyhadreasontofeelthattheywerebeingtoleratedbutnotverystronglyencouraged.

AftertakingoverfromHolmesinthefallof1963,GeorgeMuellerdecidedto tidy up the experiments operation and at the same time get all the stringsfirmly inHeadquarters’hands—anarrangementhemuchpreferred.Oneofhisfirst proposals was to set up a board under OMSF to coordinate all mannedspaceflightexperiments.AfterdiscussionwithOSSA,wheresomeobjectedthattheproposedboard’scharterusurpedtoomanyofOSSA’sprerogatives,MuellerissuedadirectiveestablishingaMannedSpaceFlightExperimentsBoardon14January1964.15Thenewboard,withanexecutivesecretaryandafull-timestaffin Washington, would conduct the staff work necessary in coordinating theexperiments.Thedirectiveestablishedfourcategoriesofexperiments(scientific,technological,medical,andDoD)andthechannelsthroughwhichtheycametothe board. Each sponsoring office solicited proposals, evaluated them, andforwardedthemtotheexperimentsboard;thestaffsentthemtotheappropriateOMSF program office (Gemini or Apollo) for a determination of flight

feasibility;andtheboardapprovedordisapprovedeachexperimentforflight.Ifitcouldnotagreeunanimously,Muellermadethefinaldecision.Theboardgaveeachexperiment apriority rankingwithin amaster list;Mueller assignedeachapprovedexperimenttooneofthecentersfordevelopment.16

TheMannedSpaceFlightExperimentsBoardeffectivelysupersededMSC’sInFlight Experiments Panel, but Houston retained the important function ofassessingfeasibility.InMarch1964Gilruthconsolidatedhiscenter’smachineryfor reviewing experiments under an Experiments Coordinating Office in theEngineeringandDevelopmentDirectorate.ThisofficedrewsupportfromFlightOperations, Flight Crew Operations, the Gemini and Apollo program offices,and center medical programs, all of which were concerned with technical oroperationalfeasibility.EachexperimentwasassignedanMSCtechnicalmonitorto work with the principal investigator and see the hardware throughdevelopment.17

Thusby the time itssecondprogramstarted,OMSFhad theorganizationalmachinery to solicit, evaluate, anddevelopexperiments.Scientistsdisliked thecumbersome bureaucratic system, especially the detailed documentation itrequired; but NASA had to make certain that experiments were scientificallyworthwhile,thattheywouldworkinflight,thatthecrewsknewhowtooperatethem,andthattheywouldnotjeopardizeamissionoranastronaut.Onthewholethesystemworked;itsmainfeatureswereretainedduringtherestofthemannedspaceflightprogram.

Experimenters learned their trade in theGemini program,where scientificresearch became a part of manned spaceflight. On the 10 Gemini flights 111experimentswereperformed:17scientific,12technological,8medical,and15DoD;* 36 investigators from 24 organizations participated. The officialassessmentofresultswas,“TheexperiencegainedfromtheGeminiExperimentsProgramhasprovidedinvaluableknowledgeandexperienceforfuturemannedspaceflight programs.” Unofficially, many of those involved agreed that theresults were comparatively unimportant as science; the chief value of theexperiments was in working the kinks out of the experiment-managementroutine.18

Getting experiments on board the spacecraftwas not as straightforward asthe system implied. Scientists, astronauts, flight planners, and spacecraftengineers all had to learn as theywent. Time, and some failures, taught themhow to design experiment hardware, assure its reliability and flightworthiness,engineeritintothespacecraft,integrateitintothetimeline,andtrainthecrewstooperateit.Muchofthetraditionalscientist-engineerantipathycanbereadinto

the stories told by participants. Scientists chafed under the inflexiblerequirementsoftheengineers,whofoundscientistsblithelyunconcernedaboutsuchdetailsasschedulesandlast-minutechanges.Thecooperationdisplayedbyastronauts varied, to say the least; some took the experiments seriously, butothersconsideredthemanuisance(andsaidso).Whenitwasover,scientistsandspacemen understood each other better and, for the most part, professedsatisfactionwiththeresults.19

GeminigavemedicalinvestigatorstheirfirstchancetoanswersomecrucialquestionsthathadbeenraisedbytheMercuryflights,duringwhichthemedics’principaltaskhadbeentosupportflightoperations.WhileMercuryhadallayedmany of the fears expressed in the 1950s, it had also produced evidence thatweightlessness had potentially serious effects on the circulatory and skeletalsystems.Gemini’slongerflightsofferedthechancetomonitorphysiologymoreextensivelyandtoconductsomeinflightmedicalexperiments.20AsinMercury,managers in Gemini were primarily interested in medical certification thatweightless flightwas safe—at least for eight days, the anticipated length of alunar landing mission. Medical researchers, however, aware of the markedindividualdifferencesamongcrewmen,wantedasmuchdataastheycouldget,to give their conclusions a better statistical base.After the eight-day flight ofGemini5inAugust1965,pressuresmountedtodiscontinuethemedicalstudies,whichcutdeeplyintotrainingandflighttime.*Gemini7(4–18Dec.1965)wasthelastflighttoconductmorethanonemedicalexperiment.

TheGeminimissionsdispelledthemajorconcernsaboutweightlessnessonshortflights,butalsoindicatedsometrendsthatcouldbecomeseriousonlong-duration flights.Thequestions left unanswered at the endofGemini providedthe rationale for the medical program on AAP: How does the body adapt toweightlessness? How long do the changes continue? What countermeasuresmightbeeffective?21

SCIENTISTSANDMANINSPACEThe early scientific satelliteswere small, built to be launchedon available

boosters, and relatively inexpensive. They were also remarkably successful.Scientists who flew payloads in the early days accepted the limitations, sincetheywereoffsetbycomparativelylowcost,whichmademoreflightspossible.PresidentEisenhower’sscienceadviserssawnocompellingreasontohurryintomannedspaceflight.Fromthescientificpointofview,mannedflightwasfartoo

expensive for the results itmight return, which seemed to be almost nil. TheSoviets’ apparent attempts to acquire prestige by launching the first man intospace did not disturb this view. The President’s Science Advisory Committee(PSAC)belittledthesignificanceofmaninspace,advisedagainstbeingdrawnintoaracewiththeRussians,andsteadfastlybackedthespacescienceprogramas the more valuable phase of space exploration. That was also the phase inwhichtheUnitedStateswasleadingandcouldmaintainitslead.22

John Kennedy understood the wider appeal of manned spaceflight anddetermined to put the U.S. ahead in all phases of space exploration; but hisscienceadviser, JeromeWiesner (amemberofPSACfromits inception in theEisenhowerdays),triedtochangethenewpresident’smind.AtaskforceheadedbyWiesnerreportedon12January1961that theemphasisonProjectMercurywaswrong; instead, NASA should play downMercury’s importance and findways “to make people appreciate the cultural, public service, and militaryimportanceof spaceactivitiesother than space travel.”23Besetwithproblems,MercuryofferedtheU.S.littlechanceofsurpassingtheSovietsatanearlydate.

NASA,however,haditsownoutsideconsultantstoprovidescientificadvice—theSpaceScienceBoard of theNationalAcademyof Sciences,* created in1958.TheSpaceScienceBoard tookadifferentviewof long-rangepolicy forthespaceagency.AmonthafterWiesner’sreport,theboardurgedthatplansforearlyexpeditionstothemoonandtheplanetsbebasedonthepremisethatmanwould go along. “From a scientific standpoint,” the board said, “there seemslittleroomfordoubtthatman’sparticipation…willbeessential,ifandwhenitbecomestechnologicallyfeasibletoincludehim.”Theboardsawlittledifferencein the scale of effort needed to send man on space explorations and thatnecessary to approach his capabilities with instruments. There was nomechanicalsubstitutefortrainedhumanjudgment.24

Kennedy’s decision to commit the nation to Apollo established thedominance of technology over science in NASA’s programs. Scientistsimmediately objected to the space program becoming, as one astronomer toldSen. Paul Douglas of Illinois, “an engineering binge instead of a scientificproject.”Spacescientists,justifiablyproudofthesophisticatedinstrumentstheyhaddeveloped,weredisappointedthatthepublicdidnotappreciatethescientificleadership theyrepresented.25Manyscientists took theWiesner-PSAGviewtothepublicintheperiodfollowingtheApollodecision,buttheywerefightingalosingbattle.Acceptanceof“manon themoonin thisdecade”—andCongressemphatically had accepted it—dictated an engineering program to developlaunchvehiclesandspacecraft thatdominatedNASA’sbudgetand thepublic’s

attention until itwas completed. Scientistswho opposed it underestimated thefascinationthatthisgargantuantechnologyheldforthemediaandthepublic.

TheSpaceScienceBoard’sattitudewasdifferent.AcceptingtheApollogoal,theboardworkedfor thebestscientificprogramthatcouldbeachievedwithintheApolloframework.*Ithadendorsedmannedlunarandplanetaryexplorationin 1961; and the next year, in its first summer study undertaken at NASA’srequest, it reaffirmed that endorsement. Ninety-two academic and industrialscientists participated in the 1962 summer study, which was principallyconcerned with the state of the unmanned program and NASA’s plans for itsfuture.Buttherewasaworkinggroupon“ManasaScientistinSpace,”andtheroleofmanreceivedmoreattentionthanmighthavebeenexpected.Thereportnotedthatman’sjudgmentandabilitytoevaluateatotalsituationfarexceededanythingmachinescoulddo,andconcludedthatascientificallytrainedmanwasessential to adequate exploration of the moon and the planets. The workinggrouprecommendedthatPh.D.scientistsberecruitedfor trainingasastronautsassoonaspossible,preferablyintimetobeincludedinthefirstcrewtolandonthemoon.† Meanwhile astronauts already in the program should be given asmuchscientifictrainingaspossible.26

The working group’s conclusions took into account the replies to aquestionnairetheSpaceScienceBoardhadsenttospacescientistsafewmonthsbefore,seekingtheiropinionsontheroleofscientistsinApollo.Theresponsesreflectedtheviewthateachflightshouldincludeatleastonecrewmanwhowasa scientist first and an astronaut second. The man who landed on the moonshould be an expert who could collect samples quickly but with greatdiscrimination. Scientist-astronauts should be allowed to continue theirprofessionalscientificdevelopment;hencetherespondentshopedthatastronauttraining “wouldnot involve too large a fractionof their time,” perhaps only apartofeachyear.(Thisseeminglycavalierattitudetowardtheskillsrequiredofastronauts may have been only naive, but it was matched by the astronautoffice’sviewofscientists.Thatview,pithilysummarizedbyaNASAofficialafewyearslater,wasthat“itiseasiertoteachanastronauttopickuprocksthantoteachgeologiststolandonthemoon.”Reconcilingtheseviewstooktime.)27

The summer study did not look beyond Apollo, giving only briefconsiderationtoearth-orbitinglaboratories.Thereportcommentedonlythat“thetimephasing and formof such a laboratoryneeds further study.”Theprimaryrole for an orbiting laboratory seemed to be in biological studies, although itwould likely be useful as a base formodification,maintenance, and repair oforbitingsatellites.Astronomersbelievedthattelescopesshouldnotbemounted

inmannedorbitingstations,sincethemotionoftheoccupantswoulddisturbthealignmentoftheinstruments.28

AlthoughthereportacceptedthenecessityforsciencetotakesecondplaceinApolloforthetimebeing,itcontainedclearevidencethatsomescientistswereunhappywith the lunar landingprogramandhadnotbeen reluctant to say so.Noting that considerable confusion existed about the Apollo mission and itsproperjustification,thereport’sauthorsurgedNASAtojustifyApollo’scostinterms of the scientific capability itwould provide after the technological goalhadbeenachieved.AtthesametimetheycalledonscientiststorecognizethattheApollo goal grewout ofmany considerations,most of themnonscientific,andtoacceptthatassomethingthey—andNASA—hadtolivewith.29

WithinayearscientistswhohadfearedApollo’sfiscalappetitefoundtheirapprehensions well grounded. Preliminary consideration of NASA’s FY 1964budget in the fall of 1962 almost led to the sacrifice of unmanned scienceprograms. Only a convincing argument from Administrator James Webbpersuadedthepresidenttoleavethemalone.30WhenNASAwenttoCongressinthespringof1963askingfor$5.71billion,talkofbudgetcutsbecamecommon.Webbandhis lieutenantsheldout,however, insisting that the1970goalcouldnot be met on a smaller budget. Whether from a belated realization of themagnitudeof theApollocommitment—at least$20billion—orbecauseof thesuddensharp increase inNASA’sbudgetrequest,criticsraisedquestionsaboutthenation’spriorities,callingthelunarprogramatechnologicalstuntthatwouldcost farmore than it was worth. During the spring and summer a number ofrespectedscientists(mostofthemnotconnectedwiththespaceprogram)addedtheirvoicestothechorusofobjections.

Philip H. Abelson, editor of Science (the weekly journal of the AmericanAssociationfortheAdvancementofScience),touchedoffthescientists’protestswith an editorial on19April 1963.Examining the justifications that hadbeenadvancedforApollo,Abelsonfoundtheminadequate.Itspropagandavaluewasoverrated. The prospect of military advantage was remote. “Technologicalfallout” could never recovermore than a fraction of the project’s cost.As forscientificreturn,Abelsonsawpracticallynone,especiallysincenoscientistwaslikelytobeinthefirstcrewtoreachthemoon.Unmannedprobes,eachcostingperhaps1%ofthepriceofanApollomission,couldreturnmoreandbetterdata.Furthermore,theycouldprovideinformationneededinthedesignofamannedlanding vehicle.* In sum, he could find no justification for the high prioritygiventoApollo.31

Abelsonopened thedoor for a crowdof critics.For thenextmonthor so,

“ScientistBlastsMoonProject”couldhavebeenusedastheheadlineformanyanewsstory.NobelPrizewinnersvolunteered theircondemnation.DefendersofApollo replied, and a full-dress debate was on. NASA Deputy AdministratorHughL.DrydenaccusedAbelsonandothersofsettingupastrawmantoknockdown: “No one in NASA,” he said, “had ever said the programwas decideduponsolelyonthebasisofscientificreturn.”Anaerospacemagazineofferedtheopinion that the critics (“an esotericwing of the scientific community”)wereunhappy because engineers were successfully pursuing goals that scientistsconsideredunseemly.Eightnotedscientists(threeNobellaureatesamongthem)acknowledgedDryden’s point and calledApollo “an important contribution tothefuturewelfareandsecurityoftheUnitedStates.”32

ThebrouhahaswirlingaroundApolloanditsscientificimportancecouldnotescapecongressionalnotice.InJune,beforeresumingdeliberationsonNASA’sbudget, theSenateAeronauticalandSpaceSciencesCommitteescheduled twodays of hearings on the subject and invited 10 prominent scientists to testify.Senatorsheardlittletheycouldnothavereadintheirnewspapers;scientistshadthesamereservationsaboutApolloasotherconcernedcitizens(plusoneortwoof theirown)andhad the sameaxes togrindasother lobbyists.†Theyarguedthatmanygoalsweremoreworthyof$20billion thanamoon landing: aid toeducation, social programs, medical research, the environment, improving thecities—evensupportforotherareasofscience.HarryH.Hess,chairmanoftheSpace Science Board, and Lloyd V. Berkner, its first chairman, presented thefamiliar NASA point of view. On one point, at least, the witnesses generallyagreed:insomesituationsthepresenceofascientificallytrainedobserverwouldbeworththecostofgettinghimthere.33

Criticismfromthescientificcommunitydieddownsomewhatasthesummerended. Abelson continued to snipe at Apollo from time to time, but by early1965hewasreadytogiveuphiscampaign.Ifpeoplewantedthemoonexplored,hetoldaninterviewer,itwasallrightwithhim,provided“thepublicrealizesitischieflyforfunandadventureandnotbecausesomegreatcontributionisbeingmade to science.” The heart had gone out of the scientific opposition, and asDanielGreenbergwrote,“withLyndonJohnsonwholeheartedlyforgoingtothemoonandwithmostofthecapitalinvestmentforthatprojectalreadypaidfor,itis going to take more than a few dissents to inspire Congress to toy withApollo.”34

Theeffectofthisoppositiononplansforthefirstlunarlandingwasnil.Itseffect on NASA policies became apparent only later. When it appeared thatApollo would succeed, lunar scientists (who wanted to make sure the right

thingsweredoneonthemoon)andMSCengineers(whobegantoseescientificexplorationas thebest justificationforadditional lunar landings)sawthat theyneeded each other and worked toward accommodation. From Apollo 12 on,relations between lunar scientists and the Houston center consistentlyimproved.35

Events of 1964 indicated that the Space ScienceBoard had been listeningattentivelytothedebateof1963.WhenPresidentJohnsonaskedJamesWebbfora new look at space goals, NASA asked the board to reexamine its 1961statement and consider what should follow Apollo. The board had alwayssupportedNASAonthequestionofmaninspace—its1961statement, infact,had been ahead of the agency on the question ofmanned space science—butnowitbackedawayfromstrongendorsementofmannedprojects.Initsreportof30October1964settingforthnationalgoalsinspacefor1971–1985,theboardaffirmed the basic goal of exploring the moon and the planets, but relegatedmannedexploration to secondplace. It namedMars as the target for intensiveunmanned exploration; while that was under way, the solution of biomedicalproblemsshouldbepursued“atameasuredpace,sothatweshallbereadyformanned[Mars]explorationby1985.”OSSA’sspacescienceprogramshouldbecontinued,andinsomeareasexpanded.Theboardurgedabalancedandflexiblescientific research effort, able to respond to unexpected opportunities.Moneyshouldbespentwheretheprobabilityofscientificreturnseemedgreatest.Suchaprogram, using Apollo-developed hardware and operational capability, wouldensureasteadyflowofscientificdividendsfromspaceevenifApollometwithunforeseen delays. Lunar exploration and manned orbital stations warranted“significantprograms,butarenotregardedasprimarybecausetheyhavefarlessscientific importance.” An earth-orbiting station was more important fordevelopingoperationaltechniquesthanforscientificwork.36

Late in 1964 NASA asked the Space Science Board to convene anothersummer study, this time toconsiderpost-Apolloprograms in space research—specifically planetary exploration, astronomy, and manned space science.Participants met at Woods Hole, Massachusetts, in June and July 1965 toformulate their recommendations. The summer study report generally agreedwith the Space ScienceBoard’s policy statement of the previousOctober, butfoundmore justification forman’sparticipation in space research.Mostof thereport consisted of suggestions for improving OSSA’s unmanned scienceprograms. It endorsed the exploration of Mars as the principal goal for theimmediatefuture.Astopolicy,NASAshouldaimforabalancedprogram.Thedistinctionbetweenmannedandunmannedspacesciencewasartificial;forany

giveninvestigationthemodeshouldbechosentogivethebestscientificresults.Again the scientists emphasized the need to train more scientist-astronauts,suggestingthatscientificknowledgewouldbecomemoreimportantthanpilotingskills as themanned programmatured.Of particular interest toAAP plannerswasanendorsementof a solar telescopemount for theApollo servicemodule(seebelow)andthestrongrecommendationthatanearth-orbitinglaboratorywasneededtostudyman’sresponsetothespaceenvironment.37

GeorgeMuellerandHomerNewellmadewhat theycouldof theadviceoftheWoodsHole studywhen they testified before congressional committees inthe spring of 1966. Mueller saw the orbital workshop as an important steptoward the long-termspace station—a low-costway togain experiencebeforeflyingasix-toeight-manlaboratory.Newellwasgratifiedthattheproposalforatelescopeon theApollospacecraft foundfavor,butotherwise the reportcalledfor a more ambitious program than OSSA would be able to support. In fact,budget cuts had already forced OSSA to cancel the Advanced Orbiting SolarObservatory (AOSO), a project the summer study had enthusiasticallyendorsed.38

SOLAROBSERVATORIESINORBIT

The loss of AOSOwas keenly felt, because study of the sun was one ofOSSA’smajoractivities.AlreadytwoOrbitingSolarObservatories(OSOs)hadbeen launched, with gratifying results. The OSOs collected data on solarradiation, especially those wavelengths (ultraviolet and x-ray) that do notpenetrate the atmosphere. AOSO was to have been much bigger, with betterstabilization and pointing accuracy, higher resolution, the ability to detect andrespond to transient events such as solar flares, and 10 times as much data-storage capacity. The $167.4-million project had called for fourAOSOs to belaunched through 1971, providing coverage of the period of maximum solaractivity* expected in 1969. By July 1965 conceptual design studies had beencompletedandthecontractfortheprototypewasbeingnegotiated.39

Severe cutsweremade inNASA’s budget requests during 1965, however.OSSAwasreducedby16%,from$783.2millioninFY1966to$661.4millionin itsFY1967 request.Hardchoiceshad tobemade.Manyprojectswere cutback, but AOSO had to be canceled, because its funding requirements wereparticularlyhighintheupcomingfiscalyear.40TheOSOswouldcontinue,andalthoughtheymighttakeonsomeoftheworkthatAOSOwouldhavedone,they

could provide neither the quality nor the quantity of data that the second-generationobservatorywasdesignedtogather.

Homer Newell was worried as 1966 began, not so much for the loss ofAOSO as for the survival of a significant space-science program. He couldhardly help remembering the close call that space science had had only fouryears before, and he saw the same pressures building again. Early in the newyearhesoughthelpfromGordonMacDonaldofUCLA,whohadservedonboththePresident’sScienceAdvisoryCommitteeand theSpaceScienceBoardandwas an active supporter of OSSA’s programs. Newell wrote him that theaccomplishments of space science once again were in danger of beingovershadowedbytheglamourofmannedspaceflight.WiththenationcommittedtoApolloandmoneygettinghardertocomeby—Vietnamwasstartingtomakesubstantial demands on the nation’s resources—space sciencewould suffer. Ifscientists did not demand support for a first-class research effort, Congresswould not give it.Budget cuts alreadymadewith little protest from scientistswerefosteringanattitudethattheprogramswerelessimportantthanOSSAhadsaid.Mannedspacescienceneededoutsidesupporttoo.ThevolumeandweightcapabilitiesbeingdevelopedinApollowereenormous,andacademicscientistshadnotcomeclosetomakingfulluseofthem.Withouthigh-qualityproposalsfromoutside,“there isastrongtendency[inOMSF]togetexperiments just tohave experiments to fly.” Newell’s staff was trying hard to keep the mannedprogramscientificallyrespectable,buthelpwasneeded.HeurgedMacDonaldtospeakout, to testifybeforecongressionalcommittees ifhecould,and to“prodand needle some of your colleagues to do the same.”41Newellwas having torallyspacescientiststotheirowncause;thevigorousprotestsof1963werenotheardin1966.

Meanwhile,OSSAwasdoingwhatitcould.InSeptember1965thePhysicsand Astronomy Section had moved to establish a foothold for astronomy inmannedspaceflight.Asix-monthcontracttostudythefeasibilityofinstallingatelescope mount in the Apollo service module was awarded to Ball BrothersResearchCorporationofBoulder,Colorado,along-timedesignerandbuilderofinstruments for OSSA programs. The study was to determine whetherastronomicalinstrumentsonamannedspacecraftcouldbestabilizedenoughtogathergooddataandwhethermanwouldbeusefulinmakingobservationsfromorbit. Called at first the Apollo telescope orientation mount, the device soonbecameknownsimplyastheApollotelescopemountorATM.42

Thekeyfeaturesof theATMwereprovisionforcontrolandadjustmentbytheastronautsanduseofphotographicfilmtorecorddata.*Itcouldnotreplace

AOSO,becauseAOSOhadbeendesignedtoobservethesuncontinuouslyfor9months while the proposed ATM flights were limited to 14 days. But afterAOSOwas canceled, the ATM became the only possibility for observing thesolarmaximumwithhigh-resolution instruments.OSSA thushadan importantscientificproject inneedofavehicleat thesame timeOMSFwas lookingforimportant scientific experiments to fly in the Apollo Applications Program.NewellandMuellerbegantalkingaboutcombiningthetwoearlyin1966.

AstheprogramofficesdiscussedATM,anumberofpointshadtobesettled.Management was one. Goddard Space Flight Center was experienced inastronomy programs and had directed the Ball Brothers study, but theOMSFcentersweremore experienced in integrationonmannedvehicles.Toward theendofJanuaryNewell’sofficeaskedLangley,Marshall,Goddard,andMSCtosubmitproposalsformanagingtheATMproject.Threeproposalswerereceived—Langley could not spare the resources to support the project—and afterreviewing them OSSA decided to leave the project at Goddard. With thatquestion settled, Newell asked Deputy Administrator Robert Seamans forapprovaloftheproject,citingtheneedtogetstartedimmediately:onlytwoanda half years remained before the 1969 solar maximum. The project approvaldocument Newell submitted noted that the instruments were compatible withseveral locations in the spacecraft, but specifically mentioned the servicemodule’sexperimentssectorasthecurrentconcept.43

Mueller, however, was committed to using the lunar module as anexperiment carrier, and hewanted theATMmounted there.At anAAP statusreviewon8April1966,Newell,Mueller, and their technicalexperts reviewedbothproposalsforSeamans.OSSAarguedthatmountingtheATMintheservicemodulewascheaperandmorecertainof success; it required fewerchanges tothespacecraft;and itcouldmeet thescientifically important1968 launchdate.Against that only a single 14-day mission was possible, because the servicemodule burned up on reentry. OMSF asserted that the lunar module-ATMcombinationwouldrequirelessmoneyimmediately;itcouldbeleftinorbitandreused; and subsequent use of the lunar module as a laboratory would befacilitatedbytheexperiencegainedwiththeATM.Ontheotherhandthelunarcraftwastotallyuntriedanditsproductionwaslagging.Neitheroptionseemedclearly preferable, and Seamans asked for more details. He was reluctant toapprove the project immediately, because he could see no way to fund theATM’s FY 1967 requirements and thought it unwise to start a competition inindustry until the agency could follow up with immediate development.Meanwhile he approved two more studies by Ball Brothers, one to study

automatic operation of the ATM if it could be left in orbit after a mannedmission,theotherforstudyingadaptationoftheATMtothelunarmodule.44

A mockup of the Apollo telescope mount installed in the lunar excursion module, January 1967. Thecombinationwasneverbuilt.MSFCA49627.

Mueller saw a Marshall-based ATM project as the solution to severalproblems, but he was already getting objections from within his ownorganization.AstronglywordedletterfromRobertGilruth(pp.45–46)wasonhisdeskwhiletheprojectwasbeingdiscussedwithSeamans;theMSCdirectorobjected both to the use of the lunar spacecraft as a laboratory and theassignment of integration to Huntsville. Ignoring Houston’s protest, Muellerwentahead.Hedecidedon18MaythattheentireATMsystem,exceptforthetelescopes themselves, would be designed, built, and integrated into the lunarmoduleatMarshall.On8JuneHuntsvilleplannersstarted talkswith the lunarmodule’s prime contractor, Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation, andshortly thereafterMSC authorizedGrumman to study the compatibility of theATMwiththelunarmodule.OSSAobjectedtoamissionassignmentsdocumentissued in June by theAAPoffice, because the orbital altitude and inclination,proposed launch dates, and operational plans did not agree with OSSA’sintentions.45Again,Muellerpressedon.

Newell and Mueller met with Seamans several times in June and July,seekinghissignatureontheircompetingprojectapprovaldocuments.On11Julythe three agreed that the entire ATM project, experiments and all, should betransferredtoMarshallfordevelopment.Thisdecisionresultedfromagrowingfeeling atHeadquarters that itwas best not to divide responsibility for such acomplex project, and Goddard could not manage the whole package alone.46Afterthat,itwasasafebetthatMueller’splanwouldbeadopted.Hecontinuedto give Seamans technical data, including the results of tradeoff studiescomparingvariouslocationsfortheATMandrecommendingthatitbemountedonthelunarmodule.

InHoustonduringtheGemini10mission(18–20July1966),MuelleraskedMSC officials to comment on those studies. In response, the Houston staffagreed that all theATMwork should be assigned toMarshall, butmaintainedthatselectionofthelunarmoduleastheexperimentcarrierwouldforfeitallthebenefitsgainedbythatassignment.Instead,Marshallshoulddesignandbuildaspecial structure to carry the ATM and its supporting systems—a “rack” thatcouldbelaunchedinsidetheCSM-LMadapter.Inorbitthecrewwouldoperatethe solar telescopes from the commandmodule.Up to 30daysof observationcould be conducted if themission used an ExtendedApollo spacecraft.MSCcalculated thatmodifying the lunarmoduleasMuellerproposedwouldcost atleast$100millionmorethanarackandmighttaketwoorthreeyearslonger.47

MSC’smanagers also objected toMueller’s proposed plan for operations,whichrequiredtheApollospacecrafttorendezvouswiththeseparatelylaunchedtelescopemount.Twocrewmenwouldmove into the solar observatory,whichthen separated from theCSM.After conducting14daysof solarobservations,theATMvehiclerejoinedtheApollocraftandthetwocrewmenreturnedtothecommand module. If the second rendezvous could not be accomplished,however, the ATM crew had no way to get home. This riskMSC absolutelycould not justify for such amission. On safety considerations alone, Houston“couldnotsupporttheproposedApolloApplicationsLM/ATMapproach.”48

Other factors contributed to MSC’s opposition to Mueller’s plan. Thesummer of 1966 was a particularly trying time for the lunar-module project.Grummanwasexperiencingseveretechnicalandmanagementproblems,andtheMSCprogramofficehaditshandsfulltryingtofindawayoutoftwoyearsofserious difficulties. They did find a way, in spite of Mueller’s insistence oncomplicating their problemsbybringing in anotherproject andanother center.EventuallyMSC’sApolloSpacecraftProgramManageraskedMuellerdirectlywhy he continued to back the lunar-module laboratory in the face of all its

technical drawbacks; were not his motives at least partly political?Mueller’sreplywas that they “were not partly political but completely political.”49 Thenecessity tohold theMarshall teamtogether,combinedwith theneed toavoidanythingthatlookedlikeamajornewproject,lefthimlittlemaneuveringroom.

Houston’s objections could not be completely ignored at Headquar ters,however, and on 2 August OMSF recommended that Seamans approve aderivativeof theMSCsuggestion.Reexaminationof fundingrequirementsandmanpowerresourcesatMarshallnowindicatedthattheoptimumprocedurewasto contract for some$60-millionworth ofmajor components of theLM-ATMsystemand to useMarshall personnel for selecteddevelopment tasks.Muellersaid that the 1968 launch date could be met, given immediate approval andinitiationofwork.OpinioninOSSAwasnottoohopefuloflaunchingtheATMintimetoobservethesunduringitsperiodofmaximumactivity,butthatofficeneverthelesssecondedMueller’scallforimmediateapproval.50

On 29 August 1966, five days after the Senate completed congressionalactiononNASA’sFY1967appropriation,SeamanssignedMueller’sversionofthe ATM project approval document, authorizing development of one set ofinstruments for flight on the secondApolloApplicationsmission.Noting thatseveralimportantdetailswereundefined,Seamansaskedtobekeptinformedofmajordecisionsmadeduringtheprojectdefinitionphase.ThenextthreemonthswerespentinworkingouttheATMdesignandoperatingmode,culminatinginthe orbital cluster based on the multiple docking adapter (pp. 36–39).Experimenters, who had beenwaiting fourmonths to go aheadwith buildingtheirinstruments,werenowfreetodoso.DesignoftheAOSOinstrumentshadnotgonevery farwhen thatprojectwas terminated, andOSSAhadkept themalive, hoping to find a way to use them. The Goddard ATM team had keptinterestalivebyorganizingabettingpoolon thedateSeamanswouldsign theprojectapprovaldocument.ThedevelopmentscheduletogettheinstrumentsontheATMwasnowverytight,butneitherGoddardnortheexperimenterscouldhelpthat.51

Althoughthewaitingwasbadfortheexperimentsschedule,itprovidedtimeto settle some basic questions about the mount. Besides the issues discussedalready, therewas the problemof stabilizing theATM to the degree required.Themainpurposeoftheprojectwastogetthesuperiorresolutionthatfilmcouldprovide, and for this it was essential that the mount be extremely stable.Specificationscalledforholdingthe telescopes’alignmentwithin±2.5secondsofarcfor15minutesata time—equivalent tokeepingtheATMpointedat thebridgeofaman’snose,akilometeraway,withoutallowingittodriftasfarasthe

pupil of either eye. Some experimenters did not believe this could beaccomplished. Conventional attitude-control thrusters could not handle suchrequirements,soattheMayAAPreviewMuellerdecidedtousegyroscopesasthe basic means of stabilizing the ATM. Research at Langley had producedprototypesof“controlmomentgyros”with90-centimeterrotors,largeenoughtostabilizeavehiclethesizeoftheATM.Moreworkwouldberequiredtoqualifytheseforlong-termreliabilityinspace,andbothLangleyandMarshallsetaboutit.52

ThreedaysafterSeamansapprovedtheproject,fouragencieswerenotifiedthattheirexperimentshadbeenselectedforATM.On6SeptemberthecontractsweretransferredfromGoddardtoMarshall;onthe19ththebasicATMprogramwas approved by the Manned Space Flight Experiments Board. Marshall’scompatibility studies for theLM-ATMhardware andmission, presented at theboardmeeting,showedanexperimentscanister1.5meters indiameterand3.3meters long, carrying the instruments on a cruciform spar that divided thecanisterintoquadrants.Thecanistercouldbemountedonarackattachedtotheascentstageofthelunarmodule.TheestimatedweightwaswithinthecapabilityoftheSaturnIBwithacomfortablemargin.53

The five instruments, capableof recording the sun’s spectrum fromvisiblelighttohigh-energyx-rays,constitutedacoordinatedapproachtosolarresearchneverbeforeattempted.Fewlaymenwouldrecognizeanyoftheinstrumentsasatelescope,althoughallbutonecouldrecordimagesofthesun(orsmallregionsof it) on film. The Naval Research Laboratory’s two ultraviolet instrumentscouldphotographtheentiresunorselectedsmallareas,usingwavelengthsthatrevealed the composition of the area under study. American Science andEngineeringofCambridge,Massachusetts,wasbuildinganx-rayinstrument torecorddetailedimagesofsolarflaresandtomonitorthesun’sx-rayoutput.TheHigh Altitude Observatory at Boulder designed a white-light coronagraph,which,byblocking the intense light fromthesun’sdisk,couldphotograph themuch fainter corona. The only non-photographic instrument was HarvardCollege Observatory’s ultraviolet spectrometer and spectro-heliometer. Itcomplemented NRL’s instruments, but used photoelectric detectors andtelemetered the readings to the ground. Thus it was the only instrument thatcould be operated remotely while the ATM was unmanned, although in thatmodeitlackedfine-pointingcontrol,whichwasafunctionofthecrew.54

Crosssectionthroughthetelescopemountcanister,showingthecruciformsparandinstruments.

Marshall’s compatibility study turnedupnothing toprevent scheduling theATMforlaunchinthefourthquarterof1968.Thereweresomedoubtsthattwooftheinstrumentscouldbedeliveredsixmonthsbeforelaunchasrequired,butitwas “intended that schedule incompatibilities be overcome during contractnegotiations.” The question of power for themodulewas stillmoot; plannersspokeof anarrayof solar cells togenerateup to threekilowattsof electricity.With the approval of the ATM instruments, AAP’s largest andmost complexscientificprojectwasreadytogetunderway.Marshall’sAAPoffice,asmanagerLeeBelewsaid,then“turnedonasystemsdesigneffortthatwasforreal.”55

EXPERIMENTSFORTHEWORKSHOP

ATMdeservedalltheattentionitgot,buttheworkshopneededmorethanasetofsolartelescopestojustifyit.Aftersomuchtalkoftheimportanceofmaninorbitalscience,itneverthelessturnedouttobehardtofindexperimentsthat

requiredman’sparticipationandeffectivelyusedtheworkshop’s largevolume.TheproblemwasgraphicallystatedbyWernhervonBrauninMay1965,whenhe noted that the optimistic schedule being proposed by Mueller would, ifimplemented, make it possible to put 970metric tons of payload into a 225-kilometerorbiteveryyear.AsingleSaturnVcouldorbitallofNASA’spreviouspayloadsatonetime—andthensome.56

Earlyin1966Muellertoldthecentersthatfundsfortheexperimentprogramwouldbeshort.Theycouldnotusecontractors todevelopexperimentsas theyhaddoneinthepast,butwouldhavetodoitthemselves.Hesuggestedusingoff-the-shelf, commercially available components wherever possible. Von Braunpassed the word along at Marshall, reminding his staff that their concernextended beyond the workshop: it would have to be filled with experiments.HuntsvilleandHouston thenbeganpreparing listsof things theywould like toseedoneintheworkshop.57

After the February 1966 AAP review, Robert Seamans directed OMSF toincludetheexperimentsintheseperiodicexaminationsoftheprogram’sstatus.By March, 3 experiments were actually under development, 10 were beingconsideredbytheMannedSpaceFlightExperimentsBoard,andanother13werereadytobesubmittedtotheboard.Elevenwereinthedefinitionphase,108werebeing planned for definition studies, and 72 were waiting for the process tobegin.Sinceanexperimenttypicallyrequired32monthsfrominceptiontoflightreadiness, the outlook for a substantial program of experiments for a 1968workshop was not good. Money was the major problem, aggravated byinadequatemanpowerat thecenters and thedivisionof responsibilitybetweenOSSA andOMSF. Seventeen biomedical experiments had been identified, butwork statements defining center responsibilities for them had not yet beenwritten. The ATM, to which OSSA was giving top priority, was a promisingproject;butitneeded$19million,forwhichnosourcehadbeenidentified.58

WithinOMSFtheresponsibilityforearlyphasesofexperimentslaywithE.Z.Gray’sAdvancedMannedMissionsOffice,andMuellernowurgedthatofficeintoaction.GrayrespondedbynamingDouglasLordchiefof theExperimentsDivisionandcharginghimwithassemblingacoherentsetofexperimentsfortheworkshop. After preliminary discussions with experiments offices at Houstonand Huntsville, Lord called on the centers in mid-May to submit a list ofexperimentstheycouldmakeready,alongwithpriorities,developmentfundingplans,andschedules,topresenttotheexperimentsboardatitsJulymeeting.Amonthlaternothinghadbeenreceived.Whenproposalsdidcomein,Graywasnothappywith them,andhemincednowords inamessage tovonBraunand

Gilruthon28June:“Itisevidentthattheproposedworkshopexperimentsdonotconstitute a reasonable program.” For example, no experiments had beenproposed to assess the habitability of the spent stage and provide designparametersforspacestations.Severalof theexperimentsdidnotreallyrequirethe workshop; others needed little or no participation by the crew. “In myestimation,”heconcluded,“wehavenotfacedupto theproblemofdefiningauseful setof experimentswhichcanbedeveloped inour in-house laboratoriesandsubsequentlyconductedintheworkshop.”59

Lordthentookateamtothecenters,“beatingthebushes…tofindlow-costexperiments.”“Wehadn’tputa lotofmoney intodefiningexperiments,”Lordrecalledlater,“soyoureallyhadtogooutandtrytofindthem,andtherewerenot a lot.” Von Braun said that “the complex system for getting experimentsapprovedwas so terrible itdidn’tmatterhowmanywecould findbecausewecouldn’t get them through the system anyway,” at least not in time for a late1968 flight. Still, Lord and his crew spent sixmonths pressing the centers todeviseexperimentsandgettingthemevaluated.60

Experiment reviewswere held atHouston andHuntsville inAugust 1966.Twenty-four experiments, mostly engineering exercises, were scrutinized; 8were rejected, 13 accepted, and 3 withdrawn or combined with others. Toppriority was given to a “Habitability/Crew Quarters” experiment, with bothcenters participating.Other experiments aimed at determining how effectivelyastronautscould repair andmaintainequipment, investigating the flammabilityof materials in zero gravity, and evaluating spacesuits and extravehicularmobility aids. Eleven of these were approved at the September experimentsboardmeeting, on condition that funds for their development could be found.Theboardremindedbothcenterstokeepcostsdownbyusingin-housefacilitiesandmanpowerasmuchaspossible.61

Rather surprisingly, considering that they had always been a primejustificationforworkshop-typemissions,themedicalexperimentswereslowtoget started. Other activities were taking up all the available manpower atHouston,wherethatworkwascentered.ThemedicalresultsofGeminiwerestillunder evaluation and 16medical experimentswere being developed for earth-orbiting Apollo missions. Planning the Apollo experiments, evaluating theGemini data, and conducting ground-based supporting research taxed theunderstaffedMedical Research and Operations Directorate at MSC. SimilarlyHouston’sCrewSystemsDivision,whichwouldhavean important role in thedevelopment ofmedical experiments,wasworking at capacity on life-supportandenvironmental-controlsystems,amongotherthings.62

The most important medical studies for the first 28-day mission couldnonethelessbedefined,andattheSeptembermeetingoftheexperimentsboardOMSF’sOfficeofSpaceMedicinepresented threeproposals.Two—MetabolicActivitiesandCardiovascularAssessment—wouldmeasure theresponseof themuscular and circulatory systems to zero gravity, providing inflight data bytelemetry. The third, Bone and Muscle Changes, was a continuation of theGeminiM-7experiment(n.,p.63),requiringpre-andpostflightmeasurementofcalciuminbonesandcollectionofurinesamplesinflightforlateranalysis.Theboard approved the medical experiments with the understanding that detailedplans would be provided later. It also concurred in a recommendation that aphysician-astronautbeincludedinthecrewofthefirstworkshopmission.*63

Thenextboardmeeting,inNovember,wasabusyone,mostlyoccupiedwithAAP experiments. Two medical, four technological, and six scientificexperimentswereapproved,subjecttotheusualconditionthatfundingbefound.Bynowthefirstworkshopmissionwasbeginningtobeabitcrowded;thecrewwouldnothaveenoughtimetocarryoutalltheapprovedexperiments.Anotherproblem was posed by a proposed artificial gravity experiment; maneuveringfuelwasinsufficienttospintheclusterwhilemaintainingareservetobringthecommandmoduleoutoforbit,shouldthatberequired.Thesetwoitemspointedup the difficulty of integrating a group of diverse experiments with theoperational requirements of the mission. A group at Marshall responsible forexperiment integration was finding it a headache—especially since theexperimentswerechangingeverytwomonthsandthespacecraftwasstillbeingdefined.64

At that samemeeting theboardmoved todealwith the relatedproblemofexperiment priorities. Sponsoring agencies established priorities for theirexperiments, but it was up to the board to work out an integrated list. Firstpriority inNovemberwent to habitability, followed by the biomedical studiesand crew mobility and work capability experiments. An artificial gravityexperimentwas in last place. These prioritieswere not binding andwould beadjustedastherosterofexperimentsgrew.Theboardwouldcontinuetowrestlewiththepriorityproblemforanotherfullyear.65

Attheendof1966,only2experimentsweredefinitelyassignedtospecificmissions.Thirty-one,includingtheATMandthemedicalgroup,wereapprovedandtentativelyassigned;19wereapprovedandawaitingassignmenttoaflight.With the adoption of the cluster concept and the definition of the first fourlaunches (two missions)—a process completed only in December—theexperiment program solidified considerably. By February 1967, all of the

tentative assignments had been made definite, 8 more experiments had beenscheduled,andseveralnewoneshadbeenproposedandapproved.66

BythetimeGeorgeMuellerpresentedAAPtothepresson26January1967,theprogramwas, ashe indicated,makinga substantial start inmannedorbitalscience. The medical experiments on the first mission would help determinewhatmancoulddo andhow longhe could function in zerogravity; theATMexperimentswereexpectedtosettlemanyquestionsaboutman’susefulnessasascientistand(itwashoped)gathersolardataofunprecedentedquality;andthemany smaller experimentswouldyield informationuseful to space technologyand operations. Neither comprehensive nor perfect, the workshop and ATMmissionswere,scientificallyspeaking,astart.

MOREADVICEFROMTHESCIENTIFICCOMMUNITY

WhileOMSFwashammeringoutthedetailsofitsfirstpost-Apolloproject,thePresident’sScienceAdvisoryCommitteewasconsidering itsanswer to thequestion,“Wheredowegoinspacefromhere?”Through1966,24membersofPSAC’s panels on space science and space tech nology examined the nation’sspace program. Their report, mainly concerned with broad policyrecommendations, also contained several specific criticisms ofAAP thatwerelessthanwelcomejustasMuellerwasabouttogotoCongresstocampaignfortheFY1968budget.

ThePSACreport,publishedon11February1967,generallyparalleledthatoftheSpaceScienceBoard’s1965WoodsHolestudyinendorsingexplorationof the moon and planets as the most profitable near-term activity for spaceresearch.PSAC,however,assertedthatforthe1970samajorgoalwithadefinitedeadline was inappropriate. The question was “not so much ‘What majorendeavor will best provide a basis for expanding our space technology andoperational capability?’ but ‘What are themost advantageous ways to exploitthisgreatcapabilityfor theachievementof thenationalpurposes…?’”PSACfavored a balanced program based on the expectation of eventual mannedexploration of the planets. This would entail a strongly upgraded planetaryprogram, full exploitation of the ability to explore the moon, qualification ofman for long-duration space operations, advancement of technology on allfronts, and the use of earth-orbital operations for the advancement of science,particularly astronomy. Such a program would aim at answering the basicquestionsthatwere,inPSAC’sestimation,themostchallenginggoalsofspaceexploration: Is there life elsewhere in the universe?What is the origin of the

universe?Howdidthesolarsystemevolve?67

Proceeding from philosophical questions to specifics, PSAC examinedNASA’splansandofferedsomesuggestions.ItsstatementofabroadapproachforNASAinthe1970sseemedtocoincidewiththestatedpurposesofAAP,butthe scientists called for a different emphasis.AnyApollo-Saturnhardwarenotneeded for the first two lunar landings should be used for extensive lunarexploration, not AAP. Beyond currently programmed vehicles, PSAC favoredlimitingSaturnproduction to fourSaturnVsper year and someminimumbutunspecified number of Saturn IBs. The report compared the Saturn IBunfavorablywith the Titan,which theAir Force intended to use to launch itsMannedOrbitingLaboratory;theTitanwashalfasexpensivebuthadthesamepayloadcapacity.68

The PSAC report revived the issue of a permanent earth-orbiting spacestation,consideringitarequirementforqualifyingmanforlongstaysinspace.Besidesthat,astationwouldprovideaplacetostudythereactionofmanylifeformstozerogravityandtodoresearchinmanyscientificdisciplinesandspacetechnology.Thereportrecommendedsendingupthefirstmoduleofapermanentstationinthe1970s.Asasteptowardthefunctionsofaspacestation,theAAPorbitalworkshopwasacceptable,butwithreservations.Citingrecentexperiencewith extravehicular activity, the report was dubious regarding the “extensiveconstructionefforts”requiredbythewet-workshopschemeandarguedthatsuchactivitymightcompromisethemedicaldatathatshouldbegatheredearlyinthemission.Ratherthanriskthat,PSACsuggestedthatNASAshouldhelptofundMOLifthatwouldacceleratetheacquisitionofbiomedicalinformation.Italsourged theAirForce topaymore attention tobiomedical research in theMOLprogram.69

Astronomywastakentobethescientificfieldmostreadyforexploitationinthepost-Apolloperiod;hencePSAC’sastronomygroupreviewedtheATMplans—andfoundthemgravelyflawed:“Fromaconceptualpointofviewthisisthewrong way to carry out a man-supported astronomy project in earth orbit.”Man’s role in AAP was only to operate the instruments, and “it makes nointrinsic differencewhether he is 10 feet or 100 feet from the instruments…which he manipulates through electrical signals.” A microwave control linkbetween the Apollo spacecraft and a free-flying ATM would be better. Stillbetterwouldbeaworldwidecommunicationsnetwork,sothattheoperatorcouldbeontheground.“Theheaviestdemandsontheman[intheATMproject]aretodo things which ideally should be done on the ground … or byelectromechanical systems … which do not have to override the angular

momentum of theman’smovements.” The best jobs for a man in orbit wererepair,maintenance,andadjustmentoftheinstruments;butbecauseoftheshortdevelopmenttime,theATMinstrumentswerenotbeingdesignedtoallowrepairandadjustment.70

OMSFwas trying to please the science community by striving for a 1968launchof theATM,but this schedule and the resultingpressureon instrumentdevelopmentdrewseverecriticism.Theperiodofmaximumsolaractivitywasratherbroad;by1970thefrequencyofsolarflares—oneeverycoupleofdaysatthe maximum—would probably still be high enough to justify the mission.NASA’srushtomeeta1968launchdateputunwarrantedpressureontwooftheinstruments and might force compromises in the whole ATM design andoperationalprocedures.71

ThereportconcludedthattheATMwascertainlynotideal,butitscostwaswithin reason, and to astronomers anxious to fly somekindof high-resolutioninstruments ATM was a great deal better than nothing. PSAC recommendedpostponing the launch for a year, however, and using the time to redesign theATM,getridofitsbasicfaults,andrelievethehard-pressedinstrumentmakers.Theastronomersconcluded:

…theproposedmodedoesnot takeusdown thedevelopmentalpathwhichwe foresee forearthorbital astronomy. … It will very likely demonstrate dramatically the disadvantages ofoverconstraining themanphysicallywhile overburdeninghimmentally anddoingboth over a 1-monthperiodwithreliefonlyduringperiodsofsleep.Thus,weurgethatthemissionbeconductedprimarilyforthevalueofthescientificreturnandthatallmissionparametersbeoptimizedtothatobjective.

And,having talkedwithsomeexperiencedastronauts, thescientistswerewaryof the complexities ofmission operations. They urged that experimenters andmissionastronautsworkoutanacceptablemethodofmanagingtheexperimentsduringflight.72Evidently theyhadheard thatallcommunicationswithorbitingspacecraft had to go through the CapCom*—an arrangement which in theiropinioncouldnotpossiblyworkforanastronomymission.

The report seemed to have something for everyone, advocates and criticsalike.Itwaslukewarmtowardtheworkshopmissionandnegativeaboutdetailsof theATM,butrecommendedthatbothproceed.Thereportdrewlittlepublicnotice, but when Homer Newell went before the House Subcommittee onScience and Applications he found that Chairman Joseph Karth had read itcarefully,underlinedmanypassages,andcouldquoteextensivelyfromit.KarthandNewell engaged ina longcolloquyas towhetherPSACfavored the solarastronomymission;Kartharguedthenegative,butNewell,producingclarifyinglettersfrompanelmembers,readitasaqualifiedendorsement.GeorgeMueller,

perhaps feeling that thebestdefense isagoodoffense, took the report’sbroadrecommendationsand,withoutwaitingtobeasked,showedCongressthatAAPwasworkingtoachievethem.Inresponsetowrittenquestionssubmittedfortherecord,herefutedPSAC’scriticismsoftheATM.73

LessthanafortnightbeforethePSACreportwaspublished,NASAandthespaceprogramwereshakenbythefatalfireinanApollospacecraftatKennedySpaceCenter.74Amongotherconsequencesofthefire,theimpactofthereportwasmasked.Eventswouldoutstripboth the report andNASA’s reaction to it;andforthenext18months,AAPwouldbesubjectedtostressesfarmoretaxingthanadversescientificcriticism.

*Experiment, asNASAuses the term, refers toanyexercisewhosepurpose is togatherscientificorengineeringdata,andalsototheequipmentusedforthatpurpose.

* In Oct. 1967 Newell became associate administrator, NASA’s third-ranking official. He retired in1973.

*Abreadboardexperimentisaworkingmodelcontainingall thecomponentsoftheflightmodelbutnot permanently assembled. It is put together to prove that the experiment works and to allow easymodificationduringdesignstudies.

*Manyoftheexperimentswererepeatedonseveralflights.* Pre-and postflight medical measurements were not so troublesome, but inflight experiments were

something else.One experiment (M-5,Bioassay ofBodyFluids) required collecting and returning urinesamples;evenworsewasM-7,MineralBalance,whichrequiredstrictcontrolofdietandcollectionofallfecesandurinebefore,during, andafter flight. Itwasdoneonlyonce,onGemini7.Foroneastronaut’scomments on the Gemini medical experiments, seeMichael Collins,Carrying the Fire: An Astronaut’sJourneys(NewYork:Farrar,Strauss,andGiroux,1974),pp.145–48.

*TheAcademyisaprivate,unofficialbodycharteredbyCongressin1863;itspurposesaretoadvancethe cause of science generally and to advise the government on scientific matters when requested.Membershipisamarkofeminenceinresearchsecondonly(perhaps)totheNobelPrize,thoughmanyfirst-rankscientistsarenotmembers.DanielS.Greenberg,“TheNationalAcademyofSciences:ProfileofanInstitution,”Science156 (1957):222–29,360–64,and488–93; idem,ThePoliticsofPureScience (NewYork:TheNewAmericanLibrary,Inc.,1967),pp.12–15.

* According to one knowledgeable science journalist, the SSB could do little else. Concerning theboard’sroleinadvisingNASA,DanielGreenbergwrote,“EarlyintherelationshipNASAmadeitclear…that it was not the least bit interested in the Board’s view onwhether there should be amanned spaceprogram….Foravarietyofreasons…therewastobealarge-scalespaceprogram,andiftheBoardwishedtoprovideadviceonitsscientificcomponents,NASAwouldbepleasedtoconsiderit.”Science156(1957):492.

† The first scientist-astronauts were recruited in 1965, the second group in 1967. Of 17 scientistsrecruited,plusonewhoqualifiedasapilot,onlyone(ageologist)wenttothemoon,onthelastmission.Three others flew in Skylab. Astronauts and Cosmonauts, Biographical and Statistical Data, reportpreparedfortheHouseCommitteeonScienceandTechnology,June1975.

*This, of course,wasdone.Surveyor,Ranger, andLunarOrbitermissions assured the feasibilityoflanding,providedusefuldataforthedesignofthelunarlandingmodule,andcertifiedthesiteschosenforApollolandings.

†LeeDuBridge,anexperiencedscientificadviser togovernment,bluntlymadeonepoint thatothersusuallymentionedmoredelicately.IfNASA’sbudgetwerecut,hesaid,theagencymightshiftfundsfromitsSustainingUniversityProgramtoApollo—somethingthatDuBridge,presidentofCaltech,feltwouldbeagreatmistake.

* The sun’s overall activity,measured in terms of radiation andmagnetic effects, varies in a periodaveraging11yearsfromonemaximumtothenext.

* Filmwas not normally used in unmanned satellites because of the difficulty of recovering it fromorbit.Forsomepurposes,however,astronomerspreferredfilmtoelectronicdetectorsbecauseofitssuperiorresolvingpower.Onamannedmissionfilmcouldbebroughtbackbythecrew.

*Onlyonewasthenintheastronautcorps,Lt.Comdr.JosephP.Kerwin,USN,laterscientist-pilotonthefirstSkylabmission.

* The “capsule communicator”—the only person who talked directly to crews in orbit. Everythingpassed up by radio had to be cleared through flight operations officers and then communicated by theCapCom.

5

YearsofUncertainty,1967–1969

Adversity marked the last two years of Lyndon Johnson’s presidency.America’scommitment inVietnamgrewmoreexpensive, tyingdown535000troops,taking24000lives,andcosting$2billionamonth.Civildisordersandassassinationscontributedtothepublicmalaise.Theoptimismoftheearly1960sfaded,takingwithitmuchofthespiritofadventurebehindthespaceprogram.Facinga1968deficitof$25billion,thepresidentacceptedsubstantialreductionsin nondefense spending. Though Apollo enjoyed continued support as acommitment made but not yet achieved, post-Apollo programs took sharpcutbacksinfunding.1

ApolloApplications shared the hard times in fullmeasure. The spacecraftfire at the Cape tarnished NASA’s image, raising basic questions about theagency’scompetence.ForsomemonthsNASAofficials focused theirattentionon the lunar landing, leaving AAP planners to proceed in an uncertainenvironment, unsure of funds and largely dependent onApollo’s performance.SuccessivecutsinAAPbudgetsforcedaretreatfromtheambitiousprogramlaidout in 1966. Step by step, projected flights shrank and launch dates werepostponed. The clustermissions remained two years from launch—a standingjokewithinNASA.2

Inlatesummer1968,AAPreacheditsnadir:itsmostambitiousproject,theApollo telescope mount, was threatened with cancellation. Costs were risingalarmingly,technicalproblemspersisted.Thegeneralelectionbroughttopoweran administration that had yet to formulate a space policy. Then successes inApollo,particularlyApollo8’s flightaround themoonatChristmas,actedasabadlyneededtonic.AchangeofcommandatNASAhelpedaswell.JamesWebbhadtakencarethatnothingwouldinterfere—orevenseemtointerfere—withthelunar landing.His successor,ThomasO.Paine,would have tomakehismarkwith the next program. Paine tried hard to sell ambitious plans for NASA’s

future.Althoughhisproposalswerenotadopted,theirformulationgaveAAPaboost.

In the spring of 1969, the use of a SaturnV to launch a ground-equipped(“dry”)S-IVBworkshopbecameirresistibleasasolutiontothemanytechnicalproblemsof theclustermissions.AndwheninJune theAirForcecanceled itsManned Orbiting Laboratory, AAP could be regarded in a new light. Thefollowing month, in the afterglow of Apollo 11’s lunar landing, NASAannouncedthatAAPwouldbeflownwithadryworkshoplaunchedbyaSaturnV.Removalof the severe limitations imposedby theSaturn IB,aswell as thedifficultiesofconvertinga fuel tank into livingandworkingquarters inspace,wouldallowtheprogramtomakerealprogressforthefirsttime.

IMPACTOFTHEFIRE

ThedaybeforethefatalfireatKennedySpaceCenter,GeorgeMuellerhadreferred toAAPflights1 through4asa firmprogram.But forallhispositivetone,someimportantmatterswerenotsettled.Houstonstillopposedtheplantocarrythesolar telescopesonamodifiedlunarmodule,buthadaccededfor thetimebeingwiththeunderstandingthattheconceptwouldbestudiedfurther.Thecenter program offices considered a mid-1968 launch for the first missionunrealistic;thenewdirectorofAAP,CharlesW.Mathews,hadalreadynamedacommitteetodefinetasksmoreclearlysothatareasonablelaunchdatecouldbeset.3

The committee—Mathews and the three center program managers—baselined* the first four flights in February 1967. Besides agreeing on theessential features of each mission (allowable payload, orbit, and operationalmodes), the group added a solar-cell array to theApollo telescopemount andidentifiednumeroustasksrequiredofthecenters.4

The center program offices spent themonth ofMarch assessing schedulesand testprograms, andon the30th thecommitteeaffirmed that the June1968launchdatecouldnotbemet.Anewschedulewaslaidout,postponingthefirstlaunch to December 1968, with the solar astronomy mission following sixmonths later. Even with the time thus gained, two problems remained.Developmentofthesolartelescopeswaslagging.Twoofthefiveexperimentersbelieved they could make a mid-1969 launch date, but the other three (HighAltitude Observatory, the Naval Research Laboratory, and Harvard CollegeObservatory) needed more time. Second, in the aftermath of the fire the

assumption that command and service modules would be available for AAPmissionsbecamequestionable.NorthAmericanAviationwas still defining thebasic tasks of modifying the spacecraft for the applications missions. Webb,determined that nothingwould impedeApollo’s recovery, proposed to have adifferent contractormodify spacecraft for AAP so that NorthAmerican couldconcentrate onApollo deficiencies.He also gave theApollo program directorsoleauthoritytodivertacommandandservicemoduleforAAP.Thepossibilitythatanewcontractormightcomeintotheprogrammademodificationuncertain,andlittleprogressresulted.5

AnearlyversionoftheApollotelescopemount.Thesolararrayontherightispartiallydeployed.

The accident touched off a period of hectic planning at the HeadquartersAAPoffice.Although the full impact of the firewas not readily apparent, thecertaintyof lengtheningdelayforcedaseriesof revisions inApolloschedules,leadingtoevenmorechangesinAAPschedules.OnemajorpurposeofAAPhadalwaysbeentogiveNASAflexibility,andAAPofficialsstilltriedtoprovideforevery Apollo contingency; in the event of an early lunar landing or anunforeseen delay,ApolloApplicationsmissionswere to fill the gap.Mathewsremembered the six months following the fire as a “trying time [when] wedeveloped something like 57 separate program plans for AAP.” His programcontrolofficerlaterassertedthattheofficeprepared55differentplansinasinglemonth. Whatever the number, program documents substantiate an enormousworkload.6

At Houston the accident pushed AAP into the background. According toMaxFaget,“forayearthere…westoppedarguingaboutanythingexceptthat

damned fire.” Shortly after the accident, Webb gave George Low the job ofmanagingthespacecraftrecovery,andhisdeputy,RobertThompson,waslefttorun theAAPoffice under adverse conditions. Formonths on end, paperworkwastieddownbyindecisionoverreliabilityandqualitystandards.7

OnceMathews felt settled in his new position, he set out to reviewAAPplansinpersonwiththecenters.AtHuntsville,hefoundvonBraunandhisAAPmanager,LelandF.Belew,mainly concerned about the short deadlines for thesolar instruments. At Houston, Gilruth and Thompson questioned NorthAmerican’s ability to provide spacecraft on schedule and doubted that a newcontractor could accomplish theAAPmodifications on time. Theywere evenmore concerned about the number of flights proposed for 1969: a total of 10manned launches, 6 Apollo missions and 4 AAP flights. MSC’s FlightOperations Directorate, however, was preparing to handle no more than 6manned missions a year. Mathews said that some of the scheduled missionsprobablywouldnotbelaunched,butwereincludedtogiveOMSFflexibilityinreacting to program contingencies.MSC officials were not impressed by thatreasoning, preferring a realistic schedule thatwould allow them tomake firmplans—apositionwithwhichtheAAPmanageratKennedySpaceCenterfullyagreed.8

Debateover the1969schedulebecameacademic that summerasCongresspruned the AAP budget. The fire had diminished confidence in NASA. DonFuqua(Dem.,Fla.),who laterservedaschairmanof theHousespacesciencessubcommittee, thought that its impact was particularly great on congressmenwhohadbeenneitherstrongsupportersnorcriticsofNASA.Inmoreprosperoustimes the agency might have emerged from the accident without seriousconsequences; bymid-1967, however, the administration’sgrowingdeficit—towhichNASAwasonecontributor—was thebiggest issueonCapitolHill. Inaconference committee, Senate and House members concurred in paring $107million from AAP’s $454 million request. The AAP office prepared a newschedule,postponingthefirstmissionsbyfivemonthsandeliminatingtheuseofrefurbishedspacecraft.InAugusttheappropriationbillsetAAPfundingat$300million,nearly$50millionbelowtheauthorizationlevel.PresidentJohnsondidnotopposethereduction.9

Each congressional cut prompted a flurry of planning as the AAP teamadjusted the program. One plan avoided further postponement of flights bycutting deeply into funds for experiment definition and payload integration.Anotherprovidedmoremoneyforexperimentsandintegrationbydelayingthelaunchesthreemoremonths,flyingthewetworkshopinOctober1969.Inview

ofthedistinctpossibilitythatmorereductionsweretocome,theAAPofficesetoutathirdprogrambasedon$250million.Thisplandictatedanadditionalthreemonths’ delay, permitting postponement of launch vehicle deliveries andsubstantiallyreducinghardwarepurchases.Muellerconsidered$250millionthelowestacceptableleveloffunding.Anythingless,hetoldSeamans,woulddelaytheprogram’s“realstart”foranotheryearandwouldprovewastefulinthelongrun.Earlierprograms,suchas theAirForce’s ill-fatedSkyboltandDyna-Soar,illustrated the futility of maintaining a high level of design activity withoutbeginningactualhardwaredevelopment.Muellerconcluded,“Thenormalresultis increased cost in subsequent years and often even an inability to bring theprogramelementstoalogicalconclusion.”10

InSeptemberWebborderedsomeAAPfundstransferredtoNASA’sOfficeofTrackingandDataAcquisition,leaving$253millionforApolloApplicationsinNASA’sFY1968operatingplan.ThereductionruledoutconcurrentApolloandAAP flights, for even if launch vehicles and spacecraft became available,NASAcould not afford to launch and track them.The firstAAPmissionwasnowplannedforJanuary1970,withwetworkshopandsolarastronomymissionsfollowing later that year.TheOctober 1967 schedule called for 17Saturn IBsand7SaturnVs,asharpcutbackfromthe40launcheslistedthepreviousMay.Eventhesefiguresseemedoptimistic,asSaturnIBproductionwasexpectedtoendat16vehicles.11

ThesadfateofmissionAAP1Aepitomizestheprogram’sproblemsin1967.Becauseofthespacecraftfire,NASAdecidedthatApollomissionswouldcarryonlythoseexperimentsthatcontributeddirectlytothelunarlanding—adecisionthatlefthalfadozenscientistswithoutflightsfortheirexperiments.Atthesametime,AAPplannerswerestrugglingwithpayloadweightsandcrewworkloadsontheworkshopmission.Facedwiththeseproblems,OMSFstartedplanninganewmissiontoinaugurateAAP:atwo-weekCSMflightinlate1968totestthelunar mapping and survey system in earth orbit and conduct other earth andspacescienceexperiments.ThemappingandsurveysystemhadbeenintendedtosupplementLunarOrbiterandSurveyorinselectingApollolandingsites.Bythemiddle of 1967, however, information returned by those two projectswasjudgedadequate.The lunarmappingandsurveysystemseemedredundantandSeamanscanceleditinAugust.12

Despite the lossof itsprincipalexperiment,AAP1Amovedaheadrapidly,drawingmuchofitssupportfromthesciencesideofNASA.FortheOfficeofSpaceScienceandApplications,1Arepresentedthefirstmajoreffortatmannedspace science. One OSSA project manager noted after an August briefing

(perhapswithsomeskepticism)that“thejustificationforthemissionappearstobetheexperimentsandnotmannedspaceflight.”Headdedthat“a14-dayflightdoes not seem to be a cost effective way of obtaining space data for theexperimentsselected.”NonethelessAAP1AgeneratedmuchenthusiasmwithinOSSA, where considerable effort was spent to accelerate development of theexperimenthardware.13

By this pointAAP 1Awas becoming an earth-resourcesmission, carryinghalf-a-dozen specialized cameras and four infrared sensors. Mission planningwas under way in Houston and at the Denver plant of Martin Marietta, thepayload integration contractor. On 25 August MSC published preliminarydesignsofanexperimentcarrierthatwouldfitintothespacecraft-lunarmoduleadapter,betweentheservicemoduleandtheS-IVB.Thismodulewouldprovidea shirtsleeve atmosphere and enough room for one man to operate theinstruments.MartinengineersworkedoutaflightplanprovidingsixpassesovertheU.S.eachdayatanaltitudeof260kilometersinanorbitinclined50°totheequator.14

Apartfromitsscientificcontent,theAAPofficealsovaluedmission1Aforits training potential. NASA had a tradition of progressively increasing thecomplexityofmissions.StartingAAPwitharelativelysimpleflightwouldallowattentiontobefocusedfirstonmanagementandoperatingrelationships.AAP1AwouldgiveMartinMariettathechancetoworkwithprincipalinvestigatorsandApollocontractorsaswell asNASAcenters.And ifNASAswitched toanewcontractorformodifyingandrefurbishingthespacecraft,thatfirmwouldfind1Aagoodtrainingground.15

BylateOctober1967,AAP1Aplanningwasinfullswing.Onthe27ththeFlightOperationsPlanningGrouphelditsfirstmeeting;on10NovemberMSCpublished a project plan; 10 days later theManned Space Flight ExperimentsBoard approved 10 earth-resource and meteorological experiments. In mid-DecemberengineersmetinDenverforapresentationbyMartinMariettaontheexperiments carrier. Then, suddenly, themissionwas gone. At the end of theyear,Mathewsnotified thecenters thatAAP1Ahadbeen terminated;NASA’sfinancialsqueezewasblamed.ThedecisioncausedconsiderableunhappinessinOSSA,whereitwastakenasmoreevidencethatMuellerwasnotinterestedinscience.AttheAAPoffice,itseemedtobemoreworkfornaught.Alltheworkwas not in vain, however; when NASA officials resurrected earth-resourceexperimentsthreeyearslater,several1AsensorsfoundtheirwayintoSkylab.16

PROBLEMSWITHTHECLUSTERMISSIONS

Technical as well as financial problems intensified as 1967 wore on. TheApollo fire had brought the micrometeoroid hazard (p. 35) into renewedprominence.EarlyinthenewyearengineersatDouglasAircraftCompany,theS-IVBcontractor,opted for“beltand suspenders”when theydecided tocovertheinsulationinsidethetankwithaluminumfoilandtoaddanexternalshieldtothestage.Theirshielddesignusedathinaluminumsheet,heldflushwiththeS-IVB skin at launch and raised inorbit to stand13 centimeters off the tank allaround. Small particles striking this shield would lose most of their energybeforereachingthetankitself.17

On 27 February von Braun presided over a wide-ranging meeting atHuntsville to review the meteoroid problem. Engineers from four contractorsandtwoMSFcentersexaminedthedata,lookedatfilmsoftests,anddiscussedDouglas’s shield design. Clearly aluminum foil suppressed flame propagationandtheshieldreducedthechanceofaseriouspenetration;asadividend,MartinMariettaengineersshowedthattheshieldwouldsimplifycontroloftemperatureinside the workshop. Neither the weight of the shield (estimated at 320kilograms)noritscost(about$250000)wasaseriousdrawback,andthegroupconcludedthat itshouldbeadopted.Studieswouldcontinue,however—testingthe effect of liquid hydrogen on the foil lining, looking for new andnonflammable insulating materials, even making contingency plans to applyinsulationtotheoutsideoftheS-IVBifallelsefailed.18

Payload weights were a continuing headache during the year. Early inJanuary the weight of the AAP 4 payload (the lunar module with its solartelescopes)was approaching the Saturn IB’s lifting capacity. Twoweeks laterplanners increased the orbital altitude for that mission, reducing allowablepayload still more, and MSC imposed larger power requirements, making abiggersolararraynecessary.BymidyeartheATMexperimentscanisterrequiredanactivecoolingsystem;twooftheinstrumentsgeneratedenoughheattodistorttheir optical axesbeyondpermissible limits.At the same time it becameclearthat heavy shieldingwould have to be added to film storage vaults to preventfogging of filmby radiation in orbit.Toward the end ofApril 1967 all of thepayloadsexceptAAP1wereoverweight,anddesignchanges in theworkshopwerecreatingaweightproblemforthatmissionaswell.Rigidmetalfloorsandwalls had been added to the wet workshop, and the growing roster ofexperimentscalled formorepower, tobesuppliedbyadding twosetsof solarpanels to the workshop. The Apollo command module, undergoing extensive

redesign after the fire, was also gaining weight; by midyear it would be 900kilogramsoveritsdesignlimit.19

Mission planning had to deal with another problem; the growing list ofexperimentsrequiredtoomuchcrewtime.Acompatibilityanalysisinlate1966showedthatassignedexperimentsneeded313man-hours,whileonly288wereavailable.ThedirectorofflightcrewoperationsatHoustoncomplainedthattheexperimentscalledformore training timethancouldbeprovided.InFebruary,the experiments board found that weight, power, and crew-time requirementsdemandedaredistributionofexperimentsamongthefourAAPmissions,ataskwhichnecessitatedasystemofexperimentpriorities.GeorgeMuellerpassedthisjobtoDouglasLord,whoreportedinJulywithaschemethattheboardacceptedwithout substantial change. Besides the obvious factors (weight, space, crewtime,powerconsumption,andavailabilityofhardware)Lord’scriteriaincludedsuch intangibles as “the value of the experiment to the overall national spaceeffort,”whichgavetheprioritiesacertainnegotiability.Bytheendof1967LordandBellcomm,OMSF’sconsultingsystemsengineeringfirm,*haddeterminedtherelativepriorityofallapprovedAAPexperiments;thereaftertheassignmentofexperimentstomissionswassomewhateasier.20

While the experiments boardworried about priorities, program officials atthecenterswrestledwithmoreconcreteproblems.Forthefirsthalfoftheyearthe Apollo telescope mount provided more than its share: three of the fiveexperimentswerebehindschedule.DuringMay,schedulechangespostponedtheATMmissiontomid-1969,easingthedevelopmentproblemforoneexperimentbut giving the other two no relief. At ameeting on 13 July,HarvardCollegeObservatoryandtheNavalResearchLaboratoryestimatedthattheirinstrumentswouldbedeliveredmuchtoolateforthescheduledlaunch.Thethermalcontrolproblemspromisedtodelaydeliverystillmore.21

WhentheproblemswerediscussedatanAAPreviewon18July,anumberof solutions were suggested; but postponing the launch to accommodate theexperiments was not among them. Upset, the scientists complained to highermanagement.At theJulyManagementCouncilmeeting,JamesWebbspokeofthescientists’concern.InAAP’scircumstances,hesaid,itwasimportanttokeepthe scientific community happy. Nevertheless, only two alternatives weredebated: flywhatcouldbedeliveredonscheduleor relaxcertain requirementsonthelaggingexperimentsinthehopeofspeedingtheirdevelopment.Muellermetwiththeprincipalinvestigators,theOSSAprogrammanagers,andMarshallrepresentatives inWashingtonon27July todiscusspossiblecoursesofaction.Harvard proposed to reduce the complexity of its instrument to alleviate

production problems; a simpler instrument could gather the desired data,provided the launch went off on time. The Naval Research Laboratory’sprincipal investigator, Richard Tousey, was out of town, and NRL’srepresentativewasreluctanttochange;butwhenMuellerdeclaredthatasecondATM would be flown about a year after the first and that NRL’s originalinstrumentscouldgoonit,thelaboratory’sspokesmanagreedtoconsiderit.22

When Tousey returned toWashington, anothermeetingwas called. OSSAexpressed concern that schedule pressures were forcing scientists to settle forless than first-quality data—a concern shared byTousey,who did notwant tosimplifytheNRLexperiments.Hewantedtoholdtotheoriginalspecificationsandconcentrateonfinishingoneinstrument;hewaswillingto takethechancethattheotherwouldbeleftoffifitcouldnotbemadereadyintime.Aftermuchdiscussion, during which OMSF renewed its assurance of a second solarastronomymission,NRLagreedtoacceptsomereductionintheperformanceofitsinstrumentsandgoaheadwithboth.OSSA’sSpaceScienceandApplicationsSteeringCommitteeendorsedthenewarrangementon14August.Thescientistsaccepted the change, but the meetings apparently reinforced their belief thatOMSFwasmoreinterestedinflyingmissionsthanindoinggoodscience.23

Medical experiments also laggedbadly throughout1967. InApril,MuellerproddedMSC to get on with building the experiment hardware, citing $1.46million authorized for that purpose in the preceding sixmonths; of that sum,MSC had committed $876 000 but had obligated only $8000.* Gilruth’sresponseisnotonrecord,butaninternalMSCsummaryassertedthatfourmajormedicalexperimentswereinvariousstagesofpreliminarywork;somewereinthefinalstagesofcontractnegotiation.Inanycase“Headquarters’concernaboutallegedscheduleslippageseemssomewhat inappropriate,”because itwasself-evidentthatAAPscheduleswouldhavetobeadjusted.Asthoseschedulesthenstood,prototypehardwareforuseintrainingwastobedeliveredbymid-Juneof1967—anobviousimpossibility.24

AAPUNDERINTERNALATTACK

In spite of all the problems,Mueller stuckwith his plans to fly the basicworkshopandATMmissionsasscheduled.Somepeoplewonderedwhetherheseriously intended to launch the wet workshop. If he did not, he kept thatintention to himself. Difficulties were to be expected, but they had not yetprovedinsurmountable.Mueller’sattitudewassharedbyHuntsville’smanagers

and working-level engineers. Marshall was fully committed to the wetworkshop; von Braun, proud of the center’s “can-do” reputation, wanted topreservethatimage.IfhismanagershadreservationsaboutthefeasibilityoftheAAPmissions, they kept them quiet and bent all their efforts to working theproblems.25

OfficialsatHoustonhadplentyofreservationsanddidnotbothertoconcealthem from anyone. SinceMarch 1966,whenGilruth had detailed the center’scriticismsofAAP toMueller (pp.45–46), theHoustoncenterhadparticipatedreluctantly in planning the workshop. Perhaps encouraged by AdministratorWebb’s unwillingness to pushAAP strongly, center officials pointed outwhatseemedtothemfaultsofbothconceptionandexecution.FromtheestablishmentoftheAAPofficeatMSC,theHouston-Huntsvillealliancewasanuneasyone.Onecentersawitselfmakinglevel-headed,practicalcriticismsofapoorconceptandunsoundengineeringandmanagementdecisions; theother sawa seriesofroadblocks thrown up to thwart plans rather than cooperation to solveproblems.26

Houstonhadnofundamentaldisagreementwith thebroadobjectivesof themissions;thefaultlayinthemeanschosentocarrythemout.AsBobThompsonandhisstaffsawit inmid-1967, theevolutionfromagroupof loosely relatedearthorbitalflightstotheworkshopcluster—the“Kluge,”*theydubbedit—hadcommittedAAP to a bad configuration. Thompson said later of theworkshopmission,“Hadwestartedwithacleansheetofpaper,wewouldneverhavedone[it] that way.”With Gilruth’s consent Thompson began assembling a detailedcritique of the AAP missions. In MSC’s Engineering and DevelopmentDirectorate,designersbeganworkonasubstituteforthewetworkshop.27

TheManned Spacecraft Center was not the only source of criticism. Theassociate administrator for advanced research and technology told Webb inAugust1967thathehadnoconfidenceinAAP.Scientificadvisorygroups,too,foundmuchtocriticize.AtHuntsvilleon11ApriltheScienceandTechnologyPanelof thePresident’sScienceAdvisoryCommittee toured themockups andreviewed experiment plans. Some members took exception to the proposedallotmentofexperimenttime,feelingthatunlessthemedicalexperimentsweregiven priority on the firstmission the question ofman’s adaptability to spacemightbeleftindoubt.Indeed,otherexperimentsshouldnotbeincludediftheyjeopardizedthemedicalobjectives.MembersoftheSpaceScienceBoard’sLifeSciencesCommittee,afterabriefinginlateJune,faultedthetightschedulingofcrew time. They felt that planning activities down to the minute negated theprime advantages of manned experiments: reflection, judgment, and creative

responsetotheunexpected.28

LateinJuneRobertSeamanstouredtheMSFcenterstoseehowwellApollowas recovering from the fire.While inHoustonheevidentlybecameawareofMSC’sdoubtsaboutApolloApplications,foron26JulyheaskedMuelleraboutthevalidityoftheprogramplanspresentedtoCongressinMay,andhowmuchthecentershadbeen involved in thepreparationof thoseplans.SinceMuellerhadheardother reportsof“NASAofficials”complaining thatAAPplanswereirresponsible,hetookthetimetocomposeaseven-pagedefenseoftheprogram.Mueller insisted that every OMSF program had been thoroughly coordinatedwithallelementsofhisorganization—includingcenterpersonnel.Thisdidnot“alwaysmeanthattherehasbeenacompletemeetingofminds,”buttherewasnofoundationtochargesthatanyonewasnotconsulted.HewentontoexplaintheplanningandreviewthathadgoneintoeachmajorAAPdecision,concludingthat theprogramhadachieved reasonable stabilityandwas realistic in lightofcurrentfundinglevels.29

On 29 August 1967 Bob Thompson sent Charles Mathews somerecommendationsforconsiderationinthenextroundofAAPplanning—whichMSCmanagementwas surewould be necessary after congressional action onthebudget.Thompsonagreedwiththebroadprimaryobjectivesoftheprogram,but felt that the sequence of missions should be determined by missioncomplexity, rather than by preselected priorities which were, to say the least,debatable.He then outlinedMSC’s suggestions forAAP flights during 1969–1972.30

TheHoustonplandelayedtheworkshopmissionsforoneyear,separatedthetelescopemountfromtheworkshopmissionsanddelayeditforsomethingmorethan a year, and ended with a ground-outfitted “dry” S-IVB workshop to belaunched on a Saturn V. As a start, MSC proposed to develop a smallexperiments carrier to fit in the spacecraft-lunar module adapter, capable ofcarrying a variety of payloads.* One of these would be launched in 1969,carrying the leftoverApollo experiments plus some earth-sensing instruments;several more such missions could be planned as options for the 1969–1971period. For 1970, Houston’s plan called for one 28-day and one 56-dayworkshop mission, devoted to biomedical and engineering experiments andoperations.The telescopemountwould be flown in 1971 in amission of 2–4weeks durationwith the lunarmodule and telescopes docked to the commandmodulefor thewholetime.After that,newoptionsmightbeopenedupbytheaccumulatedexperienceandbychangingfiscalresources.MSCsawanumberofadvantages to this plan. It would begin with comparatively simple missions,

progressing to longer andmore complex ones. Earth-resource experiments onthe first flight could provide an early payoff.Removal of the solar telescopesfrom the workshop (effectively discarding the cluster concept) resolved thecritical problems of payload weight, crewworkloads, and the combination ofscientificskillsrequiredofthecrew,besidessimplifyingoperations.Finally,theplanneatlymatchedtheexpectedavailabilityofSaturnIBs.31

Reaction to this proposal at Headquarters was—from Houston’s point ofview—disappointing.Mueller, unconvinced, directedMathews to answer eachofHouston’sobjectionsandproceedasplanned.Houstoncontinuedthealternatedesign studies, reviewing them informallywithMathews.Ageneral reviewofOMSF’s future earthorbiting missions, from AAP to space stations, wasscheduledfor18November; theMSCcontingentcamepreparedtopresent thecaseagainstthewetworkshop.32

Mathews,Mueller, andDisher opened the reviewwith assessments of thestateofAAP.Allacknowledgedproblems,butreflectedabasicconfidenceintheprogramandthemissionplans.Next,RobertGilruthbriefly introducedMSC’spresentation,referringtoAAP’smanyquestionableaspectsandstatingconcernoverthecomplexityoftheclustermissions.Headmittedthatnosingleproblemseemed insoluble; itwas the sum total of technical andmanagerial difficultiesthatgavepause.33

BobThompsonthentookthefloortopresentMSC’sproposedsubstituteforthewetworkshopandorbitalcluster.Thiswasasmallerworkshopmodule,builtinsidethespacecraft-lunarmoduleadapterandfittedoutaslivingquarters.Atitslower end this module could carry any of several specialized experimentmodules, such as the solar telescopes or earth-sensing instruments. Less thanhalf as roomy as the S-IVB workshop, the laboratory was nevertheless bigenough tohouseexperimentsandcontrolpanels formajorexternalexperimentpackages.Itcouldbeequippedwithsolarcellstoprovideupto3.7kilowattsofelectricalpower.Intheirmissionplans,MSC’smainconcernsbecameevident.Theirproposed flight schedulecalled for10Saturn IB launchesbetween1969and 1972—the same as current AAP schedules. Since the solar instrumentswould be fitted to the workshop and launched with it, however, the doublerendezvous for the ATMmission (p. 38) was avoided and the lunar module-Apollo telescopemountwasunnecessary.The firstmissionwouldperform theessentialmedicalexperimentsandcollectearth-resourcesdata.Asecondvisittothesmallerworkshopwouldgiveupto112daysofmannedoperationbytheendof 1970 andwould establishman’s ability to work in zero g fully as well ascould be done in the S-IVB workshop. In 1971 the solar astronomy mission

wouldbelaunchedwithoutthemedicalexperiments,eliminatingthecompetitionforcrewtimecreatedbythatparticularpairing.Witharevisit,another112daysoforbitalexperienceand84daysofsolarobservationswouldaccrue.For1972Houston projected two more missions, but had established no specificexperimentplans.34

Turningtospecificcriticismsofthecurrentprogram—Thompsonreferredtoareas of concern as “warning flags”—he cited the crucial faults of the S-IVBworkshopandthelunarmodulesolarobservatory.Theplantostowexperimentsin themultipledockingadapterat launchandmovethemintotheworkshopinorbit created unnecessary complexity. Equipment had to be designed both forstorage in theadapterand foroperation in theworkshop.Someof themedicalexperimentshadtobeoperatedinbothplaces.Muchofthefirstfourdaysofthemissionwas given over to outfitting theworkshop, a considerable taskwhichraised MSC’s skepticism. Worse, it interfered with crucial medicalmeasurements at the start of the mission—the period of adjustment toweightlessness for which no data were available. The problems of using thelunar module as the carrier for the solar experiments were well known andThompsonmerelyalludedtothemoncemore.35

Thompsonnextquestionedplansforpreflighttestingofclustercomponentsand contingencyplans in caseof failure.Howcould the cluster be adequatelytested before launch?Whatwould themission beworth if the crew could notopentheworkshopormoveintoit?Thealternateworkshopwassmallenoughtobefully tested in its flightconfiguration,and itdidnothave tobeequipped inorbit.36

TouchingonAAP’smanagementstructure,Thompsonsaidthatitcreatedtoomany interfaces between centers and contractors. MSC’s plan would greatlysimplifyprogrammanagement, since each center couldbe responsible for onemissionandsuperviseoneprimecontractor.Hethensummedup: themodifiedlab provided full preflight assembly, checkout, and testing; improved theprogram’s flexibility; gave a better-balanced approach to program objectives;and created better center-contractor relationships. Houston recommended anearlystudytoreevaluatethewholeclusterconcept.37

The next day, Sunday, the group flew to Huntsville to examine hardwaremockups and to let Marshall respond to the objections. Point by point the“warningflags”werediscussed,andonly theMSCrepresentativesfoundthemdisturbing.Huntsvilleofficials argued thatmostof theproblems requiredonlydiligentapplicationofresourcestosolvethem.Gilruthassertedoncemorethathis center’s proposal greatly simplified the programwithout compromising its

objectivesandmade iteasier toachievewithavailable resources.Nooneelse,however, saw any advantage to switching to new hardware.VonBraun statedthat the wet workshop and cluster missions were feasible and desirable. Thealternativerepresentedanewprogram,whichwouldentailatleastayear’sdelayandwastemuchof the timeandmoneyalreadyspent.KurtDebus,directorofKennedySpaceCenter,agreed; itwasmuch thesame tohiscentereitherway,butachangewouldonlywastetimeandmoneywithoutofferingcompensatingadvantages.MuellernotedthatthesmallerworkshopmightbebetterthantheS-IVB, or it might not; but it could be expected to have its own developmentproblems, perhaps as serious as those of the wet workshop. Further, theprospectsforgettingapprovalforanewstartwereextremelypoor.38

Mueller summed up by asking three questions. Were there compellingtechnical factors that made the present approach infeasible? Were therecompellingreasonswhyOMSFwouldnotbeproudoftheresultsofthecurrentapproach?Were there compelling reasonswhy the present approach could notsatisfyprogramobjectives?Heaskedeachpersontorespondtothesequestions;everyone present answered no.Mueller then said that the dominant problemsweretosupporttheprogramwithadequatemanpoweratallthreecentersandtocoordinate the totalefforteffectively.HedirectedCharlesMathews to see thattheworkloadwasequitablydistributedsoas toassure that theclusterprogramcould be carried out.39 Houston’s challenge had apparently been thoroughlydebatedandrebuffed.

After returning to Washington, Mueller briefed Robert Seamans on theweekend’s discussions. Sporadic consultations among NASA’s top managersduring the nextweek convincedWebb to call for a full review. Itwas held 6December, beginning with a review of the launch schedule, orbitalconfigurations, and expected contribution of eachmission to the objectives ofmannedspaceflight.AftersketchingoutMSC’sproposal, the reviewexaminedthetechnicalproblemsoftheworkshopandsolarastronomymissions.Twenty-oneofHouston’sconcernswereclassifiedaseither“problemswhichhavebeenresolvedorarenowconsideredtoberesolvableinastraightforwardmanner”or“major open problems which are common to present or alternate approach.”Onlyfourwerelistedas“majoropenproblemswhicharepeculiartothepresentclusterconfiguration.”AfterreviewingthestatusofAAPexperiments,missionplans,andhardwarecomponents, thereviewendedwithOMSF’sevaluationofHouston’s proposal—essentially the same as Mueller had expressed atHuntsville—and concluded, as had the weekend’s review, that the “presentapproachisfeasibleandshouldproceedasplanned.”40

MuellerhadmadehisowndecisionevenbeforeWebbcalledforthebriefing.On1Decemberhe sent the center directors JohnDisher’s noteson the18–19Novemberdiscussionsandadraftofaletterstatingthattherewasnocompellingreason to back away from thewetworkshop.Muellermade his position quiteplain:“Ihavedecidedthatweshouldcontinuewith thepresentAAPapproachand request that you proceed accordingly in your implementation of AAPrequirements.”41

VonBraun’sinitialresponsereflectedintenseannoyanceatHouston’ssuddenintransigence. He concurred with Mueller’s decision, reproached MSC forwaiting so long to raise objections, brought up some “warning flags” aboutmissionAAP1AandtheApollospacecraftthatHoustonhadsomehowneglectedtomention,andcommentedunfavorablyonMSC’salternateproposal.Theletterwas on itsway—Belewwas carrying it toWashington—when itwas recalledandamuchmilderversionsubstituted.InitvonBraunnotedthatwhatMSCsawas danger areas were really “a logical progression of techniques evolved inGemini and themanned lunar landing.”He offered the opinion that judicioustrimmingof long-termAAPplanscouldmakethefirstclustermissioncheaperthan the FY 1967 estimates had indicated. Finally, he urged Mueller to startstudies for follow-on activities. “Our in-house and contractor studies to date,”von Braun said, “show a dry Saturn V launched Workshop to be a highlyimpressive candidate for this next step.” He enclosed summaries of severalMarshallstudiesthatrebuttedMSC’swarningflags,pointbypoint.42

WhenGilruth responded toMueller’s letter he tried oncemore to conveyMSC’s basic points. He did not agree that current plans should be followedunless they could be proved totally unsatisfactory. Instead, Gilruth said, “weshouldhave thebestprogramwhich ispracticalwith thefundsmadeavailablebyCongress.”Congresshadnotspecificallyapprovedeithertheclusterconceptorthefourprojectedmissions;andsinceAAPfundsforFY1968werebeingcut,a thorough review was desirable even though it might lead to changes inprogram content as well as schedule. MSC was recommending a completeprogramreview,notpushingaspecificalternateconfiguration.43

InaseparateletterGilruthsentalongeightpagesofcommentsonDisher’snotesspellingoutthebasicquestioninthebaldestterms:Whyborrowtrouble?CertainlytheS-IVBinsulationcouldbefireproofed,but“noneofthiswouldbenecessary … in a ground fitted vehicle.” Even Marshall admitted seriousproblems in making the S-IVB habitable; “this results from the compromisesnecessarytoconvertaliquidhydrogentanktoalivingcompartment.”AsfortheproblemsOMSFsaidcouldbesolvedinstraightforwardfashion,“thenecessity

tosolvethemisnotrequiredinthealternateapproach.”Thelitanywaslong,butit came down to a single theme:Why do it this waywhen there is an easieralternative?44

Webb evidently heard enough in the 6 December briefing to solidify hislong-standing doubts about AAP. On 6 January 1968 he asked Floyd L.Thompson,directorofLangleyResearchCenter, tochair a reviewofalternatepossibilities for post-Apollo manned spaceflight. Committee membershipreflectedWebb’sviewthat itwasanagency-wideconcern: thedirectorsof thethree OMSF field centers, Langley, and Lewis, plus the director of the AAPofficeinHeadquarters.45Thompson,anoldNACAhandabouttoconcludea42-year career in aeronautical and space research, was a respected figure in theagency.HehadbeenassociatedirectoratLangleywhentheSpaceTaskGroup,Gilruth’s Mercury team, was formed there in 1958. His last extraordinaryassignmenthadbeenheading theboard that investigated theApollo spacecraftfire. His chairmanship and the high-level membership of the Post-ApolloAdvisoryGroupwouldassureathoroughreview.

The group met four times from late January to late March, visiting eachmanned spaceflight center.46 The members reached considerable unanimityaboutthefutureofmannedspaceflight.Thenextstepshouldbetomakemananeffectiveparticipantinorbitalscience.Towardthatend,severalthingscouldbedone between 1971 and 1975: qualification ofman for 100–200 days in zerogravity,determinationof theneedforartificialgravity,anddevelopmentof thetechnologytosupportmaninspace.ThegroupfoundtheobjectivesoftheearlyAAPmissionsgenerallyinlinewithpost-Apolloneeds,butthoughttheprogramwas scattering its shots too widely. The wet workshop was only marginallyadequatetoobtainthebasicinformationaboutadaptationtoweightlessness.“Ifunresolveddifficultiesdopersist in thepresentnear-termapproach,” thereportconcluded, “the better course may well be to develop plans for ground-assemblingtheworkshopandlaunchingitdry,usingthemorecostlySaturnV,and to accept such schedule delays as will be required by this course.”Thompsonwasrealisticaboutthevalueofhiscommittee’swork;therealservicerenderedhadbeentogetHoustonandHuntsvilletolookcriticallyatAAPplansanddevelopaprogramthatbothcenterscouldsupport.Onthematterofthewetworkshop,representativesofthosecenterscouldnolongertalktooneanother.47

AlongwiththeThompsoncommittee,twoothergroupswereestablishedintheOfficeofMannedSpaceFlight to scrutinize specificaspectsofAAP.One,chaired byGeorgeMueller, was to review the solar astronomymissions. Theother, headed by Douglas R. Lord, deputy director of the AdvancedManned

Missions Program in Headquarters, was to define two versions of a ground-outfitted “dry” S-IVB workshop, to be launched on a Saturn V, as possiblefollow-onmissionsafterthewetworkshop.48

Lord’s group comprised 150 persons at Headquarters and the centers,organizedintosixtaskteams.Asetof13optionswasconsidered,fromasimplewet-workshop-turned-dry to a highly advancedworkshopwith a sophisticatedpackage of experiments.Cost estimateswere rough, because hard engineeringdatawerescarce;butitappearedthattheleastexpensiveoptionwouldcost$412millionmorethancurrentplans.Thisworkshopwouldmeetthespecifiedlaunchdate, but its experiments offered the least scientific return and the leastadvancementofmannedspaceflightobjectives.Ontheotherhand,theadvancedworkshopwiththemostproductiveexperimentsovershotthedesiredlaunchdateby more than a year and cost an extra $2.3 billion besides. Considered as afollow-on project, none of the options was appealing. Any of them wouldcompete with the cluster missions for money. The wet workshop made itsheaviest budgetarydemands inFY1969and1970—just theyearswhenadryworkshopwould need heavy financing to get going. Perhaps, asMueller wastellingCongress, logic dictated a progression from thewetworkshop to a dryone;butitwasmoneythatmadetheprogramsgo.Fortherestof1968,mentionofadryworkshoptofollowtheclustermissionsallbutdisappearedfromofficialcorrespondence.49

Mueller’sLM-ATMEvaluationBoardsetitselfthetaskofexaminingeveryaspect of the astronomymodule andmission that had beenquestionedby anyelement of OMSF—which amounted to a critical look at Houston’s repeatedobjectionstothemission.SinceMuellerwasoccupiedwithbudgethearings,theboarddidnotbeginitsmeetingsuntilearlyMarch.Theexperimentswerefoundtobeingoodshape,althoughthescientistsdoubtedthatNASAcouldlaunchonschedule.Thegreatestconcernwastherisingcostofadaptingthelunarmodulefor its new functions.Most of themodificationswere required to support thecrew during rendezvous and docking—that aspect of the mission that MSC,tireless in criticism, had objected to once more. At last Mueller conceded.Manneddoublerendezvousanddocking(p.73)weredroppedandreplacedbyautomaticrendezvousandremote-controlleddocking.Houstonwascontentwiththis.Thetechniquewasnotyetworkedout,butitwassomethingthatoughttobe developed in any case, and itwas preferable to the operational complexityandcrewhazardsofmannedrendezvousanddocking.Houston’svictoryonthispoint,however,owedasmuchtocostconsiderationsasanythingelse.50

SHRINKINGBUDGETSANDSHRINKINGPROGRAM

WhileAAPwasbeingreconsideredwithinNASA,Congresswaspullingthepursestringstighter.NASA’sbudgetrequestforFY1969wasthesmallestsince1963. OMSF had at one time hoped AAP would benefit from the decline inApollocosts,downnearly$1billion in twoyears;but the troubledpassageoftheFY1968budgethadloweredthatexpectation.TheFY1969requestforAAPwas$439million,16%lessthanthesubmissiontotheBureauoftheBudgettheprevious fall and less than half of what had been anticipated in the FY 1968budget. Nearly half of the $439 million went for new launch vehicles andspacecraft modifications; experiments accounted for another 40%. No newspacecraftwasincluded,andthetwoSaturnIBsandtwoSaturnVsrepresentedonly a third of the numberMueller hadhoped for.Gonewere the secondwetworkshop,thesecondsolarobservatory,theearth-resourcesmission(AAP1A),and the lunar explorationmissions. In congressional testimony a possible newdirectionforAAPwasindicatedbyincreasedemphasisonaSaturnVworkshop.Webb told the House committee that the wet workshop was “an interim steptoward theSaturnVworkshop”;Muellersaid thatallofAAP’sstudies todatepointed to“the logicofprogressing to theSaturnV launchedworkshopas thenext follow-up step in the evolutionarymanned program.” InMueller’s view,thisworkshopcorrespondedtotheorbitalstationproposedforthemid-1970sbythe President’s Science Advisory Committee report of February 1967. AAP’sbudget request proposed to spend $70 million for early work on a Saturn Vstation—more than twice the sum programmed for the wet workshop or thetelescopemount,andmorethanthatallocatedforSaturnVproduction.51

Committeemembers’questionsand remarks indicated thatAAPwas in forroughsledding.WilliamRyan(Dem.,N.Y.),avocalcriticofNASA,questionedWebbaboutoverlapofAAPwiththeAirForce’sMannedOrbitingLaboratory.Webbassuredthecommitteethatthetwoprogramsdidnotduplicateeachother,provoking Ryan’s rejoinder, “Clearly there is duplication.” The committee’sranking minority member, James Fulton (Rep., Pa.), questioned the need foradditionalSaturnsinviewoftheexpectedsurplusfromtheApolloprogram.HefearedthatNASAwastryingtomaintainitsSaturnindustrialbaseattheexpenseofnewresearch.Onearlieroccasions,FultonhadcharacterizedAAPasan ill-defined program, and apparently he saw little improvement. When Muellerspoke of AAP having numerous objectives, Fulton called his remark “theunderstatement of the year.” After Donald Rumsfeld (Rep., III.) questionedMueller about “overlapping” aspects of AAP andMOL, Fulton made severalcaustic remarks about the wet workshop’s layout, questioning among other

things the need for a shower costing $300 000. Fultonwas critical of severalspecific details of the design, suggesting thatMueller review thewhole thing.“Whenwe lookedatyourwiringon theApollo204,”he said, referring to theApollofire,“itdidn’ttakemuchtoseethatsomebodycoulddothepanelwiringbetter.”52

In spite of these criticisms, a majority on both congressional spacecommittees concurredwithMueller’s assessment that the AAP request wouldsustain only aminimum program. As Representative Emilio Daddario (Dem.,Conn.) put it, further cuts would put NASA out of business. The supporters’main concern appeared to be that the practical benefits of space wereinsufficientlypublicized.DaddarioexpressedthedilemmawhileaskingWernhervonBraunaboutNASA’scontributions toAmerican technology:“Wefeel thatwehaveseengreataccomplishments…andyet…howdowe,with thegreatexpendituresmade,provethatthetechnologythatisdevelopedfromitisworththecost?”TheSenateCommittee’srankingmembers,ClintonAnderson(Dem.,N.M.)andMargaretChaseSmith(Rep.,Me.),expressedsimilarfeelings.Smithconcluded, “We have not completely answered the ‘why’ question—why weshould undertake each proposed project from the standpoint of the specificpayoffsexpected.”Suchcommentswerenot lostonNASAofficials; inMarchtheAAPoffice reexamined thepossibilityofearlyearth-resourceexperiments,whosebenefitswereeasilyunderstoodbythepublic.53

Asthehearingsproceeded,eventsconspiredtoundermineNASA’stenuoussupportinCongress.TheTetoffensiveinFebruarythrewU.S.troopsinVietnamon the defensive and increased the costs of the war. Two months later, riotsfollowing the assassination ofMartin Luther King brought pressure for moredomesticspending.Congress,preoccupiedwiththeadministration’srequestfora10%income-taxsurchargeandtheopposition’sdemandfora$6billioncutinnondefense spending, locked onto post-Apollo programs as prime targets forretrenchment.Webb later describedwhat happened toNASA that spring as “amasswalkoutofCongressionalsupport.”54

ByMarch it was obvious that NASA’s budget would be cut; the questionwas, how much? In that somewhat depressing atmosphere, the ManagementCouncilandAAPmanagersmetatKennedySpaceCenteron21March1968toassess the program in light of the special studies just concluded. AAP thenconsisted of three missions using five Saturn IBs. The wet workshop and itscrewconstitutedflightsAAP1and2,a28-daymissiontosetuptheclusterandconduct experiments; these launches had slipped to the second half of 1970.Three months after the first crew returned, a second would go up to the

workshopfora56-daybiomedicalmission,AAP3A.Thelasttwolaunches,inmid-1971,would takeup theLM-ATManditscrewonAAP3and4,devotedlargely to solar observations. No other flights were defined, but the meetingbroughtagreement that someearth-lookingexperimentsought tobe studiedaspossible additions. Planners also decided that a duplicateworkshop should bebuilt,toserveasabackup.TherewasstillsometalkofaSaturnVdryworkshopasthefollow-ontothecluster,buteveryoneagreedthatintelligentplanningforadryworkshoprequiredinformationfromthewetworkshop,andAAPcouldnotaffordboth.55

TheAAP cluster as visualized in theOffice ofManned SpaceFlight atNASAHeadquarters, September1968.MA68-7001.

Mathews toldAAPofficials at the centers on21March that a strategy forslowingAAPwork was needed, one that wouldminimize the cost of currentworkanddefernewcommitmentswhilepreservingtheability togoahead.Hewarnedthatthiswouldlastforseveralmonths,sincespacecraftmodifications,apacingitem,couldnotbeginuntiltheFY1969budgetwasfirm.Meanwhilethecenters should try to bring all AAP work to the same stage of development.DuringApriltheHeadquartersprogramofficeworkedoutaholdingplanfortherestof1968, imposingreductions thatcausedseveralcontractingproblemsbut

broughtAAP spending down bymore than 50%.After theHouse slashed theAAPauthorizationon3May,Mathewsputtheholdingplanintoeffect.56

The extent of NASA’s decline in congressional favor became evident thatdayontheHousefloor.Duringtwohoursofdebate,RepresentativeOlinTeague(Dem., Tex.) presented a comprehensive defense of the agency’s budget,including the $395 million his committee had recommended for AAP.Republicans professed support for space activities, but clearly felt that certainprogramsshouldbereduced.RepresentativeJamesFultonproposedtocutAAPfundingto$253.2million,thesameasforFY1968.Hisamendment,alongwithother reductions, passed by voice vote. Many representatives, like DonaldRumsfeld,regrettedtheactionbutthoughtitnecessarytodeferNASAprogramsinfavorofotherswithhigherpriority.57

The Senate space committee considered the House cut too deep andrecommended $350 million for Apollo Applications. On the floor, however,William Proxmire’s proposal to reduce the NASA authorization by $1 billionfailed by only five votes. Senate and House agreed on a figure just over $4billion, with $253 million for Apollo Applications—about three-fifths theamountrequested.58

NASA’s authorization was still subject to the Revenue and ExpenditureControlAct,whichrequiredtheJohnsonadministrationtorefrainfromspending$6billionofitsauthorizedfunds.ExactlyhowthiswouldaffectNASAandAAPwas uncertain; but on 20 June, theAAPoffice submitted a programbased on$119millioninnewfunds.Saturnproductionlinesweresoonshutdown.WebbinstructedhismanagementchiefnottodefinitizeanyAAPcontract,because“wehavemade it clear to theCongress… thatwewould not commit these fundsuntilwe [were] sureweweregoing forwardwith theAAP in someconsistentandcohesiveform.”59

Far from being cohesive, the Apollo Applications Program now seemedabouttocomeapartattheseams.Variousexpedientswereconsideredtoreducecosts: eliminating continuous occupation of the workshop, cutting back thenumberofexperiments,andsimplifyingtheexperimentequipment.Whensolarscientists expressed serious misgivings about their participation under thoseconditions, NASA officials considered canceling the solar experimentsaltogether.60

The telescope-mount schedule had caused someunhappiness a year earlierwhenprincipal investigators fromHarvardCollegeObservatory and theNavalResearch Laboratory indicated that they could not meet a 1969 launch date.

Muellerhad resolvedmatters temporarilybypromisingasecondsolarmissionandsecuringthescientists’agreementtosimplifytheirinstruments(pp.89–90).Insubsequentfundingcuts,thesecondmissionhaddisappearedandthelaunchdateforthefirsthadslippedto1971.Understandably,theinvestigatorslostsomeoftheirenthusiasm.61

On 16 May 1968, Leo Goldberg, director of the Harvard CollegeObservatory,informedHaroldLuskin,thenewdirectorofAAP,thathewantedtodiscontinueworkon instrumentHCO-C,ascanningultravioletspectrometeruseful primarily for studying large flares during the solar maximum, and toreinstate the original ultraviolet spectroheliometer (called HCO-A). LuskinrepliedthattheATMwouldbelaunchedbyJune1971anddirectedGoldbergtocontinueworkonHCO-C.Currentplanswere to stop funding for theHCO-Ainstrument, butNASAwould attempt to review theHarvard proposal in June.Luskin’s telegramwas apparently the last straw forGoldberg,who vented hisanger the following day in a letter to JohnNaugle. He reminded the head ofOSSA thatHarvard had agreed to fly the simplified experiment as a favor toNASAandwithtwostipulations: thatHarvardwouldbeabletoflyitsoriginalinstrumentsonasecondATM,andthat thefirstmissionwouldbe launched in1969.Under the latestschedule,however, themoreversatileHCO-Awouldbealmostcompletedwhenthesolarmissionwaslaunched;andasGoldbergputit,“Baseduponourpastexperience,I thinkyouwillagreethatwe[canexpect]afurtherslippageofat leasttwotothreemonths.”WiththeATMlaunchpushedbackinto1971,twoyearspast thesolarmaximum,thesimplerinstrumentwasnolongerworthflying;infact,thefirstmission“wouldbebetteroffwithoutit.”Goldberg noted that theATMwas taking up a great deal of the observatory’stime,leavinglittlefordevelopingotherinterests.Heconcluded:

I think it is time to faceup to the realization that ourparticipation in theATMprojecthasbeenguidedmorebycircumstanceandexpediency thanbytherequirementsoffirst-ratescience.Ifwedonotjointlytakethefirmactionnow to reverse this trendwe shall bedoing astronomyandNASAbothagreatdisservice.

BynowOSSAwassidingstronglywith thescientists,andafterMuellermadesomeotherconcessionstotheATMexperimenters,LuskinagreedtostopworkontheHCO-CandtoldGoldbergtoproceedwiththeHCO-A.62

Mostof theother investigatorsseemedsatisfiedwith themissioneven if itflewaslateas1972,believingtherewouldbesufficientsolaractivitywellpast

the1969maximum.But theprojectwasstill in trouble. InJuly,WebbdecidedthatNASA could no longer affordATM and deleted its funding from the FY1969 operating budget pending a full debate. Webb opened the review on 5AugustwithafewremarksaboutNASA’sfinancialstate.TheappropriationsbillhadnotyetclearedtheSenate; itwouldbeseveralmoremonthsbeforeNASAhada firmbudget.Until itdid,hewas settinga spending levelof$3.8billionandproceedingona“courseofperil.”Halfadozenspokesmen thendefendedtheATM, both on its ownmerits and because of commitments that had beenmade to outside groups. Naugle praised Marshall’s direction of the project,notingthattherewerenomajorunresolvedtechnicalproblems.FloydThompsonpointed out the program’s technological importance; he thought developmentssuch as the controlmoment gyroscopesmade themissionworthwhile, even ifthe science failed.EdwardG.Gibson,anastronaut-physicist, saidATMwouldprovide the first chance for an observer to apply his judgment to enhance thequalityofspacescience.Atlast,WebbagreedtocontinuetheATM,buthewasstillconcernedaboutwinningcongressionalsupport.Duringthenextfewdays,the FY 1969 operating budget was altered to provide $50 million for ATM’sfurtherdevelopment.63

THEWETWORKSHOPGOESDRY

Apollo Applications began the new fiscal year on 1 July 1968 underconditionsofrealausterity.Mostworkwasonamonth-by-monthbasis,largelyunder letter contracts—an arrangement normally used only to get a contractorstarted on a projectwhile a definitive contractwas being negotiated.NASA’spolicywastoavoidlettercontracts,whichstipulatedalevelofeffortandalimitof compensation; but in the uncertain climate of 1967 and 1968 they becamecommon.ByOctober1968therewere15lettercontractscoveringAAPprojects,includingtheairlock,theSaturnIBs,andthepayloadintegrationwork.64

Webbhadneverbeenanenthusiast forAAP,andas theendof thedecadeapproachedandbudgetstightened,hisdeterminationthatitshouldnotgetinthewayofApollointensified.Eversincethespacecraftfirehehadconcentratedhisenergiesonensuring the successof the lunar landing;whenCongress reducedNASA’sbudget,WebbreprogrammedAAPfundstomeetApollorequirements.In1968hewas“puttingstrongimpedanceinthesystem,”astheAAPofficesawit,bypostponingallAAPprocurement“unlessthereisacompellingurgencyforthe requirement.” Apollo Applications, he told center directors in June, wasnothingmorethan“asurgetankforApollo.”65

On16September1968,however,Webbannouncedthathewouldretireearlyin October. His deputy, Thomas O. Paine, would take over as actingadministrator.Painehadspent19yearsasascientistandadministratorwiththeGeneral Electric Company before taking his first government job in January1968. While he and Webb held generally similar views about the agency’sfuture, Paine was more interested in post-Apollo programs. On 4 October heannouncedtohisstaffthatAAPcouldproceedwithsomeconfidence.Anythingdoneinthenextseveralmonthstosolidifytheprogramwouldbebeneficial;hesuggested negotiating definitive contracts. Paine ended the meeting byencouraginghisstaffto“lookforallwaystomovefaster.”66

Althoughthechangeofleadershiphelped,successesinApollowereatleastequallyimportantingettingAAPmovingagain.TheOctoberflightofApollo7,an 11-daymission in earth orbit, redeemed the space craftmanufacturers andrestoredpublicconfidenceinNASA.Fordrama,however,nothingthathadgonebefore surpassed Apollo 8’s Christmas trip to the moon. By rekindling thecountry’senthusiasmforspaceflight,Apollo8didmuchtoassureapost-Apolloprogram. The congressional space committees greeted NASA’s budget inJanuary1969withawarmthreminiscentoftheearly1960s.InApriltheNixonadministrationcuttheAAPrequestby$57million,but$252millionremained—enoughtokeepamodestprogramalive.67

WhenNASAhadbegunprojecting itsFY1970 requirements in the fallof1968, themismatch betweenAAP schedules and prospective funding becamesevere.Marshall’sallocationforApolloApplicationswasonlyabouttwo-thirdswhat the center needed to meet the current schedule. Houston’s plight wasworse;Gilruth estimated thatAAP required75%more thanMSCwasallottedfortheprogram.Underthesecircumstancesadryworkshoptofollowtheclustermissionsseemedaluxurybeyondtheprogram’smeans.Inawire-servicestoryinSeptember,Webbindicatedhisdoubtsaboutpost-Apolloplans.“Wehavenomoney for additional workshop flights,” he said. “So after the first threemissionswe’ll sit back and consider the next step.We could go to an interimstep like the Saturn 5 workshop or we could begin planning for a multi-manspacestation,onceagaindependingonthemoneyavailable.”68

WhenPainebecameactingadministrator,hetootalkedaboutaspacestation;buttheideagotlittlesupport.President-ElectRichardNixonsetupataskforceonspacepolicy. InJanuary1969, thisgrouprecommendedagainstcommittingthenation to a large space station. InFebruary, thenewpresident appointed aSpaceTaskGroup headed byVice-President SpiroT.Agnew tomake amoredetailedstudyandreporttohiminSeptember.Thenewadministrationwasinno

hurrytodecideNASA’slong-termfuture.69

AtNASAHeadquarters,interestinadryworkshoprevivedbrieflyinthefirstweeksof1969.Withpayloadweightandstowagespacebecomingcriticalfortheclustermissions,theweight-liftingcapacityoftheSaturnVwastootemptingtoignoreany longer,and thesuccessofApollo8 raised thehope thataSaturnVcouldbesparedfromtheApolloprogram.JohnDisherpresentedaplantouseaSaturnVinplaceofaIBtotheManagementCouncilon5February;theintentwastocutthecostoftheclustermissionsbylaunchingallthemodulesatonce.Disheracknowledgedthatthechangewould“openaPandora’sbox”oftechnicalandadministrativeproblemsandthatitmightbeseenasarecurrenceofAAP’sinability todefineaprogramandstickwith it. Itwouldadverselyaffect costs,schedules,morale,and—worstofall—supportfromCongress,scientists,andtheaerospace industry.When itbecameapparent in theensuingdiscussion thatnocostsavingwouldresult,thecouncilshelvedtheplan.70

In lateApril,Mueller told theSenatespacecommittee that theprogressionfromwetworkshoptodryworkshoptospacestationnowappeared“inefficientandonlymarginallyeffectiveinadvancingspacetechnology….thenextstepinearthorbitingmannedspaceflightmustbeanew,semi-permanentspacestation[and]anewlowcosttransportationcapability”—thatis,areusablespacecrafttoshuttlefromearthtoorbitandback.TheAAPclustermissionswouldbeginlatein 1971 and end some time in 1972. The firstmodule of a space stationwasexpected to go into orbit by themid-1970s, and in the following10 years themodularstationwouldbebuiltuptoitsfullsize.71

Interestinthedryworkshopwasnotcompletelydead,however.AtMarshall,vonBraunkepttheideaalive;hedidnotwanttorisklosingtheclustermissionsordowngradingtheexperimentprogramonaccountoftechnicaldifficulties,andtheweight and stowageproblems refused togoaway.AtHouston,MaxFagetwasgettingwindofcontinuedinterestinswitchingtotheSaturnV.Pointingoutthatflyingbothawetanddryworkshopwouldbealamentablewasteoffunds,hecalledGilruth’sattentiontoanMSCstudyonadryworkshop,implyingthatreconsiderationmightbeinorder.ThecenterAAPmanagersdidnotconcur.LeeBelew cited “substantial reasons for not changing from the present coreprogram.” After a meeting to examine the technical problems facing the wetworkshop,Belewsawnothingtojustifyachange,andHouston’sAAPmanageragreed.72

Crosscurrentswere running atHeadquarters;Mueller now seemed inclinedto change to a dry workshop, but the AAP staff was opposed. Talking withWilliamC.Schneider,*thenewprogramdirector,Belewgottheimpressionthat

he was under considerable pressure to change. Schneider felt that the dryworkshopwouldbenocheaperandthatachangewoulddelaythefirstlaunchbyatleastayear;BelewgatheredthatMuellerhopedforyetadifferentapproach.73

Belew, reporting these conversations to von Braun, was not unalterablyopposed to the change; but he reminded von Braun of a few points that“sometimes get obscured with the light of something new shining in”: allcontractswouldhavetoberewrittenandrenegotiated,Grumman’sworkontheLM-ATM terminated, and Marshall’s manpower assignments completelyredistributed. Itwouldbeamassive job.The sheer inertiaof aprogramas faralongasthewetworkshopwasformidable.74

Muellerkept thepressureon, at last convinced that thewetworkshopwassimplynotpracticalandthatonlyadryworkshopcouldsaveAAP.Theweekendof3–4Mayhepresentedtocenterdirectorsandprogrammanagersacompletelynewplan—an integrated program leading fromAAP to the space station (andbeyond),includingthreedryworkshopflightsbetween1972and1974thatwereexpected to furnish fundamental information for the design of the station. HechargedSchneiderwithdefiningtheactionsrequiredtochangethecoreprogramincasesuchaplanwereapproved.WhenthegroupreassembledthefollowingweektohearSchneider’sreport,Marshallpointedoutthatan18-monthdelayinthefirstlaunchwaslikely.MSCobjectedthattheproposedprogramwouldonlycompetewiththewetworkshopandtheshuttlestudiesforscarcefunds.Afteragreatdealofdiscussion,thegroupagreedtoconsideradifferentstudy:amissionusingthedryworkshopforAAP2only,followedbyanimproveddryworkshopthat would be revisited four times. Schneider developed a list of specifictechnicalpointstobeassessedbythecentersandcalledforareportby15JuneontheimpactofshiftingAAPtoadryworkshop.75

On 15May Belew reported preliminary findings fromMarshall.With thebenefitofseveraloptimisticassumptions,adry-launchedworkshopwithintegralATM would entail a 10-month delay. Two complete sets of flight hardwarewouldcostanextra$50millionto$100million,andtherewouldbeaddedcostselsewhereforcheckout, launch,andmissionoperations.ThecriticalfactorwasgettingaquickdecisionfromHeadquarters—Belewsaiditwouldhavetobein4–6months.Aboveall,itwasimperativetoresistchangesfurtherdowntheline.He conceded that the dry workshop solvedmany problems and offeredmoreconfidence of success; but he pointed out that anothermajor change could bedemoralizing. Changes in experiments,mission plans, and program objectiveshad plagued Apollo Applications from the beginning; and the large payloadcapacity of the Saturn V would invite new experiments and encourage

investigatorstoimproveoldones,withcostsgoingupandschedulesslippingallthe while. Belew saw no “technical show-stoppers” in the wet workshopprogram, and it could meet AAP’s primary objectives. Considering all theproblemsthatwouldarise,hiscenterpreferrednottochange.76

There was an alternative, Belew said, which on brief examination lookedbetter:simplyshiftingthepresentcoreprogramtoadryworkshopwithnootheralterations or additions. This stood a good chance of meeting the currentschedule and required little change in the design of the cluster modules. Itremovedsome“verysubstantial”problemsassociatedwithusingtheS-IVBasapropulsive stage—problems that were giving Marshall more trouble thananticipated three years before. It meant using a Saturn V without takingadvantageof its fullpayloadcapacity,but thatwas thevery thing thatmade itattractive:usingthatcapacityentailedtoomuchdelay.77

On21May1969,whilethecenterswerestillworkingontheimpactoftheshifttoadryworkshop,MuellerpresentedfouroptionsforManagementCounciltoconsiderasalternativestothewetworkshop.Alternatives1and2requiredaSaturnVtoputuptheclusterandaSaturnIBtoorbitthecrewandthetelescopemount. Alternatives 3 and 4 launched the telescopes along with the clustermodulesonaSaturnVandthecrewonaIB.Ineachcasetherewasthechoiceof using anAAP command and servicemodule, the fuel cells ofwhich couldoperate for 56 days, or a quiescent CSM, which was powered down afterdocking, its fuel cells producing just enough power to keep critical systemsready for a quick return to earth if necessary. In the discussion that followed,alternatives 1 and 4 emerged as clear favorites. The first—basically theminimum-change dry workshop that Belew had described to Schneider—wastechnically inferior, but required fewer adjustments to the program. It wasthereforethemoresalable,becausealternative4requiredsomanychangesthatitwas,practicallyspeaking,anewstart.Muellertoldthecenterstoreporttohimassoonaspossible.78

During the following week first reactions crystallized into firm positions.FieldcentersandHeadquarterspreferredalternative4ontechnicalgrounds,butagreed that alternative 1 had the best prospects of acceptance by Paine andCongress.VonBraun’s response first reaffirmedhis conviction that no changewas necessary; the wet workshop only needed some “hard-nosed scrubbingdown” to get it on track.Thedryworkshop, however,was clearly superior. Itwouldallowaddingsomeexperimentsthathadbeenputoffbecauseofweightandvolume limitations.Althoughheclearlypreferredalternative4,vonBraunfeared that such a major change would lead to unwelcome examination by

powersoutsidetheagency.79

SchneiderpresentedfulldetailsofthefourSaturn-VoptionstoPaineon27May. Alternative 1, backed by the centers, was estimated to cost about $50million lessover theentireprogramthanalternative4;but in thecrucial fiscalyears1969through1971,alternative4showeda$200millionadvantage.Moreimpressive were the evaluations of probable success in accomplishing AAPobjectives.TheSaturnVclusterwiththequiescentspacecraftoutscoredallotheroptionsandofferedthehopeofgettingsignificantlymoresolardataaswell.ItwasclearlyOMSF’schoice.80

Paine,consciousof theneed togetApolloApplicationsmoving towardanattainablegoal,concludedthattheSaturn-V-launcheddryworkshopwasthebestchoiceavailable.HewrotetoSenatorAndersonthatNASAwasinvestigatingtheuse of a SaturnV to launch both theworkshop and theATM; in view of thepossibilityofchange,actionsoncertaincontractswouldbehelduptemporarily.Schneideralertedthecenterprogrammanagerson17Junetobereadywithadryworkshop proposal for the July Management Council meeting. He expectedalternative 4 to be the only option considered. In preparation for thismeetingSchneider scheduled a review atMarshall on the 19th and ameetingwith theexecutivesofmajorAAPcontractorstheweekofthe23d.81

Marshall had already started a dry-workshop study, which would not becompleteuntil the endof themonth,butby the19thconsiderable informationwasavailable.ThisstudywasbasedonaconfigurationinwhichtheATMwasmountedaheadof themultipledockingadapteronahingedstructureallowingthe instruments to be swung out 90°. Marshall had produced favorable cost,schedule, and mission success projections for this configuration, which wasquicklyaccepted.Atthemeetingwithmajorcontractorsaconsensuswaseasilyreachedonalaunchdateforplanningpurposes:July1972.82

Thedecisiontodropthewetworkshophadeffectivelybeenmadebytheendof June. Formalization soon followed. Paine signed the project approvaldocumentchangeon18July1969.83

In the meantime, action by the Pentagon had reduced the possibility thatCongress might oppose the change. On 10 June the Defense Departmentannounced termination of theManned Orbiting Laboratory. The decision wasmade reluctantly, as $1.3 billion had already been spent on the program; butdelays had increased the estimated cost to $3 billion, and MOL’s continuedfundingthreatenedseveralsmallerprograms.MOLwasavictimof technologyaswellas tightbudgets.Since1965theAirForcehadmadelargeadvances in

the use of unmanned satellites for communications, meteorology, andobservation,andtheMannedOrbitingLaboratorywasclearlyobsolescent.ThecancellationendedtheAirForce’shopesformannedspaceflightandbroughttoacloseadecadeofpoliticalcompetition.84

Only one thing remained: positive assurance that a Saturn V would beavailable for Apollo Applications. Planners had assumed this as a matter ofcourse,andApollo8,9,and10hadremovedallbutthefaintestshadowofdoubt;but until the landingwas actually accomplished itwas not prudent to suggestthatApollodidnotneedoneofitslaunchvehicles.*PublicannouncementofthechangewasdelayeduntilApollo11wasonitswayhome.On22July1969,twodays after the first lunar landing, the centers were formally directed toimplementthedryworkshopprogram.85

AtthesametimeSchneiderspecifiedcertaincontractactionsthatweretobetaken. Grumman’s letter contract for lunar module modifications was to beterminated, aswas theAllis-Chalmers subcontract to produce cryogenic tanksfor the command-servicemodule.NegotiationswithNorthAmerican onCSMmodificationswere tobe suspendedandamanpower limitationplacedon thatworkwhileareproposalwasbeingarranged.MarshallwastoamendMcDonnellDouglas’s contracts for theworkshopandairlock, redirectingwork toward thedry workshop. The impact on all experiments was to be examined and thenecessarymodificationsmade.Schneiderthenlaiddownaruleintendedtoavoidanotherendlessparadeofchanges:

Thebasicobjectives,tasks,experimentsandmissiondurationswillremainunchanged….Only thosechangeswhicharedictatedby theconfigurationmodificationtodryworkshopareauthorized….Allotherdesirable,butnotrequired changes, will be discouraged and final disposition will be onspecificmerits.86

The decision was welcomed everywhere (except, probably, at thosecontractorswhoseAAPworkwas discontinued), nowheremore than atMSC.TheHoustoncenter,infact,considereditselftohavebeentheprimemoverforthe change—an attitude that was at least partially justified. Certainly MSC’santipathytowardthebasicideahadkeptattentionfocusedonthewetworkshop’sfaults;but thecombinationof technicalproblemsandevercontractingbudgetsmade the abandonment of the wet workshop virtually certain—at least in itsambitious form of early 1969. At Houston satisfaction with the change was

moderatedonlybythedelayinmakingthedecision.87

Mueller followed thereorientationorderwitha letter tocenterdirectorson28Julyemphasizingtheprogram’spriorities.Flightsafetywasnumberone,withscheduleandcostconsiderationsclosebehind.ThelargepayloadcapacityoftheSaturn V was useful on both counts; it permitted heavier (and thus safer)components, eliminating the expensive test programs required by lessconservative design. The increase in permitted launchweight had its dangers,however,andoncemoreMuellercautionedthattheonlyallowablechangeswerethose dictated by the change from wet to dry. (The requirement to operatemedical experiments in the multiple docking adapter, for example, no longerapplied.) No others would be made except by specific authorization of theprogramdirectorinWashington.Muellerstressedtheneedtoarrivequicklyatafirmconfiguration,avoidingdelaysandelaborationoftheprogram.88TakenwithSchneider’s telegram of the 22d, this letter established a minimum-change,minimum-cost philosophy that would produce somemisunderstandings as thedefinitionofthedryworkshopmatured.

At Marshall it was realized that the change was probably inevitable and,withoutdoubt, technicallydesirable.Still,Belewarguedthat thewetworkshopcould—andshould—havebeencarriedthroughtoasuccessfulconclusion.Thisattitude might have contained a trace of parochialism, but much more wasinvolved.Thedryworkshopimposedagreatdealofextraworkthatcouldnotbehandledwiththemanpoweravailable.Marshallhadlostmorethan600positionsin agency-wide cutbacks early in 1968 and had adjusted its AAP workloadaccordingly.Nownewitemsofhardwarehadtobebuilt(thepayloadshroudandtheATMdeploymentmechanism)andnewanalysis,design,andtestinghadtobedone.TheintegratedlaunchconfigurationmeantthatallworkshopandATMcomponentshadtobedeliveredatonce;previouslytherehadbeenasix-monthgap between the two, allowingmanpower to be shifted fromone to the other.Marshall’sassessmentshowedatleastasix-monthpostponementoflaunchifallof this work had to be done in-house. Belew accordingly proposed to haveseveral major jobs done by outside contractors, which course was ultimatelyfollowed.89

RETROSPECTANDPROSPECT

With the decision made and the program defined (except for one set ofexperiments thatwould shortlybeadded),noonehadmuch time to reflecton

the program’s short but eventful history.AAP had come a longway from thesimpleproposalof1965 toget insideanemptyS-IVB tankandconduct someexperiments.Whetherthatexercisecouldhavebeendone,orwouldhaveprovedworthdoing, isdebatable; it seemed likeagood ideaat the time.Probablynoone foresaw that this simple exercise would grow into the first major post-Apolloprogram;but itcamealongata timewhencircumstancesforcedit intothatrole.

James Webb, determined to fulfill the commitment to the lunar landing,could see no clear mandate for a space program to follow that achievement.Lackingsuchamandate—andhehadsoughtit,withoutsuccess—hedeclinedtopress for a program of his own choosing. Possibly he felt that was for hissuccessortodo.PossiblyhefeltthatanationalcommitmenttoanotherprogramlikeApollocouldnotbesustained;certainlyhisdeputy,HughDryden,hadbeensurethatitcouldnot.90

GeorgeMuellersawanimperativeinNASA’sfoundinglegislation:tobuildand maintain an unexcelled capability to operate in space for the nationalinterest. Under that axiom he could not envision allowing the Saturn-Apollotechnological accomplishment to be dissipated. If no clear mandate wasforthcoming, thenutilizationof thatenormous investmentwasmandatoryuntilthenextstepcouldbedefined.Whenthetimecametokeepthatcapabilityalive,thewetworkshopwaswhatMuellerhadandhedeterminedtomakethebestuseof it.As circumstances changed, he adjusted his program—postponing launchdates,trimmingtheexperimentprogram,reducingthenumberofflights,shiftingthework load between centers—tomake the best use of his resources. ThoseresourcesdwindledalarminglyasAAPwascaughtinaperiodofrisinginflationand increasing disillusion with sophisticated—and to some, pointless—technology.Mueller was, besides, in basic disagreement with elements of hisownorganization,especiallyMSC,whereitwasthoughtthatthewholeprogramhad been conceived hind end foremost. That disagreement, however, keptattention directed at the program’s weaknesses and eventually contributed toremedyingthem.

WebbleftNASAatacriticaltimeforApolloApplications;andTomPaine,trying for an ambitious space venture after themoon, sawhis efforts come tonaught in the face of public antipathy and presidential apathy. His attempt,however,probablyprovidedtheimpetustomaketheprogram’skeydecision,thechange to the dryworkshop.Mueller stayedon until late 1969, seeingApollothrough the first two lunar landings and Apollo Applications on the road tosuccess.Speakingatthecentersasheleft,Muellerexpressedconfidencethatthe

new,integratedplanwouldbethebasisforNASA’sfutureandthatwhatwastobe learned from thedryworkshopwouldbeofgreat importance toeverythingthatwouldfollowit.91

ThedecadeofApollocame toanendasApolloApplicationsgearedup tocarryoutthedryworkshopmissions—onlythreemannedflightsnow,a28-daymissionscheduledformid-1972,a56-dayflight inOctoberof thatyear,andafinal 56-day mission early in 1973. Responsibilities were defined and theorganizationwassetuptoallowthetwomajorcenterstoworktogether,whichtheywouldnowdowithbetterunderstandingthanbefore.Therewouldstillbeplentyofdisagreements,butHuntsville andHoustonwereagreedon thebasicpurposeofthemissionsandreadytogetonwiththem.

* Baselining means defining a point of departure—for hardware, mission, or program—to whichsubsequentchangesarerelated.

* Bellcommwas a subsidiary of American Telephone& Telegraph, created to perform independentsystems analyses for OMSF and otherwise assist in making technical decisions. Numbering about 200people,BellcommperformedmanyevaluationsofApollo,AAP,andSkylab.

*Funds arecommittedwhen agency officials agree among themselves to spend a certain amount ofmoneyonagiventask.Subsequently,whentheagencycontractswithanoutsider,thefundsaresaidtobeobligated.Theformerisabudgetingorbookkeepingexercise,thelatterislegallybinding.

*A kluge is an assemblage of unrelated parts which, in spite of not being designed to fit together,performstheintendedfunction.

*ThisideadatedbacktotheoriginalplansforApollo(seepp.12–13);itwasincludedinthestatementofworkfortheApollospacecraftin1961.

*SchneiderhadtakenoverApolloApplicationsinDec.1968,following18monthsasApollomissiondirector.BorninNewYorkCityandeducatedatMITandtheUniversityofVirginia,Schneiderhadjoinedthe National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, NASA’s predecessor, in 1949. He was a veteran ofGeminiandhisworkonApollo8hadearnedhimNASA’shighestaward,theDistinguishedServiceMedal.

*IthadtakenallofJamesWebb’spowerofpersuasiontoconvinceCongressandtheBOBthatApollorequiredatleast15SaturnVlaunchvehicles,andhewouldtoleratenosuggestionthatanycouldbeusedforsomethingelse.InNovember1966anationalmagazinequotedvonBrauntotheeffectthatifallwentwell thefourthSaturnVmightbesent to themoon in1968.Webbdirectedhimtobackdownfromthatposition as soon as possible. Webb to von Braun, 17 Dec. 1966. Until the Apollo lunar mission wassuccessful—andaslongasWebbwasadministrator—AAPcouldnotplanfortheuseofaSaturnV.

PartII

DevelopmentandPreparationstoFly,1969–1973

July 1969 was the watershed for Skylab, dividing four years of programdefinition from a like period of hardware design, fabrication, and testing. Thelatter period began with a year of changes, including the addition of anothersubstantial scientific program (the earth-resource experiments) and majorimprovements in theworkshop’s living accommodations. These changeswerenot made without difficulty, for they required time and money that were notreadilyavailable.AprogramreviewinJuly1970establishedSkylab’sfinalformand content; designs were then stabilized and development began in earnest.Periodic testingandreviewsduringthenext twoyearsassuredthatallsystemsfunctioned together and that the crews could operate them with maximumeffectiveness.

Following the first lunar landing, and especially after Apollo 13 in April1970, theMannedSpacecraftCenter andKennedySpaceCenter could devotemoreattentiontotheirSkylabresponsibilities.AtHouston,missionplannersandtraining officials devisedmeans tomanage the longestmannedmissions everflown,while adjusting to the strong scientificorientationofSkylab.ManagersandtechniciansattheCapepreparedforfinalcheckoutandlaunchofthemostcomplexsystemtheyhadeverhandled.

Development of the spacecraftmodules, the experiments they carried, andthe preparations to launch and operate them are the subjects of part II of thishistory.Chapter6focusesontheprogramleaders,theproblemstheyfaced,andthetoolstheyusedtomanageSkylab.Chapters7through11dealwiththemajorexperiment programs and the spacecraft components, work managed largelyfromHuntsville.Houston’spreparationsfordirectingthemissionsaretreatedinchapter 12, the launch operations at Kennedy Space Center in chapter 13,bringingthestorydownto14May1973andthelaunchofSkylab.

6

ManagingtheDesignPhase

Intheyearfollowingthedry-workshopdecision,SkylabmovedbeyondtheboundsofApolloApplications.Althoughmuchofthehardwareandmanyofthemanagerial practices retained the Apollo stamp, the program took on a newdimension.ThenameSkylab,adoptedinFebruary1970,signifiedthechangeofoutlook: officials no longer viewed the program simply as a means to useleftover Apollo hardware. Increasingly, it was seen as America’s first spacestation—andperhapstheonlyoneformanyyears.Severalfactorscontributedtothischange.Apollo11’ssuccessallowedNASAofficialstogivemoreattentionto Skylab, while the Saturn V’s greater lift permitted program engineers toexpand their plans andmake theworkshop a better laboratory and home.Theprogram also took on increased importance as it slowly became apparent thatCongresswouldnotfundaspacestationduringthe1970s.

MOVINGOUTOFAPOLLO’SSHADOWGeorgeMueller’s integratedplanofMay1969listedApolloandSkylabas

NASA’sfirstmannedprogramsofthe1970s.Theagencyhopedtomoveoutintwogeneraldirections:ononeavenueApolloledtofurtherlunarexplorationandthepossibilityofalunarbase;asecondroutetoEarth-orbitaloperationsbeganwith two Saturn-V workshops and proceeded to a permanent, manned spacestationwithalow-costShuttle.Majormilestonesforthedecadeincluded:

1972-Earth-orbitaloperationswithSaturn-V-launchedworkshop1973-Startofpost-Apollolunarexploration1974-SuborbitalflighttestsofShuttle

-LaunchofsecondSaturn-Vworkshop1975-Initialspacestationoperations

-OrbitalShuttleflights1976-Lunar-orbitstation

-FullShuttleoperations

Sometimeinthe1980sor1990s,NASAwouldestablishbasesinEarthorbitandonthelunarsurfaceandwouldlandmenonMars.1

Paine was anxious to win approval for this ambitious plan in 1969 whilepublic enthusiasm was high. The Space Task Group, a body established byPresident Nixon to consider America’s future space program, provided theadministrator an excellent sounding board. In meetings that summer, Painepromoted a mannedMars mission as NASA’s next major objective. The taskgroup’s September report,America’s Next Decades in Space, recommended abalanced manned and unmanned space capability and listed three possibleprograms leading to a manned landing onMars before the 21st century. Themost ambitious option called for a 50-man,Earth-orbiting station in 1980 andthefirstMarsflightthreeyearslater.Fundingwouldreach$8billionannuallyby1976. The least ambitious option cost half that amount and delayed theMarsexpeditionuntilthe1990s.Thegroup’schairman,VicePresidentSpiroAgnew,endorsed theMartian goal enthusiastically, but elsewhere the proposal fell onbarren soil. Opposition appeared in Congress and the press, and the Nixonadministration approved less than three-quarters of NASA’s proposed $4.5billion budget for FY 1971. That was one-half billion dollars less than thepreviousyear’sappropriationandbroughtNASAtoitslowestleveloffundinginnine years. On 13 January 1970 Paine briefed the press on the impact of thereduction:NASAwouldsuspendproductionof theSaturnV,cancelApollo20,delaytheinitialworkshopflightuntillate1972,andpostponeApollo18and19until1974.2

The followingmonthNASA renamed its ApolloApplications Program.AwidespreaddissatisfactionwiththeacronymAAP*hadpromptedPainetoseekanew name shortly after the dry-workshop decision. A committee considerednearly 100 names ranging fromSocrates toLSD and recommended 8, 4 frommythology and 4 from American history. Mueller forwarded therecommendationstoNASA’sProjectDesignationCommitteewiththecommentthatanamechange“couldenhancethepublic’sidentificationwiththeprogramand hopefully provide a more manageable term for everyday use.” Thecommittee passed over the recommendations and selected, instead, a namesubmittedbyLt.Col.DonaldSteelman,anAirForceofficerondutywithNASAin1968.Skylab,acontractionfor“laboratoryinthesky,”metbothofMueller’sobjectivesasthenamewasquicklyacceptedwithinandoutsideNASA.3

During 1970 Paine continued to press for an expansive space program

despite the lackof support fromCongressorWhiteHouse.ByJunehehad toconcede that at least one more Apollo mission would be eliminated and thattherewas no possibility of further Saturn production. Paine hoped thatSkylabcouldflyasearlyasmid-1972.Hismainconcernwastohave“amajormissionofnewsignificance”by1976,somethingmorethanjustanotherSkylab,buthewasclearlyoutofstepwiththeNixonadministration.NASA’sinterimoperatingbudget, made public on 2 September, provided only $3.27 billion. TwomoreApollo missions fell by the wayside; the program would end in June 1972.Skylab was supposed to lift off five months later. Paine resigned on 15September1970.4

The task of defending NASA’s budget fell to George Low, the actingadministrator. InOctoberEdwardDavid, thepresident’s scienceadviser, askedLowtoevaluatetherelativeprioritiesofApolloandSkylabinthelightoffurtherpossible cutbacks. Low defended both programs, saying that “to reduce orconstrain the scientific returns fromApollobydroppingoneormoremissionswouldinvolveverygreatlosses.”ButcancelingSkylabwasevenlesspalatable:“On balance, the weight of evidence seems to favor Skylab over Apollo if achoice must be made.” The scientific returns from the single Skylab missionwould probably exceed those from an additional lunar landing. America hadalreadybenefitedfromitsApollo investment,whereascancelingSkylabwouldprovidenoreturn.Finally,SkylabcouldleadtomorenewoptionswithlessriskthanApollo.5

DavidwasaskingLowtoconsiderreductionsinanalreadyausterebudget.Inaperiodof6%inflation,NASAhadsoughtamodestincreaseto$3.7billion.TheOfficeofManagementandBudgethadcounteredwitha$3.3-billionoffer,whichforcedlargereductionsintheSpaceShuttleandnuclearengineprograms.Neither Apollo nor Skylab suffered serious cuts; their combined loss of $50millionamountedtolessthan5%oftherequestedamount.Nevertheless,thelosscouldbeabsorbedonlybyslowingthepaceofoperations.TheOfficeofMannedSpaceFlightsetnewlaunchdatesofDecember1972andMarch1973forApollo17 and Skylab respectively.When Kennedy Space Center indicated that suchclosely spaced launches would require overtime, Skylab was moved backanothermonth.Thebudgetdecisioninlate1970markedthelastmajorchangeinSkylab’sschedule.Thereaftertheprogrammovedsteadilytowardlaunch.6

ASECONDSKYLAB

A second Skylab, under consideration since mid-1969, was a principalcasualty of the 1970 budget deliberations. Shortly after thewet-to-dry switch,CharlesMathewssuggested that thecenterprogramofficesbegin investigatingartificialgravity forasecondworkshop; the informationgained therebywouldprove valuable in planning for a permanent space station. In SeptemberMueller’sofficebroadenedthestudybyaskingtheofficesofspacescienceandadvanced research to propose other experiment payloads. Guidelines for afollow-onworkshop,preparedinNovember, listedseveraloptions—ayearlongoccupationof aworkshop similar to the firstSkylabby four three-mancrews,theadditionofartificialgravity,substitutionofastellartelescopefortheATM,and amore complex group of earth-resource sensors.The additional logisticalsupportandthenewexperimentswouldbeaccomplishedwithaslittlechangeaspossible to theworkshop’sbasicconfiguration.Since thefirstSkylab’sbackuphardwarewouldbecomethesecondworkshop,nomajorchangescouldbemadeon the hardware until near the end of the firstmissions. The committee set aseriesofmilestonesforsubsequentstudies:apreliminaryreporton20January1970 to support congressional hearings, a work statement by July, and apreliminarydesignreviewinearly1971.7

Thedefinitionofnewexperimentscontinuedintothenewyear.On7March,Dale D. Myers, George Mueller’s successor,* reviewed the progress ofpreliminarystudieswithhisstaff.Thegroupconcludedthatdefinitionofastellartelescopehadadvancedfarenoughforpresentneedsandthatmajoremphasisinstudies should go to artificial gravity and to payloads “providing tangiblebenefits of general public interest.” After the meeting, Schneider asked hiscenter programoffices to provide cost estimates for three possiblemissions: arepeat of the first Skylab, a yearlongmissionwith advanced solar instrumentsbutnomajorchangesto thecluster,andthesameconfigurationwithadvancedearth-resourceinstrumentsinplaceofthetelescopemount.8

Answersfromthecentersconflicted.Houstonwantedafirmcommitmenttoa more sophisticated station, even if it meant delaying the first Skylab.Huntsville, fearing that a major commitment to a follow-on Skylab wouldjeopardize thepresentprogram,arguedthatayearlongmissionwas impossiblewithoutmajorhardwarechangesandthatartificialgravitywoulddoubleortriplecosts. The most that NASA could afford, in Huntsville’s opinion, was acombined earth resources-solar astronomy mission of eight months’ duration.Bothcenters’viewswereairedattheAprilmeetingoftheMannedSpaceFlightManagementCouncil, alongwith Schneider’s proposals for furtherwork. ThecouncilapprovedadditionalstudiesofSkylabIIconfigurationsanddirectedthe

committeeonartificialgravitytopresentitsfindingsbyearlyMay.9

Skylab II studies proceeded that summer in preparation for the FY 1972budget discussions. Payload weight soon became a serious problem, whosesolutionmightrequiremodifyingthesecondstageoftheSaturnrocket.Thecostoutlookwasmoredisturbing—estimatesrangedfrom$1.32billiontomorethan$1.5 billion. Schneider had discussed a second Skylabwith officials from theOfficeofManagementandBudgeton31Julyandknewmoneywouldnotcomeeasily. After another review on 31August, he informedMyers that Skylab IIstudieshadprovidedsufficientdataforplanningpurposes.Furtherstepsawaitedafundingdecision.10

ThedecisionthatfallwentagainstSkylabII.Therewassomequestionaboutitsutility;unlesstheagencymadeexpensivemodificationsforartificialgravity,themissionwouldessentiallyduplicateSkylabI.NASAmanagementfoundthatfundinganotherworkshopdictatedeitheramuchlargerbudgetorlengthydelaysintheSpaceShuttle.AlthoughtherewasstrongsupportforasecondSkylabinthe House space committee, the Nixon administration was unwilling tounderwritethecosts,andNASAdidnotwishtojeopardizeitsfutureprograms.11

MANAGEMENTTOOLS

During the summer of 1969, the program manager had his hands fullmanaging the first Skylab. FromSchneider’s point of view, research scientistsmoved in a world different from that of engineers. He found it difficult toconvincethem“thatyoureallyneedthehardwaresixmonthsbeforeflight.”Indefense of the scientists, they were probably influenced by their ApolloApplications experience, when schedules had slipped from month to month,allowing almost indefinite time to improve their instruments. Thoseimprovements contributed to the rising costs of developing the experiments, afrequent subject in Schneider’s correspondence. Changes to the experimentalinstruments alsomade it impossible to “freeze interfaces between experimentsandspacecraft,”withfurtherdamagetobudgetsandschedules.12

Indeed, interface controlwasoneofSkylab’sbiggest problems.Aerospaceengineers used interface todescribe the commonboundarybetweenparts of aspace vehicle, such as an electrical or pneumatic connection or a physical fit.Thousands of interfaces on Skylab required close supervision to ensurecompatible connections.TheSkylab programofficesmanaged these interfaceswith procedures developed for Apollo: interface control documents and

intercenterinterfacepanels.Interface control documents provided design requirements and criteria for

every interface, describing the parameters and constraints under which thecommonpartsfunctioned.Whentheinterfaceconcernedtwoitemsdesignedbythe same center, a level B document applied. If the interface involved two ormorecenters,alevelAdocumentwasinorderandanintercenterpanelassumedresponsibility.Following theprogrammanager’sapprovalofadocument,eachcenterwasresponsibleforimplementingitssideoftheinterface.Huntsvillehadthe additional responsibility of examining both sides of flight hardwareinterfaces for overall compatibility, whileKennedy Space Center performed asimilar rolewhere flighthardware joinedgroundsupportequipment.Marshall,with support from Martin Marietta, scheduled and tracked interface controldocumentsandkeptthemasterfile.Incaseswhereprogrammanagerscouldnotagreeonpanelaction,thematterwenttoHeadquartersforresolution.13

Theelaboratesystemhadboggeddownin1968andhadthreatenedtodelayApollo; a similar situation troubledSchneider twoyears later.At ameeting inJuly1970,henotedthat incompleteinterfacecontroldocumentsweredelayingthedesignof“variousSkylabmodulesandmanyexperiments.”SchneideraskedProjectIntegrationDirectorThomasHanestoreviewthestatusofalldocumentsandrecommendwaystoeliminatethebottleneck.Littleheadwaywasmadeoverthe next two months, causing Schneider to direct his program managers tosimplify their procedures and get their contractors more directly involved.Hanes’s officewouldworkwith the centers in developing a better schedulingandtrackingsystem.Shortlythereafter,thecentersjoinedforcesinanInterfaceWorkingGroup;meeting biweekly, the group clearedmost of the backlog byearly1971.14

IntercenterpanelsdealtwithSkylab interfaces that involvedmore thanonecenter.EarlyinApollo,GilruthandvonBraunhadorganizedpanelstoexchangeideas and formalize agreements between Huntsville and Houston. When thethreecenters(KennedySpaceCenterjoinedthearrangementin1963)approveda solution, the panels would document the agreement. Huntsville found thepanels to its liking; in December 1963, von Braun called them “the onlyeffectivemediumofworkingouttechnicalproblems…whichcutacrosscenterlines.”Houstonwas lessenthusiastic.BySeptember1966SamuelPhillips, theApollo programdirector inWashington,wanted to eliminate themcompletely.Heprobablydislikedthepanels’independencefromHeadquartersandmayhavefearedthatthegroupswerenotproperlydocumentingallofApollo’sinterfaces.Nevertheless, inMarch 1967CharlesMathews established a panel system for

Skylab.His initialordercovered fourareaswhere thecentersworked togetherfrequently: mechanical, electrical, instrumentation and communications, andmission evaluation. Interfaces on launch operations equipment were to behandledbytheApollopanelforthetimebeing.TwoweekslaterMathewsaddedthree more panels: mission requirements, systems integration, and systemssafety.15

ByAugust 1969 therewasnoquestion atHeadquarters about theneed forintercenterpanels;withthenumberofinterfacesonSkylabtherehadtobesomeformal means of tying the centers’ work together. But realignment of somecenterresponsibilitiesinlate1968hadraisedanumberofquestionsaboutpanelrelationships and Schneider hoped to resolve them. Huntsville wanted todiscontinue the practice of co-chairmen in certain key areas and let theresponsible center direct panel activities. Houston had suggested doing awaywiththeSystemIntegrationPanelsinceitduplicatedthebaselineconfigurationmeetingsheldbyHeadquarters.Therewasalsosupporttoupgradeguidanceandcontrol activities—currently a subpanel of mission requirements—to anindependentpanel.Atameetingof5August,officialsdecidedagainstwholesalechangesinthepanelsystem;instead,theSystemsIntegrationPanelwasdeletedandapanelforplanningtestswasadded.16

Interfaces were part of the larger problem of configuration control.Configuration referred to the various characteristics of hardware: size,weight,shape, connecting points, and power requirements. During the design phase,engineersmade frequent configuration changes,many ofwhich affected otherparts. TheApollo 13 accident provided a classic example of a breakdown inconfiguration control. In 1965, engineers had increased the power used topressurizeanoxygentankwithoutchangingtheprotectivethermostaticswitchesonthetank’sheater.Duringnormaloperationstheerrorcausednoproblem;butanunusualoperation,aimedatcorrectingadifferentproblemsomedaysbeforelaunchin1970,appliedthehighervoltagelongenoughtoweldtheswitchesshutand damage some insulation. In space, the tanks exploded with near-fatalconsequences.17

ApolloandSkylabofficialsattempted toavoidsucherrors throughaseriesofconfigurationcontrolboards.Thesegroupsevaluatedchangestoanapproveddesignatoneoffourlevels,dependingontheimpactofthemodification.Level4modificationsaffectedneitherweightnorperformance, suchaschanging thescrews on an instrument frombrass to nickel alloy.Level 3 boards dealtwithmodificationsthatmightaffectthescheduleorcostofaparticularexperimentormodulebutwouldnotaffectotherhardware;attheselevelsthecentersimproved

many experiments without Headquarters approval. A level 2 change affectedothermajorhardwareandrequiredtheapprovalofthecenterprogrammanageror his representative. A good example of such a change resulted from aHuntsville inspection by vonBraun. Shown plans for a vacuum pump on thelower-bodynegative-pressuredevice,vonBraun took strongexception: “Rightthrough that wall you’ve got the greatest vacuum in the universe.” Engineersinitiatedalevel2changetodrillaholethroughtheworkshopwall.Whensuchchangeswereapprovedbya level2board, thedecisionwas transmitted to theHeadquartersofficeforreview.Level1actions,requiringSchneider’sapproval,involvedchangestohardware,software,orfacilitiesthatmightresultininabilityto meet the operations plan and mission objectives; changes that affectedmilestones;andchangesinexcessof$500000orthatwoulddoubletheagreed-oncostofanexperiment.18

Interfacecontrolandconfigurationdocumentswereanimportantpartofthedocuments system that Skylab inherited from Apollo. Paper work hadcharacterizedmajor projects of the post-WorldWar II era, andApollowas noexception; indeed, observers facetiously suggested that NASA was trying toreachthemoononstacksofpaper.TheSkylabProgramOfficeusedthreetypesof document to direct the activities of the center program offices. “SkylabProgramSpecifications”establishedmajorfunctionalandperformancestandardsforprogramhardware.Forexample,theAugust1969editionsettheprobabilityofcrewsafetyatalevelcomparabletoApollo,withspacecraftpartsandsystemsdesignedtowork995timesoutof1000andthereliabilityoftheworkshopandlaunch vehicle put at 0.995 and 0.990 respectively.* “Skylab Program WorkAuthorizations” identified center responsibilities for more than 50 major enditems, among them the one-g spacecraft trainer (Houston) and a workshopengineeringmockup (Huntsville). A second list in the authorization documentidentifiedover130missionmilestones,deadlinesforspecificactions.“MissionDirectives” provided detailed statements on objectives, flight plans, spacevehicleconfigurations,experiments,andcenterresponsibilities.19

When the paper threatened to drown the program, Schneider asked hismanagerstoreviewallrequirementsinthelightofthreequestions.Whatistheminimum information needed to meet general program responsibilities?Whatinformation do you need to meet specific technical responsibilities? Whatinformationdoyoubelieveotherofficeswillexpectyoutohaveavailable?TheHeadquarters office undertook a similar review of the documentationrequirements it leviedagainst thecenters. InspiteofNASA’s intentions,manyparticipants—particularly scientists—wereappalledby the amountof red tape.

An investigator working on the human-vestibular experiment at the NavyAerospace Medical Institute, on first seeing the “Experiment GeneralSpecifications,”was takenaback.HetoldHoustonofficials that thecostofhisexperimentwouldincreasetenfoldandsuggestedthatNASA“buildadirectlinebetweenPensacolaandHouston,tocarrythecarloadsofpaper….”20

Of the various management tools used in Skylab, probably the mostimportant—certainly the most prominent—was NASA’s formal system ofreviews. During Apollo, NASA had developed this system to serve as keymanagement checkpoints during program development. The first three,occurringduringthedesignphases,were:

1. Preliminary requirements review—a review of concepts considered and oftheconceptchosentomeetmissionobjectives;

2. Preliminary design review—an examination of the basic design conductedearlyinthedetaileddesignphase;

3. Critical design review—a technical review of specifications and drawingsneartheconclusionofthedetaileddesignphase.

InSkylab’s preliminary and critical design reviews, themodule or experimentunderreviewwasalsoexaminedforitscompatibilitywithotherportionsofthespacestation.Thenextreviewscameneartheendofhardwaredevelopment:

4. Configuration inspection—a comparison of manufactured end items(including test equipment as well as flight hardware) with specifications,drawings,andacceptancetesting;

5. Certification of flightworthiness—a determination prior to shipment fromthefactorythatflighthardwarewascomplete,qualified,andaccompaniedbysupportingdocumentation.

Whereas the first five reviews were conducted for each stage, module, andexperiment,thelasttwocoveredtheentireSkylaboperation:

6.Design certification review—held fourmonths before launch to certify thespacecraftdesignforflightworthinessandsafetyandtoassessthedesignofthe launch complex, mission control center, and Manned Space FlightNetwork;

7. Flight readiness review—held several weeks before launch to validate theoperationalreadinessofthetotalmissioncomplex.

With these sevenmilestones, NASA tracked the progress of Skylab hardware

fromdrawingboardtolaunchsite.21

Since Huntsville was responsible for most Skylab hardware, Lee Belewdirected a majority of the reviews. He appointed review board chairmen,scheduled review dates and sites, and ensured that experiment sponsors,contractors, and other NASA offices were represented. Design review teamsperformed thedetailedexaminationofblueprints, spendingmuchof their timewith“reviewitemdiscrepancies,” theprincipalmeans to recommendhardwarechanges. If aqualified individualdidnot like the locationofanexperimentorthelivingarrangementsoftheworkshop,hecouldsubmitadiscrepancyreport.Teams then screened the reports, combining similar ones, approving ordisapprovingmany,andsubmittingotherstothereviewboardfordecision.Theprocesswas fully documentedwith centermanagersmaintaining the status ofevery document as to number, title, category, date for completion, and theindividuals responsible for assigned actions. One or two individuals earned acertain notoriety with the center offices by recommending large numbers ofchanges.22

ThechangeovertothedryworkshoptouchedoffextensivereevaluationsatMcDonnell Douglas plants and inHuntsville. ByDecember 1969 the processhadadvancedsufficiently towarrantapreliminarydesignreviewof theclustersystems. Several hundred NASA and contractor representatives divided intogroupstoexaminerequirementsforandpossiblechangestothevarioussystems.Three days of discussion disclosed a number of significant items. WhereasHuntsvilleandMcDonnellDouglashadassumedtheastronautswouldentertheclusterinventedpressuresuits,Houstonwasplanninga“shirtsleeve”entry.TheMannedSpacecraftCenteralsoobjected to the layoutof the telescopemount’scontrolanddisplayconsole,sinceastronautscouldnotmonitoritandthepanelfor thestructural transitionsectionsimultaneously.*Anotherproblemstemmedfrom the decision to incline Skylab’s orbit 50° from the equator so as toaccommodate earth-resource experiments. The change posed problems forengineers working on the thermal control system. To maintain compartmenttemperatures within the comfort zone when in sunshine, the workshop wouldhave to give off more heat than had been planned. Modifications for thispurpose,however, increased theheating requirementsduringnighttimeperiodsbeyond the available power.A decisionwas postponed pendingmore detailedstudies.23

A number of other questions were discussed, but in retrospect the mostimportant decision concerned the electrical power system. From the wet-workshopdays,twoseparateelectricalsystemshadevolved;oneofthemserved

the lunar module and the telescope mount.With the elimination of the lunarmodule, two independent systems no longer made sense, but the “minimumchange”dictuminJulydiscouragedanyimmediatealterations.AttheDecemberreview, a proposal to combine the separate systems was approved in turn bylevel 3 and 2 configuration control boards.Afterweighing increased cost andcomplexity against the greater probability of mission success, Schneiderapprovedthechange.Itwoulddevelopthat,aftertheaccidentduringlaunch,thisdecisionwouldsavethemission.24

Theclustersystemsreviewgeneratedanumberofactionsoverthenextfewmonths, among them a detailed study of the power and thermal systems,reorientation and relocation of the ATM’s display panel, modifications of themultiple docking adapter including the retention of a side port for emergencydocking, and a thorough study of the ATM’s computer software. The workproceededundera tightschedulewhichreceivedattentionwhenSchneiderandBelewmetwiththeairlockteaminSt.Louison10–11December.Schneiderwasparticularlyworriedabouttheshorttimebetweencriticaldesignreviewsandthedeliveryofflighthardware.Ifmajorproblemsaroseatthereviews,contractorswouldprobablynotmeettheirdeliverydates.Accordingly,Schneiderwantedallpersonnelinvolvedinadesigntoreviewandcritiquetheirareasofresponsibilityregularly. Managers were to stress content “rather than extensive formalpreparationofpresentationmaterial.”25

InJanuary,SchneiderpressedBelewtoholdaseriesofreviewsthefollowingmonth, much like the Decembermeeting in Huntsville. The program directorwasconcernedthat“failuremodeandeffectsanalyses”*werelaggingandwoulddelaytherestofthedesignwork.Heconsideredreviewsinthisareamandatory,while follow-up reviews on the electrical power, environmental control, andattitude-controlsystemswerehighlydesirable.BelewdidnotshareSchneider’sconcern about work on failure modes. Although formal documentation wasusuallynotavailable,Huntsville’sdesignersandanalystswereworkingcloselytogether, and Belew had taken steps to have the failure mode documentsavailable 90 days before the critical design reviews.As for the other reviews,Belewwantedtoavoid“large,relativelyinefficientreviewswhichwouldinfactimpedemuchactivitywhichisalreadyplanned.”26

Belewpreferredtousemonthlycrew-stationreviews,agreedtobythecentermanagers inDecember. In thesemeetings,astronautswalked throughmockupsof flight hardware to ensure that the design met operational requirements.Attendancewasheld toaminimum;NASAandcontractor representativeshadsufficientranktomakeimmediatedecisionsonmattersnotinvolvinglargecost

or schedule delays. The next meeting of a configuration control board thenconfirmed their decisions.Whenmembers of the review team disagreed, theycouldappeal to theboard.However, review teamswereencouraged to resolvematters among themselves. The reviews used engineering mockups at eachcontractor plant, and each mockup included appropriate interfaces. (Thus theairlockmockupinSt.Louishadaworkshophatchandadjacentportionsofthedocking adapter.) Belew thought crew-station reviews provided a “morecontinuouseffortofresponsibleparties,concentratednearertheworkinglevel.”JudgingbyBelew’sweeklyreports inearly1970,Skylabwasonereviewafteranother.AtcontractorplantsinSt.Louis,Denver,andLosAngeles,teamsof40to50engineersandastronautsparticipatedincrew-stationreviewsonthemajormodules. In between these meetings, smaller groups coordinated dailychanges.27

Reviews of 70 Skylab experiments were an additional burden for theprogram offices. Managers were required to certify each review as tocompleteness and adequacy of documentation within 60 days of completion.Despiteattemptstotailorthereviewstotheimportanceoftheexperiment,basedon crew safety andmission success, the centers fell behind schedule. In JulySchneidertookthemanagerstotaskfor27uncertifiedreviews.28

Designworkclimaxedinmid-1970withcriticaldesignreviewsofSkylab’sprincipal hardware. Each lasted nearly a week and involved upwards of 300NASAand contractor engineers.Reviewboards considered an average of 200discrepanciesoneachmoduleandalthoughmostof theproposalswereminor,collectivelythechangescoulddelaySkylab’slaunchbyseveralmonths.29

THEPROBLEMOFCHANGES

ChangesposedthebiggestproblemforSkylabmanagersduringthefirsttwoyears of program development. At the time of the dry-workshop decision,Headquartershaddecreed “minimumchange.”The restrictionwas short lived,however; by October 1969 a dozen major changes were under consideration,amongthema120-daymissionforthefinalcrew,anearth-resourcepackageofexperiments, an orbit inclined 50° from the equator, operation of the solartelescopesinanunmannedmode,andtheadditionofa teleprinter.ThatmonthSchneiderapprovedaseriesofphysicalmodificationstotheworkshopincludingthe addition of a side access door and a window, the reversal of the “floor”equipmenttothenew,hard“ceiling,”andanewwardroomcombiningthesleep

compartment with the food management area. At Huntsville, the centerresponsible for keeping all of that hardware on schedule, Belew protested theextentofthechanges,statingthattheyconstitutedanewworkshopmission.Heestimated the changeswould delay the schedule by sixmonths and add $100milliontothecosts.30

Indeed,Schneiderhadnotgiventhecentersmuchslack.Twoweeksafterthedry-workshopdecision,heannouncedaworkingschedulewithaflight-readinesstargetofMarch1972.Bysettinghisdeadlinefourmonthsaheadoftheofficiallaunch date, Schneider sought to ensure against unforeseen problems.Huntsville’s reaction in August was positive; the working schedule appearedfeasible with the possible exception of the solar telescope mount. Houstonofficialswerelesssanguine.KennethS.Kleinknecht,*whowouldsoonreplaceThompson as Skylab manager, noted that “AAP schedules are fluid and arebeingestablishedbeforefulldefinitionofeithertheworkshoportheCSM.”Hesawnoslackleftinthescheduleforproblemsorchangesandconcluded,“withsuchanapproach,schedulescannotbemet.”InDecember—beforethechangeshad been fully assessed—Belew reported that his contractors were under an“extremelytightschedule.”ThecentersgainedbreathingroominJanuary1970whenFY1971budgetcutsforcedafour-monthslipintheworkingschedule;butbyMay,Houstonwaspushing for further delay and some itemswere three tofourmonthsbehindschedule.31

As design work proceeded, NASA officials debated the merits of furtherchanges.On27March1970—shortlyafteramajordecisiontomodifytheurineprocessing—Dale Myers announced that Skylab could accept no moreexperiments,since“hardwaredevelopmentactivitieshavereachedthestageandmaturitywhereanysignificantadditionsormodificationswillcauseascheduleslip.”InMay,however,Houstonsoughtfurtherchangesinhabitabilityaspectsofthe workshop. This brought loud protests fromHuntsville and led to amajorprogram review 7–8 July. The review team approved many of the proposedchanges, while reaffirming the launch date of July 1972. The director ofMarshall wrote Headquarters that the new changes would eliminate all slackfromSkylab’sschedule.Ifmodificationscontinued,Huntsvillewouldbeunabletomaintaineitherscheduleorbudget.Thefollowingmonth,heurgedGilruthtoassist him in reducing program changes since the limitations of the Skylabsystems“arenowbeingreached,orinsomecasesnearlyexceeded.”32

CorrespondencebetweenBelewandSchneider that summerpointedup theproblemoffunding,whichthechangesexacerbated.On17JulyBelewindicatedthat Huntsville would need more money if the center was to maintain the

schedule.SchneiderrepliedthattherewerenounallocatedSkylabresources,norwasitprudenttoexpectmore.HeaskedBelewtodeviseawayofmeetinghisprogram objectiveswithin present resources. The planwas to include specificmanpower restrictions formajor contractors and in-house personnel. From thesubsequent review, Belew concluded that the Skylab schedule and resourceswere, indeed, incompatible;Marshall needed $285million in FY 1971 funds,nearly$50millionmorethantheintendedallocation.Meanwhile,Schneiderhadfound an additional $25 million for Huntsville, halving Belew’s deficit. TheHuntsville manager proposed to spread the shortfall among all his majorprojects,bringingeachdownabout10%belowdesiredfunding.ThislookedallrightuntilearlyOctober,whenMcDonnellDouglas reported that itsallocationwould delay workshop delivery by two months, removing all the schedulemargin fromtheofficial launchdate.On7OctoberBelewreported thatunlessNASAcontrolledchangesmorestringently,itwouldnotmakea1972launch“atanyprice.”Duringateleconferenceonthe13th,Schneideradded$12milliontoHuntsville’sfundssothatBelewcouldspeeduphiscontractor’swork.(ThesumeventuallycamefromHouston’sallocation.)33

SchedulingpressureseasedinSeptember1970whenSchneiderdroppedtheideaofaworkinglaunchdate,setfourmonthsaheadoftheofficialschedule.AtHouston,Kleinknechtwasparticularly pleasedby the endof the two-schedulepolicy:

Whenpeopleknowthatthey’reworkingtoaschedulethatnobodyexpectstomake, you can’t keep themmotivated and people start playing gameswith theschedule, too….Theonlywaytorunaprogramis tohaveado-ableschedule;itcanbeambitious,[butitmustbe]onethateverybodycanfocus on and feel that if he does his part of the job we will remain onschedule.

Schneider attempted to retain some cushion by scheduling hardware into theCapethreemonthsbeforetherequireddate.34

Thecriticaldesignreviewsrecommendedmanysmallmodifications,butfewlarge changeswereproposed after the fall of 1970.AsSchneidernotedon15December:“TheflexibilitytoincorporatechangeswithoutimpactingthelaunchdateandcriticalprogramresourceshaspassedandeachproposedchangehastobeconsideredonthebasisofSkylabsystemsimpactandhoweachchangecanimpact other aspects of the total Skylab program.” Although Huntsville hadopposedmanyof theproposedchanges in1969and1970—largelybecauseof

theimpactonschedulesandcost—afterthemissiontheconsensuswasthatthechangeshadenhancedtheprogramwellbeyondtheircost.35

THEPROBLEMOFREENTRY

One change that had been debated and ruled out was providing forcontrollingthereentryoftheorbitalclusterwhenitfinallycamebacktoearth.Atnearly75000kilograms,Skylabwouldbetheheaviestobjecteverplacedintoorbit, and its high orbital inclination would take it over most of the earth’ssurface.The eventual reentryof theworkshop—or largepiecesof it—posed aproblemofamagnitudethatNASAhadnotpreviouslyhadtoface.Foryearsthehazardoffallingspacejunk—spentboosterstages,spacecraft,orsatellites—hadexisted, and treaties spelled out the responsibility of spacefaring nations forinjury or damage caused by their vehicles. Starting in late 1962 the mannedspaceflight centers and their contractors had studied the survival of earth-orbitingvehiclesandmeansofpredictingtheirimpactpointsorcontrollingtheirreentry. Predictionwas difficult, and providing for controlled reentry imposedsevere weight penalties. All the studies, however, indicated such a smallprobabilityofhumaninjurythatNASAmanagementacceptedtherisk, inspiteof White House and State Department fears of possible diplomaticrepercussions. Some measures were taken for payloads that seemed to createabnormalhazards.Theunmannedspacecraftusedon the test flightofGemini-Titan 1, and the 17 590-kilogram payload of SA-5 were both modifiedstructurally so that they would break up into small pieces on striking theatmosphere.36

No such solution was possible for Skylab, however, and early in 1970Administrator Thomas Paine called for a review of the reentry hazard and anassessmentofpossibleengineeringchangestominimizeit.TheresultingstudyconsideredtheS-IIboosterstage,thefoursegmentsofthepayloadshroud,andtheorbitalworkshop,concludingthattherewas1chancein55thatafragmentofSkylabwouldstrikesomeone.37

Asforcountermeasures,theonlysuresolutionwastoaddretro-rocketsandcontrolsystemssothatgroundcontrollerscouldbringthefragmentsdowninapreselectedlocation—preferablyawidestretchofocean.FortheS-IIstage,thestudy group calculated, such systemswouldweigh about 9000 kilograms andwould cost perhaps $10 million; for the workshop the weight penalties weresimilar and the costs even higher. The added weight of these systems would

severely tax the attitude-control and electrical power systems, requiringextensiveredesignandaddingmonthstotheschedule.38

Thestudygroupconcluded thatNASAshouldaccept the rather small risk,whichwassomewhatlessthanthatexpectedfromallothersources—meteoritesandspacejunkalreadyinorbit*—duringSkylab’sexpectedlifetime.Thecostofreducing the risk by 50% was extremely high. The group recommended,however, that criteria for acceptable risk should be established early in futureprograms,sothatplanninganddevelopmentcouldincorporatethem.39

These conclusions were corroborated in all important respects later in theyear by a study performed for Marshall by Lockheed Missiles and SpaceCompany.Lockheed’s experts concluded that 306piecesof theSkylabcluster,totaling22600kilograms,wouldsurvivereentry.Thelargestpiecewouldbethefilmvault,asbigasalargeexecutivedeskandweighingasmuchasacompactcar. Lockheed’s study did not assign a significantly higher risk figure thanpreviousstudies,however.40

In lateNovember 1970DaleMyers forwarded formal recommendations toActingAdministrator George Low. These largely agreedwith the conclusionsreached 11 months earlier—namely, that the risk was small enough to beaccepted in view of the weight and cost penalties imposed by redesign. LowacceptedMyers’s recommendations and ordered the Office of Manned SpaceFlight toworkwiththeOfficeofPublicAffairsandtheOfficeofInternationalAffairs to develop a plan for the public affairs aspects of the Skylab reentryproblem.41

The first phase of program development ended in late 1970 with thecompletionof designwork. In 16monthsSkylabprogramoffices haddefinedrelationswithApollo,organizedmanagement tools, steered thecluster throughits design phase, decided what to do about the reentry problem, and begunpreparation for tests. Skylab’s appearance and objectives had undergoneconsiderablemodification,buttheperiodofmajorchangewasover.Aheadlayhardwarefabricationandtests.

*AAP had become the butt of frequent jokes.Opponents referred to it as “AlmostAProgram” and“Apples,Apricots,andPears.”AcartooncirculatedinHoustonshowedtwoMartiansobservingtheAAPspacestation.One,withapuzzledexpression,wastellingtheother:“Idon’tknowwhatthehellitis,butIthinktheycallitAAP.”

*MuellerbecamevicepresidentofGeneralDynamicsinDec.1969.Myershadbeenvicepresidentandgeneralmanager of theSpaceShuttle programatNorthAmericanRockwellCorp. since June1969, andearlierpresident andgeneralmanager for theApollo commandand servicemodules.Hehad first joinedNorthAmericanAviationinJune1943asanaeronauticalengineer.

*On27Oct.1969thelaunchvehicle’screwsafetyfactorwaschangedto0.995.

*Thestructuraltransitionsection,oneoffourcompartmentsintheairlock,waslocatedattheforwardend of the airlock tunnel. It included a heat exchanger, molecular sieve, carbon dioxide sensor, circuitbreakers,andseveralpanels.

* In “failure mode and effects analyses,” all imaginable hardware failures were listed. Engineersexaminedmethods todetectandeliminateeachshortcoming through redesign, removalof low-reliabilityparts,oroperationalprocedurestoworkaround(bypass)thedifficulty.

*KleinknechthadbeenmanagerofthecommandandservicemodulesintheApolloprogramsinceFeb.1967.WithaB.S.inmechanicalengineeringfromPurdue,hehadgonetoworkforNACA-LewisResearchCenterin1942.AttheFlightResearchCenter,EdwardsAFB,Calif.,heworkedonthedevelopmentoftheX-15.AttheMannedSpacecraftCenter,hemanagedtheMercuryProjectOfficeandwasdeputymanagerforGemini.

*A1972studydeterminedthat547spacecraft,282rocketbodies,and1931fragmentswereorbitingtheearth;1911of themhadbeenlaunchedbytheU.S.and849byothercountries.Between1967and1972,826piecesofspacejunkhadreenteredtheatmosphere;of these,184wereAmerican(56NASAand128DoD).Atleast31fragmentshadbeenrecoveredandtentativelyidentified.

7

LivingandWorkinginSpace

Skylab’s experiments and spacecraft systems received the best engineeringattention NASA and its contractors could give them, to make sure they werefunctional, efficient, reliable, and safe. But the workshop was not just aworkshop; itwashomeaswell,wherecrewswouldbeconfinedforas longasthreemonths.Makingitapleasantplacetolivemightbeimportantinmakingitefficient.

GeorgeMuellerbecameconcernedabouttheamenitiesoflivinginspacein1967but,recognizingthedifficultiesinherentinthewetworkshop,didnotpressthe point strongly. Once those difficulties disappeared, however, he and theHeadquartersprogramofficeputsteadypressureonthefieldcenterstoimproveliving conditions in the dry workshop. Not only was it important for Skylabcrewstohavesomethingbetterthanaboilerroomtolivein,therewasalsothechance to learn something about living conditions in orbit for the benefit offuture programs. Nobody knew much about housekeeping in a space station.Mueller found willing allies in Houston, where man had always been theprincipalconcern;butHuntsvillehadtobeconvinced.Constrainedbyschedule,budget,andresources,MarshallresistedtheextensivechangesthatHeadquartersandHoustonproposed.ImprovementsinSkylab’slivingconditionsweredebatedforayearbeforebeingacceptedasessentialtomissionsuccess.

HABITABILITYOFEARLYSPACECRAFTThe three clustermodules enclosed347cubicmetersof space—more than

150timesasmuchasaGeminispacecraft,nearly60timesthatinsidetheApollocommandmodule.Overtwo-thirdsofthiswasintheliquidhydrogentank,6.6meters in diameter and 8.9 meters high, which became the orbital workshop.Herethecrewswouldeatandsleepanddomuchoftheirwork.

Earlyspacecrafthadbeendesignedtobeoperated,notlivedin.Weightandvolumelimitations in theMercuryandGemini“capsules”—theepithet, thoughdespised by crews, was apt—meant that only the bare requirements forprotecting and sustaining life could be provided. Michael Collins, pilot onGemini 10, compared the two-man Gemini craft to the front seats of aVolkswagen.ThattinyspacewashomeforFrankBormanandJamesLovellfor14 days on Gemini 7. Borman later admitted they had made it on sheermotivation;afteraccomplishingtheirprimepurpose,thefirstorbitalrendezvousoftwospacecraft,therestofthemissionhadbeenatestofendurance.1

TheApollocommandmodule,thoughjustovertwicethevolumeofGemini,was still primarily a functional spacecraft. Some improvements made it a bitmore pleasant—hotwater, for example—and its extra space gave the crew ofthree some freedom to move around and exercise stiff muscles; but fewconcessionsweremadetomerecomfort.Forthemostpart,astronautsacceptedwhatever discomforts were inherent in their spacecraft, unless they interferedwithperformance;whatmatteredwasaccomplishingthemissions.Quitealotofminorinconveniencecouldbetoleratedbyamanonhiswaytothemoon.

Whenearlyplannerslookedaheadtoorbitingspacestations,theirattentionwasdevotedtoproblemsmuchmorepressingthancrewcomfort.Of41paperspresentedataspacestationsymposiumin1960,onlyoneaddressedthequestionofmakingthestationapleasantplacetolive.Thispapernotedthatoperatinganorbiting stationwould bemuch like keeping a lighthouse (“a rather humdrumtask”)anddiscussedsomeofthefactorsthatwouldhavetobeimprovedsothatpeoplecouldbeinducedtogointospace“aftertheromancehaswornoff.”Someofthesefactorswereintangible,saidtheauthor,buttheywerenolessimportantforthat.Nineyearslaterthesituationhadchangedlittle.Spacecrafttechnologystill occupied the engineers’ attention, while the questions of everyday livingwereleftforsomeoneelsetolookafter.2

Habitability, livability—orwhatever name is given to the suitability of theenvironmentfordailyliving—is,asoneNASAdesignerremarked,“anebuloustermatbest,”onenotusuallyfoundintheengineer’svocabulary.Besidesfactorswithin the engineer’s usual responsibilities, such as the composition andtemperatureoftheatmosphereandthelevelsoflightandnoise,habitabilityalsoencompassestheeaseofkeepinghouse,theconvenienceofattendingtopersonalhygiene,andtheprovisionforexerciseandoff-dutyrelaxation.Experienceandintuition both suggested that these factors would become more important asmissionsgrewlonger.Lookingaheadtospacestations,NASAdesignersneededbasic informationon theseproblemsof living inspace,asGeorgeMuellerhad

toldcongressionalcommitteesmorethanonce.3

HABITABILITYOFTHEWETWORKSHOP

The earliest spent-stage proposal had not called for using the S-IVB asround-the-clock living quarters, although it had provided for testing somehabitabilityfeatures.Asplanningprogressedthrough1966,however,theideaofsettinguphousekeepinginthespentstagetookhold.InSeptemberofthatyearthe Manned Space Flight Experiments Board approved an MSC-sponsoredexperiment entitled “Habitability/Crew Quarters,” having the objective ofobtainingdesign criteria for advanced spacecraft and long-term space stations.Houston’s presentation of this experiment included sketches showing theworkshop divided into compartments by means of fabric panels, which werestowedatlaunchincanistersmountedontheairlocktrusses.4

Marshall toohadan experiment that includedcrewquarters: theworkshopitself,onthebooksintheearlydaysas“ExperimentM402,OrbitalWorkshop.”Forawhilethetwooverlappingexperimentswereapointofcontentionbetweenthe centers. Crew quarters were obviously a part of the workshop, which, asMarshall read the Lake Logan agreement of 1966, was a mission modulebelonging to Huntsville. Houston saw habitability as an experiment with aprincipalinvestigatoratMSC;besides,itlogicallycameunderthejurisdictionofMSC’sCrewSystemsDivision.Foroverayear the twoprogramofficescouldnot agree on what the habitability experiment was or who had charge of it.FinallyCharlesMathews issued anorder givingMarshall overallmanagementand integration responsibility for “Experiment M487, Habitability/CrewQuarters,”whiledividingalistofspecifichardwareitemsbetweenthecenters.Houston kept the life-support systems, along with food management, wastemanagement,personalhygiene,andsleeprestraints;Marshallgottherest,whichwasmostlythestructure,plumbing,andwiringofthecrewquarters.5

Houstoncoulddoverylittlewithitsshareoftheworkshopdutiesin1967.Itwasnotstatedcenterpolicy,buteveryoneunderstoodthatApolloApplicationshad low priority until Apollo was back on track. The fact was, as oneMSCdivision chief said, “if we didn’t get the Apollo program done, a lot of thediscussionaboutAAP[wouldbe]academic.” Itwaswell into1968before thecentercouldspareanymanpowertoworkonprojectssuchashabitability.6

At Huntsville meanwhile, Belew’s engineers went ahead, using their ownideaspluswhateverhelpMSCcouldgive.Byearly1967theplantousefabric

curtainstosubdividetheworkshophadbeendroppedinfavorofmetalpartitionsinstalled in the tank before launch. These were fabricated of aluminum,machined into a triangular grid pattern that didnot obstruct fuel flow; foldingsheet-metalpartitionsmadeitpossibletoclosetwoofthecompartmentsduringoccupancy.Theworkshopventilationsystem,asetoffabricpanelsforminganannular space next to the wall, was also put in place before flight. Duringactivationoftheworkshopthecrewwouldinstallfanstocirculatetheairandriga curtain under the floor to form a mixing chamber for the circulatingatmosphere.7

Houston’s first look at Marshall’s detailed plans came at the preliminarydesign review at Huntsville, 8–10May 1967. Design details were necessarilytentative, but it was evident that Marshall had paid very little attention tohabitability. Houston, however, was more concerned with fire hazards thananything else, and about the only comment concerning living conditions dealtwiththetemperaturecontrolsystem.8

During that summer and fall GeorgeMueller took a strong interest in theworkshop, especially the layout of the living quarters. After examining themockup in July, he suggested adding a second floor (a ceiling on the crewquarters) to provide extrawork space; but since thatwouldhave aggravated aserious weight problem, his suggestion was not adopted. Later he proposedinstallingtwogrids2.6metersabovetheliquid-oxygen-tankdome,creatingtwocompartmentswithfloorsbacktoback.ThisbecametheacceptedconfigurationuntilJuly1969.9

Looking at the mockup, Mueller was appalled by the barren, mechanicalcharacterof theworkshop interior. “Nobodycouldhave lived in that thing formore than two months,” he said of it later; “they’d have gone stir-crazy.”Expressing thisconcern toLeeBelewandCharlesMathews,hesuggested thatanindustrialdesignexpertbebroughtintogivetheworkshop“somereasonabledegree of creature comfort.” Late in August, Mathews wrote to Belewrecommending action onMueller’s suggestion and offering the names of twocommercial firms. Marshall arranged for Martin Marietta, the integrationcontractor, to engage an industrial design consultant on subcontract. His taskwould be to provide “comments and recommendations based on the latestindustrial design concepts, relative to floor plan arrangements, color schemes,lighting,noiselevels,andallotherfactorsrelatingtohumancomfortinconfinedquarters.”A two-month study beginning on 1December 1967would evaluatethewetworkshop.10

CONTRIBUTIONOFINDUSTRIALDESIGNERS

For the habitability study, Martin Marietta chose one of the best knownindustrialdesignfirmsintheworld—RaymondLoewy/WilliamSnaith,Inc.,ofNew York. Loewy, a pioneer of industrial design in the United States, hadworkedonfunctionalstylingforavarietyofindustrialproductsforfortyyears,besides designing stores, shopping centers, and office buildings. Approachinghis75thbirthdayin1968,Loewyhadreducedthescopeofhisownprofessionalactivitysomewhat,buthetookapersonalinterestintheworkshopproject.EarlyinDecember1967heandFredToerge,thefirm’svicepresident,visitedalltheAAP contractors’ plants, ending their tour at Huntsville with briefings on theprogramandanexaminationofwhatMarshallhaddonetothatpoint.LoewyandToergethenstoppedoffinWashingtontodiscusstheirimpressions(whichweremostlybad)withMueller,Mathews,andotherAAPofficials.11

Loewy/SnaithproducedaformalreportinFebruary1968,citingmanyfaultsintheexistinglayoutandsuggestinganumberofimprovements.Theinteriorofthe workshop was poorly planned; a working area should be simple, withenclosedandopenareas“flow[ing]smoothlyas integratedelements…againstneutralbackgrounds.”Whiletheyfoundacertain“honestyinthestraightforwardtreatmentofinteriorspace,”theoverallimpressionwasnonethelessforbidding.The basic cylindrical structure clashedwith rectangular elements andwith theharsh pattern of triangular gridwork liberally spread throughout theworkshop.Thevisualenvironmentwasbadlycluttered.Lightswerescatteredapparentlyatrandomovertheceiling,andcolorsweremuchtoodark.Thisdepressinghabitatcould, however, be much improved simply by organized use of color andillumination.Loewy/Snaithrecommendedaneutralbackgroundofpaleyellow,with brighter accents for variety and for identifying crew aids, experimentequipment, and personal kits. Lighting should be localized atwork areas, andlightswithawarmerspectralrangesubstitutedforthecoldfluorescentsusedinthemockup.12

Martin Marietta presented these findings along with some of their ownrecommendations atHuntsville on 28 February, urging immediate attention tothe consultant’s recommendations. The color scheme was of first priority; itwouldnotbeeasytofindafinishthatcouldstandimmersioninliquidhydrogen,andtherewasnotmuchtimetolook.Thefloorplanshouldberevisedassoonaspossible. Loewy recommended creating a wardroom—a space for eating,relaxing, andhandling routineofficework—andMartin’sengineersconcurred.Betteryet,thefloorplanshouldbemadeflexiblebytheuseofmovablepanels,

sothatdifferentarrangementscouldbetested.Evaluatingasinglelayoutwasnotagoodwaytoacquireinformationaboutthedesignofspacestations.13

These suggestions were received at Marshall with a certain amount ofperplexity. To the extent that they had considered styling and interior decor,Huntsville engineers had assumed that Douglas, an experienced builder ofcommercialaircraft,wouldtendtothem.Andsincenoneoftheastronautswhohadexaminedthemockupshadattachedanyimportancetosuchthings,Marshallhad assumed that theywere of small concern. Fairly soon, however, programofficials recognized that there was something to the Loewy/Snaith study andbegan towork on the color scheme.Because of the liquid-hydrogen problem,this turned out to be a major headache for the duration of the wet-workshopplans.14

Mueller was pleased with Loewy/Snaith’s work, and a new contract wasdrawn up engaging the firm through 1968. By nowMSC was taking greaterinterest in the crew quarters, and the newLoewy /Snaith contract specificallyprovided that the consultants would work with the principal investigator forMSC’shabitabilityexperiment.15

In June 1968 a new principal investigator was appointed for experimentM487atMSC:CaldwellC.Johnson,chiefofspacecraftdesignintheAdvancedSpacecraftTechnologyDivision.16Caldwell(thefirstl issilent)JohnsonwasatidewaterVirginianwhohadjoinedNACAin1939, twoyearsaftergraduatingfromhighschool.HehadbeenamemberofGilruth’sdesignteamsinceMercurydaysandhadworkedonApollofrom1961to1963,whenhebecameassistantchief of the Advanced Spacecraft Technology Division. Johnson was an ideaman,whosefortewasproducingnoveldesignconceptsforallkindsofsystems;hetooklittleinterestinoverseeinghardwaredevelopment.HisnewassignmentprobablyreflectedGilruth’sdesiretohaveanexperienceddesignerdoanend-to-endjobontheworkshop’screwquarters.17

HisfirstlookattheworkshopconvincedJohnsonthathabitabilityhadbeengivenno thoughtat all. In thecourseof theirwork,heandhiscolleagueshadbuilt up a store of informationondesign factors for all kindsof crewactivityundercircumstancesofconfinementand isolation;but theirdatamightaswellnothaveexisted.Marshall,lackingexperienceinmannedspacecraft,apparentlyhad taken ideas from any available source—including the astronauts, whosetalents as spacecraft designers, Johnson felt, were limited at best. But sinceHuntsville’s engineers regarded crew quarters as part of their designresponsibility, they were annoyed when Loewy/Snaith and Caldwell Johnsonundertook to set them straight. Johnson understood their annoyance, butwent

aheadwithhissuggestionsinspiteofit.18

It took the rest of 1968 for Johnson to establish the boundaries of hishabitability experiment and to define its content. The following May hesummarizedhisapproach.19Habitability,hesaid,wasnotanexperiment in theusualsense;itwassimplynotpracticaltotestseveraldifferentdesignconcepts.Instead, MSC’s best design judgment would go into the workshop, and themissionswouldevaluatethatjudgment.Johnsontookhistasktobethecreationofanoperationalsystemthatwouldreducethechoresofdailylivingtoalevel“entirely incidental” to spaceflight operations. He proposed to deal with ninemajor components of habitability: environment, architecture, mobility andrestraint, food and water, clothing, personal hygiene, housekeeping,communicationwithinthespacecraft,andoff-dutyactivity.Bysystematizingtheman-spacecraftrelationship,Johnsonhopedtobringsomeengineeringrigorintoanotherwisechaoticfield.20

HABITABILITYOFTHEDRYWORKSHOP

Thelimitationsofthewetworkshopcrampedthehabitabilityexperiment,astheydidalmosteverythingelse,andafter thewet-to-drychangeitseemedthatmuchmorecouldbedone;butMarshall showedno inclination to improve theworkshop.Amonthafterthechange,MSCcriticizedthelayoutas“tooaustere”;far from providing the best that current technology could offer, “the presentconcept[lookslike]acanvastentcity.”Thefloorplanmadenosense;thefoodmanagement compartment was too small and the sleeping compartments toolarge. Later the same month, preparing for the preliminary design review ofMarshall’s habitability support system,* MSC found the workshop still“designed to the threshold of acceptability…. The dry workshop has none of[Apollo’s] constraints, and yet an … austere design persists.” Huntsville,however, had no plans to make substantial changes. Belew envisioned “onlyminorimpact[onhabitability]asaresultofthe“dry”workshopconfiguration,”andintendedtousemostofthewet-workshophardwareinthedryworkshop.21

Early that fall it became obvious that there were at least two schools ofthoughtonhabitability.InMueller’sview,theworkshopshouldbealaboratoryto test concepts and devices,with a view to establishing criteria for design offuturespacestations.BothheandSchneiderputhabitabilityhighonthelistofSkylabpriorities.Houstondidnotbelievethislaboratoryconceptwaspractical,butagreedwiththeimportanceHeadquartersattachedtoimprovedhabitability.

Thebeneficiariesof thisconcern—theastronauts—caredlessaboutstylingandappearance than efficiency; they wanted a spacecraft in which they could dotheir jobs without a lot of petty annoyances. They were, in fact, somewhatdisdainful of the attention given to such amenities as interior color schemes.†SincetheastronautswerereviewingcrewquartersconceptsbeforeanyoneelseatMSCwasdeeply involved, theiradvicewasoften(toooften,some thought)followed at Marshall. Partly this was because Marshall engineers were a bitoverawed by personal contact with astronauts; partly it was because theengineershopedtheastronautswouldinfluenceMSC’sSkylabprogramofficetoaccept Huntsville’s decisions.Marshall was reluctant tomake any but clearlynecessarychanges—whichdidnotyetincludehabitabilityimprovements.22

BySeptember1969GeorgeMuellerwasconcernedthatHuntsvillewasnotactingonLoewy/Snaith’sideas,sohecalledameetingonhabitabilityformid-October. Schneider spelled out the issues for the program offices on 30September,notingthatprovisionsforcrewcomfortleftmuchtobedesired.Hedidnot intendtoabrogatetheminimum-changephilosophyestablishedinJuly,but“significantandnecessaryimprovements[canbemade]withrelativelylittlecostorscheduleimpact.”Crewcomfortwasnottheonlyconsideration.Marshallshouldkeepinmindthat“apublicimagewillbeformedbyTVtransmissions”fromtheworkshopinorbit.TherecommendationsofbothRaymondLoewyandCaldwell Johnsonwere tobegiven full consideration;wayscouldbe found tokeep costs down and still improve the workshop.23 Schneider had a way ofemphasizingbyunderstatement,andthismemoindicatedthatHeadquarterswasmorethanalittleimpatientwiththetreatmenthabitabilitywasgetting.

The workshop principals (including Raymond Loewy, who came atMueller’s invitation)met inWashingtonon14Octoberforageneralreviewofthehabitabilitysupportsystem.Muellerlefttheclearimpressionthathewasnotsatisfied with the handling of crew quarters, remarking more than once thathabitability was the most critical factor in future manned spaceflight—anattitudeheartening to theMSCdelegation,whosepresentations focusedon theshortcomingsof current design inmany areas.24During the day all aspects ofhabitability were discussed, including some that had major impact on theworkshop structure. Both Loewy and Johnson had suggested rearranging thefloorplantoprovideawardroom;bothhadalsoendorsedaddingalargewindowto allow the crew to enjoy the view from orbit, something that had beenimpossible in thewetworkshop. Thewardroomwas easily agreed to, but thewindowcreatedanimpasse.Whileeveryoneagreedthatitwouldbeverynicetohave,Belewpointed out that awindowposed one of the toughest problems a

spacecraftdesignercouldface.Itwastoocostly,itwouldweakenthestructure,itwould take too long to develop and test, and it was not essential to missionsuccess.Counterargumentscouldnot rebuthisposition.Finally,MuelleraskedLoewy for an opinion. The response was unequivocal; it was unthinkable,Loewysaid,nottohaveawindow.Itsrecreationalvaluealonewouldbeworthitscostonalongmission.Withthat,MuellerturnedtoBelewandsaid,“Putinthe window.” Schneider formally authorized the window and the wardroom,alongwithseveralotherchanges,*on31October.25

Not many habitability questions had to be settled at the associateadministrator’slevel,butmostofthemdidinvolveagreatdealoftwo-andthree-sidedargument—usuallyCaldwellJohnsonononesideandMarshallengineersonanother,withthecrewssometimesonathird.Seeminglyminordetailsoftenproduceddisagreement. Johnsonhad topersuade thecrews that the testpilot’straditionalone-piece flight coverallswerenot suited to long-term living in theworkshop.Inthistheyacquiesced,buttheywouldnotgiveupthepocketsonthelower trouser leg—ideal for a pilot strapped into an airplane cockpit, but(Johnson believed) a useless impediment to moving around freely in zero g.Johnson and Fred Toerge designed a basic two-piece uniform to which amatchingjacketcouldbeadded.Itwasbothpracticalandattractive;Johnsonhadone of his staff wear a prototype to conduct a briefing in May 1969, and it“broughtdownthehouse,”ashetoldToergelater.Subsequentversionsretainedthethree-piecedesign,butJohnsonwasdisappointedwhenthecrewsspoiledtheeffectbycoveringtheshirtandjacketwithnametagsandbadges.26

Lowerdeck(aftcompartment)oftheworkshoptrainer,withcrewquartersintheforeground.Notethelackofchairsaroundthehexagonalgalley table—chairsarepointless inzerogravity.Astronautswouldsleepstrappedtothewallsofthecubiclesatleft,savingmorefloorspace.Thebathroomisinthecenter.Severalexperiments would be conducted in the work area at the top. Against the far wall is the lower-bodynegative-pressure device used inM092. In the center of the floor, partially hidden by a partition, is thehatchintotheliquid-oxygentank,whichonSkylabservedasanoversizetrashreceptacle.72-H-87.

When it came to matters of purely personal preference, such as off-dutyrelaxation and entertainment, Johnson was content to let crewmen have theirchoice.Heproposedanentertainmentcenterinthewardroom,equippedtoshowmoviesorprovidemusic,but itdrewnoenthusiasticresponse.Nordidcardorboard games; crew preferences tended strongly toward reading and recordedmusic—provided everyone could have his own private tape player; musicaltastes were quite disparate. As it turned out, this was about as muchentertainment as anyone wanted, or had time for. Amusing themselves in offhourswasnoproblemforanyofthecrews.27

Keeping clean was of more concern. Though Houston’s medical expertswere satisfied that sponge baths were enough to keep down serious

dermatologicalproblems,MuellerandSchneiderwantedtoprovidesomewaytotake a shower. InApril 1969Schneider toldBelew to look into a lightweight,low-cost “whole-body bather” of some kind—not something on which themission would depend, but which would permit the concept to be evaluated.CaldwellJohnson,althoughhethoughtitwasnotagoodidea,providedadesignconceptandBelewdutifully sent it toMcDonnellDouglas foracostestimate.Thecontractorreturnedanestimateofover$3millionforaspacebathandwaterreprocessor. Belew asked for and got permission to reject this proposal, butSchneidercontinuedtopressforanexperimentaldevicethatcouldbetriedafewtimesonthefirstmission.Intheevent,asimpleshowerwentintotheworkshopandwasusedonallthreeflights,butitgotmixedreviewsfromthecrews.28

Manyaspectsofhabitabilitywere troublesomebecause therewerenoclearanalogies for the workshop missions and little experience to draw on.Submarines seemed to be reasonably close parallels, but when astronaut PaulWeitztalkedwithknowledgeableNavypeopleearlyintheprogram,helearnedlittle. Apart from some figures for optimum light levels and maximum noiselimits,what theNavy hadwasmostly “anecdotal data”—sea stories. In 1969,however, when Grumman sponsored an oceanographie mission by the Swissscientist and engineer Jacques Piccard, Marshall participated, hoping to gainsomebasicknowledgeofhabitability.Piccard’svoyage,calledtheGulfStreamDriftMission, used a six-man submarinenamedBenFranklin. It set out fromFloridaon16July1969withaMarshallengineerinthecrew,and31dayslater,havingdrifted2700kilometerssubmergedintheGulfStream,surfacedoffNovaScotia.29

Astronaut Jack Lousma, pilot on the second crew, in the shower.When the curtain was attached to theceiling, the flexiblehosewithapush-button showerheadcouldbeused.Waterwas thendrawnoffbyavacuum system. The old-Jashionedwashcloth continued toworkwell under exotic conditions. SL3-108-1295.

Piccard visited MSC on 25 February 1970, and Caldwell Johnson tookparticularnoteofeverycomplainthemadeabout livingconditionsaboardBenFranklin.ReportingthesecommentstotheSkylaboffice,JohnsonpassedalongPiccard’s statement that many of the faults had been pointed out before themission, butGrumman engineers seemed unable to remedy them—or even tounderstandthecomplaints.Havinghadlittlesuccessgettinghisownideasintopractice in1969andreflectingonFranklin’ssimilaritytoSkylab, Johnson toldtheMSCSkylabmanager,“ifIhadn’tknownbetter,IwouldhavethoughtIwaslisteningtoadebriefingofthefirstWorkshopmissionin1973.”30

THEFOODSYSTEMNothing gave the workshop developers more trouble than the human

digestive tract—and the experimenters whose main concerns were with whatwentintoitandwhatcameoutofit.Foodmanagementandwastemanagementwould have been complicated enough as independent systems, but theimposition of stringent medical requirements made things much worse. Thewastemanagementsystem(seechap.8)producedmajordesignproblemsdowntoafewmonthsbeforelaunch;thefoodsystemwasbroughtundercontrolbytheendof1971.

Contemplatingtwo-monthmissions,almosteveryoneagreedthatspacefoodhad tobe improved. InMercuryandGemini, crewshadnotcomplainedaboutfood, even though it was designed to meet the engineering requirements ofspaceflight rather than to appeal to the palate. Compressed, processed, andpackaged, space food was an engineering triumph: it took up little space, itwould survive launch without disintegrating, and it would last almostindefinitely.Furthermore,itprovidedbalancednutritiontosustainlifeupto90days—provided, as oneofficial put it, away couldbe found “to influence thecrewstoeat[it].”31

ThefirstthreemannedApolloflightsin1968and1969broughtcomplaintsabout thefood.Thiswassomewhatsurprising,becausethefoodwasmuchthesame as in Gemini, and some of the same astronauts had found it quiteacceptable.Seekinganoutsideopinion,MSCnutritionistspersuadedDonaldD.

Arabian,chiefofMSC’sTestDivision,toevaluateApollorations.Althoughheadmitted to being “something of a human garbage can,” Arabian found theexperience one he did not care to repeat.He had agreed to subsist onApollofood for fourdays,but theprospectquicklybecameunappealing.The sausagepattiesinhisfirstbreakfastresembled“coarsegranulatedrubberwithasausageflavor,”whichleftasickeningaftertastethatpersistedforanhour.AttheendofthefirstdayArabiannotedamarkedlossofappetite;bythethirdday,eatingwasa real chore.Meal preparation offered no pleasant anticipation; therewere noaromas tostimulate theappetiteandno texturalvariety toprovidesatisfaction.Thoseitemsthatmostcloselyresembledoff-the-shelffoodswereexcellent,butthosepreparedespeciallyforspaceflightcouldonlybecalledbad.Arabiancouldnot understand why such common items as peanuts and chocolate had to begroundupandconvertedintobite-sizecubes,whichstucktotheteeth.32

Improving the food and solving the problems of long-term storage wouldhavebeenchallengeenoughtofood-systemdevelopers;superimposedonthosewere the rigorous requirements of themedical experiments. From the earliestdaysofAAP,medicalscientistshadplannedtoconductamineralbalancestudy,measuring theastronauts’ intakeandoutputofcalciumandnitrogenaspartofthe effort to understand the effects of long periods ofweightlessness onman.Gemini had shown that astronauts lost calcium frombones and nitrogen frommuscle—not enough tobeoperationallydangerouson a lunar landingmissionbutpotentiallyseriousforlongerflights.NothingwasdoneinApollo,however,and in 1969 the medics knew no more about the process than in 1966. TwoSkylabexperiments,M071andM073,weredesignedtodeterminehowlongthelossescontinued,howserioustheywere,andwhetheranythingcouldbedonetoarrestorreversethechanges.

Experiment M073 measured the urinary output of several substances ofmetabolic importance; its requirements affected mainly the urine and fecescollection systems. M071, on the other hand, required accurate control ofmineral intake as well as accurate measurement of output. Mineral-balancestudies are common but exacting procedures. The subjects, usually hospitalpatientsconfinedtobed,aregivenaconstant,carefullymeasuredsupplyoftheconstituentsunderstudy (calciumandnitrogen),and their totaloutputofurineand feces is collected, accuratelymeasured, and carefully analyzed.Even in awell equipped hospital such studies are difficult; on Skylab, experimentersproposed to conduct them on active astronauts engaged in a host of otheractivitiesatthesametime.33

For medical purposes the best diet was made up of homogeneous items

whose composition could be accurately determined and controlled—pureedvegetables,puddings, andcompressed,bite-size solids.Dehydrated foodswereacceptable,providedtheywerereasonablyuniform,butheterogeneousitemslikespaghetti andmeat balls or turkeywith gravy posed serious problems for theexperimenters. The diet that best suited the scientists, however, was the verykindthatcouldbedependedontoprovokestrongcrewresistance.Formissionsof four to eightweeks,management atHouston believed the crews should bepampered, and good food was one way to make long missions tolerable—orperhapsmore accurately, bad food was a sure way tomake them intolerable.Mueller, Schneider, and Caldwell Johnson, probably reflecting the complaintspassedonby theApollocrews,began tocampaign formoreconventionalandappealingmealsthatcouldbeeateninmoreorlessnormalfashion,ratherthanpastestobesqueezedfromtubesorcubestobeeatencold.Itcouldbedone;theApollo8crewhadenjoyedahotmealofturkeyandgravy,eatenwithaspoon,and the effect on morale was remarkable. Johnson recognized a challenge indesigningafoodsystemthatwouldremovemanyoftheengineeringrestrictionsthathad limited spacemenus, and in the springof1969hebegan formulatingsomeideas.34

By the time the dry workshop was baselined, the food system was notdefined indetail, though itsmajorconstraintswereunderstood. InApril1969,PaulC.Rambautnotedthatmedicalrequirementsandhabitabilityconsiderationssometimesconflicted.The latter,however, tookprecedence; if theexperimentsmade the food intolerable, the experimentswould have to yield. Rambaut, anMSCnutritionistwhowasprincipalcoordinatingscientistfortheM070seriesofexperiments,expectedSkylabtouseawidervarietyoffoods,includinghotandcold items;and theworkshop’s foodmanagementcompartmentwouldprovidesomeoftheamenitiesofconventionaldining.35

At the April Management Council meeting, not long after the Apollo 9mission and its crew’s complaints about the food, George Mueller decidedsomething should be done about it. On 22 April, Schneider offered someguidelines to theMSCprogramoffice. Itwas time togetaway fromcompleterelianceonApollo-typefood,hesaid,andprovidesomethingmorelikenormalcuisine—perhaps frozen dinners, freeze-dried camping foods, possibly evenfresh fruits and vegetables. He recognized that providing for stowage andpreservation would affect workshop development, but suggested that if mealscouldbegreatlyimproved,theweightandvolumeallowancesforfoodcouldberaisedbyasmuchas10%.36

MarshallhadalreadyheldapreliminaryrequirementsreviewinlateMarch;

at that timeMSC’s specifications had been rather broad: an estimate of totalstorage space, plus provision for heating and cooling certain items duringpreparation. On 16April Johnson urged theHouston program office to add afoodfreezer;aMartinMariettastudyhadconvincedhimitwasfeasible,anditwouldpermitamuchgreatervarietyoffoodtobetakenalong.InMay,MSC’sprogramofficesentHuntsvilleanewsetofrequirements,includingafreezer,anoven,andprovisionforprotectingstoredfoodfrompressurechanges.Thenewspecificationscalledforfiveclassesoffood:dehydrated,intermediatemoisture,wet-pack (heat-sterilized itemssimilar to the turkeydinnerprovidedonApollo5),frozen,andperishablefreshfoods.Marshallwasuneasyabouttheescalationinsizeandcomplexityofthelarderandgalleyatthislatedate,butwentalong,sinceHeadquarters urged the improvements. By the end of July, after severalmeetingsinvolvingbothcentersandMcDonnellDouglas,thenewrequirementshadbeenacceptedandseveralconceptswereunderstudy.37

Houstonwaslatewithitsdefinitionof thefoodsystemforseveralreasons.During the wet-workshop phase of AAP, dieticians atMSC had depended ondata from the Air Force Manned Orbiting Laboratory, expecting to modifysystemsandprocedurestomeetSkylab’smedicalrequirements.WhenMOLwascanceled in June 1969, full responsibility suddenly fell on the MSC group,alreadyoverloadedwithApolloduties.WithMarshallclamoringforstorageandpreparationrequirements,CaldwellJohnsondesigningacompletelynewsystem,and the development contract not yet firm,MSC’s chief of food and nutritionpleaded for help. He wanted three more persons assigned to food-systemintegrationatMartinMarietta.Therequestforproposalsonthefoodsystemhadtobeout in twoweeks,andMartinMariettashouldbeworkingoneightotherproblem areas as soon as possible. It took another five months to get food-systemmanagementinhand.38

Astronaut Owen Garriott, scientist-pilot on the second crew, at dinner, left. SL3-111-1519. The traycontainedheatingelementsforpreparingtheindividualpackets.Right,AstronautJosephKerwin,scientist-pilot on the first crew, trying a grape drink in the workshop trainer. Beverage powder was packed incollapsedaccordion-shapedcontainersthatexpandedinlengthaswaterwasadded.Crushingthecontainerexpelledthecontents.73-H-275.

Marshall’suneasinessaboutthechangingrequirementsturnedintoalarminmid-1969,asitbecameclearthatHoustonwasjustbeginningtoworkoverthefoodsystem.Thatfall,CaldwellJohnsonproposedtosimplifythedevelopmentof the food system by taking the engineering problems offMarshall’s hands.Another contractor should take charge of storage and preparation equipment,furnishingtotheworkshopcontractoracompletesystem,readytobeinstalled.Backing up this proposal, he submitted a concept for a simplified storage andpreparation system, packing individual servings of food in metal containersshapedtofitcompactlywithinapressure-proofcanister.Oneprotectivecanisterheldseveraldays’supplyoffood,sothewardroompantrycouldbereplenishedonce aweek.The food containerswere designed to fit the compartments in apreparationandservingtray,wheretheycouldbeheatedasrequired.Toprepareameal,thecrewmanwhohadchef’sdutieswouldsimplytakeouttheitemsonthemenu,addwatertodehydratedfoods,securethecontainersinthetray,turn

on theautomatically timedheatingelements,and let the traydo therest.Afterthemealthecontainerscouldeasilybeweighedtoaccountforleftoverfood(asrequiredbythemedicalexperiments)andthendiscarded,withverylittlemess.39Thisproposalwasnotadopted in itsentirety,butseveralof thebasicconceptsfoundtheirwayintothefinalfoodsystem.

MARSHALLCALLSFORAREASSESSMENT

LeeBelew,SkylabprogrammanageratMarshall,expressedreservationsinJuly1969abouthiscenter’sabilitytomeetaJuly1972launchdate.Bythefallof1969,whenHeadquartersagreedthatseveralmajorjobsshouldbefarmedoutto contractors, he felt he could make it—provided everyone followed theminimum-change directive that both Schneider and Mueller had affirmed.Instead, both Houston andWashington spent the rest of the year thinking upimprovements—mostlyinhabitability—thatcosttimeandmoney.InNovemberBelewremonstrated toSchneider thatchangeswere threateninghisbudgetandschedule. The tradeoff studies that had to be done on proposed improvementssiphonedoffMarshall’smanpoweranddelayedaction.EithercostswouldgouportheschedulewouldslipunlessMarshallgotsomerelief.40

FromCaldwell Johnson’s point of view, nothingmuchwas happening; sofewofhissuggestionswerebeingactedonthatbyearly1970hefeltcompelledtogooutsidenormalchannelstomakehispoints.HegotachancethefirstweekinApril,whencenterdirectors,programmanagers,andkeytechnicalpeoplesetoutonafour-daytourofSkylabcontractors’plantsforafirst-handassessmentoftheprogram’scondition.AteverystopJohnsoncalledGilruth’sattentiontothesadstateofhabitabilityfeatures, losingnoopportunity,asherecalledlater,“toputtheneedlein.”Manyofthefaultshepointedoutwereminor,andsomewereonlyapparentbecausethemockupswerenotaccurate,buttheeffectwaswhatheintended.Habitabilitybecameanissue.41

Chris Kraft, MSC’s deputy director, put the matter with characteristicbluntnessassoonasthetourwasover.“Ithink,”hetoldhischief,“thateveryonewhohasafeelfortheproblemsoflivinginspacecameawayfromtheSkylabtourwiththesamethought—thatinsufficientattentionhasbeenpaidtohowtheastronautsaregoingtoliveduringthoseverytediousmissions.”Nomatterthatthecontractorshadallprotested that thecrewshad reviewed theirwork;Kraftsaidtheastronautsshouldnothavethelastwordanyway.“Theyaretoopronetoaccept amake-shift situation on the basis of “that’s theway things have been

doneinthepast.’”HesuggestedthatGilruthassignperhaps10peopletoreviewhabitabilityandassurethatproperattentionbegiventoit.42

Gilruth sentKraft’smemo toEberhardRees, urgingHouston’s concernonMarshall’snewdirector.*PassingtheletteralongtoBelew,ReesremarkedthatKraft’spointswerewelltaken.ReeshadspentenoughtimeatanAntarcticbaseearly in 1967 to appreciate some of the hardships of a less-than-idealenvironment,andhefeltthatMSC’ssuggestionsoughttobeexamined,“evenif[implementingthem]costsmoremoney.”HewantedBelewtoappointsomeoneto examine the whole matter without considering cost. In response, Belewsketched out the history of the habitability problem, listing several majoraccommodationsMarshallhadalreadymade.Evidentlyhebrought thedirectoraround to theSkylaboffice’s viewof thematter, forRees’s answer toGilruthemphasizedMarshall’s concern for costs and schedules. Habitability changes,Reessaid,wereonthepointofchangingthewholeSkylabprogramconcept.ItwastimeeithertoreaffirmSkylab’sfund-limitedandexperimentalnatureortocommittheprogramtoadifferentobjective.43

Others at Huntsville had just about reached the end of their tethers onhabitabilitymatters. The chief of theMan/Systems IntegrationBranch reactedimpatientlytoCaldwellJohnson’scommentsontheBenFranklinmission.Thesourceof the“hardships” thatFranklin’screwhadenduredwasnomystery; itwas lack of money. Tradeoffs had been made with full consideration ofhabitabilityprovisions,andthelittlesubmarinehadprovedadequatetoperformasuccessfulmission.Skylab’shabitabilitychanges(mostofwhichweretrivial)wereaboutto“sendtheprogramintoconvulsions.”Certainamenitieshadtobeprovided,butunlessprogramofficialswerecarefultheymightbedoingnothingmorethan“ajobofinteriordecorating.”44

Belew had asked Gaylord Huffman, technical assistant to Marshall’sworkshopprojectmanager,tosurveythehabitabilityquestion.HuffmanreportedhisrecommendationsinJune.Heconcludedthatthepurposeoftheexperimentshouldbechanged;NASAcouldlearnmorebytestingavarietyofconcepts.Healso felt itwouldbebest tomove theprincipal investigator’s responsibility toHuntsville. Current attempts to satisfy the crew and the principal investigator,who frequently disagreed, were the main reasons for the almost continualredesign ofworkshop systems. That problem, he implied, was best solved bygettinganewprincipalinvestigator.Besides,theBenFranklinmission,inwhichMarshallhadparticipated,wasabetteranalogytoSkylabthananApollomission—which,afterall,wastheonlyexperienceHoustonhad.45

After the tour of contractor facilities, Gilruth, wanting to be sure that

Caldwell Johnson’s criticisms had some foundation, appointed an ad hoccommitteetoexaminethem.LateinMaythecommitteesubmitted17pagesofdetailed recommendations for correcting the deficiencies Johnson had beenciting formonths. Attachedwere 15 requests for engineering design changes,approvedbyMSC’sSkylabofficeandclassifiedas“mandatoryforoperationalsuitability.”GilruthforwardedthereportandthechangerequeststoReeson26May1970,characterizingthemas“requirements.”AcknowledgingthatHoustonhadacquiescedinMarshall’sworkshopdesign—probablylongerthanitshouldhave—he nonetheless felt strongly that crew comfort had to be assured onmissions as long as those proposed for Skylab. MSC’s management had notapprovedallofthecommittee’sfindings,butthoseforwardedtoMarshallwereconsiderednecessary.46

Rees’s reply reflected surprise and dismay, the more so because the newrequirementswereproducedbypeoplewhohadbeenworkingwithMarshallformorethanthreeyears.WithoutdisputingthatmanyofHouston’sdemandsweredesirable,Reeswasalarmedattheircumulativeeffect—anassessmentmuchlikeGilruth’s criticisms of the wet workshop at the “warning flags” review ofNovember1967.AsReessawit,theSkylabprogramwasindangerofrunningoff in all directionsunlessHeadquarters and the field centerswereworking tothesamerules,andhehadsoadvisedHeadquarters.47

Oneofthe15mandatorychangeswasthenewfoodsystemthatJohnsonandMSC’s nutritionists had just got down on paper. Selling it to the Marshallprogramofficewasnoteasy,sincetheMSCproposals involvedthoroughgoingchanges to a design thatMcDonnell Douglas had already started to fabricate.MayandJunesawaseriesofmeetingsbetweenthecenterprogramofficesandthecontractor,withMSCdoggedlyinsistingonchangeandMarshalltenaciouslyarguing that thecostandschedule impactswouldwreck theprogram.Houstonnotonlyproposedadrasticincreaseinfoodstoragespace,butalsolowerfreezertemperatures, a relocated wardroom table, and a new food tray requiring aspecialfixtureinthegalley.Comingastheydidontopofseriousproblemsthatweredevelopingintheurinecollectionsystem(chap.8),MSC’sproposalswerejustabout the last strawforMarshall’sSkylaboffice—and it lookedas thoughHoustonwasnotfinishedwiththenewdesign.48

Responding to Rees’s pleas, OMSF chief DaleMyers scheduled a top-to-bottomprogramreviewfor7–8July1970atHuntsville.Marshall’smajorworrywaswith fundamental programguidelines.WasSkylab an experimental, fund-limitedprogram,orwasitsupposedtobethenextApollo?Houston,ontheotherhand,came to themeetingwithyetanother seriesofproposals requiringmore

changes.Themedicalexperimenters,concernedaboutthehumidityandcarbondioxide levels in the workshop, wanted the environmental control systemchanged. The major question raised about habitability was the high cost ofMSC’snewfoodsystem;butsincenoonecouldsuggestacheaperalternative,itcame through practically untouched. Schneider was not sure that the newarrangementwouldsimplifymanagementandreducecosts,asHoustonargued,but after detailed examination of the tradeoffs, he agreed to it. Headquartersrepresentatives,pointingoutthathabitabilityfactorswereuncommonlydifficultto reduce to numbers, pleadedwith both field centers tomakemore effort tonegotiatetheirdifferences,MarshallmakingmoreallowanceforintangiblesandHoustonshowingmorecostconsciousness.49

TheprogramreviewapprovedsignificantchangeswhilereaffirmingboththeJuly 1972 launch date and the existing cost ceilings. Rees conveyed hisdisappointment toCharlesMathews later in themonth. The review hadmadeMarshall’stasknearlyimpossible;theapprovedchangestookabsolutelyalltheslackoutofhiscenter’sschedule.Furthermore,heexpectedstillmorechangestocome;everyonebutMarshallseemedeagertoupgradeSkylabfarbeyonditsorigins as an austere, experimental program. If that trend continued, NASA’sabilitytogetonwithotherprogramswouldsuffer,becauseitwouldappearthatSkylab’s cost had been seriously underestimated. Rees then summarized hiscenter’sviewofthepastyear’sevents:

Westartedwithanopen-endedastronomymissionwherewewerereadytotake a number of risks… and where habitability accommodations wereconsistentwithanearlylaunch/lowercostapproach.…weareproceedingto perform in orbit a very sophisticated and unprecedented medicalexperiment where the subjects must be handled delicately so as not todisturbthemedicalbaseline.

The trouble was that the desirable changes often had serious impact on othersystems—the medical experiments being horrible examples—and Reeswonderedwhere itwouldall end.Marshallwouldgoalongwith thedecisionsreachedat the review,butReesdidnotbelieve that theschedulecouldbemetwithinthebudget.50

Mathews’s response indicated his sympathy with Rees’s problems, but heagain stipulated that the July 1972 launchwould bemet—andwithin budget.Some compromises would no doubt have to be made in order to reconcileresources with requirements; but the basic Skylab philosophy, “economical

applicationofexistinghardwarewithminimumnewdevelopments…consistentwith basic objectives,” still held.As for the exceptionsmade in the past year,eachhadpowerfuljustification,andtheirapprovaldidnotsignaldeparturefromthe policy. He reminded Rees that “Skylab may be the only mannedmissionflownforanuncomfortablenumberofyears[and]itiscriticalthatwemakethemostofthisopportunity.”ItwouldtakethebestmanagementthatNASAcouldmuster, but Mathews was confident that Schneider and the center programmanagerscoulddoit.51

In mid-August Rees wrote to Gilruth summarizing the status of MSC’sengineeringchangerequirementsof26May.Afteragooddealofhorse-trading,inwhichMSCwithdrewsomerequestsandothersweredisapprovedbecauseofexcessivecostordelay,themajorchangesinthefoodsystemhadbeenadopted.Rees urged his MSC counterpart to help him hold the line against furtherchanges,becauseMarshallhadneither the fundsnor the time toaccommodatethem.52

In fact, the workshop suffered no more spasms from habitabilityrequirements. The next big headache came from the waste collection andmeasurementsystems(chap.8).Later in1970theastronautswouldraisesomeissues with the medical experimenters about the food, but the impact on themajorfoodsystemswasunimportant.CaldwellJohnson’sofficekeptaneyeonthedevelopmentofhabitabilitysystems,whileheturnedhisattentiontodesignproblemsinShuttleandintheembryonicApollo-SoyuzTestProject.

*The habitability support system included all of the hardware required to carry out the habitabilityexperiment:lights,fans,floorandwalls,foodstorageandpreparationequipment,watersupply,andsoon.

†Anastronaut-officejokerecalledanearlysuggestionthattheinterioroftheApollocommandmoduleshouldbepaintedblueaboveandbrownbelow,sothatpilotsdisorientedbyzerogwouldhaveanup/downvisualreference.MichaelCollinstellsthestoryinCarryingtheFire;itwasrepeatedtothepresentauthorsbysomeoftheSkylabcrewmen,withtheimplicationthatthiswastypicaloftheabsurdthingssomepeoplewillworryaboutiftheyareencouraged.

*OneofthesewasadoorcutintotheS-IVBwalltoprovideaccesstotheclusterduringcheckoutatKSC. Besides making checkout easier, the door speeded up assembly of the workshop at McDonnellDouglas.W.K.Simmons, Jr., “Saturn IWorkshopWeeklyNotes,”1Aug.1969;R.M.Machell tomgr.,AAPOff.,“WeeklyActivityReport,”29Aug.1969.

*VonBraunhadbeenpromotedtoDeputyAssociateAdministratorforPlanning13Mar.1970.ReeswasborninWürttemberg,Germany,in1908;hereceivedanM.S.inmechanicalengineeringfromDresdenInstituteofTechnologyin1934.DuringWorldWarIIhewastechnicalplantmanageratPeenemünde.HecametotheU.S.withvonBraunin1945,workingfirstatFortBlissandlaterattheRedstoneArsenal.HebecameadeputydirectorofMarshallin1960.

8

TheMedicalExperiments

Medicalexperimentswereoneof themajor justifications for theworkshopfrom theoutset, andHouston’smedical researchersknewwhat theyneeded toinvestigate.The experiments defined in late 1966 sought answers to questionsraisedbyexperienceinMercuryandGemini:Whatchangesdoesweightlessnessproduceinthehumanbody?Howlongdothechangesgoon?Howdoesmanadapt,ifhedoes;andwhatcanbedonetocounteractthechangesifhedoesnot?

Responsibility fordeveloping the instruments toconduct theseexperimentslay with the Manned Spacecraft Center’s Medical Research and OperationsDirectorate. Normally the physicians would have laid down the experimentrequirements, while the Crew Systems Division and the Engineering andDevelopmentDirectoratedesignedandbuiltthehardware.ButshortlyafterthemedicalprogramforSkylabwasapproved, theApollospacecraftfire threwallofHouston’s arrangements askew.As one result, themedical experiments didnot get coordinated attention from allManned Spacecraft Center offices until1969.Theirdevelopmentwasplaguedbytechnicalproblems—notunexpected,considering their complexity and novelty—that often threatened to delaySkylab’s launch. Through a sometimes stormy four years,MSC andMarshallworked hard on these experiments; but the work paid off, for all of themfunctionedwithoutmajorfailurethroughallthreemannedmissions.

DEFININGTHEEXPERIMENTS

AmongthefirstexperimentssubmittedforAAPmissionswerethreemedicalstudies:metabolic activities, cardiovascular functionassessment, andboneandmuscle changes. The first grew directly out of the unexpected difficulties theGemini astronauts had with extravehicular activity and was designed todeterminewhether physical workwasmore demanding in zero g than on the

ground.Thisexperimentusedabicycleergometer,ahighlyinstrumentedversionof an exercise bicycle, to measure the rate of energy expenditure duringcontrolledexercise.Theergometerwastobeusedfrequentlyduringthemissionsso that trendswith time could be detected, if they existed. The second study,cardiovascular function, assessed changes in the heart and circulatory systemresulting from the absence of gravity.This required stressing the heart (whichhas less work to do in weightlessness and grows lazy) by subjecting theastronaut’s lower body to a partial vacuum, simulating the effect of gravity indrawing blood into the legs. Changes in blood pressure, heart rate, and legvolumeweretelemeteredtotheground,wherephysiciansassessedtheconditionofthesubject’sheartandbloodvessels.Supportingthemedicalexperimentswasa sophisticated system that supplied power, provided gases for the metabolicexperimentandvacuumforthelower-bodynegative-pressuredevice,displayedcertaincriticaldatafortheastronautsonboard,andtransmittedinformationfromthe experiment sensors to the ground.1 The thirdmajor experiment, bone andmusclechanges,wasthemineral-balanceexperimentdescribedinchapter7.AtHeadquarters and at MSC, aerospace medical experts spent much of 1967definingtheexperimentsindetailandselectingprincipalinvestigatorsforthem.Not until November 1967 was the program organized, fully defined, andsubmittedtotheMannedSpaceFlightExperimentsBoardforreview.2

Themedicalexperimentsandtheirinterrelationships,abriefingchartusedatNASAHeadquartersin1971.ML71-5271.

Engineering assistance was hard to come by at Houston in 1967 in theaftermathoftheApollofire.EverythingwassubordinatedtogettingApollointoshape and recovering time lost in the lunar landing schedule. In thesecircumstances Dr. Charles A. Berry, director of Medical Research andOperations,washardpressedtogetthemedicalequipmentbuiltontimewiththefundsavailable.AtameetingofprogramofficialsatKennedySpaceCenter inMarch 1968, Wernher von Braun suggested to Berry that Marshall couldfabricatesomeof theequipment, saving timeandmoney.AlthoughvonBrauncarried away the impression that Berry welcomed such assistance, follow-upcontactsindicatedconsiderablereluctance.WhenvonBraunformallyproposedthearrangement,Gilruth’sreplywaspoliteandalmostnoncommittal.Berryhadadvised his chief that he was not convinced Marshall could meet MSC’srequirements.3

Twodevelopmental versions of the ergometer atMarshall SpaceFlightCenter, June (left, 0-08627)andSeptember1970(right,011738).

Sinceeveryoneagreedthattheseexperimentscouldeasilybecomeapacingitemfortheprogram,Marshallwantedtohelpifpossible.Talkscontinuedinto

the fall, Marshall trying to get a commitment and MSC demanding detailedinformationastohowMarshallwouldconducttheproject.On30October1968thecentersagreedthatMarshallwouldbuildtheergometer(andthegasanalyzerthatwentwithit),thelower-bodynegative-pressuredevice,andtheexperimentsupport system.Thedollarvalueof theprojectwasnot large (anestimated$4million), but the engineering challenge was substantial and would extendMarshall’sexpertiseintoanewarea.AtaskteamfromthePropulsion&VehicleEngineering Laboratory, headed by Robert J. Schwinghamer, was establishedand work got under way.4 The arrangement looked simple, but it turned outotherwise.Itwashardforonecentertodirectanotherasitwouldacontractor,and during the next few years relationswere occasionally strained.But in theafterglowofasuccessfulprogram,mostparticipantsagreedthatthestrainshadproducedacreativetensionthatresultedinfirst-classequipment.5

ASPACETOILET

WhileonegroupatMarshallworkedonmedicalexperiments,anothergroupwascomingtogripswithamorecomplexproblem:providingasystemforwastemanagement in the workshop. The problem had new dimensions in Skylab.Previous programs had required nomore than a sanitarymethod of collectinganddisposingofbodywasteswithaminimumofhandling;butforSkylab,themedicalexperimentsrequiredcollection,measurement,andreturnofbothurineand feces for analysis.Gemini andApollo systemswould not do, even if—astheywerenot—theyhadbeenidealfromtheuser’spointofview.6

The design of a system to collect and measure urine was driven by twoconsiderations: the requirements of the mineral balance experiment and theastronauts’insistenceonasystemthatwaseasytouseandfailureproof.Asthemedical requirements stood in late 1968, each urine void had to bemeasuredwithanaccuracyof1%,a sample (10%)ofeachvoidhad tobecollectedanddried, the solid residues being combined daily. The system had to preventcontaminationofonecrewman’surinebyanother’s.Eachday’ssamplesweretobetaggedwithidentifyingdata:who,when,andhowmuch.Attheendofa28-day mission, a Skylab crew would have something like 540 grams of neatlypackagedurinesolidstobringbacktothelabs.7

The engineering problems involved in collecting liquid, separating it fromair,measuringit,andaccuratelysamplingit,allinzerog,wereformidable.Onlytwo systems were available: one that the Fairchild Hiller Corporation had

devised for the Air Force’s Manned Orbiting Laboratory and one that theGeneralElectricCompanyhaddevelopedfortheBiosatelliteprogram,wherethesubject was a seven-kilogram monkey. While GE’s prototype could measurevolumes within 0.2%, Fairchild Hiller’s was designed for only rough volumemeasurements.MarshallbelievedtheFairchildHillersystemwouldbeeasiertodevelopinthetimeavailable,butMSC’smedicsdidnotthinkitcouldmeettheirrequirementsforvolumemeasurementandsampling.Theywerewillingtowaitforcomparativetestresults,butwantedtheGEsystemkeptunderconsideration.InspiteofHouston’swarnings,MarshalltooktheadviceofMcDonnellDouglas,primecontractor for theMOLaswellas theSkylabworkshop,anddecided toadopttheFairchildHillersystem.8

By early 1969 the medical experimenters were reconsidering theirrequirements.InJanuarywordgotbacktoMarshallthatinvestigatorswantedtocollect all the urine for a 24-hour period, mix it, measure it, and take out asampletobefrozen.Poolingbeforesamplingwouldreducethechancesforerrorinmeasurement;thechangetofreezingaroseoutofconcernforthestabilityofsomeurinecomponents.Organiccompounds(hormonesandsteroids)wouldbepartiallydestroyedbytheconditionsofdryingMarshallproposedtouse(heatingto 60°C under vacuum). Principal investigators feared their results would bechallengedbyotherresearchersunlessthesampleswerepreservedbyastandardmethod,andfreezingwastheonlyacceptedmethod.9

Thewaste-managementunit inJune1971.Having the toiletmounted in themiddleoj thewallposednoprobleminzerogravity.Betweenthetoiletandthelapbeltistheholderfortheurinereceiver.Urinewouldbecollectedinthethreedrawersatthebottom.Thefootrestraintsonthefloorprovedoflittleuse.MSFC020096.

Sinceno freezerwasplanned for theworkshopat that time,Marshall tookstrong exception to this costly and time-consuming change.Besides, FairchildHiller’smedical consultants insisted that dryingwas perfectly adequate.MSCchallenged thisassertionvigorouslyat thepreliminaryrequirements reviewforthehabitabilitysupportsystemon25March1969;Marshallproposedastudytoprovethepoint,andMSCagreed.McDonnellDouglaswasdirectedtocomparedrying with freezing to verify that vacuum drying would not alter the urine

components—orifitdid,toshowthatthechangeswerepredictable.AfterMSCreviewedthecontractor’stestproposal,anindependentanalyticallaboratorywaspickedtoconductthetest.Itwasexpensiveandwouldtaketime,butMarshallengineers felt that ifan independent studykilled the requirement fora freezer,thetimeandmoneywouldbewellspent.10

Houstonwasequallydeterminedtoestablishfreezingasthemethodforurinepreservation.Early thatsummer,BobThompsonemphasized toBelewthat theonly acceptable procedure was to chill the urine immediately after collection,sampleit,andfreezethesamplesforreturn.WheninJulythecentersagreedtoprovide for frozen food in theworkshop,McDonnellDouglaswas directed toresume preliminary design studies on a urine freezer. Paul Rambaut, MSC’sprincipalcoordinatingscientistfortheurineexperimentsanddeeplyinvolvedinboth thewastemanagement and food systems, saw considerable irony in thisturn of events. While the scientists concerned with urine constituentsunanimously agreed that urine samples must be frozen, nutritionists equallyagreedthatfrozenfoodwasnotrequired.Yetthefoodfreezerwasacceptedwithlittle resistance from the engineers, while the urine freezer was strenuouslyopposed.11

Throughout the summer, Houston’s medical directorate was skeptical ofMarshall’sintentions,suspectingthattheefforttoprovideaurinefreezerwasnotbeingpursuedseriously.Theycontinuedtowarntheircenter’sSkylabofficethatevenifthestudyshoweddryingtobeacceptable,itwasstill“opentosuspicionbecauseitisnotthestandardapproachusedbytheauthoritiesinthesefieldsofinvestigation.” As far as other aspects of the Fairchild Hiller system wereconcerned, the medical experimenters had no confidence in its method ofvolume determination, and they began to investigate an alternative techniqueusingachemicaltracer.12

InlateOctober1969,BillSchneiderdecidedtotrytoresolvethesequestions.He called Headquarters and center program officials to Huntsville on 21November for a discussion of the issues. The test results on the two urinepreservationmethodswere not yet available, but preliminary indicationswerethat freezing was no better than drying. After examining the engineeringtradeoffs, Schneider reaffirmed current plans, but allowed the freezer study tocontinue.Dismayedbythisdecision,MSC’smedicsaskedforanotherreview.InHoustonon18December,Marshall reviewedtheexperimentrequirements thatMSC had established, pointing out that freezing was not specified. Afterreviewing the engineering considerations and test results, Marshall made itsrecommendations: stay with the present system (drying), stop all work on

samplingandfreezing,andgoonwithurinestorageteststoestablishtherateatwhichtheheat-sensitivecomponentswerelostwithtime.Oncemore,Schneidersawnoreasontochangetofreezing.AllHoustoncouldgetwasanagreementtohaveFairchildHiller’stestresultsreviewedbyanindependentconsultantandtostudy the impact of sampling and freezing on workshop systems. DirectingMarshall to start this study,Schneider emphasized that if a change to freezingcaused a schedule delay, Marshall was to find a way to work around thebottlenecks and keep the workshop on schedule. On 30 December MarshallorderedMcDonnellDouglastodothestudy.13

During the next three months, Fairchild Hiller and its subcontractor,Bionetics, Inc.,ofBethesda,Maryland,completed thestudiesondryingversusfreezing.MSCmethodicallypeckedawayat theresultsandstatisticalanalysis.Thetestresultsseemedambiguous.FairchildHiller’sprogrammanageradmittedasmuchonsubmittingthefinaltestreport:“Ineffectthestatisticsareadraw.”ButMSChadrunsometestsofitsown,whichshowedgreaterlossofhormonesin dried samples than Bionetics had found. After the February meeting PaulRambautsummarizedthesituationandrecommendedthatthedryingprocessbedropped once and for all. Severe and unpredictable deterioration of the heat-sensitive compounds did occur, and (once more) no recognized expertconsideredheat-dryingtobeacceptablefortheproposedstudy.AcknowledgingtheengineeringproblemsthatMarshallfacedinprovidingforfreezing,Rambautnonethelesssawnothing tobegainedby furtherattempts toqualify thedryingprocessfortheSkylabmissions.14

With the results in, Schneider convened one lastmeeting on 10March toconsider their implications. Though Huntsville stuck to its guns, it could notrebutHouston’sarguments.(Marshallhadnothadtimetodoitsownstatisticalanalysis of the Bionetics results.) Houston’s tactics and arguments finallyprevailed, andSchneiderordered an immediate change in theurineprocessingsystemtoprovideforfreezingthesamples.15

In retrospect thiswas probably themost vigorously contested point in theentire workshop program. Stan Mclntyre, Marshall’s project engineer for theurinesystem,latersummarizedhiscenter’sview.“Weknewthatwhenwewentintothecomplexitiesofpullingsamples,handlingfluidsinzerogwasgoingtobeacomplexgrayarea thatnobodyhadeverbeen in.”Rather than tackle thatjobtheyelectedtoavoidit,andtheircontractor’sscientificadviserassuredthemthat drying would satisfy the medical objectives. Berry, on the other hand,insisted that MSC knew all along that the Fairchild Hiller system would notwork,andhesowarnedvonBraun.WhatirritatedBerrymost,however,wasthe

engineers’insistenceonarguingwithmedicalexpertsaboutwhatwasessentiallya medical question. In the end, thoughMarshall accepted the change, Skylabengineers were not convinced. The workshop project manager at Huntsvillecommented fouryears later, “tomydyingday I’ll always saywe shouldhavedriedtheurineinsteadoffreezingit.”16

Withthefreezingquestionsettled,attentionturnedtovolumemeasurement.Theexperimenterswanted the totaldailyurineoutputmeasuredwithin2%—adifficult goal, since liquids collected in zero g always entrap gas. FairchildHiller’ssystememployedasyntheticmembranemadeupofmicroscopicfibersof liquid-repellentmaterial,permeable togasesbutnot to liquids.Asectionoftheurinecollectionbagwasmadeofthismaterial,andthecompany’sengineershad designed the bag (so they assured McDonnell Douglas) so that surfacetension would separate liquid from air. With the bag properly oriented, asqueezing device forced air out through the membrane while the urine wasretained.Thevolumeofliquidwasmeasuredbydeterminingitsthicknesswhilethe bag was confined in a box of fixed length and width. General Electric’ssystemusedadifferentprinciple; it separatedair fromurinewithacentrifugalseparator and used a peristaltic pump to measure volume and collect aproportionalsample.17

In the spring of 1970 programofficials began evaluating the two systems.McDonnell Douglas tried hard to sell the Fairchild Hiller system; Houston’smedicalteamstronglybackedtheGEdevice,partlybecausetheyfeltitofferedbetter prospects for future development. Marshall’s program officials mightordinarilyhavegonealongwiththeirprimecontractor,butseemedskepticalofFairchildHiller’s scheme; and theymight have thought it prudent not to startanotherargumentwithHouston.Atareviewon3April,theGEsystemseemedto have clear technical advantages, but company representatives appearedreluctant to undertake development of the system for Skylab. McDonnellDouglasvigorouslydefended its subcontractor’s system,asserting that it could“easilyguarantee”anaccuracyof1%involumemeasurement.MSCevidentlycouldnotpersuadeGeneralElectric tocompete,soinMaytheFairchildHillersystemwasselectedfordevelopmentandtesting.18

WhenFairchildHiller’s collectionbagwas tested inzero-gaircraft flights,however, it failed. The liquid-impermeable membrane did not function afterprolongedcontactwithurine,andthebagwouldhavetostoreurineforafulldayduringoperations.Foralltheconfidencethecompanyhadinitsanalysisoftheforcesactingonliquids,urinemightneverthelesscomeincontactwiththefilter.The small unbalanced forces always present during zero-g aircraft maneuvers

were enough to cast doubt on the whole concept. The company proposed anumberofremedies,butallwouldtaketime.19

Center and contractor engineers spent a busy September trying to devisealternatives or to fix the system they had. Three major meetings during themonthdidnothingtoraiseconfidenceinit,andaproposaltousetwobags,onefor collection and another for measurement, created new problems.Headquarters,meanwhile, had learned that fluid-mechanics experts atLangleyResearch Center were working on gas-liquid separation in zero g using acentrifugal separator. Preliminary discussions between Langley and MarshallindicatedthatLangley’sdevicewasworthfurtherexamination.20

Afterreviews,meetings,andstudiesduringOctober,Schneider,Belew,andKleinknechtdecidedtocontinueworkingonthreesystems(theoriginalone-bagdesign,atwo-bagdesign,andthecentrifugalseparator)untiloneshoweddistinctadvantages.Sincethequestionofvolumemeasurementwasstillindoubt,MSCwasdirectedtoreportonthetracermethodandtomakerecommendationsforitspossibleuse,eitherasabackuporastheprimarymethod.21

Slowly, during the next several months, the centrifugal separator pulledahead.Zero-gtestsinNovemberrevealedthatthetwo-bagsystemwasseriouslyflawed.As1971began,BelewtoldSchneiderthattheone-bagsystemnolongerseemed worth working on, and Houston decided that only the centrifugalseparatorwouldsatisfyallmajorexperimentalandoperationalrequirements.On15 January, the three program offices agreed to drop the one-bag system andconcentrateontheothertwo,which,theystipulated,mustbeinterchangeablesoastosimplifyintegration.HamiltonStandard,afirmthathadworkedwithMSCin the Apollo program, was awarded a letter contract to develop the Langleyseparator. Belew notified Schneider that if neither system developed seriousproblemsadecisionwouldbemadeinSeptember.22

ByMay, however, StanMclntyre was convinced that the two-bag systemwas beyond salvage and recommended dropping it. In spite of changes inmaterialandbagdesign,thefilterwas“basicallyunreliableandnotsuitableforSkylab.”Areviewon28Juneshowedthatkeepingthetwo-bagsystem,evenasabackup,entailedacostincreaseofat least$1.5million.On21JulyMarshallordered theworkshop contractor to stop allwork on the two-bag system.Thecentrifugalseparatorwasselectedinitsplace.23

Houston, meanwhile, had been working on the tracer method for volumedetermination. The principle is simple: a known quantity of a substance notnormallypresent inurine isplaced ineachcollectionbagbeforeuse;after the

bagisfilledandthetracerthoroughlymixed,asampleistaken;thefractionofthe tracer found in the sample is the same as the fraction of the total urinevolume represented by the sample. If the sample contains 1% of the tracerelement,thenthesamplevolumeis1%ofthetotalvolume.Lithiumwaschosenasthetracerelement.Asmallamountoflithiumchloridewouldbeputineachcollectionbag.Aspartof thenormalprocessingprocedure, thecontentsof thefullurinebagwouldberecirculatedthroughthecentrifugalseparator,thoroughlymixing the tracerwith the urine.Having satisfied themselves that themethodgavetheaccuracytheyrequired,MSC’smedicalexperimentersadopteditasthebackupmethodtoverifyvolumemeasurementsmadeinflight.24

Comparedtotheurinesystem,thedesignofacollectorforsolidwastewassimple.Allfecesweretobecollected,vacuumdried—heatingwasnoprobleminthiscase—andreturnedforanalysis.Again,FairchildHillerhaddevelopedasystem for the Manned Orbiting Laboratory; this one proved satisfactory forSkylab. The collector was a plastic bag fitted with a porous filter to allowpassageofair.Itwasenclosedinaholderbeneathatoiletseat;behindtheholderwas a blower that pulled a current of air through holes in the rimof the seat,carrying the feces into the bag. The air from the blower passed through adeodorizing filter and back into the workshop. The bag was then weighed,placed in a processor where the feces were heated under vacuum to removemoisture,andstowedforreturn.25

Sincetheproblemsofseparatingairfromliquidandofvolumemeasurementdidnotarisewithsolidwastes,thefecalcollectionsystemwasingoodshapebytheendof1969. Itsprincipalproblemaroseoutof thedifficultyofconclusivetesting in zero g.The zero-g condition couldbemaintained for only about 30seconds in the KC-135 aircraft, and the device had to be tested in that shortperiod.Urinationcouldbesuccessfullysimulatedbymechanicaldevices,andaurine-collectingdevicewaseasytotest;butdefecationcouldnotbesimulated.Test subjectswhocouldperformoncuewereneeded.TheHuntsvilleprogramofficewasabletofindafewpeoplewiththistalent,andinNovember1969twodaysofaircrafttestingproducedninegood“datapoints”forthefecalcollector.26

Still, aircraft testing was not absolutely conclusive, and in January 1970Marshall’sSkylabofficestartedlobbyingforaflightofthefecalcollectorononeoftheApollomissions.InJulytheApolloprogramofficeagreedtoatestflightonApollo14, only to reverse thatdecision later in the summer.Theunofficialaccount thatgotback toMarshallwas thatMSC’sSkylaboffice supported thetest, the astronautofficewasofficially indifferent to it, and the commanderofApollo14flatlyvetoedit.Marshallhadtomakedowithaircrafttesting.27

BUILDINGTHEMEDICALHARDWARE

From theMarshall director’s vantage point, building experiment hardwareforMSC looked like a straightforward job.TheBiomedicalTaskTeamwouldfabricate some components inMarshall’s shops (the ergometer frame and theshell for the lower-body negative-pressure device), contract for others, andassemble and test the final articles toHouston’s specifications.The agreementhammeredoutbythetwocentersspecifiedthatMarshallwouldfunction“inthesamemanneraswouldanyothercontractor,”withMSCmanagingthecontractinthecustomaryway.Missing,however,weretheincentivesandpenaltiesthataNASAcentercouldapplytoacommercialcontractorinasimilarsituation.28

Houston’smedicaldirectoratewasresponsibleformanagementandtechnicaldirection of Marshall’s task team, while the Skylab office retained “overallCenter management including verification of requirements and resourcemanagement.” The medical directorate supplied technical direction andinformation; integration requirements were to be exchanged through the twocenter program offices. As events of the next two years would show, thisarrangementwasunwieldy.Linesofauthorityandsupplywerecomplex,anditwassometimesdifficulttotellexactlywhowasinchargeatMSC.Managementproblems thus complicated the technical snags that Marshall’s task teamencountered.29

The critical experimentwasMl71,metabolic activity,whichmeasured thebody’srateofenergyproductionwhilephysicalworkwasbeingdone.Abicycleergometer provided several calibrated levels of resistance against which theastronautcouldwork,whilehisenergyproductionwasmeasuredbytheratioofcarbondioxideexhaledtooxygeninhaled.Buildingtheergometerpresentednospecial problems, but the system tomeasure respiratory gases did. It requiredaccurate flowmeters, precision valves, and a high-speed gas analyzer—all ofthem at the leading edge of technology and all of them interacting with aspecializedcomputeranddata-transmissionsystem.30

Facedwithashortdevelopmentscheduleforacomplexsetofexperiments,Houston’smedicaldirectoratewanted to lookatmore thanonedesign.For thegasanalyzerthemedicshadsettledonamassspectrometer,anelectromagneticinstrument that sorts out gases according to their molecular weights anddetermines the percentage of each gas in a mixture. During 1969,Marshall’sbiomedical task team was evaluating one mass spectrometer design whileHouston’s Skylab office was discussing another with Martin Marietta. InSeptember a third choice entered the picture when MSC’s Biotechnology

Divisionfoundthatamassspectrometerwasbeingdevelopedbyanotherofficefor another purpose and recommended that it be adopted for the metabolicanalyzer.31

Whilethemedicalexperimenterstendedtoletdevelopmentalworkcontinuein the hope that one designwould show clear advantages over the others, theHouston Skylab office had tomeet a schedule. In April 1970, after the threedesigns had been compared, Houston program manager Kenneth Kleinknechtchose thedesignMarshallhadbeenbacking.Noting that thisunitwouldmeetthestatedmedicalrequirementsandthatagreatdealofmoneyhadalreadybeenspent, Kleinknecht sought assurance that Marshall wanted to finish the job.Whenhegotit,hestoppeddevelopmentworkontheothertwoinstruments.32

In early 1970 the other medical experiments were having a number ofmanagement difficulties. Marshall and Martin Marietta, the workshopintegrationcontractor,couldnotagreeastowhoshouldintegratetheMarshall-builtmedicalexperimentswiththeexperimentsupportsystem,whichwasalsoaMarshall responsibility. Reporting to Huntsville’s program office, Marshall’srepresentative in Houston noted that the medical directorate and the Skylabprogram office at MSC were not communicating very effectively. And atHuntsville, Robert Schwinghamer’s task team felt that themedical directoratewas not coordinating its directions to them. Schwinghamer complained morethan once that hewas getting conflicting instructions from different people atMSC.33

Schedulepressuresundoubtedlycontributedtotheconfusioninthemedicalexperiments program, because in July 1970 the medical directorate formallyrequested relief. As the schedule stood, development test units for theexperiments—prototypes that would be tested to uncover faults in design orconstruction—had to be delivered inOctober 1971, 13months before launch.Flightunits,modifiedasaresultofthesetests,wererequiredamonthlater.Thatsinglemonthwascertaintobeinadequatetocorrectdeficiencies.Theunrealisticschedule might well force compromises in design and testing, degrading thevalue of the experiments. The medical investigators expected, under thosecircumstances,thatsoonerorlatertheywouldbetoldtoflytheexperimentsinwhatevershapetheywerein,simplybecauseitwaslaunchtime.Intheirview,however,thescheduleshouldyieldtomissionobjectives;therewasnopointinlaunching hardware that gave less than complete results. When the medicaldirectorateproposedalaunchdelay,itwasdisapproved;butthedeadlineforthemetabolicanalyzer—thebiggestworry—wasrelaxedtoallownecessarytesting,solongasdeliveryofthecompletedworkshopwasnotdelayed.Theworkshop

contractorwouldhavetoworkaroundthemissingexperimentasbesthecould.34

Reviewing the state of the medical experiments that summer, medicaldirector Charles Berry and center director Robert Gilruth decided that someengineerswereneededtoimproveliaisonwithMarshall.InSeptember,GilruthannouncedtheappointmentofRichardS.JohnstonasBerry’sdeputydirectorforbiomedical engineering and acting chief of a newly formed Skylab ProjectSupportOffice. Johnston had been chief of theCrewSystemsDivision in theearlydaysofAAP,thenspecialassistanttoGilruthfortwoyears,andin1970wasexperimentsmanager forApollo.After spending some timemastering thecomplexities of the management arrangements, Johnston brought in severalengineerstoexpeditethetranslationofmedicalrequirementsintohardware.Bythe end of 1970,management problemswere amuch smaller annoyance thanbefore.35

Marshall’sfirstmilestonewastheproductionofdesignverificationtestunits,which would be put through tests duplicating their expected use to discoverdeficiencies in design or construction. The verification testing was originallyscheduledtobegininOctober1970andrununtilJuly1971,butitactuallybeganonlyinFebruary1971.Inthenextthreemonths,sixweeksoftestactivitywerelostonaccountoffailuresincomponentssuppliedbyMSCcontractors.Bymid-May Huntsville officials were expecting to resume tests shortly, but newrequirementsimposedbyMSCpromisedtoextendthetestprograminto1972.36

Assemblyandtestingcontinuedthrough1971,workingtowardadeadlineof15 January 1972 for delivery of all flight hardware to McDonnell Douglas.Troubles with electronic modules, however, continued to plague the project,notablytheleg-volumemeasuringdevicemanufacturedbyMartinMarietta.Themetabolicanalyzer,too,beganactingup.Bymid-summer1971onlythebicycleergometer and the lower-body negative-pressure device were comparativelytrouble-free. In June, when MSC wanted two components removed from themetabolicanalyzertestunitforexaminationbythemanufacturer,Schwinghamerreportedthatthishaltedprogressinthemostsuccessfultestprogramtodate.37

Late in September two “NASA alerts,” agency-wide warnings aboutdefective components, called attention to recently discovered malfunction ofelectronicparts,among themcapacitorsand integratedcircuits similar tosomealready built into the metabolic analyzer. The capacitors were checked andreplaced, but the integrated circuits—there were nearly 200 of them—completely stalled the program.Not enough acceptable replacements could befoundanywhereinthecountry;deliveryofnewoneswouldtakefrom12to20weeks. Testing went on with the units as built, but plans had to be made to

replacethesuspectcomponentsandretesttheequipmentfurtherdowntheline.Atyear’sendHuntsvillenotifiedMcDonnellDouglasthatflightarticleswouldarrive2to4weekslate.38

Otherfactorsnowbegantoimpingeonthemedicalexperiments,particularlyHouston’s plans to simulate a 56-day Skylab mission, using the medicalhardware. To be of any value, this had to be runwell in advance of the firstmission,and it required functioningexperimentequipment.AndatMcDonnellDouglas’sCaliforniaplant,assemblyandcheckoutoftheworkshophadreacheda point where technicians were having to work around the missing medicalhardware.

LateinJanuary1972,MSCrequestedauthorizationtopostponecompletionoftestsanddeliveryofhardwareasmuchassixweeks.Schneiderapprovedtherequestinpart.Deliveriesmightbeputoff,buthewouldnotagreetodelayingthe test program and told the centers to find a way to complete it. By nowSchneider was contemplating dropping the troublesome metabolic analyzeraltogetherandaskedMSCtoestimatetheimpactofsuchastep.Boththemedicsandtheprogramofficeobjectedvigorously;alltheexperimentsweremandatory,and the metabolic analyzer’s problems could be solved. Evidently Schneideracceptedtheirevaluation,forthesubjectwasnotraisedagain.39Marshallfounda way to substitute one metabolic analyzer unit for another so that theMl71equipment could be delivered in late February. Flight units of the medicalequipmentbeganarrivinginCaliforniainFebruary,themetabolicanalyzeron13April.Therewasalotofintegrationandtestingyettobedone,butthehardestworkwasbehind.40

ASIMULATIONANDWHATCAMEOFITSince 1968 Houston’s medical directorate had been considering a full

simulationofa56-daySkylabmission.Primarilythedoctorswereworriedaboutchanges in the microbial population when three men were confined in closequarters; theywantednoflare-upofbacterial infection,eitherduringamissionorafterthecrewsreturned.Besides,aproperlyconductedsimulationwouldgivethem one-g data from the medical experiments, useful in assessing changesbrought about by weightlessness, and would check out the experimentprocedures and equipment. Early in 1970 MSC petitioned Headquarters forfundstoconductafull-dressmissionsimulation.41

Houston’splans,however,were tooambitiousforHeadquarters’purse,and

aftersomemonthsofdiscussionsamodifiedplanwassubmitted.Insteadoftwoflight-configured Skylab mockups, MSC agreed to use an existing altitudechamber equipped with flight-type medical hardware and waste-managementsystemsandusingflightfood.Thebacterialecologyquestionwasdropped;thenew plan was intended to check out the hardware, establish baseline medicaldata,andverifyexperimentproceduresanddata-handlingsystems.42

After getting approval for this proposal in February 1971, the medicaldirectorategotbusyorganizing theSkylabMedicalExperimentsAltitudeTest,knownthereafterasSMEAT,apronounceableifunintelligibleacronym.SMEATwas to be the only mission-length simulation in Skylab’s entire experimentprogram,andHoustonorganizeditthoroughly.AsteeringcommitteechairedbyRichardJohnstonoversawtheentireoperation;fourtest-projectmanagerswereresponsibleforvariousaspectsofthetest,andtheyworkedwithmedicalteams,principalinvestigators,andflightoperationsandcrewtrainingpersonnel.43

Crew Systems Division’s altitude chamber, which approximated Skylab’ssize and shape,was configured to duplicate the orbitalworkshop as nearly aspossible.Thelowerlevelwaslaidoutwiththewardroomandfoodpreparationarea, the medical experiments, and the waste management compartment. Theone-genvironmentimposedsomelimitations;crewmencouldnotsleepagainstthewallastheywouldinflight,andthewastecollectionmodulehadtobeonthefloor, not on thewall as in the flightworkshop. The upper level, occupied inSkylabbystowedequipmentandexperiments,wasusedasastudyareaduringthesimulation.Sincethemedicalexperimentsdidnot takeupallof thecrew’stime,theyplannedtooccupytheiroffhoursbystudyingRussianandreading.44

Outside the test chamber,medical operations personnelwouldmonitor theperformanceof themedicalexperiments, takingdata justas theywouldduringthemission.Communicationwith the crewwas intermittent, corresponding totheactualtimesthatSkylabwouldbeintouchwithagroundstation.45

Inmid-1971 a SMEAT crew of two pilots and a scientist was picked. Lt.Cmdr.RobertL.Crippen,USN, andLt.Col.Karol J.Bobko,USAF,both ex-MOLastronautswhojoinedNASAinSeptember1969,becamecommanderandpilot; theywere joinedby scientist-pilotWilliamE.Thornton, aphysicianandbiomedicalengineer from the scientist-astronautgrouppicked inAugust1967.Ofthethree,onlyThorntonwasdirectlyinvolvedinSkylabatthetime;hewasoneof theprincipal investigatorsfor thesmall-massmeasurementdevice tobeusedforweighingspecimensinflight.46

Afterayearofpreparation,Crippen,Bobko,andThorntonwerelockedinto

the chamber on 26 July 1972 for their eight-week stay. Since both crew andoperationspersonnelhadmuchtolearn,therewasnolackofactivitytofillthetime. It took a few days to get routine working relationships established andstraightenoutprocedures.Aswouldhappenwiththeflightcrewsayearlater,theSMEAT crew found that they got along well enough with each other, butdevelopedacertain“usversusthem”feelingtowardthoseoutside.Mostoftheirproblemswere normal and predictable: poorly-fittingmedical sensors, lack offamiliaritywithsomeequipment,proceduresthathadtobemodified;andthesewereironedout.Thecrewfoundtheenvironmenttolerableifnotluxurious,thefoodgoodifnotexciting.Therewasplentytodoandnoidletimetospeakof,thoughtheydidfindtimeforanhourorsoofTVaday—commercialchannelswereavailable—andtheycouldcallfamilyandfriendsonanoutsidetelephoneline.47

Thoughmost of the problems in SMEATwere small and easily corrected,some very big ones proved the simulation’s value. In the very first days thebicycle ergometer broke down and the metabolic analyzer was consistentlyerratic. Worse yet, the SMEAT crew uncovered faults in the urine collectionsystemthatthreatenedtorequiresubstantialredesignofthewholeunit.48

Withlaunchonlyninemonthsaway,MSCandMarshallimmediatelybegantroubleshootingtheergometerandthemetabolicanalyzer.Theergometerfailureprovedtobeamechanicaldesignproblemuniquetothetestunit;whenthiswascorrecteditfunctionedasintended.(Still, theotherunits—oneofthemalreadyinstalled in the workshop—were torn down, examined, and rebuilt, and sparepartswereincludedintheflightinventory.)Themetabolicanalyzer’sproblemswere more complex, involving both mechanical and electronic failures. Ameeting in late September prepared a list of essential changes and tests, andMarshallbeganreworkingtheunits.49

Problemswiththeurinesystemwerepotentiallyveryserious.Thetwo-litercollecting bags were too small. Indications of this shortcoming showed up inpre-SMEAT activities; and during the simulation it turned out that onecrewman’snormaldailyurineoutputwasnearerthreelitersthantwo,andbothof the others produced more than two liters occasionally.* This was not aproblemfortheSMEATcrewbecausetheyhadothertoiletfacilities,butitwasdesperatelyseriousfortheengineers.Theurinepoolingbaganditsmechanicalaccessoriestookupeverycubiccentimeterofthespaceallottedtoit.Increasingitscapacitylookedallbutimpossible.50

AsecondSMEATproblemwas,fromthecrew’spointofview,evenworse.The urine centrifuge leaked, and the collection unit could not be cleaned up

completely.Onsixoccasions,collectionbagsweretorninhandling,dumpingaliterormoreofurineintothewaste-collectionunit,ontothefloor,andontothecrewman. Astronauts were already concerned that the system seemed toocomplex andhadnot been adequately tested in zero g; these urine spillswerevery nearly the last straw.PeteConrad,whowould command the first Skylabmissionandwhowasintrainingatthetime,lostallconfidenceinthesystem.HebeganworkingwithHoustonengineerstoadaptthesystemthatwasabouttoflyonApollo17 and indicated that hewas quite prepared to abandon the Skylabsystementirely.Foratime,relationsbetweenengineersandcrewrepresentativeswerestrained.51

Meanwhile,testsatMcDonnellDouglashadturnedupanentirelyunrelateddefect in theurine system.The in-flightvolume-measuring system, a complexdevicewithapressureplateandseveralmechanical linkages,didnotmeet theaccuracyrequirements.Withlaunchnowonlysixmonthsaway,theurinesystemseemed to need complete redesign, or the medical requirements had to bereconsidered—orboth.52

AweekafterSMEATended,atelephoneconferencebetweenHeadquarters,Houston, and Huntsville led to agreement on expanding the urine system’sstorage capacity to four liters. Three options for design modifications weredefinedforstudy,twoofwhichbypassedthecentrifugeentirelyandreliedontheApollo77system.Twoweekslater,however,aconsensusdevelopedforatwo-way system, using a four-liter bag but giving the crew a choice of collectingdevices, the Skylab centrifuge or the Apollo roll-on cuff.* It was generallyagreedthatmeasurementofvolumeinflightcouldbedispensedwith,sincethelithiumchloridetracertechniquewasadequate.Thesechangesallowedtheurinecollectiondrawertobesimplified,leavingroomforthelargerbagaswellasaprotectivemetal box to enclose it.Mixing the 24-hour pooledurine, however,wouldhavetobedonebykneadingthebagbyhandratherthanbyrecirculatingits contents through the centrifuge.By 15November, three and a halfmonthsafter the problems came to light, an acceptable designwas critically reviewedandmodificationsweregoingforward.53

CommentingonthesignificanceofSMEATatitsconclusion,DickJohnstonexpressed the conviction that it saved the program, since serious operationalproblemswouldhavecomeupinflightwithnowaytosolvethem.BothheandKenKleinknecht acknowledged the problems to the press, but bothwere surethat they would be worked out. When the waste management system finallyflew,thegruelingfourmonthsofworkafterSMEATpaidoff.Theurinesystemand the medical hardware worked exactly as required. Redesign of the urine

system was justified, because two crews had at least one member whoconsistentlyexcretedmorethantwolitersofurineaday.Experiencedcrewmenfound the system a great improvement over what they had used before. Therookies, who had heard all the horror stories about waste management, werepleasantly surprised. And after all the tumult and shouting, Pete Conrad tookparticularcaretocomplimenttheengineersonanoutstandingsystem.54

*Thebagsizewasbasedonphysiologicalnorms,notonmeasurementstakenwithcrewmen.Whenthesystemwasdesigned thecrewshadnotbeen selected.Requestsbymedical investigators tomeasure24-hoururineoutput for the astronautswere turneddownby the astronautofficebecause itwould interferewithtraining.CarolynLeachinterview,3Dec.1976.

*Thiswasarubbertubethatfunctionedasanexternalcatheterandwasattachedtoacollectingbag.Itamountedtoaheavycondom.R.S.Johnston,L.F.Dietlein,andC.A.Berry,eds.,BiomedicalResultsofApollo,NASASP-368(Washington,1975),p.475.

9

StudyingtheSun

Skylab’s major nonmedical scientific project was the Apollo telescopemount, which became a part of the program in 1966. Themost complex andexpensive of the scientific programs and the most demanding in terms oftechnical requirements, the ATM had been allotted one of the three AAPmissions (pp. 55, 74). When the decision was made to launch the solarobservatoryalongwiththerestofthecluster,itspeculiarrequirementsdictatedmanyfeaturesoftheorbitalassemblyandthemissions.

SOLARINSTRUMENTS

Withitsfoursolararraysextendedlikethesailsofamedievalwindmill,theApollotelescopemountwasthemoststrikingfeatureoftheorbitingSkylab.Atthehubofthearrayswasthecanistercarryingthesixmajorinstrumentsmakingupthesolarobservatory.(App.Dtabulatesinformationonallexperiments.)Fiveof thesemeasured radiation in thehigh-energyultravioletandx-ray regionsofthe spectrum—radiation that does not reach the earth’s surface because it isabsorbedbytheatmosphere.Thesixthphotographedthesun’scorona,atenuousbodyofgaswhosefaintlightisblottedoutforobserversonearthbythebrilliantlightofthesolardisk,scatteredbytheatmosphere.*

From a study of the wavelength and intensity of x-rays and ultravioletradiation, scientists could deduce the composition, density, and temperature ofthe region under study. Photographs of the coronawould provide informationabout its motion, physical state, and magnetic environment and would relatechangesinthecoronatoeventsatthesun’ssurface.Thisinformation,scientistsbelieved, would help them understand the processes by which energy istransferredfromthesun’sinterioroutintospace.Togetthatinformation,solarphysicists needed instruments with high resolution, pointing accuracy, and

stability. Such characteristics had to be designed into the telescopes and theirsupportingsystemsfromthestart.1

TheApollotelescopemountasdepictedona1972briefingchart.MSFC-72-PM7200-115A.

Though initially conceived for use on the Advanced Orbiting SolarObservatory, the ATM instruments were general-purpose telescopes; withsuitablemodifications,theycouldbeusedonothermissions.Themajorchangemade when the instruments weremoved to the ATMwas to convert them tophotographic recording (all except Harvard’s ultraviolet spectrometer). Filmgave better spectral and spatial resolution* than photoelectric recording, butphotoelectric instruments could record a wider range of intensities and had ashorterresponsetime.Sincefilmhadtobereplenishedduringthemission,thisdecisionmadealltheexperimentsexceptHarvard’sdependentontheastronauts,whowould recoverexposed filmand reload thecamerasduringextravehicularactivity.Itwasaboldsteptotakein1966,whenworkingoutsidethespacecraftwasstillaquestionableareaofmannedspaceflightandwhenearlyexperienceinGeminihadnotbeenencouraging.2

Changing filmat theApollo telescopemount, a briefing slide from late 1970. The viewingports for thevariousinstrumentsareontheraisedcenterofthewhitecircle.S-71-48024.

To assist the human operator of the solar telescopes, several accessoryinstruments were added to the ATM in the later stages of design. A monitormeasured the total x-ray output of the sun, a useful index of overall solaractivity. It was connected to an audible alarm, set to go off when apredeterminedhigh level of x-radiationwas exceeded, alerting the crew that asolar flare might be imminent and that the control panel should be manned.Another monitor displayed an image of the sun in ultraviolet radiation andsimilarly served as a means of locating active solar regions. In 1968 twopointing-control telescopes were added to the instrument package. Equippedwithfilterstopassasinglewavelength,thered-orangelightinthespectrumofincandescent hydrogen, these hydrogen-alpha or H-alpha† telescopes revealedmuchofthefinegranularstructureofthesun’ssurface,whichtheydisplayedonatelevisionmonitoratthecontrolpanel.Bothhadvariablefocallength(zoom)lensesandcross-hairs toenableprecisepointingof theother instruments,withwhichtheywerealigned.CamerasprovidedapermanentrecordofwheretheH-alphatelescopeswerepointedwhenobservationsweretaken.3

The experiments and their supporting systemswere designed to be nearlyindependentofthecarriervehicle—until1969,amodifiedlunarmodule,whoseascent stage provided a pressurized cabin with room for two crewmen and acontrol and display console for the instruments.When the lunar module wasdiscarded in the change to the dryworkshop, some changes to theATMwere

required. Itwasmovedontoasupportingstructureabove themultipledockingadapter,itspointingsystemwasmodifiedtocontroltheentireworkshop,andthecontrol panel wasmoved into that now-vacantmodule. The instruments werescarcelyaffectedby thischange,and theirdevelopment,whichwaswellunderwaybytheendof1968,washardlyperturbed.

APOLLOTELESCOPEMOUNT

Thesolartelescopesweremassive—theentirecollectionweighedoveratonandsomeofthemwerethreemeterslong—buttheywerestillprecisionopticaldevices, requiring elaborate support systems. Primary among the requirementswastheabilitytoaimtheinstrumentspreciselyatanydesiredpointonthesunandholdthemthereinspiteofdisturbancestotheorbitalassembly.Anotherwasstrictcontrolof temperature.Topreserve thealignmentof itsopticalelements,theNavalResearchLaboratory’s telescope had to be keptwithin 1.5°Cof thetemperature at which it had been calibrated, and the temperature could notchangemorethan0.005°Cperminute—allofthiswhiletheinstrumentcanisterwasexposedtothefullblastofunattenuatedsolarradiation.Thentherewasthematterofusing thehumanoperatoreffectively,automatingasmanyoperationsas possible while still allowing him to use judgment and make on-the-spotdecisions aboutwhat shouldbeobservedandwhich instrumentsused.Finally,systemssuchaselectricalpoweranddatamanagement,ifnotaschallengingassomeoftheothers,werenolessessential.4

Responsibility for these supporting systems, which with the structure thatsupportedthecanistermadeuptheApollotelescopemount,felltoMarshall(p.75).ApolloApplicationsProgramManagerLelandBelewestablishedanATMProjectOfficeinJuly1966,withReinIseasprojectmanager.Ise,whosetenuredatedbacktopre-NASAdayswiththeArmyBallisticMissileAgency,wasoneof several engineers who came to AAP from the defunct Saturn IB-Centaurprogram. Marshall’s Astrionics Laboratory would build parts of the mount,contract someof the systemsout to industry, andassemble the test,prototype,andflightarticles.5

Besides the test and flight hardware, engineering simulators and trainingmockups were required for design work and crew training. By mid-1968,Marshallhadbuilt a control anddisplay simulatoronwhichengineersworkedout the switches, controls, and computer logic. Later, this simulator wasupgraded to provide computer-generated displays simulating the observations

thatwouldbemadeinflight;itwasthenusedbycrewsandengineerstodevelopand verify inflight operating procedures. Simulators for the power, attitude-control, and pointing-control systems were also being built in 1968. Traininghardware included a one-g trainer, a full-scale mockup of the entire mount(except for the solar power arrays) with functional work stations, and amechanically functional control and display console. There was also a zero-gtrainer,consistingofmockupsoftheworkstationsthatcouldbeflowninaKC-135.6

Zero-gtestingwascriticaltotheATMdesign.Filmcamerasattachedtothetelescopes contained all of the experimental data (except for that from theHarvardinstrument),andtheyhadtoberetrievedbythecrewworkingoutsidethevehicle.ThisrequirementproducedclosecollaborationbetweenHoustonandHuntsville;astronautsfrequentlyconferredwithengineersandtesteddesignsoftheworkstationswherefilmcameraswereremovedandreplaced.

Forthiskindofdesignworkthe20–30secondsofzerogravityobtainableinaircraftwereinadequate.Thebestalternativewasworkingunderwater,withthesubject’s arms, legs, and body carefully weighted until they were neutrallybuoyant,neithersinkingnorfloating.ThistechniquehadbeenusedinpreparingforGemini,andintheearlydaysoftheApolloApplicationsProgramMarshallhad done some neutral buoyancy design work in a water tank once used forexplosiveforming.In1968thecenterwasputtingthefinishingtouchesonanewNeutral Buoyancy Facility expressly designed for the purpose—a tank 22.8meters in diameter and 12meters deep, inwhich full-sizemockups of clustercomponentscouldbe immersed.Thenew tankwasbuiltprimarilyasadesignaidforMarshallengineers,butlaterintheprogramitalsobecameanimportantcrew training facility. Underwater simulation of zero g was not perfect, butastronautsfoundthatanythingtheycoulddointhetankcouldgenerallybedonein orbit. Better still, underwater simulations were conservative; they requiredmore effort than the same task required in space and therefore didnot lead tounderestimatingthedifficultyofatask.7

InstrumentswiththecapabilitiesoftheATMsolartelescopeshadneverbeenflownonmannedspacecraft,andtheir requirementsplacedseveredemandsonsystemsinthecluster.Pointingaccuracyrequirementswereunprecedented; theinstrumentshadtobepointedwithin2.5arcsecondsofthedesiredspotandheldtherewithoutdriftingmorethan2.5arcsecondsin15minutes’time.(Aquarter,viewed from a distance of a kilometer, is about 2.5 arc seconds in diameter.)Conventional thrusterenginesforattitudecontrolcouldnotbeused; theywereinsufficientlydelicate, theyrequiredtoomuchfuelfor longmissions,andtheir

exhaustgaseswouldinterferewithopticalobservations.From1966onward,theattitudecontrol systemfor thesolarobservatorywasbasedoncontrolmomentgyroscopes.

A controlmoment gyroscope (CMG) is, as the name implies, a gyroscopelargeenoughtoimpartcontrollingmomentsortorquesdirectlytoaspacecraft.*Engineers often called them “momentum exchange” or “momentum storage”devices,meaningthattheturningmotionproducedbyexternalforcesactingonthe spacecraft could be transferred to the gyroscopes rather than moving thespacecraft itself. ThreeCMGs, eachwith a 53-centimeter rotorweighing 65.5kilograms and turning at about 9000 rpm,weremounted on theATMsupportstructure. Any two could control the cluster; the third provided the requiredredundancy.Eachwasmountedintwogimbalringsthatcouldrotatearoundtwoaxes.8

Practicing the retrieval of film from the telescope mount in Marshall’s Neutral Buoyancy Facility, left.MSFC027034.The filmmagazine ison theendof theboom; thewhite flotationcollarnear it providedneutralbuoyancy.Below,thetaskbeingperformedinspace.73-H-979.

Controlmomentswere generated by exerting a force on the gimbals.Anyattempt to turn the gimbal of a spinning gyroscope produces a seeminglyanomalousmotion: force applied to the outer gimbal results inmotion of theinnerone,thegyrorotormovingatrightanglestotheappliedforceanditsownaxis.At the same time a reactive force opposes the force applied at the outergimbal, and since the gimbal is attached to the spacecraft framework, thisreactiveforceturnstheclusteraroundoneofitsaxes.

Coupledwith theCMGswas a set of sensors that determined the cluster’s

attitudewithrespect to thesunand thehorizon,aswellas thecluster’s rateofrotation.Asunsensoranda star trackerdeterminedattitudeerrors,while rate-sensinggyroscopesdeterminedhowfastthevehiclewasturningineachofthreedirections. Signals from these sensors went to the ATM’s onboard digitalcomputer,whichcalculatedthenecessarychangesinattitudeandsentcorrectivecommands to the CMGs. Torque motors on the gimbals applied a preciselycontrollable twisting force, the gyro rotors moved to new positions, and thespacecraftremainedinthedesiredorientation.Theneteffectwastotransfertherotationalmotionoftheworkshop(itsangularmomentum)tothegyroscopes.9

For observations with the solar telescopes it was necessary to point theinstrumentcanisterdirectlyatthesunandholditthereaslongaspossible.Whenthespacecraftcameoutoftheearth’sshadow,theattitudecontrolsystempointedthecanisteratthesun,withthevehicle’slongaxisintheorbitalplane,holdingitthereuntiltheworkshopwasabouttoenterthedarksideofitsorbitagain.This“solarinertial”attitudewastheoneinwhichthespacecraftwouldspendmostofitstime,andtheelectricalpowerandtemperaturecontrolsystemsweredesignedonthatbasis.

There were several sources of unwanted motion for the orbital assembly.Crew motion within the vehicle would produce small random forces;aerodynamic drag, though small at orbital altitude,would still be appreciable.The largest perturbation, however, was produced by gravity, which actedunevenlyonalargeunsymmetricalstructurelikeSkylab.Whilethespacecraft’scenter of mass faithfully followed the prescribed orbit, the heavier end waspulled toward the earth more strongly than the lighter. This gravity-gradienttorquecaused the cluster to turn slowlyaround its centerofmass.Partof thistorquecouldbeeliminatedbyproperlypositioningthespacecraftintheplaneofitsorbit,butthatsolutionwaslimitedbythenecessitytopointthetelescopesatthesun.Theresidualgravity-gradienttorqueandaerodynamicdragproducedanetrotationthattheCMGshadtoabsorb.

TheCMGsystemwascapableonlyofcoarsepointing—within6arcminutes(0.1 degree), two orders of magnitude larger than the instruments required.MechanicalconstraintslimitedthetraveloftheCMGgimbals;andafteralongperiod of absorbing unwanted torques, the CMG rotors reached a position ofsaturation,analignmentinwhichnofurthercorrectioncouldbeproduced.Whenall of theCMGsbecame saturated they couldno longer control the spacecraftuntiltherotorswerereturnedtotheiroriginalposition.Awayhadtobeprovidedto“desaturate” thegyroscopesduringperiodswhen thesolar instrumentswerenotinuse.10

Forthispurposeengineersusedthesameforcethatcausedsaturationinthefirstplace:gravity-gradienttorque.Astheorbitalassemblyenteredthedarksideof its orbit, the ATM digital computer—the most sophisticated ever put on amanned spacecraft—determined the degree of saturation and commanded amaneuverintoanattitudesuchthatthegravity-gradienttorquewouldreturnthegyros to their original position in time for the next sunlit portion of the orbit.Maneuveringforthisprocedure(calledmomentumdumping)wasaccomplishedbythethrusterattitude-controlsystem.11

For the fine-pointing control requiredby the telescopes, the spar onwhichtheinstrumentsweremountedwassuspendedinsidegimbals.Thegimbalringscouldbemoved twodegreesupordownand leftor right; theyweremountedinsidearollringtoenablerotationaroundthelongaxisofthecanister(thesunline).The entire fine-pointing assemblywas suspendedby frictionless flexiblepivotscapableofdampingoutsmalldisturbances.Eachdegreeoffreedomwascontrolled by a fine sun-sensor and rate gyroscopes that normally pointed theinstrumentswithin2.5arcsecondsofthesun’scenter.Onthecontrolpanelwasa joystick—much like an airplane’s control stick—which activated an opticaldeviceinthefinesun-sensor,permittingaccurateoffsetpointingofthecanistertoanypointwithin24arcminutesofthesun’scenter.*12

The wet workshop was to have depended on an auxiliary attitude-controlsystempoweredbychemicalfuelsforuseonthefirstthreemannedmissionsandCMGsforthefourth,theATMflight.Forthedryworkshop,engineersadoptedathrusterattitude-controlsystempoweredbycompressednitrogen.Itwassimplerthanchemicallypoweredsystemsanddidnotcontaminatethespacearoundthesolartelescopes,butitwasheavier—apenaltythatwasacceptedinviewofthesystem’s advantages. Twenty-two spherical tanks around the S-IVB’s thruststructurefedgastosixthrusters(twoineachaxis)inthestage’saftskirt.ThesethrustersprovidedtheforcerequiredindockingandmaneuveredthespacecraftwhentheCMGscouldnotmanagethetask.13

TheattitudeandpointingcontrolsystemswereMarshall’sresponsibility,butMSCastronautswouldhavetooperatethem,soearlyin1967anintercentertaskteamwas formed towork on the crew’s interfacewith the solar experiments,amongotherproblems.TheHoustonmembersweredissatisfiedwithMarshall’sproposals for the ATM control panel; it looked more like a system for anunmanned spacecraft than for a manned one. MSC wanted more informationprovided to theATMoperatorandmoreparticipationbyhim in thecontrolofspacecraft systems.Houston particularly objected toMarshall’s digital-addresssystem,wherebycontrolcommandswereentered intoacomputerbypunching

5-digit numbers into a keyboard. If man was as important to the solarobservatory as everybody insisted, Houston believed he should do more thanrelay numbers to a computer and monitor a few status indicators. In August1967, Bob Thompson collectedMSC’s comments on the control-panel designand forwarded them to Lee Belew, recommending a number of changes andspellingoutMSC’sphilosophyforpaneldesign.14

Fivemonthslater,however,apreliminaryrequirementsreviewshowedthatthetwocenterswerestillnotinagreement.ThoughanMSCrepresentativehadbeenworkingcloselywithMarshalldesigners,theHoustonreviewteamstronglydisagreedwithseveralconcepts—oncemoreconcentratingonthedigital-addresssystem.* A complete redesign of the control and display system seemednecessary, and aworkinggroupwas established to resolve the differences.Bymid-May,workingwithastronautsand thecontractor, thegrouphadaconceptthatreasonablysatisfiedeveryone,anddetaileddesignworkcouldgoon.15

The control and display panel that resulted was probably the mostcomplicatedeverputintoaspacecraft.IthadthreetimesasmanycontrolsastheApollo commandmodule; one ATM experimenter thought it was “at least ascomplicated as one for a large aircraft.” Painstaking design work, however,produced a control center that was highly functional and not inordinatelydifficult to operate. The exact status of each instrument was displayed to theoperator,alongwithinformationontheworkshop’sattitudeandorbitalpositionand theconditionof theATMpowersystem.Two televisionscreensdisplayedthe sun as seen through the H-alpha telescopes; another displayed thecoronagraph’sfieldofview,andafourththex-raymonitor.Thelogicaldesignputall instrumentcontrols,attitudeandpointingcontrols,andtelemetrywithinarm’slengthoftheseatedoperator.16

MISSIONPLANSANDOPERATINGPROCEDURES

With experimentdevelopment reasonablywell inhand, theATMscientiststurned their attention to othermatters in 1969.Operational procedures—whenand how the instruments would be operated, how much observing time wasallowed, how rigid the flight planwould be—were of primary concern duringthenexttwoyears.NoonehadanyexperiencewithmissionsquitelikeSkylab.The astronomers, experienced with sounding rockets and unmanned’missionsdevoted to a single set of experiments, now found themselves competingwithmedical experiments for operational time. Flight controllerswhowere used to

having total control over communicationswith the spacecraft nowhad todealwithexperimenterswhoinsistedontalkingdirectlywiththeastronauts.Notonlythat,theexperimenterswantedtobeabletochangetheflightplaneveryday—even oftener, if the capricious sun unexpectedly spouted flares. The flightcontrollers’ ideal mission—never realized, to be sure—was nicely predictableand offered just enough of the unusual to challenge their ingenuity. Thescientists,ontheotherhand,neededtobeabletoadjusttheirobservingprogramtounpredictableevents,tochangethemodeofoperationofeachinstrumentasconditions indicated, or to drop everything else andwatch the sun for severalorbits if something really interesting was happening. Moreover, the scientistsneverhesitatedtocomplaintoNASA’stopmanagementwhenthingsdidnotgotosuitthem.

AstronautEdwardGibsonatthecontrolanddisplayconsolefortheApollotelescopemount,above.S-74-17306.His hand is on the joy stick that aimed the solar instruments, as indicated by cross hairs in thehydrogenalphatelescope,right.108KSC-73P-434.Gibsonwasscientist-pilotonthethirdcrew;thissolarflarewasphotographedbythefirstcrew.

Operational questions were a major subject at a principal investigators’meeting in April 1969. E. M. Reeves, representing the Harvard CollegeObservatory,wantedtoknowhowprioritieswouldbeassignedtothetelescopesandwhowouldresolveanyconflictsthatarose.Marshall’sexperimentsmanagerassuredhimthatMartinMariettawasdevisingacomputerprogramtodistributeobservingtimeequitably,andMartinwouldbrieftheastronomers.ReevesthenexpressedconcernthatMSCwasnotgivingSkylaboperationsenoughattention.Assured that Skylabwould get higher priority onceMSC had landed the firstmenonthemoon—threemonthsaway,ifallwentwell—Reevesthenurgedthatplanners provide direct communication between principal investigator andastronautatleastonceaday.Suchfree-rangingconversationswerenotnormallyallowed on manned flights. When Houston’s representative invited theastronomers to visit the Mission Control Center during one of the upcomingApollomissions, toseehowmannedflightoperationswereconducted,ReevesrejoinedwithaninvitationtoflightcontrollerstoCambridge,wheretheycouldlearnhowscientificmissionswererun.17

Latein1968Harvardproposedtochangetheclustercontrolsystemsothatits instrument, theonlyone thatproduceddata in real time, couldbeoperatedfromthegroundduringunmannedperiods.Ineffect,theywantedtoaddallthecapabilities of unmanned instruments. When Marshall’s preliminary tradeoffstudies showed a large cost and schedule impact, Program Director BillSchneider demurred, but Harvard’s principal investigators persisted, seekingsupportfromotherATMinvestigators.Threeoftheotherfourprojectscientistsindicatedthatthey,too,wouldlikesomeunmannedoperatingtime;anddespiteMarshall’s insistence that the proposals were not feasible, additional studieswere ordered. Again Marshall showed that large cost increases and longschedule delays would result. They convinced the programmanager from theOffice of Space Science and Applications, but not the scientists, who werecertain the studies were (perhaps intentionally) too pessimistic. In mid-December, however, the Harvard astronomers finally agreed to acceptsubstantially less than they had originally asked for, and Schneider agreed topreserve the option of unmanned operation; he stipulated, however, that theremustbenohardwarechangescostingmorethan$50000andnoscheduledelay,and thatboth theSpaceScienceandApplicationsSteeringCommittee and the

Manned Space Flight Experiments Boardmust approve any change before hewouldacceptit.18

AlreadyunhappyoverthelossofthesecondATMflightthatGeorgeMuellerhad promised them in 1967 (p. 90), the solar scientists were annoyed in July1969by the dry-workshopdecision.BothLeoGoldberg andGordonNewkirkcomplainedtoMuellerthattheyhadbeengivennochancetoevaluatetheeffectof that change on their scientific programs. Mueller tried to placate them byexplainingtheadvantagesofthedryworkshop,includingahigherprobabilityofsuccess for the ATMmission and considerably more observing time; but thefailuretoconsultrankled,allthesame.19

AnothersurprisewasinstorefortheATMscientistslaterintheyear,whenthey learned that Headquarters was about to add a group of earth-sensingexperimentstoSkylab—anotherexample,toastronomers,ofMueller’stendencytomakemajor changeswithout consulting thosewhose experimentswouldbeaffected.Not onlywould these new experiments competewithATM for crewtime; theywould requireholding thecluster inanattitude thatprecludedsolarobservations.The filmand tape theyusedwouldadd to the load inanalreadyoverloadedcommandmodule.Thisnewdisturbance,coupledwiththefact thatobserving-time allotments for the dry-workshop missions were still unsettled,prompted the astronomers to request immediate attention to operationalprocedures.20

AtameetinginlateSeptember1970,ATMexperimentersandMSCofficialsdiscussed Skylab operations,whichHouston intended to conduct inmuch thesame way it had run its previous missions. Experimenters would specify theobservations theywantedcarriedoutand the time theywanted spenton them;theflightoperationsofficewouldimposethemanyoperationalconstraints;andaftertheusualreiteratedtradeoffs,aflightplanacceptabletoboththescientistsandmissioncontrollerswouldbelaiddown.Duringthemissions,changestothisagreedplanwouldbepassed througha longchainofcommandandrelayed tothespacecraftbytheCapCom.Whilethismighthaveworkedformanytypesofexperiments, itwasunsuited tostudying thesun—mainlybecause thesunwasunpredictable,butalsobecauseexperimenterswantedtobaselaterobservationsontheresultsofearlierones.WhenOSSA’srepresentativepointedoutthatafewreally good photographs were worth more than a lot of uninteresting ones,Houston promised to work with the astronomers to assure success on thescientists’terms.21

Whilethisearlyencounterwithoperationspersonnelwasencouragingtothescientists, their first look at the computerized time allotments produced by

MartinMariettawasnot.Nobodywastotallysatisfiedwiththeprogram;RichardTousey of NRL found it unacceptable. In response to Tousey’s protests,Marshall’sexperimentsmanageracknowledgedtheprogram’sshortcomings,butassured NRL’s principal investigator that further refinements by MartinMarietta’s experts would improve it. The principal investigators, however,decidedtotakemattersintotheirownhands.WithoutinformingNASAofficials,theinvestigatorsdeviseda time-sharingplanthatwouldmakebestuseof theirinstruments. After listing the most important problems in solar physics, theyselected those to which the ATM instruments were expected to contributesignificantly.From this analysis a setofprocedureswasdeveloped thatwouldmakeuseofeveryinstrumentduringallthetimeallottedtosolarobservations.AtfirsttheycalledthistheProgramOrientedObservingProgram,butwhenthehumor in the acronym grew stale they changed it to the Joint ObservingProgram. In time therewere13programs (table1), eachwith a setofdefinedobjectives, a list of the data required to satisfy the objectives, and a list ofbuilding blocks—sequences of instrument operation—that would gather thenecessary data.22 (JointObserving Program 2,ActiveRegions, is reprinted asapp.G.)

WhenthescientistspresentedtheirplanatameetinglateinMarch1971,itwasNASA’sturntoreactindignantlytoanunexpectedchangeproposal.KSC’srepresentative pointed out that adopting the scientists’ proposal would meanscrapping the work thatMartinMarietta had already done, and perhaps evenrewriting themission-requirementsdocument—both,apparently,unthinkableatthat stage. The astronomers, believing no one could plan better use of theirinstrumentsthantheythemselves,stuckbytheirproposal.Withthehelpofsomeengineers in mission planning at Houston, the scientists got their observingprogramsadoptedasthebasicmodeofoperationforthesolarinstruments.23

Table1.JointObservingPrograms(August1971)

1.Studyofthechromosphericnetworkanditscoronalextension

2.ActiveregionsA.Rapidlydevelopingactiveregion

B.Long-termevolutionofanactiveregionG.Structureofanactiveregion

D.SunspotsE.Chromosphericvelocities

3.Flares

A.Flare-centeredpointingB.Non-slewingflares

C.Limbflare4.Prominencesandfilaments

A.EvolutionoffilamentsandprominencesB.Structureofaprominence

G.Structureofafilament5.Thesun’satmosphereasderivedfromcentertolimbvariation

6.Synopticobservationsofthesun7.Atmosphericextension

8.Coronaltransients9.Solarwind

10.Lunarlibrations11.Instrumentalcalibration

12.Solareclipse13.Stellarobservations

TECHNICALPROGRESSANDPROBLEMS

WorkontheATMinstrumentsandsupportingsystemsprogressedsmoothlyduring1969.Criticaldesignreviewswerecompletedonallof the instruments,on the solar-cell wing assemblies, the ATM control computer, and the startracker. Qualification tests on a number of experiments and support systemswerecompleted,andbytheendoftheyearHouston’sthermalvacuumchamberwas being prepared for tests on the ATM. An assessment of the project inJanuary 1970 showed that, except for the prototype instruments, the solarobservatory was generally on schedule. The situation was helped bypostponementof launchdate from July toNovember1972,which allowed forhardwaredeliverytotheCapeinNovember1971.Anotherreviewon11March1970 showed no problems that could delay the schedule, though somesubsystemsrequiredcloseattentiontokeepthemontrack.24

Asolarwing for the telescopemountbeingassembled.Atright,acompletedwing isstored in its launchconfiguration.ML71-7321.

Thetelescopemount,constructedatMarshallSpaceFlightCenter,undergoingthermalvacuumtestingatMannedSpacecraftCenterinJuly1972.72-H-1040.

By themiddleof theyear,however,anaccumulationofnigglingproblemswashavinganeffect.AfteranATMreview11–12August,KSC’srepresentativewas pessimistic about the project, noting that the wet-to-dry change and thescientists’ predilection for tinkeringwith their instruments hadproduced “nearchaos” in the configurationcontrol system.Already,deliveryof the flightunit

had slipped 18months, and the addition of the unmanned capability could beexpectedtodelaytheATMevenmore.25

IftheKSCofficialwasundulypessimistic,thereasonprobablyreflectedthatcenter’s enormous work load in checking out the entire cluster. Furthermore,checkoutproblemsalwayslookedmoreseriousfromFloridathantheydidfromAlabama. Generally, the experiments were doingwell in 1970; by the end ofJune, four of the five instrument prototypes had been delivered and were instorageatHuntsville.Persistentproblemsdidexist,however;S082Bhadtroublewithitselectronicassembliesandfilmcameras,andthezoomlensesfortheH-alphatelescopeswouldnotalwaysfocusproperly.TheninJuly,testingofS082Arevealed serious deterioration of its spectrograph grating; replacement wouldtaketime.InspiteofsomeschedulereliefattheendofAugust,whenthetargetlaunchdate(July1972)wasofficiallydropped,alloftheATMinstrumentswerehaving problems. NRL’s two S082 instruments would be delivered late, andMarshallwashavingtroublefindingmoneytocompletethetestprogram.26

Much of the pressure on the ATM was relieved in January 1971, whenHeadquarterspostponedthelastApolloflight(Apollo17)toensurethatitwouldcarryanoptimumloadofexperiments.Skylabwasputoffagain, this timeforfourandahalfmonths;whenthelast launch-readinessschedulewaspublishedon13April,thenewlaunchdatewas30April1973.Experimentproblemswerenolongerathreattotheschedule,buttheycontinuedtodemandattention.27

In May, after passing its acceptance review, experiment S082B showedseriousdeteriorationinitsresponsetoshortwavelengthradiation.Examinationofitsopticalcomponentsrevealedthatitsmaindiffractiongratingwasafflictedwith “purple plague,” a condition resulting from an unexpected chemicalreactionbetweenthegoldcoatingofthegratingandthealuminumcoatappliedoverthat.Thegratinghadtobereplaced,causinganeight-weekdelaythattookallofthecushionoutoftheATMdeliveryschedule.28

At the end of 1971 a midterm review of the entire Skylab program gavegrounds for cautious optimism. TheATM posed no serious problems, but theprojectmanager’soverallassessmentwasthatnotimeremainedtotakecareofmajorproblems.Everythinghadtogorightfromthenon.Theflightunitcouldbedelivered toKennedySpaceCenterby1October1972,asscheduled,but itwasgoingtotakeconstanthardworktomakeit.InthatrespecttheATMwasinmuchthesameshapeastherestofthecluster.29

Onlyone serious anomaly showedup inATM testing, and thatonehad tosome extent been anticipated. Thermal vacuum testing atMSC inAugust and

September resulted in failure of one of the control moment gyros, caused byinadequatelubrication.Thisdefecthadbeensuspectedearlier,andbackupunitswithbetterlubricatingsystemsweresubstituted.TheATMflightunitwasflownfrom Houston to KSC on 22 September 1972, the same day that the orbitalworkshoparrivedbybargefromCalifornia.Finalcheckoutandmatingwiththeotherclustercomponentswerereadytobegin.30

*Thecoronacanbestudiedfromtheearthduringtotalsolareclipses,orbyuseofcoronagraphsathighaltitudes,wheretheatmosphereisthinner.

*Resolutionreferstoaninstrument’sabilitytoseparatecloselyspacedlinesinthespectrum,toseparatetheimagesofadjacentpointsonthesun,ortorespondtotwoseparateeventscloselyspacedintime.

† This red-orange light (wavelength 656.3 nanometers) is the first (longest wavelength) line of theBalmerseriesinthehydrogenspectrum,hencethedesignation.

*Thegyroscopesordinarilyusedinguidanceandnavigationsystemsaremuchsmaller;theyfunctionbygeneratingelectricalsignalsthatinturnactivateattitudecontrolsystems.

*Thesun’sangularradiusisabout18minutesofarc,hencetheinstrumentscouldbepointedatregionsasfaroutas1.3solarradiiwithoutusingtheCMGs.

* Gilruth told von Braun that “the old test pilot types… are just more in favor of mode selectorswitchesthanthemorescientificallyinclinedscientist-astronauts.”VonBraun’shandwrittenannotationonHaeussermann’s“Notes”of29Jan.1968.

10

LateAdditionstotheExperiments

Solarastronomyandspacemedicineweremajorexperimentprograms,andtogetherwiththeso-calledcorollaryexperimentstheywerecertainlyadequatetofilltheoperationaltimeavailableontheSkylabmissions.Theywerealsoaboutas much as the program could comfortably accommodate and still launch ontime,apointparticularlystressedbyprogramofficialsatMarshallSpaceFlightCenter.

ButwhentheOfficeofMannedSpaceFlightchosetodeveloptheShuttleasitsnextmajorprogram,Skylabwasleftastheonlymannedprogramthatwouldbe flying foranuncomfortably long time.ForallofHeadquarters’ stipulationsthatonlymandatorychangesweretobemadeafterthedry-workshopdecision,therewasanatural tendency touse this last setofmissions tobestadvantage.Besidesanumberofchangesintheworkshop(pp.123–24,144–48),onemajorandoneminorgroupofexperimentswereaddedbetweenJuly1969andJanuary1973.

OBSERVINGTHEEARTH

CancellationofApolloApplicationsmission1Aattheendof1967seemedtoputanend toanypossibility thatSkylabwouldconductstudiesof theearth(pp.87–88).Yetwithin twoyears theSkylabprogramofficewaspreparing toaddasetofcomplexandexpensiveinstrumentsforthatverypurpose.Thosetwoyears had seen a tremendous upsurge of interest in remote sensing and itspractical applications.* Increasingly in the late 1960s, users of aerialphotographyandotherremotesensingtechniquesbecameawareofthepotentialand limitations of airborne surveys of the earth’s surface.Advances in sensortechnologyhadmaderemotesensingusefulinagriculture,forestry,geologyandmineralprospecting,oceanography,cityplanning,andland-usestudies.Therise

oftheenvironmentalmovementinthelate1960sbroughtincreasedconcernforairandwaterpollutionandanappreciationthatsuchproblemsexistedonascalethatcouldhardlybeassessedexceptthroughthesynopticeyeofthesatellite.

Not least important was the realization that the view of earth from anorbiting spacecraft was both wide in coverage and rich in detail. The colorphotographs taken on early Gemini missions surprised and delightedcartographersandgeologistsinseveralfederalagencies.1Besideshavingawideview, a satellite could look at the same site frequently. For some applications,such as crop and snowpack surveys, this kind of realtime data collectionexceededanythingaircraftcoulddo.

NASA had launched a series of meteorological satellites (Tiros, Nimbus)startinginthemid-1960s,butinearly1968wasonlybeginningseriousstudyofother earth-sensing vehicles. Activity in this field was a responsibility of theManned Spacecraft Center, where remote-sensing instruments were tested onaircraft.ByFY1968theprogramhadabudgetof$6millionandabout150full-timeNASAand contractor personnel assigned.TheU.S.GeologicSurvey, theDepartment of Agriculture, and the Naval Oceanographic Office helped tocoordinatetheprogramandevaluateitsresults.2

Sincecrops,minerals,andwatersupplieswereamongthefeaturesthatcouldbemonitoredbyremote-sensing instruments, the termearthresources came tobecommonlyappliedtoremotesensing.Towardtheendofthe1960s,publiclyexpressed concernwith dwindling natural resources drewmuch attention, andthe notion gained currency that space technology could be exploited to helpsolveproblemsonearth.Speakingofthisperiod,aMartinMariettaofficiallaterremarked,“Everybodyhadhisowndefinitionofwhat“earthresources”meant,but all the definitions were good.” Some who viewed the expensive mannedspaceflight programs as pointlessly wasteful evidently felt that NASA couldredeem itself by contributing to the solution of environmental problems,includingresourceshortages.3

Any such program was bound to have a wider appeal than some of theesotericscienceprojects.OneSkylabprogramofficial,commentingonhisownexperience,said,“WhenIwould[visitmyhomestate]inthosedays,Icouldtalkabout that ATM all day and they’d be polite, but as soon as I started talkingabout taking a crop survey, my friends … knew what that meant.” Manycongressmen responded similarly. Those who were reluctant supporters ofNASA’sscientificprogramsfoundearth resourcesagodsend:a spaceprogramwithapayoffthatcouldbeeasilyappreciatedbymanyoftheirconstituents.ThechairmenofbothofNASA’sHousesubcommitteesbecamechampionsofearth-

resourceexperiments.Inearly1968,whenJohnNaugle,associateadministratorfor space science and applications, outlined plans in that area for the SpaceSciencesSubcommittee, he found congressmen eager to supportmore than heproposed.AttheendofthatyeartheHouseSubcommitteeonNASAOversightpublishedastaffreporturgingfarmoreworkintheearth-sensingfield.4

AtthattimetheOfficeofSpaceScienceandApplicationswasstillstudyingthe objectives for an earth-resources technology satellite and conductingdevelopmentworkonsensors.NaugletoldtheSubcommitteeonSpaceScienceand Applications that he expected to ask for funds in fiscal 1970 to develophardwareforflightinlate1971orearly1972.Meanwhile,theOfficeofMannedSpaceFlighthad theonlyprogram—Skylab—thatmightbeable to flysensorsany sooner (the official schedule listed an AAP flight in November 1970).Prospectswerenotgood,however, in1968;after thecancellationofAAP1A,about all OMSF could do was to establish the requirements for earth-sensingexperimentstobecarriedonsomefuturewet-workshopflight.Inayearthatsawthe solar telescopes come to the verge of cancellation, any thought of addinganothermajorsetofexperimentswasvisionary.5

Some, however, urged a different course. Jacob Smart, NASA’s assistantadministratorforDoDandinteragencyaffairs,toldGeorgeMuellerinMay1968that an earth-resources project might be the salvation of the space program.“Whetherornotjustified,”Smartsaid,“earthresourcesensingfromaircraftandspace has been widely advertised as promoting great economic returns.”PointingouttheunexpectedrichesthathadbeenfoundintheGeminiandApollophotographs, he suggested that Mueller ask OSSA for suggestions aboutinstrumentstoflyonApolloandApolloApplicationsmissions.6Muellerhad,infact, listed earth-resource observations first among several possible objectivesforAAPin1965(pp.43–44).

Interest in flying earth sensors on amannedmission remained alive in theOfficeofSpaceScience andApplications, though temperedby the experiencewithAAP1A.WhenFloydThompson’sPost-ApolloAdvisoryGroup(pp.97–98) suggested earth sensing as a promising activity for manned spaceflight,OSSAonceagainlookedintothepossibilities.IfOMSFcouldorbitasubstantialearth-sensingpayloadin1969or1970,itcouldprovideusefuldatafordesigningthe earth-resources technology satellite, still in the planning stages. TheThompson committee’s report, however, was not too promising, according tooneOSSAofficialwho looked into it.Coverageof theUnitedStates from theproposedwetworkshopwasnegligibleonaccountoftheloworbitalinclination*obtainable with a Saturn IB. The committee’s estimate of the cost of such a

missionwasmuchtoolow.Andfinally,unlesstheexperimentsweredefinedasprimaryobjectivesof the flight, theywould likelybedroppedwhen schedulesand budgets got tight—as they inevitably would (witness AAP 1A). It wassimply not prudent for OSSA to rely on manned programs to provideinformation,thoughofcoursethepossibilityshouldnotbeexcluded.7

Onemoreinfluentialvoicewasaddedtothechoruscallingforearth-resourcemissions when the National Academy of Sciences published a reportsummarizing a two-year study of applications satellites conducted for NASA.That report urged a two-to three-fold increase in funding for applicationssatellites,moreattentiontocommunicationsandnavigationvehicles,andapilotprogramforanearth-resourcessatellite.8

Inviewofthereadymarketforearth-surveyingexperimentsthatexistedinearly1969,itwouldhavebeensurprisinghadtheOfficeofMannedSpaceFlightnotreviveditsearth-resourceexperiments—whichitdid.Bythefallofthatyear,whenthedusthadsettledsomewhatafter thedry-workshopdecision,meetingswerebeingheldtodeterminewhethertheAAP1Asensors,orupgradedversionsofthem,couldbeaccommodatedontheworkshop.TheOfficeofSpaceScienceandApplicationswasdefining a packageof such experiments for studyby itsSpaceScienceandApplicationsSteeringCommittee.9

EARTH-RESOURCEEXPERIMENTS

When preliminary studies showed no insurmountable problems, MSCquicklypresentedaproposaltotheMannedSpaceFlightExperimentsBoardon8 December 1969. Leonard Jaffe, who as acting director of the EarthObservationsProgramDivisionrepresentedOSSA,wasconcernedbythehastypreparationoftheproposal.Henotedseveralimportantunresolvedquestions—cost,particularly,butalsothestateofdefinitionofthesensorsthemselves.Still,Jaffe strongly supported flying such a set of experiments and said thatOSSAwould present some definitive recommendations as soon as possible. CharlesMathews,chairingthemeeting,concededthatfundingandmanagementneededmore study; but he, too, strongly favored the project. The board accordinglygave final approval to only one of the proposed experiments, deferringconsiderationoftherestuntilbetterinformationwasavailable.10

Initially four instruments made up the new earth-resource experimentspackage. The only one that had been flown before was the multispectralphotographicfacility(experimentS190A;allexperimentsare listed inapp.D).

This was an improved version of an experiment flown with great success onApollo9thepreviousspring.Itconsistedofsixprecisioncameraswithcarefullymatched lenses, each using a different film and filter combination to record adifferent spectral range of visible or infrared light. The other instruments, allexperimental in the sense that their use in orbit had not been proved, wereradiometric rather than photographic; they recorded the intensity of radiationemitted by or reflected from surface features. Two of these, a spectrometer(SI91)anda10-bandmultispectralscanner(S192),operatedintheinfrared.Thespectrometer recorded thewavelength and intensity of infrared radiation fromselectedsmallareas (0.45-kilometerdiameter)on theground; themultispectralscanner simultaneously measured the intensity of infrared in 10 wavelengthranges,scanningaswath74kilometerswidecenteredonthespacecraft’sgroundtrack. The fourth instrument (SI93) had two functions: it was a microwaveradiometer, similar to the infrared instrument but sensing longerwavelengths,andaradarscatterometer,whichmeasuredthereflectivepropertiesofthesurfacetoward radar waves. Somewhat later two more instruments were added: apassiveL-bandradiometer,SI94,tomaptemperaturesofterrestrialsurfaces;andahigher-resolutioncamera,S190B,toaidininterpretationofdatafromtheothersensors.11

Earth-resource experiments, as depicted on briefing charts. Above, area coverage of the first fiveinstruments.S190B,addedlater,photographeda109-km(59-nm)square.S-71-2255-S.Left,thefrequencycoverageofallsixinstruments.S-72-216-S.Below,thebottomofthedockingadapter,showingthesensorsof the first five instruments. SWOB was designed to be operated through the scientific airlock in theworkshop.S-72-214-S.

SkylabProgramDirectorBillSchneiderimmediatelyorderedthecenterstobeginpreliminarywork:MSCtoprepare thedocumentation,Marshall tostudyintegration requirements and hardware modifications, and all three centers tocontinuebasiccompatibilitystudies.Everyefforthadtobemadetokeepcostsdown. The experiments board had been given an estimate of $10 million fordeveloping the instruments and $11,125million for support and data analysis,thelattertobefundedbyOSSAanduseragencies.12

Early in February OSSA recommended that the first four instruments beflown; Dale Myers agreed on the 16th. The microwave instrument was onlyprovisionallyapproved,however,sinceitscompatibilitywiththespacecrafthadnot been conclusively established and it might cost an additional $2 million.Directingthecenterstoproceedwiththeearth-resourceexperiments,Schneiderreminded them that “all possible effort must be made to deliver [theexperiments]withinpresentcostandscheduleguidelines”—thatis,$25millionfor development, integration, and delivery by July 1971. Should developmentcostsexceed thebudget, itwouldbenecessary toconsiderdropping theentirepackage. Requests for proposals were sent out, a source evaluation boardappointed, and by the middle of 1970 contracts had been awarded for theinstruments.13

Schneider’s correspondence for the next six months documented a steady

increase inprojectedcosts,alongwithhis repeatedwarnings that“wehavenoresource reserves tocoveradditional requirements.”Bymid-March thecostofthemultispectralcameraswastwicewhathadbeenestimatedinDecember.ByJune, the cost of the entire package had soared to $36million, and Schneiderwarned that reconsiderationmight be necessary. In June, although the Skylaboffice recommended deleting themicrowave sensor, theManned Space FlightExperimentBoard,persuadedbyOSSA’spleas tokeepit,urgeddevelopingalltheinstrumentsforflight.14

DespiteacutinNASA’soverallbudgetthatsummer,Myershadlittlechoicebuttogoaheadwiththeearth-resourceinstruments.HeinformedAdministratorJamesFletcherofthisintentinJuly,sayingthathewaslimitingthecostoftheproject to $36.4 million. The extra $11.4 million would come from “furtherreductionintheplannedSkylabun-costedobligationattheendofFY1971”—inotherwords,outoffundsalreadyallottedforSkylab.Schneiderpassedthewordtothecenterprogrammanagers,directingthemtoreallocatefundswithincurrentfiscal limitations. FromHouston,wheremuch of the burden of cost reductionwouldfall,KennethKleinknechttoldHeadquartersthathisbackwastothewall,financially, and that the other projects in Skylab might suffer. He added thatWashington ought to consider the centers’ problems before adding expensivenewexperimentstoamaturingprogram.15

Sixmonths latercostshadgoneupstillmore, toanestimated$42million,butseemedtobeunderbettercontrol.Inmid-1971,reviewingtheproject’scosthistoryforMyers,Schneiderattributedmuchofthetroubletounrealisticinitialestimatesandto less-than-efFectivemanagementatall levels.Thefact that thesensorshadbeenflownintheaircraftprogram—whichwasonlyapproximatelytrue—had thrown managers off their guard and led to poor assessment ofdevelopment problems and costs. In the general eagerness to get the packageready for flight, neither OSSA nor OMSF had formulated requirements insufficientdetailbeforesolicitingbids;changesinspecificationsduringcontractnegotiation had increased costs. Nor had there been adequate coordinationbetween MSC’s Science and Applications Directorate (which directedinstrument development) and program control officials in theHouston Skylaboffice.Changeshadbeenmadeintheexperimentswithoutfullassessmentoftheconsequences. Insum, ithadnotbeenagoodjobofmanagement,and in theirhaste to get the instruments into the program, managers at all levels hadproceeded less carefully than they should have. The project was now undercontrol,butanynewmajorproblemscouldwreckit.16

Lookingforaplacetoputtheinstrumentsandtheircontrolsystems,planners

quicklysettledonthemultipledockingadapter,wherespacewasstillavailable.An optical-quality window would have to be added for the multispectralcameras; the infrared spectrometer would have to be installed through thepressurehull;andbracketswouldhavetobeaddedtotheoutsidetosupportthemicrowave and multispectral scanners, both of which used large antennas.Marshall went ahead at once with these changes, though they caused someinterferencewithsystemsalreadyinstalledonthemodule.

Therequirementsoftheearth-resourceexperimentscausedmajorchangestomissionplans.Primaryamongthesewasanincreaseinorbitalinclinationto50°.SkylabwouldnowgoasfarnorthasVancouver,Winnipeg,Bastogne,FrankfurtamMain,Kharkov,Mongolia,andSakhalinIslandnorthofJapan.Tothesouth,SkylabwouldpassoverallofAustraliaandAfricaandmostofSouthAmerica,except Tierra del Fuego. Three-fourths of the earth’s surface would lie underSkylab’spath,theareawhere90%ofitspopulationlivesand80%ofitsfoodisproduced.17

Skylab’sareaofoperationswith50°orbitalinclination.S-72-1795-S.

SinceNASA’snetworkoftrackingandcommunicationsstationswassitedtocoveraspacecraft inanorbitof lower inclination(oronitswayto themoon),the50°orbitmeantthatSkylabwouldbeoutofcontactduringalargefractionofeach orbit. The increased inclination also changed the angular relation of theorbital plane to the sun line, requiring recalculation of heat loads in theworkshopandpowerproductionbythesolararrays.18

Amongthemoresignificantchangeswastheneworbitalattituderequiredbythe earth-sensing experiments. While the solar telescopes had to be pointeddirectlyatthesun,theearthsensorshadtobeaimedatthatpointontheearth’s

surfacedirectlybeneath the spacecraft (nadir).Except forminorperturbations,inertia would keep the cluster aligned with the sun, but would move itcontinuallywithrespecttothenadir.Whentheearth-resourceexperimentswereoperating, the spacecraft would have to rotate at an angular rate equal to itsangularvelocityinorbit,about4°perminute.Thismodeofoperation(calledtheZ-local vertical because theZ axis of the orbital assembly pointed toward thecenteroftheearthateachinstant)madesolarobservationsimpossible,changedthecluster’sheatbalance,andreducedpowerproduction.

Thenewrequirements,plusincreasingweightsandmomentsofinertiaintheworkshopcluster, touchedoffaseriesofdesignchanges in theattitude-controlsystem.Whereas the control moment gyros had been responsible for attitudecontrol during solar observations and the thruster system was to be used forothermaneuvers,Marshallengineersnow transferredmostof themaneuveringresponsibilities to the gyros, with the thrusters held in reserve. New controlprograms were entered into the ATM’s digital computer, which could, oncommand from the control anddisplay console,maneuver the cluster betweensolarinertialandZ-localverticalattitudesandintoanyofseveralotherattitudesrequiredinspecialcircumstances.19

The earth-resources package presented its largest challenge to flightplanners. The photographic instruments required specific lighting conditions,whichrestrictedthenumberofsites*thatcouldbephotographedfromSkylab’sorbit. Thermal and power problems in the Z-local-vertical attitude limited thenumberofsuccessiveearth-observingpasses.Exceptforthemicrowavesensor,the earth-resource experiments were limited by weather conditions at thesurface;observationsplannedforonepassmighthavetobepostponedifcloudcoverwasheavy.Andalwaystherewasthefactthattimefortheearth-resourceobservationswouldhavetobetakenfrommedicalorsolarexperimentsorboth.

In view of these limitations, a preliminary study showed that about 45 ofSkylab’stripsacrosstheUnitedStatesduringthethreemissionswouldbeusefulforearth-resourcesensing.Thatfigurewasusedforplanningpurposesforaboutayear,untilproposalsfrompotentialusersdemandedmore.Itwouldtakeagreatdealofjugglingtooptimizeallthefactorsthathadtobetakenintoaccount.20

SELECTINGTHEINVESTIGATORSFortwoyears,nooneknewexactlywhattheearth-resourceinstrumentswere

going to do. Not only was NASA evaluating a set of sensors; it was also

evaluating a new concept of experiment management. The earth-resourceinstruments were to be a scientific “facility,” whose specifications weredeterminedbyNASA;userswouldbeaskedtoproposespecificusesforthedatathoseinstrumentscouldgather.(Previouslyexperimentershadproposedboththeinstrument and the experiment, with NASA providing support for itsdevelopmentandthespacecraftonwhichtoflyit.)Theprincipalinvestigators’responsibilities for earth resourceswerenot the sameas thoseof theprincipalinvestigators for thesolar telescopes.Userswouldhavenocontroloversensordesign,but theycould(withinoperational limits)specifywhenandwheretheywanteddatataken.21

Until those userswere chosen, a number of important activities could notproceed. Particularly frustrated by this situation was Eugene Kranz, chief ofHouston’sFlightControlDivision.HavingtodefineitsroleinSkylabbytheendof1970,Kranz’sdivision couldnotget agripon the earth-resourcespackage.Whereasnormallytheofficewouldhavesponsoredmeetingswithexperimenterstofindoutwhattheyneededfromtheinstruments,therewere—onlytwoyearsbeforeflight—noinvestigators to talk to.Norcouldrequirementsbecomparedeffectively with the design constraints of the cluster during critical designreviews.Inmid-1970,FlightControlhadbeengivenresponsibilityforcollectingSkylab’sdatarequirements,includingdataprocessinganddistribution,andoncemore the earth-resource experiments raised unanswerable questions. Was thepurpose of the experiments to evaluate the sensors or to collect data? Thedistinctionmarkedly affected theway experimentswouldbehandled.Pendingreceipt of specific instructions, Kranz decided to treat the earth resources asdata-collectingscienceexperiments.HewasawarethatthisconflictedwithotheropinionatMSC,butbytakingthatapproachhehopedtogetsomeclarificationofcenterpolicy.22

Kranz’s difficulty undoubtedly stemmed from the same source asSchneider’s cost problems: the haste with which NASA was attempting toorganizeandcarryoutamajoradditiontoanexistingprogram.WithOSSAincharge of some aspects of earth resources,MSG responsible for others,* andHeadquarters coordinating the activity under severe budgetary restraints, it isprobablynotsurprisingthatcommunicationsometimesbrokedown.

Even asKranzwas complaining, however, selection of experimenterswasabout to begin. On 22 December 1970, 6000 announcements of flightopportunityweresentouttopotentialusersofearth-resourcedata.Universities,stateandlocalgovernmentagencies,privateconcerns,andforeigngovernmentswere solicited for proposals. By mid-1971 approximately 230 proposals had

beenreceivedandscreeninghadbegun.After theOfficeofSpaceScienceandApplications had examined them for scientific merit, the proposals wereevaluatedbythemannedspaceflightcenters(primarilyMSC)forcompatibilitywiththeplannedmissions.Notuntilthatprocesswascompletecoulddefinitiveflightplanningbegin.23

Althoughmanyproposalsneededtobebetterdefined,thereweremoregoodproposalsthan45earth-resourcepassesallowedfor.SchneiderthereforedirectedHoustonandHuntsvilletodeterminehowmuchmoreZ-local-verticaltimetheycouldprovide.Marshallfoundthatwithincertainlimitations,another40passescouldbemade;themainproblemswereencroachmentonATMobservingtimeandprovidingspacetostorefilm.Theextra40passesincludedsomeinthesolarinertial attitude; for some investigators an oblique view of the earth wasacceptable,andthisallowedtheearthsensorsandthesolartelescopestooperatesimultaneously. With these extra passes available, 160 of the more than 230proposalswereplacedonacandidatelistforfurthernegotiation.24

Consultation with the investigators during the first half of 1972 producedchangestomanyoftheproposalsandbroughtthemwithinSkylab’scapability.As MSC got a clearer picture of the cost of supporting these investigations,however, officials urged cutting the total to a far smaller number—a proposalvigorously opposed by bothOSSA andOMSF.WhenHeadquarters suggestedthat management of some of the investigations could be moved elsewhere torelievethestrainonMSC,thecenteragreedtonegotiatewithall160.InAugust1972,ninemonthsbeforethescheduledflightofthefirstmission,Headquartersannouncedthat106investigators,83fromtheU.S.and23fromothercountries,hadbeenselectedfortheearth-resourceexperiments.25

FLIGHTPLANNINGANDINSTRUMENTDEVELOPMENT

While project officials were negotiating the final details of earth-resourceexperiments with investigators, mission planners were refining their plans fortaking data. An important change was made early in 1972, when Houstonproposedtolaunchtheworkshopintoacontrolledrepeatingorbit,inwhichthespacecraft passed over the same point at regular intervals, to increase theprobability of successful coverage of the earth-resource sites.WithMarshall’sconcurrence, this feature was incorporated into mission plans in June. Theworkshopwas tobe inserted into a372.5-kilometerorbit thatwould repeat itsfirstgroundtrackonthe72drevolution,fivedays(lesstwohours)later.Minor

adjustmentswouldbemadeperiodicallyduringthemissiontocorrectfornormalperturbations.26

Flight planning for earth-resource passes was at least as complex as anyotherexperimentactivityinSkylab,includingthesolarobservations.Therewere570combinationsofgroundsitesandexperimentaltaskstobeaccomplishedin60 earth-oriented passes during the three missions; frequently groundobservations or aircraft flights had to be coordinated with orbital passes, tocalibrate the instruments.Weatherconditionscouldalways interfere.Andaftercompletinganobservingpass,experimenterscouldneverbesurethat theyhadsecuredthedatatheywanted,sinceresultswerenotavailableuntilthefilmwasprocessedonearthafterthemission.

Missionplannersworkedoutbasicearth-resourceproceduresinthefirsthalfof1972.Planningforagivenday’sobservationswouldstartfivedaysbefore(aconsideration based on the five-day repeating ground track), with all of theactivities preplanned for the mission but not yet accomplished put on a“shoppinglist.”Manyofthesewouldbeeliminatedbecauseofthespacecraft’sgroundtrackorthecrew’swork-restcycle.Thoseremainingwouldbecomparedagainst the expected sun angle, the day’s flight plan (other experimentsmighthave higher priority), and the condition of the workshop’s attitude-controlsystem.Weatherforecastsandthereadinessofgroundsupportandaircraftwerethen considered, perhaps eliminating a fewmore possible activities.Twodaysbeforeexecution,plannerschosetheobservationswiththehighestprobabilityofsuccess, and summary flight planning began, with updated weather forecastsbeing continually monitored. On the day before, detailed flight planning wascompleted—coordinates of each site, instruments to be operated, time ofspacecraftmaneuvers—and,afterchecking the latestavailableweather reports,flightplanners committedSkylab to an activitynot later than threehours (twoorbits)beforeitwasexecuted.27

The short time available for development of the instruments presentedproblems.WhiletheS190Acamerasweresimilartoothersthathadbeenflownbefore, the infrared and microwave sensors were less well developed andencounteredanumberofdelays.MartinMarietta,whoseresponsibilityincludedbothintegratingtheexperimentsintothemultipledockingadapterandbuildingthe controls and displays for them, often had to cope with changes in theinstruments that affected the company’s own hardware. To make sure thateveryoneconcernedwasawareof the implicationsofsuchchanges,Martinsetup a working group of representatives of the five other contractors and theastronautoffice,whichmetmonthlytomakedecisionsonproposedchanges.It

wasprobablytheonlywaythatthetradeoffsbetweenthevariousfactionscouldbeaccomplishedinthetimeavailable.28

By November 1971, Program Director Bill Schneider could report to theOffice of Space Science and Applications that flight hardware had beencompleted and delivered for integration into the multiple docking adapter. Inspiteofthat,eachsensorhadoneormoreproblemsthatwouldrequirehardwarechangesbeforelaunch;andafterintegrationcheckstheinstrumentswerepulledoffthemoduleforadditionalwork.Somesubsequentqualificationtestsrequiredjugglingtheschedulestoworkaroundthemissingexperiments.29

Latein1971Schneideragainrecommendedcancellationoftwoexperiments.Themultispectralscannerwasexperiencingdifficultiesthatcoulddelaylaunch,and themicrowavesensorhadsofewinvestigators interested in itsdata that itseemed an unjustifiable expense.Neither experimentwas in fact dropped, butOSSAconcededthatthemultispectralscannerwasexpendableif theworkshoplaunchhadtobepostponedonitsaccount.Anylengthydelaywoulddisrupttheseasonal variations that other investigators wanted to observe, and themultispectralscannerwasnotworththat.30

On6October1972themultipledockingadapterandairlockweredeliveredto theCape.TheS193microwaveexperiment arrivedninedays later.Duringthe next few months a number of equipment failures occurred; both themultispectral scanner and the microwave sensor had to be returned to themanufacturersforcorrectionofdefects,asdidthecontrolanddisplaypanelandoneofthetaperecorders.LateinMarch1973thelastearth-resourcessimulationtestwascompletedsatisfactorily,andtheexperimentswerepronouncedreadytogo.31

STUDENTEXPERIMENTS

Whiletheearth-resourceexperimentswerepublicizedasofferingbenefitstothe public as a whole—in contrast to the medical and solar astronomyexperiments—some in theSkylabprogramfelt thatpublic interestandsupportshould be broadened. In the spring of 1971Ken Timmons, aMartinMariettaofficial whose office had responsibility for the multiple docking adapter,conceived the idea of allowing high-school students to propose some simpleexperimentsfortheworkshop.PreliminarydiscussionswithColoradoeducationofficialsindicatedastronginterest,soTimmonspassedtheideaontoMarshallSpaceFlightCenter.SkylabmanagerLelandBelewalsolikedtheidea,andhein

turn mentioned it to William Schneider in a telephone conversation.Headquarters then negotiated a contract with the National Science TeachersAssociation to organize and manage a nationwide competition for studentproposals.32

InOctober1971NSTAmailedoutsome100000announcements,specifyinga4February1972deadlineforreceiptofproposals.Morethan55000teachersrequestedentrymaterialsand3409proposalswerefinallysubmitted, involvingover4000 students fromall50 states ingrades9 through12.By1March,12regional screening committees had selected 300 proposals for the finalwinnowing,whichwouldproduce25winners.ProposalswerejudgedbyNSTAonscientificmerit,but throughout the selectionprocessNASAengineerswerecalledonforquickjudgmentsastofeasibility.By15March,25nationalwinnersand22“specialmention”entrieshadbeenchosen.33

The selection process had taken into account such limitations as weight,volume, power consumption, and crew time needed. But once the winningexperiments had been chosen it was necessary to run them through NASA’snormal sequence of reviews. To avoid overwhelming the students withpaperwork, however, certain documentation requirements were relaxed; astreamlined system of record-keeping summarized the results of the reviews.Andinlightoftheshorttimeavailablefordevelopingtheexperiments,projectofficialsinsistedthateachNASAofficedesignateasinglepersontoparticipateinreviews.Thisensured thatactioncouldbe takenon thestudentexperimentswhennecessary.34

The 25 winning students participated in a preliminary design review atHuntsvilleduringtheweekof8May1972.Theexperimentswereputintothreecategories:thosethatrequiredfabricationofseparatepiecesofhardware,thosethat could be affiliated with existing Skylab experiments, and those whosegeneralobjectivescouldbeattainedbycooperationwithrelatedresearchalreadyin the program. Six experiments were put in this latter category when itdevelopedthat theycouldnotbecarriedoutonaccountof technicalproblems.Thesestudentswereallowedtoworkwithprincipalinvestigatorswhoseresearchprograms closely approximated their own interests, so that they could at leastparticipate in somepartofSkylab’s scienceprogram.Of the rest,8wouldusedata already planned for collection and 11 required development of newhardware. These students spent the next three months working with NASAadvisers, designing the equipment for their investigations and preparing for acritical design review in August. By early 1973 the student experiments hadbeen completed. The flight acceptance review was held at Marshall 23–24

JanuaryandflightunitsweredeliveredtotheCapetwodayslater.35

The experiments devised by these students ranged in quality from fair toextremely good, according to Marshall’s program manager and others whoparticipated in the judging.Oneproposal called formeasuring the intensity ofneutron radiationatorbital altitudes, something thatprofessional scientistshadneverdone.Anotherproposedtostudyx-radiationfromJupiter,usingoneoftheATMinstruments.Oneof themostwidelypublicizedstudentexperimentswasdesigned to study adaptation to zero g by determiningwhether a spider couldspin a normal web and, if not, whether the arachnid could adapt toweightlessness during a mission. Others dealt with questions in astronomy,biology,andspacephysics(all19arelistedinapp.D).

BothNASAandNSTAparticipantswereagreeablysurprisedbytheoverallsophisticationofthestudentproposals.Someofthestudents,ontheotherhand,felt that NASA’s expectations had been too low. One significant secondaryfinding was that many students had serious misconceptions of scientificprinciplesandthescientificmethod,leadingsomeoftheevaluatorstoexaminetheirowncollege-levelteaching.Thecontestjudgeswerealsodistressedtofindthat quite a number of the students could not express themselves clearly inwriting.36

Thestudentexperimentswere the last addition toSkylab.On thewhole, itwas probably aworthwhile exercise. Both students and science teachersweregrateful forNASA’s interest in scienceatapre-professional level.Thestudentwinners, though few in number, learned a great deal—not only about science,but about the day-to-day conduct of a complex project like Skylab, wherenonscientificconsiderationsoftendeterminethecourseofascientificproject.

*Remotesensing designates a variety of activities, fromphotography to radiometry, conducted fromhigh-flyingvehiclesandusuallymeasuringelectromagneticradiationreflectedoremittedfromfeaturesontheearth’ssurface.Mappingbymeansofaerialphotographyisacommonexample,butnonphotographicmeasurements (photometry) including infrared (heat) andmicrowave radiationhave applications inotherareas. Even more useful for some purposes is multispectral sensing, the simultaneous measurement ofseveraldifferentbands in thevisibleand infraredspectra.Amajordrawback tosurveysbyaircraft is thedifficultyofcoveringlargeareasinashorttime.PeterC.Badgley,LeoF.Childs,andWilliamL.Vest,“TheApplicationofRemoteSensingInstrumentsinEarthResourceSurveys,”paperG-23,35thAnnualMeetingoftheSocietyofExplorationGeophysicists,Houston,6–10Nov.1966.

*Theangleoftheorbitalplanewiththeequator,e.g.30°,givesthelatitudesthatmarkthenorthern-andsouthern-mosttravelofthespacecraft.Ataninclinationof30°,aboutashighasthewetworkshopcouldgo,thespacecraftfliesnofarthernorththanNewOrleans.

* Since much of Skylab’s flight path was over foreign countries, some of them sensitive to thepossibilityofsurveillancefromorbit,theuseofthewordtargettorefertogroundsiteswasforbidden.The

wordwasnotusedevenintraining,lestanastronautinadvertentlyuseitinflight.LeonardJaffetoSkylabprog,dir.,“NomenclatureforEREPObservations,”31Aug.1972.

*In1970asin1967,MSCwaswrestlingwithApolloproblems—notacatastrophethistime,butanearmiss:theabortedflightofApollo13inApril1970andthesubsequentinvestigation.

11

PuttingthePiecesTogether

In the year following July 1969, Skylab programmanagers and engineersadjusted their plans to the new capabilities of the Saturn V dry workshop.Initiallychangeswere limited,byHeadquartersorder, to thosemadenecessarybythewet-to-dryconversion;butmanyimprovementsandadditionsweresoonauthorized. By July 1970most of these new features had been assimilated; aprogram review reaffirmed Skylab’s schedule and budget,marking the end ofmajor design refinements (pp. 125–27, 144–48). Later that summer, criticaldesignreviewsonthethreemajorclustermodulesputfurtherchangesunderthejurisdiction of configuration control boards. Thenceforth only deficienciesdiscoveredduringtestingcouldjustifymajormodifications.

MOREWORKFORCONTRACTORS

Comparing resources to the dry workshop’s new requirements in August1969,Marshall’sprogramofficedetermined that someof the requiredchangescould not be accomplished at the center. The new support and deploymentstructurefortheApollotelescopemount,forexample,wouldovertaxMarshall’sshops,whichwerealreadybuildingthemountandthemultipledockingadapter.Instead,Marshallproposedtoaddthenewstructure,alongwiththeshroudthatprotectedSkylabuntilitreachedorbit,toMcDonnellDouglas’scontractfortheairlock.Similarly itwasapparent thatequippingandcheckingout themultipledocking adapter, about to become the control center for both the solarobservatory and the new earth-resource experiments, exceeded Marshall’scapacity. Accordingly, Huntsville’s managers decided to add to an existingcontractwiththeMartinMariettaCorporationtheresponsibilityforoutfittingthedockingadapter.1

Martin Marietta had held a contract for payload integration since AAP’s

earlydays,whentheprogramconsistedofmanysmallpayloadseachcarryingasetofrelatedexperiments.Underthisconcept,thecompanywasresponsibleforseeing that mission payloads were compatible, qualified for spaceflight, andsuitable for accomplishing mission objectives. It was a broad responsibility,encompassingmission planning, operations, and training, aswell as hardwareprocurement. As AAP shrank, however, during 1967 and 1968, Martin’sresponsibilities dwindled; NASA program offices had trouble findingappropriateworkforthecompany’sengineerstodo.Martinwasnothappywiththissituation,andcompanyofficialswereparticularlydisappointedwhenAAPmission1Awascanceled(pp.87–88).Earlyin1969,MarshallredefinedMartinMarietta’sdutiesinApolloApplicationsanddefinitizedthefirm’slettercontract.Under thenewarrangementMartinwouldconductspecificengineeringstudiesinsupportofintegrationdecisionsmadebytheNASAcenters:electricalpowerand thermal analyses, experiment compatibility studies, coordination of testplans,andmissionplanning. Inaddition, thecontractorwouldassistNASAbykeepingtrackofconfigurationchanges,updatingtheinterfacespecificationsandinterface control documents, and maintaining the document repository atHuntsville.2

MovementandassemblyofhardwareforSkylab.Abbreviations:AS&E,AmericanScience&Engineering;ATM, Apollo telescope mount; HAO, High Altitude Observatory; HCO, Harvard College Observatory;KSC, Kennedy Space Center; MDA, multiple docking adapter; MDAC-ED, McDonnell DouglasAstronautics-Eastern Div.; MDAC-WD, Western Div.; MMC, Martin Marietta Corp.; MSC, MannedSpacecraft Center; MSFC, Marshall Space Flight Center; NRL, Naval Research Laboratory; O&C,Operations&CheckoutBldg.;VAB,VehicleAssemblyBldg.PM-7200-135.

Assignment of the multiple docking adapter to Martin Marietta’s DenverDivisionwasboth logical andhelpful to thecompany.Completing theadapterwasfundamentallyajobofintegration,whichwasMartin’sacknowledgedtask;butaslongasthecompanyhadnohardwareresponsibilities, itsrelationtotheother prime contractors had been somewhat ill-defined.While the integrationcontractor had provided much necessary information, it was NASA and theprimecontractorswhohadmadetheintegrationdecisions.Thedockingadapter,whichconnectedtoalltheotherclustermodules,putMartinonanequalfootingwiththeothermajorcontractors.3

TESTPROGRAM

SinceSkylab was one of a kind, there would be no preliminary flights todiscover and correct design deficiencies; preflight testing assumed criticalimportanceearlyintheprogram.Whilesomecomponentsofthecluster—theS-IVBstage,forexample—wereeitherwellprovenitemsorsufficientlysimilartoApollo hardware that exhaustive testing was not required, many others wereuntried. Each new component had to be qualified during development. Acarefullydocumentedtestprogramwasformulatedandfollowed,toensurethateverypartwouldsurvive thestressesof launchand functionas requiredundermissionconditionsforitsspecifiedlifetime.

Twoprimarydocumentsdefinedthetestprogram.Themissionrequirementsdocument specified exactly what each mission was to accomplish; and thecluster requirements specification defined permissible materials, design andconstructionpractices,andhumanengineeringstandards.Fromthesedocuments,NASAtestengineersdevelopedtheproceduresforcontractorstofollowinordertosatisfytheagencythathardwarewouldbeacceptable.4

Thereweretwomainphasesintheoveralltestprogram:developmenttests,used by contractors towork out the best choice ofmaterials and designs, andqualificationteststodemonstratethatacomponentwasadequateforitsintendedfunction.Forthefirstphase,design-verificationtestunitswerebuiltthatdidnothavetoconformfullytoflightspecifications.WhenMarshallbuilt themedical

experiments, for example, design-verification test units enabled engineers towork out such things as the optimum size for the bicycle ergometer and thelower-body negative-pressure device, the range of adjustment necessary toaccommodate the crewmen, and the electronic circuitry necessary to transmitmedicaldatatotheexperimentsupportsystem.Afterthedesignwasacceptablyverified,aqualificationunit,identicalinallrespectstotheflighthardware,wasfabricatedandsubjectedtoallnecessarytests.Followingthequalificationtests,several of the test articleswere refurbished and converted to training units orbackuphardware.5

SincealmosteverythingonSkylab functioned as a part of a larger system,compatibilitywas as important as reliability.As assembly proceeded, systemstests were conducted at progressively higher levels of complexity to discoverand correct anymechanical, electrical, or electromagnetic incompatibilities. Inprinciple,systemstestingshouldhavecontinuedallthewaythroughverificationoftheentireclusterwithallitssystemsoperating;inpractice,thiscouldnotbedone. It was impractical, for example, to test the jettisoning of the payloadshroud, thedeploymentof theApollo telescopemount,or theunfoldingof thesolar arrays on the workshop and telescope mount. Each of these operations,however, was verified by analysis, testing with nonflight hardware, andsimulations.6

Becauseofthecomplexityofthemodulesandthenumberofteststheywentthrough,programofficialsdecidedattheoutsettosetupatestteam,composedof contractor and agency engineers, for each of the major modules. Fromcontractors’ plants to Houston, Huntsville, and Cape Canaveral, these teamswentwith theirmodules to each test site, assisting resident personnel in post-acceptance testing. The experience thus accumulated was of great value introuble-shootingandcorrectingtestanomaliesastheywereencountered.7

MODULEDEVELOPMENT:AIRLOCKANDDOCKINGADAPTER

Althoughtheairlockandthemultipledockingadapterwereseparateentitiesbuilt by different contractors, they were in many respects simply twocomponentsofasinglemodule. (When theadapterhadfirstbeenproposed, infact, Houston—then in charge of the airlock—had refused to consider it asanything but an extension of the airlock.) Production plans called for the twounitstobejoinedandtestedasasingleunitbeforebeingshippedtoKSC.MartinMarietta andMcDonnellDouglas’sEasternDivision at St. Louis thus became

closecollaborators.ByJuly1969,airlockandadapterhadgonethroughconsiderableevolution.

Theairlock,whichin1965hadbeenarathersimpletunnelgivingaccesstotheS-IVB tank and to the outside, had grown much more complex as programconceptsmatured.Besidesitsairlockfunction,inthedryworkshopitcarriedthecluster’s communications, electrical power distribution, and environmentalcontrolsystems.Anewstructuraltransitionsection,3.05metersindiameterand1.2meterslong,providedspaceforthecontrolpanelsandequipmentaswellasthebaseforattachmentofthemultipledockingadapter.Theairlock’sstructuraltrusses carried cylinders of compressed gases for the workshop atmosphere.With the change to the dry workshop a fixed airlock shroud, of the samediameter as the S-IVB, was added to serve as the base on which the Apollotelescopemount deployment structure stood.During four years of change, theairlock’slaunchweighthadgrownfromabout3600kgtonearly35000kg.8

Similarly, the multiple docking adapter was no longer a simple passivemoduleenablingtheclustertocarryseveralexperimentpackages.During1967and 1968 it had been enlarged to provide space for carrying the workshop’sfurnishings into orbit,meanwhile losing one after another of the original fivedockingports.Thedry-workshopdecision,however,nullifiedthisfunction,andatmid-1969theadapterwasonceagainavirtuallyemptyshell:acylinder3.05meters in diameter by 5.25 meters long, with the main docking port in itsforwardendandacontingencyportononeside,enclosingabout35cubicmetersof space. Some of this space was immediately preempted for the Apollotelescope mount’s control and display panel; within a short time more of itwould be taken up by the earth-resource experiments and their supportingequipment. Not surprisingly, the adapter became, in the latter stages of theprogram,akindofcatch-allforequipmentstorageandworkspace.Thisledtoasomewhat random arrangement of crew stationswithin the adapter,making itquite a different environment from the workshop with its predominant one-gorientation. The difference was the subject of considerable comment by thecrews,butnoonefounditdistracting.9

During1970and1971muchofthedevelopmenttestingfortheairlockandadapterwasconducted.StatictestsatHuntsvillesubjectedthetestarticlestothestructural loads expected to be imposed at launch. Internal pressurization andleakage tests verified the integrity of hatches and seals under prelaunch andorbital conditions. Meanwhile, at NASA’s Plum Brook Station in Ohiocontractor andNASA engineerswere verifying the systems for jettisoning thepayloadshroud.Threeseparate testsof theexplosivesystemforseparating the

shroud into four segments were successful, with only minor discrepanciesrequiringattention.Completionofthesetwosetsoftestsclearedthewayforthenextstageofclustertesting.10

Thelastmajordevelopment testson theclustermodulescamein1971and1972, when high-fidelity mockups were put through vibroacoustic tests atHouston.Subjecting themodules to thevibrationand soundpressureexpectedduringpoweredflighthadtwoobjectives:todeterminethatthestructurescouldwithstand the environment and to find out whether the criteria set forqualification testswereadequate.The testshad tobescheduled lateenough indevelopment so that the test articles would be faithful replicas of flightequipment, yet early enough for their results to be incorporated into thequalification test program.FromFebruary throughMayof1971 theworkshopwas put through the 4500-cubic-meter test chambers at MSC; tests of thepayloadassembly(airlock,adapter,telescopemount,andpayloadshroud)beganinSeptemberandranthroughJuly1972.11

The airlock module in January 1968, left, S-68-604, and under construction at McDonnell DouglasAstronauticsCo.inSt.Louisin1971,below,ML71-7322,andin1972,right,72-H-86.

Nostructural failures, andonly a fewanomalies, resulted from these tests.Test specifications, however, were changed in several areas of the workshop.Actual testingshowedthatspecifiedvibrationlevelsweretoohighin33of53environmentalzonesoftheworkshop,andtoolowin6.Hadthosespecificationsgoneunchanged,components testedat too lowa levelcouldeasilyhavefailedduring launch after passing their qualification tests. On the other hand, manycomponents would have unnecessarily failed their qualification tests,necessitating expensive redesign and retesting. The control moment gyrospresentedaproblemofthissort;theycouldnotpassthequalificationtestsatthevibration levelscalled for.Whena testgyrowas run throughMSC’svibrationtests, however, engineers discovered that the specifications were much tooconservative. The specifications were relaxed and the gyros passed without

redesign.12

ThemultipledockingadapterduringtheApolloApplicationsera(1967),topleft,MSFC-67-IND7200-021,andasbuilt forSkylab,bottomleft,ML71-5280.Above, the flightarticlebeingprepared forshipment inDecember1971fromMartinMarietta’sDenverfacilitytotheMcDonnellDouglasplantatSt.Louis,whereitwould bemated to the airlock.MSFC026857.Below, the backup article being prepared for pressuretests.ML71-7637.

TRAINERSANDMOCKUPS

In addition to the test articles, engineeringmockups, and flight equipment,both Martin Marietta and McDonnell Douglas built zero-g trainers, neutralbuoyancy trainers, and high-fidelity mockups for one-g trainers. The zero-gtrainers were usually partial mockups (small enough to fit into the KC-135aircraft)thatallowedweightlesstestingofcriticalfeaturesofeachmodule,suchas crew restraints and extravehicular aids. These trainers and mockups wereuseful in the developmental phase, while engineers and astronauts were stillworking out optimum designs, and provided much data applicable tomanufactureof the flightarticles.Neutralbuoyancy trainersconsistedofwire-meshmockupsofentiremodules;immersedinthebigwatertankatHuntsville,they served principally to verify the astronauts’ ability tomove objectswithinthemodules, aswell as developing procedures for extravehicular activity.Theone-g trainers, accurate replicasof the flightmodulescontainingequipmentofthe best fidelity available, came into use later in the program as crews beganlearningflightprocedures.13

Progress in both the airlock and multiple docking adapter programs wassatisfactory during 1971. In December, Leland Belew reported at a midtermprogramreviewthatneithermodulehadanytechnicalproblemsthatcoulddelay

the program. The earth-resource experiments, however, had faltered. Both theinfrared spectrometer and the multispectral scanner were snagged on troubleswith the coolers that maintained the proper operating temperature for theirdetectors; the scanner had faults in its data-recording system as well. Themultipledockingadapterhadalreadybeenacceptedanddelivered toSt.Louisforattachment to theairlock,however,and theexperimentswouldbe installedthere. A cautious estimate predicted that the combined modules could bedelivered to Kennedy Space Center by 5 September 1972, as current plansrequired;butthatassumedpractically100%successintherestoftheprogram.14

AtSt.Louis,engineersworkedaroundthemissingearthsensorsforanothersixmonthswhile completing other tests and checkouts. Bymid-1972 the twomodules were ready for the last tests: a crew-compartment fit-and-functionreview,withastronautsmethodicallyverifyingeveryon-orbitprocedure;andanaltitudechamber test, simulating theperformanceof themodules in space.Noseriousdiscrepancies appearedduring these final tests, but someminor testingremained for technicians at the Cape. On 5 October 1972 the airlock andmultiple docking adapter, the last of the flight modules to be shipped, wereloadedonaSuperGuppyaircraft*inSt.Louis.ThenextmorningtheyarrivedatKSC, where they were unloaded and trundled off to the Vehicle AssemblyBuildingtobestackedatoptheworkshop.15

TheairlockmoduleanddockingadapterarrivingatKennedySpaceCenter,October1972.108-KSC-72P-472.

MODULEDEVELOPMENT:THEWORKSHOP

The workshop project at McDonnell Douglas’s Huntington Beach,California, plant bore the brunt of change during 1969 and 1970. Work hadstarted inApril 1969,whenMcDonnellDouglas tookS-IVB stage 212out ofstorageandbeganmodifyingitforitsnewrole.Inthecourseofimprovingthehabitability of the dryworkshop,Houston’s designers completely changed thelayout of the crew quarters, added a viewing window to the wardroom, andconsiderablyupgradedthefoodstorageandpreparationrequirements(chap.7).Difficultieswiththewastemanagementsystemleftitsdesignupintheairuntilthe end of 1970 (chap. 8). New requirements imposed by the earth-resourceexperimentsrequiredachangeintheattitudecontrolsystem(chap.10).Allthesechanges added to the engineering work load at McDonnell Douglas; theworkshophadalwaysbeenthemostcomplexofthehabitablemodules,andsuchtop-to-bottomredesigncouldonlydelayassembly.

TheworkshopunderconstructionattheMcDonnellDouglasfacilityinHuntingtonBeach,Calif.Above,atestversionbeingpreparedforshipment toMannedSpacecraftCenter,December1970.70-H-1628.Left,theflightunit.MSFC-71-PM7234.Right,wide-angle-lensviewoftheaftcompartment(lowerdeck)duringthe crew-compartment fit-and-function test. The ergometer (M171) is in the foreground, the lower-bodynegative-pressuredevice(M092)behindthehandlebars.S-72-44799.

By mid-1971 Headquarters had become somewhat uneasy about thecontractor’s progress, and the project integration office investigated. Theresulting evaluationwas about equally critical ofMcDonnellDouglas and theMarshall project office. It cited inefficient management, some questionableengineering practices, the company’s inability to forecast costs and schedulesaccurately, plus an unwieldy management arrangement among Huntsville’sSkylab office, its workshop project office, and the resident manager in

California. Recommendations included strengthening Marshall’s management,advising thecompanyof its shortcomings, andgenerally instillinga feelingofurgencyintothecontractor.16

After conferences amongHeadquarters,Marshall, andMcDonnellDouglasofficials, Marshall’s program manager, Leland Belew, appointed a 24-manOrbitalWorkshopTaskTeamheadedbyWilliamK.Simmons, Jr.,manageroftheMarshallworkshopproject.The team’s job, as stated in its charter,was toprovide “timely on-site programmatic and technical interface” with thecontractor inallmatters relating tocompletionof theworkshop; thenicknameappliedtosuchgroups—tigerteam—wasmoreindicativeofitsrole.Thatrole,plainly,wastoget theprojectontrack.InAugust1971,Simmonsandmostofhis group,which included James C. Shows of theHouston Skylab office andRichard H. Truly of the astronaut corps, moved to California for a year.McDonnellDouglasassignedtwokeyofficialsatHuntingtonBeachtoitssideofthe project: Walter Burke, president of McDonnell Douglas AstronauticsCompany,26yearswiththeorganizationandaveteranofboththeMercuryandGeminispacecraftprograms;andFredJ.Sanders,whohadbeenmanageroftheairlockprojectbeforecomingtoCaliforniain1969.17

Simmons and Sanders immediately set up a weekly meeting schedule toreviewprogressandblockout futurework,andpairedoff tiger-teammemberswiththeircompanycounterpartsinseveralareasofresponsibility.Houston’stwomemberswere concernedmainlywith problems pertaining to crew interfaces.Since thosecoverednearlyevery system in the spacecraft,Trulyprobablyhadthemosthecticjobofthelot.Heprovedtobeahardbargainerwhenitcametomattersofcrewconvenienceandworkloads.18

At theheartofMcDonnellDouglas’sdifficultywith theworkshopwas thecomplexity of Skylab’s systems. Thousands of individual parts, some comingfromthecompany’sownshops,somefromsuppliers(includingNASA),hadtoflowintotheproject inanorderlysequence.Partsthatfailed,orthathadtoberedesigned after testing, could causedelaysof daysorweeks.Oneof the firstdiscoveriesSimmonsmadewas that the contractor hadno integrated scheduledepictingthesequencingrequirementsforthisflowofcomponents.Anotherwasthat information was inordinately slow in percolating down through themanagement structure to the shops; change orders could take weeks to reachproduction workers. Simmons moved quickly to establish a master schedulefrom which priorities could be assigned, and the company moved its deputyoperationsmanager into an office just off the shop floor to expedite changes.WhileSimmonsandSandersattendedtodetails,WalterBurke’srolewastokeepabreastofproblemsandseethatnecessaryjobsweregivenproperattention.Thecompanypresident’spresencehadasalutaryeffectatalllevels.19

Simmons’s notes to Belew that fall were filled with reports of major andminor snags.Paint flakedoff stowage lockersandgot scuffed inhandling; theworkshopwindow’selectricallyconductingcoatinghadsomehowgotscratched;brazed joints in hydraulic tubing were not always reliable. A major worrysurfaced when it was found that the iodine used to disinfect drinking waterextractednickel ionsfromthebrazingmaterial.Engineers incorporatedanion-exchange resin in the system, which effectively removed the toxic nickel butpulledouttheiodineaswell.Theirproposaltogetaroundthatprobleminvolvedagooddealofworkbythecrew,andTrulyobjected.Atthesametime,testsonthe deployment of the workshop solar panels turned up half-a-dozenanomalies.20

By mid-October the situation seemed little improved. Looking toward adelivery date of 15May 1972 for the completedworkshop,MarshallDirectorEberhard Rees was pessimistic. He urged Burke to do something about hiscompany’s poor record, noting thatwhile the airlock and docking adapter hadpassed70%and85%oftheirqualificationtests,theworkshop’srecordwasonly

25% completion. Two months later, at the Skylab midterm review, Simmonsacknowledged that development and qualification testing was still behindschedule. Systems still giving trouble included the thruster attitude-controlsystem,thesolararrays,andthepotablewatersystem.21

Progressseemednobetterintheearlymonthsof1972;asoldproblemsweresolved,newonesarose.StartinginMarch,however,Simmons’sweeklyreportsnoted that the checkout programwas getting underway; bymid-May, hewaslookingaheadtothecrewcompartmentfit-and-functionreview,whencrewmenwould go through the workshop from top to bottom. That four-day task wascompleted on 27 May, and the task team started evaluating McDonnellDouglas’sproposaltoshiptheworkshopon15August.22

After 10months of intensivework, and almost suddenly, the team’sworkwasnearlycompleted.DuringJuneandJulypreparationswentforwardfor thefinal all-systems test of the workshop. Started on 17 July, this sequence wascompletedthreeweekslater.Onlyafewanomalieswerediscoveredin the510hours of tests, which took every workshop system through its paces. Severalitemswere left to be completed at theCape, but little remained to be done inCalifornia. On 7 September 1972 Headquarters officials, includingAdministrator James C. Fletcher and Associate Administrator for MannedSpaceflightDaleD.Myers, participated in a ceremonymarking acceptance ofthe completed workshop by NASA. The next day the module, aboard theU.S.N.S.PointBarrow,departedSealBeachforthe13-daytripviathePanamaCanaltoFlorida.23

Suchabriefdiscussionoftheassemblyoftheworkshopnecessarilyfailstoconvey the magnitude of the effort involved. Not only were the workshopsystems complex; everything in the spacecraft had to work properly beforelaunch.Nopartialsuccess,tobecorrectedonsubsequentmodels,wastolerable.Avalidanalogymightbeanewcommercialaircraft—saytheConcorde,whichwasperhapscomparable incomplexity to theworkshop. Ifengineershadbeenrequired to build the first model fault-free and ready for immediate andunlimitedcommercialservice,supersonicpassengerservicemightstillbeahopeforthefuture.

Inanyevent,alltheflighthardwarewasattheCapebytheendofSeptember1972,readyforstackingandpreflighttesting.

REENTRYREEXAMINED

While the workshop, with no provision for controlled reentry, awaitedassemblyandcheckoutattheCape,thetimecametocallforproposalstobuildShuttle’slaunchsystem.Implementingrecommendationsmadethepreviousyear(p. 354), Deputy Administrator George Low ordered that the request forproposals include the requirement for a studyof the reentryhazard createdbythelargefueltanks.Similarstudieswouldberequiredforallfutureprojects.24

AtthesametimeLowdirectedtheOfficeofMannedSpaceFlighttodevisesuitable means for deorbiting the S-IVB stages that would take the crews toSkylab. On Apollo missions the S-IVB stages had been disposed of in space(solarorbit)oronthelunarsurface,butthistechniquewasnotapplicabletotheSkylab missions. When studies showed that the simplest way to deorbit theemptyupperstageswasbyventingexcesspropellantsthroughtheengine,Loworderedthismethodadopted.25

Thediscussionofthehazardsoforbitaldebrisraisedquestionsinthemindof Administrator James C. Fletcher, who had taken over in 1971 after thedecisiontoforegocontrolledreentryforSkylabhadalreadybeenmade.Fletcher,unwillingtoaccepttheriskinvolvedifhehadanypracticalalternative,orderedthe matter reopened. With just over four months remaining before launch,program directorWilliam Schneider directedMarshall andMSC to study thepossibilityofusingthemainengineoftheApollospacecrafttodeorbitSkylabasthelastcrewleftit.26

Initial reaction from both centerswas negative. Besidesmany engineeringproblems,Houstonfoundthepotentialcrewhazardsunacceptable;iftheApolloshould have any trouble undocking after placing the workshop on a reentrytrajectory, the astronauts would be in serious trouble. Marshall noted thatmodifications to the launch vehicle would be required, as well as changes inlaunchprocedures;bothwoulddelaylaunchandincreasecosts.Justtoconductthe necessary studieswould take sixmonths, leaving little time to incorporatechangesbeforethelastcrewwaslaunched.27

Nevertheless, Schneider persisted; and in April 1973 a group at Houstonbegan reviewing the techniques and operational procedures for deorbiting theclusterwiththeservicepropulsionsystemoftheApollospacecraft.Bythetimetheworkshopwas launched the groupwaswell into its task and had definedmany of the problems that would have to be worked. But their efforts werewasted.Thelossofthemicrometeoroidshieldandthedamagetotheworkshop’ssolararraysduringlaunch(chap.14)createdtoomanyengineeringuncertaintiesthatcouldnotbedealtwith.On13July1973Schneiderstoppedallstudiesoncontrolleddeorbit.28Whateverproblemsmightbecreatedbythereentryof the

workshopwouldhavetobesolvedlater.

*SuperGuppywasbuiltforNASAbyAeroSpacelines,Inc.,inthemid-1960stocarryoutsizedcargo,principallyfortheApolloprogram.MadefromsectionsoffourBoeing377Stratocruisers,theplanewasforatimetheworld’slargestaircraftintermsofcubiccapacity.ItsSkylabcargoincludedthetelescopemountandtheinstrumentunit,aswellastheCSM.

12

PreparationsforFlight

As Skylab progressed from blueprint to hardware, the program office atHouston focusedattentionon flightoperations.SkylaboperationswoulddiffersignificantlyfromApollomissions,inwhichaseriesoftime-criticaleventshadboundtheoperationtoarigidschedule.Spacecraftfailureswereanticipatedbycontingencyplansthatleftlittletochance.InSkylab,extensiveearthandsolarobservationsdictatedamoreflexibleschedule.TheoperationsteamsinHoustonandHuntsville also needed greater staying power; whileApollomissions hadlasted no more than two weeks, Skylab’s would run for months. Datamanagementwasanotherconcern.UnlikeApollomissions,theworkshopwouldbeoutofcontactwithgroundstationsmuchofthetime.DatawouldhavetobestoredonboarduntilSkylab passedover a ground station,when the telemetrywouldbe“dumped”intoagroundreceiver.Skylaboperationswouldalsoforcethe Houston center into new relationships with Huntsville and the scientificcommunity.Marshall and the principal investigators would exert considerableinfluence on Skylab. Crew training would have to be expanded to meet thescientific objectives. The dual requirement for training in both science andspacecraftoperationslaidaconsiderableburdenonHouston’strainingofficeandalsotouchedoffalengthydisputeovercrewselection.1

DEFININGCENTERRESPONSIBILITIES

During Skylab missions, Houston and Huntsville would achieve aremarkabledegreeofteamwork,quiteunlikethedisharmonythatcharacterizedearlyApolloApplicationsplanning.ThatdisagreementhadoriginatedinGeorgeMueller’s determination to get AAP underway using the lunarmodule and alow-cost wet workshop. While Houston had no confidence in this concept,Huntsvillewaswilling—evenanxious—todevelopthehardware.Relationswere

furtherexacerbatedbyHuntsville’sdesiretohavemoresayinflightoperations.Asdevelopmentcenterfortheworkshop,MSFCwouldcertainlyplayanactiverole;workingoutthedetailsofthisnewrelationship,however,requiredlengthynegotiations.

ThetwocentersbeganpreparingforAAPoperationsinlate1966,focusinginitially on communications and the role of Huntsville’s Operations SupportCenter.Fromtimetotime,HuntsvilleofficialssuspectedthattheircounterpartsinHoustonwereusingobstructionisttacticstopreventMSFC’sparticipationinplanning and executing AAP flights. Martin Marietta’s integration contract,whichmadeno reference toHuntsville’ssupport role,wasparticularlygalling.Nevertheless, it appeared likely at Huntsville that Houston would eventuallygiveground.Huntsville’s involvementwith theworkshop “made it technicallyverydifficulttoexclude[Marshall]fromoperationssupport.”2

In1967Huntsvillepressedformoreresponsibilityinflightoperations.Atthevery least, the center wanted a supporting role on AAP flights; ideally, theworkshop would help Marshall become a leader in spacecraft design andoperations.MSCgavegroundgrudgingly.InJune,DirectorofFlightOperationsChristopherKraft agreed to useMarshall engineers forAAP flight operations,provided theywere integrated into his organization. Thiswas unacceptable toHuntsville,whichwanted the group to remain separatewith the lead engineerreporting to MSC for requirements. By November 1967 the two centers hadagreed that Huntsville would staff a Systems and Experiments SectionwithinMSC’sFlightControlDivision.3

Byearly1969itseemedthatthetwocenterswerenearamodusvivendi.InFebruary, MSC’s program manager Robert Thompson assured Belew, hisoppositeatMarshall, thatHuntsvillewouldbekeptawareofalldevelopments“by the necessary coordination of our two offices and by MSFC review andconcurrence with the evolved operating procedures.” Houston would initiatechangeproposalsthroughMarshall’sprogramofficetoprecludeanyappearanceof meddling with that center’s contractors. Supplemental contracts, added toMarshall’sbasiccontracts,wouldformalizeHouston’srelationswithMcDonnellDouglasandotherfirms.4

Huntsvilleofficialswerepleasedwith theseconcessions,but stillwantedaformal agreement spelling out the “total operations interface.” Such anagreement,whilerecognizingHouston’sdirectionofmissionoperations,wouldalsohonorMarshall’s “cradle-to-grave” responsibility forhardware.Huntsvilleexercisedthisresponsibilityforitslaunchvehicles,analyzingtheirperformanceinflightandestablishingoperationalproceduresandlimits.KSC’slaunchteam,

offspringof thevonBraunorganization,consideredMarshall’s involvementonSaturntestsanaturalextensionofitsdesignresponsibility;HuntsvillehopedtogainsimilarrecognitionfromMSCforSkylaboperations.AtanAprilplanningmeeting,Marshall’s staff approved a recommendation that the center seek “anactivevoice in real-timeoperationsdecisionsaffectingeither individualMSFChardwaremodulesortheintegratedcluster.”5

Twomonthsafter thedry-workshopdecision, center representativesmet inHoustontodiscussoperations.MSCrevieweditsspecificrequirementsforflightplanning,Huntsvilleoutlinedthefunctionsofitssupportcenter,andadebateonmanagement philosophy ensued. Before adjourning, the two sides reachedagreementonseveralpoints:(1)Themissionrequirementsdocument,preparedjointly by the two program offices, would serve as the basic instrument formissionplanning,andbothofficeswoulduseitastheirformalcommunicationslinktoMSC’soperationsteam;(2)Houstonwouldpreparetheoperationaldatabook, using information from Huntsville and contractors; and (3) MarshallwouldprovideHoustonaccesstoitsconfigurationcontrolboards.6

Other aspects of Skylab operations, however, continued to divide the twocenters.WhileHoustonsoughttoupgradetheworkshop,Huntsvilleclungtotheno-change dictum.Matters reached a low point at the telescope-mount designreviewinMay1970when,asanMSCofficialrecalls,thetwosides“sluggeditout toastandstill.”Thereafter,relationsimprovedmarkedly,andbyyear’sendthe two centers had agreed on the basic framework for Skylab operations. Aflightmanagement team,comprisingprogrammanagersandMSC’soperationsmanagers, would set policy. Although Houston had a majority on the team,Huntsville and KSC were assured a voice in all matters. Daily operationsremained in the hands of MSC’s flight control teams. If problems involvedhardware,theflightdirectorcouldseekassistancefromaMarshallliaisonteamstationednearbyintheFlightOperationsManagementRoom.Theliaisonteamcould,inturn,callforhelpfromamuchlargergroupofengineersatHuntsville’soperations center. An elaborate communications system tied the two centerstogether,providingHuntsvillewithdetailedinformationonSkylab’scondition.7

OPERATIONSPLANNINGINHOUSTON

Attitudes in Houston changed appreciably after Apollo 17 and the dry-workshop decision (pp. 109–10).Until July 1969,mostMSCofficials viewedSkylabas anunwelcomediversion; after the lunar landing, it became thenext

majorprogram.TheFlightControlDivision began preparing an operations plan inAugust

1969.DivisionDirectorEugeneKranzhopedtoretainmanyApollofeaturesintheSkylaboperation,butcertainchangesweredictatedby the longermissionsandthelargernumberofflightsystems.HoustoncouldnotaffordtokeepafullcomplementinitsMissionControlCenterthroughouttheSkylabmissions,asitwas doing forApollo. Besides, an earth-orbitalmission required less support.Duringtheastronauts’workinghours,a“high-level”shiftwouldrunoperations;atnightMSCwouldmaintainaskeletoncrewwithadditionalengineersoncall.A second concern involved staffing of themission control room, the heart ofHouston’soperationscomplex.TwoflightcontrollersdividedtheresponsibilityforspacecraftsystemsonApollo.SinceSkylabhadfivedistinctunits(includingthe telescopemount), a similar division, plus other requirements,would bringthe staff to nearly 30 engineers. Kranz feared that such a large group mighthamper the flight director: “You would end up caucusing instead of makingdecisions.”Hispreliminaryplanallowedonesystemsexpertforeachspacecraft;the plan also consolidated some other duties. With these changes, Kranzexpected tohavenomore than20flightcontrollers in thecontrol roomduringperiodsofpeakactivity.Normaloperationswouldrequireonlyll.8

Kranz renewed Skylab planning in November as part of a larger reviewconducted by the flight operations directorate. Manning requirements were amajortopic,butanumberofotherissueswerealsodiscussed:theimpactofthenew 50° orbital inclination on operations, Houston’s relations with principalinvestigators, and the requirements for unmanned operations. Kranz listed 11aspects of the Skylab operation that had no precedent inApollomissions andaskedforathoroughreviewofthese“keymissionissues.”9

Duringthenext30months,theflight-controlorganizationwasrestructured.Several instructors were retrained as systems engineers. Men assigned to theexperiments required extensive training; several took lengthy courses in solarphysics. In October 1972, one flight-control team was assigned full time toSkylab. One of its first tasks was to develop procedures for data processing;anotherwastoconductseveralmissionsimulationswiththeflightcrews.AfterApollo 17’s splashdown, the rest of the division turned its full attention toSkylab.10

Whenthemissionsbegan,thedivision’spreparationsprovedsoundinmostareas.Oneexceptionprovedtobethetransmissionofdata.Signalstransmittedfromthespacecraftwerepickedupby1of13stationsinthetrackinganddatanetworkandforwardedthroughGoddardSpaceFlightCentertoHouston.About

aquarterofthetime,Skylabwouldbecloseenoughtoastationtotransmitdataas it was acquired. Most of the time, however, data were recorded to be“dumped” when the workshop reached the next station. Skylab’s telemetrysystemrequiredonlyfiveminutes to transmitdata thathad taken twohours togather.11

The systemwas amajor change fromApollo, andHouston’s flight-controlteamshadtroubleadjusting.Onlunarmissions,flightcontrollershadseenonly10%of the data, but they had been able to call up specific informationwhenneeded. Increased telemetry from theworkshop and the long periods betweentransmissionsruledoutimmediateaccesstodataduringSkylab.Instead,usingaprocess called “redundancy removal,” only changes to data reached MissionControl.Thenewequipmentwasinstalledlate,andsomeflightcontrollersfailedto master it. The shortcoming became rather painful during the crisis thatfollowedlaunchoftheworkshop.AccordingtoKranz:“Becauseofthelackofproficiency in the data retrieval task, the flight controllers were generallyinefficient in accomplishing contingency analyses.” After the first mannedmission,12personsweretrainedspecificallyfordataretrieval.12

WhileKranz’sdivisionpreparedforoperations,theFlightCrewOperationsDirectorate began work on a Skylab flight plan. Eventually, a plan wouldprovideadetailedscheduleforeachcrew’sactivitiesinspace.Theinitialdrafts,however,serveddifferentpurposes.Theywere,firstofall,trainingvehiclesforflightplannerswhofoundtheirApollobackgroundoflimitedvalue.Thedraftsalso served to point up crucial issues, define crew-training requirements, anduncoverproblemswithexperimentpriorities.Muchofthenecessaryinformationcame from the mission requirements document: objectives, experimentrequirements,extravehicularactivity, recoveryzones, informationon televisionand photography. General guidelines for scheduling crew activities were setwithin the FlightCrewOperationsDirectorate. Initially, these guidelineswerefairly rigid (e.g., all crewmen would eat together), but as schedulingcomplexitiesincreasedsomeflexibilitywasallowed.Althoughcomputerswereused, the actual scheduling was done by hand. The goal was to meet all theobjectivesofthemissionrequirementsdocument.Whenthisprovedimpossible,theprogramofficesrevisedthedocument,usuallyreducingthenumberoftimescertainexperimentswererepeated.Thebooks,checklists,cuecards,maps,andchartsusedinplanningeachmissiontotaledmorethan10000pages.13

HUNTSVILLEORGANIZESFORMISSIONSUPPORT

Huntsvillebeganpreparing formission support inmid-1970by identifying17 major tasks and appointing a manager to handle each requirement. TheMission Operations Office coordinated planning principally through monthlymeetingsoftaskmanagers,primecontractors,andrepresentativesofMarshall’smajor divisions.Muchof 1971was spent preparing documents; in the end19plansformissionsupportwerewritten.MarshallengineersmetfrequentlywiththeHoustonoperationsteam;aparticularlyimportantseriesofmeetingsinmid-1972 reviewed hardware characteristics and operating procedures. In OctoberHuntsville tested two years of work with a mission simulation, a prelude toparticipationinHouston’sdressrehearsals.14

Marshall consolidated its support in the Huntsville Operations SupportCenter, an organization that had proved itself during Apollo. Skylabrequirementswould be handled by 10mission support groups, each staffed toservice amajor system, e.g., attitude control. Initialmanpower projections forthesupportgroupstotaledmorethan400engineers,sometobedrawnfromtheprogram office, others from MSFC laboratories and contractor teams. Saturnengineerswouldmonitor launch vehicle operations during checkout and earlystagesof flight.Otherpersonnelmanagedacomplexcommunicationsnetworkofvoice,television,andhigh-speeddigital-datalinesconnectingHuntsvillewithHouston and the Cape. The Mission Operations Planning System, an assetunavailableduringearliermannedmissions,allowedsupportpersonneltodrawonHouston’scomputersforimmediateprintoutsofcurrentflightandexperimentdata.15

MSFC officials divided the Skylab mission into five phases. Pre-launchsupport began in October 1972. During this phase both launch vehicle andworkshopengineerswouldbeatKSC’scall.Thesecondphase,workshoplaunchanddeployment,lastedonlyafewcrucialhoursbutproducedpeakactivityatthesupportcenter.Launchofacrewrepresentedathirdphase;thefirstpartofeachlaunchwouldalsorequirepeakoperations.Mannedoperationswere thefourthphase.Thesupportcenter’scoordinatingstaffwouldserveatfullstrengthwhiletheastronautswereatworkandatpartialstrengththerestofthetime.MembersofthemissionsupportgroupswouldhandleSkylabproblemsduringthenormalworkweek.Nightsandweekends, theywould remainoncall foremergencies.The last phase, unmanned operations, required MSFC monitoring, becauseseveralworkshopsystemscontinuedtooperate,asdidthesolartelescopes.16

TESTPILOTVS.SCIENTIST-ASTRONAUT

The choice of Skylab crewmen was bound to cause hard feelings amongHouston’sastronauts.Thegrouphadexpandedrapidlyinthemid-1960s,andasNASA’sfortunesdeclineditwasclearthatsomeofthemwerenotgoingtofly—atleastnotuntilthe1980s.TheproblemwasaggravatedbyHouston’sselectionpolicy. As director of flight crew operations, Deke Slayton determined whowould fly. His recommendations went through Gilruth to Headquarters, butSlayton’schoiceswereusuallyapproved.Heplacedapremiumonexperience;consequently astronauts moved in a natural progression from Gemini flightsthroughserviceonApollobackupcrewstoanApolloflight.Hispolicyfavoredthosepilotswhohad entered theprogramby1963 and those test pilots in the1966 group who received an early assignment. At a disadvantage were thescientist-astronauts brought into the program in 1965 and 1967. By the timethesemenhadfinishedtherequiredyearofAirForceflighttraining,theywerelastinline.

Dissatisfaction among the scientist-astronauts surfaced after the first lunarlanding. Despite speculation that subsequent missions would stress science,SlaytonchoseonlytestpilotsforthenextthreeApolloflights.InOctober1969,scientist-pilots complained to Headquarters about selection criteria thatemphasizedoperationsattheexpenseofscience.Slayton’srebuttalstressedthehazardsofalunarmission—noonewouldbenefitfromadeadgeologistonthemoon—and downplayed the importance of scientific competence in lunarexploration.17

AstronautJosephP.Kerwinremovingexperimentequipment fromastoragelockeronthetopdeckof theworkshop trainer. During the missions, unpacking and restowing equipment and supplies would take asurprisingamountoftime.S-72-40260.

During 1970 opportunities for the scientist-astronauts declined further. InJanuaryNASAcanceledoneApolloflight; inSeptember, twomore. It seemedlikelythatnoscientistwouldexplorethemoon.LatethatyeartheSpaceScienceBoard sought assurances from NASA that two scientists would fly on eachSkylab mission. The board’s action coincided with a resurgence ofdissatisfaction among the scientist-astronauts in Houston. Homer Newell,NASA’s top-ranking scientist, went to Houston in January 1971 to hear theircomplaints and seewhat could be done about them.Onebyone the scientist-astronautstoldNewellthattheycouldnotgetafairshakeaslongasatestpilot(Slayton) picked the crews. As they saw it, his choices were determined byflying time, special skills, and personal relations. Science was not aconsideration;infact, thosewhoshowedmoreinterestinsciencecouldbeatadisadvantage. Several astronauts recommended that Headquarters establishcriteriaforcrewmembership,preferablywithsomeappreciationforscience.ThegroupfeltstronglythateachSkylabmissionshouldincludetwoscientists.Oneofthemnoted,“flightoperationstakeonlyasmallfractionofthetimerequiredforscienceandotherobjectives.”18

Newell incorporatedmuchofwhatwassaid inhis recommendations to theadministrator.On the sensitive issue of crew selection, he urged thatHarrisonSchmitt (the only astronaut with a Ph.D. in geology) be assigned to a lunarlandingasearlyaspossibleandthattwoscientistsbeconsideredforeachSkylabflight. He also proposed a review of NASA’s crew-selection process andsuggested restructuring the scientist-astronaut program to allow a greatercommitmenttoascientificcareer.Sincehehadheardonlyonesideoftheissue,Newelllabeledhisrecommendations“tentative.”19

Therecommendations touchedoffseveralmonthsofdebateconcerningthemakeup of Skylab crews. Slayton and Gilruth argued against more than onescientistperflight,reasoningthathardwareproblemswoulddemandahighlevelofsystemsexpertise,anareainwhichtestpilotswerethoughttoexcel.GilruthinformedDaleMyersinJunethatreliabilitystudiesindicated“ahighprobabilityof systems problems … during the mission.” Since the workshop’s systemscouldnotbemodifiedafterlaunch,Houstonwasdirectingmostofitstrainingto“systems management and malfunction procedures.” He also pointed out thatSkylabmissionshadbeenplannedaroundaconceptofmaximumcross-training,whichwouldgiveeachcrewmanroughlythesamedegreeofproficiencyonallmajorexperiments.Consequently,anastronaut’sspecificacademicbackgroundwasrelativelyunimportant.20

Myerswantedtoaccommodatethescientistsbyincludingasecondscientiston at least one mission, but Gilruth’s arguments were persuasive, andMyersremained undecided. When three Soviet cosmonauts died on 29 June duringreentry, however, he agreed thatNASA should give operational considerationstop priority. On 6 July Myers recommended approval of Houston’s plan forSkylabcrews;twopilot-astronautswouldgooneachmissionwithonescientist-astronaut. On the first flight, the scientist would be a physician. Myers leftselection of specific crew members to Houston. Newell expressed somemisgivings,buttheplanwasadopted.21

Crewselectionsweremade late in theyear and formallyannouncedon19January1972.Charles“Pete”Conrad,therankingSkylabastronaut,headedthefirstcrew.Conradhadflownthreepreviousmissions,commandingApollo12’sflighttothemoon.Twoastronautsnewtospaceflightmadeuptherestofanall-Navycrew.JoeKerwinhadearnedhisM.D.atNorthwesternUniversitybeforejoiningNASA in1965;PaulWeitzhadentered theprogramayear later.AlanBean,commanderofthesecondmission,wastheonlyotherveteranselectedforSkylab; he had gone to the moon with Conrad in November 1969. OwenGarriott, an electrical engineerwith aStanfordPh.D., filled the scientist’s slot

and Jack Lousma, a Marine major, received the pilot’s assignment. AnotherMarine test pilot,GeraldCarr, headed the third crew,which includedEdwardGibson,aCaltechPh.D.,andAirForceLt.Col.WilliamPogue.*Theselectionsrepresented a compromise among NASA interests: less experience—only twoveterans—than Slayton wanted and fewer professional scientists than Newellwanted.22

In retrospect, the importance of crewmakeupwas overstated.On all threemissions, test pilots performed experiment work creditably while scientist-astronautsprovedadeptatrepairingspacecraftsystems.Successdependedmoreon teamwork and individual attitudes thanon academic training.Although themedicaldirectoratehadfoughthardtosendaphysicianonthesecondmission,their fears about a 56-day flight proved groundless. Apollo telescope mountexperimenterswerewell served byGarriott andGibson. Ideally the second orthird crew should have included an earth-resources specialist, but the earth-resourcesexperimentshadbeenaddedlateintheprogramandnoneofNASA’sscientist-astronauts was particularly qualified with the hardware. Furthermore,given the experimental nature of those instruments, expertisemight havebeenwasted. Slayton’s contention that the flight plan would allow little time forindependentresearchprovedlargelycorrect.23

CREWTRAINING

CrewtrainingbeganinOctober1970,largelybecauseofproddingfromtheApollotelescopemountinvestigators.TheNavalResearchLaboratory’sRichardTouseyhadfirstapproachedHoustonaboutasolarphysicscourseforastronautsin 1967. He renewed his request in February 1970 in a strong letter to theprogramoffice.Recountinghisearliersuggestions,Touseynoted“thatlittlehasbeendoneasyettoarrangeforscientifictrainingofthecrew.”Heacknowledgedthat astronauts couldoperate the telescopemountwithout anunderstandingofsolar physics, but the data thus obtained would be inferior. For that reasonNASAhadpromisedthatitscrewmenwouldhaveappropriatescientifictraining.TouseyfearedthatHouston’sprocrastinationwouldnecessitateacramcourseafew months before launch, “when systems operational training will beparamount.”Ideally,trainingshouldbegin24monthsbeforeliftoff.WithaJuly1972 launch date (according to early 1970 schedules), therewas little time towaste.24

Houstonwasnotparticularlyeagertobegincrewtraining,fortheastronauts

wereheavilyinvolvedindesignreviewsandtrainingchiefJohnVonBockelhadhishandsfullwithApollo.ByJune,however,MSChadtakenstepstosatisfythetelescope-mountinvestigators.AtameetinginDenver,itwasagreedthatSkylabastronauts would begin a 10-week, 60-hour course in solar physics that fall.Principal investigatorswould takeanactivepart.Allcrewmenwouldbegiventhesameleveloftraining,regardlessoftheirbackground.25

Principal investigators were generally pleased with the course outlinepreparedbyDr.FrankOrrall,UniversityofHawaiiphysicist.Touseysuggestedseveralchanges,includingobservationsofthesunduringthecourse,ratherthanafterward. He also proposed to augment Orrall’s presentation with severallecturesontheroleofsolarphysicswithinthelargerframeworkofscience.Hehoped this would stimulate the astronauts’ interest by pointing up theapplicationsofsolarphysics“outsidethestudyofoursunasmerelyathinginitself.”26WhenthecoursegotunderwayinlateOctober,mostoftheastronautsfound the instruction quite a challenge. One admitted, “I was right up to myeyeballs in trouble thewhole time, trying tokeepupandunderstandwhatwasgoing on.”Most of them had trouble communicatingwith the investigators—professionalsinanesotericspecialty.ForJerryCarr,thecoursewentmuchbetterafter he gave up trying to be a solar physicist and instead looked forways tobecomeacompetentobserver.27

The one-g trainer atManned Spacecraft Center. Above, exterior of the workshop and Apollo commandmodule.ML71-7650.Right above, upper deck (forward compartment) of theworkshop. The square portwiththecoiledmetallichosehangingonit,leftofcenter,isthescientificairlock.Thedoubleringofstoragelockersandwatertankswouldbeeasilyaccessibleinzerog.S-72-51657.Rightbelow,thelowerdeckwithcompartmentslabeled.ML72-5059.Seefollowingpagesforremainingmodulesofthetrainer.

Theone-gtrainer,cont.Topleft,theairlockmodulemountedtopermitlateralrotation.Thespacebetweenthe fixed shroud and the airlock carried atmospheric gases under high pressure (6 cylindrical tanks ofoxygen, 6 spherical tanks of nitrogen).ML71-7655.Below, the airlock, docking adapter, and telescopemount.Theblackringatleftisthefixedshroud.Thetelescopemount,attheheadofthestairs,isdeployedinflight attitude. Unlike the other modules, the telescopemount had no interior work space; astronautswouldworkonlyonitsexterior.ML71-7653.Bottomleft,powersupplyandcircuitbreakerpanels insidetheairlock.ML71-7649.

While the astronauts were learning solar physics, MSC’s training officebeganworkonamuchlargerprogramencompassingallSkylabtraining.RobertKohler took the lead inpreparing thesyllabus,assistedbya teamfromMartinMarietta.Kohler laidouta2200-hourprogramstretchingover18months.Theschedule was based on a 28-hour training week; previous programs indicatedthatastronautswouldspendanother20to25hoursintravel,physicalexercise,flying, and reviews. Kohler’s program included 450 hours of briefings andreviews, 450 hours of experiment work, and nearly 700 hours of simulatortraining.ItwasademandingschedulecomparedtoApollomissions,whichhadaveraged1200hoursoftraining.28

Briefings constituted a largepart of training in1971.Experimentbriefingswerehandledintwophases.Principalinvestigatorslecturedtheastronautsonthe

theory, objectives, and judgment involved in gathering data; later, MartinMarietta instructors provided a nuts-and-bolts presentation on operationalprocedures, maintenance, safety, and support equipment. North AmericanRockwell conducted a lengthyblockof instructionon theApollo spacecraft—130hoursofbriefingsandnearlytwiceasmuchtimeinthesimulator.AlthoughSkylabcrewswouldspend relatively little time in theApollo spacecraft, thosefew hours would encompass a number of events where an error could provefatal.Thelargestblockofinstructionaltimewasdevotedtotheworkshop,withMartin Marietta covering the telescope mount and McDonnell Douglas theremainingsystems.29

Astronaut Charles Conrad, Jr., training at the display and control panel of the telescope mount. S-73-20339.

The firstcrew trainingwith themedicalexperiments.Kerwin is in therotatingchairused for thehumanvestibular function experimentM131,whileWeitz records.Conrad is riding thebicycle ergometer in thebackground.72-H-1262.

Through most of 1971, the training office worked its schedule aroundspacecraft testing.Traditionally, astronautshadplayedanactive role in testingflight hardware.TheSkylab syllabus provided 100 hours for this purpose; thecrews would eventually spend twice that much time. The scheduled hours,moreover, reflected only part of the time actually invested. Most tests wereconductedatcontractorplantsorotherNASAcenters.Frequently,crewswouldtraveltoHuntsvilleorSt.Louisonlytohaveatestpostponed.ScheduleslipsatHuntingtonBeachwerethebiggestheadache;workshopdelayscostthetrainingoffice hundreds ofman-days.After themissionswere completed,VonBockelwouldrecommendagainstastronautparticipationinfuturespacecrafttesting.30

Anumber of other training requirements kept astronauts on the go.Crewsreviewednavigationalstarsandreceivedinstructiononthestellarexperimentsatthe Morehead Planetarium in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. Work with theastronaut maneuvering units took them to Denver and to Langley ResearchCenter in Virginia. Apart from spacecraft testing, extravehicular training in

Huntsville’s neutral buoyancy trainer (p. 170) required the most travel.Beginning in February 1972, one crew or another used the tank nearly everymonth.31

Practicing extravehicular activity inMarshall’s big water tank. After being used extensively during thedesignphaseofSkylab, theNeutralBuoyancySimulatorproved tobe thebestplace to train forworkingoutsidethespacecraft.Suchworkwascarefullyplannedandthentimedinthetank.72-H-1093.

Training moved from theory to practice in early 1972 when crewmenoccupied the Skylab simulators. A computer system in theworkshopmockupdisplayed images similar to those the astronauts would see in flight. Thetelescope mount console was its most prominent feature; crewmen spent asmuch as 200 hours studying solar activity on its video screens. The computercouldalsodisplaynormalandabnormalconditionsonahalf-dozenothercontrolpanels.Frequently,whileonecrewtrainedintheworkshop,asecondworkedinthecommand-modulesimulator,practicingflightstoandfromSkylab.TwootherApollo simulators provided special training for launch aborts and rendezvous

procedures. Astronauts could operate the simulators independently or inconjunction with Mission Control. When complex display systems were notrequired, crewsworked in one-gmockups, trainingmodels that duplicated theSkylabconfiguration.32

Houston’s basic principle was that all crewmen should become proficientwith themajorexperiments;at the same time,however, thevarietyof systemsrequiredadegreeofspecialization.ThecommanderwasgivenresponsibilityfortheApollo spacecraft; the scientist tookchargeofextravehicularactivities, thesolar telescope, and medical experiments; workshop systems and the earth-resourcesequipmentfelltothepilot.Thisdivisionoflaborwasapparentinthetraining performed by the crews. Conrad, despite his considerable flightexperience in thecommandmodule, spent400hours in theApollo simulators,55hoursmorethanPaulWeitz.Weitz,inturn,spentnearlytwiceasmuchtimeon earth resources as either of his crewmates. Kerwin’s preparation for themedical experiments, 181 hours, considerably exceeded that of either of hispartners.Thepatterngenerallyheldtruefortheothercrews.Thesyllabuswasaguide rather than a rigid yardstick. Schedules could be changed by the crewcommanderandthemission’strainingcoordinator.Commandersexertedagreatdeal of authority; for example, Conrad insisted that 20 hourswas not enoughtraining for workshop activation, and his crew eventually spent 125 hoursmastering the task. Instructors evaluated progress by operational competencedemonstrated,ratherthanhoursofexposure.33

The start of “mini-sims” in September 1972 marked the transition fromindividualtoteamtraining.Thesesessionsintheworkshopsimulatorkickedoffat6:00a.m.,reveilleonamissionday,andranuntilbedtimeat10:00p.m.Thecrewreceivedinstructionsfromateleprinterasitwouldinflight.Voicecontactwith the ground was limited to times when the simulated flight brought theworkshopoveragroundstation,butinstructorscouldanswerspecificquestionsat any time.Mini-simswere an excellent investment of time; crews benefitedfrom the integrated training, and flight planners uncovered a number ofschedulingconstraints.34

TheextensiveSkylabsimulators.S-72-116-S.

AstronautCharlesConrad,Jr.,trainingwiththehumanvestibularfunctionexperimentM131’,March1973.Thesphereandamagneticrodwereusedtoindicatebodyorientationnon-visually.Thechairrotatedandtiltedforward,backward,andsidetoside.S-73-20695.

Pressures mounted in the last months before launch as training schedulesweredisruptedbysimulatorbreakdowns,reviews,andlast-minutedemandsonthe astronauts.By January1973 the first crewhad fallenbehind schedule andworkweeks stretched to 60 hours. Late thatmonthBill Schneidermoved theworkshoplaunchfrom30April to14Maybecauseofdelaysat theCape.Theextra twoweeksgave the trainingofficea littlebreathing room,but thecrewscontinuedtoworkatahecticpace.35

Afterthemissionswereover,VonBockelwasreasonablysatisfiedwiththetraining program, though he would havemade some changes. He had soughtunsuccessfully to trainonlyonebackupcrew,considering the5000man-hoursinvestedinthesecondasunnecessary.Slayton,however,neededtwo;sinceoneprimecrewincludedadoctorandtheothertwoaphysicalscientist,hehadtobepreparedtoreplaceboth.VonBockelacknowledgedthathisinstructorsdidnotalways stay ahead of the students. The astronauts were eager to learn, andprogramengineersseldomignoredtheirquestions.“Ifthecrewwantedtoknowsomething,” he recalled, “people seemed to come out of the woodwork.”Instructors, on theother hand, frequently had trouble getting information.VonBockel recommended that in future programs, training materials should bepreparedwellinadvanceofinstruction.

Skylab’sbiggest trainingproblem,as indicatedby the flights,was the long

interval between instruction and performance of certain critical tasks.The lastcrew’sdeactivationandreentrycame13weeksafter training,and theymadeaprocedural error—quickly rectified—that could be attributed to unfamiliaritywithprocedures.VonBockelrecommendedthat futuremissionsallowtimeforrefreshertrainingduringtheflight.36

*App.EcontainsbiographiesoftheSkylabastronauts.

13

LaunchingSkylab

August 1972 brought back memories of Apollo’s heyday at the KennedySpaceCenter(KSC).InonehighbayoftheVehicleAssemblyBuilding,Apollo17—thelastvehicleofthelunarlandingprogram—wascompletingitsfinaltestsbeforerollouttothepad;theboosterforSkylaboccupiedasecondbay;andinathird was a new 39-meter pedestal that would serve as the launch table formannedSkylabmissions.ThescenepointedupSkylab’sclosetieswithApollo:the programs shared common facilities, operations, andhardware. Since 1970,one office had directed both programs. Despite the similarities, Skylabintroducedimportantchanges.SaturnIBlaunchesshiftedfromCapeCanaveralto NASA’s complex 39. The payload of the workshop required differentequipment and tests; in particular, the experiment hardware added a newdimensiontothecheckout.

Launch preparations, including the facility modifications, requiredconsiderable debate; but once decisions were reached, the changes wentsmoothly and at relatively little cost. Launch operations encountered moredifficulty.Checkout revealedmanydefects typical ofnew flighthardware, butofficialshadexpectedproblemsandthescheduleallowedfordelays.

SELECTINGTHELAUNCHCOMPLEX

High amongGeorgeMueller’s goals forApolloApplicationshadbeen thecontinued employment of the Saturn industrial team. Reductions in NASAfundinghaddashedhishopes,andbymid-1968KSCofficialsfacedtheproblemofmaintainingaSaturnIBlaunchteamduringa longperiodof inactivity.Theteamnumberednearly3000,some90%ofwhomwerecontractorpersonnel;andmore than half of these were employed by stage contractors. For Saturn IBrockets, Chrysler Corporation’s SpaceDivision built, tested, and launched the

firststage;McDonnellDouglasthesecondstage;andIBMtheinstrumentunit.Other contractorswere responsible for design engineering andmaintenance ofcommunications,propellantsystems,andstructuresatlaunchcomplexes34and37.DuringsevenyearsofCapeoperations,theSaturnIBteamhadcompiledanimpressiverecordof14launcheswithoutafailure.TheApolloscheduleinearly1968, however, called for the transfer ofmannedmissions from Saturn IB toSaturn V after theApollo 7 flight in October. Saturn Vs were launched fromcomplex39onMerritt Island.WhenthefirstApolloApplicationsmissionwaspostponed to late 1970, KSC faced at least a two-year hiatus in Saturn IBoperations.1

After studying the problem and considering the conflicting interestsinvolved,Mueller approved a plan that cutmanpower at theSaturn IB launchcomplexesby87%,leavingaskeletoncrewof350.Thetwocomplexeswouldbekeptinastandbycondition,withtheremovableequipmentinstorageandtheprincipalstructuresperiodicallysandblastedandrepainted.Evenso,thenumberofpeopleretainedfortheirspecificoperationalskillswaslargerthanneededformaintenance,themixofmaintenanceskillswasnotthemosteconomicalforthejob, and retention of key personnel would prove difficult. The alternative—organizinganewSaturnteamin1970—wasevenlessattractive.2

As KSC officials pondered ways to maintain a IB cadre, a parallel studyexaminedthepossibilityofusinganotherlaunchsite.ThereweredisadvantagestobothSaturncomplexesontheCape.LC-34wasold,undersized,andshowingthe effects of salt-air corrosion. Originally an Army project, its design hadsufferedfrominadequate funding.Duringsevenyearsofuse, thecomplexhadundergone major modifications including changes to support manned flights.LC-37 had been designed by NASA engineers in 1961 with a betterunderstanding of Saturn requirements; its service structure, launch umbilicaltower,andblockhouseweremoreappropriatelysizedtoIBoperations.Butithadnotyetbeenalteredformannedlaunches,andthatchangewouldtakenearlytwoyears.3

The Advanced Programs Office at KSC wanted to launch AAP missionsfrom the newer LC-39 on Merritt Island; consolidation of manpower andequipment there would save money and improve operations. Complex 39differed from the IB complexes in two major respects. First, because of theSaturnVshugedimensions,everythingoncomplex39wasoversized.Second,itembodied the mobile launch concept. At the older complexes on the Cape,techniciansassembledtherocket,stagebystage,onthepad.OnMerritt Islandthis was done within the controlled environment of the Vehicle Assembly

Building. Then a crawler transported the rocket andmobile launcher to a padfivekilometersaway for final checkoutand launch.A136-meter toweron themobilelauncherperformedthefunctionsoftheolderstationaryumbilicaltower.Eight service arms on the launcher tower provided electrical, pneumatic, andpropellant services to various stages and modules of the space vehicle;astronauts used a ninth arm to enter the command module. A mobile servicestructure,which stood opposite the tower at the pad, provided access to otherpoints on the vehicle. LC-39 had two pads, but only one mobile servicestructure,whichwasessentialformannedmissions.4

The biggest problem in launching the IB from LC-39 was adjusting thelaunchfacilitiestothesmallerrocket.SinceanApollostackedatopaSaturnIBwas 43 meters shorter than the Apollo-Saturn V, much of the supportingequipment would not be correctly positioned. Service arms 7 through 9connectedwiththeApollospacecraftonaSaturnV;thosearmswouldswingfaraboveaspacecraftstackedontheSaturnIB.Relocatingtheservicearmswasnoeasytask;theywereactuallymechanicalbridges,18meterslongandweighingup to 25 tons. Five of the arms supported the vehicle until launch and couldswingclearin2–5seconds(hencethepopularnameswingarm).Workplatformsin the assembly building and on the mobile service structure posed similarproblems.Whiletheworkplatformsdidnothavetoswing,theywerealsolarge.Those in the assembly buildingwere 18meters square and up to three storieshigh.Besidesrelocatingthearmsandplatforms,thelaunchteamwouldhavetorepositionpropellant,pneumatic,andelectricallinesthatnearlycoveredthebacksideofthemobilelauncher.5

InaFebruary1969studyonlaunchingtheIBfromLC-39,Boeingproposedtominimizemodificationsbyplacing theSaturn IBona39-meterpedestal sothat the second stage and instrument unit, as well as the Apollo spacecraft,wouldstandat thesameheightas theSaturnVconfiguration.Thus the launchteamcouldusethelauncher’supperservicearmsandtheworkplatformsoftheservice structure and assembly building. The modifications were estimated tocostabout$5million,one-thirdthecostofanewlauncher.Thebiggestdesignproblem involved the dynamic characteristics of rocket and pedestal at liftoff.Hold-downarmsonthelauncherrestrainedthevehicleforfoursecondsaftertheengines ignitedwhile launchcontrolascertained thatall systemswereworkingproperly;duringthistime,thethruststretchedtherocket’sframeupward.Iftheenginessuddenlyshutdown,thevehiclewouldreboundwithconsiderableforce.The pedestal would have to be strong enough to absorb that force withoutdangerous oscillations.Boeing suggested further studies of the rocket-pedestal

dynamics.6

In 1970, followingNASA’sdecision to complete the lunar landingsbeforeSkylab,debatereopenedonlaunchingIBsfromLC-39.GradyWilliams,chiefofdesignengineering,hadlittlequarrelwiththeBoeingreport.Sincethepedestalwas the chiefquestionmark,hisofficehadundertakenageometric evaluationand tentative layout, sized thepedestalmembers, andperformedapreliminarystressandweightanalysis.HisdeputyhadfoundsomemisgivingsinHuntsvilleabout vehicle-pedestal dynamics andwind loads at liftoff, but Saturn officialsseemedwilling tomake thechange.Williamsconcluded that themodificationswouldnotdelaySkylab.7

Walter Kapryan, director of launch operations, pointed out severaldisadvantages to thechange.Withonlyonepedestal for the IB launches,KSCfaced a tight checkout schedule, requiring weekend work and reducingoperational flexibility. If the pedestal were seriously damaged in a launchmishap, repairs could delay the last crew beyond the eight-month life of theworkshop.But operations on LC-39would savemoney, particularly ifNASAreachedaquickdecisionandshutdownLC-34andLC-37.RayClark,directoroftechnicalsupport,believedthetentativeestimateofa$10millionsavingwastooconservativeandthatthedifferencemightbehalfagainasmuch.Henotedthat dual operationsonLC-39wouldpose aproblemduringhurricane season.The center had only two crawlers to move three large structures—the twolaunchersandthemobileservicestructure.Sinceeachtransfertooksevenhours,thelaunchteamwouldhaveitshandsfullifahurricaneapproached.8

From Huntsville, Saturn manager Roy Godfrey also asked for an earlydecision:first,tosavemoneyonLC-34,wheremodificationstogroundsupportequipmentwerecostingnearly$4000aday;andsecond,toleavesufficienttimeforchangesonLC-39.Allowingforasix-monthstudyofthepedestaldesignanda year of wind-tunnel tests and data analysis, Huntsville needed to begin itsdesignworkinmid-July.Godfreydidnotinsistonanunmannedlaunchtotestthepedestal,butheexpectedclosecentercoordinationinreachingadecision.Hearguedthatthebenefitsofthechangeshouldcover“notonlytheidentifiedcostimpactsandprogramrisksbutalsotheprobability[ofadditionalcostsandrisks]whendetailedanalysisandtestsareaccomplished.”9

The view was much the same from Houston, where the potential savingsfrom an LC-39 operation offset reservations about a manned launch from anuntriedpedestal.Thechange toLC-39wouldhelpMSC’sprincipalcontractor,North American Rockwell, by avoiding a transfer of Apollo equipment fromMerritt Island to the Cape and reducing the manpower required for launch

operations.Muchofthesavingswouldbelost,however,ifdecisionwasdelayedbeyond15May.Houstonwaswellalong indesignworkforLC-34equipmentandexpectedtoletmaterialcontractsbyJune.10

Inpresenting its case toDebuson23April, theSkylabOfficeemphasizedthatLC-39operationswould save considerable sums,while demonstrating theversatility of the Merritt Island complex. Questions during the presentationrangedwidely.DidthecostestimatesforLC-34includerehabilitationcosts?Theanswerwasno.Debusinquiredaboutthepurposeofthewind-tunneltestandthepossibility of disputes when nonunion workers from Chrysler joined unionpersonnelonLC-39.At theconclusion, thedirectorpolledhis staff and foundgeneralsupportfortheproposal.11

AmeetinginHuntsvillethatsamedaydisclosedmoredoubts.TheMarshallstaffconsideredlaunchingavehiclefromthepedestalasa“majortechnicalrisk”that simulationsanddynamicanalysis couldnot resolve;doubtswould remainuntilthefirstlaunch.Huntsville’ssupportforthemovetoLC-39wascontingentuponseveralrequirements:apedestalloadtesttoconfirmitsrigidity,apulltesttomeasure vehicle stiffness, and threemonths of additional checkout time toresolveunforeseenproblems.12

All partieswanted thematter settled soon; a decision after 15Maywoulddiminishsavingsandadelaybeyond1Junewouldresultin“unacceptablecostandschedulerisk.”Atameetingofofficialsfromthefourprogramofficeson27April,ProgramDirectorBillSchneidersaidthatagoalof15Maywasprobablyunrealisticsincethematterrequiredtheapprovaloftheadministrator.Anyway,Schneiderwasmoreconcernedabout testing thepedestal.Heasked, “Howdoweprovewe can safely launch fromLC-39?”Prevailing opinion atKSCwasthattestsanddataanalysiswouldprovidesufficientconfidenceinthepedestal.The deputy Saturn manager at Huntsville considered the cost savings apersuasivereasonforusingLC-39,particularlywithNASA“undereverytypeofpressuretolimitoperatingcosts.”Aftertheneedforatriallaunchwasdebated,Schneider closed the meeting by stressing that operational advantages shouldweighmoreheavilythancostconsiderations.13

Decisions inWashingtoncamesooner thanSchneiderhadexpected.On29April1970,Myerstentativelyauthorizedachangeover,atthesametimebarringany irreversible action. Administrator Paine gave verbal approval on 11May,andfourdayslaterthecongressionalspacecommitteeswerenotifiedofNASA’sintent to use LC-39. In June Schneider askedKSC for “substantiating data toshow that flight-crew safety standards will not be degraded.” Morgansubsequently sent Headquarters a plan that included design reviews, dynamic

andstressanalyses,awind-tunnelprogram,andseveralpullteststomeasurethedeflectionofthevehicleandpedestal.14

Outside KSC, doubts about the pedestal lingered. In November 1970 theprogramoffices again considered themerits of a trial launch to train the crewand prove the system, when Chrysler officials suggested a static firing as atrainingexercise.Afterareviewbytheprogrammanagers,Schneiderconcludedthat KSC’s plan was sound. His recommendation against a trial launch wasacceptedbytheManagementCouncilthefollowingmonth.15

THEMILKSTOOL

The pedestal (milkstool in local parlance) was Skylab’s most distinctivefeature at LC-39. Weighing 250 tons, this was a stool for the likes of PaulBunyan.Fourlegsofsteelpipemorethanahalf-meterindiametersupportedthelaunchtable.Thecolumnsstood15metersapartatthebasebutleanedinwardtoless than half that width at the top. Horizontal and diagonal pipes braced thestructure.Viewedfromabove,thelaunchertablewithits8.5-meterexhaustholeresembledahugedoughnut.Onitsdeckwerehold-downandsupportarms,fuelpipes,andelectricallines.AremovableplatformovertheexhaustholeallowedtechnicianstoservicetheeightenginesoftheSaturnIB’sfirststage.16

DesignworkbeganinJuly1970.BuchananrejectedChrysler’sbidtobuildthepedestalunderasole-sourcecontract,consideringthedesign“verydifficultto fabricate … and apt to become distorted from the initial bath [Saturnexhaust].”Chrysler’sargumentthatitsproposalwouldexpeditematterscarriedno weight, since KSC had included time for competitive negotiations. Insubsequent bidding, Reynolds, Smith, and Hills (architects for the mobilelauncher)wonthepedestalcontract.KSCoptedtodesignthepedestal’ssupportsystemsinitsownshops.17

Thebiggestproblemindesigningthepedestalwastominimizeverticalandhorizontal vibrations. The requirements eventually set forth by Huntsvilleallowed only the slightest sag under very heavy loads, yet the designerswerelimited in theweight theycoulduse toachieve thedesired stiffness.Since theSaturnVwasanear-capacityloadforthecrawler,thepedestalcouldweighlittlemorethanthestageitreplaced.KSCengineerssetthatfigureat225metrictons.The effects of the Saturn’s exhaust had to be considered. Although flametemperatureswouldapproach2700K,itwasuncertainhowmuchofthiswouldimpingeonthepedestal.Windloadswerestillanotherfactor.Duringoperations

at the pad, the service structure would deflect much of the wind and an armconnected to the top of the rocketwould damp vibrations.Neither protection,however,wouldbeavailable in the finalhoursof thecountdown.Wind-tunneltests established a maximum permissible wind speed of 32 knots for launch.Designers considered connecting the pedestal to the launcher tower for addedstrengthuntilstudiesshowedthatthepedestalwouldactuallybestifferthanthetower.18

Construction of the pedestal produced the only major contractual disputeover Skylab’s launch facilities. In the fall of 1970, the Small BusinessAdministration asked that the contract be set aside for one of its firms. KSCrefused,statingthatan“experiencedtotalorganization”wasrequiredtopreventslipsinthesix-monthschedule.SincethepedestalwasSkylab’spacingitem,anydelayswould have a serious effect on the entire program. In asking for openbidding,thecenteralsocited“precisiontolerancesofalignmentandelevationfarexceeding the normal industry standards.”Unable to changeKSC’s plans, theSmallBusinessAdministrationsoughthelpinWashingtonfromitscongressionalcommittee and NASA Headquarters. The matter dragged on for more than amonth, keeping plans at a standstill. Finally in late December, Head quartersruled in KSC’s favor. But when bids were opened a month later, HollowayCorporation,asmallelectricalfirminnearbyTitusville,submittedthelowbid,$917000.WorseyetfromKSC’sviewpoint,theproposalcalledforfabricationby another small firm in Jacksonville. Fortunately, the episode had a happyending.Inspiteofproblemssecuringthesteelpipe,Hollowayanditsassociatescompletedtheworkontimeandtospecifications.Afterward,theSmallBusinessAdministrationwroteCongressaletterchastisingNASAforitsreluctancetouseasmallfirm.19

PREPARINGALAUNCHPLAN

In its early planning, KSC shared the frustrations of other ApolloApplications offices as scheduleswere continually revised. The dry-workshopdecisionprovidedafirmerbasisonwhichtowork,andbyDecember1969thecenterhadapreliminarylaunchplan.Amajorassumptionwasminimumtimeonthe pad.Whereas Apollo operations normally took 8weeks there, the SkylabOfficeaimedfor24workdays,minimizingexposuretotheweatherandreducingthecostoflaunchoperations(whichinthefinalmonthrantoabout$100000aday). The center would do as much work as possible inside the assemblybuilding, including removal of work platforms from the workshop’s interior.

Access to the workshop on the pad would be limited to contingencies, e.g.,testing the water supply, checking a questionable instrument reading, orinstallingalateexperiment.20

Veterans in the Launch Operations Office doubted that the center couldmaintainsuchatightschedule,andforthenextyearpadtimeandaccesswerehotly debated. Charles Mars, Skylab project leader for the operations group,believed the principal investigators would demand, and ultimately gain, lateaccess to their experiments. He wanted to plan accordingly, leaving accessplatforms in the workshop during rollout and allowing pad time for thescientists.AtaSeptember1970reviewofthelaunchschedule,Debussidedwiththeprogramoffice,emphasizingthat“padaccesswouldbebyexceptiononly.”ToMars’ssurprise,thecenterheldfirmtothispositionforthenext30months.21

While theworkshop remained off limits, other pad requirements extendedtheschedulebeyondtheoriginalprojection.ByJune1970plannedpadtimehadincreasedtosixweeks,countingtwoweeksforcontingencies.WhenHuntsvilleobjected, KSC eliminated the cushion, but estimates continued to rise. At theDecember program review, Paul Donnelly, associate director for operations,presented a 44-day schedule, including 30workdays. The biggest increase—9days—involvedfillingand testing theoxygenandnitrogen tanks thatprovidedtheworkshop’s atmosphere.Donnelly agreed to review thematter further anddeterminewhatrequirementscouldbecompressed.Inearly1971theoperationsoffice did reduce the time allowed and scheduled other tests in parallel.Thereafter,plannedpadtimeremainedat30days.22

Theoperationsplanlaidoutfortheworkshopin1971employedabuilding-block approach. Components and systems of each major module would becheckedoutindividually.Then,midwayintheeight-monthschedule,technicianswould stack the space vehicle and begin integrated systems tests. Thesewereparticularly important because the major modules had not previously beenmated,eithermechanicallyorelectrically.Beforerolloutthelaunchteamwouldstow food, film, and other consumables. Because experience showed that thefirst launch in a manned program brought many unanticipated problems, theSkylabscheduleranseveralmonthslongerthanatypicalApollooperation.Theextramonthsalsoallowedforanincreaseinlaunchactivity:afterAugust1972,not one but three vehicleswould be inwork at LC-39.Apollo 77’s launch inDecemberwouldreducetheload,butfourmonthslaterKSCfaceditsfirstdualcountdown, leading to Skylab launches 24 hours apart. Themagnitude of theoperationwarrantedanearlystart.23

LaunchofaSkylabcrewrequiredlessplanning,sinceitwasessentiallyan

Apollooperation.Theextensiveoperationsinearthorbitrequirednewstowageplans and some new test procedures.More importantly, the change of launchsitesdictatedanearlytrialrunoftheLC-39facilities.HighlightsofthescheduleincludedtheonlymatingoftheApollospacecraftwiththedockingadapterpriortoliftoff,andthetestofthepedestalinJanuary1973.24

FACILITYMODIFICATIONS

Facilitymodificationswerepartandparceloftheoperationsdebate,muchofthediscussionfocusingonanew“contingency”armforaccesstotheworkshop.TheDecember1969plancalled forentry through thesidedoor,anewfeaturethatKSChadlobbiedfor.Intheassemblybuilding,technicianswouldreachthatdoor from service platforms; at the pad a new swing arm would providecontingencyaccess. In1970, thearmbecame theprincipalmeansof access tothe workshop. The launcher’s uppermost service arm (9, which Apolloastronauts used to board the commandmodule) was relocated adjacent to theworkshop’s side hatch. An airlock, designed to protect the interior of theworkshopfromcontamination,replacedtheApollowhiteroomattheendofthearm.Ratherthanbuildasecondairlockforoperationsintheassemblybuilding,theengineeringofficerecommendedthatthenewarmbeusedtherealso.25

Bytheendoftheyear,plansforaccesstotherestofthespacevehicleweresettled. Much of the traffic to the airlock and multiple docking adapter wasrouted over the new swing arm.Once inside, techniciansmoved up the stackthrough the workshop’s forward dome hatch. While the vehicle was in theassemblybuilding,thetelescopemountcouldbereachedfromaccessrampsonthetopworkplatform,whichhadbeenfittedwithanothercleanroom.KSChadnot planned to service the telescope mount at the pad, but in mid-1970Huntsvilleidentifiedseveralservicerequirements,andarm8waschosenforthispurpose.26

Much of the debate on Skylab operations centered on the mobile servicestructure,theonlymajoritematLC-39withoutabackup.Thestructurecouldbemoved, but the five-kilometer trip between pads took about six hours. IfoperationsatpadArequiredtheservicestructure,padBwentunsupportedforatleastaday.Kennedyplanners initially ruledoutusing theservicestructure fortheworkshop,butduringthediscussionsonaIBlaunchfrom39,HansGruene,director of launch vehicle operations, challenged that decision. Loadingcryogenics into S-II stages had sometimes cracked the insulation, requiring

inspection and repair on the pad, and Gruene saw no reason to believe theproblem would not recur during Skylab. If the service structure were notavailable,analternatemeansofaccesstotheS-IIwouldhavetobedevisedorthe rocket would have to be returned to the assembly building. The staffacknowledgedtheproblembutdidnotconsideritseriousenoughtoruleoutthetransferoftheIBoperation.27

Events that summer confirmed Gruene’s prediction. In July, HuntsvillestipulatedthattheS-IIinsulationwouldbeinspectedonthepad.Thereseemedlittlechoicebuttousetheservicestructureforsuchwork.WhileworkmencouldreachanypartoftheSaturnVfromabosun’srig,theiractivitieswereseverelylimited. Using the service structure for both Skylab vehicles, however, posedobviousschedulingdifficultiesandafewdesignproblemsaswell.Thepayloadshroud on the workshop was nearly three meters larger in diameter than theApollo spacecraft. Ifworkmenwere to service theS-II stage from the servicestructure,thebottomplatformwouldhavetobeextended.28

ThematterbouncedbackandforthbetweenKSCofficesforseveralmonthsbeforeitwassettled.InOctober,Kapryanagreedtomodifythelowestplatform,althoughthechangewouldleaveonlyoneplatformtoservicethelowerhalfofthe IB rocket. He recommended that the bottom platform be restored to itsoriginal configuration after launch of the first crew, so that all work stationswouldbeavailableforthelasttwomissions,pointingoutthatthelossofonedayin theoperationwouldcostmore than the$85000modification.Hisproposalwasapproved.29

AfewothermodificationswerenecessarytoadaptSaturnVfacilitiestothesmallerIB.ThefiveswingarmsthatservicedthelowerstagesoftheSaturnVwere replaced by a single arm,modified by adding a three-meter extension toreachtheIBbooster.UmbilicallinesandawithdrawalmechanismwerebroughtfromLC-34.In theassemblybuilding,anewworkstandwasbuilt toreach thestructuralsectionbetweenthetwostages.Inthelaunchcontrolcenter,19firingpanelswereinstalledforIBoperations.KSC’spropellantsteamfacedaproblemonthepad;theliquidoxygensystempumped37850litersperminuteintotheSaturnV,four timestherate theIBcouldaccept.Rather thanalter thesystem,theSaturnV’sreplenishmentsystemwasused.Itpumped4540litersperminute,abouthalfthedesiredrate.30

Initial payload testing—except for the workshop—took place in theOperationsandCheckoutBuilding,eightkilometers southofcomplex39.Themostnotablechangewastheadditionofacleanroomforthetelescopemount.Locatedinthebuilding’shighbay,theroomrestedonasupportsystemthatwas

designedtopermitcalibrationoftheexperimentoptics;specificationscalledfortheplaneofthefloortomovelessthanfivesecondsofarcina24-hourperiod.Adjacentroomshousedtheairconditioningunitandgroundsupportequipmentusedtotestthetelescopes.Asecondmodificationalteredthedimensionsoftheintegrated test standused forsystems testingon theApollospacecraft,placingthecommandmoduleatthebottomlevelandallowinganimportantmatingtestbetween the spacecraft and docking adapter. In a less noticeable change, theApollolaboratoriesweremodifiedtoaccommodateSkylabexperiments.31

The first pieces of the pedestal arrived at the construction site outside theassembly building in April 1971. The pipes were sandblasted, painted, andweldedintosix-metersections.Baseplateswereinstalledonthelauncherfloor,and by early May the pedestal was taking shape. The eight segments of thelaunchtablecameinmid-June.ThetablewasplacedatopthepedestalinearlyJulyandanaccessbridgefromthelauncherwasaddedshortlythereafter.32

Thatfallcontractorsoutfittedthepedestalandbeganconstructingthecleanrooms.Thepedestalworkincludedtheinstallationofengineserviceplatforms,newfuelandpower lines,andaquenchsystemtocool theexhaust.Thecleanroominthecheckoutbuildinggotofftoalatestartbecauseofproblemswithapartition between Apollo 16 operations and the Skylab work. By Christmas,however, the work was on track. The modifications in the checkout buildingcontinuedwithoutamajorproblem.33

HANDLINGTHEEXPERIMENTS

For checkout purposes, experiments were divided into three groupsaccording to complexity.About half fell into the simplest category,which didnotrequirecontinuoussupportfromthedevelopmentcenterorcontractor.Thishardware was normally installed before it reached Kennedy and was notremoved for test purposes. Experiments in the second group warrantedcontinuous support from the developer. Most of this hardware required off-moduletesting.Thegroupincludedabout40%oftheexperiments,includingtheearth-resourceinstrumentsandmostofthecorollaries.Thethirdgroup,preflightand postflightmedical experiments, involved no functional hardware, and thedevelopmentcentersretainedresponsibilityforpreparations.34

Thetestingofexperimenthardwarewascomplicatedbythemanyinterfaces.Skylabcarriedover70experiments,mostofwhichconnectedtooroperatedinconjunctionwith other experiments and flight hardware. As one example, the

ultraviolet panorama telescope, developed in France to photograph stars, hadeightseparatepartsthatinteractedwitheachotherandwithsevenotheritemsofflight hardware. Altogether, the telescope depended on 41 interfaces forsuccessfuloperation;ofthese,morethanhalfhadtobetestedatthelaunchsite.TheFrenchinstrumentwasingroupone,thelesscomplicatedexperiments.Themany interfaces were tracked with a fit-check matrix, a chart that listed allhardwareconnectionsandwhentheywereverified.35

Most of the checkout was performed by module contractors; thus anexperiment mounted in the workshop was tested by McDonnell Douglas.Contractors were responsible for receiving inspection, bonded storage andhandling, installation and removal of experiment hardware, preparation ofdocuments, planning and coordination of the checkout, and resolution ofanomalies. When hardware was removed from the module, responsibilityrevertedtothedevelopmentcenter,workingunderKennedymanagement.36

Principal investigators were considered to be representatives of thedevelopmentcenter.Althoughtheywerenotdirectly involvedin theprelaunchcheckout,manyparticipated in theoperation.AKennedyengineer assigned toeach experiment served as the point of contact, and the scientists wereencouragedtoreviewtestproceduresanddata.Theresponsiblecentersarrangedthe investigators’activities inadvance,however, tominimize interferencewiththe test schedule.The investigatorswerehandledwithcare; someof themhadpolitical connections in both the legislative and executivebranches andwouldnotbeshyaboutcomplaining.Asarule,investigatorswhodidnotvisittheCapewere less tolerant of test restrictions. Those who saw the complexity of theoperationatfirsthandaccepteditsconstraints.37

RELATIONSWITHHUNTSVILLE

The launch teamhad little trouble defining spacecraft test procedureswithHouston, since the command and service modules differed little from theirApollocounterparts.CoordinationwithHuntsvillewasanothermatter.Formuchof the planning phase, Marshall and Kennedy were at loggerheads overworkshop test procedures. The problem was twofold. Huntsville was used todealingwithHansGruene’s launch vehicle operations team, a group that hadoncebeenapartofMarshall.Overtheyears,theSaturnengineersdevelopedaclose relationship. Checkout of the workshop, however, came under TedSasseen’sspacecraftoperationsoffice,withwhichHuntsvillehadworkedlittle.

Establishingnewrelationshipsusuallytakestimeandthisprovednoexception,butadjustmentwasmademoredifficultbyMarshall’soverzealousconcernforitsSkylabhardware—orsoitappearedoutsideHuntsville.NASA’spracticewastohavedesign centers define test requirements fromwhichKennedypreparedtest procedures. The centers reviewed the procedures, ironed out areas ofdisagreement, and the launch team then conducted the test. In this case,Huntsville seemed determined to run the operation, particularly the firstintegrated-systems test. The two centers took more than a year to reach acompromise.38

A second dispute concerned preflight tests of the telescope mount. Itscheckout represented the first time that a manned spaceflight center was toperform tests at the launch site (previously contractors had done the actualtesting), and some misunderstanding was likely. The full extent of thedisagreement came to light inDecember 1970 at a reviewof telescopemountflight procedures. Gene Cagle, engineering manager for the telescope mount,tookimmediateexceptiontotheKennedypositionthathisgroupwouldperformasacontractor.EvenhadHuntsvillebeenwillingtoassumethesubordinaterole—anditwasnot—CaglelackedthemanpowertomeetKennedy’srequirements.Thepreflightprocedureslisted73formsthatthetestteamwouldmaintain,manyofwhichrequiredseveralsignaturesatvarious levels.Caglecontended thathehadbarelyenoughpeopletodotheactualcheckout,muchlessfilloutthepaperwork.He alsoobjected to the requirement for quality assurance.He estimatedthat it would take 700 men, three times the number he had, to comply withKennedy’s rule thatan inspectormustverifyeach testingstep.Furthermoreheobjected to the launch center’s applying its philosophy of quality control to aMarshalloperation.AtHuntsville,thetestingorganizationassuredthequalityofitsownwork.39

Kennedyofficials turnedadeaf ear toCagle’s criticisms.Their proceduresembodiedwisdomacquiredovermanyyearsinthelaunchoperationsbusiness.TheatmosphereattheCapebeforeamajorlaunchwasquitedifferentfromtherelativelyrelaxedconditionsofcheckoutatHuntsville.Withthousandsofpeoplepushingtowardsthesamedeadline,aformalsystemofpaperworkwasessential.Shortcutsinevitablybroughtonbiggerproblems.Besides,contractorsmanagedto work within the system. Cagle’s request for manpower assistance fromKennedy was denied, since it violated the center’s checks-and-balancesphilosophy.Neithersideappearedwillingtogiveaninch,andthemeetingwastemporarilyadjourned.40

It took nearly a year to bridge the gap. Spacecraft operations helped by

lendingCaglesomesystemsengineers fromits liaison teaminHuntsville; thatgroupfollowedthetelescopetoHoustonandthentotheCape,workingaspartof Huntsville’s test team. Kennedy also agreed to perform quality checks, asHoustonwasdoingforthethermalvacuumtests.MarshallinturnattemptedtomeetKennedy’sotherrequirements.Theactualcheckoutofthetelescopemountwent very smoothly; afterwardDebus recognized the test team’sworkwith aletterofcommendation.41

PROBLEMSOFNEWHARDWARE

Whenflighthardwarearrivedinmid-1972,thelaunchteammovedtocenterstage, where it would remain for the next nine months. The first spacecraft(CSM116)arrivedaboardNASA’sSuperGuppyon19Julyandmoveddirectlyto the Operations and Checkout Building. The following week the spacecraftunderwent inspection in an altitude chamber.During thenext twomonths, thecheckoutwouldbescheduledaroundApollo77requirements.42

Theworkshop’sS-ICbooster(number513,the13thflightarticleinICstageproduction)arrivedfromNewOrleansaboardthebargeOrionon26July.By22August all four propulsion stages for the first two vehicles were on hand.Skylab’spacequickenedafter theApollo77 rollout and theLaborDay break.During thenext twoweeks, thestageswerematedatop their launchers.On22September theworkshop and payload shroud completed a two-week trip fromHuntingtonBeach,California,onthePointBarrow,aspeciallyequippedvesselof theNavy’sMilitarySealiftCommand.The telescopemount flew in aboardSuperGuppy.Withinafewdays,theworkshopjoinedtheSaturnVinhighbay2.43

Earlyoperationswent smoothly, in largepartbecause the launch teamwasworking with proven equipment and procedures. One of the first new tasks,deploymentofthemeteoroidshield,endedtheclearsailing.Thetest,scheduledfor3–7October,wasamilestone,sincetechnicianscouldnotentertheworkshopuntil the deployment was verified and the shield refitted around the accessdoor.44

Beforeconducting the test,McDonnellDouglashad to rig the shield in itslaunch configuration, snug against theworkshopwall. In a job somewhat likefasteningacorsetaroundasleepingelephant,32 technicianswrestled the545-kilogram shield into place around the workshop. Trunnion bolts running thelengthoftheshieldwerethentightenedtodrawitagainsttheouterskin.Thefit

wasunsatisfactory.Severalbulgesremained,andthereweretwo-centimetergapsalongtheupperandloweredgesoftheshieldassembly.Thebasicproblemwasthattheflightshielddifferedinseveralrespectsfromthestatic-testarticle,whichhadbeenusedforearlierdeploymenttests.Afterseveralfutileattemptstofollowthe prescribed procedure, the launch team began experimenting. Techniciansloosened the bolts that fastened the ends of the shield’s 16panels, pushed thepanelsagainstthetank,andretightenedthebolts.Thegapremained.Thepanelsweremanipulated in otherwayswith littlemore success.McDonnellDouglasfinallycalledahaltandscannedtheshieldwithanultrasonicdevice:62%ofthesurfacewastouchingtheworkshop.Theworkshopwasthenpressurizedandthecontactareasagainmapped:95%ofthetwosurfaceswereincontact.Sincethepressuredifferentialbetweentheworkshopandtheshieldwouldbesubstantiallyhigherduringflight,Huntsvilleacceptedtherigging.45

Themeteoroid shield,above.Theoverlappedendswere joinedby trunnionbolts,usedduring rigging totighten the shieldagainst theworkshop.The extra circumference requiredwhen the shieldwasdeployedwasprovidedbyfoldoutpanels,releasedbyordnance.Atright,oneofthe16torsionrodsandswinglinksthatmovedtheshield(attop,darker)outtothedeployedposition.Thelowerendoftheauxiliarytunnel,whichwouldfigureinthelaunchaccident,isvisible.MSFC028356.

Once inorbit theshieldwouldbedeployed tostand13centimetersoff theworkshop,andverificationofdeploymentadded to the launch team’s troubles.On the first try, two latches thathelped fasten the shield inplaceduring flightfailed to engage. Three of 16 torsion rods used to rotate the shield outwardappearedovertorqued,and1wassubsequentlyreplaced.Onthesecondtest,theupper latch failed again.As the lower latchwas sufficient to retain the shield,Huntsville accepted the condition. The final rigging for flight began in lateOctober,severalweeksbehindschedule.46

Testsof theworkshop launchvehiclebegan inearlyNovember, inparallelwith checkout of theworkshop. Inmid-November, the two solar arrays—theirwings folded in—were mounted to the workshop. Tests on the refrigerationsystemwerecompletedbyThanksgivingandonthewaste-managementsystembyChristmas.TheSaturnIBwasrolledouton9January.47

Theairlockanddockingadapterarrivedon6October,thelastmajoritemstoreach the launch center. During the next four months, all modules wereexaminedexhaustivelyintheOperationsandCheckoutBuilding.Testingofthetelescope mount uncovered few major problems, and by mid-January theHuntsvilleteamhadattacheditsthermalshieldandsolararrays.Otherhardwareprovedmore troublesome, in particular the earth-resource experiments, which

hadbeenamongthelastaddedtotheSkylabprogram.AslateasJanuary,MartinMariettawas reportingproblemswith signal conditioners, videotape recorders,andtheheatcontrolforthewindowofthemultispectralcamera.48

End-to-end tests on the earth-resource instruments proved particularlyfrustrating. In these exercises, technicians simulated subject matter for thecameras to record.After the equipment ran through a typical operation, videotapes were removed and the results checked against the input. Repeatedly,significantfractionsofthedatawerenotrecorded.EventuallytheMartinteam,atthesuggestionofaKSCemployee,triedtworudimentaryprocedures—cablewiggling and pin probing—that were outlawed at the Denver plant. During atest, a technician wiggled each cable at a specific time. Comparison of themovement with data output identified half a dozen erratic channels. Asubsequent probing of cable connector pins revealed several defective joints.Withnewconnectors,theinstrumentsperformedsatisfactorily.49

The problemswith the earth-resource experimentswere typical of Skylab.Duringeightmonthsofprelaunchoperations,one-thirdofthehardwarerequiredrepairs in place; another one-fifth caused mechanical problems duringinstallation.More important, 61%of the experimentshad tobe removed fromSkylab because of test failures or late design changes, greatly increasing thecheckouttime.Besidesthehoursspentremovingandreinstallinghardware,thechanges entailed retesting of all interfaces. The experiment project officer atKSCconcludedthattheexperience“didnotsupportthetheorythatasindustrygains experience in building and testing space hardware the product will getbetterandtherewillbefewerfailuresatthelaunchsite.”HenotedthatmuchofSkylab’s hardware was pushing the state of the art and was therefore highlysusceptible to test failures and design changes. From the test results, heestimated that about one-third of Skylab’s experiments would have failed inspacewithoutthelaunchcheckout.50

TheApollo spacecraft andSaturn IB launchvehicle thatwould carry the secondcrew toSkylab,shownmovingtothepad11June1973.108-KSC-73P-369.

FROMCERTIFICATIONREVIEWTOLIFTOFF

Program officials gathered at Merritt Island on 19 January 1973 for thedesigncertificationreviewofthelaunchcomplex.Thereviewwasthelastofaseriesdatingback to June1972 inwhich themanned spaceflightmanagementcouncilhadexaminedSkylabhardware,experiments,andmissionoperations(p.122).ThemeetingatKSCfocusedonsingle-pointfailures,*suchasthemobileservicestructure,andthoseelementsofthelaunchcomplexthathadundergone

significant change from Apollo operations. No major shortcomings emergedfromthereview;atitsclose,KSCandMarshallwereaskedtocompleteactionina dozen areas, among them dynamic analysis of the pedestal and a review ofpreviousIBlaunchproblems.51

The trip also gave Schneider a first-hand look at the lagging operation.Testing on the airlock-docking adapter had fallen four days behind in earlyJanuary, raising doubts that the launch team could stack the modules on theSaturn V by the 19th. Postponement became a foregone conclusion a weekbeforethedeadline,whenthelaunchteamhadtoremovethecontrolanddisplaypanel from the earth-resource experiments. The test office, facedwith anotherweek’sdelay, rescheduled thematingfor the29th.Uponreviewingthevarioustestproblems,Schneiderconcluded that theentirescheduleshouldslipat leasttwo weeks. The lost time might be made up, but further delays were just aslikely. Inannouncing thedecision,aNASAspokesmannoted that“thecurrentposture cannot be attributed to any one item, but is a result of the first-timetestingofthemodulesandthemanyexperiments.”Tentativedatesof14and15Maywere set for the first launches. Firm dateswere to be established in lateMarch.52

Fewer problems cropped up during the next two months. An integratedsystemstestbegunon9Februaryrepresentedthefirsttestoftheworkshopanditslaunchvehicleasaunit.The10-dayexercisewentsmoothlyexceptforminorproblems in the refrigeration system, most of them involving ground supportequipment.On20February,RockwellbroughttheApollocommandandservicemodules to theassemblybuildingformatingwith theSaturnIB.Thestaywasbrief;withinaweekthatvehiclewasonthepad.Marchwasamonthoftestingand loading. On the 7th, Martin Marietta finished the last of four simulatedpasseswiththeearth-resourcecameras.Twoweekslatertheentirelaunchteamranthroughasimulatedcountdownandliftoffoftheworkshopduringtheflightreadiness test, the last major milestone before the vehicle left the assemblybuilding. The exercise continued four more days, testing the initial workshopoperations.Atthesametime,technicianswereloadingprovisions;bytheendofthemonth,thatjobwas70%complete.53

Skylab and the last Saturn V to be launched being carried by a crawler-transporter from the VehicleAssemblyBuilding(right)tothepad,16April1973.108-KSC-73P-240.

During the final two weeks in the assembly building, the launch teamconductedaseriesofcrewcompartmentfitandfunctiontests,afinalinspectionensuring that everything was in its place. The test office report of 12 Aprilconcluded,“theinternalOWSisclosedoutforflight.”Finalactionsinthehighbayincludedtheinstallationofthepayloadshroud,arelativelysimpleshellthatcovered the telescopemountduring launch.Theordnanceused to separate thestagesortodestroyanerrantvehiclewasaddedonthe14th,andtheworkshoprolledouttwodayslater.54

On thepad, firstorderofbusinesswas toconnectand testvarious supportsystems: fuel, water, electricity, environmental control, and high-pressure gaslines.On the25th, the launch teambegan thecountdowndemonstration test,adressrehearsalofthefinalweek.For10yearsthisexercisehadclimaxedSaturnprelaunchoperations;onSkylab,however,itwasevenmoreimportantasatestof integrated operations for two space vehicles. Months of planning paid offwhenthedualcountdownproceededwithoutamajorhitch.Followingsimulatedliftoffson2–3May,fueltanksweredrainedandinsulationwasinspected.Thena second terminal count began for the Saturn IB-Apollo—a dry run with the

crewaboard.55

Programofficialsawaited the launchof theworkshopwithmixed feelings.There was pride and a sense of relief that, after long years of work, thelaboratory,itslaunchvehicle,andlaunchcomplex39wereready.Therewasalsoapprehension:somanythingscouldgowrong—andhad,atvarioustimesinthepast.Onmostprogramsthemaidenflightwasonlythefirstofseverallaunches;a failure meant delay, sometimes costly delay, but it did not spell the end.Skylab’ssuccess,however,dependedlargelyontheoutcomeofitsinitiallaunch.Ifsomethingwentwrong,itwasdoubtfulthatCongresswouldprovidethe$250millionnecessarytotryasecondtime.

DeliberatedoubleexposurepermitscomparisonofthefirsttwospacevehiclestobelaunchedintheSkylabprogram;theywereactually3kmapart.Ontheleft,perchedonthemilkstool,istheSaturnIBthatwouldloftthefirstcrew.Ontheright,theSaturnV’sthird(upper)stagehasbeenreplacedbySkylab.108-KSC-73PC-199.

The weather provided the suspense for the final 10 days of launchoperations.Afteraheavyrainon4May,workmendiscoveredthat thepayloadshroudleaked,butattemptstosealitweredelayedbyhighwindsandmorerain.Onthe9th,thefirstdayofthefinalcount,lightningstruckthemobilelauncher,forcingahurriedretestofvehiclesystems.Fortunatelythethunderstormsabated

duringtherestoftheweek,andthefinalcountdownproceededwithoutamajorhitch. Just before liftoff, Martin Marietta technicians rectified an oversight—attachingametalUnitedStatesflagtothedockingadapter.56

At1:30p.m.on14May,theworkshopclearedthelaunchtowerandmissioncontrolpassedfromKSCtoJSC.*

Launchconfiguration.Above,theunmannedSkylab.S-72-1768-S.Below,anApollowithcrew.S-72-1794-S.

*Single-pointfailureswerethosethatwouldterminatetheoperationbecausetherewasnobackupforthefaultyequipment.

* TheManned Spacecraft Center,Houston,was renamed the Johnson SpaceCenter on 17 February1973.

PartIII

TheMissionsandResults,1973–1979

Skylab’s debut as the sustainingmission forAmericanmanned spaceflightwasanear-disaster.Oneminuteintotheflightthemeteoroidshield—whichalsoserved as the primary means of thermal control—ripped away, leaving theworkshop exposed to searing solar heat and in the process disabling its solarpanels. For two hectic weeks engineers worked to devise ways to repair thedamagewhileflightcontrollersmaneuveredthespacecrafttominimizedamagefrom excessive heat. Their ingenuity and perseverance saved the $2.5 billionprogram,andthemannedmissionswentoffwithsurprisinglylittledislocation.

Experimenters learned much from the Skylab program. So did crews andflightplanners:whattheylearnedwassomethingabouttheinfinitevariabilityofman.Theresourceful“can-do”firstcrewwassucceededbyahard-drivinggroupofoverachieversandinturnbythemethodical,sometimesstubbornthirdcrew.Noonecouldreasonablyfaulttheperformanceofanyofthesecrews,butoncemore it was impressed on everyone in the program that astronauts are notinterchangeablemodules.

The scientific productivity of Skylab was impressive, almost overloadingsomeof the investigatorswithdata.So toowas thephysical adaptationof theastronauts to orbital flight. After Skylab, prolonged weightlessness would nolonger hang as a threat over lengthy missions. The third crew eclipsed allexistingflight-durationrecordswithan84-daymissionwhoselengthwouldnotbesurpassedforfouryears.

Thederelictworkshopstayedaloftforfiveyearsafterthelastmission,whilemannedspaceflightlanguished.TechnicalandfinancialproblemsinShuttle,thenextmannedprogram,pusheditsfirstflightfurther into thefuturedaybyday.SinceNASAhadintendedtouseShuttle toboostSkylab intoahigher, longer-lived orbit, the workshop was doomed to an uncontrolled reentry into theatmosphere,withconsequencesnoonecouldpredict.Forthreemonthsin1979

Skylab was in the headlines as it had not been since the success of the firstmannedmission.Butinspiteofsometimesnear-hystericalpublicanticipationoftheworkshop’sreentry,itcametotheendofitsroadwithafewspectacularbutharmlessfireworks.

Thelastsectionofthisbookdealswiththelaunchaccident,themissions,theresultsoftheprogram,andSkylab’send.

14

SavingSkylab

TheSaturnVperformeditsfinalmissioninstyle,and10minutesafterliftoffon14May1973Skylabwasinitsplannedorbit,436kmabovetheearth.Duringthenexthalfhoura seriesofcommands from the instrumentunitwouldbringthe laboratory to life. First a radiator cover was jettisoned so that therefrigeratorscouldbeswitchedon.Nextthefoursectionsofthepayloadshroudpeeledaway;Skylabofficials,recallingthefailureofasimilarcoveronGemini9, breatheda sighof relief.Withdeploymentof the telescopemount from theforward end of the stack to its flight position astride the docking adapter 16minutes into the flight, Skylab passed a crucial hurdle. Themove cleared thepath for the Apollo spacecraft to reach its docking port. Within minutes thetelescopemount’s four solarwings, resembling the sails of aDutchwindmill,opened.Meantime, thespaceshiphadassumedasolar inertialattitude, its longaxis in theplaneof theorbitand the telescopemountpointing toward thesun.Thusfartherehadbeenonlyonecuriousindication,areportfromHoustonthatthemeteoroidshieldhaddeployedprematurely.Whennothingmorewasheard,officials at the launch site dismissed the indication as a false telemetry signal.Afterthetelescopemounthadmovedintoitsproperposition,therewastimetorelaxwhileawaitingdeploymentoftheworkshop’ssolararrays.1

THEACCIDENT

The relaxation was short lived. About half an hour after liftoff, FlightDirector Donald Puddy in Houston reported erratic signals from both themeteoroidshieldandtheworkshopsolararrays.Thesolarwingswerescheduledtodeploy41minutesafterlaunch,whenSkylabhadpassedbeyondtherangeofthe station atMadrid.Tensionmounted asofficials listened fornews from thetracking station at Carnarvon, Australia. The information was confusing. One

telemetrysignalindicatedthatthearrayhadreleasedfordeploymentbutwasnotfullyextended,whiletemperaturesignalssuggestedthatbothwingsweregone,aconclusion reinforcedby theabsenceofvoltagesignals.The failureofbackupcommandsfrombothGoldstone,California,andMadridseemedtoconfirmtheworstfears.ThesolarpanelswerethemaintopicofdiscussionatthepostlaunchbriefingatKennedy.2

MissionsequenceforthefirsttwoSkylabmissions.MSFC-72-SL7200-130C.

Deployment of the Apollo telescopemount, uncovering the docking port through which the crewwouldenter.ML71-5285.

Bylateafternoon,itappearedthatSkylabhadatleasttwomajorproblems.Iftheworkshopsolarpanelswere indeedgone,Skylabhad lostnearlyhalfof itselectrical power. Theworkshop andATM array each provided about 5 kw ofusablepower.Apollofuelcellscouldproduceanadditional1.2kwfor20days;afterthatthecommand-servicemodulewoulddrawelectricityfromSkylab.Thesystem had been designed with power to spare; even without the workshoppanels, officials believed an adequatemissionwaspossible untilApollo’s fuelcellsrandry.Thenthecrewwouldbeforcedtocurtailmostexperimentsforthelast week. The second and third crews would be hampered for much longerperiods.3

The power shortage drew most attention at an evening press conference;little was said about an even more serious problem, the apparent loss of themicrometeoroid shield.Noonewas particularlyworried about damage from ameteoroid strike, since the chances of a hit were slim.* But the shield’ssecondaryfunction,thermalcontrol,loomedlargeintheaftermathofthelaunch.The shield had been designed to keep the workshop on the cool side of the

comfortzone,heatingbeingeasierthancooling.Theoutsideoftheshieldwasablack-and-white pattern designed to absorb the desired amount of heat. Theinsideoftheshieldandtheoutsideoftheworkshopwerecoveredwithgoldfoil,whichregulatedtheflowofheatbetweenthetwo.Itwasanadmirablesystemaslongastheshieldstayedinplace.Withoutit,thegoldcoatingontheworkshopwouldrapidlyabsorbexcessiveheat,makingtheinterioruninhabitable.4

Theshieldhadfailedtodeployatthescheduledtimeandsubsequentgroundcommands had no effect.While officials were debating further action, Saturnengineers discovered flight data indicating an anomalous lateral accelerationabout a minute after liftoff. The data, coming just before the space vehiclereached its maximum dynamic pressure, suggested some structural failure. Ashort time later,workshop temperatures began rising, strong evidence that theshieldwasgone.Withina fewhours, readingsonmanyof theoutside sensorsexceeded82°C,themaximumscalereading.Internaltemperaturesmovedabove38° C. Working from the thermal model, Huntsville engineers figured thatworkshop temperatureswouldgoashighas77°C internallyand165°Con theoutside, endangering food, film, perhaps even the structure itself. MissionControlthereforebeganmaneuveringtheexposedareaoutofdirectsunlight,andsomecoolingoccurred.5

Ableakpictureconfronted theSkylab teamtheeveningof launch.Besidestheoverheatingandthelackofpower,theattitude-controlsystemhadproblems.Responses from rate gyroscopes were not averaging properly, and the initialmaneuvershadexpendedexcessiveamountsofnitrogengas.NodoubtengineerswishedtheycouldbringSkylabbackforrepairs.Thiswasoutofthequestion,ofcourse.Thechancesofrepairingitinspacelookedunpromising,buttheattempthadtobemade.6

The first decision was to delay the launch of the crew by five days.Huntsvillebegana seriesofanalytical studies topredict likely temperatures inthe workshop and assess their impact. Both Huntsville and Houston startedinvestigatingwaysofdeployingathermalshield.Atthesametime,contractorsandotherNASAcenterswereencouragedtopursueindependentstudies.7

AtMarshall,CenterDirectorRoccoPetronemovedwithcharacteristicvigor,giving carte blanche to a special task force under the direction of the deputydirectorsoftheAstronauticsandAstrionicsLaboratories:“Whateveryouneedatthecenterisyours.”TheteamoperatedfromtheHuntsvilleOperationsSupportCenter, with personnel largely drawn from the mission support groups.Marshall’s laboratories and contractors’ plants provided additional help.Computertimewassooninshortsupply.Eventuallymuchoftheworkwasdone

on Martin computers in Denver, and sometimes procurement had to searchelsewhere.8

The accident drastically altered activities within Huntsville’s operationscenter.Anormal40-hourweekhadbeenplannedforoperationspersonnel,witha skeleton crew on duty the remainder of the time. Facing an emergency ofundeterminedlength,officialsquicklyestablishedanaround-the-clockschedule,reinforcing the operations team with Skylab design engineers. The supportgroups directly affected by the accident (electrical power systems, attitudecontrol,andenvironmentalcontrol)doubledinsize,whileoverallnumbersattheoperationscenterincreasedfrom400to600.9

At first, Eugene Kranz, chief of JSC’s Flight Control Division, tried tooperate with his four flight-control teams, having each team work specificproblemswhennotmanning the consoles, so that individualswhoworkedoutplanscouldthenimplementthem.Bythe15th,however,theschemehadbecomeunworkable. Too many things required investigation, and the major problemsdemanded continuous attention.Two teamswere directed toman the consolesaroundtheclock,while theother twosupportedcontingencyplanning:alteringthe flightplanandactivationchecklist, supportingdevelopmentofasunshade,andreducingpowerrequirementsoftheworkshop.10

IfHuntsvilleandHoustonboretheheaviestresponsibility,iheentireSkylabteamwas involved. FromHuntington Beach to Cape Canaveral, workdays of16–18hoursbecamenormal, andpeople lost trackof time.Tempers remainedremarkably calm despite the long hours.Relations betweenMarshall and JSCwere excellent, a condition that both sides attributed to the closeworking tiesthathadgrownupduringSkylab’sdesignanddevelopmentphases.Therewashealthycompetitionbetweengroupsdevelopingsunshades,butinlookingbackon the time,participantsmostoftenrecalled the teamworkand the tremendousamountofworkaccomplishedinsuchashorttime.Huntsvilleofficialsreferredtotheperiodas“the11yearsinMay.”11

MANEUVERINGFORMINIMUMHEAT,MAXIMUMPOWER

The electrical power situation, while bothersome, was not an immediatethreat. But the workshop’s temperature had to be lowered fast. Separately,neitherproblemseemedinsurmountable;togetherthelossofthesolarpanelsandmeteoroid shieldposed adilemma, for anything that reduced the effect ofonemalfunction increased the effects of the other. To produce electricity, Skylab

neededtoremaininasolarinertialattitude,withthesun’sraysperpendiculartothesolarpanels,butthispositionexposedthefulllengthoftheworkshop.ForatimeMissionControlpointedtheforwardenddirectlyatthesun,whichloweredtemperatures somewhat but also reduced power generation. Experiments withvariousattitudesshowedthebestcompromisetobepitchedupabout45°towardthe sun.During the daylight portion of each orbit enough sunshine struck thesolarpanelstochargethebatteriesforthenextperiodofdarkness,andinternaltemperaturesstabilizednear42°C.12

Thesearchforacompromiseattitudewascomplicatedbysteeringproblems.Ninerategyroscopesservedasthebasicsensorsforattitudecontrol,measuringthe rate of rotation around three axes. Several gyroscopes overheated the firstday, producing off-scale readings and causing the flight controllers todiscontinue the practice of averaging the information from two gyroscopes.Fortunately,atleastonegyroscopeineachaxisworkedsatisfactorily.Thegyrosaccumulated excessive errors, and because the errors were erratic, groundcontrollers could not compensate for them. During the first few weeks, theattitude-controlteamwagedaconstantbattletopredictthemovementoftherategyroscopes.Theproblemwascompounded,however,whenSkylableftthesolarinertial plane. Random errors sent spurious signals to the control-momentgyroscopes, frequently causing them to reach saturation (p. 172).Desaturationrequired a daylight pass in the solar inertial attitude.To reduce the amount ofmaneuvering required, Mission Control worked out some rough-and-readysubstitute procedures: measuring roll attitude by reading temperatures onoppositesidesoftheworkshop,determiningpitchanglebytheelectricaloutputofthesolarwings,andcalculatingSkylab’smomentumtodetermineifitwasinthecorrectorbitalplane.13

All theseunscheduledmanueversuseduplargeamountsofattitude-controlpropellant,andwhiletherewerepossiblesolutionstotheothermalfunctions,thegascouldnotbereplaced.Duetofavorablelaunchconditions,Skylabhadliftedoffwithanexcesssupply,butinthefirstthreedaysthecompressednitrogenthatpoweredtheattitude-controlthrusterswasexpendedatanalarmingrate.By17May,23%ofitwasgone,twicetheamountexpected.Thesituationimprovedasflightcontrollersbecamemoreadeptatmaneuveringtheworkshop.Thoughtheexpenditureofnitrogenremainedtoohigh, theratecouldbe tolerateduntil thefirst crew was launched. On the 17th, that launch was delayed another fivedays.14

Ironically, while much of the workshop suffered from overheating, theairlockwastoocold,droppingbelow4°Conthe18th.Thesuitumbilicalsystem

locatedintheairlockusedwatertotransferheatfromtheastronauts’suitsduringextravehicular activity. Despite attempts to warm the airlock with heaters, itstemperaturecontinuedtodrop,approachingfreezingonthe21st.Ifalineintheumbilicalsystemfroze,itmightcracktheheatexchangeratthejunctionwiththeairlock’s primary coolant loop. On the 20th, flight controllers had rolled thevehicleafewdegreestoexposetheairlocktomoresunlight.Whentherewasnosignificantchange in temperature,Skylab’spitchwasdecreased to40°.On thefollowing day, theworkshopwas rolled to place thewater loops under directsunlightforonepass.Thesemaneuverswarmedtheairlockandproducedmoreelectricity, but sentworkshop temperatures up aswell.By the end of the 21streadingsapproached54°C.FlightcontrollersjuggledSkylabfortherestofthesecond week, trying to keep temperatures and power within safe limits. Thestableconditionexpectedat theendof thefirstweekeluded them,butat leasttheypreventedseriousdamagetothevehicle.15

Evenwiththeworkshop’ssolararraygone,therewasenoughpowertomeetSkylab’sneedsuntilthecrewarrived—iftheshipremainedperpendiculartothesun’s rays. When sunlight struck the solar panels at less than a 90° angle,however,productiondecreasedsharply.Theestimatedpowerrequirementfortheunmanned Skylab was 4.5 kw, a few hundred watts below the ATM powersystem’s maximum output. When it became apparent that maneuvers wereessential,engineersturnedoffheatersandtransmitters,reducingrequirementsto3kw.Thisprovedsufficientuntilthesecondweek,whenhigh-anglemaneuversdroppedSkylab’selectricaloutputbelowthatlevel.Onthe24th,8oftheATM’s18batteriesstoppedworkingbecauseofexcessiveelectricaldemands.Returningtheworkshopto thesolar inertial revivedonly7batteries.The losspointedupthedangeroffurtherhigh-anglemaneuvers.16

ASSESSINGTHEHEAT’sEFFECT

TherapidbuildupofheatraiseddoubtsaboutSkylab’sprovisions.Thedayafter launch, controllers began plans to restock the larders, assuming that thehigh temperatures would probably ruin all nonfrozen foods. Over in the foodlaboratories, however, tests conducted before launch had indicated that thecannedfoodcouldwithstand54°Ctemperaturesforat least twoweeksandthedehydrateditemswouldlastevenlonger.Newtestswerestartedtoconfirmtheearlier findings, baking one lot of food at 54° and a second batch at thetemperatureoftheworkshop’sfoodlocker.Periodicsamplingindicatedthattheheatwasnotalteringthefood’smineralcontentortaste.Tobeonthesafeside,

the crew was given a quick course in food inspection. On the 22d Houstonofficialsconcludedthatthefoodwasallright,andplanstorestocktheworkshopweredropped.17

The initial prognosis onSkylab’smedical supplieswas also pessimistic; itwas thought that half of the 62 medications aboard the workshop might beruined. During the following week, Houston’s medical team pared down theresupply list, relying on heat tests and information from pharmaceuticalcompanies.Atthesametime,HuntsvilleofficialsdebatedtheconditionoffilmaboardSkylab.Whilethefilmforthesolartelescopeswasoutofharm’swayinthedockingadapter,thatforearth-resourcecamerasandotherexperimentswasstored inworkshopvaults.Theproblemwasoneof dryness aswell as heat—emulsiononthefilmwoulddryoutinthelowhumidity.Saltpacksplacedinthevaults toprovidemoisturewerenot expected to lastmore than4days.Kodakengineersbelievedthecrewcouldrestorethefilmbyrehumidifyingthevaults,but that might take up to 20 days. Accordingly, plans were made to carryadditionalfilmontheApollospacecraft.18

Duringtheearlyriseintemperature—toperhaps150°Catsomepointsontheworkshop’s exterior—Huntsville engineers feared for Skylab’s structuralintegrity, but the spacecraft was pressurized without incident.19 A relatedproblem involved the possible release of toxic gases into the workshop. ThealuminumwalloftheS-IVBtankwasinsulatedontheinsidewithpolyurethanefoam. Well suited for temperatures several hundred degrees below zero, thematerial at 150°C could give off carbon monoxide, hydrogen cyanide, andtoluenediisocyanate. The last item was the most dangerous, lethal in smallconcentrations. Chemical experts from industry and the academic worldconsidered thehazard a long shot andMcDonnellDouglas tests indicated thatthe concentration of toxic gas in the workshop’s large volume would not bedangerous.Nevertheless,theworkshopwasventedandrepressurizedfourtimes.Thecrewwouldweargasmasksandsampletheairuponfirstentering.20

DEVISINGASUNSHADETheSkylab maneuvers were an attempt to buy time until some way was

found to shade the workshop. Chances of finding a solution were reasonablygood,certainlybetterthantheoddsgivenbymanynewsmen.Foronething,notallof theexposed surface requiredprotection;coveringpartof thearea facingthe sun would bring temperatures within satisfactory limits. Second, a shade

would not require rigid tie-downs or strongmaterial since there is nowind inspace.Butasolutionhadtobefoundquickly,beforetheworkshopdeterioratedbeyond recovery. In the week after the accident, Skylab officials examinedscores of ideas, ranging from spray paint and wallpaper to balloons, windowcurtains, and extensible metal panels. Of the various proposals, 10 seemedpromisingenoughtocarrythroughdesignandatleastpartialdevelopment.21

Huntsvilleofficialsbeganconsideringareplacementforthemeteoroidshieldafewhoursafterlaunch.Someoftheearlyideaswereratherfarfetched,butnosuggestionwasignoredif its“packagewaslightandthedeploymentrelativelysimple.”Several conceptswerediscardedafter the first review.The astronautsruled out use of the astronaut maneuvering equipment, experimental gear inwhich thecrewhad littleconfidence.The ideaofdeployingaweatherballoonthrough thescientificairlockwasopposedby thermalengineers,whofeared itmight reflect enough heat tomelt solder joints on theATMsolar panels; theypreferredaflatshadewithsomedistancebetweenitandtheworkshopwall.AsimilarwinnowingofideasoccurredinHoustonwhenMaxFaget’sengineeringdirectorate met on launch night to brainstorm the problem. After debating anumber of suggestions, staff members were assigned specific concepts forfurther study. Next day paint and wallpaper were eliminated as possiblesolutions.Whilespraypaintworkedsurprisinglywellinavacuumchambertest,itposedseriouslogisticalproblemsandathreatofcontamination.Wallpaperwasruled out because of uncertainty about the condition of the workshop’sexterior.22

Fromtheinitialdiscussions,threepromisingsolutionsemerged:extendingashadefromalongpoleattachedtothetelescopemount,deployingashadefromthemaneuveringApollospacecraft,orextendingadevicethroughthescientificairlockontheworkshop’ssolarside.Theextravehicularactivityrequiredbythefirst option was a drawback since NASA liked to train extensively for suchoperations. In its favor, the crew had practiced extravehicular work on thetelescopemount;andiftheyhadaportablefootrestraint,astronautscouldfacethe exposed area without difficulty. A shade deployed from the spacecraftofferedtheearliestrepairandtheleastcomplexdesign.Theseadvantageswereoffset by the difficulty of flying around the workshop. The scientific airlockprovidedtheeasiestoperation.Astronautscouldextendtheshadefrominsidetheworkshopusing a procedure alreadyprepared for an experiment.Theproblemwastodesignadevicethatwouldfitthroughanopening20centimeterssquareandthenexpandtocoveranarea7meterssquare.23

Faget’s group at JSC concentrated on rigging a shade from the Apollo

spacecraft, since this seemed to have the best chance of meeting a 20 Maylaunchdate.StandingintheApollohatch,anastronautwouldattachtheshadeatthe aft end of the workshop. The spacecraft would move laterally to anotherpointontheaftend,wherehewouldsecureasecondcornerof theshade.TheCSMpilotwouldthenslowlymaneuverthespacecrafttowardSkylab’sforwardend,allowingtheshadetoplayout.Atthetelescopemount,theastronautwouldmakeathirdattachment.ThisshadewassooncalledtheSEVAsail,forStandupExtravehicularActivity.24

Responsibility for the SEVA sail fell to Caldwell Johnson, chief of thespacecraftdesigndivision.Heorganizedadevelopmentteamandworkedinthecentrifugebuilding;for10daysthegroupfeltlikegoldfishinabowl,aspublictours to the centrifuge observed their activity from amezzanine. Seamstressesstitched the orange material, parachute packers folded the sail for properdeployment,anddesignengineersattendedtothevariousfasteners.ProbablythebiggestobstaclewasgettingexactdataonSkylab,sincesomedrawingswerenotcurrent.Inoneortwoinstances,theengineersreliedonphotographsprovidedbyMcDonnell Douglas. Johnson faced an additional problem—warding offsuggestions from other NASA officials, whose good intentions might haveimprovedthedesignattheexpenseofthedeadline.Inspiteofminordelays,theSEVA sail made rapid progress. At theManagement Council meeting on the16th,itwastentativelychosenasthefirstshadefordeployment.25

OpinionatJSCinclinedagainstsendingastronautsoutsideSkylab;Gemini’sextravehiculartroubleswerewellremembered.AtMarshall,ontheotherhand,EVAfromthetelescopemountwaspreferred,largelybecauseoffearsthatdebrismight block the scientific airlock. On the evening of the launch, Huntsvilleengineersbegandesigningasunshadethatlookedlikeawindowblind.Workingsteadily through the night, the group completed the design on the 15th andimmediately started fabrication. Testing started the following evening at theneutral-buoyancy simulator. Russell Schweickart, commander of the backupcrew,andJoeKerwin,scientist-pilotoftheprimecrew,hadflownfromHoustontotestseveraldevicesanddeterminehowmuchanastronautcouldseefromthetelescope mount. They entered the tank amid a circus atmosphere, newsmenpeering through floodlights towatch the underwater activity. Before theworkended,Huntsvilleengineersconcludedthattheyneededanotherdesign.26

Schweickart and Kerwin changed from their tank suits and joined 75Marshallengineersforadebriefing.Theastronautswerestillinquarantine,andthebluemaskswornbytheotherparticipantsgavetheappearanceofasurgicalward.Schweickartsketchedideasonablackboardasthediscussionproceeded.

Simplicitywasessential;launchwaslessthanfourdaysawayandcrewtraining,transport, and stowagewould require at least 36 hours.By earlymorning, thegrouphadsettledonanewconfigurationoftwopoles, tobecantileveredfromthe telescopemount.The17-meterpoleswouldbeassembled from11 smallersections.Acontinuous loopofropewouldrun the lengthofeachpole througheyelets at the far end.After the shadewas attached to both ropes, it could bepulledoutmuchasonehoistsaflag.Theheightofthepolesabovetheworkshopcouldbevariedifnecessarytoavoiddebris.27

Blackboards at Marshall Space Flight Center following the skull session that originated the twin-polesunshade,16May1973.MSFC040066,040067.

While Huntsville proceeded with its twin-pole sail, a Houston team wasdeveloping the parasol that would be the first sunshade. Its designer, JackKinzler,hadnotbeenamongtheofficialsinitiallycontactedforideas.AlthoughhisTechnicalServicesDivisionenjoyedareputationforbuildingflightitemsonshortorder,itwasnotapartofHouston’sR&Dengineeringforce.Kinzlerhadapracticalbent,aswellasapersonal interest insavingthemissionforhisclosefriend and neighbor, Pete Conrad. The morning after the launch he begandesigning possible solutions. Having stowed many items in the Apollospacecraft, he was familiar with the weight and size constraints. He waspredisposed to use the scientific airlock since itwould simplify operations forthe crew. He soon hit upon a happy combination of coiled springs andtelescopingrodstoprovidethemeansofdeployingalargecoverthoughasmallporthole.28

Bythe16th,Kinzler’sinspirationwastakingshape.Heattachedaparachutecanopytosometelescopingfishingrodsthatwerefittedinhub-mountedsprings.Springs,poles,andcanopywerethenstowedinacontainerroughlythesizeofthe airlock canister. Kinzler deployed the parasol with strings tied to thetelescoping rods. As the fishing poles extended and locked in a horizontalposition, the attached parachute formed a smooth canopy. DemonstrationsquicklyconvincedHoustonmanagementoftheconcept’smerit,andKinzlerwasencouragedtocontinue.29

SelectionoftheprimeshadewasamajortopicofatelephoneconferenceofSkylabofficialsonthe19th.Thedecisiontodelaythecrew’slaunchthesecondtimehadeliminatedtheSEVAsail’sprincipaladvantage.Flightcontrollershadreservations about it anyway—its deployment would cap a rugged 22-hourlaunch day for the astronauts. Furthermore, the Apollo thrusters mightcontaminate the telescopemount and its solar panels.Medical representativesfavored theparasol,notwanting tochanceanEVAearly in themissionbeforethecrewwasacclimatedtospace.DekeSlaytonstressedthatusingthescientificairlockwas“themostdirectapproachandtheleastdifficult[operation]forthecrew.” Schneider believed Huntsville’s twin-pole sail had the best chance ofsuccess, but Kraft wanted to eliminate it because it was 25 kg overweight.Duringasecondstatusbriefingthatnight,JSC’sdirectorrecommendedfurtherdevelopmentoftheSEVAsailincaseHuntsville’sshouldfailneutral-buoyancytests. The group approved Kinzler’s parasol—Conrad’s preference—placing itaheadofthetwin-polesail.30

Confidentthatitstwin-poleshadewouldworkinspace,theHuntsvillegroupdesigned it for easydeployment in theneutral-buoyancy tank.AsSchweickartrecalled,“our realchallenge…wasconvincingmanagement thatwecoulddoit.”Inseveralinstances“wesetaboutdesigningtheequipment[to]lookgood.”In spiteof the tight schedule,Marshall observed its traditional stepsofdesignand development, including preliminary and critical design reviews, benchchecks,andstaticanddynamicstructural tests.Huntsvilleaimedatcompletingitsshadebythe22d,whenNASAmanagementwouldreviewthedeploymentinthe neutral-buoyancy simulator.A tank test on the 18th confirmed the shade’sfeasibility,butalso indicated that thepolesectionscouldseparateunderstress.Afterthelockingnutwasmodified,theshade’sweightwasreduced,andtefloninsertswere placed in the eyelets to reduce friction, the dress rehearsal in thetankwentoffwithoutahitch.31

The parasol sunshade developed at Johnson Space Center. Details of hardware, above, S-73-26374,-26381, and rigging, left, -26389. Packed into a modified experiment canister, the sunshade would bedeployedthroughthescientificairlock,aboveright.MartinMariettaphoto.Thesketchesshowthestepsindeployment,whichwouldresultinthesunshadebeingheldclosetotheworkshopwall.

Skylabsunshadeparasoldeployedfromscientificairlock31May1973

Thetwin-polesunshadebeingmade,22May1973.108-KSC-73P-323.

InHouston,Kinzler’sparasolwasnearlymadeover.The fiberglass fishingpoles were replaced by stronger aluminum rods, the coiled springs by a “rat-trap”spring.ThecanopyhadtobeenlargedwhenHuntsville’sthermalengineerscalculatedtheexactrequirements.Perhapsthebiggestchangeinvolvedtheshapeoftheframe.Theairlockwasfoundtobeconsiderablyoffcenteroftheareatobe shaded. Since there were distinct advantages in packing and deploying asymmetrical frame, Kinzler designed all four arms to the same length, 6.5meters,lettingtherodsontwosidesextendbeyondtheoff-centercanopy.32

While safety divers look on, Astronaut Jack Lousma erects the twin-pole sunshade over a portion of aworkshopmockup inMarshall’swater tank,22June1973.For theunderwater simulation,nylonnettingwasusedinsteadofthealuminizedfabricthatwouldbeusedtomakethesunshade.Heisstandingonthetelescopemount.73-H-640.

Afterthe17th,DirectorChrisKraftconcentratedmostofJSC’sresourcesontheparasol.Faget’sengineeringdivisionprovideddesignsupportwhileDonaldArabian,programoperationsmanager,directedconfigurationcontrolandtesting.Arabian quickly expanded the parasol team beyond Houston, farming outspecific requirements to North American and Grumman. During the secondweek,heandKinzlersuperviseddevelopment,exercisingjointvetopoweroverchanges. Both men recall a lot of “engineering after the fact.” If somethinglookedlikeitwouldwork,theybuiltitanddesignedthedetailslater.33

Certainbasiccriteriagovernedtheselectionofshadematerial,theforemostbeingitsthermalperformance.Thematerialalsohadtobelightweight,compact,deployable, noncontaminating, and stable over a wide range of temperatures.Materialswereunacceptable if they tendedtoretain theirstowedconfigurationwhen deployed. “What appeared to be a relatively straightforward design

problemtosomeoftheenthusiasticshielddesignersturnedouttobeanightmareof complexity when all the … design criteria were addressed.” A spacesuitmaterialconsistingofnylon,mylar,andaluminumwasselected.Less than0.1mm thick, it met all the criteria but one—nylon had a marked tendency todeteriorate under ultraviolet rays. Deterioration could be reduced by applyingthermal paint to the nylon. The paint added considerable thickness to thematerial—noproblem for theSEVAand twin-pole sails,whosecontainershadroom to spare, but the parasol fitted tightly into a small container. Houstoncanvassedthecountryforinformation,findingnoprecisedataonnylon’slong-termexposure in avacuum,partlybecauseNASAhadavoidedusingnylon inspace.Beforetheendofthefirstweek,Houstonoptedtogowithoutthepaint;thesecondcrewcouldreplacetheparasolifitdeteriorated.34

Huntsvillehadlessconfidenceintheunpaintednylon.Severaldaysaftertheaccident,RobertSchwinghamer’sofficebegantestingJSC’sshadesaspartofaprogramthatinvolvedadozenmaterialsand49tests.After100hoursofsolar-vacuum testing, nylon lost half its pull strength. Houston officials were notgreatly worried by these results or similar findings at their own center; theybelievedtheinnersurface,aluminum,wouldreflectmostoftheheatinanycase.TheHuntsvillestudies,however,showedadeclineinshieldingperformanceaswellasstrength.35

At the design certification review in Huntsville on the 23d, every majoraspectofSkylab’sproblemwascovered,withparticularemphasisonsunshadecandidates and materials testing. Houston’s spokesman summed up the caseagainstnylon:althoughtestresultsvaried,allshowedthematerialdeterioratingin time under exposure to ultraviolet rays. In executive session, Skylab’s topofficials agreed to retain the parasol as their first choice butwith a protectivecovering for the nylon. Houston, anticipating such a decision, had selectedkapton,anultraviolet-resistant tape.The twin-poleandSEVAsails,madefromthe same nylon-reinforced material, would be covered with thermal paint.LangleyResearchCenterwasdirectedtocontinueworkonaninflatabledeviceintheeventthereshouldbeanunexpectedhitchwiththeparasol.36

ThedecisioninHuntsvilleleftJSClessthanadaytomodifyitstwoshades.Wednesday evening crews began applying kapton to the parasol and spray-paintingaSEVAsail.CaldwellJohnson’steamquicklyranintoproblemsonthelatter; contaminants in the paint required a lengthy straining process, and theoven-drying took longer thanexpected.ByThursdaymorning itwasuncertainwhether theSEVAsailwoulddryin timefor thelaunch.Parasolmodificationsproved even more troublesome as the additional bulk of the kapton made

stowagedifficultand releaseevenharder, raisingseriousdoubts that theshadewouldworkinspace.MoraleattheHoustoncenter,atahighpointadayearlier,plummeted. At a final review at Kennedy, the parasol, with its nylonunprotected,wasreconfirmedastheprimarydevice.Theeducatedguessofmostmaterialsexpertswasthatthenylonwouldlastatleast28days.Marshall’stwin-pole shade would be deployed later if the parasol showed signs ofdeterioration.37

InHouston,packingtheparasolproveddifficult,evenwithoutthekapton.Initsfinalconfiguration,theextensionrodwasrecessedmorethanexpected.Kraftnotedthattheastronautswouldhaveadifficulttimeconnectingthesectionsofrod.Theparasolteamagreedtoadda5-cmsleeve.ManufacturingbeganastheparasolwasdeliveredtoEllingtonAirForceBase;thenewpiecefollowedonaseparateflighttotheCape,arrivingjustbeforefinalcloseoutofthespacecraft.38

PLANSTOINCREASESKYLAB’sPOWER

NASA’s immediate electrical problem was to reduce power requirements;but for the long run, more power had to be provided. The ATM and Apolloelectricalsystems,thoughadequateformostofthefirstmission,wouldfallfarshort on the 56-day flights. Schneider putHouston andHuntsville towork onpromising concepts. JSC examined a solar-wingedmodule to dock at the sideportofthedockingadapter;Marshallinvestigatedvariationsofaportablearray.The necessary hardwaremodifications precluded the use of either by the firstcrew, but there was a third option. Telemetry suggested that remnants of themeteoroidshieldstillheldoneof the twoworkshoparrays inplace. Its releasewould solve the problem quickly. The debris might be cleared the first day,duringastandupEVAfromtheApollohatch.Itwasjustahope;Schneidertoldapressconferencethat“we’renottoooptimistic.”Morelikely,NASAwouldhavetosettleforphotographsthatwouldimprovethechancesofdeploymentlater.39

The chief of Marshall’s Auxiliary Equipment Section was given theresponsibility of developing tools to cut away debris. He started with tree-trimming shears from a Huntsville hardware store and then called the A. B.ChanceCompanyofCentralia,Missouri,makerof tools forpowercompanies.ChanceofficialsagreedtodisplaytheircompletelineoftoolsinHuntsvillethefollowingday.Twoitemswereselected:acablecutterandauniversaltoolwithprongs for prying and pulling. Both were modified for mounting on a 3-mpole.40

While the tools were under development, Huntsville’s Space SimulationBranchpreparedaSkylabmockupintheneutral-buoyancytank,completewithloose wires, twisted bolts, and fragments of a meteoroid shield. Close by,supports were installed for a model of the command module, flown in fromHouston.NASAofficialsevaluatedthetoolsonthe21st,andthefollowingdayastronautPaulWeitzpracticedfreeingasolararray.ThetoolshadalreadyleftforKennedywhenthecertificationreviewruledthatthepointedtipsofthecutterswereahazard.Newheadswithblunttipswerequicklypreparedandthechangemadeatthelaunchsite.41

LAUNCHANDDOCKING

Final launchactivitieswere interruptedbya lightning strikeon the servicestructure’smastthatknockedaspacecraftgyroscopeoffline.Theguidanceandnavigation system was quickly retested and the count resumed. The schedulewas alteredwhen the parasol’s delivery became problematic; propellantswereloadedthreehoursearlyandfinalstowagedelayeduntil3:00a.m.Atthathour,thecrewwaspreparingtoboard.42

Liftoffonthemorningof25May1973wasflawless.Bymid-afternoonthecrewhadreachedSkylabandfounditverymuchasexpected.“Solarwingtwoisgonecompletelyoffthebird,”Conradreported.“Solarwingoneis…partiallydeployed….There’sabulgeofmeteoroidshieldunderneathitinthemiddle,andit looks to be holding it down.” Sunlight had blackened the gold foil on theworkshop’sexterior.Moreimportant,thescientificairlockwasvirtuallyfreeofdebris. During the inspection, Weitz had trouble televising the damaged areafromthespacecraft’scrampedquarters,butHoustonacknowledged“someprettyclear views.” Conrad completed the flyaround, optimistic that the crew couldfreethearrayinstandupEVA.43

The astronauts ate dinner before trying to extend the array. Weitzmanipulatedthetoolswhilestandingintheopenhatch,asKerwinheldhislegsandConradmaneuveredthespacecraft.WhenApollopassedovertheCaliforniatracking station 40 minutes later, the crew was having obvious difficulties.Absorbed in their problem, the astronauts were venting their frustration withfour-letter words, while Houston repeatedly tried to remind them thatcommunication had resumed. Conrad’s report was gloomy; the metal stripwrappedacross thearraybeam, thoughonlyacentimeterwide,was riveted inplacebyseveralboltsthathadapparentlyfastenedthemselvestothearrayasthe

shieldtoreaway.Weitzhadpulledthepanelwithallhisstrengthbuttonoavail.Conrad summed up the situation as the spacecraft headed into the earth’sshadow:“Weain’tgoingtodoitwiththetoolswegot.”44

ThejammedsolararrayasseenfromtheApollospacecraftcarryingthefirstcrewtoSkylab,above.SL2-4-272.Acloserview,left,ofthefragmentofthemeteoroidshieldthatheldthesolararrayagainstthesideoftheworkshop.Segmentsofthesolarpanelcanbeseenpartiallydeployed,lowerleft.Thelightergrayarea,lowerright,isareflectionoftheremnantofshieldtrappedbeneaththearray.SL2-1-107.

The crew then expected to end the work day by docking. When Conradattemptedit,however,theprobedidnotengagethedrogue.Hetriedtwobackupprocedureswithnomoresuccess.Flightcontrollersproposeddockingwith thecircuitbreakersopen,butthisalsofailed.By9:00p.m.,thecrewwasdowntoitslastalternative,donningthepressurizedsuitstoattemptanotherrepairbyEVA.WhilepracticingthatemergencyprocedureinHouston,ConradhadjokinglytoldKerwin that if events ever reached that stage, theywere coming home. Facedwitharealproblem,ConradradioedMissionControl,“Wemightaswell…trytheEVA.Becauseifweain’tdockedafterthat,Ithinkyouguyshaverunoutofideas.”45

Theprocedure involveddepressurizing the spacecraft, opening the forwardtunnel hatch, and removing the probe’s back plate to bypass some of theelectricalconnections.Then,centeringtheprobeanddrogue,thecrewusedtheApollo’s thrusters to close on the docking adapter. When the two dockingsurfacesmet,all12latchesproperlyengaged.Whiletheprogrammanagersheldamidnightpressbriefing,thecrewstraighteneduptheApollocabintocloseouta22-hourday.46

ACCOMPLISHINGTHEREPAIR

Despite the first day’s troubles, NASA officials remained optimistic aboutdeployingtheparasol.Thecrewentered theworkshopinmid-afternoonon the26th,havingfirstactivatedthedockingadapterandairlock.Weitzreportedadryheat, “like thedesert.”The crewproceededdeliberately, leaving theworkshoponoccasionforrelieffromtheheat.Theoperationtookabouttwohours.Afterconnectingtheparasolcanistertothescientificairlockandopeningtheport,theastronautsthreadedextensionrodsandgraduallyextendedtheparasol.Whenthefolded arms finally swung outward, spreading the fabric, the crew wasdisappointed.Conradreportedthat“it’snotlaidoutthewayit’ssupposedtobe.”He estimated that the wrinkled canopy covered only about two-thirds of itsintendedarea.AtMissionControl,however,thenewsofacleandeploymentwasgreetedwithcheers.Houstonofficialsbelievedthewrinkleshadsetinduringthecoldof the lengthydeployment (theshadehadbeenextendedbutunopened inthe dark portion of the orbit) and they expected thematerial to stretch in thesunlight.47

Theworkshopcooledconsiderably in thenext threedays.The temperatureon the external surface dropped 55°C overnight. Internal temperatures reactedmoreslowly,falling11°Cthefirstday.Theoutlineoftheparasolcouldbetracedbyrunningahandalongtheworkshopwall;theunevencoveragelefthotspots,including an area near Joe Kerwin’s sleeping compartment. By the 29th,engineershadconcludedthattheworkshopwouldstabilizenear26°C,about5°Cabove thedesired level but still tolerable.Full-scaleoperationsbegan that daywith medical tests, solar observations, and preparations for the initial earth-resourcespass.PowerconsumptionranveryclosetoSkylab’soutputof4.5kw,particularlywhenthecrewoperatedthetelescopemount,whichdrew750watts.At the evening news briefing, Flight Director Neil Hutchinson acknowledgedthat the power limitation was one of several problems complicating the earlyflightplanning.48

The30thbroughtyetanothercrisis.Theearth-resourcemaneuver involvedtakingSkylab’s solar panels out of direct sunlight and relying on batteries forpower. As the spacecraft passed through the earth’s shadow, four batteriesdroppedoffline.Despiterepeatedattempts,flightcontrollerscouldrestoreonlythreeofthemwhentheworkshopreturnedtoitssolarinertialattitude.Theloss,Skylab’s second in aweek, reduced power capacity by another 250watts andraisedseriousdoubtsaboutthesoundnessoftheelectricalsystems.*Onthe31st,theManagementCouncilmovedthelaunchdateforthesecondcrewaheadtwoweeksbecauseoftheworseningconditions.Thegroupdiscussedpossibilitiesoffreeingthesolararrayandset4Juneasthedateforadecision.49

AteamledbyRustySchweickarthadbeenstudyingthesolar-arrayproblemsincethedayafterlaunch.Talkswiththecrewhelpedfillinsomeoftheblurredtelevisedpictures so thatby the29th,Huntsvillehada reasonable facsimileofthejammedarray.Duringthenextfourdays,thegroupdevelopedadifficultbutfeasibleprocedure.Exitingfromtheairlockport, twocrewmenmovedthroughthe airlock trusses to the long antenna boom at the forward edge of theworkshop.Afterattachinganeight-metercablecuttertothedebris,oneastronautusedthepoleasahandrailtoreachthesolararray.Thereheconnectedabeam-erection tether—anylonropewithhooksateachend—between thesolarwingand the airlock shroud; the tether would be used to break a frozen hydraulicdamperonthearrayoncethedebrishadbeenremoved.Themostdifficultaspectoftheoperationwasthelackoffootholdswhichwouldallowtheastronautstowork with both hands. By 2 June, however, Schweickart and Ed Gibson haddemonstratedtheproceduresuccessfullyinthewatertank.Whatcouldbedonetherecouldusuallyberepeatedinspace.50

InHuntsvilleon4June,theManagementCouncilreceivedableakpictureofSkylab’s condition. If no more batteries failed, the first crew could probablycomplete the scheduled experiments.Without some additional power, the nexttwocrewscouldnot.Schweickartreviewedtheproceduretofreethesolararrayandshowedfilmsofhispracticesessioninthetank.Somemembersexpressedreservations.Attaching the cutter to debris eightmeters away seemed a trickymaneuveratbest,andtherewasnoalternatewayofsecuringthepole.Norwasitclearthatthestraprunningoverthesolararraywastheonlythingpreventingitsrelease.Nonetheless,thegroupapprovedtheattempt.Theextravehicularactivitywasnomorehazardous thanotherEVAs, and successpromised largegains inpower.Evenfailuremightprovidevaluableinformationforalaterattempt.51

ThateveningSchweickartgavethecrewabriefdescriptionoftheoperation.After the crewwas asleep, a list of tools, assembly instructions, and detailed

steps followed over the teleprinter. The astronauts reviewed the procedure intheirsparetimeandresolvedafewquestionsduringanhour-longsessionwithHouston the following evening. On the 6th, the crew rehearsed the operationinsidetheworkshop,communicatingwithMissionControlbytelevisionaswellas radio.Kerwin donned his pressure suit for amore realistic simulation, andConrad made several small changes in the beam-erection tether. Neither wasparticularlyoptimisticabouttheirchances.52

ThecrewopenedtheairlockhatchjustbeforeSkylabbeganadarkpassonthemorningof7June.Conradassembledthetoolsunderthelightsoftheairlockshroud,andthetwomenmovedtotheantennaboom.Whenitwaslightenough,Kerwin tried to fasten the cutters.His initial attempts failed. In theHuntsvilletank,Schweickart hadplaced his feet at the base of the antenna; on the flightmodel, cable connectorswere in theway.AsKerwin recalled, “one handwasessentially useless—wrapped around the antenna—and with the other hand Icouldn’t control the pole….Every time youwouldmove it, your bodywouldreactandmovetheotherway.”OnseveraloccasionsKerwingotthejawsofthecutterclosetotherestrainingstrap,onlytohavethepolemoveashebroughthishandfromtheantennatoopenthecutters.WhenHoustonlostcommunicationsat 11:42 a.m., Kerwin had been hard at work over half an hour, his pulsereaching150.ThenKerwinhituponanideathatsavedtheday.Heshortenedthetether that ran from his suit to the antenna by doubling the line, therebyestablishingafirmpositionagainsttheedgeoftheworkshop.TenminuteslaterthecrewnotifiedHoustonthatthepolewasfastenedsecurelytothearray.53

Astronauts and engineers in Marshall’s water tank, late May and early June 1973, experimenting withvariouscuttingtoolsandtechniquesthatmightbeusefulinfreeingthesolararray.MSFC040538,MSFC040555,and73-475.

AstronautRussellSchweickart(atright)andMarshallengineersbeneathasolararraybeam,thepieceofhardwarethathadtobefreedtodeploytheonesolarwingthatremainedontheworkshop.MSFC040493.

Techniqueforfreeingthejammedsolararray.Aftercuttingthedebrisstrap,bothastronautswouldpullonthelinetofreethefrozenactuator.

Although the worst was over, the crew had more problems. At the solararray, Conrad could attach only one of two hooks on the erection tether; theholes on the array were a bit smaller than those on the ground model. Afterstrugglingwiththesecondhookforatime,hedecidedtomakedowithonlyone.Kerwincut therestrainingstrapwithoutmuchtrouble,butreleasing thefrozendamperprovedmoredifficult.Thetwomenworkingtogetherfinallysucceeded.AskedbyHoustonhowthearrayhaddeployed,Conradlaughinglyresponded:

I’msorryyouaskedthatquestion.Iwasfacingawayfromit,heavingwithallmymightandJoewasalsoheavingwithallhismightwhenitletgoandbothofustookoff.…Bythetimewegotsettleddownandlookedatit,thosepanelswereoutasfarastheyweregoingtogoatthetime.

Bythenextdaytheywerefullyextendedandproducingnearly7kwofpower.54

INVESTIGATIONBOARD

Congressional critics were quick to fault NASA for the accident. Senatespace committee chairmanFrankMoss called forNASA to investigate,whichagency policy required in any event. On 22 May, Bruce Lundin, director ofLewis Research Center, was asked to head an inquiry. His committee firstexaminedtheflightdatatoestablishtheeventssurroundingtheaccident.Then,having settled on failure of the meteoroid shield as the primary cause of theaccident, the board reviewed its development in great detail, concentrating onthemanagementaspectsofdesign,fabrication,andtesting.Theinquiryincludedvisits to the threemannedspacecentersandMcDonnellDouglas’sHuntingtonBeachplantbeforethereportwascompletedinearlyJuly.55

TherepairedSkylab.Thesunshade, thoughnot linedupwithparade-groundprecision,quicklymade theworkshoplivable.Thefoursolararraysofthetelescopemountarefullyextended,asisthesurvivingarrayoftheworkshop.Thephotographwastakenbythedepartingfirstcrew.73-H-580.

The board examined 10 ways that the shield might have failed, butconsideredonly2aslikely.Thefirstinvolvedthespacebetweentheedgeoftheshieldandtheworkshopwall.AlthoughNASAhadstipulatedthattheshieldfittightly against the tank, at launch the shield had gaps that exceeded designspecificationsbyhalfacentimeter.Wind-tunneltestsconfirmedthatabuildupofpressure in these spaces could have led to the accident. Flight data, however,pointed toward the shield’s auxiliary tunnel as the probable cause of theaccident.Thetunnel,usedasaconduitforwires,wasdesignedtoventpressureasthelaunchvehiclerosethroughtheatmosphere.Butthetunnelhadnotbeenconstructedasdesigned,andpressurecouldbuildup.56

Lundin’s committee theorized that the pressure may have become highenoughtolifttheshieldintotheairstreamoneminuteafterlaunch.Astheshieldripped away, it wrapped around one solar array and broke the latches on theother. Forces of gravity and aerodynamic drag held the array close to theworkshop for over eightminutes until the spent S-II stage separated from theworkshop.When the stage’s retrorockets fired, theexhaust tore the solar arrayfromitshinge.57

WhyhadNASAandMcDonnellDouglas failed todetect thedeficiency insixyearsofdevelopmentandtesting?TheboardblamedtheerrorinpartonthepresumptionbySkylabengineersthattheshieldwouldfittightly,asspecifiedindesign criteria.The actual shieldproved to be a “large, flexible, limp system”that could not be rigged to design specifications. The committee criticizedNASA’s failure to treat theshieldasa separate systemwithaprojectengineerresponsibleforallitsdetails.Therewasnoevidencethatdevelopmenthadbeencompromised by a lack of time, money, or expertise. Instead, the committeeattributed“thedesigndeficiencies…andthefailuretocommunicatewithintheproject… to an absenceof sound engineering judgment and alert engineeringleadership concerning this particular system over a considerable period oftime.”58

Amongtheboard’sspecific recommendations, threehadbroadsignificanceforNASAmanagement.Onecalledfortheappointmentofaprojectengineeroncomplexitemsthat involvedmore thanoneengineeringdiscipline.Thesecondwarnedagainstundueemphasisondocumentationandformaldetails:“Positivestepsmustalwaysbetakentoassurethatengineersbecomefamiliarwithactualhardware,developanintuitiveunderstandingofcomputer-developedresults,andmakeproductiveuseof flightdata in this learningprocess.”Finally, theboardencouraged the assignment of an experienced chief engineer tomajor projectssuch as the workshop or airlock. Freed from administrative and managerialduties,hewould“spendmostofhistimeinthesubtleintegrationofallelementsofthesystemunderhispurview.”59

* The shield was added to the wet-workshop design in March 1967 when there was still muchuncertaintyaboutmeteoroidhazards(p.55).NASAsubsequentlyplacedtheprobabilityofastrikeatabout1in100.Apuncturewouldnotnecessarilyendthemission,asthecrewcouldpatchholesupto5mmandthenreplenishtheworkshop’satmosphere.

*Thebatteriesweredesignedtodropoutofthesystemwhen80%oftheirchargewasgone.Someofthem,possiblyweakenedbytheheat,stoppedproducingelectricitywhenthechargedroppedbelow50%.Thefailureonthe30thwasinaregulator.Thebatterycouldberecharged,butwouldnotfeedpowerintothelargerelectricalsystem.

15

TheFirstMission

The first crew crammed enough drama into two weeks to last the entireprogram. Aside from the repair, there were controversies regardingcommunicationsandthecrew’shealth.NASA’spublicaffairschiefclashedwiththeOfficeofMannedSpaceFlightoverprivatecommunications—whether theAmerican press should be excluded from air-to-ground discussions aboutoperational and medical problems. The Office of Public Affairs feared thatprivateconversationswouldharmrelationswiththepress;OMSFbelievedthatforbidding private communications could endanger the mission. While thismatterwas debated, crewmen struggledwith the ergometer,Skylab’s principalmeansofexercise.Theydevisedasatisfactorymeansofridingthemachine,butnotbeforethestrenuousactivitycausedamisunderstandingabouttheirhealth.Inthe last twoweeks of operations,with the additional power from the releasedsolararray,theastronautscompletedmostoftheirassignedtasks.

PRIVATECOMMUNICATIONS

Since its earliest days, NASA had prided itself on the openness of itsprograms—insharpcontrasttothesecrecymaintainedbytheSovietUnion.Theagency kept newsmen abreast of missions with transcripts of air-to-groundtransmissions and frequent briefings. The policy worked well until the late1960s, when the press began complaining of a credibility gap. SeveralnewspapersviewedaprivateconversationfromApollo9asamoveawayfromNASA’s open policy; the Washington Post noted that space officials weredebating“howmuchtotellthepublicaboutsomeofthemoreintimatedetailsofspaceflight,”andtheHoustonPostarguedthatthepublichadarighttomedicalinformation about the astronauts. InMarch 1969Administrator Thomas Painereiteratedhissupportforanopenprogramwithprivatecommunicationslimited

to special medical situations or operational emergencies. Any privateconversationwouldbesummarizedforthepress.NASAfollowedanopenpolicyfortheremainderofApollo,althoughHoustonofficialschafedattherestriction,preferringcandiddiscussionswiththeastronautsoveraprivateline.1

ForSkylab,JSCproposedtomodifyagencypractice,justifyingthechangeson the length and the peculiar medical requirements of the program. Theproposal establishedprivatemedical conversationson a daily basis.The flightsurgeonwould inform thepressofanysignificantmedicalnews,but the tapeswould be neither released nor transcribed for the news media. Privateprogrammatic communications were permitted “when a real operational needexisted.”Apublic affairsofficerwouldmonitor anyprivatecommunicationofthis nature and summarize substantive matters for the press. There were alsoprovisions for weekly unmonitored calls between the astronauts and theirfamilies.2

OMSFendorsedtheHoustonplan,notingthatdoctor-patientrelationswereconsideredprivilegedsincemostpeoplewereunwillingtodiscusstheirphysicalconditions openly, and the astronauts were “no exception to this generallyaccepted and widely known situation.” Although the press received medicalinformation on public figures, the bulletins contained only those detailsconsidered appropriate for release; specifics were often withheld. Privatecommunications would help NASA doctors ascertain important preliminarysymptoms, complaints that nearly everyone—including astronauts—wouldignoreunderordinary circumstances.OMSFexpresseddissatisfactionwith thepractice of paraphrasing private medical conversations, citing the Apollo 15experience when NASA managers had wanted information on James Irwin’sirregular heartbeat,* but feared that adverse publicity would threaten theremainingmissions.Atcertaintimes,privatecommunicationwouldbenefit theprogramwithoutdeprivingthepublicofitsrighttoknow.3

JohnDonnelly, assistant administrator for public affairs,moved quickly tohead off any change in policy, informing Administrator James Fletcher inJanuary 1973 that he and OMSF could not agree. Private conversations withfamilies posed no problems, but Donnelly strongly opposed routine medicalconferencesonaprivate loop.“Itseemstometheconditionof themenin themachines isasmuch, ifnotmore,ofanewselement than theconditionof themachines—particularlyonamissionlikeSkylab.”Donnellydoubtedthatprivatemedical communications would encourage astronauts to report “freely andhonestly their physical condition.” Pilots were in general reluctant to admitproblems that might shorten a mission or make themmore dependent on the

ground. He personally doubted that a private line would improvecommunications and feared the point would cloud the real issue: “Should theagencyabandon a successful and respected policywhich haswonworld-wideacclaim…?”4

InMarch1973Fletcheradoptedacompromisethatallowedroutinemedicaldiscussionsoveraprivateline.Conversationswouldnotbeparaphrased,buttheflight surgeon would provide newsmen with summary bulletins. Theadministrator also approvedprivateoperational communications “inmattersofextremeemergency.”Thecallscouldbeinitiatedbyflightcontrollersorthecrewandwouldbeparaphrasedforthepressbythepublicaffairsoffice.5

Thenewpolicywas tested less than aweek after launchof the first crew.PeteConrad shared the dislike ofmanyHouston officials for the open policy.While acknowledging the public’s right to know about NASA decisions, hebelievedthatdiscussionsleadingtosuchdecisionsshouldbeprivate.Lateon28May, Conrad asked for a private conversation the followingmorning, saying,“It’s not [garbled] any emergency right now.” Several NASA officials wererousedfrombedtodiscussthecommander’srequest.Despitetheprotestsofthepublic affairs office, Schneider approved a private loop. Donnelly wanted thecrewremindedthataprivatecommunicationrequiredanemergency,butDeputyAdministratorGeorgeLowturneddownthesuggestion.6

Theprivatecommunicationonthe29thwidenedtheriftbetweenOMSFandthepublicaffairsoffice.Conradbeganbyapologizingfor thedifficultyhehadexperienced riding the bicycle ergometer (see pp. 284–86). From there, theconversationmovedtootherproblemsincludingthesolararray,dockingprobe,and workshop temperatures. Conrad expressed surprise that the mission wasgoingsowellandreportedthecrew“ingoodshape.”Whennewsmenreceivedasummary an hour later, they questioned whether an emergency had reallyexisted. Donnelly publicly stated that the situation had not justified a privatecommunicationandthatgroundpersonnelhaderredinarrangingone.Privately,he sought to release the tape of the conversation and have Conrad formallyreprimanded. Although neither action was carried out, Dale Myers agreed tohavethecapsulecommunicatorinMissionControlaskthecrewifanemergencyexistedbeforearranginganotherprivatecommunication.7

Asecondcontroversythatdayconcernedtheinformationrecordedonboardandrelayedtothegroundatintervals.Thismaterialwascalled“channelBdumpdata” to distinguish it from live air-to-ground conversations over the primarychannel. In February, Conrad had mistakenly told a press conference thatnewsmenwouldreceivetranscriptions,althoughtheagencyactuallyplannedto

treattherecordingsasconfidential.Thematterwasforgottenuntilthe29thwhenthe availability of the tapes became an issue.AtDonnelly’s insistence,Myersinitiallyagreed toreleaseallchannelBdata,but thenexcludedinformationonmedical experiments: Houston’s doctors did not want sensitive medical datareleased to the public lest laymen draw erroneous conclusions. Donnellyappealed to Low, arguing for the release of all channel Bmaterial to allay a“climate of mistrust.” He cited a possible challenge under the Freedom ofInformationActandconcluded,“Itisabadideatocensorthistypeofmaterialbecause it calls intoquestion thecompletenessofeverythingelseweputout.”Low honored the doctors’ request, however, pending a full discussion withFletcher.8

On the 31st, the administrator rescinded the requirement that MissionControl question the crew about the seriousness of an operational problem,fearing that such questioning might inhibit the crew from raising matters ofconcern.InapressreleaseFletchersaid,“Wedonotwant torisk thesafetyoftheflightbyhavingtheastronautsinfer,fromourquestions,thattheyshouldnotuse the private communications loop when a real need might exist.” Thewording reflectedGeorge Low’s view that “extreme operational emergencies”includedanymatterof“realconcern”tothecrewthatcouldnotberesolvedoveranopenline.FletcheralsoapprovedMyers’srefusaltoreleasemedicaldataonthechannelB tapes; thepracticewas inkeepingwithNASA traditionand theinformation had been promised to the medical investigators on a proprietarybasis.9

Fletcher’spressreleaseclarifiedNASApolicy,butdidnotsettletheissueofprivatecommunications.DonnellyremainedsuspiciousofhisNASAassociatesandfearfulofacredibilitygap.Afterthelaunchofthesecondcrew,hewarnedFletcher that reporters forTime, theNewYorkTimes, and theChicagoTribunewere unhappy about deviations from the traditional open policy. Theserepresentativeswereparticularlyconcernedthatthetrendtowardroutineprivateconversations would weaken their negotiating position with the Soviet Unionregarding communications for the Apollo-Soyuz flight. Donnelly’s aggressivedefenseofthenewsmen’sinterestmayhaveaffectedhisowncredibilitywithinNASA,because thepress didnot appear that concerned—at least not in print.AbsorbedwithWatergate,newspapersgaveSkylabrelativelylittleattention,andmost coverage focused on the crews’ success; little waswritten about privatecommunications.10

Withoneexception,Skylabcrewsavoidedprivateoperationalconversationsafter29May,perhapsfromfearoffurthercontroversy.Conrad,forone,believed

the lack of a private line inhibited communications. After the mission hecomplained “that all too often he was left in the dark” concerning Houston’splans. He cited, as an example, learning from his wife, during a birthdaygreeting, aboutEVAplans to free the solar array.He acknowledged thatmoreinformationcouldpassoveropenlines,butthoughtthatHoustonofficialswouldbemorecandidoveraprivatechannel.Thelackofaprivateoperationalchannelhad little apparent adverse affect on the first twomissions; on the last flight,however,theopenpolicywouldcontributetothepoorcommunicationsbetweenHouston and the crew. In the issue of private communications, the agency’spolitical interest ran counter to its operational needs, and no satisfactorycompromisewasachieved.11

PHYSICALFITNESSINSPACENASA’s astronauts and doctors had disagreed about medical experiments

sinceGeminidays.Astronauts felt theywerebeing treated likeguineapigs inwhat were often viewed as unnecessary experiments.Mike Collins called theinflightsleepanalysisexperimentonGemini7“aclassiccaseofthetailwaggingthe dog, with decisions to be made by the wrong people (the medics) in thewrong place (the ground) with the wrong information (brain waves).” Themedicaldirectorate,ontheotherhand,vieweditsexperimentsasakeyelementof manned spaceflight and insisted on rigid controls. Dr. Charles Berryacknowledgedthatmostagencymanagers,aswellasastronauts,consideredhisstaff“overcautious”;buthebelievedthecautionwasjustified.NASAwasundersubstantialpressurefromcriticsofmannedspaceflight,anditwasimportanttomakesoundjudgmentsabouttheastronauts’adjustmenttospace.12

Physical exercise was one of the activities disputed by the two groups.Doctorswanted to control exercisebefore andduring amissionbecauseof itsmedical implications; ideally they would measure all physical activity.Astronautsobjectedtorigidcontrolsbecauseofpersonalinconvenience,aswellas abelief that theycouldbest judge theirneed for exercise.Thecompromiseworked out, for Skylabmade no attempt to regulate all exercise; themedicaloffice settled for periodicmeasurements of physical condition. Daily exercisewaslefttotheindividualastronauts,withtheunderstandingthatcrewmemberswouldreporthowlongandhardtheyhadworked.Theergometer,theprincipalexercisemachine,providedameansofgaugingtheworkload.13

Kerwin in the lower-body negative-pressure experimentM092.Weitz is helping him attach sensors. Thepurposeoftheexperimentwastoprovideinformationconcerningcardiovascularadaptationinspaceandimpairmentofphysicalcapacityuponreturntoearth.SL2-2-180.

Thefirstcrewwasallowed,bytheflightplan,30minutesadayforexerciseon either the ergometer or an isometric device. Twice a week each crewmantested his physiological response to exercise by performing the metabolicexperiment,M171.Morespecifically,Ml71measuredthechangesinmetabolicresponse to work, charting blood pressure and heart rate as well as oxygenconsumption.* There were five periods to the 25-minute test: a rest phase toestablishthemetabolicrate;threeperiodsofexerciseat25%,50%,and75%ofthecrewman’smaximumcapacityforwork(determinedinpreflighttests);andarecoveryphase.AsecondarypurposeofMl71wastoevaluatetheergometerasan exerciser for long-duration flights. During the lunar missions, the crew’sability to exercise had been limited by the size of the Apollo spacecraft, andmost astronauts had shown a decline in physical conditioning. The loss wastemporary (within 36 hours they normally returned to preflight levels ofexercise),butitindicatedapotentialdangerforlong-termflight.14

Problems with the ergometer surfaced during Weitz’s first run of the

metabolicexperimenton28May.Becauseoftheheatintheworkshop,Kerwinhad recommended shortening the schedule forM171.Houston encouraged thecrew to attempt the entire exercise, since deviation would affect experimentcontrols.Midwaythroughthethirdleveloftheexercise,however,Weitzcalleditquits.Thewaist and shoulderharness—intended to secure the astronaut to thebicycle—wasrestrictinghismovement.Weitzfoundthathewasdoingtoomuchof theworkwithhis hands, not enoughwithhis big legmuscles.† During theprivate communication on the 29th, Conrad reported that the ergometer couldnotberiddeninspaceasithadbeenonearthandquestionedwhetherthecrewcouldfinish thefull regimen.Afewhours later,Kerwin toofailed tocompletethe exercise. Conrad persisted to the end but compared the third level to “20minutesofafullworkload.”HetoldMissionControl:“Iwasreallyrunningoutofgas.Andyet,IwasusingmusclesthatIdon’tnormallyuseontheground.”The crew recommended lowering the workload (amount of resistance in theergometer pedals) by 10–20% to compensate for the difficulty of riding inspace.15

Conradridingtheergometerastheexperiment’sprincipalinvestigatorhadenvisaged,above, SL2-8-714,andinhisownzero-gadaptation,right.SL2-9-742.

Theinitialproblemsonthebicyclewereaggravatedbyatightschedulethatreduced the crew’s physical exercise. On 31 May Kerwin complained thatHouston’sflightplanwaseffectivelyeliminatingtheperiodofphysicalactivity:“It’s been scheduled strictly on paper, as far aswe’re concerned, because theother scheduled tasks have taken so much time that they have completelyabsorbed and wiped out PT [physical training].” Too often exercise wasscheduledjustbeforeorafteramajoractivityhavingafixedtimerequirement.KerwinconsideredthisaseriousmistakeandhopedthatMissionControlwouldgivetheexerciseperiod“priorityovermostotherobjectives.”16

Duringthesecondweek,thecrewexperimentedwithdifferentpositionsontheergometer,eventuallydiscardingtheharnessaltogether.Theastronautsfound

that they could stabilize themselves by locking their triangular cleats into thepedals and placing their hands against the ceiling or on the handlebars.According toWeitz, itwas “a revelation… it’s somuch easier than strappingyourselfdown.”Conraddisplayedaknack for“armergometry,”pedalingwithhishandswhilehisfeetpressedagainsttheceiling.Afterdiscardingtheharness,andaftertheworkshophadcooleddown,thecrewreturnedtopreflightlevelsofexercise.Atapressconferenceon6June,EdwardMichel,principalinvestigatorforMl71,acknowledgedthateliminationoftheharnessaffectedthecontrolsforhis experiment just as the first week’s excessive heat would have to beconsidered in assessing the initial runs.He seemed relieved, however, that thecrewhadfoundawaytoridetheergometer.17

On4June thecrewbeganplans to free the solararray,confident that theyhad resolved their difficulties on the ergometer. Houston’s doctors weredisturbed,however,bytheinitialresultsfromtheMl71experiment.Pulserateshadrunabnormallyhigh,andConradshowedaseriesofheartpalpitations.*Themedicalofficehadsaidnothingaboutthemattertothepressorthecrew;infact,thedoctorshadnotknownthedetailsforseveraldaysbecauseofdelaysintheflowof data. They attributed the high rates to the heat and harness, but somethought theymightbeseeingearlyeffectsofweightlessness.ThedoctorswereparticularlyanxioustoretestConradbeforeheattemptedextravehicularactivity.ThateveningCharlesRoss,thecrew’sphysician,toldConradabouttheproblemandsaidthatHoustonwasmakingspecialplansforhisM171runthenextday,scheduling the experiment over North American tracking stations so that themedical office could receive the data quickly. The doctors recommended thatConrad reduce hismaximumworkload. If he showed further palpitations, thedoctors wanted him to avoid strenuous exercise—including the extravehicularactivity.18

Dr.Kerwingivingphysicalexaminationtothecommanderofthefirstcrew.SL2-2-157.

The crew was taken aback, believing that the doctors had overreacted tooutdatedinformation.ConradwasparticularlyupsetbyHouston’sfailuretoaskDr.Kerwinorhimselfforapersonalevaluation.BeforehisM171runonthe5th,Conradrequestedaprivatecommunicationtoclarifythemedicalsituation.Overthe private line, the crew told Skylab officials that they were in excellentconditionandwantedtoexerciseasmuchaspossible.Kraftexpressedregretatthe apparent misunderstanding and assured the crew that there was no doubtabouttheirgoodhealth.Infactthemedicalofficehadaltereditsplansincethepreviousevening,buthadnottoldthecrew.ThenewinstructionslefttheMl71workloadtothecrew’sdiscretion.19

The matter was closed that afternoon when Conrad ran the full Ml71protocolwithoutdifficulty.Therewerenoattempts thereafter toplaydowntheimportanceofexercise.Conradwouldlaterdescribetheincidentas“averykeythinginthewholeflight.”Attheendofthemissionhewasinbetterconditionthanhiscrewmates,presumablybecauseofhishigher levelofexercise.At thefirst crew’surging,Houston increasedphysicalactivityon latermissions,withbeneficialresults.20

FLIGHTPLANNING:THEASTRONAUTS’VIEW

The astronauts found the first week’s schedule too demanding. On sometasks there was little difference between operating the trainer and the flightmodel;butotheractivities,suchashandlingsmall itemsor locatingequipmentinstowage,tookmuchlongerinzerogravitythanexpected.Althoughadditionaltimehadbeenallowedforthemtobecomeacclimated,theastronautsranbehindschedule(aswouldthelatercrews,atthestart).Theproblemwascompoundedon the first mission by inex perience at Mission Control. Skylab operationsrepresented a considerable change fromApollo, and coordination occasionallyfalteredduringthefirstweek.21

The men spent the first three days activating the hot workshop. Theyadjustedtospacequitewell,showingnosignofmotionsickness,butfoundthepacefatiguing.Whenoperationsbeganonthe29th, theastronautsworkedpastdinner to complete their assignments. After a second hectic day, Conradconcludedthattheschedulewasunrealistic:“Weweretryingtodoitall…andweregettinginefficientbyrushing.”HeinformedMissionControlthatthecrewwas“runningallover thespacecraft,”and that therewere“enoughguysdownthere to thinkout the flightplana littlebetter thanyou’redoing.”On the31stConrad offered a number of planning suggestions: allotting more time forhousekeepingand individualexperiments, schedulingonecrewman toperformanentireprocedure,andminimizingthelossoftimebetweenexperiments.22

A holiday on 1 June gave the crew a chance to relax and catch up onhousekeeping chores. During a 15-minute telecast, the astronauts performedacrobaticfeatsandtheirown“Skylab500.”ConradhadwageredsomeHoustonfriends before launch that centrifugal force would allow him to overcomeweightlessnessandwalkerectonthestoragelockersthatcircledtheupperdeckoftheworkshop.Startingontheirhandsandkneesinaslowcrawl,theybuiltupspeed andmoved to a crouch, then finallywalked rapidly on the lockers.Thetelevisionpicturesprovidedtheproof.23

Much of the second week was spent on freeing the solar wing. The fullschedule of experiments was resumed on the 9th, following a day ofhousekeepingandrelaxation.Aftertheexcitementofthefirsttwoweeks,normaloperationsseemedhumdrum;Kerwinrecalledoneeveningwhen“itseemedlikeithadbeenday18foraweek.”Astheastronautsadjustedtotheirsurroundings,theyfrequentlyfoundthemselvesaheadofschedule.Theydecidednottoaskformorework,however;preparationsforthereturntoearthwouldtakeupmuchofthe last week, and they did not want to set unrealistic standards for the next

crew.24

FLIGHTPLANNING:THEINVESTIGATORS’VIEW

Skylab’s first three weeks in space was a trying time for the principalinvestigators.For10daystheyfacedthepossiblelossofyearsofwork.Afterthecrew’s launch, the shortage of electricity caused further anxiety, and manyscientists viewed each day as the last chance to gather data. “The risk of themissionbeingcutshort,”JohnDisher recalled,“wasabigfactor in thealmostfrantic approach of some … experimenters.” If anything, the problem wasacerbatedbytheapparentqualityofthescience.Theinvestigatorswerepleasedwith the initialdata,but asRobertParker,programscientist,put it, “They feltstarvedforit.”Fewscientiststhoughttheyweregettingtheirrightfulshareoftheflight plan, and Parker (who had assumed responsibility for schedulingexperiments just a fewmonths earlier)didnot enjoy their trust.Consequently,“mostofthemthoughttheirexperimentwastheonlyonethathadbeenreducedinscope.”KarlHenize,ascientist-astronautandinvestigatorforanexperimentinstellarastronomy,recalledafeelingoffrustrationborderingonparanoia:“Younever quite knewwhat the otherman’s problemswere, andyou’dput in yourrequirements and you’d get them back allmangled…. everybodywasmad ateachother.”25

Kerwin strapped into his sleep restraint and wearing the instrumented cap for the sleep-monitoringexperimentMl33,whichevaluatedthequantityandqualityofsleepduringprolongedspaceflight. SL2-3-205.

The return of full electrical power did little to ease scheduling pressure.Investigatorswereanxioustomakeupthetimelostindeployingtheparasolandsolararray—about15%ofthetimeallottedforscience.Atanewsbriefingon8June,Parkerlikenedhisproblemtocrammingasize10footintoasize8shoe:something had to give.Medical experiments retained their priority; during thelasttwoweeksthecrewactuallyincreasedthefrequencyofcardiovascularandmetabolic tests. The earth-resource experiments, hard hit by the initial powershortage,weregivenahighpriority,aswerethesolarobservations.Conversely,the corollary experiments took a lower priority. Parker tried, however, to giveeveryone some time in the flightplan.Bymission’s endon22 June, the crewhad reduced the shortfall of experiment hours, meeting nearly 100% of themedical requirements and 80% of the solar observations. Earth resourcesremainedthehardesthitofthemajorexperiments;becauseoftheshortenedrunsduring the firsthalfof themission, thecrewconductedonly60%of thework

programmedforthatarea.*26

ConradandWeitzworkingwiththematerials-processingfacilityM512.SL2-9-738.

While most scientists expressed satisfaction with the results of the firstmission, some investigators, according to Parker, “felt they had really gottengypped.”Thegeneralmoodwas“thattheyhadputanawfullotoftheirtimeandNASA’smoneyintogettingverylittledata,andthey’dbetterjollywellgetmoretime… in the nextmission.”During the next twomissions, Parker sought toplacate his colleagues with periodic planning sessions. The meetings provedhelpful, allowing the investigators to gain an appreciation for each other’sproblems.Evenmorehelpfulinalleviatingdiscontent,however,wasthesteady

streamofdatafromSkylab.27

THELONG-AWAITEDSOLARFLARE

Withitsvariousswitches,monitors,andchecklists,theconsoleforthesolartelescopes was a complicated station. After working with it some time, oneastronaut concluded, “there’s no way to go very long … without making amistake, you just hope that you don’t make any that are too large.” Kerwinacknowledgedalotofmistakesonthefirstmission,attributingmostofthemtofrequent interruptions.“Wenevergot tobuckledowninto theATMroutineupthere,atleastnotformorethanafewdaysatatime.”28

Oneof thebiggest problemswith theATMconsolewas its flare detectionsystem.Designedtoalertthecrewifasolarflaredevelopedwhilenoonewasattheconsole,itfrequentlywentoffastheworkshoppassedovertheeasternpartof South America, where the earth’s radiation belt dips much lower. Themagnetic field triggered the flare alarm whenever the crew left the systemrunning.Kerwin later recalledhis frustrationswith thedetector: “Every time Ileft thealarmon, itwasn’t5minutesuntil thealarmsounded.Thensomebodyhadtobreakloosefromwhathewasdoing,gouptotheATMconsole,andturnitoff….Ineverrealizedthat[theSouthAtlanticanomaly]wassoubiquitous.”Allowing forexaggeration, the falsealarmswerea frequentdisturbancewhichthecrewmenputupwithtocatchaflare.Kerwin’seagerness,infact,provedanearlyembarrassment.On30May,reactingquicklytoanalarm,heforgotthathewas over the South Atlantic and started the procedure for recording a flare;fortunatelyhe realizedwhathadhappenedbeforehewastedmuchfilm.WhileKerwingracefully accepted the teasing about hismistake, the incident did notincreasehisenthusiasmforthealarmsystem.Afterthemission,heevaluateditas“absolutelyworthless.”29

Forthreeweeks, thefirstcrew’shopesforaflarewentunfulfilled; thenon15 June persistencewas rewarded.The astronauts had agreed to give up theirfree day to make up lost time on the experiments, but the outlook for solaractivity was not promising. Houston reported a few subnormal flares and apossibility of more action, to which Kerwin responded: “We’d like somesupernormalflares,please.”Fivehourslaterthemission’sfirstgood-sizedflarewasspotted.KerwintoldHouston:“I’dlike…youtobethefirsttoknowthatthepilot[PaulWeitz]istheproudfatherofagenuineflare.”ThesolarscientistswereextremelypleasedthatWeitzhadtrackedtheflarethroughtwominutesof

itsrisingportionandthesubsequentfall,ataskthatinvolvedmonitoringseveraldisplaystoconfirmthesolaractivity,initiatingseveralflareprograms,andthenpinpointingtheflarewiththesolartelescopes—allwithinamatterofseconds.30

AnydisappointmentthatthecrewmayhavefeltaboutitsATMworkwasnotshared by the principal investigators. During the course of Skylab’sdevelopment, solar scientists had been, at times, among the program’s mostvocalcritics.Manynotedastronomersquestionedthewisdom—atleastthecost—of manning solar telescopes in space (p. 81). This attitude changeddramaticallyastheresultsbeganarriving.31

CRITIQUEOFTHEFIRSTMISSION

ThecrewgaveSkylabhighmarks in thepostflightdebriefings.Witha fewexceptions, experiment hardware worked satisfactorily. The multispectralscanner(oneoftheearth-resourceinstruments)causedWeitzmuchunhappiness.“Adjusting the focuscompletelymessedup thealignment.More thanoncewelostthealignmentcompletely.Itjustdroppedoffthebottomofthescale.”Asaresult,3ofthe12passeswiththemultispectralscannerwereofmarginalquality.All three crewmen complained about calibrating the body-mass measuringdevice. Each astronaut’s weight was determined daily by measuring theoscillatoryfrequencyofaspring-mountedchair.Threetimesduringthemissionthedevicewascalibrated,usingobjectsofknownmass;theproblemwasgettingthe items—in particular, several heavy batteries—to stay in place during thecalibration. For the most part, however, hardware performance surpassed thecrew’sexpectations.32

The crewgave the support teammany compliments.Weitz “could not sayenough about the high-fidelity trainers,” and Kerwin noted that trainingpersonnel had even “put in the failures and the sticky parts.”Most checklistsworked well, except for inflight changes; there was no easy way to catalogteleprintermessagesforlaterreference.Conradrecommendedthatthenextcrewtake notebooks and keep teleprintermessages in a permanent file. Channel Bcommunications also needed improvement; when the astronauts replied toqueries, their answers—sent down over the secondary channel—sometimesdisappearedfordays.33

If the astronauts were satisfied with Skylab as a home, they could notrecommend it as a restaurant. Food seemed to lose its flavor; bread that hadtasted“verygood”inHoustonwas“verymuchdifferentand…worsetasting”

in space. Generally, the astronauts’ preferences remained the same. Weitz’scommentwastypical:“ThefoodsIlikedIcontinuedtolike.ThefoodsIdidn’tlike,mydislikeforthemincreased.”Onenoticeabledifferencewasthedesireforspicyfoods,whichtheastronautsattributedtotheirlossoftasteandsmell.(Thecrewmen’s senseswere probably dulled by head congestion, a result of bloodpoolingintheupperregionsofthebody.)Germanpotatosalad,longonvinegarandonions,provedsopopularthatthecrewusedupallfourcansonboard.Asfor categories of food, the frozen foods were rated most acceptable and thereconstituted items the least satisfactory. Conrad recommended that the nextcrew take some spicier foods along and allow more time to reconstitute thedehydrated items. “I found that if I reconstituted the peas, the beans, and theasparagusearly,andthenreheatedthem,Istilldidn’tlikethem,buttheywerealoteasiertochokedownthanwhenIaddedthehotwater,shookupthebagandthentriedtogetthemdown.”34

AlanL.Bean,commanderofthesecondcrew,onthebody-massmeasuringequipmentofexperimentM172.73-H-974.

Conradturnsbarber,Weitzholdsavacuumhose.Notehowthefoodtrayswereattachedtothesidesofthesmallgalleytable.Themuch-debatedwardroomwindowisinthebackground.SL2-9-755.

Matters weremade worse by the astronauts’ rigid diet; with fixedmenus,they knew when to expect the undesirable foods. The diets provided somevariety,butnotenough.Kerwinrecalled that“foods thatwedidpickwerenotpalatabletouswhentakenrepeatedly,partlybecausewejustdidn’teatthatkindoffoodthatoften.”Herecommendedthatfutureprogramsuseaplanoriginallyconsidered for Skylab, in which categories of food were defined and itemswithinacategorywereinterchangeable.35

Despite the shortcomings of the cuisine, the crew obviously enjoyed theflight.Whereelsecouldoneperformsuchacrobaticsorenjoysuchamarvelousview?Moreover, the mission had been a huge success. Despite personal andmechanical problems, ground and flight crews had persevered. The lastextravehicularactivityprovidedafittingclimax.Theprimarygoalhadbeen toreplaceATMfilm;asasecondaryobjectiveHoustonwantedtotrytoreactivateoneofthedeadpowermodulesontheelectricalsystem(p.258).Afterreviewingtestresults,Huntsvilleengineershadconcludedthatarelaywasstuckandthatablow to the battery housing would free it. Following instructions sent up byteleprinter, Conrad jarred the housing smartly with a hammer, and withinminuteselectricitywasflowingagain.36

Themedicalexperimentsdidnotendwithreturntoearth.HereKerwinundergoesonemorecheckaboardU.S.S.Ticonderoga,22June1973.73-H-544.

1.PREFLIGHTHISTORYHASINDICATEDPASTRELAYHANG-UPSWHICHHAVEBEENFREEDBYMECHANICALLYSHOCKINGTHERELAY.

2. RECOMMENDED PROCEDURE IS TO STRIKE THE CBRMHOUSING AT THE POINT INDICATED BELOW. TESTSINDICATETHATYOUCANNOTHITTHECBRMHARDENOUGHTODAMAGEIT.

3. DIAGRAM BELOW IS DETAIL OF CBRM. LOCATION WRT CENTER WORK STATION IS SHOWN IN ATMSCHEMATICSBOOK,DIAGRAM5.9,LOCATIONL5.

5.CODE =ALLENHEADSCREWSONRAISEDPORTIONOFCBRM.

=ALLENHEADSCREWONWHICHTOPOUND.

Teleprintermessage sent to first Skylab crew, giving instructions for repair of charger-battery-regulatormoduleduringextravehicularactivity.

*Thisoccurredinlunarorbit,followingthreetiringdaysonthemoon.NASAdoctorslaterattributedtheexcessivefatiguetoalowlevelofpotassium.

*ManyreaderswillrecognizeMl71asanaerobicexercise.Aerobic,“livinginair,”inthelastdecadehastakenontheadditionalmeaningofphysicalactivity that increasesheartandrespiratoryactivityforasustainedperiodoftime.

† Caldwell Johnson had argued that the ergometer would not work in space and had provided analternatedesign.Whyitwasrejectedisnotcompletelyclear.

* In a press conference on 5 June,Dr.RoyceHawkins describedConrad’s condition as a prematureventricularcontraction,butindicatedthattheconditionwasnotuncommon.

*Understandably,NASAofficialsstressedtheamountofworkaccomplishedratherthantheshortfall.Thefirstcrewtook29000picturesofthesunand14kilometersofmagnetictapeforearthresources.Seechap.18foradetailedtreatmentofresults.

16

TheSecondMission

The succession of battery and gyroscope failures early in themission hadraisedseriousdoubtswhetherSkylabcouldsurvivetwomonthswithoutacrew.Afterdetermining that themedical office and the launchcenter couldmeet anearlierdate,launchofthesecondcrewwasadvancedthreeweeks.1

Thelaunchon28July1973waswithoutincident,butthecrewencounteredseriousproblems in space.All threemensuffered frommotionsickness to theextent that they fell significantly behind schedule. Several mechanicaldifficultiesalsothreatenedtocutthemissionshort,butallwereresolved.Intheend, the second crew, determined to make up for a slow start, becameoverachievers.

MOTIONSICKNESSWhileadjustingtoweightlessness,anumberofastronautshadbeenafflicted

bymotionsickness.Althoughthe19AmericanswhohadflowninMercuryandGemini had been immune to the poorly understood malady, almost half theSovietcosmonauts,flyingintheslightlylargerVostokandVoskhodspacecraft,hadsufferedfromit.WiththestartofApollo,theAmericanslosttheirimmunity;9 of 29 astronauts had motion sickness in that program, with nausea andvomiting persisting in some cases for several days. Because the problemwasoccurringinthelargervehicles,somedoctorsbelievedtheincreasedfreedomofmovement—particularlyheadmovement—broughtonthemalady.Ithadbeenapleasant surprise, therefore, when the first Skylab crew remained free frommotion sickness.Conradcautionedagainstundueoptimismduringapostflightpressconference,predictingthatfutureastronautscould“experiencesomeformof…motiondisturbancethatmay…takemorethanafewsecondstogetusedto.”2

Hiswarningwasborneoutlessthananhourafterlaunchofthesecondcrew,when pilot Jack Lousma complained of nausea. A capsule of scopolamine–dextroamphetamine,amedicationthatblocksthenerveendingstothestomach,provided some relief, and he managed to eat lunch. The illness returned ingreater intensity that afternoonas thecrewbeganactivating theworkshop.By6:00p.m.allthreemenwereexperiencingmotionsickness,Lousmatheworst.3

ThesecondcrewphotographedSkylab’sdockingport,28July1973.SL3-114-1660.

Theyshowednoimprovement thenextmorning;breakfastwenthalf-eaten.At 8:30 a.m. Bean reported, “Although we’re moving around getting thingsdone,we’renotdoing themasrapidlyaswe’d like to.”At lunchtimethecrewstill hadno appetite, and the commander requested a break so that they could“get in the bunk and just stay still for awhile.” He also asked Houston toconsider giving them the next day off. Mission Control agreed to themidafternoonrest,butthecrewhadtospendmostofthetimetryingtoresolvean electrical problem in the spacecraft. That evening the astronauts had fallennearlyafulldaybehindschedule;NASAofficialspostponedaplannedEVAforatleastoneday.4

InHouston,thecrew’sconditiontouchedoffadisputeastothebestcurefor

theillness.Dr.AshtonGraybiel,principalinvestigatorforexperimentM131,hadfoundthatsubjectsadjustedtoaslowlyrotatingroommorequicklywhentheymade rapid head movements, as compared to remaining still. He wanted thecrew to conduct a series of headmovements three times a day—30 to 40 perminutefor10minutesatatime—andwarnedthattheastronautswouldnotgetwell by resting. Graybiel had Dr. Berry’s support, but a number of Houstonofficials(mostof themfromoutside themedicaloffice)wereopenlyskeptical.After the second day, Houston asked the crew to continue activation tasks attheirownpaceandalsotry theheadmovements.Theastronautsundertooktheexercises reluctantly, since movement increased their nausea; on the 30thGarriottworkedthroughtheexercisestwiceandBeanonce.Lousmaavoidedtheexercisesaltogether.5

Although the worst of the illness was over by the third day, activationproblemskeptthecrewbehindschedule.Beanblamedmuchoftheirtroubleonunscheduled tasks. “Weseem toendupwithaboutasmanynewchores…asold….We’re having difficulty progressing because we’re doing other work.”That afternoon the astronauts spent five man-hours troubleshooting theworkshop’s dehumidifier and another hour repairing the urine separator. Timewasalsolostsearchingforpersonal items.AsBeanremarked,“Everytimeyougotodosomethinglikegetyourkitoutandshave,youfindtherearenoshaverheadsthere,andyouhavetogohunt…somewhere.”Aftertheflighthewouldattributemuchof the sickness to the firstweek’shecticpace. “Whileweweredoing activation … the whole thing was hustle all the time…. Half of theproblemwehad[in]adaptingtomotionsicknesswascausedbythefactwewerenot eating on time, we were not getting to bed on time, and we were notexercising.”Forfutureflights,Beanrecommendedthatmealsandrestbegivenpriorityoveractivationrequirements,takingadayortwolongerifnecessary.6

Theastronauts feltmuchbetterby1August; a telecast toMissionControlshowed them at lunch, obviously in high spirits. Bean demonstrated hisproficiencyateatingwhilehangingupsidedownandLousmareportedthat“thefood tasteda lotbetter.”Themealwasoneofsix thecrewateduring theday.Since the astronauts had experienced themost discomfort with full stomachs,Houstondoctorsrecommendedmore,smallermeals.ThatafternoonLousmahadonlymilddizzinessdoingexperimentM131,andGarriottcompletedthefirstrunon the ergometer and lower-body negative-pressure device. By evening, themedicalofficehadgiventhegreenlightforEVAon4August.7

NASAofficialswereperplexedbythemotionsicknessandworriedaboutitsimpact on future programs. Individual astronauts had fallen ill on previous

flights but never an entire crew. Furthermore the astronauts’ response did notmatchpreviousperformance.Beanhadflowntothemoonwithoutasymptom,andLousmahadshownastrong resistance tomotionsickness inground tests.While the cause of the illnesswas uncertain, the possible effectswere all tooclear.AsGeorgeLowsaw it, “Werewe to lose threeor fourdaysoutofeachseven-day Space Shuttle flight because of motion sickness, the entire Shuttleeffortwouldbeinjeopardy.”Afterthesecondmission,thepreventionofmotionsicknessbecameatoppriority.8

Beanontheergometerbreathingintothemetabolicanalyzer.SL3-110-1399.

ARESCUEMISSION?The crew’s first EVAwas delayed again on 2August by a faulty steering

rocketthat,forawhile,threatenedtheentiremission.Apollo’sreactioncontrolsystemconsistedoffourindependentsetsofrocketsspaced90°apartaroundtheservice module. Each set had four thrusters, hence the common designation,quad.Astronautsfiredtherocketssinglyorinpairstostabilizethespacecraft’sposition in orbit or to change velocity; the thrusters could also return thespacecrafttoearthifthemainserviceenginefailed.ItcameasasurprisewhenquadBdevelopedaleakonlaunchday—thereactioncontrolrocketshadbeenamong Apollo’s most reliable systems. Skylab procedures, however, provided

forspacecraftoperationswithonequadshutdown.9

Surprise turned to alarm six days later when temperatures in quad D fellbelow normal limits. The drop triggered a master alarm, alerting MissionControl andwaking the crew.At first themalfunction seemedminor, and theproblem was not immediately connected with the first day’s leak. Crewmenactivated heaters in the reaction control system and turned to other duties.Duringthenexthour,MissionControlreceivedpositiveindicationsofasecondleak: temperature and pressure in quad D dropped sharply and the astronautsreportedastreamofsparklersoutsidetheirwindow,similartothecrystalstheyhadseenthefirstday.10

A tense moment in Mission Control, Johnson Space Center, 2 August 1973. A problem in the Apollospacecraftthreatenedtorequirethatthesecondcrewreturntoearthprematurely.Fromleft:GaryE.Coen,guidance and navigation system flight controller; Howard W. Tindall, Jr., flight operations director;ChristopherC.Kraft,Jr.,JSCdirector;SigurdA.Sjoberg,JSCdeputydirector.S-73-31875.

JSCengineersassumedtheworst—that thetwoleaksrepresentedagenericproblem in the oxidizer portion of the reaction control system, possiblycontaminationofthenitrogentetroxide.Ifthisweretrue,theotherrocketscouldsoon fail. An oxidizer leak could also damage electrical circuits within theservicemodule.AlthoughquadDhad lost less than10%of itsoxidizer, therewasnotellinghowfast theleakmightexpand.Theastronautscouldmaneuver

the spacecraft with two quads, or perhaps even one, but it was a situation toavoid if possible. At mid-morning the press was informed of the situation’sgravity. Skylab’s rescue capability, added three years earlier, suddenly lookedlike a good investment. According to Glynn Lunney, Houston’s spacecraftmanager, “ifwe did not have a rescue capabilitywewould be… getting thespacecraftdownasrapidlyaswecould.”11

At Kennedy, the news had an electrifying effect. Within three hourspreparationsforarescuewereunderway.ByeliminatingsubsystemtestsattheOperationsandCheckoutBuilding,thespacecraftcouldbematedwithitsSaturnlaunchvehiclethefollowingweek.Atthepad,storagelockerscouldberemovedfromthecommandmoduletomakeroomforadditionalcouches.Foregoingthetraditional countdown demonstration test, the Launch Operations OfficeexpectedtohaveavehiclereadyinearlySeptember.12

Tensions eased considerably when JSC engineers concluded that the twothrusters did not share a common problem. The possibility of contaminatednitrogentetroxidewasalsoruledoutafteranexaminationofrecordsatKennedy.JSC officials believed the two quads were still serviceable; if not, simulatoroperations indicated that thespacecraftcouldreturnsafelywithout them.Kraftnotified the crew that EVAwould be delayed again, this time so thatMissionControl could prepare procedures for reentry with two operational quads. Henoted that rescueoperationswereunderwayas amatterofprudence,but that“we’reproceedingasifwe’regoingtohaveanominalmission.”13

The leaking thrusters pointed up strengths and weaknesses in the Skylaboperation.A subsequent investigation attributed the failure in quadD to loosefittingsintheoxidizerlineswhichhadgoneundetectedduringtwoyearsoftests.When the crisis struck, NASA officials were not certain that the crew coulddeorbit with only one or two operating quads. Fortunately, Skylab’s rescuecapabilitymeantthatnodecisionhadtobemadeimmediately,andwithinafewhours the spacecraft’s condition had been correctly assessed. The missioncontinued.14

DEPLOYINGTHETWIN-POLESUNSHADETheastronautshadtogooutsidetheworkshopfortwotasks.ATMfilmhad

tobe replacedbeforemakingany solarobservations, andMarshall’s twin-polesunshade had to be deployed before the parasol’s nylon disintegrated underultravioletradiation.Whentoreplacetheoriginalshadehadbeenaquestion.Bill

Schneider andRoccoPetronehadargued fordeploymentbefore the first crewleft theworkshop, butKraft did notwant to subjectConrad’s crew to anothermajor extravehicular activity. Medical considerations won out, and thedeploymentwasputoffuntilthesecondmission.Marshall’sdesignwaschosenrather than an improved parasol because it could be deployed over the firstparasol.Theworkshopwouldnotbeuncoveredevenforafewminutes.15

Marshallengineersfeltconfidentabouttheirdeploymentprocedure.OnthisEVA, unlike Kerwin’s freeing the solar array, the crewmen would have firmfooting. Garriott would begin the operation, positioning himself at the workstationoutsidetheairlockhatch.Therehewouldconnectthe11sectionsofpolewhileLousma,workingfromthemount’scenterstation,securedfootrestraintsand the shade’s base plate to the ATM truss.When the two 17.5-meter poleswereassembled,Lousmawouldattachthemtothebaseplate,formingaV.Hewould then fasten the sail to rope running the length of the poles and slowlyhoisttheshade.Beanwouldmonitortheoperationfromthedockingadapter.Thecrewwaswellprepared.Besidesloggingmorethan100hoursofEVAtraining,theyhaddeployedthesailinHuntsville’swatertank.16

Ample time was scheduled for the operation as one mistake duringextravehicular activity could spell disaster. Preparations began on the 5th, thecrewreviewingproceduresandinventoryinghardware.Theastronautsspentthemorningofthe6thdonningtheircumbersomesuitsandtestingsupportsystems.Shortlyafternoon,theydepressurizedtheairlockandopenedthehatch.17

Theworkwent slowly at first.A rubber grommet, intended to fit over thelocking nut on each section of pole,was catching on the storage rack. It tooknearly 20minutes to remove and connect the first three sections, a pace thatthreatened to extend the deployment several hours beyond schedule. ThenGarriott repositionedhimselfandwasable to remove therodsfromadifferentangle.ThedelayillustratedtheproblemsthatfrequentlyaroseduringEVAwhenflightarticlesvariedevenslightlyfromthetestmodel.18

Otherdifficultiescroppedup.Theastronautslostsometimetryingtountwistthe rope before they hit on the idea of separating the pole, passing the linethrough,and rejoining thepolesections.Lousmaran into further troublewhenhebeganhoistingtheshadeoutalongthepoles.Foldsinthematerialwouldnotstraighten out at once, but with help from the sun’s rays, the sail graduallyopened. Altogether the deployment ran nearly four hours; despite minorfrustrations, the crewmen seemed to enjoy the exercise immensely. Theyconcluded the EVA by exchanging ATM film, retrieving experiment samples,andlookingforevidenceofseveralmalfunctions,includingtheproblemwiththe

Apolloquads.WhenGarriottandLousmafinallyreenteredtheairlock,theyhadspent6V2hoursoutside,byfarthelongestspacewalktothattime.19

Thetwin-poleshielddeployedovertheparasol.

Temperatures in the workshop fell at once. Although the parasol hadmetimmediate needs, its uneven deployment had left some hot spots.At times ofmaximum sunlight, such as the last week for Conrad’s crew, temperaturesreached28°C.Thiswasacceptableduring theworkdaybutuncomfortable forsleeping.Withthesecondshadeinplace,theinsidetemperaturesapproximatedthose originally intended by thermal engineers. Perhaps more important, thesuccessfuldeploymentstrengthenedconfidenceinextravehicularactivity.Givensufficient preparation, astronauts could accomplish a wide variety of tasks inspace.20

Garriott standingon the telescopemount.AfterhelpingLousmadeploy the twin-pole sunshade,GarriottattachedexperimentS149tooneofthesolarpanels.Theexperimentwasdesignedtocollectdustparticlesinspaceandstudytheirimpactphenomena.SL3-115-1837.

SOLARVIEWING

Thecrewwastedlittle timegettingtoworkwith thesolar telescopes.On7August, Garriott observed the sun’s outer atmosphere, the corona, for threehours.Althoughtherewasnoprominentsolaractivity,hefilledtheair-to-groundchannel with questions for the principal investigators. The sun grewconsiderablymoreactiveonthe9thwhenGarriottphotographedamedium-sizedflare.Thefollowingday,astronomersattheCanaryIslandObservatorydetectedan even larger solar event. Word was passed up to the astronauts who wereenjoyingahalf-dayofrest.(Thecrewrefusedtotakeafulldaywhiletheywerebehindschedule.)GarriottandBeanquicklymannedthetelescopesand,duringthenext hour, filmed an enormous eruptionof solar radiation.Afterwards,Dr.ErnestHindleroftheHighAltitudeObservatorydescribedthecoronaltransientas“amagnificentspecimenofthistype,”onethatwouldcomealongonlytwoorthreetimesayear.21

Solarobservationsincreasedduringthenext10days,reachingapeakof14man-hoursonthe20th.Thehydrogen-alphatelescopesweretheprincipalmeansto locate solar activity and recognize early stagesof flares.Skylab’sx-rayandultravioletinstrumentswerealignedwiththeH-alphatelescopes.ThuswhenanastronautplacedthecrosshairsoftheH-alphamonitoronaparticularactivity,heautomaticallybrought theother instruments tobearonthesametarget.TheH-alpha telescopes provided photographs and television, as well as a zoomcapability to vary the field of view. A second monitor on the ATM panelpresented images from the extreme ultraviolet spectroheliograph. In thesewavelengths, some 20 times shorter than the unaided eye could see, the sunappearedblotchywithmanybrightpoints,indicatingactiveregions.22

Thewhitelightcoronagraph,developedattheHighAltitudeObservatoryinColorado, served as the principalmeans of studying the corona. Four coaxialdisks,locatedatthefrontofthetelescope,blockedoutthebrightlight,allowingonlythefaintcoronatobeseen.Althoughthecoronagraph’swavelengthswerevisibletothenakedeye,theinstrumentprovidedaviewseldomseenonearth;ineffect,thecrewenjoyedasolareclipseeveryhouroftheday.Picturesfromthecoronagraphwererecordedon35-mmfilmandcouldbedisplayedonaconsolemonitorortransmittedtothegroundviatelevision.23

Twoweeksofsolarviewingculminatedonthe21stwiththediscoveryofahugesolarprominenceonthesun’seasternedge.NASAwasagainalertedbyanastronomerworkingattheNationalOceanicandAtmosphericAdministration’ssite in theCanaryIslands.AtJSC,investigatorsquicklypreparedanobservingprogramforthecrew.MeantimeBeanhaddiscoveredthestructure,sitting“likea big bubble… on the edge of a disk.” During the next several hours, solarscientistswatched theprominence—nearly three-quarters the sizeof the sun—archoutwardthroughthecoronaasamassiveloopstructure.Investigatorswereecstatic, calling it “themost significant [solar] event since the launch.”Bean’sjudicious use of limited film in thewhite light coronagraph brought the crewpraise.24

Thesecondcrew’ssuccesswiththeATMpromptednewsmentocontrasttheresults of the first twomissions.At a press conferenceon10August,Hindleracknowledgedthatoperationshadimprovedbutcreditedthechange,inpart,toConrad’s crew. Their complaints had helped open lines of communication.Investigatorsenjoyedmoreaccesstothesecondcrew,eitherdirectlyorthroughthecapsulecommunicator.Consequently,thescientistshad“muchmorerapportwiththiscrewthan…thelastone.”Personalitieswerealsoafactor;asHindlernoted,“Garriottasksmanymorequestionsofusthatwerespondto.”25

EARTH-RESOURCEANDCOROLLARYEXPERIMENTS

ForaweekaftertheEVA,thecrewwasheavilycommittedtoearth-resourceobservations. Flight planners had bunched the 26 scheduled earth-resourcepasses at the start and finish of the 58-day mission; during the middle threeweeks poor lighting conditions prevailed in the northern hemisphere.Houstonusually scheduled one pass a day, the average run lasting about 35 minutes.Anothertwohours,however,wastakenupadjustingcamerasettings,replacingfilm, and loading maneuver parameters into Skylab’s computer. (Later in themission,thecrewhalvedthispreparationtime.)UnlikeATMoperations,whereone man worked alone most of the time, earth resources was a team effort.NormallyGarriottoperatedtheS190Bearth-terraincamerathroughtheantisolarscientificairlock,oppositetheparasol.BeanandLousmatookturnshandlingtheviewfinder tracking system for the S191 spectrometerwhile the othermannedcontrolsatthemaindisplayconsole.26

Nine earth-resource passes flown before 13 August met with varyingsuccess;thesensorsperformedsatisfactorily,butheavycloudcoverhinderedsiteverificationon several runs.Thepasson8Augustwas typical in its coverageand objectives. Starting off the coast of Oregon, the crew operated the earth-resource cameras for 35minutes, covering a 13 500-kilometer stretch of landand sea to a point south of Sao Paulo, Brazil. Objectives included data onOklahoma’ssoilmoisture,Utah’smineral formations,Houston’surbangrowth,and the Amazon’s resources. At a briefing on the 15th, coordinator RichardWilmarth expressed satisfaction with the quantity of data. Newsmen, in turn,questioned the three-week gap in operations and the paucity of sites in thesouthernhemisphere.WilmarthindicatedthatNASAwasconsideringadditionalruns.*27

Theinterruptioninearth-resourcesworkgavethecrewachancetodosomeof the 22 corollary experiments, the catchall title for those relating to spacetechnology,spacephysics,andstellarastronomy.BeanandLousmadidmostofthecorollarywork,leavingGarriottfreetoattendtheATMconsole.Commanderand pilot spent the morning of 13 August flying the M509†” maneuveringdevice,a largebackpackthatNASAhopedtoperfectforEVA.AlthoughBeanwasgenerallyimpressedwiththeM509,hewantedmorespeedandlesspreciseattitude control. He stressed the need “to get something that flies like aspacecraft,”toensurethattheastronaut’sintuitiveresponsewasacorrectone.Insubsequentsessions, thetwomentestedahand-heldunitfedfromabackpack.Beanfoundthegaspistolunsatisfactory.Hesaiditfeltunnaturalandwouldtake

“toomuch training time.”A foot-controlledunitwas judgedunsatisfactory forsimilarreasons.Theyspentover75man-hoursflyingorphotographingtheunitsinaction.28

MostofthetimeremainingforothercorollarieswenttoKarlHenize’sstellarastronomy(S019)andDr.DonaldPacker’sairglowphotography(S063).Henizehad taught at Northwestern University before joining the corps of scientist-astronauts. His experiment employed a reflecting telescope and prism incombination with a 35-mm camera positioned in the workshop’s antisolarairlock.Acrewmanwouldfirstextendarotatingmirrorthroughtheairlockandthenfocusthetelescope.Whenthedesiredstarfieldwasinview,hewouldtaketwo or three photographs, the exposure time varying from30 to 270 seconds.Normaloperations took less thanonehourbut requiredscheduling thecameraworkduringanightphaseofSkylab’sorbit.Packer’sexperiment,developedattheNavalResearchLaboratoryinWashington,involvedcameraworkfromboththewardroomwindowandthescientificairlock,inreflectedlightaswellasinthe dark. His objective was to photograph the earth’s ozone layers and thehorizon’sairglow.29

Beanattheantisolarscientificairlock,operatingtheultravioletstellarastronomyexperimentS019,above,SL3-108-1275.Below,theinstrumentwithdrawnfromtheairlockandadiagram.S-71-3508-S.

MOREMECHANICALPROBLEMS

By the secondweek,mechanicalmalfunctions had become an unfortunatefact of life for NASA engineers. Skylab seemed to be aging rapidly. Thedehumidifier’s leak remained a constant annoyance. Though not a seriousdanger, it required daily servicing. On 20 August, Bean spent the entire dayinspecting the system; after adding nitrogen, he checked out each connection,listeningwithastethoscopeandapplyingasoapsolution,muchasonedoeswithabicycle tire.Byday’s end engineershad concluded that all pipe connectionswereingoodworkingorder.Suspicionsturnedtotheseparatorplateswithintheheat-exchangeunit.Minormalfunctionsseemedtocropupnearlyeveryday.On

20August, themechanism used to extend themirror forHenize’s experimentjammedmidwayouttheairlock.Attemptstoretractthemirrororfullyextenditprovedfutileuntilthefollowingmorning.30

Leaksinthecoolantloopswereamoreseriousproblem.Twoloopscooledthe various electronic systems including the controls for the ATM and earth-resourcespackage.On5AugustHuntsvillereceivedtelemetryindicatingalossof pressure in the primary loop. The signals cast a pall of gloom in GeorgeHardy’s office, where engineers already feared a leak in the secondary loop.Contingency planswere quickly drawn up to cover a total loss of the coolingsystem.BythetimeHardybriefednewsmenthenextday,matterslookedmuchbetter.Furtherdataindicatedthattheprimarysystemwouldrunforanotherthreeweeks, at least; the secondary loop would probably last the entire mission.Before the final flight,Huntsvillehoped todeviseameansof replenishing thecoolant.31

Erratic gyroscopes were the most troublesome of Skylab’s mechanicalproblems.Huntsvilleengineershadwrestledwithfaultyreadingsfromtheninerate gyroscopes since the first launch, three months earlier. From detailedinvestigation,thegyroscope’shighdriftrateshadbeenlinkedwithgasbubblesin its float chamber. The bubbles apparently formed when the chamber wasexposedtothehardvacuumofspace.Aftercorrectingthedesign,Huntsvillehadpreparedabackuppackageofsixrategyros(promptlydubbedthe“six-pack”).Itwascarriedupbythesecondcrewtobemounted,ifnecessary,onanexperimentrackinthedockingadapter.ThelocationwasclosetoSkylab’scenterofgravity,allowed for a proper alignment, and provided an easy tie-in with the oldsystem.32

The decision to install the six-packwas a difficult one.Althoughmost ofSkylab’s nine rate gyroscopes showed some instability, Mission Control hadmaintainedonegoodgyroscopeineachaxis,andusuallyaserviceablebackup.Installingthenewgyroscopepackageinvolvedworkoutsidetheworkshopandfailurecouldpossiblyendthemission.Therewasgeneralagreement,however,thatadecisionshouldnotbedelayedbeyondthesecondEVA.InstallationonthefinalEVA,comingjustonedaybeforemission’send,wouldnotleavethecrewenoughtimetomakeadjustments.On21August,NASAmanagementoptedforthesix-pack;theoriginalrategyroscopeswereshowingcontinueddeteriorationandHoustondidnotwant to faceanunmannedperiodwithonlyoneworkinggyroscopeineachaxis.Theastronautswouldinstallthenewgyroscopesonthe24th before replenishing the ATM film magazines. The EVA went likeclockwork,andwhenpowerwasrestored,Skylabhadninegoodrategyroscopes

(thesix-packandthreefromtheoriginalgroup).Forthefirsttimeinnearlythreemonths,Skylabengineerscouldemploytheredundancymanagementproceduresoriginallyplannedforthemission.33

AROUTINEDAYINSPACESicknessandmechanical failuresdisrupted the flight schedule for10days,

butafterthefirstEVA,thecrewsettledintoaroutine.Reveillecameat6:00a.m.CST, a loud buzzer waking the astronauts. In the hour before breakfast, theydressedandshaved.Therewasnorealtroubleselectingclothesastheastronautshadonestandarduniform,browntrousersand turtleneckT-shirts. If toowarm,one could convert the trousers to shorts by unzipping the pants legs. Duringstrenuousactivity,suchasthebicyclerun,theastronautsusuallystrippedtotheirunder-shorts.Theuniformalsoincludedajacketforthecooltemperaturesoftheairlockanddockingadapter.Withnoprovisionsforwashingtheuniforms,theywereworn a fewdays anddiscarded.The feet proved to be themost difficultpartofdressing;astronautsfoundthemselvesstretchingtheirstomachmusclesasthey bent over in zero gravity to put on a sock or tie a shoelace. The clothesreceived high marks for the most part, although there were some complaintsabouttheshortageofsocksandtheproblemofsecuringobjectsinsidepockets.34

Skylab’s waste-management compartment resembled the bathroom of acommercialjetlinerinitssize,metallicappearance,andevenitsgurglingnoises.Thecompartmenttooksomegettingusedto.Foronething,thefloorlackedthetriangulargridworkcommontotherestoftheworkshop;engineershadprovideda smooth surface for easier cleaning. Consequently, it was difficult to get afoothold,andamemberofthethirdcrewwouldcomplainthat“youjustricochetoffthewalllikeaBBinatincan.”Anotherproblemwasmaintainingcontrolofvarious toilet articles, which floated away unless anchored. Bean secured hisarticles to the cabinetwithVelero, a plasticmaterialwith interlocking bristlesthat enjoyed wide use around the workshop. The lack of gravity precluded aconventionalsink;handscouldbewashedfromavalverecessed into thewall.Wetwashclothswere the principalmeans of bathing, since a shower requiredabout an hour.The first crew showered once aweek and seemednot tomindvacuuminguptheexcesswater.Latercrewmensettledforadailyscrubbingwithwashcloths.Thebathroom’ssizeprecludedmorethanoneoccupantatatime,alimitationwhichposedsomeschedulingdifficultiesinthefirsthour.PaulWeitzeased the problem by shaving at night; Carr and Pogue of the third creweventually quit shaving altogether. Bean’s team found sufficient time by

extendingtheirpreparationsintothebreakfasthour.35

At7:00a.m. thecrewassembledaround thewardroom table forbreakfast.Parallelbarsunder the food trays servedasachairof sorts,but theastronautsgenerally preferred to stand. (Sitting placed a strain on the stomach musclesfrom the forced bending at thewaist.)A typical breakfast included bacon andeggs,bread,coffee,andorangejuice.WhilemealswereadefiniteimprovementoverApollo, the astronauts complained that their foodwas too bland and themenu too regimented. Eating in space had other drawbacks, among them theobviousproblemofholdingthingsdown.Whenthelidonawarmingtraywasopened,invariablyacanortwowouldfloataway.Silverwareandfoodparticlesshowedasimilartendencytowander.Allthreecrewscomplainedaboutthesizeoftheutensils.Bean,whowasprobablytheleastcriticalofthenine,foundtheirsmallsize“ridiculous.”Gasbubblesinthewatersupplywereanotherheadache.(Theair thathadbeenusedtopressurize thewater tankscouldnotfloat to thesurface in a weightless condition, hence the bubbles.) Occasionally, whencrewmen rehydrated their food, the bubblywaterwould burst the clear plasticbags, splattering food around the wardroom. The gas also contributed toflatulence,andasamemberof the last crewput it, “fartingabout500 timesadayisnotagoodwaytogo.”Despitethesefrustrations,mealtimeswereamongthe more pleasant hours spent in space. They provided a break from a busyschedule,anopportunity toviewtheworldfromthewardroomwindowor justrelax.36

Althoughtheastronautswouldhavewelcomedaleisurelyhourforbreakfast,activities had to be completed before theworkday began: setting up the noonmeal, checkingout spacecraft systems, loading film, collecting andprocessingurine,weighingfecalsamplesandleftoverfood.Attimes,theyfoundthemselvesbehind schedule before the workday began. On a typical day, Garriott wouldman the ATM console by 8:00 a.m. Bean and Lousma would undertake amedical experimentor a testofmaneuveringunits.Bymid-morning, the crewmightchange,LousmamovingtothesolartelescopeswhileGarriottreturnedtotheworkshop’slowerlevelforhisdailyrideontheergometer.Physicalexercisehad receivedshort shriftduring the first twoweeks,butafter10August flightplannersbeganprogramming90minutesadayforexerciseandhygiene.Iftherewerenomajorexperimentsorrepairwork,Beancouldperformacorollary.Thisgroup provided an excellent means of filling out the workday, since most ofthemcouldbedoneinanhourortwo.Solarviewingcontinuedthroughlunch,the crew eating in shifts. The afternoon broughtmore experiments.When theastronauts ran out of work, as Bean’s crew sometimes did, flight controllers

employeda “shopping list”of activities—experimentsor repairs that crewmencouldundertakewithshortnotice.37

Dinnerwas at 6:00 p.m., afterwhich the crew turned to household choresand a review of the next day’s schedule. The latterwas time-consuming as itusually involved a number of changes in experimentwork, particularly on theATM.TheteletypemachinewasanimprovementoverApollo,whenastronautshad copied schedule changes in longhand; but the daily instructions toSkylaboften required twometers of teletype. Crewmen had trouble just securing theprintouttothewardroomtable.38

Duringaneveningpassoveragroundstation,thecrewtransmittedastatusreportincludingmedicaldataoneating,sleeping,andexercise.Bean’sreporton30Augustwastypical.Afterprovidingtotalsonwaterconsumption,urine,andergometerexercise,henotedthatthecrewhadaveragedbetweensixandsevenhours of good sleep. As for their diets, Bean had added 15 salt tablets to hisprescribedmenu,Garriott “five salts, peach ambrosia, and jam”; andLousma,thebiggesteateraboard,hadadded“13½salts,onecherrydrink,onecanbuttercookies, and substitutedoneveal and two lemonades forone tunaandbread.”Each evening the crew also held a privatemedical conferencewith the flightsurgeon.Theconferencesconfirmedwhatwasapparentfromthestatusreports;aftertheinitialillnessthesecondcrewwasadjustingtospacequitewell.39

Planners had hoped the crewwould complete the evening chores by 8:00p.m., leaving two hours for relaxation; but the second crew seldom spent anevening thatway.Bean,Garriott, andLousmavirtually ignored thedistinctionbetweenworkday and off-duty activities. Although the first crew hadmade apointofeatingtogether,theseconddeclinedsuchluxury.Onemanremainedatthe ATM console, another reviewed the next day’s instructions, and the thirdgrabbedabitetoeat.Dinnerusuallybecamealatenightsnack,eaten30minutesbeforebedtime.Iftherewasnotenoughtimeintheday,physicalexercisewaiteduntil evening. The final solution, and one frequently taken, was to postponesleepbyanhourortwo.40

Ifmost dayswere all work and no play, it did notmake Jack a dull boy.Lousmakept up a constant banter for his “space fans”on the channelB tape,commentingoneverythingfromtheairlock’slackofspacetoGarriott’stonsorialtalents. At every chance he put in a plug for the Marine Corps. Some ofLousma’s clowning was captured on film, including an amusing routine with“barbells”inspace:afterstrainingmightilytolifttheweightsfromthefloor,hesoared into space, the bells high over his head.Lousmaproved adept on bothsidesofthecamera;histoursoftheworkshopfilmedinearlySeptembergivean

excellentpictureoflifeinspace.41

SciencedemonstrationsprovidedGarriott a diversion from thedailygrind.Beforelaunchhehadplannedaseriesofdemonstrationsonhisweeklyholiday.Thoughmostholidayswereskipped,Garriottfoundtimetoillustratetheeffectof weightlessness on water drops, magnets, and spinning objects. In the besttradition of science, one of his most successful demonstrations was a suddeninspiration. While working with a nut and bolt on a student experiment, hedecidedtospinthenutinspaceandattractitwithamagnet.Theresultwasanimpressive display of a spinning object precessed by a magnetic torque.Garriott’sdemonstrations,thoughfarlessimportantthansolarviewingorearthresources, could be easily understood by laymen and for that reason broughtSkylabmuchinexpensivepublicity.42

Bean appeared to have little need for diversion. The most industriousmember of a work-oriented crew, he seldom even took time to look out thewindow.Hischiefdelightseemedtobeaddingexperimenthourstotherecord.

ATEAMOFOVERAGHIEVERS

Thecrewhadrunbehindscheduleforthefirst10days.AftertheEVAon6August,BeanaskedMissionControlhowfartheyhadfallenbehind.Houston’sresponsebolsteredtheastronauts’resolvetocatchup;asLousmarecalled,“wedecided that we weren’t going home without doing 100% … and more ifpossible.” The turnaround during the next two weeks was striking. WhereasHouston had previously given the crew more than it could handle, flightcontrollerswere soon hard pressed to find enoughwork.On 12August Beanaskedformoretasks,notingthat“we’reworkinglesshardat themomentthanwewereprior toflight.”HegentlyadmonishedMissionControl to“doa littlebitmore,”because“we’vegottheability,andtime,andenergyandIknowy’alldo down there.” Mission Control did its best to oblige the commander,increasingthedailyworkload—thetimespentonexperimentsorrepairactivities—from8to12hourspermanduringthethirdweek.Bymission’send,thecrewhadsurpasseditsexperimentgoalsby50%.43

In earlySeptemberBean sought to have theirmission extended aweekormorebeyondthe59-daygoal.Therequestwasturneddown;Houston’smedicalofficewantedmoredatabeforecommittingastronautsbeyondtwomonths.Thedecisionalsotookintoaccountthedwindlingsupplyoffoodandfilmaboardtheworkshop. By mid-September flight controllers had reduced ATM work to 8

hours a day. The resumption of earth-resource passes filled some gaps, butMission Control was hard pressed to occupy the crew’s time. At a postflightbriefing,Bean complained about the lack ofmeaningfulwork. “We had goodscientificexperiments,but…notenoughtofillthetimeavailable.”Hissolutionwas not to reduce the 70-hour workweek; Skylab represented too large aninvestment for that. Rather, he proposed adding new experiments. Garriottseconded Bean’s position, urging the last crew to take more ATM film. Therecommendations, and more importantly the pace set by the second crew,convincedflightcontrollersthata12-hourdaywasreasonable.Flightplansforthe finalmission, fleshed outwith new experiments, reflected such standards.Thethirdcrewwouldfinditatoughacttofollow.44

*Thedrought-strickenregionofMaliandMauritaniawasaddedtothescheduleinlateAugust.

†App.Dcontainsadditionalinformationonalltheexperiments.

17

TheLastMission

While the second crew set new records for productivity in orbit, the thirdcrew spent long days in Houston’s simulators. Bean and his colleagues hadenjoyedfirstpriorityinusingthelimitedtrainingfacilitiesuntiltheyleftfortheCape.OnlytowardtheendofJuly,withjustoverthreemonthsremainingbeforescheduledlaunch,didCarr’screwhaveuninterrupteduseofthetrainers.Besidespracticing rendezvous, docking, and reentry procedures—tasks which took upmost of their time—they rehearsed extravehicular activity in Huntsville’s bigwater tank, sat through hours of simulations at the ATM console, andfamiliarizedthemselveswiththe50-oddpiecesofexperimenthardwaretheyhadtooperate.

CHANGESTOTHEMISSION

As if this were not enough, mission planners and experimenters devisedmoretasksforthelastcrew.Afterlookingatearlyresults,astronomersaskedfornew solar observations. Medical experts required extra measurements andphotographs. Planning for these new experiments was sometimes faulty; thecrew would later complain that training for some of them had been totallyinadequate.

Lateinthesummer,HeadquartersprogramofficialsdeterminedtouseSkylabasaplatformforobservingacometdiscoveredbyaCzechastronomer,LubosKohoutek, inMarch 1973. Its early discovery, ninemonths before perihelion,gaveastronomersmoretimethantheynormallyhadtoprepareforobservingacomet (see app. F). Since the newcomer would swing around the sun in lateDecember,Carr’screwwouldbe inanexcellentposition toobserve it.1UsingSkylab for comet-watchingmeant that new, complexmaneuvering procedureshadtobeaddedtothetrainingschedule.

Thenewexperimentswerearecognizableadditiontothethirdcrew’sworkload.What no one seemed to recognize was that the second crew had raisedeveryone’sexpectationsforthelastmission.Inapressconferenceon2October1973, JSC SkylabmanagerKenneth S.Kleinknecht enthused over the secondcrew’saccomplishments,whichshowed,hesaid,thatman“wasabletodomorethanwethoughthecoulddo.”Managementwasretaining theoption toextendthe last mission to 70 days, and since this would cost around half a milliondollarsaday,flightplannerswouldhavetosupplyenoughworktojustifyit.ThechiefofHouston’sOrbitalAssemblyProjectOfficeobservedthattheremarkableproductivity of the second crewwas “indicative ofwhatwe can expect in thefuture.”ThemanageroftheJSCMissionsOfficethenoutlinedrecentchangestoplansfor the lastflight.Therewouldbe28man-hoursofexperimentworkperdayand12newJointObservingProgramsfortheATM.Tento14earth-resourcepasseshadbeenaddedtothe20alreadyplanned,andthecrewwouldtakesomeadditional medical measurements. Continuing the handyman traditionestablishedonthefirsttwomissions,thelastcrewwouldrechargethecoolantinarefrigerationsystemandtroubleshoottheearth-resourcesmicrowaveantenna,whichhadfailed.2

RemovingthefirstofeightdamagedstabilizationfinsfromtheSaturnIBthatwouldcarrythethirdcrewtoSkylab.Theworkdelayedthelaunchfivedays,until16November1973.73-H-1105.

ThroughoutOctobertrainingandlaunchpreparationswentsmoothly,aimingfora liftoffon11November.Fivedaysbefore that,however, inspectionof theSaturn IB launch vehicle disclosed cracks in each of its eight stabilizing fins.Thecracks,probablycausedbystresscorrosion,mightwellhavecausedthefinsto be ripped off as the rocket passed throughmaximumaerodynamic pressureearly in flight. Replacement fins, flown in fromNASA’sMichoud, Louisiana,facility, were installed where the Saturn sat, atop the 39-meter “milkstool.”Special work platforms, much like painters’ scaffolds, were swung from themobile launcherdown to thebaseof the rocket.The repaircrewshad toworksome12-hour shifts,but the jobwascompletedon12November.Launchwasrescheduledforthe16th.3

The major uncertainty clouding the third mission was the possibility ofmotion sickness during the first days in orbit. After the second crew’sunfortunateexperience,NASA’stopmanagershadbecomegravelyconcerned.Agroup of NASA and outside medical experts, convened in late October toevaluate the data on space malaise, recommended medication upon reachingorbit.AfterCarrandhiscrewmatesobjected,becausebothofthefavoreddrugshadundesirablesideeffects,itwasagreedthatthecommanderwoulddelayhismedicineuntilafterrendezvouswascomplete.Onthesecondandthirddaysallthreeastronautsweretotakethecapsulesroutinely;thereafter,onlyifsymptomsappeared.Theywereinstructedtorestrictheadmovementsasmuchaspossibleandtospendthefirstnight inthecommandmodule,sincemovingaroundinalarge space seemed somehow conducive to motion sickness. The astronautsagreed—somewhat reluctantly, because theywere not convinced that even themedicalexpertsfullyunderstoodtheillness.4

ANERRORINJUDGMENT

Skylab’s last mission roared into the Florida sky at 9:01 a.m. EST, 16November1973.The launchandearlyphasesof flightwere routine,except tothe all-rookie crew; on their first pass over the United States, missioncommander Lt. Col. Gerald P. Carr told Mission Control that the spacecraftwindowsweresmudgedwherethethreedelightedfirst-timershadbeenlookingout. On the fifth revolution, between Australia and Guam, Carr sighted theworkshop;within10minuteshehadclosedtoabout30meters.Hemaneuvered

theApollo spacecraft inwithgreat precision, but once again thedockinggeargave trouble.After twounsuccessfulattempts,Carrhard-docked thecommandmoduletothemultipledockingadapteralmostexactly8hoursafterlaunch.5

Thatdone,thecrewwasoutoftouchwithHoustonfor41minutesbetweenBermuda and Carnarvon, Australia, so they started straightening up thecommandmodule,stowingthegearusedduringrendezvousanddocking.First,however,Carrandscientist-pilotEdwardG.Gibsontooktheirantinauseapills.PilotWilliamR.Poguehadalreadyattendedtothat,buttoolate.Afewminutesbefore ground contactwas established, he askedGibson to hand him a vomitbag.Gibsoncomplied,andasheandCarrwentaheadwiththeirchores,Poguesaid,“IthinkI’mgoingtogoslowforthenextfewminutes.”Itwasnotenough;weightlessnesshaddone itswork,andPoguevomited—notverymuch,buthewas quite nauseated. Houston came back on the communications circuit justbefore 6 p.m. and reiterated the physicians’ warning about entering theworkshop.Beforelaunch,Carrhadrequestedachangeofplantoallowthemtobeginactivatingtheworkshopthatevening,butflightplannerssawnoadvantageinthat.Carragreedtowaituntilthenextday.6

AfterSkylab went out of radio range, Carr andGibson debatedwhat theyshould say about Pogue’s illness during the evening status report, due in justoveranhour.Carrwasinclinedtokeepmumforthetimebeing.Toaccountforthe foodPoguehad not eaten,Carrwould say thatPoguewas not hungry.Astheyprepared their secondmeal,CarrandGibsonmulledover thesituation. Itwas ironic,becausePoguewasnoted forhis resistance tomotionsickness.Hewasknownas“IronBelly”—theguywith“cementinhisinnerear.”Cementorno, Pogue was miserable. The others had helped him move to the dockingtunnel,whereairfromacabinfanmightmakehimfeelsomewhatbetter,buthewas not improving. When Houston came on the air again, Carr asked topostponethestatusreport,sincetheyhadnotstartedeating.Houstonagreed,andCarrhadtwomorehourstodecidewhattodo.7

Had they remembered that an onboard tape recorder was running all thistime,CarrandGibsonwouldhavereportedPogue’svomiting.Buttheydidnotremember;and,thinkingthatonlythethreeofthemwouldeverknowwhathadhappened, they decided to minimize the potential repercussions of the pilot’sillness.Poguehadvomitedverylittle;itwasnotagut-wrenchingattack.Surelyhe would recover before they moved into the workshop the next morning.Gibson feared that the doctorswould overreact if they knew of the vomiting.Carrwavered.HeconsideredreportingPogue’sillnessbutnotthevomiting.“I’djust say he doesn’t feel like eating.” But a few minutes before the medical

conference, he toldPogue, “I thinkwebetter tell the truth tonight….Becausewe’regoing tohavea fecal/vomitusbag to turn in, although Iguesswecouldthrow thatdown the trashairlockand forget thewhole thing….”Gibson likedthatidea:“Ithinkallthemanagerswouldbehappy.”Vomitingwasworsethannauseaintheflightsurgeons’view,anditwouldbesimpletodisposeofthebagandreportonlythatPoguewasnauseated.Thedistinctionwasafineone,hardlyworththeuproarthatwouldresultiftheyreportedwhatactuallyhappened.So,asGibsonputit,theycouldkeeptheincident“betweenyou,me,andthecouch.Youknowdarnwell,”thescientist-pilotincautiouslyadded,“thateverymanageratNASAwouldprobably,underhisbreath,wantustodojustthat.”So,duringthemedical conference, Pogue’s nausea wasmentioned but not the vomiting.Beforeretiring,Carrreadtheeveningstatusreporttotheground,reportingthat“thepilothadnostrawberriesforlunchandhasnoteatenmealC.”8

Saturdaymorning theyall feltbetter after agoodnight’s sleep.Poguewasrecovering,buthe still chose to take thingseasy for awhile.Theothers fixedbreakfast while enjoying a view of the Alps and south eastern Europe. At aquarter tonine theywere ready to enter theworkshop. It tookhalf anhour topressurize the multiple docking adapter, remove its hatch, and stow both thehatchandthedockingprobeinthecommandmodule.At9:16Carrturnedonthelightsandthecrewstartedtowork,hookingupcommunications,startinguptheenvironmentalcontrolsystem,andpoweringuptheworkshop.9

Meanwhile, the tapes from the onboard recorder were being routinelytranscribed inHouston, revealing the candid discussionsCarr andGibson hadheldregardingPogue’sillness.Reactionwasprompt.Amedicalconferencewascalled inmidafternoon.Toward theendof theday,AlanShepard, chiefof theAstronautOffice, took themicrophone inMissionControl to give the crew apublicandofficial,ifmild,reprimand.“Ijustwantedtotellyou,”hesaid,“thatonthematterofyourstatusreports,wethinkyoumadeafairlyseriouserrorinjudgmenthereinthereportofyourcondition.”Carracceptedtherebuke:“Okay,Al. I agree with you. It was a dumb decision.” And that was that. At thatevening’s change-of-shift press briefing, reporters wondered if the incidentportended a break in frank and open communication between crew and flightcontrollers.FlightDirectorNeilHutchinson thoughtnot;but if therewereanyfurthersignsoflackofcandor,hesaid,flightcontrollerswouldimmediatelytakestepstosetmattersright.10

Howmuchthisincidentcontributedtothecrew’slaterproblemsisuncertain.Managers believed—and the tape-recorded evidence supports their view—thatthe astronauts meticulously reported on channel B every mistake they made

thereafter.Theywere,however,unwillingtodiscusstheirproblemsonthepublicair-to-groundchannel.AsCarrnotedlater,theycouldhardlyenjoyhavingtheirshortcomings discussed on front pages across the country the next day. AndsincePeteConrad’suseoftheprivatelineforoperationalpurposes(p.281)hadstirredupsuchaflapwithintheagency,thatroutewasclosedtothemexceptinrealemergencies.AlltheyhadwaschannelB,withitsbuilt-intimelagofnearly24hoursbeforeMissionControlcouldreadtranscriptsofthetapes.Eventhere(since channel B transcripts were also made public) they hesitated to becompletely frank; flight controllerswouldhavehad tobe finelyattuned to thepersonalities of the crewmen to detect specific problems.That kindof rapportwasunfortunatelymissingonthelastSkylabmission;therehadbeenlittlecloseinteraction between the crew and their flight controllers during training. Thishelpedtoproducefrustrationforallconcernedduringthenextsixweeks.11

ACTIVATION

Flightcontrolteams,happytohavemenbackintheworkshopafterseveralweeks of unmanned operation, swung back into their routine with gusto.Activating the workshop was the first order of business. Although one flightcontrollercharacterizedactivationas“onlyalittlemorecomplicatedthanwhenyou come back from vacation,”Carr and his crew (like the two crews beforethem) found it considerably more than that. Every job took more time thananticipated. Inevitably mistakes slowed them down still more, as didcommunications from Houston; every few minutes an interruption requiredsomeone’sattention.Anhourwas lostwhenPogue, flushing thepotablewatersystemwithiodinesolutionpreparatorytotappinganewwatertank,leftavalvein thewrongpositionanddumped thedisinfectant into thewaste tank.By theendofthefirstday,theywereabouttwohoursbehind.Theydidnotreducethatdeficit the next day. Nevertheless, planners set up a regular flight plan forMonday.12

ThebigjobonMondaywastorechargetheprimarycoolantloopthatcooledthe spacesuits and airlock batteries. Successful completion of this task wouldpermit carrying out the first extravehicular activity as scheduled; withoutcooling,theoutsideactivitieswouldprobablyrequiretwotrips.Usingequipmentexactlylikethatusedforrechargingground-basedrefrigeratingsystems,Poguefinishedthatjobwithouttrouble.13

This repair was only one of several extra chores the third crew had to

accomplish during the firstweek of flight.A particularly time-consuming onewasanewsetofmedicalmeasurements.Girthmeasurements atmore than50pointsontheastronauts”bodies,togetherwithphotographsoninfrared-sensitivefilm,wouldshowhowbloodandbodyfluidsmovedtowardtheheadinzerog.Themeasurementstookaboutfourman-hours;thetapeswerehardtohandleandthe crew had not used them at all before flight. The photographywould havebeen easier had there been better provision for restraining the photographer.While the subject lay on the floor of the upper workshop compartment, thecameramanwassupposedtofloatabovehim.Pogue,tryingthisforthefirsttimeonthefifthday,foundhimselfdrifting.Tryingtosteadyhisbody,hewedgedashoebetweentwowatertanks,accidentallyturnedavalveandthenkickeditoff.Theresultinglossofpressurewasdiscoveredthatnight.14

Tuesday,theirfourthdayintheworkshop,wasanotherjam-packedday;theyhad no time to look out the wardroom window, although visual observationswereontheirlistofoptionalactivities.LaterCarrtoldHouston,“Ifwe’reevergoingtogetcaughtup…we’regoingtohavetowhacksomethingout[of theflightplan] tomorrow….Wehaven’thad time to…stoweverythingproperly,andthisplaceisreallygettingtobeamess.”15

The firstweek’sbigeventwas theextravehicularactivity scheduled for22November,Thanksgivingday,whenPogueandGibsonwould reload theATMcameras and check out the inoperative antenna on themicrowave sensor. Thelatterjobmightbetricky,sincetherewerenorestraintsontheundersideofthemultiple docking adapterwhere the antennawasmounted.But havingworkedouttheproceduresinHuntsville’sbigwatertank,theastronautswereconfidentitcouldbedone.

JustbeforenoononThursday,GibsonandPoguesuitedupintheworkshop’sforwarddome and squeezed into the airlock.Anhour later, aftermeticulouslycheckingovertheirgear—steppingoutintoavacuumdoesnotallowforcarelesspreparation—theylettheairoutoftheairlockandopenedthehatch.16

Pogue’s first task was to take some photographs to record the amount ofcontamination surrounding theworkshop.He had taken only a few exposureswhenthecamerafailed.Theshutterspeedknobspunineffectuallyinhisglovedfingers. He then helpedGibson reload the ATM cameras. After finishing thattask,theyworkedtheirwayaroundtheairlocktotheinoperativeantennaontheearth-facingsideofthecluster.Theyquicklyfoundthat,althoughPoguehadtodotheworkontheelectronicsmodule,Gibsoncouldbetterrestrainhimself.Sothescience-pilotheldon tohiscolleagueandmovedhimaround,whilePoguecalledoutdirectionsandusedbothhandstowork.17

From telemetry, scientists suspected faults in one or both of thepotentiometers that controlled the antenna’s oscillations. Pogue opened themodule and cleaned the potentiometers; but when Carr applied power to theantenna,itdidnotfunction.Somesimpletestsshowedthattheproblemwasinthe pitch circuit (controlling fore-and-aft oscillations) and could not becorrected; so Pogue installed a pin to lock the pitch gimbal and a jumper tobypass it.WhenCarr activated the unit again, itworked, though only side-to-side,scanningacrossthespacecraft’sgroundtrack.Restoringmorethanhalfoftheinstrument’sfunctiondelightedtheexperimenters.18

Pogue and Gibson returned to the airlock after a 6½-hour, near-flawlessexercise.EVAhadcomealongwaysinceGemini;PogueandGibsonhadhardlyworkedupasweat.Still, ithadbeenalongday,andthateveningCarrsawnoreason tostayup late to finish thepost-EVAchecklist.Theywere tired,and itcouldwaituntilFriday.19

Next day the astronauts were still behind schedule. Neil Hutchinson toldreporters that the crewmightgetSaturdayoff, insteadofMonday. (Their firstscheduleddayoff,19November,hadbeencanceledbeforelaunch.)Themissioncould afford the time, and he thought the crew needed some breathing space.Hutchinsonadmittedthatflightplannershaderredinestimatingthetimeneededtogetthingsdoneandhadgiventhecrewtoomuchworktodo.20

The same problem had come up on the earliermissions, but evidently thehard-chargingsecondcrewhadleftalastingimpressiononflightplanners,whoweretryingtobringCarr,Pogue,andGibsonuptothelevelthatBean,Lousma,andGarriotthadachieved.Onthefirstmission,PeteConradhadbeenquicktoletMissionControlknowwhenhewaspressedtoohard(p.288);butJerryCarrwas no Pete Conrad, and no doubt his misjudgment about reporting Pogue’sillnesshadinhibitedhimstillmore.HedidnotwanttotellHoustonthathiscrewcould not keep up with the flight plan—certainly not on the opencommunicationsloop.21

Afreedayon the24thhelped,especially sinceMissionControl studiouslyavoided saying anything that might sound like harassment. That evening thecommander sat down and reviewed the first week for flight controllers. “ThebestwordIcanthinkoftodescribeit,”hetoldthechannelBtaperecorder,“isfrantic.”Learning tomovearound“just takesagreatdealof time. I thinkyoucould tell by our voices thatwewere very, very frustrated….Nomatter howhardwe tried, andhow tiredwegot,we just couldn’t catchupwith the flightplan.Anditwasavery,verydemoralizingthingtohavehappentous.”Hewascautiouslyoptimistic;theyhadfinishedalltheworkscheduledthroughthatday,

but could easily get behind again. He urged flight planners to give themschedulestheycouldkeepupwith.22

GETTINGTOWORK

Sunday itwasback to thegrind: running thecardiovascular assessmentonGibson,replacingavideodisplaytubeandinstallinganewautomatictimeronthe ATM console, and checking out the earth-resource sensors. That eveningFlight Director Donald Puddy commented positively on the day’saccomplishments. The crew’s spirits had been lifted by their day off, and heofferedtheopinionthat“withinthenextfewdaysthecomments that…we’refollowing a little bit behind the flight plan will disappear from the agenda.”Weather permitting, the first earth-resources passwould bemade onMonday,andATMobservationswerescheduledtostartTuesday.23

Flightcontrollersintendedtostartanormalworkscheduleonthe24th.Butthedayoffhadpostponedthat,andonthe23dtheworkshopsprangasurprise.That night, without warning, one of the controlmoment gyros heated up andslowed down alarmingly. All indications suggested that an inadequatelylubricated bearing had seized up. Flight controllers turned off the sick gyro,switched theworkshop computer to two-gyro operation, and began towonderhowtheyweregoingtocompletethemission.24

In normal circumstances the loss of one controlmoment gyrowould havebeenaminordisturbance;whatmadeitseriouswasthedepletedsupplyofgasfortheattitude-controlthrusters.Thefirstfewdaysafterlaunchoftheworkshop,attitude-control fuel had been used up at an alarming rate (p. 257).When thethird crew reached Skylab, the system had only about one-third its originalcapability.Manyearth-resourcepassesremainedtobedone,andthemaneuverstoobservecometKohoutekwouldbeespeciallycostlyinfuel.Iftherewastobeanyhopeofcompletingthoseassignments,flightcontrollershadtoknowexactlyhowmuchpropellanteverymaneuverwouldrequire.ExpertsatHuntsvilleandHouston immediately set to work devising more accurate ways to assess theworkshop’s momentum state and working out new computer programs. Allexperimentsthatrequiredmaneuveringbecamemuchmorecomplicated.25

Monday’s scheduled earth-resources pass was canceled because cloudscovered the site, so thedaywasgivenover to a cardiovascular experimentonCarr, stellar spectroscopy, and an observation of comet Kohoutek. Gibsoncheckedoutthesolarinstrumentsinpreparationforthefirstobservingperiodon

Tuesday. Itwas another busy day, andCarr andPogue complained ofmakingerrorsandbeingrushed.26

Tuesday’sschedulewastypicalofthewaythingswouldgoforthenexttwoweeks.By 6:30 a.m. the astronauts had started their early-morning chores.At8:22Carrreported thathehadbegunATMoperations.Halfanhour later, theylearnedthattheobservingschedulewouldbemorecrowdedthanplanned,sincescientistscouldseeconsiderablesolaractivityandfelttherewasagoodchanceforasolarflare.27

WhileCarrwaswatching the sun—hehadmost of the day’sATMduty—PogueandGibsonhad several tasks toperform.Pogue set up a camera in thewardroom window to photograph a cloud of barium vapor released from arocket,partofanexperimenttostudytheearth’smagneticfield.HeandGibsontook turns monitoring each other as subjects of the vestibular-functionexperiment.Forthenewsmedia,theymadea9-minuteTVtapetoillustratein-orbitexercise.Carrexplainedtheergometerandthe“Thorntontreadmill”whileperformingon them.The treadmillwas a sheetof slipperyTeflon fixed to thefloor,onwhichtheastronautwalkedinhisstockingfeet.Abungee-cordharnesspressedhimdown,substitutingforgravity.Scientist-astronautWilliamThorntonhadconceivedthissimpledevicetostressthelegmusclesthatwerenotproperlyexercisedbythebicycle,anditworkedverywell—sowell,infact,thatnoonecould use it for more than a few minutes. It was a welcome addition to theexerciseprogram.28

At intervals during the day,Carr and Pogue took photographs through thewardroomwindow,choosingsitesfromalistsentupbyMissionControl.Thiswas part of a program to systematize the heretofore informal observation ofcloud patterns, ocean currents, and geologic features. Later they wouldsupplement the photography with detailed visual observations anddescriptions.29

FlightcontrollersandCMGexperts,meanwhile,werelearningthelimitsoftheir maneuvering capability with two control moment gyros. Positioning theworkshopforPogue’sphotographyofthebariumcloudsaturatedtheCMGs,andconsiderable fuel was used in returning to solar inertial attitude. Aroundmidafternoon the next day’smaneuverswere canceled so that engineers couldstudy the problem a bit more. At the evening press briefing, reporters urgedDonaldPuddytoestimatehowmuchearth-resourcesdatamightbelost,buttheflightdirectorwasunwillingtoconcedethatanywouldbe.Heexpectedthatinafewdaysthecomplexitiesofmaneuveringwithtwogyroswouldbemastered,sothatbeforethemissionwasoverallmandatorysitescouldbecovered.30

A symmetrical bow-wave cloud pattern downwind of small, mountainous Gough Island in the SouthAtlantic.Theislanditself, lowerright, isclear.Thephotowastakenwithahand-held70-mmHasselbladcamera.SL4-137-3632.

Afteralongday,Carrsatdownat9p.m.togivetheeveningstatusreport—sleep, exercise, changes in food and water intake, clothing used, and so on.Ground and spacecraft exchanged several questions and answers about flightplans and the status of systems, and after briefly summarizing the day’s newsheadlines,CapComsignedoffshortlyafter10o’clock.31

By30November the guidance and control experts felt confident that theyunderstood their new constraints. They executed a complicate earth-resources

pass thatday; theastronautscarriedout theirpai flawlesslyand theamountofattitude-controlfuelusedwasveryclosetowhathadbeenpredicted.Twodayslater,however,anattempttoconducttwopassesinsequencesaturatedthegyrosand used much more thruster gas than expected. Back to the computers andsimulators went the engineers; two more days were needed to devise newprocedures.32

During theweek of 26November, as flight planners began to step up thepace of the work day, each astronaut responded to a questionnaire about thehabitabilityoftheworkshop.Aquestioncallingforcommentsonunanticipatedproblems promptedCarr to reflect on the frantic first twoweeks.Most of theunanticipated trouble arose because there was no way to train adequately forzero-g maneuvering. “When you get up here …, it’s a whole new world….Everythingwedidtooktwoorthreetimesasmuchtimeaswethoughtitwouldtake.Wefooledourselves.”Thenhetouchedontherootcauseoftheirtrouble:

Wetoldthepeopleonthegroundbeforeweleftthatweweregoingtotakeitslowandeasyonactivation,…thatwewerenotgoingtoallowourselvestoberushed.Wegotuphere,andweletourselvesjustgetdrivenrightintotheground.Weholleredalotaboutwewerebeingrushedtoomuch,butwedidnot,ourselves,slowdownandsay,“toheckwitheverythingelse”;anddothingsjustoneaftertheother,likewesaidweweregoingtodo.

Thesereflectionswentunnoticedbyflightplanners;still trying toget the thirdcrewup to thepace setby the second, theywere inno frameofmind to readsuchcommentsforwhattheywere.33Sotheypressedon,shorteningthetimefortasksbydegrees,decreasingthetimebetweenplannedactivities,followingwhatthey assumed was the crew’s increasing proficiency. Flight directors notedseveraltimesthatcrewperformancewasnotyetashighastheyhadhoped.On5Decemberboththeflightdirectorandthecrewphysicianprofessedtoseesignsthattheastronautswerenolongerasrushedastheyhadbeen,butnextday,Carrcomplainedaboutthescheduleforsevenminutes.Wewouldn’t“beexpectedtoworka16-hourdayfor85daysontheground,”thecommandertoldthem,“soIreallydon’tseewhyweshouldeventrytodoituphere.”Theflightdirectortoldreporters thatnight that27man-hoursperdayofexperimentworkwerebeingplanned—an“increasefromthenominal,”butlessthanBean’screwhaddone.34

FIRSTMONTH’sACCOMPLISHMENTS

Programofficialsreviewedthemissiononits28thday,13December1973,assessing the performance of spacecraft systems and crew and weighing theprospects for completing 84 days. That afternoon at a press conference, Bill

Schneider ticked off the mission’s accomplishments: 84 hours of solarobservations, 12 earth-resource passes, 80 photographic and visual earthobservations,allofthescheduledmedicalexperiments,plusnumerouscorollaryexperiments, student experiments, and science demonstrations. The astronautshad done three major repair jobs. The principal worries were the solar x-raytelescope,whichhadajammedfilterwheel,andanoccasionalsignofdistressinoneoftheremainingcontrolmomentgyros—somethingeveryonewaswatchingvery carefully.Unless something unforeseen happened, Schneider said, “we’reGOforour60-daymission,open-endedto84.”35

Reporters immediately raised questions about the crew.Whywere they soslow?Whywere theymakingmistakes?Howdid they comparewith the firsttwocrews?BothSchneiderandKennethKleinknechtdeniedthattherewasanyhigherincidenceoferroronthethirdmissionthanonthefirsttwoandrefusedtocomparetheperformanceofcrews.Hundredsofchangesto theflightplanhadmade the thirdcrew’s jobmuchharder.Kleinknechtputsomeof theblameonpeopleonthegroundwhohadapprovedsomanychangesandassertedthatCarr,Pogue,andGibsonweredoing“anoutstanding job.”Oneunidentifiedreporterthen resurrected the vomiting incident and the crew’s unguarded discussion,whichhecalled“ineffect…acoverup.”WasSchneider suspicious,heasked,thatothermatterswerebeingwithheldfromflightcontrollersorphysicians?No,theprogramdirectorreplied;thechannelBtapeswerefullofadmissionsoferrorand the doctors were satisfied that their medical conferences were frank andopen.Asforanycoverup,thetruegaugeofthatfirstday’sdiscussionwasthatCarr andGibsonhad finally decided thatmanagerswould have to knowwhathad happened and had saved the physical evidence. Both Schneider andKleinknechtwarmlydefendedthecrew,andreportersletthesubjectdrop.36

No matter how much officials protested, there was a problem; angrycomments from each crewman proved the point that very week. On 12DecemberPoguecomplainedbitterlytochannelBaboutthetightschedulingofexperiments.Hehadjustlostacoupleofphotographsbecausehehadtosetupacamerainahurry,andaddressingtheprincipalinvestigatorheremarked,“thisisgoing to happen again [and again] until the word gets through to the FlightActivitiesOfficers that they’re going to have to give us time to get from onepoint in thespacecraft toanother…. Idon’tknowhowwe’regoing toget thisacross to [them] unless you [principal investigators] put your foot down andstomp it hard.” Two days later Carr complained—again to channel B—in thesame vein. Flight planners seemed to forget that it took time to enter all thechanges tochecklists that theysentup.“One little [teleprintermessage]3or4

inches longrepresentsabout30minutesofwork.”Gibsontookhis turnonthe20th,detailingexactlyhowhisschedulehadbeenknockedawrythatmorningbyaseriesofsmallbuttime-consumingproblems.“That’snowaytodobusiness,”hecomplained,andwenton:“Ipersonallyhavefoundthetimesincewe’vebeenuphere tobenothingbut a33-day firedrill…. I’vebeenengulfed inbuildingblocks rather than being concerned with the quality of the data.” He thendeclared his personal independence from rigid scheduling, stating that heintendedtotakeasmuchtimeasheneededtodoeachjobright.Ifsomethinggotpushedoffattheendoftheday,toobad.“It’sgoingtocomedownright,ratherthanontime.”37

Gibson’s comments explicitly expressed something that flightplannershadsensedalready:thecrewcouldnothandletheworkloadthatflightplannersweregiving them. Program Scientist Robert Parker, an astronaut and astronomer,recalledlaterthateveryattempttoincreasethedailyworkloadcameupagainstabrickwallatabout25man-hours.Having indicated thatabout30man-hourswould be available when he accepted requirements from the principalinvestigators,Parkerwasgettinghisplansalltangledup.Aroundtheendofthefirstmonthhecutbackbyabout15%.38

ACOMETFORCHRISTMAS

As comet Kohoutek sped toward perihelion on 28 December, America’snewspapersbeganacrescendoofcoverageintendedtoclimaxwiththebrilliantdisplay they expected around the end of the year (app. F). Scientists andengineers had spent the summer of 1973 working out plans to use Skylab’sinstruments for comet studies and had developed two new cameras tosupplement the ATM telescopes and four corollary experiments already onboard.39

Systematic comet observations began on 23 November, when Pogue usedone of the new instruments, a photometric camera that measured the comet’sintrinsicbrightness.Observationstocollectdataonthecompositionofitscomaand tail began two days later. Three corollary experiments and a newelectronographiccamerameasuredultravioletradiationemittedbyhydrogenandoxygen atoms, from which scientists hoped to determine whether Kohoutekcontainedsubstantialamountsofice.Theseinstrumentsalloperatedthroughtheantisolarscientificairlockandrequiredmaneuveringtheworkshoptobringthemtobearonthecomet.By20Decemberthecrewhadmade17observationswith

thesecameras.40

Asthecometdrewclosertothesun,thesolartelescopesbecametheprimarymeansofgatheringdata.BecausethepointingsystemwasdesignedtokeeptheATM centered on the sun, extra work was required to point it a few degreesaway.Twocrewmenwereassignedtocometobservationforthefirstfewdays.Withonlythecoronagraphdisplaytoprovidevisualguidance,itwasnoteasytolocatethecomet,butaftertheyhadrunthroughthenewproceduresafewtimes,theastronautscouldcarryoutthecomplexmaneuverswithconfidence.41

CometKohoutekasphotographed throughthewhite-lightcoronagraph,experimentS052.Acoronagraphcreates an artificial eclipse so that relatively dim objects near the sun can be seen. Here the comet ispassingbehindthesun,27December1973.HighAltitudeObservatoryphoto.

AnextravehicularexcursionwasscheduledforChristmasday,asecondfourdays later. Besides reloading ATM film, the astronauts were to take out twocamerastophotographthecomet.Therewerealsotwomorerepairjobs:pinningopen a balky aperture door on the ultraviolet spectro-heliograph and freeing ajammedfilterwheelinthex-raytelescope.42

OnChristmasmorning,afterabriefexchangeofholidaygreetings,Carrand

Poguemadethelengthypreparationsandsteppedout.First,theytookaseriesofexposuresof thecometwith thecoronagraphiccamera.Carr then reloaded theATMcamerasandpinnedthemalfunctioningexperimentdooropen—stayinganextraminuteortwo,atGibson’sinsistence, toenjoythespectacularviewfromthe sun end of the telescope mount. Carr and Pogue then clamped theelectronographiccamerainplacetogetsomephotographsofthecomet.Neithercould see it, so they pointed the camera at the region where the comet wasexpectedtobeandbegantheprescribedsequenceofexposures.43

SixhoursintotheEVA,Carrpositionedhimselfatthecenterworkstationonthetelescopemounttoattemptrepairofthefilterwheel.Ithadjammedwhilehiscrewwas in Skylab, so there had been no chance to train for this job on theground. Using a flashlight and an oversized dentist’s mirror, he located thebarely accessible filter holder and verified that it was stuck between twopositions.Carr thenuseda screwdriver topush thewheel toanopenposition,with no filter in place. As he was working his hand into position, Carrmomentarilyslipped;theshuttersnappedshut,andthescrewdriverbentoneofitsthinmetalblades.CarrfearedhehaddisabledtheinstrumentanddidnothinguntilhecouldtalkwithHoustonagain—radiocontacthadfadedjustashebeganto work.When he described the situation toMission Control, the experimentmanagersquicklydecidedtobendtheshutterbladesoutoftheway,leavingtheaperture fully open. Another 30-minute communications gap came up just asCarr was about to move the filter wheel, and when radio contact wasreestablished, he verified the filter positionwithHouston’s telemetry and thenpushedthewheeltotheopenslot.Thatconcludedtheirscheduledwork.Whentheywerebackinsidetheairlock,6hoursand54minuteshadelapsed.44

On 28 December, Lubos Kohoutek himself came to Houston for a wellpublicized11-minutetalkwiththeSkylabcrew.Neither theastronomernor theastronauts learned anything from the conversation; it was simply taken forgranted that some such gesture had to be made. For the American press, theCzech astronomer had become the important personage of the comet drama,thoughhewasnoexpertoncometsandhadonlyanincidentalconnectionwiththisone.Seeminglypuzzledby thegreat interest incomet1973f in theUnitedStates,Kohouteknonethelesswentthroughthepublicaffairsroutine, includingtheconversationwiththeastronauts,withpoiseandgoodhumor.45

On 29 December, during the third EVA (provided specifically for cometobservation),GibsonandCarrfinallygotagoodlookatthecomet.GibsongaveMissionControlabriefdescriptionbeforethecometpassedintotheairglowjustafterorbitalsunset.HeandCarrthenretrievedsomesamplesofmaterialsfrom

outsidethespacecraft,setupthecamerastophotographthecomet,andmadetheexposures after theyhadgone around the earth again.Gibson thenprovided amoredetaileddescriptionofthesize,orientation,andcolorofthetailandoftheprominentspikestretchingouttowardthesun.Afterthreeandahalfhours,thetwocamebackinside,tryingtoretaintheirmentalimpressionsofthecometsothey could make sketches later. During the next few days the crew spentconsiderabletimeobservingKohoutek,usingtheATMinstrumentswhileitwasstillnearthesun.From5January1974onward,mostofthecomet-watchingwasdonewithotherinstrumentsasthecometheadedrapidlyawayfromthesun,toreturn(perhaps)in75000years.46

CARRCALLSFORANASSESSMENT

AsidefromoneortwocomplaintsfromJerryCarr,thecrewsaidlittleaboutworkloadsandschedulesduringthelasttwoweeksofDecember.Ithadbeenabusymonth,withtheextraactivityinvolvedinobservingcometKohoutek,butthe crew had no trouble keeping up with their work assignments. They evenfoundtimetobuildacrudeChristmastreeoutofpackingmaterialfromthefoodstorage cans anddecorated itwithmakeshift ornaments.But crewandgroundwerenotyetmarching to thesamedrumbeat.Flightplanners,havingmasteredthecomplexartofassemblingaday’sactivityfor threemenwithoutwastingaminute,werejustifiablyproudoftheirexpertiseandofthequantityofscientificdata it could produce.The astronauts, however, did not share that philosophy;they felt their jobwas to turn out quality results, notmerely some arbitrarilylarge quantity of data.And they chafed under the inflexible scheduling; everytinyhousekeepingchorehaditsbitoftimeinthedailyroutine.Allthreefeltthattheflightplansweredraggingthemaroundbythenoseandthatthesystemwasnotresponsivetotheirneeds.47

AroundChristmas,Carr,Gibson,andPogueagreedthat theyhadtohaveabetterunderstandingwiththeflightplannersastothewaythingsweredone.Onthe evening of 28December, after sending down the daily status report, CarrremarkedtoCapComRichardTrulythathewaspreparingaspecialmessageforMissionControl;hewouldputitonchannelBbeforeheretiredforthenight.Hethen went to the onboard recorder and taped a six-minute plea for a frankdiscussionofthemission’sstatusatthehalfwaypoint.“We’dallkindofhopedbeforethemission,”hesaid, that“everybodyhadthemessage, thatwedidnotplantooperateatthe[previouscrew’s]pace.”Nowhewasworriedabouthowhis crew was measuring up to expectations. He was puzzled by some of the

questionsbeingasked;hehadbeguntowonder,“Arewebehind,andifsohowfar?” Were flight controllers worried because the crew wanted so much freetime?Were theyupsetby the time thecrewwantedforexercise?“Ifyouguysthink that’s unreasonable, I’d like some straight words on that.” Carr assuredHoustonthathewouldaskforaprivatecommunicationifmanagementwantedto talk privately; by now, however, hewas ready to talk things out before thewholeworld.Thebigquestionwas, “Wheredowe stand?What canwedo ifwe’rerunningbehindandweneedtogetcaughtup?…we’dliketohavesomestraightwordsonjustwhatthesituationisrightnow.”48

Carr later regretted that he had waited so long. “We swallowed a lot ofproblemsforalotofdaysbecausewewerereluctanttoadmitpubliclythatwewerenotgetting thingsdoneright,”herecalled.“That’s ridiculous, [but] that’shuman behavior.” With that summation both of his crewmates emphaticallyagreed.49

Theastronautswerenottheonlyoneswhofelttheyneededafrankexchangeofviews.RobertParkerrecalledthatgroundpersonneltoowereinhibitedbytheopen communications channel. No one who spoke directly to the crew eversuggested that they were doing less than a great job. “We just very seldom[found]ourselvescapableofcallingaspadeaspade,”wasthewayParkerputit.It got worse when the newspapers began to suggest that the third crew wasslower and more error-prone than the second. Everyone in Houston becamedefensiveaboutthecrew,feelingthattheywerebeingmaligned.50NotwithoutreasondidCarrcallforsome“straightwords”fromMissionControl.

Truly acknowledgedCarr’smessage the following night, and the next dayflight planners sent up a long teleprinter message outlining their views andscheduledanair-to-grounddiscussionfortheeveningof30December.Ifittooktwohourstoreachanunderstanding,everythingelsecouldwait.51

The importance of the discussion was that it took place at all, althoughsubstantiveissuesweresettledaswell.OneofTruly’sfirstcommentswasthatMissionControlhadnotbeenawareofthecommander’sexpressedintentiontoworkatamoredeliberatepacethanthesecondcrew.Flightplannershadindeedtriedtopushthethirdcrewuptothesecondcrew’slevel,butwhenthatprovedimpossible theyhadcut the loadback.To their surprise,however,when flightplannerscompared theaccomplishmentsof the twomissionsbetween the15thand30thmissiondays,theyfoundnosignificantdifference.52

Turning to specific scheduling problems,Truly spokeof physical exercise,whichCarrfeltstronglyabout.Trulypointedoutthatthe90minutessetasidefor

exercisecausedseriousschedulingdifficulty.Theonlysolutiontheplannershadfoundwastobreakitupintotwo45-minutesessions.Carrinterruptedtogivehissideofthequestion:hewantedtimetocooldownandcleanupafteraworkouton the ergometer, because he despised rushing off to some other job feelinggrimyandhot.Doingthattwiceadaywasmorethanhecouldtake.53

Free time was another sensitive issue. All of the astronauts wanted someuninterruptedtimeaftertheygotoutofbedinthemorning,andagainattheendof thedayso theycouldunwind; thiswasall themore importantbecause theyexpectedtostayinorbitfor12weeks.MissionControlwaswillingtoplanforanuninterruptedhourbeforebedtime,butreservedtheoptiontobreakintoitifascientificopportunityarosethattheycouldnotpassup.“Yes,weappreciatethattoo, Dick,” Carr said; “the reason we started hollering is that there was justgettingtobetoomuchofthat.”“Okay,”saidTruly,“youaskedwhatsomeofourflightplanproblemsare,andthathasbeenoneofthem.”54

Afternearlyhalfanhour,Trulysummeduphisendoftheconversationwithencouragingwords.“I thinkit’s importantforyoutoknowthatwerealizethatthese last coupleofweeks, thework load thatwe’vebeenputtingonyou is alevel that youvery obviously havehandledwith noproblems….Wenaturallywouldliketocontinuetogetmorescienceperinvestedhouraswegoalong”—ahintthatHoustonstillwantedtoincreasetheworkload—so“anytimeyouseeaconsistentgapintheflightplanningthatprovidesyoualittleextratime,believeme, itwill helpus toknowabout it…. [And]whenwego to talk about flightplanning…,wethinkit’salotbettertotalkaboutitontheair-to-groundthanonthevoicedump.…soyou’llbetalkingto theteamthatdidit toyou,andyouguyscanhave itout.”“Okay,” saidCarr, “we’ll suredo it thatway fromnowon.”55

During the 20-minute communications gap that followed, Carr consultedwithPogueandGibsonandputtogetherhisownsummation.Hestillinsistedonsomequiettimeattheendoftheday,butsaidthecrewwouldconsiderbreakinguptheirexerciseperiodsifthatwouldhelp.Healsosuggestedthatactivitiesthatwerenottime-critical(suchassomeofthecorollaryexperimentsandmostofthehousekeeping tasks) the crew should do when they could best get around tothem.Thiswouldallowsomejudgmentandrelievetheautomaton-likeexistencetheyhadbeenleadingforsixweeks.56

Closing the 55-minute discussion, Truly expressed Mission Control’ssatisfaction.“Jerry,letmesayonething,that[JSCDirector]Dr.KraftandDeke[Slayton, Flight Crew Operations chief] have been here and listened … andthey’reveryhappywiththewayyou’redoingbusiness,…andtheythinkwe’ve

madeaboutamilliondollarstonight.”57

Just howmuch they had actuallymadewas not immediately obvious, buteveryonewasrelievedtofindthatcandidconversationscouldbeheldinpublicwithout serious consequences. With the assurance that difficulties could bequickly settled and that mission planners were responsive to their needs andpreferences, crewmoralewent up.Why it took so long to reach this level ofcandor remained a mystery. Many of those involved agreed that groundpersonnelsimplydidnotrealizethatthethirdcrewcouldnotbedealtwithinthesamewayas the first two. JerryCarr—unlike someotherastronauts—wasnoteasilyprodded intoexpressingdissatisfaction.Thoughhevowedbefore launchthathewouldblowthewhistle ifMissionControlpushedhiscrewtoofar,hismishandlingofPogue’sfirst-dayillnessputhimonthedefensiveandmadehimfeel he had to make up for it by producing results. Looking back on it atmission’send,Carracceptedsomeoftheresponsibility,buthealsofaultedflightplannersforallowingthecrewnotimeforadjustment.“Obviously[they]werenotthinking,”hesaid;“theywerejustcoloringsquaresandfillinginchecklists.Thatisnowaytooperateamission.”58

Afterward,membersoftheMissionControlteamminimizedtheimportanceof this discussion—and of the circumstances that led up to it—in the overallsuccessofthelastmission.Atthetime,however,everyonewasgladtheairhadbeencleared.Twodayslater,FlightDirectorNeilHutchinsonremarkedthattheastronautsweremorealert,thattheywerelookingaheadintheday’sflightplanand organizing activities to optimize their work schedule, and that they hadstayedaheadoftheflightplanallday.59

AROUNDTHEWORLDFOR84DAYS

Early in January,Carr, Pogue, andGibsonwere closing in on the existingrecordsfordurationofspaceflight.Onthe4ththeyeclipsedPeteConrad’smark—one thathad taken fourmissions toaccumulate.On25January the first all-rookiecrewineightyearswouldbecometheworld-recordholdersfortimespentin space, but for the time being that title still belonged to the second Skylabcrew. The members of the third crew were little concerned with setting newendurancerecords;thatwasincidental.Theirmaininterestwasincompletingthemission planned for them, and, after settling their differences with MissionControl,theywentabouttheirworkwithnewenthusiasm.60

The 10th of January, the astronauts had a day off—whichmeant that only

abouta thirdof their timewas formallyscheduled.Otherwise theydidas theypleased.Gibsonspentalmost theentiredaywatching the sun;PogueandCarrstayedbythewardroomwindowmuchofthetime,makingobservations,takingphotographs, or simply enjoying the view. Like the earlier crews, they werefascinatedbytheconstantlychangingpanorama.61

Managers,meanwhile,wereconductingthe56-daymissionreview,decidingwhethermenandmachinesshouldbeclearedforan84-daymission.NextdayBillSchneiderannouncedthatthewordwas“GO”for84days.Strictlyspeaking,approvalwasgivenonlyforaweekatatime,butlittledoubtremainedthatthefull12-weekflightcouldbecompleted.Theonlythinglikelytocurtailitwastheailing control moment gyroscope. Even if that failed, it would create noemergency;thecrewwouldhaveplentyoftimetoretrievetheATMfilm,packuptheircommandmodule,andleavetheworkshopinorderlyfashion.62

The gyro, however, was becoming worrisome. Engineers suspectedinadequatelubricationofitswheelbearingsandconductedmaneuverscarefully,trying to reduce stress on those bearings. Toward the end of December theybeganmanuallycontrollingthebearingheaterstokeeptemperaturesintheupperpartoftheallowedrange.This,theexpertshoped,wouldthintheoilandallowitto flowmoreeasily into thebearings.Therewasnotmuchelse theycoulddo.Experimentsthatrequiredmaneuveringthespacecraftnowhadtobescheduledmuchmorecarefully;earth-resourcepasseshadtolookexactlyrightbeforetheywerefinallyputintheflightplan.WeatherconditionsinlateDecemberandearlyJanuary were not favorable, and earth-resources photography sufferedsomewhat.Otherwise,atthe56-daymilestonethecrewwasroughlytwo-thirdsofthewaythroughtheexperimentprogram.63

Bags of trashwere deposited in the trash airlock, which had been the liquid-oxygen tank on the S-IVBstage.Towardtheendofthethirdmission,someencouragementwasrequired—whichPogueisprepared,left,toapply.Holdingontotheceiling,heisabouttojumponthehatch,sothatCarrwillbeabletoinserttheremainingbags.S-74-17304.Below,anunusualviewinsideSkylab.Thephotographerisnearthehatchinto the airlockmodule looking the length of theworkshop. The crewman in the center, seen through apassageway in the floor, is stashing trashbags.Twospacesuitsand the thirdcrewmanarevisibleon theupperdeck.SL4-150-5061.

The solar observations were closest to being on schedule—in terms ofobservingtimeandphotographs—butthesunhadbeenfairlyquiet.Thecoronahadbeenactive,mostlywhilethecrewwasasleep,butgeneralsolaractivityhadbeen low.Around 10 January, solar scientists expected some active regions tocomebackintoviewasthesunrotated.EdGibsonwasparticularlyanxiousforthe sun to cooperate.No one had yet photographed a flare from beginning toend, andwith only fourweeks left, his chances to get one “on the rise”weredropping daily. Early in January, Gibson expressed his desire to spendconsiderabletimeinthe“flarewait”mode,readytopounceonpre-flareactivity.On10Januarytheprincipalinvestigatorforthecoronagraph,RobertMacQueen,conferred with Gibson about strategy for the next couple of weeks. Theexperimenters wanted more solar activity as badly as the man on the controlpanel;MacQueencommented,“’This is the last timearoundaftermore thanadecade of this, and we certainly hope the sun cooperates.” He gave Gibsonpermissiontochangethepreplannedprogramsathisdiscretion.64

After the ATM conference the entire crew took part in a general scienceconference with experimenters’ representatives in Houston. Such conferenceswerescheduledseveraltimesduringthemission—usuallyonthecrew’sdaysoff—so that experimenters could brief the astronauts on the different scienceprograms, lay out strategy for the next few days, and get their insights into

experimentplanning.*Specificinstructionsweresentupdailybyteleprinter;theconferences, supplemented by occasional discussions at other times, gave theastronauts an understanding of the scientific objectives and moderated anyfeelingofisolationbetweentheastronautsandtheexperimentplanners.65

ForSkylabmidsummerdaycame inmid-January,when thepositionof theearth in its orbit and the high inclination of the workshop’s orbital planecombinedtokeepthespacecraftinsunlightfor46revolutions.Thecrewmadespecial efforts to reduce the load on the cooling systems. Mission Controlrecommended that they not shower during this period to avoid increasing thehumidity, but did not insist on it. Workshop temperatures climbed slowly,reaching 28°C on the 18th. Ed Gibson’s sleeping compartment was notcompletely covered by the improvised solar shields, so he moved his sleeprestraint into the cooler airlock.This addeda constraint tomissionoperations,sincetheteleprinter,locatedintheairlock,wasnoisyandMissionControltriedtoavoidusingitwhilethescience-pilotwasasleep.66

On 20 January, CapCom advised Gibson that observers had seen twosubnormalsolarflaresinoneactiveregioninasix-hourperiod.Laterintheday,however,Houstonreportedthattherewaslittlehopeanythingspectacularmightoccur.Nonetheless,Gibsonthoughttheregionlookedpromisingandwatcheditforawhile.FromnowonGibsonwouldbethemanontheconsolemostofthetime; both Jerry Carr and the scientists wanted to ensure that if anythinginterestinghappened,Gibsonwouldbetheretoruntheinstruments.Flightplanswere occasionally shuffled and duties exchanged so that he could spendmoretimeatthecontrolanddisplaypanel.67

Asfarasground-basedobserverscouldsee,thesunhadchangedlittlebythenext morning, but Gibson remained optimistic. Nothing developed during hisafternoonwatch,buthewassosureaflarewasimminentthatheofferedCarrabribe to let him stay on the panel for another orbit.Around 5 o’clock, askingHoustonforareportonx-rayactivity,Gibsonsaidhewantedtospendthenextorbit in the “flare wait” mode: “I’ve already promised the commander somebuttercookieswhenwegetbackifIcouldhavetheorbit.”Gibsongottheextraorbit—atthepriceofabottleofScotch;thebuttercookieswereforthebenefitof the listeningpublic—but anhour later hewas stillwaiting.BillPoguewasscheduled to take over theATMon the next orbit, butwhenHouston sent upsomeinstructionsfromthesolarscientists,Pogue,tongueincheek,pointedoutaproblem: “Ed has theMDA hatch barricaded up there.” Gibson stayed at thepanelandwasatlastrewarded.Justbeforecommunicationsbrokeoffhesaid,“Ithinkthistimewefinallygotoneontherise.”HewentstraighttothechannelB

recorderanddictateda23-minutedescriptionoftheevent,repeatingitovertheair-to-ground when Houston came back. He went to bed that night a happyman.68

For the remainder of the mission the ailing gyroscope periodically gaveconcern.AtonepointProgramDirectorSchneiderordered theprime recoveryshiptoprepareforearlyrecovery.Butthegyrosettleddownandattheendwashumming along at a reduced speed, still doing its job.The possibility of gyrofailure brought Skylab back into news prominence briefly, but mannedspaceflight was no longer the darling of television. On 23 January the majornetworksannouncedthattherewouldbenolivecoverageofsplashdown.ItwasthefirsttimesincelivecoveragestartedwithGemini6in1965thatthenetworkshadintentionallypassedupthereturnofacrewfromspace.*69

The crewheld the second televised press conference of themission on 31January, in which they confirmed their faith in the value of Skylab and thescientificdatacollected.As theysawit, theprogramhadprovedthatmanwasindispensable to a productive and flexible program of orbital science. Gibsonwas willing to predict that space stations and manned planetary expeditions,thoughadmittedly far in the future,wereclearlypossible“when theAmericanpeople choose tomake the effort.”When that time came,Carr said, designersweregoing tohave topaya lotmoreattention tohabitability.Notonlywas itimportant to have pleasant quarters and properly designed work areas, but“you’regoingtohavetohaveaplacethatyoucancallhome[whereyoucan]bebyyourselfanddo justwhatyouwant todo.”Askedforcommenton the lowlevelofpublicinterest,Carrsaid,“Well,Ithinkpeoplejustgetusedtothings….andtake[them]forgranted.…Aslongasthingsstayratherroutineinthespaceprogram…public interestwillstaypretty low.”Thepressconferencewas tooshort to include four questions submitted by a sixth-grade science class inupstate New York, but since they had been cleared for use, during the nextrevolution CapCom Dick Truly worked them in one at a time. The student’squestionswere,ifanything,morepenetratingthanthenewsmen’s.OnethatgaveBill Pogue pause was whether the astronaut “felt more of a man now, ascompared with before you left?” Pogue begged off the philosophicalimplicationsofthatone,butdidallowthathewasabettercrewman—thatis,amoreefficientastronaut—after77days.Severalstudentswonderedwhetherthethree missed female companionship. Taken somewhat aback, Gibson asked,“What grade did you say that was, Dick?” (Nobody had put that question sodirectlybefore.)Thenheanswered,“Obviously,yes.”70

The first of February was the last full day of experiment work: an earth-

resourcespass,asetofmedicalexperiments,afinalshotofKohoutek.NextdayEdGibsonfinishedhislastobservationsfromtheATMconsole.Onthemorningof the3d,CarrandGibsonwentoutside to recover theATMfilmcarriersandbring in some particle collection experiments. Gibson took a number ofphotographs, including some to document the condition of the twin-pole sailafteritslongexposuretospace.71

COMINGBACK

Closingdowntheworkshopandpacking the things thathad tobereturnedwerebigjobs.Ontheeveningof31January,Houstonsentupalistofchangestothedeactivationandreentrychecklists;nextmorningCarrwasoverwhelmedby15metersofteleprinterpaper.Enteringthechangesinthebooksbyhandfilledthe crew’s idlemoments for quite awhile and providedmaterial for jokes fortwo days. That evening, Carr greeted BruceMcCandless coming on his shiftwith,“Iunderstandyou’regoingtoteleprinteruptheOldTestamenttonight.”72

Themajormedicalexperimentscontinuedrightonthroughdeactivation,andtherewereafewexperimentslefttocleanupon4February.Carrransomezero-gflammabilitytests—putoffuntiltheendofthemissionbecauseexhaustingtheresidues to space created contamination. Pogue sandwiched in someobservations on light flashes while the workshop passed through the SouthAtlanticanomaly.*73

Theeffectofgravityonflame.Inagravityfield,thehotgaseousproductsofcombustionrisebyconvection,allowingcolderairwithadditionaloxygen to enterandmixwith the fuel.Without convection, a flame’s

corona is spherical and the available oxygen is quickly used. The flame dies down until more oxygenbecomesavailable.ExperimentM479studiedthisphenomenon.

The crew had little trouble locating things to take back, but like touristsreturningfromalongtrip,theyfoundsomespacelimitations.Tryingtostufffiveearth-resource tapes into a command-module locker, Carr could not close itscover,nomatterhowherearrangedthecontents.BeforeHoustoncouldofferanysuggestions, he reported that the overburdened tourist’s customary solutionworked equally well in space: “It fits if you force it.” Gibson had a similarproblemwiththetraysthatheldthemission’surineandbloodsamples.74

Whilethecrewpackedupdataandshutdownsystems,reporterswonderedwhetherNASAplannedanymorevisitstoSkylab.NeilHutchinsonplayeddownthepossibility,pointingoutthattherewouldbenoatmosphere,nopower,andnofood. Besides, theworkshop systems could be expected to deteriorate beyondreliability.TheabandonedSkylabwouldbeadriftinghulk,presentingtoomuchrisktomakearevisitattractive.Heconcededthatitwouldbepossibletodockwith theworkshop, but saw no profit in reactivating and reusing it. Still, justbeforeleaving,thelastcrewwouldusetheApollothrusterstogivetheworkshopaboost,raisingitsorbittoextenditslifebyfivetoeightyears.Plannerswantedtokeep itupuntilShuttlemissionsbegan, incase someone thoughtofagoodreasontogoback—toretrievesomeofitscomponentsfortesting,forexample.Andthecrewwouldleavespecimensoffood,clothing,andotherarticlesinthemultipledockingadapter forpossible recovery todetermine theeffectof long-term storage in space. The last two nights the astronauts went to bed earlier,shiftingtheircircadianrhythmstosuittheplannedrecoverytime.75

On 8 February 1974, Carr, Gibson, and Pogue moved into the commandmoduleandpreparedforseparation.Thesubsequentreturntoearthwasnormal,withoneexception.

At 9:36Houston time Carr fired the big propulsion engine on the servicemodule,puttingthespacecraftonitsreentrytrajectory.Nineminuteslater,whenhetriedtomaneuverthespacecraftwithhishandcontroller,Carrwasstunnedtofindabsolutelynoresponsetoyawandpitchcommands—themoresosincehehadcheckedoutalltheattitude-controlthrustersonlyminutesbeforeandfoundeverything normal. After a second or two of slack-jawed astonishment, Carrswitchedtoabackupsystemandgainedcontrol.Itwaslaterdeterminedthattheastronauts hadmistakenly opened four circuit breakers, disabling the yaw andpitchthrusters.Theincident illustratedtheneedformaintainingproficiencybyrepeatedsimulationsduringlongmissions.76

Onceinthewater,thecrewhadabouthalfanhourtowaitwhiletherecoverycrewsbroughtthemaboardship.Nobodywasseasick,thankstothecalmseas.What they noticedmostwas the return of normal gravity.Gibsonwas acutelyawareoftheweightofhisheadandoftheeffortittookjusttomovehisarms;hefeltlikehewasstillintheearlystagesofreentry.Poguehadtakenacameraoutofitslockerwhiletheywereonthechutesandalmostdroppeditbecauseofitsunexpectedweight. It felt “like it weighed about thirty-five or forty pounds.”After taking one picture of the parachutes, he had to hold the camera untilsplashdownbecausehe thoughthecouldnotget theheavy thingback into thelocker.77

Partingview.The thirdcrewhasundockedfor the triphome;Skylabwouldcircle theearth for fivemoreyears.74-H-96.

TwoviewsofSkylabtakenbythethirdcrewonthefinalfly-aroundinspection.Left,asun’s-eyeviewofthetelescope mount. The lines extending left and right from the hub of the mount are discone telemetryantennas.SL4-143-4676.Below,SL4-143-4706. Inbothpictures, thecornersof theoriginalparasolarevisibleonbothsidesofthetwin-polesunshade.

Welcomesight to tiredastronauts: the threemain ring-sailparachutesdeployedatabout3000meters toslowthecommandmoduleasitapproachedthewater.SL3-114-1760.

Whiletheastronautswentthroughthefirstoftheirpostflightmedicaltests,officialsatHoustonheld thecustomarypressbriefing.AdministratorJamesC.Fletcherstressed the importanceofSkylab’saccomplishments for thefutureofmanned spaceflight: “It has moved the space program from the realm of thespectacular into a new phase that can be characterized possibly as almostbusinesslike if not yet quite routine.” Program Director William Schneidersummarized the statistics on the experiment programs; every one, he noted,exceeded premission plans, some by more than 200%. But that was only thestart: “Our portion of Skylab has been completed. The science phase has justbegun.”Skylabhadprovedthatinspaceresearch,“thelimitisonlyourresolve,nottheabilityofmentowork,andnotourtechnicalknowledge.”78

Assoonasthecrewhaddeparted,engineerstestedthebatteriesinthemainpower system, assessing how much they had deteriorated in orbit. Theyunloaded and reloaded the ATM’s computer memory, something that had notbeennecessaryduringthemissions,andfoundthatthesystemworkedperfectly.They tried unsuccessfully to start up the dead control moment gyro, thenswitchedoffthepowertotheothertwo,measuringbearingfrictionasthewheelsrandown.Asbesttheexpertscouldtell,inadequatelubricationwasresponsiblefor the failure of number one and the near-failure of number two. On theafternoon of 9 February flight controllers maneuvered Skylab into an attitudestabilizedby thegravitygradient,with thedockingadapterpointedawayfromtheearth,andshutoffthepower.79Afterthecigarashesweresweptout,MissionControlwasquiet.

*Duringthesecondmission,MissionControlhadrelaxeda long-standingruleandallowedsomeoneotherthanCapComtospeakdirectlywiththeastronauts.

*Gemini8, broughtbackearlybecauseof technicalproblems, landed far from theprimary recoveryzone,whereTVcoveragehadbeenplanned.

*ScientistshypothesizedthatintraocularlightflashesobservedonseveralApolloflightswerecausedbycosmicraysexpendingtheirenergyintheretina.EarlierobservationsonSkylab,however,suggestedacorrelationwith theSouthAtlanticmagnetic anomaly, andPogue’s experimentwas done in the hope ofconfirmingthat.Strappedinhissleeprestraint,henoted the time,direction,andshapeof theflashes.HefoundanabundanceofeventsoccurringintheSouthAtlanticanomaly,andthecosmic-rayhypothesishadtobereexamined.E.A.Hoffmanetal.,“VisualLightFlashObservationsonSkylab4,“ProceedingsoftheSkylabLifeSciencesSymposium,August27–29,1974,NASATMX-58154,pp.287–95.Incontemporaryterminology,theunmannedlaunchoftheclusterwascalledSkylab1,themannedmissionsSkylab2,3,and4.

18

Results

As Schneider had said, themissionswere only the first phase of Skylab’sscience program. Principal investigators immediately began processing thestaggeringamountofmaterial thecrewshadcollected (table2).From the fivesolartelescopes,astronomershadalmost103000photographsandspectra(plus68000 from theH-alpha cameras); the earth-resource instrumentshadyieldedpilesofphotographsandkilometersofmagnetic tape,dense indetail.Medicalinvestigators had 18 000 blood-pressure measurements, 200 hours ofelectrocardiograms,andextensivefood,urine,andfecalsamplesforbiochemicalanalysis.1

Onlyasmallfractionofthisinformationwasavailableduringthemissions,most of it medical. Houston’s medical directorate had significant operationalresponsibilities, apart from simply monitoring their experiments. Physiciansassessed crew health and health trends daily, using telemetered data, the crewmedicalconferences,andchannelBreports,andcontinuouslyadvisedprogrammanagersastothephysicalconditionoftheastronauts.Anyunfavorabletrendsorsuddenchangescouldhavecurtailedamission.2

Therestoftheexperimentershadtowaitforeachcrewtoreturnwithfilm,tape,andsamples.Aftereachofthefirsttwomissions,“quick-look”assessmentssuggestedchangesoradditionstoexperimentplansforthenextflight.Thenthelongandtediousevaluationsbegan,tocontinueforyears.Evenduringthelaterflights,however,preliminary resultswerepresented to scientificmeetings, andby the end of 1974 severalmajor symposia had been conducted summarizingSkylab’sresults.

MEDICALFINDINGS

InlateAugust,medicalinvestigatorsspentthreedaysinHoustondiscussing

the data from all the missions. In the entire program, these were the mostimportant investigations formanned spaceflight; its future depended onman’sability toadapt tozerogravity, to remainhealthywhile inspace,and to returnwithoutsufferinglong-termaftereffects.Onthewhole,findingspresentedatthislifesciencessymposiumshowedthatfewseriousproblemsremained.

Table2.ScienceAccomplishments

One that was still troublesome was motion sickness in orbit. Of the nineSkylabcrewmen,fivebecameillintheearlystagesofflight;onlythefirstcrew,plus Ed Gibson on the last, showed no symptoms of motion sickness. (JoeKerwin,however,wasseasickinthecommandmodulewhileawaitingrecoveryof the spacecraft.) The workshop had carried an experiment to determinesensitivitytomotionsickness,achairinwhichthesubjectcouldberotatedwhilemaking rapid up-and-down and side-to-side head motions. On each flight,crewmen were tested periodically. Although on the ground all the astronautscouldbebrought tothevergeofnauseaonthisdevice, inflightnonecouldbetakentothesamelevelofmalaise.3

Motionsicknesswassointimatelyinvolvedwithoperationalconsiderationsthat the experimental results were not clear-cut. They seemed to indicate thatspace malaise was a highly individualistic problem, still unpredictable in anyparticular case. The drugs used during the program reduced the severity ofsymptoms,butdidnotpreventthem.Allthecrewmen,however,adaptedwithinthe first week, and illness did not recur for the rest of the mission. Motionsickness was obviously complicated, and Skylab did not provide enoughinformationtounderstanditthoroughly.4

In other areas, investigators were somewhat better served by their

experiments.Themineralbalancestudy,whileimperfect,showedacleartrend.In space, all crewmenexcretedmore calcium in their urine, alongwith ahighlevelofhydroxyproline,anaminoacidwhoselossisassociatedwithmetabolicturnover of bone. This confirmed what had been found during Gemini andindicatedalossofstructuralmaterialinweight-bearingbonesthataresubjectedto compressive loads in normal gravity. Pre-and postflight x-rays of heel andwristbonescorroboratedthemineralbalancestudy.Inspiteof thethirdcrew’sincreasedexercise, lossofcalciumandnitrogen—thelatter indicatinga lossofmuscle mass—continued throughout the mission. The actual amount of bonemineral lost, even after 84 days,was not serious; but that depletion continuedunabated implied that longermissionsentailed risk.Comparisonof theSkylabresultswithstudiesonbedriddenpatients—thenearestone-ganalog—indicatedthepossibilityofirreversibledamagetolegbonesonmissionslastingayearormore. Another hazard was kidney stones formed as a result of highconcentrationsofcalciumintheurine.5

Results of the several experiments dealingwith the cardiovascular systemwere complexbut encouraging.Thebicycle ergometer andmetabolic analyzershowed that the body’s tolerance for exercise did not decrease during flight.Postflighttests,however,showedthatadaptationtoweightlessnesshadoccurred;astronauts could no longer perform at their preflight levels of physiologicalefficiency.Readjustmentwasslowestwith thefirstcrew; thoseastronauts tooknearly three weeks to return to their preflight exercise capacity. The othersrequiredlessthanaweek.6

Thelower-bodynegative-pressureexperiment,designedtomeasurechangesintheheart’seffectivenessduringlongexposuretoweightlessness,turnedouttobemorestressfulinorbitthanontheground.Resultsfromthefirstmissionhadbeendiscouraging;ontwooccasionsJoeKerwinhadbeenforcedtostophistestprematurely. Even after 28 days, crew adaptation seemed minimal.Cardiovascular experts assessed the results and advised continuation of thestandardprocedureforthenexttwomissions.Thisdecisionprovedsound.Thelongerflightsshowedthatafterthefirst30to50days,astronautsgraduallybuiltup a tolerance to the inflight testing.Andwhile the first crew required nearlythreeweeks to return to their preflight responses, subsequent crews readaptedmorequickly.7

Manyofthemedicalinvestigationscontributedtoapictureofwhathappensto thehumanbodyduringweightlessness:measurementof legvolume(partofthe lower-body negative-pressure experiment), stereo-photographs (whichenabled calculation of changes in body volume), hormonal and hematological

studies,andtheinfraredphotographsandlimbmeasurementsthatcostthethirdcrew so much time. Before Skylab, aerospace medical researchers hadconstructed a working hypothesis to account for the physiological changesobserved in spaceflight. On entry into weightlessness, body fluids, no longerpulleddownby the forceofgravity, shifted toward theupperbody,producingthedistendedveins,puffyeyelids,andfeelingsofnasalcongestionexperiencedbyallorbitingastronauts.Thebody’ssensors interpreted thisasan increase inbloodvolumeandreactedbyaltering thehormonebalance tostimulate lossoffluid.Thistriggeredacomplexsetofphysiologicalinteractionsleadingtoanewequilibrium (adaptation); among other things, the blood contained fewer redcells, less plasma, and a lower concentration of potassium.8 Skylab’s medicaldatawerenotcompletelyconsistentwiththishypothesis.Bloodanalysesshowedhormone levels lower than expected, along with anomalous levels ofelectrolytes. More experimental work would be necessary before even aqualitativedescriptionofadaptationtoweightlessnesscouldbeconstructed.Nophysiologicalchangeshadbeenobservedthatwouldprecludeweightlessflightslastinguptoninemonths,butitwasnotpossibletoextendthatdurationwithoutlimit.Much still had tobe learned, especially aboutmotion sickness andbonedeterioration, before manned missions lasting up to a year could becontemplated.9

In a panel discussion that concluded the three-day medical symposium,severaloutsideexpertsspeculatedaboutthemeaningoftheSkylabresults.MostagreedthatSkylabhadsettledsomeofthemajorquestionsaboutman’ssurvivalinorbitandsatisfactoryreadaptationonreturn.Allhadideasfornewresearchornew techniques to be used in future investigations. Imagining a secondgenerationofspacelaboratoriesinwhichonlyafewoccupantswouldneedtobeastronauts in the classical sense, one investigator suggested sending up“professional “subjects’” for laboratory testing. These would be normalindividualswhowould have no responsibility formanaging the spacecraft, sotheir systems could be allowed to deteriorate in order to test compensatory(preventiveortherapeutic)measures.Another,speculatingonwaystoavoidtheconsequences of bone loss, believed that the physical qualifications forastronautsmightwellbechanged.Recognizingtheneedforcrewmentofunctionbothinzerogandduringreentry,hepostulatedthat“individualsalreadyadaptedto something closer to zero g” might have certain physical advantages—”sedentary,skinny,small individuals.”Thissameexpert thought thatseriousconsiderationshouldbegiventoselectingleglessamputeesasastronauts,sincemanyofthemedicalproblemswereassociatedwithlegs.10

Ononepointallwereagreed:Skylab’smedicalinvestigationshadraisedasmanyquestions as theyhad answered—always thehallmarkof good research.For more answers, the only place to go was back to space. Among all theinvestigations, only one could effectively be simulated on earth—the mineralbalance studies, for which prolonged bed rest seemed to model the spaceenvironmentadequately.

SOLAROBSERVATIONS

Astronomers had, if anything, more data than the medical investigators.Cataloging,classifying,andcalibratingthethousandsofphotographsandspectrawould take months, and interpretation still longer. Even before the secondmission, astronomers began publishing preliminary results; only amonth afterthe first crew returned, researchers at American Science and Engineeringsubmittedabriefdescriptionoftheirx-raydatatoaprofessionaljournal.Otherinvestigators soon followed.11Though the astronomers didnot conduct an all-inclusive seminar, as had the medical investigators, assessments of the solarphysicsprogramsweremadeatseveralprofessionalmeetings.

On 3 December 1973, when the third crew had been in orbit only threeweeks,LeoGoldbergdiscussedthesignificanceofsomeoftheearlyATMdataat the141stmeetingoftheAmericanAstronomicalSociety,wherehegavetheHenry Norris Russell lecture, entitled “Research with Solar Satellites.”Goldberg,directorof theKittPeakNationalObservatory inArizona,hadbeenthe original principal investigator for the Harvard solar instrument. In AAP’searlydayshehadclashedwithNASAofficialsovermanagementoftheApollotelescopemount (p.103)andhadbeenpessimisticabout theuseofmanasanobserver in space.Having looked at the early results, however,GoldbergwasfullofpraiseforNASA.Asthingshadturnedout,thedelayinlaunchingSkylab(andtheimprovementsdelaymadepossible)hadtransformed“amereexerciseinmanned space flight intooneof themost important events in thehistoryofsolarphysics.”Thestabilityoftheorbitalclusterto2.5secondsofarcwas“oneof theoutstanding engineering achievements embodied inSkylab.”The spatialresolution obtained was certain to bring about a complete revision of solartheories. And as far as the role of man in space astronomy was concerned,Goldbergwasaconvert.Havingdoubtedthatmanhadanyuseinorbitbeyondadjustment and repair of equipment, he acknowledged that Skylab had provedotherwise.12

Goldberg’senthusiasmforthequalityoftheSkylabresultswassharedbyallthesolarresearchgroups.InLosAngeleson22August1974,E.M.ReevesofHarvard College Observatory summarized the accomplishments of the ATMproject at the annual meeting of the American Astronautical Society. Reevesnoted that all the instruments had equaled or exceeded their expectedperformance. The photographs from the coronagraph were of a quality andquantity never obtained before. Above all, Reeves was impressed by theflexibility and responsiveness of the experimentmanagement system—that is,operations.One of the remarkable accomplishments of that system during themissionshadbeenastudyoftheplanetMercuryduringitstransitacrossthefaceof the sunon10November1973.The remote-control capability built into theHarvard instrument, together with the rapid transmission of data from remotestationsinthecommunicationsnetwork,hadproduceddatathatwouldpermitanestimateofthedensityofMercury’satmosphere.13

No investigatorsweremoresatisfiedwith their results than the teamat theHigh Altitude Observatory in Colorado. Their white-light coronagraph hadshown that the solar corona was far more dynamic than had previously beensurmised.Changes in its formand structurewere apparent, not only fromonedaytothenext,butovermuchshorterintervals.During227daysofobservation,thecoronagraph(which, like theHarvard instrument,couldbeoperatedduringunmanned periods), recorded approximately 100 events called “coronaltransients.” Taking place in a period of minutes, these events sometimesinvolved the ejection of large amounts of matter and energy into the corona.Roughly half the transients were associated with flares or eruptiveprominences.14

Everyonewhoparticipatedwas impressedwith the intensityandvarietyofsolar activity during a “quiet” period. Although program delays had forcedabandonmentofplanstoobservethesunduringitsmaximumactivityin1969–1970 (p. 103), eight solar flares had been photographed during the threemissions. The last, which the astronomers called the “Gibson flare,” wasrecordedfromitsinception,afterGarriottandGibsonhaddeducedapatternofsolar x-ray activity that precededmajor eruptions. Simultaneous use of all theATMinstrumentsthoroughlydocumentedtheevolutionoftheseflaresandtheirrelationtoeventsinthecorona.15

By the end of 1974, solar astronomers were sure that they had the bestobservationseverobtainedfromspace.Correlationofthex-ray,ultraviolet,andcoronagraph observations and interpretation in terms of processes on the sunwouldtakeyears.Lookingbackatdevelopmentproblemsandaheadtothetask

of interpretation,RichardTousey,principal investigatorfor theNavalResearchLaboratory,askedwhetheritwasworththegreateffort:

Thatitwas,wouldbedeniedbyveryfew.ThesolarobservationsmadebytheATMexperimentswereextraordinarilyvaluable,perfect,andcomplete.Inspiteofinnumerableproblems,farmorethaneverimaginedpossiblewasaccomplished.Thesolarobservationsretrievedarestaggeringinquantityandquality.Bestestimatesmadebyeach[principalinvestigator]arethatnolessthanfiveyearsofworkbycompetentandsizeableteamsarerequiredtoreduceandinterpretthedata,andtenyearsmaywellbeneeded.

Tousey,whosespace researchstartedwith instrumentscarriedaloftonV-2s inthe1940s,wasconvincedthatunmannedspacecraftcouldneverhavecomenearproducing theATMresults.“Skylabhasvindicated theuseofman inspace toperformscientificexperimentation,notwithstandingopinionsstillvoiced to thecontrary.”Andaftertheinterpretations,thenwhat?Muchwouldbelefttodoinsolar research,Touseysaid;another solarmaximumwouldsooncomearound,and it would be veryworthwhile to fly the backup solar observatory. All butreadytofly,itconstituted“avaluableresourcethatshouldnotbeallowedtogotowaste.”16Therewasvirtuallynohopeofthat,however,sinceasecondSkylabhadlongsincebeenruledout(pp.116–18).

A huge solar eruption recorded by the extreme-ultraviolet spectroheliograph S082A; helium has beenejectedmorethan800000km.Forcomparison,theearthisnotmuchlargerthantheblackdotneartherimof the sun and beneath the arch of helium. The instrumentwas constructed by theU.S.NavalResearch

LaboratoryandBallBrothersResearchCorp.S-74-15562.

EARTHOBSERVATIONS

Skylab’s earth-resource experiments differed in several ways from themedicalandsolarexperiments.Giventhewidervarietyofinstruments,thelargernumberofinvestigators,andthediversityofobjectives,noclearassessmentofthevalueof theearth-sensingexperimentscouldemergequickly.Early reportsbyinvestigatorsfocusednarrowlyonindividualprojects.Intheindependentbutrelatedvisualobservationsprogram,however—anexerciseconductedlargelybythe third crew—it was possible to assess the value of man as an observer ofearth’ssurfacefeatures.

At the Skylab Results Symposium in Los Angeles in August 1974, fourteamsofinvestigatorsindicatedthebreadthoftheearth-resourcesprogramandsomethingofthevalueoftheresults.AgroupattheUniversityofKansasfoundthat the microwave instruments showed promise for measuring soil moisturefromorbit.GeologistsattheUniversityofWyomingevaluatedtheearth-terrainandmultispectralphotographsformappinggeologicalandagriculturalfeatures.TheyconcludedthattheSkylabinstrumentswere,forsomepurposes,betterthanthoseontheLandsatsatellite—chieflybecauseofthebetterresolutionaffordedby photographs—but that both had to be supplemented by high-altitudephotographyfromaircraft.17

Of more interest were the data returned from the multispectral scanner,which covered 13wavelength bands in the visible and infrared regions of thespectrum. Investigators at Purdue University used these and the multispectralphotographsfromS190Ainacomputerizedprogramofland-usedetermination;their project aimed at automatic classification of land into nine categoriesrangingfromresidentialandcommercial tograss,farmland,andwoodland.Byisolatingthecharacteristicspectraofeachoftheseuses,particularlyusingtwoormorespectralbands,theycouldclassifylandwithhighaccuracy.Skylab’sdatawere roughly as good as those from Landsat’s multispectral scanner, whichsensedonly fourwavebands.Similar resultswere reportedby researcherswiththe U.S. Geological Survey, studying swampland in Florida, and GeneralElectric,lookingatgeologicfeaturesinNewMexico.18

Later in the year, similar reports for the other sensorswere presented to aconferenceatHuntsville.Againthemultispectralscannerreceivedmuchoftheattention, but geophysicists also reported encouraging results from the radaraltimeter.Thisinstrumentprovedtobeabletomeasuretheshapeoftheearth’s

surface—more particularly, the ocean’s surface—with reasonable accuracy.Perhaps themost impressive resultwas thedetectionof localvariations in sealevel, such as a 20-meter depression near Puerto Rico, probably caused by alocal gravity anomaly. The instrument also responded to subsurface geologicfeatures; altimeter data showed clear correlations with the profile of thecontinentalshelfoffthecoastofGeorgiaandFlorida.19

While preliminary results indicated that Skylab’s earth sensors hadperformedasexpectedand that the investigatorshad found themuseful,wideruseof thedatawasslow incoming.Users seemedcontent to relyonLandsat,whichhadbeen launched inJuly1972,possiblybecauseof familiaritywith it,but also because Landsat viewed the same ground track every 18 days at thesamelocaltime.ThisrepetitivecoveragewasnotavailablefromSkylab.Inmid-1975aNASA-sponsoredearth-resourcessymposiumheard166reports,only29dealingwithSkylabresults.20

The earth-resource experiments did little to establish the value of man inspace.Added to the program late, the instruments could not be optimized forman’s participation.Apart from tracking assigned siteswith theviewfinder onthe infrared spectrometer, theoperator’smain jobduringadata-gatheringpassconsistedofpunchingbuttonsandrecordingtimesandoperationalsequencesonchannelB.Judgmentastoalternativesitesormodesofoperationdidnotenter.On the other hand, astronauts could replace components and do routinemaintenance—somethingtheastronomershadfeltwasabsolutelyessential,butwhichtheirinstrumentswerenotdesignedfor.ApartfromthemajorrepairjobonthemicrowaveantennacarriedoutbyPogueandGibson,thecrewscleanedtape recorder heads, replaced one tape recorder, and installed an improveddetectorononeoftheinfraredinstrumentsduringflight.21

Thevalue of an intelligent observer for earth observations fromorbitwas,however,clearlyestablishedbythespecialprogramdevelopedforthethirdcrew.A team of 19 scientists put together a plan for visual and photographicobservations of surface features.This programwasonlyminimally structured;scientists briefed the crew in themost general terms as to themajor areas ofinterest(oceancurrents,geology,Africandroughtregions,plusadozenothers)andpreparedabooksummarizingwhattheastronautsshouldlookforandwhattheymightexpecttosee.Someobservationswereformallyscheduled,butmuchof the program depended on the crew’s ability to locate and describe (orphotograph) features of interest. During the mission, weekly conferencesallowedformodificationsandadditionstotheschedule.22

Gazingoutthewindowwasaprimerecreationalactivityfortheastronauts,

and when it acquired a scientific value they enjoyed it even more.With twocameras and an assortment of lenses and film, plus 10-power binoculars, theyspentmanyhoursat thewardroomwindowlookingatassignedsitesorsimplykeeping an eye open for something interesting. If the results were notquantifiable, they nonetheless proved what all man-in-space enthusiastsintuitivelyknew.Man’sabilitytodiscriminate,toselecttheimportantfeaturesofa wide vista, and to respond effectively to unexpected events constituted hisgreatest contribution to orbital investigations. Following and describing oceancurrentsfordistancesupto3500km,recognizingupwellingeddiesofcoldwaterin warm currents and then discovering the same phenomenon in unexpectedlocalities, waiting for the precise moment to take a photograph—suchachievements could not have been programmed into completely automaticsensors.23

NASA’SOWNEXPERIMENTS

Surveying the results of thehabitability experiment,Caldwell Johnsonhadreason to be pleasedwithwhat his group had done for theworkshop. Inflightevaluationsbyeachcrewman,moviesandvideotapesmadeduringthemissions,and postflight debriefings indicated that no serious mistakes had been made.Still,manyaspectsofhabitabilitywerestill tobeoptimized,andagreatmanysmallirritationsremained.

Skylab clearly showed that it was feasible to live for extended periods inorbit without becoming disoriented or encountering major problems with thelackofagravityfield.Itwassimplyanotherworkenvironment,onetowhichallthe crewmen adjustedmore or less rapidly. Indeed, they all enjoyed it. Sometaskswereactuallyeasierwithoutgravity;movingmassiveobjects,forexample,was not hard at all, provided therewere adequate handholds to control them.Smallobjectsweremoretroublesome;handtools,screws,andothersmallpartswouldnotstayput.Crewsquicklylearned,however,thattherewaslittledangerof losing something of this kind, because air currents in theworkshopwouldsooner or later carry small objects to the screen covering the intake of theventilationsystem.24

Noneof thenine astronauts expressedany strongpreference for auniformarchitectural arrangement such as that designed into the wardroom andexperiment area of the workshop. Although that layout—with a clearlyrecognizable“floor”and“ceiling”—wasanadvantageforassemblyandtesting

beforeflight,onceinorbitauniformup-and-downorientationwassuperfluous.Whatwas essentialwas a reference axis at eachwork station,with all relatedinstrumentskeyedtoasingledirection. In themultipledockingadapter,wherecircumstanceshadforcedamoreorlessrandomarrangementofequipment,allthe crewmen found they could work easily with any of it. Shifting from onework station to another meant changing the orientation, but this produced noconfusionandrequiredonlyasimplereadjustment.EdGibson,infact,gavethedocking adapter highmarks because it used all the available spacewith greatefficiency,whiletheworkshopwastedwallandceilingspace.25

OneoddsensationwasexperiencedinthedockingadapterbybothJerryCarrand EdGibson. Carr noticed that when he entered the compartment from thecommandmodulefeetfirst,hehadthefeelingthathewasveryhighandhadtobecarefullesthefallalltheway“down”totheworkshop.Gibsonfeltthesameway when he used one particular foot restraint, which poised him above theairlockhatch. Itwas theonlyplace in the clusterwherehehada sensationofheight.26

Oneareainwhichmuchworkclearlyremainedtobedonewasmobilityandrestraint in zero g. Not surprisingly, this was the area in which exhaustivesimulations could not be done before flight; only a few experiments had beensimulated in the zero-g aircraft.Mobilitywas superbandcausednoproblems,except for thedifficultyofcontrolling the feetwhenpassing throughanarrowspace,suchasthehatchintotheairlockordockingadapter.Feettendedtobumpintothesidesofthepassageway,occasionallytrippingaswitchthatwaspoorlylocated or inadequately protected. Restraint was the problem; the triangularmetalgridworkusedasflooringthroughouttheworkshopworkedwellenough,andthetriangularcleatsattachedtothecrewmen’sshoesprovidedgoodsecuritywhenlockedintoit.Butinthewastemanagementcompartment,wheresmoothsurfaces had been provided for ease in cleaning, it was very hard to holdposition. Straps on the floor, under which the feet could be slipped, proveduseless.27

Many small deficiencies had, of course, shownup in theworkshopduringflight. Every crew remarked on the need for aworkbenchwheremaintenanceand small repairs could be conducted. Forced to improvise, they used theventilationscreenintheforwarddome,wheretheaircurrentkeptsmallpartsinplace,butaproperlydesignedworkbenchincorporatingthatfeaturewouldhavebeenagreathelp.Similarly,theyfoundthattheyneededanoffice,oratleastadeskwhere theycoulddo theirpaperwork.Stowagealsoneededconsiderableimprovement. Bill Pogue’s bitterest complaints were reserved for the locker

numberingsystemandforthepoorlatchesonlockersandfilmvaults.28

Crystal-growinginspace.Theleftcrystalwasgrownduringthethirdcrew’stenureonSkylab,themiddlecrystalduringthesecond.Allcrystalsgrownonthesecondmissionshowedaring-shapedgroove,probablycausedbyaspacecraftmaneuverduringthecool-downperiod.FromH.U.Walter,Seeded,Container-lessSolidificationofIndiumAntimonide,Proceedingsof3dSpaceProcessingSymposium—SkylabResults,vol.1(NASA,1974).TheSkylabproductontheright,a20-mmcrystalofgermaniumselenide,wasthelargestgrownonearthorinspaceasof1974.S-74-19677.Below,NASAAdministratorJamesC.FletcherexplainstheprocesstoPresidentGeraldFord.AttherightisHowardJohnson,chairmanofMIT.74-H-1017.

On thewhole, however, Skylab proved to bewell designed for living andworking in space; few habitability features were so poorly conceived as tohamper the missions. There had been frustrations, but most of the astronautslearnedtoworkaroundtheworkshop’sfaults.And,asallgoodexperimentsaresupposedtodo,thehabitabilityexperimenthadshownspacecraftdesignersthelimitsoftheirexpertise;itpinpointedtheareaswheretheyneedednewideas.

NASA had another major experiment on board, exploring means forcontrolledmaneuveringbyamanoutsidea spacecraft.Apart fromoneor twotests during the Gemini program, engineers had not experimented withmaneuveringaids,andwiththeapproachoftheShuttleeratheyfeltaneedtotryout some concepts. The workshop’s upper dome, 6.5 meters in diameter andaboutthesameinheight,wasanidealspaceinwhichtoconducttests,andthishadbeenoneofthefirstexperimentssuggestedforthewetworkshopin1965(p.27). Skylab tested three concepts for an astronaut maneuvering unit: a largebackpack, a small, hand-held gas pistol similar to that used by EdWhite onGemini4,andafoot-controlledunitdesignedtoleavethehandsfreeforwork.

Thebackpack,thoughbulky,wasfarmoresophisticatedthantheothertwo.Fourteencold-gas thrustersgave theastronaut controlovermotionalong threeaxesandrotationaboutthree,usingahandcontroller.Gyroscopestabilizationofattitudewasavailable,andsmallcontrolgyroscouldbeusedforrotation.Duringthesecondandthirdmissions,fivecrewmentestedtheunit,flyingitfornearly14 hours to give the engineers data on allmodes of operation.OwenGarriott

determined that operation of the unit was easily learned; having no preflightexperiencewithit,hepickedupthetechniquesofoperationinlessthananhour.Several potentially useful tasks were performed with the experimental unit.Besides simple point-to-point flying and station-keeping, the astronautssimulatedinspectionofaspacecraftbyflyingtheunitinasemicircleconcentricwith theworkshopwall and about half ameter away from the upper stowagelockers.Then,afterasecondcrewmanhadsuspendedalargeobjectintheupperdome,givingitaslowspinintheprocess,theoperatorapproachedthespinningobject,gavehimselfarateofspinsynchronouswithit,graspedit,andusedthemaneuveringunit to reduce the spin to zero.The techniquecouldbeuseful inrecoveringtumblingobjectsinspace.29

The two other units, though much simpler, were also less versatile andthereforelesspromisingfororbitaluse.Thehand-heldunitprovedtoodifficultto control accurately; itwas hard to produce translationalmotionwithout alsocausingsomerotation.Whiletheastronautsfeltthatitmightbeusefulforshortpoint-to-pointmovements, itwasmuch less attractive for complexmaneuvers.Thesamewastrueofthefoot-controlledunit.Itsthrusters,locatedalongsidetheastronaut’sfeet,couldnotproducesimplelinearmotionexceptvertically,andittoo tended to cause unwanted rotation.Although the tests onSkylab indicatedsome success with this unit and gave its designers some data, it was clearlyinferiortothebackpackunit.30

CarrflyingtheastronautmaneuveringequipmentofexperimentM509intheforward(upper)compartmentoftheworkshop.Twodistinctmodelsareinvolved:thesmallhand-heldunit inCarr’srighthandandthelarge backpack, the controls forwhich are in the arm rests.Neither proved completely satisfactory. ThehatchtotheairlockmoduleisbehindCarr.S-74-17305.

COMETOBSERVATIONSANDSTUDENTEXPERIMENTS

AmongthescoresofotherexperimentscarriedbySkylab,twosetsreceivedextensive public notice: the observations of comet Kohoutek and the studentprojects. Four months after the third crew returned with data on Kohoutek,NASAhosted a symposium atMarshall SpaceFlightCenter to examine theseand other results. The Skylab observations had been merely a small part of

NASA’sextensiveprogramtoobserve thiscomet.Ground-basedobservatories,airborne telescopes, and satellites had all been brought to bear,most of themusing instruments better designed for the purpose than those Skylab carried.While Skylab’s instruments produced several useful observations, theircontributionwasminorcompared to thedatagatheredby theothers.Themostsuccessful experiments of the Skylab group were the far-ultravioletelectronographic camera,which detected a cloud of hydrogen surrounding thecomet, and the photometric camera, whose periodic exposures showed thatKohoutek dimmed appreciably after passing perihelion. Sketches and visualobservations were among the most interesting data provided from the Skylabprogram.31

Inviewof their late entry into theprogram, itwas tobeexpected that thestudentexperimentswouldproducemixedresults.Severalwereunsuccessfulonaccount of equipment failure, some could not be conducted for operationalreasons,andothersyieldedusableinformation.AplannedobservationofJupiterwiththex-raytelescopeshadtobecanceledbecausepowerlimitationsdidnotallow the necessary maneuvering. When a substitute observation of an x-raysourceintheVeilNebulawasproposed,Skylab’sinstrumentsprovedtolacktherequired sensitivity and pointing accuracy. Similar problems foiled two otherstudentinvestigators:detectionofultravioletradiationfrompulsarsandastudyofx-raysfromstarsofdifferentspectraltypes.32

Experiments with living organisms had better luck. Students founddifferencesinbacterialcoloniesgrowninSkylab,comparedtocontrolsonearth;andriceseedlingsexhibitedcuriousanomaliesduringdevelopment.Probablythemost widely noticed student project used the web-spinning ability of thecommon cross spider (Areaneus diadematus) to test for adaptation toweightlessness.Afterdismalfailuresontheirfirsttries,twospiderstakenalongbythesecondcrewsoonproducednearlynormalwebs.OwenGarriottwantedtoextendthisexperimentafewmoredays,butbothspidersdiedshortlyaftertheinitialobservations—eitherfromstarvationordehydration.33

Noonewouldclaimthatthestudentexperimentsproducedrealadvancesinscience, although their ideas were original and often sophisticated. This wasscarcely thepoint.Theproject’s real effectwason the students and their highschoolteachers,whoweregreatlystimulatedbyNASA’sinterestintheirideas.The contact with “real world” scientific investigations was an enlighteningexperience, not only for the winners in the competition, but for all of thecompetitors. Those who saw their experiments flown sometimes learned thatfailure is also a possible result of research. For its part, NASA learned that

simple experiments, developed at low cost and flown in a short time, can beeffective.Thepoorresultsofsomeexperimentscanbeattributedtothelackofadequate training forcrewmenandoperationspersonnel, the resultof theverybusytrainingschedule.34

SKYLABSCIENCE:ANASSESSMENT

For all the vagaries of its early development, Skylab held to its primarypurposeofputtingmanintoorbit toperformscientificwork,andinthataimitwas indisputably successful. Some scientists even felt that a second Skylabwouldbejustified,evenifitdidnomorethancontinuetheworkofthefirst;butNASA, in a periodof shrinking spacebudgets that forcedhard choices, couldnotaffordtoplowthatgroundagain.ThethreeSkylabmissionsclearedthewayfor the agency to move ahead to the Shuttle. The backup hardware, a fullyfunctional copy of the orbiting Skylab, was taken out of storage in 1976 andconsigned to the National Air and Space Museum—surely one of the moststrikingmuseumexhibitsinhistory.

Skylab’s medical results broke down most remaining barriers to extendedmannedspaceflightbyshowing thatmanadapts ratherwell to thezero-gravityenvironment,retaininghisabilitytofunctioneffectivelyformanyweeks.Givenproper attention to the appropriate environmental factors, he canmaintain hisphysical well-being andmorale, then readapt to earth surface conditions withsurprising speed.Long-termproblems remainunsettled, but thesewill providethenextgenerationofresearchproblems.Skylabshowedthatspacefarersneednotbesuperblyconditionedphysicalspecimens;normalhealthyindividualscanbetakenonorbitalmissionswithoutrisk.

As for man’s value as a scientific observer, the point doubtless can bedebatedwhetherthemoneyspentonthesystemsrequiredtosustainmancouldhavebeenbetter spent formore sophisticated unmanned equipment. ScientistswhoparticipatedinSkylabwillargueforman.Astronomerswhohadforyearsworked with unmanned satellites were won over by the performance of theSkylabcrewsandgroundsupportpersonnel.Theirabilitytoreacttounexpectedoccurrences on the sun was a prime factor in the success of the ATMexperiments.Thesamecouldbesaidfortheearth-observationsprogram;amaninorbit, trained to lookforobjectsof interestandalert forunfamiliar features,provedtobeofgreatvaluetoearthscientistsinmanydisciplines.35

InretrospectitseemsclearthatSkylab’sexperimentprogramwasjustalittle

too ambitious and heterogeneous. The large number of widely differentexperimentscreatedoperationaldifficulties,crowdedthetrainingschedule,andoccasionally led crewmen into errors.While the difficultieswere successfullyovercomeandmuchvaluableexperiencewasgained in theprocess, individualexperimentswouldprobablyhavefaredbetterhadtherebeenfewerofthem.Butthepolitical atmosphere inwhichSkylabmaturedgavemanagers little choice.Asthelastmannedprogramformanyyears,thefirstmultipurposespacestation,andtheprovinggroundforman’susefulnessinspace,Skylabwasforcedtotakeonmore experiments thanwas optimum.The earth-resources package and thestudentexperimentsarecasesinpoint(chap.10).Theformerwasawelltimedresponse toanexpressedpublicdemand, the latterawayofbroadeningpublicsupportformannedspaceflight,andbothpaidtheirway.

Although the specific results ofmany of Skylab’s experimentswill not beworked into the fabric of science for a number of years, Skylab clearlyestablishedthatmanhasaplaceinspacescience.Haditfailed,orevenleftafewkey questions unanswered, the future ofmanned spaceflightwould have beenbleak indeed.Skylab’s success assured thatmanwouldnot be the limit to theAmericanventureintospace.

Skylab4’s viewof its starting point, takenwith the earth-terrain cameraon color infrared film.Launchcomplexes39Band39A,upperleft,areconnectedbycrawlerwaystotheVehicleAssemblyBuilding.LiningCapeCanaveralitselfareolderSaturnandTitancomplexes.CocoaBeachisjusttotherightoftheCape;PatrickAirForceBaserunwaysarevisiblefartherdownthecoast.SL4-93-167.

Aspectacularsolarflarephotographedbythethirdcrew19December1973inthelightofionizedhelium,usingtheextreme-ultravioletspectroheliographoftheU.S.NavalResearchLaboratory.Thetwistedsheetofgasspans588000kmandseems tobeunwinding itself.Thedarkerareasat the topandbottomare thesolarpoles.74-HC-260.

X-ray photograph of the solar corona, 28May 1973. The corona is the thin outer portion of the sun’satmosphere.Areashotter thanonemilliondegrees canbeobserved in x-rays.The loopsandarchesareproducedbytheinteractionofthesun’smagneticfieldandtheionizedgasofthecorona.S-73-31696.

Thesunphotographedatawavelengthof625.3angstroms throughHarvardCollege’sspectroheliometer.Theblackareasarethesurfaceof thesun;thereds,yellows,andwhitesarethecoronasome70000kmabovethesurface.Thepictureisoneofasetstudyingactiveregions.S-74-21923.

ThisimageofthesunintheextremeultravioletwastransmittedfromSkylabtoHouston,wherecomputerreductionaddedthecolorcontoursandgaveitaneedlepointcharacter.Theblackareastartingatthenorthpoleandextendingwellintosouthlatitudesisalargecoronalhole,anareawheretemperatureanddensityareunusuallylow.DatacollectedwithSkylabinstrumentsestablished,beyonddoubt,thatcoronalholesarethesourceofthehigh-speedstreamsofparticles(thesolarwind)thatbuffettheearth’supperatmosphere,disruptthemagneticfield,andcauseothereffectsintheloweratmosphere.S-73-32884.

S190Bphotographof theBlackHills (lower left)andBadlands (lowerright)areaofsouthwesternSouthDakota.TheCheyenneRivermeandersacrosstherightside.RapidCityandEllsworthAirForceBaseareadjacenttotheBlackHills.Therectangularpatternsarecausedbythepracticeofdry-landsstripfarming.The light areas produced crops—mostlywheat—theprevious year; the dark areas are the current year’sgrowingcrops.SL2-81-159.

RemarkablydetailedphotographoftheGrandCanyonareaofnorthernArizona.Thehighsunangle,lightsnowcover,andexcellentvisibilitycombinedtogiveapictureofunusualvaluetothegeologist.Onlyafewof the abundant lineations, which indicate faulting, joining, and monoclinal flexing, were shown oncontemporarygeologicmapsofthearea.SL4-142-4436.

Planktonbloom(upperright)intheSouthAtlantic,25December1973.OfftheeastcoastofSouthAmerica,thesouth-flowingBrazilCurrentmeetsthenorth-flowingFalklandCurrentnear40°southlatitude,wherebothturneastward.Thelightareaacrossthemiddleofthephotoistheboundarybetweenthetwo.Skylabcrewmenfollowedtheboundaryvisuallymorethan3500km.Thepinkformationinthelowerleftisclouds.SL4-137-3721.

Two smoke plumes stretch some140 km across the Gulf ofMexico from the central Louisiana coast,7December1973.The value of such photographs in studying diffusion of pollutants is obvious. SL4-136-3475.

MarshesofDorchesterCounty,Maryland,photographedincolor-infraredbyS190AinJune1973.Land-usemapscanbecompiledandtherelativesalinityofbodiesofwatercanbedeterminedfromsuchimagery.SL2-15-174.

Birthplace of Western civilization, as seen from one of its highest technological achievements. Thephotograph was taken with a 70-mmHasselblad camera, 100-mm lens, and medium-speed Ektachromefilm.SL3-121-2385.

19

WhatGoesUp…

Before undocking from Skylab, Gerald Carr had fired Apollo’s attitude-controlthrustersforthreeminutes,nudgingthecluster11kilometershigher,intoan orbit 433 × 455 km. After the crew had returned to earth and the end-of-missionengineeringtestswerefinished,flightcontrollersventedtheatmospherefromtheworkshop,oriented thecluster inagravity-gradient-stabilizedattitudewiththedockingadapterpointedawayfromtheearth,andshutdownmostofitssystems.Skylabcouldstillrespondtotelemetrysignalswheneveritssolarpanelswereinsunlight.Asuitedastronautcouldenterit—assuminghecouldreachthehatchandhadsomereasontogoinside.1Butnoplanscontemplatedsuchavisitoranyotherreuseofthehugehulk.Withonecontrolmomentgyroinoperativeandanotherailing,withtwocoolantloopsbehavingerraticallyandseveralofthepower-supply modules approaching the end of their expected life spans, the$2.5-billionorbitinglaboratorywasjunk.

It was, in fact, inexorably headed for a flaming death in the earth’satmosphere.Calculationsmadeduring themission,basedoncurrentvaluesforsolar activity and expected atmospheric density, gave the workshop just overnineyearsinorbit.Slowlyatfirst—dropping30kilometersby1980—andthenfaster—another100kilometersbytheendof1982—Skylabwouldcomedown,andsometimearoundMarch1983itwouldburnupinthedenseatmosphere.2If,asplannershoped,Shuttledevelopmentwentsmoothly,oneofthenewcraft’searlymissionswouldattachapropulsionmoduletotheworkshoptoboostitintoahigherorbit. Ifnot, the75000-kilogramclusterwouldprobablyattractmorepublicattentionthanNASAwantedwhenitreturnedtoearth.Flightcontrollerscoulddolittletochangethecourseofitsreentry.

PLANSTOSAVETHEWORKSHOP

Thenine-yearlifetimeoftheorbitinglaboratoryseemedamplein1974,andinanycaseNASAhadmorepressingproblemstoworryabout.Duringthenextthreeyearstheagency’sannualbudgetsshranktorecordlowlevels,delayingthedevelopmentofShuttle.MeanwhiletheRussianmannedprogramshowedeverysign of vitality. Soviet cosmonauts surpassed Skylab’s endurance records, andSovietspaceofficialsspokeofestablishingpermanentstationsinearthorbit.

By early 1977 the first Shuttle orbiter Enterprise was being prepared forlanding tests, and planners could begin to think about payloads andmissions.Early in the year Headquarters directed Johnson Space Center and MarshallSpaceFlightCentertooutlineschedulesandfundingrequirementsforaShuttlemission to boost Skylab into a higher orbit. Houston was not optimistic.Problems of rendezvous and docking with the inert workshop had not beenthoroughlystudied;andJSC’sstudiesshowedthatavisittoSkylabcouldnotbecarriedaloftearlierthanthefifthtestflightoftheShuttleorbiter,expectedtobelaunchedinlate1979.Asthenextsolarmaximumapproached(1980–1981), itwasbecomingclearthatthesunwasconsiderablymoreactivethananyonehadpredictedthreeyearsbefore—badnewsforSkylab,becausesolaractivityheatedthe earth’s upper atmosphere, increasing its density at orbital altitude anddraggingtheworkshopdownfasterthananticipated.3

Marshall’sexpertstoldHeadquartersinMarch1977thatastudycontracttodefinetheboosterstagefortheSkylabmissionshouldbeawardednotlaterthanmidyear.Headquarters then set the fifth test flight as the targetmission and 1Septemberasthelatestdatefordecision.Thiswouldallowjustovertwoyearsforhardwaredevelopment.Meanwhilethecenterscontinuedtocompilethedatanecessarytomakethatdecision.4

InSeptemberthewordwasGO,andinNovemberMarshallawardeda$1.75million letter contract toMartinMarietta Corporation to conduct analysis anddesignstudiesforateleoperatorretrievalsystemtobecarriedinShuttle’scargobay and used to attach a propulsion module—also still to be designed—toSkylab’sdockingport.Sincetimewascritical,developedandqualifiedhardwarewas to be used to the extent possible—very much in the Skylab tradition. ApreliminarydesignreviewwassetforMarch1978.5

Withinamonth,however,thisscheduleseemedinadequate.AmeetingoftheAmericanGeophysicalUnion heard inDecember fromHoward Sargent, chiefforecaster for theNationalOceanic andAtmosphericAdministration (NOAA),thatthecurrentsunspotcyclewasthesecondmostintenseinacentury.Sargent’sforecast was based on a model different from that used by NASA; he (andothers) criticized the space agency for using what he considered to be an

inaccuratemodel.Asked by journalistswhether he thought theSkylab reboostmissionwouldsucceed,SargentofferedtheopinionthatNASAwas“inapileoftrouble”ifitwascountingontheclustertostayinorbitlongenoughforShuttletoreachitonthecurrentschedule.6

Critics of manned spaceflight tried to make capital of the discrepancybetweenNASA’spredictionsandthoseofNOAA,butinfactnosinglemethodof predicting sunspot activity was universally accepted by solar scientists.(Ironically, Skylab’s own results—unavailable in 1974—would eventuallycontribute to refining thosemethods.)Allwere basedon analysis of historicaldata. NASA’s scientists used more observations and predicted less sunspotactivity than their counterparts at NOAA. Sargent and his colleagues insistedthat some of the very early (17th century) observations thatNASAusedwereunreliable and reduced the accuracy of the predictions. The space agency hadignoredtheforecastsNOAApublishedin1976,leadingsomecynicstoattributeself-serving motives to the forecasters at Marshall: since Huntsville still hadthoughts of using Skylab somehow, it was not in their center’s interest toacknowledge that the space station might fall to earth before it could berescued.7Sincenosuchproposalswereeverformalized,thesimplerexplanation—that Skylab was simply forgotten in the press of more urgent business—isequallycredible.

REGAININGCONTROLOFSKYLABEarly in 1978 Skylab was rudely thrust into the glare of publicity—like

earlierNASA activities, by the Soviet space program.The unmannedCosmos954,apparentlyasa resultofsystemsfailure, flamed into theatmosphereovernorthernCanada,scatteringpiecesofitsnuclear-fueledelectricalpowermoduleover a wide area. The module contained 45 kilograms of uranium highlyenrichedinthefissionableuranium-235isotope,andanintensivesearchforthepieceswasstartedimmediately.8

Coming so soon after the arguments of the previous month, the CosmosreentryproducedimmediateconcernforwhatmighthappenwhenSkylabcamedown.NASA’spublicaffairsofficeassuredtheworldthattheclustercontainednoradioactivematerialandthatitwouldnotdropbelow278kilometersbeforeOctober1979.9Thatwashardly reassuring, since it cutnearly fouryears frompreviousestimatesofSkylab’slifeexpectancy.

As far asNASAwas concerned themost stimulating reactionwas aquery

from the State Department. In view of worldwide interest in Cosmos, Statewanted to know, what did NASA propose to do about Skylab?10 Diplomaticrepercussionswerepossiblealmostanywhere in theworld ifapieceofSkylabfdllonacitizensomewhere,sincethe laboratory’sorbitalpathtookitover theheadsof90%of theworld’spopulation.AlthoughNASA’s studieshad shownthattherisktohumanswassmall,itwasnotzero—afactthatwasimportanttoanyagencysensitivetopublicopinioninthelate1970s.

NASA immediately got to work to determine the condition of Skylab’ssystems.IfthederelictweretobereboostedforlateruseorbroughtoutoforbitatasiteofNASA’schoosing, itwasnecessarytodeterminehowmuchcontrolcould be exercised from the ground. In themost favorable circumstances thiswaslimitedtocontrollingthecluster’sattitude,therebydecreasingorincreasingatmosphericdrag;itwasimpossibletoincreaseitsaltitude.IfeverythingworkedwellSkylab’s orbital lifetime might be extended by as much as five months,whichmight—justmight—giveShuttleengineersenoughtimetogetthereboostmission aloft. Toward the end of February, an eight-man team—four fromMarshallandfourfromJSC—wenttoKindleyNavalAirStation,Bermuda,theonlytrackingstationthatcouldstill transmit theUHFsignals thatoperatedtheobsoletetelemetryequipmentaboardSkylab.11

Meanwhile, during NASA’s budget hearings, Administrator Robert FroschexplainedtotheSenatespacecommitteewhattheagencywastryingtodoandthe difficulties it was encountering. He was still hopeful that the teleoperatorretrieval systemcould be built in time for launch inOctober 1979, but by hisownestimates theoddswereonly50–50 thatSkylabwouldstillbe inorbitbythen.Froschpointedoutthattheprojectionswerebasedonforecastsofsunspotactivityandwerethereforemuchlessaccuratethanhewouldprefer.WilliamC.Schneider explained to the senators what the reboost mission involved. The4540-kilogramteleoperatorunit,mostlyfueltanksandengines,wouldbeguidedby an astronaut in the Shuttle orbiter to dock at themultiple docking adapter,whereuponitsthirty-two100-newtonthrusterswouldpushtheworkshopintoahigherorbit.Designstudieswerealreadyunderway.Fabricationandassemblywere scheduled to begin in sixmonths, and the completedmodulewas to bedeliveredtotheCapeinearlySeptember1979foranOctoberlaunchonthethirdorbiter test flight.12 It was an ambitious schedule, considering that the firstorbiterhadnotyetbeenlaunched.

TheengineersinBermudamadetheirfirstcontactwithSkylabthefollowingmonth.Workingwith the North AmericanAir Defense Command (NORAD),they located theworkshopby radar, aimed a radio signal at it, and received a

response.FortwominutesSkylabreportedontheconditionofitssystems,thenfellsilent.Apparentlyitwasrotatingatabout10revolutionsperhour,andwhenits solar panels turned out of the sunlight the radio transmissions ceased. Thefirstthingtheengineersneededtodowastochargethebatteries,andsincetheycouldtransmitcommandsonlybrieflyonceduringeachorbitalpass,thiswouldtaketime.Withinaweek,however,theyhadchargedtwobatteries,determinedthe workshop’s attitude, and ascertained that the onboard computer could beusedtohelpcontrolthespacecraft.13

Thenextgoalwas togaincontrolof theworkshopsystems,principally thecontrol moment gyros, the thruster attitude control system, and the attitude-sensing rate gyros.Once thesewere in hand, flight controllers could keep theworkshop in aminimum-drag attitude, conserving altitudeuntil the fateof theShuttle mission was clear. After that they could either maintain the low-dragprofileorincreasethedrag,whichwouldgivethemsomecontroloverthepointofimpactwhentheworkshopfinallyreachedtheendoftheroad.Sincealltheseoperationsrequiredpower,thesolarpanelshadtobekeptinsunlightasmuchaspossible. Balancing these requirements was a complex job that could not behandledbyaskeletoncrewataremotesite,soinJuneacontrolcenterwasjury-riggedatJohnsonSpaceCenterandmannedbytwoteamsofflightcontrollers.Shortly thereafter thestationatMadridwasbrought into the trackingnetwork;later, Goldstone in California and a station near Santiago, Chile, would beadded.14

By early June the JSC team had turned on the two functioning controlmomentgyrosandusedthemtostabilizethecluster inalow-dragattitudethatallowed them to keep the batteries charged. This was not accomplished withgreatease, for thegyro thathadgivenHoustonsomuchworryduring the lastdaysofthethirdmissionagainshowedsignsofstress—decreasedwheelspeedandincreasedmotorcurrents.Besidesthat,therefrigeratingsystemsthatcooledthebatteriesintheairlockmodulewereailing;onehadlostnearlyallitscoolingfluid,andtheotherwasnotcompletelyreliable.Jugglingthedemandsofpowerproductionandminimumdragwiththesecomplicationsthrownintookagreatdealofplanning,andcrewsworked10-hourshiftsthroughthesummer.InJulytheyalmosthadtostartalloveragainwhenaspurioustelemetrysignalcausedthecomputertoswitchthecontrolmomentgyrosoffandthegasthrusterson;asignificant fraction of the remaining propellant was used before the Houstonteamcouldregaincontrol.15

Meanwhile Headquarters was setting up an organization to deal with theproblemsthatwouldarisewhenSkylabcamebacktoearth.On25JulyaSkylab

Contingency Working Group was established to coordinate interagencyplanning.UnderthedirectionofWilliamG.Bastedo,thisgroupwasresponsiblefor a host of activities, from keeping track ofSkylab’s condition to informingforeigngovernmentsof thecurrentstateofaffairs.BesidesNASAparticipants,the group included members from the departments of State, Justice, andDefense.16

The effort to saveSkylabwas becoming costly.Not counting expendituresforhardwaredevelopment,NASAhadspent$750000onthedyingworkshopby1June1978andexpectedtolayoutatleast$3millionmorebytheendoftheyear.At leastoneofficial thought thismoneywas largelywasted.ChrisKraft,directorofJSC,publiclyexpressedhisopinionthattheeffortwasfutile.HedidnotexpecttheSkylabsystemstocontinuefunctioninglongenoughforitsreentrytobecontrolled(tacitlyimplyingthattherewasnohopeforthereboostmission).He conceded that his engineerswere obliged to do everything they could, butthoughtthatNASAwouldnothavegonetosuchlengthsiftheCosmosaccidenthad not focused so much attention on falling spacecraft fragments—attentionthatKraftevidentlyfeltSkylabdidnotdeserve.Inhisopinionthemoneywouldhave been far better spent on the Shuttle program, which was falling behindscheduleforlackofadequatefunding.InWashington,however,wheretheWhiteHouse and the State Department could look over his shoulder, Robert Froschreiterated theagency’sdetermination tocontinue theeffort in spiteof theverysmallchancethatSkylabwouldhitanyone.17

AssummerturnedtofalltheHoustonoperation,directedbyCharlesHarlanofJSC’sFlightControlDivision,beganworkingaroundtheclock.AdditionofthetrackingstationinChilegavecompletecoveragethroughouteachofSkylab’srevolutions,andbyOctober1978Harlanhadenoughpeopletosetupfiveflightcontrol teams that worked three shifts a day. A few had sat behind controlconsolesduringtheSkylabmannedmissions,butmostwerenew.18

TheSkylabworkinggrouphadarehearsalofsorts inSeptember,whentheunmannedsatellitePegasus1cameoutoforbit.Theexerciseservedmainlytoevaluateimpactpredictionmodels,usingorbitaldatafromNORAD,aswellastoestablishinteragencyprocedures.Havingcheckedoutitscommunicationsandmodels,thegroupmonitoredPegasus’suneventfulreentryoverthesouthwesternAfrican coast on 17 September. From this exercise, goals were set for theeventualdemiseofSkylab.19

Having started with little confidence in the aging systems on board theorbital cluster, but havingdiscovered that those systemswerebetter built thanthey expected, flight controllers developed real enthusiasm for their task. The

problem was important enough to be worthwhile and difficult enough to bechallenging.Early in the summer theyhaddetermined that they coulduse theonboard computer, and Marshall control-system engineers devised newprogramstocontrolthespacecraft’sattitudewithoutusingthegasthrusters.Theremainingfuelfor thesehadtobekept inreserve,for theywouldbeneededifthereboostmoduleshouldreachtheworkshop.Thebatterieshadtobewatchedconstantly.As those inuseheatedup,otherswereputon line to replace them;occasionallytheyallwarmedupandthecoolingsystemhadtobeswitchedonlongenough to return them tonormal temperature.As the relationofSkylab’sorbital plane to the sun changed, all the variables changed.Many hours werespentdevisingandtestingnewcombinations.TheninNovemberthesickcontrolmoment gyro slowed down even more. The workshop was turned around, toexposethegyrotosunlightandwarmupitsbearingssothatlubricantmightflowmore freely. The maneuver had been used during the third mission withambiguous results,but since thegyrowasnowoperating faroutside the limitsreached during the mannedmission it seemed worth trying; loss of this gyrowould seriously complicate the problem. In the event, both gyros lasted untilreentry.20

LASTDAYSOFSKYLABTheyear-longefforttokeepSkylabaloftendedinDecember1978.Although

the teleoperator propulsionmodulewas approaching final assembly, problemswith Shuttle’s main engines had delayed critical tests, and program officialsclearlysaw that the reboostmissioncouldnotbe launchedbyOctober.Froschadvised thePresidenton15December thatSkylab couldnotbesavedbut thatNASAwoulddoallitcouldtocontrolreentrytominimizetherisktopopulatedareas. John Yardley, associate administrator for the Office of SpaceTransportation Systems (successor to the Office of Manned Space Flight),provideddetailsof thedecisionto thepressonthe19th.ShuttlescheduleshadslippedsofarthatthereboostmissioncouldnotbelaunchedbeforeMarch1980,and the workshop’s rapidly decaying orbit, plus the increasing difficulty ofcontrollingitsattitude,maderescueimpossible.21

The decision would simplify the work of Houston’s flight control teams,though not immediately. For six more weeks they worked three shifts a day,holdingSkylab in its low-dragattitudeuntilpolicymakerscoulddecideexactlyhow to manage the reentry. Choices were severely limited. As soon as thedecisionwasreached,Bastedosentadetailedreentryplantothedepartmentsof

State, Defense, and Justice and to the Federal Preparedness Agency forcomment.AmeetingwithNORADon9January1979establishedradartrackingrequirements and set up formal technical liaison. Reentry information fromNORAD would be transmitted to NASA field centers and to a coordinationcentertobesetupbyYardley’sofficetodirectthereentry.22TheoperationwasonlyslightlylesselaboratethanpreparationsforthereturnofanApolloflight.

Oneof theSkylabgroup’schief functionswas toensure thatNASAspokewithasinglevoiceduringthemonthsremainingbeforereentry.SinceNASAandNORAD used differentmodels to predict reentry times, it was important thatpublic statements about the date and place of reentry be consistent. Thisprecaution was wiser than it seemed at the time. Three months later, when anuclear reactor accident inPennsylvania almost required evacuationof severalthousand people, much confusion resulted when different experts madeconflictingpublicstatementsastothelevelofdanger.

NowthatSkylabwascertaintocomedown,televisionandthepresslookedforward to an event that might prove spectacular and in any case would benewsworthy.Muchas theyhaddonewithCometKohoutek (app.F), reportersand headline writers began to play up the coming reentry. Some bizarre by-products of the event provided an occasional flash of weird humor. InWashington, two computer specialists established a firm calledChicken LittleAssociates,offering toprovideup-to-the-minuteestimatesof thedanger toanyspecific person, for a fee.With the implication that NASA’s predictions wereunreliable,ChickenLittledrewpublicity—especiallyabroad.Then,justamonthbefore reentry, a group from the Brookline (Mass.) Psychoenergetics Instituteattempted to increase Skylab’s altitude by telekinesis. They staged a“coordinatedmeditation”sessioninseveraleasternstates,butproducednoeffectdetectableonNORAD’sradars.23

InWashingtonandHouston,moreseriouspreparationscontinued.Bastedo’sstaff finished the NASA reentry plan and sent it to the White House on 30January.March offered a second opportunity to check out refined procedureswhenHEAO 1, a NASA astronomical satellite, returned to earth. Data linksbetween NORAD, Washington, and Huntsville were checked out. As a finalrehearsal,theSkylabgroup,NORAD,MSFC,andJSCfollowedthereentryofaSoviet rocket body 27–29 April. This target of opportunity was used todeterminethestateofreadinessofallparticipantsintheSkylabreentry.InJune,apapersimulationwasrunasalastcheck.24

Work at the control center at JSC had slacked off somewhat in earlyFebruary, followingadecision to return theworkshop to solar-inertial attitude.

Since power management was much easier in this attitude, round-the-clockmonitoringofsystemswassuspendedforseveralweeksandmanyoftheflightcontrol people were sent back to their regular jobs. Attitude control too wascomparatively easy in solar inertial, in spite of the increased drag, but it wasexpectedtobecomemoredifficultastheworkshoplostaltitude.FromFebruarythroughMay, however, the control center simplykept an eye onSkylab whileplansweremadeforitslastfeworbits.25

Toward the endofApril,Headquarters issued its first forecast of a reentrydate calculated fromNORAD’smodel. On the 25th, when the workshop hadfallen to about 320 kilometers, NORAD estimated a probability of 50% thatSkylab would come down by 19 June; therewas a 90% chance that it wouldreenterbetween13 Juneand1 July.This formatwasusedconsistently for therest of the waiting period, because it was impossible to give a more preciseestimateuntil reentryhadvirtuallybegun.Marshall’s engineersuseda slightlydifferentforecastingmodel;theyestimatedreentrybetween15and22June,buttheirestimateswereneverpublicized.NORADwasinthebusinessof trackingsatellitesandNASAusedNORAD’sforecastsforpublicutterances.26

SinceflightcontrollerswerenotvitallyinterestedinNORAD’spredictions,thediscrepancywasnotparticularlybothersome.Thetwogroupsdidexchangeinformation, however, and determined the different ways the two computermodelstreateddata.NORADmadeafairlystraightforwardextrapolationbasedon recent observations, while NASA continuously took account of changingatmospheric density and the spacecraft’s drag profile as it camedown.Harlanreasonedthatthetwopredictionswouldconvergerapidlyasreentryapproached,whichturnedouttobethecase.27

By the end of May, engineers and managers had agreed on a method ofcontrolling the reentry. Skylab would be placed in a high-drag “torqueequilibrium”attitude,inwhichaerodynamicforceswerebalancedbythecontrolmoment gyros as long as they had the capability. This would subject theworkshop to a known retarding force fromwhich impact predictions could bemade.Flightcontrollerscouldthenreducedragifnecessarytoshiftthereentrypoint.Whentheclusterfellto140kilometers,itwouldbesettotumblingend-over-end,reducingthedragtoaknownlevelandallowingareasonablyaccuratepredictionof impact.Theoretically impactcouldbeshiftedbyasmuchas fiveorbitsbychangingthetumblingaltitude,butthatwouldtaxthesystemstotheirlimit.Ashiftofonetothreeorbitswasamorerealisticexpectation.Thetorque-equilibrium attitude made power management more complex, so the Houstoncenterwentbackto24-hoursurveillanceandcontrol.28

Meanwhile each ground track covered by Skylab was assigned a “hazardindex,” ranging from 0 to 100, depending on the population exposed on thattrack comparedwith the least dangerous track.On the basis of these numbersHarlanmighthavetoshift theimpactpoint toanorbitoflowerriskinthelasthoursofflight.Itwasastatisticalgame—sensible,butofferingnoassuranceofsafety.AsHarlancommentedlater,“Clearlyyoucouldcomeinonanorbitwithalotofpeopleandnothitasoul,oryoucouldcomeinonanorbitwithafewpeopleandhitaschoolhouseandkillabunchofkids.”AdministratorFrosch’stestimony before a House subcommittee in June pointed up NASA’spredicament.Hereiteratedthesmallriskofhumaninjury(1chancein152),andemphasized that the fragments would be widely scattered. Although Froschcouldnotgiveabsoluteassurancethatnoonewouldbeinjured,hetriedhisbesttoconvincehisaudiencethattherewasreallynotmuchtoworryabout.29

Statistical arguments, however, are inherently unconvincing, at least to thegeneralpublic;andFrosch’sassuranceswerethelesscomfortingbecauseafewofthefragmentsmightweighseveralhundredkilogramswhentheyreachedthesurface.Itwasclearthatthedecisionmadein1970wasdefinitelyembarrassingnineyearslater.Thespaceagencywasfeelingtheeffectsofachangeinpublicattitudetowardtechnologygenerallyandspacetechnologyinparticular.Alargefractionof thepublicwasunwilling toacceptany riskfromahigh-technologyprogram,especiallywhentheaveragecitizencoulddonothingtoprotecthimselffrom that risk. Congressmen and editors demanded to know why Skylab hadbeen launched without the means of controlling its reentry, and Frosch couldonlyanswerthatithadseemedtooexpensiveatthetime.

Theworkshopwasdownto261kilometersonthe20thofJune,havingfallen60 kilometers in the previous four weeks. During June NORAD issuedpredictions periodically; the median date (by which time there was an evenchancethattheworkshopwouldhavecometoearth)movedfrom16Julyto12July,whilethespreadnarrowed:7–25Julypredictedon14June,10–18Julyonthe28th.30

As reentry approached, the difference between NORAD’s predictions andNASA’s caused some small problems. Television networks, needing time toprepareforcoverageoftheevent,calledHoustontoaskwhentheyshouldsendreporting teams.Harlan and the JSCPublicAffairsOffice felt obliged to givethem a date in which they themselves had some confidence, so they told themedia officials to come a day or two before the official predictions called forreentry. This could have caused some embarrassment for Headquarters, butnobodypublicizedthepoint.31

EarlyinJulytheendwasapproachingrapidly.Theworkshopbecameharderto control as it dropped into the denser atmosphere, and power supplieswereincreasinglydifficulttomanage.On9July1979theSkylabCoordinationCenteropenedinNASAHeadquarters.WithdirecttelephonelinestoNORAD,NASAfield centers, theState andDefensedepartments, and theFAA, the centerwascapableofrelayinginformationandordersalmostinstantly.Aclosed-circuitTVdisplayfromHoustonpicturedSkylab’sgroundtrackforseveralorbits,aswellasthecurrentposition.Newsmenandothernonessentialpersonnelwerekeptoutof the operations room itself, but the closed-circuit TV, tracking charts, andperiodicbriefingskeptthecrowdinthelargernewsroominformed.Onopeningday the center issued the prediction thatSkylabwould comedownon11 Julybetween2:10a.m.and10:10p.m.EDT,mostprobablyonits34981storbit.Itwasthenatanaltitudeof190kilometers.Thefollowingdayitdropped17kmandthereentrytimewasbracketedbetween7:02a.m.and5:02p.m.EDTonthe11th.32

InHouston,CharlesHarlanandhisteamstoodbytomaketheirlastdecision.For some hours before reentry the computers gave the same prediction: theworkshopwascomingdownon11July.Theonlyquestionthatremainedwasthetiming of the final tumbling maneuver. During the last hours of 10 July itappearedthatSkylabwouldreenteronthebestpossibleorbitofthedayonthe11th,anorbitpassingacross southernCanadaand theeastcoastof theUnitedStatesandthenoveralongstretchofopenoceantoAustralia,thenextlandfall.Butearlycalculationsofthedebrispatternshowedthatiftumblingwereinitiatedat140kilometersasplanned,thewesternendofthe7400X185km“footprint”would slightly overlap North America. JSC officials then recommended, andHeadquarters concurred, that the cluster be tumbled sooner, to move thepredictedimpactareadownrange.Harlanpickedanareaabout1300kilometerssouth-southeast ofCapeTown,SouthAfrica, halfwaybetweenNorthAmericaandAustraliaandsouthoftheshippinglanes,whichwouldrequiretumblingat148 kilometers. The command was executed at 3:45 a.m. EDT, and theworkshopwentintoanend-over-endspin.33

Skylab had one more trick up its sleeve, however—one that gave flightcontrollerssomeanxiousmomentsonthelastorbit.TheyexpectedtheclustertocomeapartbeforeitpassedovertheeastcoastoftheU.S.,butradaroperatorsatBermudareportedonlyasingleimage.OverAscensionIslandtheworkshopstillhadnotbrokenup;aNORADimagingradarclearlyshowedthateventhefragilesolararrayswerestillintact.ButthetelemetrywasfalteringandstoppedentirelyasthecraftpassedsouthofAfrica.Itsunexpectedtenacityhadshiftedtheimpact

ellipse considerably to the east, however, and there was a possibility thatAustralia would catch some of the heavy fragments, which would fall at theeasternendoftheellipse.34

NORADcomputedthatimpactoccurredat12:37p.m.EDT.Shortlybefore1p.m., theWashington control center received word that the area southeast ofPerth, Australia, had indeed been showered with pieces. Spectacular visualeffectswerereportedandmanyresidentsheardsonicboomsandwhirringnoisesas thechunkspassedoverhead in theearlymorningdarkness.Officialswaitedanxiously for news of injury or property damage, but none came.Skylab wasfinallydownandNASAhadmanageditwithouthurtinganyone.35

One Australian, in fact, profited handsomely from the overshoot. A SanFrancisco newspaper had offered $10 000 for the first authenticated piece ofSkylabbroughttoitsofficewithin48hoursofreentry,andonthemorningof13July a claimant appeared. StanThornton, a 17-year-old beer-truck driver fromthe small coastal communityofEsperance, had found somecharredobjects inhis back yard, bagged them up, and caught the first plane for California. Hearrivedwithoutpassportandwithonlyashavingkitforluggage,butthepieceswere identified as remains of plastic or wood insulation from Skylab, andThorntongothisprize.36

Examiningtheirdataafterreentry,Harlanandhisteamdecidedthattheyhadmiscalculateddragduringtumbling.Itwasasmallrelativeerror—only4%—butithadshiftedtheimpactzonehundredsofkilometersfarthereastthantheyhadwanted. Fortunately the reentry orbit passed over the sparsely settled ranchcountryofWesternAustralia,butitwasaslightlyinelegantendtoanotherwisewellmanagedreentry.37

Little remained tobedone.Themakeshift control centers atHeadquarters,JSC,andMSFCweredismantled;Harlanandhisco-workerswentbacktotheirjobs grappling with Shuttle’s problems. Five Marshall engineers went toAustraliatotestthefragmentsthathadbeenrecovered,searchforothers,andtryto establish the actual pattern. Some indignation had been expressed byAustralian newspapers just after the reentry, but the NASA teamwas greetedwarmly and given all possible assistance in theirmission. Some pieces of theworkshophadbeenputondisplayinCoolgardieandothernearbytowns,butacursory search foundnoothers.Doubtlessmany remained scattered across thedustyranchesoftheoutback,tobestumbleduponsomedaybyaherderorfencerider.38

Meanwhile, just three days after Skylab’s reentry, two Soviet cosmonauts

aboardSalyut6establishedanewrecordforenduranceinearthorbit.TherecordtheybrokewasnotSkylab’sbutone thathadbeen setonly theyearbeforebyanotherSovietcrew.39

Appendixes

A.SummaryoftheMissionsB.MajorContractorsC.InternationalAeronauticalFederationWorldRecordsSetbySkylabD.ExperimentsE.Astronauts’BiographiesF.CometKohoutekG.JointObservingProgram2,ActiveRegions

AppendixASummaryoftheMissions

AppendixBMajorContractors

AppendixCInternationalAeronauticalFederation

WorldRecordsSetbySkylab

AppendixDExperiments

NOTES 1. Could not be operated as planned because the solar airlock was blocked by the parasol sunshade.

OperatedEVAby3dcrew.2.Componentfailurecausedinstrumenttoshutoffafteroperating110ofaplanned265minutes.3.Deployedthroughantisolarairlockandleftbetweenfirstandsecondmannedmissions. 4. Fore-and-aft scanning failed.After repair by 3d crew, faultwas locked out and cross-track scanning

restored,recovering80%ofdata.5.Shortcircuitinequipmentpreventedacquisitionoftelemetereddata.6.M512wasamultipurposevacuumchamberwithanelectronbeamgenerator,usedforconducting the

experimentsthatfollowinthelist.7.M518wasanelectricfurnaceattachingtoM512,usedinperformingtheexperimentsthatfollowinthe

list.8.Nospecialequipmentrequired;experimentuseddatafromotherSkylabsensors.9.Skylab’sx-raydetectorswerenotsufficientlysensitivetocollectthedatathisexperimentrequired.10.Couldnotbeperformed.WhenJupiterwasinthebestviewingposition,thepowercrisisdidnotallow

maneuveringtopointatthetarget.AnalternativetargetwasbelowthedetectionlimitofSkylabsensors.11.Onlypartiallycompleted;thewaterplantsusedintheexperimentdidnotlivelongenoughtomakethe

plannedobservations.Onesuccessfulobservationwasmade.12.Leakageoffluidsfromtheexperimenthardwareledtoinconclusiveresults.13.Hardwarefailurenegatedthisexperiment.14.Accomplishedbeforeandafterflightwithallcrews.

SOURCE:LelandF.BelewandErnstStuhlinger,Skylab:AGuidebook(NASAEP-107,1972),chap.5.

AppendixEAstronauts’Biographies

1stCrew

Commander:Capt.CharlesConrad,Jr.,USN.Born2June1930inPhiladelphia.B.S. in aeronautical engineering, PrincetonUniversity, 1953.CompletedU.S.NavyTestPilotSchoolatPatuxentRiver,Md.;joinedNASAin1962withthesecondgroupofastronauts.PilotofGemini5,21–29Aug.1965;commander ofGemini 11, 12–15 Sept. 1966; commander ofApollo 12,14–24Nov.1969.Thirdmantosetfootonthemoon,19Nov.1969.

Scientist-pilot:Comdr.JosephP.Kerwin,MC,USN.Born19Feb.1932inOakPark, 111. B.A. in philosophy, College of the Holy Cross, Worcester,Mass., 1953; M.D., Northwestern University Medical School, 1957.Commissioned in Navy Medical Corps 1958; qualified as pilot 1962.Joined NASA in 1965 with the first group of scientist-astronauts (4thgroupselected).NospaceflightexperiencepriortoSkylab.

Pilot: Comdr. Paul J. Weitz, USN. Born 25 July 1932 in Erie, Pa. B.S. inaeronauticalengineering,PennsylvaniaStateUniversity,1954;M.S.,U.S.NavalPostgraduateSchool,1964.Commissioned1954,qualifiedaspilot1956.ServedsixmonthsonU.S.S.Independence,earningtheAirMedalwith four stars, Jie Navy Commendation Medal, and the Navy UnitCitation. Selected as an astronaut in 1966 with the fifth group ofastronauts.NospaceflightexperiencepriortoSkylab.

2dCrew

Commander:Capt.AlanL.Bean,USN.Born15March1932inWheeler,Tex.B.S. in aeronautical engineering, University of Texas (Austin), 1954.Commissioned from NROTC on graduation; qualified as a pilot andcompleted the Navy Test Pilot School. Joined NASA in 1963 with thethird group of astronauts. After backup assignments onGemini 10 andApollo9,hewaslunar-modulepilotonApollo12andwasthefourthman

towalkonthemoon,19Nov.1969.Scientist-pilot: OwenK. Garriott (civilian). Born 22November 1930 in Enid,

Okla.B.S.inelectricalengineering,UniversityofOklahoma,1953;M.S.and Ph.D. in electrical engineering, Stanford University, 1957, 1960.Taught and conducted research at Stanford until 1965; selected as anastronaut in 1965 with the first group of scientist-astronauts. NospaceflightexperiencepriortoSkylab.

Pilot:Maj. Jack R. Lousma, USMC. Born 22 August 1932 in Grand Rapids,Mich. B.S. in aeronautical engineering, University of Michigan, 1959.Commissioned in1959; qualified as a pilot in1960. JoinedNASAwiththe fifthgroupof astronauts in1966.No spaceflight experienceprior toSkylab.

3dCrew

Commander:Lt.Col.GeraldP.Carr,USMC.Born22August1932 inDenver.B.S.inmechanicalengineering,UniversityofSouthernCalifornia,1954.Commissioned fromNROTC on graduation, he qualified as a pilot andserved as a fighter pilot withMarine squadrons overseas from 1962 to1965. Joined NASA with the fifth group of astronauts in 1966. NospaceflightexperiencepriortoSkylab.

Scientist-pilot:EdwardG.Gibson(civilian).Born8November1936inBuffalo,N.Y. B.S. in engineering, University of Rochester, 1959; M.S. inengineering, Ph.D. in physics, California Institute of Technology, 1960,1964. Senior research scientist in theApplied Research Laboratories ofthePhilcoCorp.untilselectedasanastronautin1965withthefirstgroupofscientist-astronauts.NospaceflightexperiencebeforeSkylab.

Pilot:Lt.Col.WilliamR.Pogue,USAF.Born23January1930inOkemah,Okla.B.S. in education, Oklahoma Baptist University, 1951; M.S. inmathematics,Oklahoma StateUniversity, 1960.Commissioned in 1952,flew 43 combat missions in Korea, earning the AirMedal and the AirForceCommendationMedal.MemberoftheUSAFThunderbirds,1955–1957. Taught mathematics at the Air Force Academy, 1960–1963.GraduatedfromtheRAFEmpireTestPilots’SchoolandservedtwoyearsasatestpilotwiththeBritishMinistryofAviation.JoinedNASAin1966withthefifthgroupofastronautsselected.NospaceflightexperiencepriortoSkylab.

Backupfor1stCrew

Commander: Russell L. Schweickart (civilian). Born 25 October 1935 inNeptune,N.J.B.S. andM.S. in aeronautical engineering,MassachusettsInstitute of Technology, 1956, 1963. Conducted research in upperatmosphere physics at the Experimental Astronomy Laboratory at MITbeforejoiningNASAwiththethirdgroupofastronautsin1963.Servedaslunar-modulepilotonApollo9,3–13March1969,testingextravehicularactivity procedures and simulating a lunar-orbit rendezvous with thecommandmodule.

Scientist-pilot: F. StoryMusgrave (civilian). Born 19 August 1935 in Boston.B.S. in statistics from Syracuse University, 1958;M.B.A. in operationsanalysis from University of California at Los Angeles, 1959; B.A. inchemistry from Marietta College, 1960; M.D. from Columbia MedicalSchool,1964;M.S.inbiophysicsfromtheUniversityofKentucky,1966;studied physiology atUniversity ofKentucky. Selectedwith the secondgroupofscientist-astronautsin1967.Nospaceflightexperience.

Pilot:Lt.Comdr.BruceMcCandlessII,USN.Born8June1937inBoston.B.S.fromU.S.NavalAcademy,1958;M.S.inelectricalengineering,StanfordUniversity,1965.Qualifiedasapilotin1960andservedonboardU.S.S.ForrestalandU.S.S.Enterprise,1960–1964.JoinedNASAwiththefifthgroupofastronautsin1966.Nospaceflightexperience.

Backupfor2dand3dCrews

Commander:VanceD.Brand(civilian).Born9May1931 inLongmont,Colo.B.S. in business, University of Colorado, 1953; B.S. in aeronauticalengineering,1960;M.B.A.fromUCLA,1964.Pilot,MarineCorps,1953–1957; test engineer with Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, 1960–1966.Graduated from U.S. Naval Test Pilot School, 1963, and served asexperimentaltestpilotandleaderofaLockheedadvisorygroupwiththeWestGermanAirForce.NospaceflightexperiencepriortoSkylab;laterflewaspilotontheApollo-SoyuzTestProjectmission,15–24July1975.

Scientist-pilot: William B. Lenoir (civilian). Born 14 March 1939 in Miami,Florida.B.S.,M.S.,andPh.D.inelectricalengineering,MIT,1961,1962,1965.TaughtandconductedresearchatMIT,1964–1967.JoinedNASAwith the second group of scientist-astronauts in 1967. No spaceflight

experience.Pilot: Don L. Lind (civilian). Born 18 May 1930 in Midvale, Utah. B.S. in

physics, University of Utah, 1953; Ph.D. in high energy physics,University of California (Berkeley), 1964. Conducted experiments onlow-energyparticlesintheearth’smagnetosphereatGoddardSpaceFlightCenter, 1964–1966. Qualified as a Navy pilot in 1955 and served twoyears active duty before joiningNASA in 1966with the fifth group ofastronauts.

SOURCE:HouseCommitteeonScienceandTechnology,AstronautsandCosmonauts:BiographicalandStatisticalData,reportpreparedbytheSciencePolicyResearchDiv.,CongressionalResearchService,LibraryofCongress,94thCong.,1stsess.,June1975;NASAHq.,“SkylabNewsReference,”March1973.

AppendixFCometKohoutek

NASA’SOBSERVATIONSOFCOMETKOHOUTEK

Comet 1973f, discovered by and named for Lubos Kohoutek, was anexceptiontothegeneralexperiencewithcomets.Itwasdiscoveredfartherfromthe sun (73.9 million km) and earlier (7 months before perihelion) than anypreviously reported comet; early calculations of its path showed that itwouldswinginsidetheorbitofMercury;anditsbrightnesswhendiscoveredindicatedthat itwas exceptionally large. Its size andnear approach to the sun indicatedthat it would be extraordinarily brilliant when it passed perihelion in lateDecember1973.1

Presented with eight months of lead time, astronomers around the worldbeganplanningextensiveandsystematicobservations.NASApreparedtouseallits available instruments to contribute to this worldwide program. Someastronomersworking on otherNASA-sponsored projects diverted part of theirresources to comet observations; a few special grants were awarded; otherexperimentersworkedoninstrumentstobeflowninaircraftorsoundingrockets.Aspecial“OperationKohoutek”officewasestablishedatGoddardSpaceFlightCentertocoordinateNASA’sobservations;italsocoordinatedactivitieswiththeSmithsonian Observatory, Kitt Peak National Observatory, and the NationalRadioAstronomyObservatory.ExistinginstrumentsconstitutedthebulwarkofNASA’s program, even though all of themwere designed for other purposes.Mariner 10, launched toward Mercury on 3 November 1973;Orbiting SolarObservatory 7, in orbit since September 1971; and Skylab’s Apollo telescopemountweretheprincipalones.AnewJointObservatoryforCometaryResearchnear Socorro, New Mexico, not yet formally dedicated, was brought intooperationforKohoutek.

As 1973 progressed, earlier predictions of the comet’s size and brightnesswere modified downward by further observation. Astronomers were notsurprised, as comets areprobably the least understood and least predictableofcelestialobjects,butcertainof theplannedobservationshadtobealtered.Therestwerecarriedoutverymuchasplanned,withgratifyingresults.

Preliminary examinationof those results showedKohoutek to havebeen amost interesting comet. Spectroscopic evidence for water in a comet wasobtained for the first time, supporting a widely accepted theory that cometsconsist largely of ice and frozen gases. Another interesting discovery wasKohoutek’semissionofradiofrequencyradiationidentifiedwiththepolyatomicmoleculeshydrogencyanideandmethylcyanide.Bothofthesemoleculeshavebeendetectedinintergalacticspace,butneverbeforeincomets.Theobservationlends credence to the supposition that comets are composed of the primordialmaterialoutofwhichthesolarsystemwasformed.

Kohoutekwasalsouniqueinbeingapparentlya“new”comet,onethathadneverbeforepassed thesun.Thisat leastwasofferedasanexplanationfor itsconsiderablydiminishedbrightness after perihelion.Never havingbeenheatedbefore, it contained much more volatile material than periodic comets. Thismaterial boiled off during approach to the sun, releasing some of the solidparticlesembeddedinitandcreatingalargecloudofhighlyreflectivedust.Butby the time the comet rounded the sun and became favorably placed forobservationfromearth,ithaddiminishedinsizeandbrightnessmuchmorethananoldercometwouldhave.

OrbitofCometKohoutek,1973–1974.

Skylab’sobservationsofcometKohoutekwereasmallpartofthetotalstudy,but theywere among the important ones. The photometric images taken dailyfromtheworkshop’sorbitabovetheatmosphereprovidedagoodrecordofthecomet’s intrinsicbrightness.Thecrew’svisualobservationsandcolor sketcheswerefarbetterthananysuchmadefromtheground.Integratedintotherestofthe studies made around the world, they will eventually play a part inunderstandingwhatcometsareandwheretheycomefrom.

KOHOUTEKASAMEDIAEVENT

Kohoutek’s early discovery and the busy preparations to study it werescientificallynoteworthy,but—onemightsuppose—hardlythestufftoexcitethepress generally. Other comets had come and gone in recent years withoutdrawing newspaper attention. But the coincidence of its perihelion with theChristmas season, the early predictions that it would be the most spectacularcelestialdisplaysinceHalley’scometin1910,andtheinvolvementofamannedspaceflight,combinedtomakeitnewsworthy.Overthelastsixmonthsof1973Americannewspapers—ablyassistedbyanintensivepublicrelationscampaignbyNASA—gavemore coverage to its approach than to any such exotic eventwithinmemory.2

In July 1973 a Washington paper reported that NASA was consideringdelayingthelaunchofthethirdSkylabcrewbytwotothreeweeksinordertohave the solar instrumentsmanned as cometKohoutek swung around the sun.AssociateAdministratorforMannedSpaceFlightDaleD.Myersremarkedthatwhilesuchadelaywouldbeexpensive,“cometsthissizecomethiscloseonceinacentury.Itreallylookslikethekindofthingyoucan’tpassup.”3AfewweekslaterthepreparationsbeingmadeatNASA’sAmesResearchCenteratMofTettField,California,attracted theattentionofaSanJose reporter,whonoted“theexcitement bubbling among the ranks of researchers who are accustomed todeliberate,carefullyqualifiedphrases.”Theywere,hesaid,callingit“thecometofthecentury.”4

Very quickly this phrase became ineluctably attached to the new comet.Preliminaryestimates that itwouldbe largerandbrighter thanHalley’scomet,eventhatitmightbevisibleinmidday,weregivenwidecurrency.Amagazineforseriousamateurastronomerswarned,“Justhowbrightthecometwillbecome

cannotyetbeforecast reliably,”5but from16August,whenNASAannouncedpostponementof theSkylab launch toallowobservationof thecomet,mostofthepressignoredsuchnegativism.6

As the launch of the last Skylabmission approached,more comet stories,still featuring the earliest estimates of size and brightness, appeared. AnAssociated Press release, quoting NASA scientists, promised the mostspectacularcelestialsightinmorethanacentury,reiteratingthecomparisonwithHalley’s comet. Kohoutek might be as bright as the full moon, with a tailstretchingacrossasixthofthesky,accordingtoanotherreport.Again,formoreknowledgeable readers, NASA’s director of Operation Kohoutek, StephenMaran,cautionedthatcometsarehighlyunpredictable;Kohoutekcouldsplitorevendisappearasitdrewclosertothesun.7

Through November the comet was still invisible to the unaided eye, butpublic interest intensified. A three-day cruise aboard the luxury liner QueenElizabeth II was almost fully booked early in themonth; byDecember, 1693peoplehadpaid$130to$295each tosailout into theAtlantic,hoping tofinddarkandclearskiestoglimpsethecometjustbeforedawn.Aleadingmarketeroftelescopesforamateursreportedsalesupby200%.EastmanKodakcompanypublishedabookletcontainingtipsforphotographingtheyet-unseenspectacle.By now, however, skeptical notes were creeping into some accounts. WhileNewsweekwasreporting that“astronomersarepredicting thatcometKohoutekwillproveanevenmorespellbindingspectacle thanHalley’scomet,” theNewYorkTimeshedged:“someastronomersfear that thecomethasbeen‘oversold’and will be a disappointment to many.” An official of the Brevard County,Florida, astronomical society offered the opinion that Kohoutekwould not be“thecometof thecentury.…Idon’t think itwillbeseen in themiddleof theday.”By lateNovember itwasreported thatalready thereweresigns that“thefirstpredictionsofpost-Christmasbrilliancemayhavebeenoveroptimistic.”8

Thatwasnotenoughtostillthefrenzythathadbeenbuiltupbymostpapers,however. Feature writers had a field day recalling the history of spectacularcomets and the superstitions associated with them. Planetariums across thecountry staged comet shows, and here and there installed special “comet hot-lines” providing recorded information by telephone. And although by earlyDecember only a few astronomers and well equipped hobbyists had seenKohoutek, the spate of stories did not abate, for as the comet approachedperihelionitwouldsurelybeginlivinguptoexpectations.9

Those who sailed on theQE2, as it turned out, had to get their money’sworth out of entertainment other than the comet—which, probably, many of

themhadplannedtodoanyway.Cloudscoveredtheareamuchofthetimeandtheseawasnotkind:manyofthepassengersgotseasick.LubosKohoutek,whowas brought along as one of the featured attractions of the cruise, thought hecaughtaglimpseofthecometinthepredawndarkness,buthewasnotsure.Inthemidwest,theearlyDecemberweatherfoiledmostofthosewhotriedtogetalook at comet Kohoutek. TheNew York Times reported that even those whocouldseeitwerelikelytofeelletdown:“themuch-publicizedCometKohoutekis proving a disappointment to astronomers, if not a fizzle.” Only three daysbefore, NASA’s spokesman for Operation Kohoutek had reiterated that thecometcouldbe“thegreatestfierychariotofalltime.”10

NASA’s promotion of the still-invisible comet was producing excellentresults when the third Skylab crew was launched—so good, in fact, that theWhiteHousemadeatentativeattempttoridethecomet’scoattails.Anadvisertothe Domestic Council approached NASA Administrator James C. Fletcherproposingahalf-hourtelevisionspeciallinkingcometKohoutek,Skylab,andthefirst family’s Christmasmessage to the country. Six months earlier this sameadviserhadurged thecouncil toexploit thespaceprogramand itsbenefits forthebenefitofthepresident’simage.Hearguedthatthe“FlashGordon”sideofspaceventureshadbeenneglected.Comparingthecoverageofspaceflightwiththefilm2001:ASpaceOdysseyandthetelevisionseriesStarTrek,he found itunimaginative, boring, and unappealing, and suggested that what was neededwasto“reallysockspacetotheAmericanpeopleforthefirsttimeinawaytheyhave wanted it all along.” Against that background, NASA’s AssistantAdministrator for Public Affairs John P. Donnelly reacted adversely to thetelevision proposal, finding it neither imaginative, perceptive, nor incisive.Donnelly pointed out that involvingNASA in politics—as the suggestionwassuretodo—wouldbeaverybadthingforthespaceprogram.(Hedidnotneedtosay that itwasahighly inopportune time toentangle thespaceagencywiththe fortunes of Richard M. Nixon while the Watergate investigations wereuncoveringdamagingevidenceagainstthepresidentandhisadvisers.)Althoughthe White House proposal was the subject of high-level and highly chargeddiscussionswithinNASA,Donnelly’sviewprevailed.11

Thecometcouldhavedonethepresidentnogood,aseventsturnedout;thehazardsofpredictingcometbehaviorcamehometoastronomersandjournalistsalike in the next month. Over a period of three weeks Operation Kohoutekdirector Stephen Maran revised his pronouncements drastically. On 20December he called early predictions of its brightness “optimistic” in view ofcurrentopinionthatKohoutekwasanewcomet.Aweeklaterhesaiditwas“not

the comet [of the century] from the point of view of public viewing.”Scientificallyitwouldbeveryimportant,but“itwon’tbeasspectacularaswehadhoped.”Whenareporteraskedaboutthe160-million-kilometertailthatwassupposed to stretch across a sixth of the sky, Maran said that estimate was“outdated.”12

Earlyinthenewyearnewspaperswerewonderingwhathadbecomeofthebrilliant spectacle they had been touting for sixmonths. Serious amateurs andprofessionalastronomersobtainedmanyvaluableandbeautifulphotographsofthecomet,but thegeneralpublicwasdisappointed, to say the least.Reportingthat thecometwasaboutasbrightas theaveragestar,onepaperheadlined itsstory, “Kohoutek: The Flop of the Century?” No expert would venture aconfident opinion as to the cause. By 10 January 1974Kohoutekwas visibleonly through binoculars. A spokesman for Goddard Space Flight Centeracknowledgedthat“fromapublicrelationspointofview,ithasbeenadisaster,”though he insisted that “from a scientific point of view, it has been a roaringsuccess.” A story in the Philadelphia Inquirer summed up the press viewsuccinctly:“The‘CometoftheCentury’WentPhzzzt.”13

With the comet sailing off into space, perhaps on a hyperbolic path thatwould never bring it back, serious reporting gaveway to parody and satiricalcomment. A guest columnist for the Chicago Tribune broadly spoofed theastronomical debacle by attributing the pre-perihelion predictions to agovernmentplottotakethepublic’smindofftheunfoldingWatergatescandals,oraconspiracywiththetelescopeindustrytoboostsales.IntheNewYorkTimesRussell Bakerwrote lightly of “TheCosmic Flopperoo,”whileArt Buchwaldintervieweda fictitiouscometdealerwhopointedout thathisproductwasnotwarrantedagainstfailuretoshine.14TheKohoutekbingewasover.

Press treatment of comet Kohoutek had emphasized the spectacularpossibilities. Perhaps reporters, encouraged by scientists’ understandableenthusiasm for a major comet’s appearance just when it could effectively bestudied, overlooked the fact that comets are notoriously unpredictable.Kohoutek’s unparalleled early discovery allowed much more time for bothscientificpreparationandpublicattention—whichfewcometsget.Perhapssomewriters,notingthatcometshadtraditionallyheraldedthefallofprincesandotherdire events, saw some connection between Kohoutek andWatergate. And nodoubtthecoincidenceofthecomet’spassagearoundthesunwiththeChristmasseasonaddedinterest.

Mostly,however, thepress simplybamboozled itself, ignoring thecautionsoccasionally invokedby theastronomers.Kohoutekhadbeen treatedasa sure

thingfromthebeginning,andwhenitmisfired,thepressfeltvictimized.Noneofit,ofcourse,wasreallynecessary.InitsMarch1974issue,SkyandTelescope—whichhadcalmlypublishedthesoberfactsaboutKohoutek—reflectedonthepress’soverreaction:

The impression made by Comet Kohoutek 1973f depends very much on with whom you talk.Professionalastronomersareenthusiasticabouttheobservationstheyobtainedthatshouldtellmuchabout the structureandoriginsofcomets.Knowledgeableamateurswere rewardedbyabeautifuland delicate object in the evening sky, better seenwith binoculars thanwith the naked eye, anddifficult to photograph. But the general public wondered what had happened to the spectaclepromisedbythenewsmedia.

Actually,1973fwasalargecometcomparableto1970II(Bennett),andanydisappointmentwasmainlyduetooverenthusiasticadvancepublicity.15

AppendixGJointObservingProgram2,ActiveRegions

RESEARCHOBJECTIVES

Study the three dimensional structure of active regions, the horizontal andverticalvariationofthetemperature,density,velocity,andmagneticfield.

Studytheshortterm(minutestohours)andlongterm(days)evolutionofthechromosphere,transitionregion,andcoronainactiveregions.

Investigate the relationship between the three dimensional structure of anactiveregionanditsevolutionasitrelatestotheproductionofflaresandothertransientphenomena.

Obtain information about the structure of the photosphere, chromosphere,transitionregion,andcoronainandabovesunspots.

Map the differential velocity fields in the chromospheric, transition, andcoronallayersoveractiveregionsandothersolarfeatures.

OBSERVATIONS

X-rayfiltergramsfromS054andS056andspectroheliogramsfromS055andS082A will contain information about the three dimensional structure. Inaddition, the spectra obtained by S055 and S082B will contain detailedinformationaboutthevariationoftemperature,density,andvelocitywithheightatselectedpositions.WhitelightpicturesofthecoronafromS052willprovideadetailed description of the density structure of the corona overlying activeregions. For evolutionary studies, observations will be obtained at a ratecompatiblewiththetimescaleofthedevelopmentoftheregions.

OPERATIONALDESCRIPTION

A.Rapidly developing active region:This programwill be initiatedwhen theastronaut or Pis observe a rapidly developing active region. When the

decisionismadetocarryoutthisobservation,BB-5[buildingblock5,asetofinstructionsforsettinguptheinstruments]willimmediatelybecarriedout.BB-5,BB-6,and/orBB-10mayberepeatedanumberoftimesasdeterminedby the Pis. If the active region iswithin 45° of the limb, BB-2 should becarried out as often as determined by the Pis. Which building blocks areperformedwilldependontherateofdevelopmentoftheactiveregionand/ortheflaringrateoftheregion.

B.Long-termevolutionofanactiveregion:Theactiveregiontobestudiedwillbe selected by the Pis on the ground and pointing information will betelemetered to the astronauts.Anactive regionwillbe selected that canbestudiedforaminimumof10daysandat leastone limbpassage.Themostdesirableobservationwouldbefromlimbtolimb.1.Whentheactiveregionisonthedisk,itshouldbeobservedonceperday,

performing BB-4 and BB-5 on alternate days. Point ATM at differentbright and dark areas of the plage. For the S055 spectra, the pointingshould be adjusted so that output of detector no. 3 (grating in opticalreference) ismaximizedforsomepointsandminimizedforsomepoints.Whentheactiveregioniswithin45°ofthelimbBB-2willbecarriedoutatleastonce.

2. When the active region is near the limb passage BB-2 (once) will becarriedout,followedbyBB-5(once),BB-6(3times),BB-13(once),BB-14(once),andBB-2(once).

C.Structureofactiveregions:Theactiveregiontobestudiedwillbeselectedby the Pis on the ground. The ATM slit will be pointed at a number ofselected positions across the active region, andBB-6, and/orBB-5, and/orBB-4, will be performed, with the number of times in each mode beingselectedduringthemission.

D. Sunspots: An active region containing large sunspots will be selected forstudy. If thediameterof theumbra isat least60arcseconds, theATMslitwill bepointed at twopositions in the centerof theumbra, andBB-6plusBB-12will be carried out (2 pointings). ATMwill also be pointed at twopositionsinthepenumbra,andBB-6plusBB-12performedateachpoint.Ifthediameteroftheumbraissignificantlylessthan60arcseconds,theabovesequencesmaybeperformedwithoutS082B.

E. Chromospheric velocities: This program will be implemented in thefollowingmanner.Anactiveregionorotherareaofinterestwillbeselected.TheATMslitwillbepointedatthearea,rolledsothattheS055scanlineiseast-west, andBB-18 carried out.TheATMwill be rolled 90°, so that the

S082Bslit isparallel to theS055scan line inBB-18,andpositionedalongthat line to the best position for observing uniform line-of-sight plasmamotion.BB-11willthenbeperformed.S055andS0S2Bwillobtainvelocityinformation while S054, S056, and S082B obtain information about theatmosphericstructureintheregionbeingobserved.

SourceNotes

In preparing this history the authors were granted access to NASAdocumentsatseveralsites.Alargecollection(occupyingsome15linearmetersofshelfspace)hadalreadybeencompiledbyRolandNewkirkandIvanErtelforthepreparationofSkylab:AChronology (NASASP-4011,Washington, 1977).To this collection, which was housed in the History Office at Johnson SpaceCenter,weaddeddocumentsfromseveralothersources:thearchivesatKennedySpaceCenter(nowapartofthatcenter’stechnicallibrary),theHistoryOfficeatNASAHeadquarters, the reading files from theSkylaboffices at JSC, and therecordsof thevariousprojectofficesatMarshallSpaceFlightCenter.MostoftheMarshall documentation has been retired to the FederalRecordsCenter atEastPoint,Ga.;itcanberecalledthroughtheManagementOperationsOfficeatMarshall.

OnevaluablesourceatMarshallwasthecollectionofLelandF.Belew,some50cartonsofdocumentsaccumulatedduringhiseightyearsasSkylabprogrammanager.WewerealsoallowedtoscreenandcopytheweeklynotessubmittedtoMarshall’s director by each laboratory director andmajor projectmanager;these,thoughbrief,documentimportantmilestonesandthegeneralprogressoftheprogram,andoftencontainhandwrittennotationsby thedirector—queries,suggestions, or comments that are of value.Similarlywe screened and copiedtheminutesofMarshall’sstaffandboardmeetings.

The volume of available documentation on Skylab is staggering. Forexample,theauthorsscreened57cartons(about2.5cubicmeters)offilesfromtheorbitalworkshopprojectmanager atMarshall—whichwasonly a selectedpart of the total files.Eachof theotherSkylabmodulesproducedcomparablequantities of paper. The files at the other centers, though somewhat lessvoluminous,areequallydetailed.Theresearcherwhodigsintothismiddenwillfindmaterialonthemostminuteengineeringandmanagementdetails,aswellashigher-level technical andmanagementdecisions.From thismassofpaperweselectedandcopiedthedocumentsusedinwritingthishistory.

The Skylab archives now comprise copies of official correspondence,technicalmanuals,flightplans,technicaldebriefingsofcrews,andtranscriptsofall communications during flight; news reference material and press

conferences; and transcripts of interviews we conducted with more than 60programparticipants.Thecollectionoccupies88cartons.

In January 1982 these documents, along with those from the Mercury,Gemini,andApollo-SoyuzTestProjectprograms,weretransferredfromtheJSCHistory Office to the custody of the Fondren Library atWilliamMarsh RiceUniversity inHouston.A custodial agreement betweenRice and JSCprovidesforthesedocumentstobestored,archived,andindexedattheFondrenLibraryand made available to researchers interested in the development of mannedspaceflight.JSCretainstitletothedocuments.

Chapter11.BartonC.HackerandJamesM.Grimwood,OntheShouldersofTitans:AHistoryofProjectGemini,

NASASP-4203(Washington,1977).

2.LoydS.Swenson,Jr.,JamesM.Grimwood,andCharlesC.Alexander,ThisNewOcean:AHistoryofProjectMercury,NASASP-4201(Washington,1966).

3.ShirleyThomas,MenofSpace,4:38–73(PhiladelphiaandNewYork:ChiltonCo.,1962);RobertR.Gilruth,“FromWallopsIslandtoProjectMercury,1945–1958:AMemoir,”EssaysontheHistoryofRocketry and Astronautics: Proceedings of the Third through the SixthHistory Symposia of theInternationalAcademyofAstronautics,NASACP-2014(Washington,1977),2:445–76.

4. Swenson, Grimwood, and Alexander, This New Ocean, chap. 6; Hacker and Grimwood, On theShouldersofTitans,chap.2.

5.NASArelease65–228,10Sept.1965.

6.CourtneyG.Brooks,JamesM.Grimwood,andLoydS.Swenson,Jr.,ChariotsforApollo:AHistoryofMannedLunarSpacecraft,NASASP-4205(Washington,1979).

7.WernhervonBraun,“ManagementinRocketResearch,”BusinessHorizons5(Dec.1962):41–48.

8.Ibid.9. Robert Gilruth interview, 6 Aug. 1975; W. A. Ferguson interview, 6 Oct. 1975; and Robert F.

Thompsoninterview,18Dec.1975.

10.MSFCreleases65–197,5Aug.,and65–267,9Aug.1965;MarshallStar,25Aug.1965.11.VonBraun toMSFCemployees,“Marshall’sChangingRole in theSpaceProgram,”13Aug.1965;

WilliamTaylorinterview,18July1975.

12.CharlesD.BensonandWilliamBarnabyFaherty,Moonport:AHistoryofApolloLaunchFacilitiesandOperations,NASASP-4204(Washington,1978),chaps.1,10,15.

13.Ibid.,chaps.15,19.

14.Brooks,Grimwood,andSwenson,ChariotsforApollo,pp.128–29.15.Ibid.,pp.129–31.

16. A. A. Blagonravov, ed.,CollectedWorks of K. E. Tsiolkovskiy, vol. 2,Reactive FlyingMachines,NASATechnical Translation TTF-237 (Washington, 1965), pp. 118–67;HermannOberth,Ways toSpaceflight, NASA TTF-622, pp. 478–91; Wernher von Braun, “Crossing the Space Frontier,”Collier’s,22Mar.1952,pp.24–29,72–74.

17.AsummaryofspacestationandorbitaloperationsconceptsisfoundinBartonC.Hacker,“TheIdeaofRendezvous: From Space Stations to Orbital Operations in Space-Travel Thought, 1895–1951,”TechnologyandCulture15(1974):373–88.

18.HouseSelectCommitteeonAstronauticsandSpaceExploration,TheNextTenYearsinSpace,1959–1969,Housedocument115,86thCong.,1stSess.(henceforth86/1),3Feb.1959,pp.iv,1–9;SenateCommittee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Subcommittee, Hearings, NASA SupplementalAuthorizationforFiscalYear1959,86/1,pp.46,79–83;U.S.ArmyBallisticMissileAgency,“ABMAPresentationtoNASA,”reportD-TN-1–59,20Jan.1959.

19. Harry Goett to Ira H. Abbott, NASA dir. of aeronautical and space research, “Interim Report onOperation of Research Committee on Manned Space Flight,” 17 July 1959; NASA, “Minutes ofMeeting of Research Steering Committee on Manned Space Flight,” 25–26 May 1959; AmesResearchCtr.,“MinutesofMeetingofResearchSteeringCommitteeofMannedSpaceFlight,”25–26June1959;Brooks,Grimwood,andSwenson,ChariotsforApollo,p.15.

20. Institute of the Aeronautic Sciences, Proceedings of the Manned Space Stations Symposium, LosAngeles,22Apr.1960,pp.8,24–32.

21.NASA,“TheLongRangePlan,”12Jan.1961,p.19;RobertGilruthtoWilliamMead,AmesResearchCtr., “Scientific Experiments to Be Conducted in anOrbiting Laboratory,” 18May 1961;MannedSpacecraftCtr.,“ProjectApolloSpacecraftDevelopmentStatementofWork,”18Dec.1961,pt.1,p.2;pt.3,pp.35,167,176.

22.GeorgeAlexander,“MarshallIntensifiesRendezvousStudies,”AviationWeek,19Mar.1962,pp.78–85;AviationWeek,28Jan.1963,p.27;GeorgevonTiesenhausen,“AnOrbitalLaunchFacility,”IASpaper 63–64, presented at 31stAnnualMeeting, 21–23 Jan. 1963; von Tiesenhausen, “Toward theOrbital Launch Facility,”Astronautics and Aerospace Engineering,Mar. 1963, pp. 52–55;Brooks,Grimwood,andSwenson,ChariotsforApollo,chap.3.

23. House Committee on Science and Astronautics, 7965 NASA Authorization, hearings before theSubcommitteeonMannedSpaceFlight,88/2,pt.2,p.589;SenateCommitteeonAeronauticalandSpaceSciences,Hearings on National SpaceGoals for the Post-Apollo Period, 89/1, pp. 344–49;MaximeFagetinterview,12Nov.1975.

24.LangleyResearchCtr.,AReport on theResearchandTechnologicalProblemsofMannedRotatingSpacecraft,NASATND-1504(Washington,Aug.1962),pp.1–20.

25.AviationWeekandSpaceTechnology,16Apr.,p.75;2July,pp.78–80;20Aug.,p.99;10Sept.1962,pp.33–34;EmanuelSchnitzer,memoforLangleyResearchCtr.assoc.dir.,“ResultsofSpaceStationConferencebetweenNASAHeadquartersandGoodyearAircraftCorporation,”21Apr.1961.

26.LangleyResearchCtr.,MannedRotatingSpacecraft.27.MaxFagetandEdwardOiling,“AHistoricalSketchofNASAMannedSpacecraftCenterAdvanced

Earth Orbital Missions Space Station Activity from 1962 to 1969,” in Space Station TechnologySymposium (Langley Research Ctr., Va., Feb. 1969); MSC Space Station Prog. Off., “ProjectOlympus,SpaceStationProgram,”13Aug.1962.

28. William E. Stoney to R. L. Bisplinghoff, “OART-OMSF and Center Meeting on Space StationStudies,”5Oct.1962.

29.JosephF.Shea,“DefinitionofPotentialApplicationsforMannedSpaceStation,”17Oct.1962.

30.HouseCommitteeonScienceandAstronautics,1964NASAAuthorization,hearings,88/1,pt.1,p.20;Seamans toNASAprog.offs.andctrs.,“SpecialTaskTeamforMannedEarthOrbitingLaboratoryStudy,”28Mar.1963.

31. Joseph F. Shea and Michael I. Yarymovych, “The Manned Orbital Laboratory,” Conference onArtificialSatellites,VPI,Blacksburg,Va.,12–16Aug.1963,pp.2–3.

32.Dir.ofSpecialMannedSpaceFlightStudies,OMSF,“ApolloExtensionSystems(AES)CapabilitiesforExperimentsinEarthOrbit,”Jun.1965.

33.OwenMaynardtochief,SpacecraftTechnologyDiv.,MSFC,“SystemsInvestigationof100DayEarthOrbitalOperationforApollo,”12Dec.1962;Faget,“100-DayApollo,StudySupport,”30July1963.

34.NorthAmericanAviation,Inc.,“Extended-MissionApolloStudy,”24Nov.1963,pp.2–4,7.

35.Ibid.,pp.5,10–11,13–14.36.Ibid.,pp.9,16–19.

37. Shea and Yarymovych, “Manned Orbital Laboratory,” pp. 27–31; “NASA Building Space StationTechnology,”AviationWeekandSpaceTechnology,22July1963,p.78.

38.SheaandYarymovych,“MannedOrbitalLaboratory,”pp.26,31–32.

39.DouglasAircraftCo., “Zero-GSpace Station FinalBriefing,”Houston, 5 Feb. 1964, pp. 7, 11–15;MSC,“AdvancedMannedMissionsStudyProgram,”July1967.

40.WilliamStoney,“ReportonStudiesforFutureMannedSpaceFlightMissions,”IndustryInformationProceduresConference,Houston,22–23Apr.1964,p.4;MaximeFagetinterview,12Nov.1975.

41.Koelle,“Notes,”27Aug.1963,13Apr.1964.TheMarshall“Notes”aresummariesofconversations,thoughts,earlyresultsinthelaboratories—virtuallyanythingamanagerwishedtoreporttothecenterdirectorinaninformalway.VonBraunoftenannotatedandcirculatedthemforotherstaffmemberstoread.

42. House Committee on Science and Astronautics, 1965 NASA Authorization, hearings before theSubcommitteeonMannedSpaceFlight,88/2,pt.2,pp.587–609;MichaelYarymovych,“LaboratoryinSpace,”readatFirstSpaceCongress,CocoaBeach,Fla.,20–22Apr.1964;E.Z.Gray,“AdvancedMannedEarthOrbitalMissionsProgramOffice,”15May1964.

43.PublicLaw85–568,“NationalAeronauticsandSpaceActof1958,”85/2,H.R.12575,29July1958,p.1.

44. Larry Booda, “Air Force Outlines Broad Space Plans,”AviationWeek, 5 Dec. 1960, p. 26; E. S.Redford and O. F. White, “What Manned Space Flight Program after Reaching the Moon?Government Attempts to Decide: 1962–1968” (an unpublished report that resulted from a NASAcontract with Syracuse University), Dec. 1971, pp. 110–11; “A.F. Studies U.S. Soviet SpacePotential,”AviationWeekandSpaceTechnology,5Mar.1962,p.91.

45.GeorgeC.Wilson,“DefenseDeniesBidsforNASAPrograms,”AviationWeekandSpaceTechnology,25 June 1962, p. 34; “Thinking Matures on Military’s Space Role,” Aviation Week and SpaceTechnology,22July1963,p.209.

46.W.FredBoone,NASAOfficeofDefenseAffairs:TheFirstFiveYears,NASAHHR-32(Washington,Dec.1970),pp.6–9,83–84;HackerandGrimwood,OntheShouldersofTitans,chap.6.

47.Boone,NASAOfficeofDefenseAffairs,pp.88–93;HackerandGrimwood,OntheShouldersofTitans,chap.6.

48.D.BrainerdHolmes,“NASA-DoDCoordinationonSpaceStationProblems,”10July1963;NASArelease 63–231, “NASA-DoD Agree on Common Approach to a Manned Orbital Research andDevelopmentProject,”17Oct.1963.

49.NewYorkTimes,11Dec.1963,pp.1,22.50. Ibid.; Brig. Gen. Joseph S. Bleymaier, “Manned Orbiting Laboratory: Operational Aspects,” 3d

International Symposium on Bioastronautics and the Exploration of Space, San Antonio, 18 Nov.1964.

51.NASAHq. to ctrs., “NASA’s Position onDoDMannedOrbital Laboratory,” TWX, 19Dec. 1963;

AstronauticsandAeronautics,1964:ChronologyonScience,Technology,andPolicy,NASASP-4005(Washington, 1965), p. 90;SpaceBusinessDaily, 16Dec. 1963, p. 401;Hal Taylor, “PostApolloPrograms Detailed,”Missiles and Rockets, 26 Oct. 1964, p. 14; Edward Kolcum, “Flexible SpaceStations Evolving at Langley,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 19 Oct. 1964, p. 74; Fagetinterview,12Nov.1975.

52. Air Force Space Systems Div., “Historical Report, Program 632A(MOL), Jan.-Jun. 1964”;Astronautics andAeronautics, 1964, p. 192;Maj.Gen.Ben I. Funk toGen.BernardA. Schriever,TWX,7Aug.1964.

53.KermitGordon,dir.,Bur.oftheBudget,“MannedOrbitingLaboratoryandRelatedMatters,”memoforrecord,25Jan.1965.

54.MuellertoDebus,15Feb.1965;HaroldBrowntoRobertSeamans,29Jan.1965;SeamanstoRobertF.Garbarini,“MannedOrbitingLaboratoryStudy:InstructionsforAdHocCommittee,”2Feb.1965.

55.HouseCommitteeonGovernmentOperations,GovernmentOperations in Space (Analysis ofCivil-MilitaryRolesandRelationships),H. rpt.445,89/1,pp.4–5,17–18;Astronautics andAeronautics,1965,pp.290–91,396.

56. DoD, “Manned Orbiting Laboratory Background Briefing; Attributable to Defense Officials,”transcript,25Aug.1965.

57. SenateCommittee onAeronautical and Space Sciences,NASAAuthorization for Fiscal Year 1966,hearings,89/1,pt.3,“PostApolloPlanningDocuments,”pp.1016–17.

58.Ibid.,pp.1027–33.59. Koelle, “Notes,” 9 Nov. 1964;Williams to von Braun, 26 July 1965; Redford andWhite, “What

MannedSpaceFlightProgram?”pp.151–57.

60.HouseCommitteeonScienceandAstronautics,SubcommitteeonNASAOversight,FutureNationalSpaceObjectives,89/2,pp.59–60;SenateCommitteeonAeronauticalandSpaceSciences,NationalSpaceGoals for thePost-ApolloPeriod,89/1,23Aug.1965,pp.5–6;WillisShapley interview,27Jan.1976.

61.SenateCommitteeonAeronauticalandSpaceSciences,NationalSpaceGoals,p.17;Koelle,“Notes,”13Jan.,17Feb.,23Mar.,15June,30Nov.1964.

62.MuellertoMSFctr.dirs.,“Saturn/ApolloApplicationsProgram,”10Aug.1965;RedfordandWhite,“WhatMannedSpaceFlightProgram?”p.124.

Chapter21. Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences,National Space Goals for the Post-ApolloPeriod,89/1,23Aug.1965,pp.3–26;WilliamB.Taylorinterview,July1975.

2.WernhervonBrauntoW.D.Compton,6Mar.1975;U.S.ArmyOrdnanceMissileCommand,“ProjectHorizon,Phase IReport,AU.S.ArmyStudyfor theEstablishmentofaLunarMilitaryOutpost,”8June1959,1:17,26.

3.“ProjectHorizonReport,”3:124,127,129–30.4.LoydS.Swenson,Jr.,JamesM.Grimwood,andCharlesC.Alexander,ThisNewOcean:AHistoryofProjectMercury,NASASP-4201(Washington,1966),p.121;IvanD.ErtelandMaryLouiseMorse,The Apollo Spacecraft: A Chronology, NASA SP-4009 (Washington, 1969), 1: 114, 186; WaltCleveland,telephoneinterview,1May1975;DouglasAircraftCo.,“DouglasSpaceCabinSimulatorDeveloping Space Station Technology,” May 1968; idem, “Douglas Orbital Laboratory Studies,”

reportSM-45878,Jan.1964.

5.WernhervonBraunandFrederickI.OrdwayIII,HistoryofRocketryandSpaceTravel,3ded.(NewYork:Crowell,1972),p.277;TedJ.Gordon,telephoneinterview,22May1975;HeinzH.KoelletoW.D.Compton,2July1975.

6. Douglas Aircraft Co., “1965Manned Space Laboratory BriefingManual,” report SM-42587, Nov.1962;idem,“S-IV/S-IVBasMannedSpaceLaboratory,”reportSM-43257,Feb.1963.

7.DouglasreportSM-43257.8.TedJ.GordonandW.H.Siegried,“KeystoEconomicalSpaceFlight:SaturnHardwareandReusable

Boosters,” Space/Aeronautics, Mar. 1963, pp. 93–95; Carl M. Hanson and C. Allen Gilbert,“Utilization of Expended Booster Stages for Manned Space Laboratories,” Aviation and Space,Hydraulic, and Gas Turbine Conference of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, LosAngeles, 3–7 Mar. 1963; M.W. Root, “Application of Saturn/S-IVB/Apollo Systems to PlanetaryExploration,” Douglas engineering paper 3645, Symposium on Post-Apollo Exploration, AmericanAstronauticalSociety,Chicago,4–6May1965;DouglasAircraftCo.professionalpaper148,“ALow-CostTechniqueforLandRecoveryofanS-IVBStagefromOrbit,”Feb.1966;DouglasAircraftCo.presentation at MSFC, “S-IVB Spent Stage Applications,” 11 Mar. 1966; Douglas Aircraft Co.,“SaturnS-IVBStageApplications (Part I),Block IStudy,Volume I,SummaryReport,” reportSM-53131, 6Apr. 1966; idem, “LunarApplications of a Spent S-IVB/IUStage (LASS),” reportDAC-56365P, Sept. 1966;DouglasAircraftCo. and IBMCo., “LunarApplications of a Spent S-IVB/IUStageinOrbit(LASSO),”studyPP-161,Nov.1966;DouglasAircraftCo.,“FeasibilityofModifyingthe S-IVB Stage as an Injection Stage forManned Planetary FlybyMissions,” report DAC-57996,May1967.

9.Gordoninterview;JoeTschirgitoWaltCleveland,4Apr.1973.10.DouglasAircraftCo.,“LondonDailyMailAstronomicalObservatory,”reportSM-36173,Nov.1959;

TschirgitoCleveland,4Apr.1973.

11.Koelle,“Notes,”lOJune1963(seechap.1,n.41);vonBraun,annotationonKoelle’s“Notes”of27Aug.and9Sept.1963;DouglasAircraftCo.reportSM-45878.

12.GeorgeE.Muellerinterview,26Aug.1975;Taylorinterview.

13.Koelle,“Notes,”13Jan.,3,17Feb.,6Apr.,15June,21Sept.1964;MSFCFutureProjectsOffice,bulletin9,Oct.1964,p.23.

14.NorthAmericanAviation, “Utilization of SpentLaunchVehicle Stages in Support ofEarthOrbitalMissions,”finalreportundercontractNAS8–11379,3:59–60,31May1965.

15.Koelle,“Notes/’11June1962,6May1963.16.VonBraun,“PersonnelandOrganizationalChanges,”24June1965.

17. E. Z. Gray toMaximeA. Faget, 16 Aug. 1965, with enclosure, “ProposedMSFAdvanced StudyProgram,FY1966”;J.H.Laue,“MinutesofAugust25,1965,S-IVBOrbitalWorkshopConceptualDesignStudyMeeting,”30Aug.1965;F.L.Williams,“S-IVBOrbitalWorkshopConceptualDesignStudy,”20Aug.1965.

18.Laue,“MinutesofAugust25,1965…Meeting.”

19.DouglasAircraftCo.reportSM-45878;NASAcontractNAS1–3893,12June1964;Presidentialpressconference, 25Aug. 1965;DouglasAircraft Co., “Notebook onAES,Apollo, andAESVehicles,”SaturnPayloadApplicationsDept.,ca.June1965;idem,“AESS-IVBExtravehicularActivity,EVAExperiment,” Saturn PayloadApplicationsDept., ca. Aug. 1965; L. O. Schulte interview, 28Aug.1975.

20. Williams, “Notes,” 25 Oct. 1965; Maxime A. Faget interview, 12 Nov. 1975; James W. Carter,

“ArtificialGravityExperimentfortheS-IVBWorkshop,”29Oct.1965.

21.Williams, “Notes,” 18 Oct. 1965;William A. Ferguson interview, 6 Oct. 1975;Williams, “S-IVBWorkshopActivities,”6Dec.1965;J.T.Shepherd,“S-IVBWorkshop,”1Dec.1965.

22.CharlesC.Wood,“Meeting—S-IVBWorkshop—Dec.2—FrankWilliams,”handwrittennotes,2Dec.1965.

23.JamesW.Carter,“RevisedObjectivesandGuidelinesfortheS-IVBWorkshopEffort,”enclosingcopyofguidelines,3Dec.1965.

24.Williamstomultipleaddressees,6Dec.1965.

25.E.Z.GraytoWilliams,TWX,23Dec.1965.26. Williams to Mathews, “Saturn Airlock Experiment Effort as Described in the December 1965

Management Council,” 23 Dec. 1965; Williams, “Notes,” 3, 10 Jan. 1966; Thompson, “S-IVBWorkshop Meeting, January 21, 1966,” 25 Jan. 1966; Leroy Roberts to Col. James, “WorkshopPresentationtoDr.MuelleronJanuary20,”25Jan.1966.

27.Fagetinterview.28.RobertstoJames,25Jan.1966;Williams,“Notes,”24Jan.,7Feb.1966;Fergusoninterview;RobertJ.

Schwinghamerinterview,7Oct.1975;F.L.WilliamstoW.D.Compton,14Apr.1976.

29.H.E.Pitcher,“AirlockPresentationtoGeo.Mueller,”memoforrecord,11Mar.1966.30.R.R.GilruthtoS.A.Cariski,“ProcurementPlan,S-IVBWorkshopExperimentSupportModule,”11

Mar.1966;MathewstoGray,“NeedforDecisiontoProceedonS-IVBSpentStageExperiment,”18Mar.1966;GilruthtoMueller,“SaturnIVBSpentStageExperimentSupportModule,”1Apr.1966.

31.W.E.Thompson,“S-IVBWorkshopMeeting,April11,1966,”13Apr.1966;WilburE.Thompson,telephoneinterview,20Feb.1976;GraytoKenKleinknecht,TWX,1Apr.1966;GilruthtoGariski,“ProcurementPlan,SaturnIVBSpentStageExperimentSupportModule,”2Apr.1966;FergusontoWilliams, “Trip Report, Washington, D.C., March 21–22, 1966,” 24 Mar. 1966; Mueller toKleinknecht,20May1966.

32.Muellertodep.adm.,“S-IVBAirlockExperiment,”2Aug.1966;SeamanstoWebb,samesubject,2Aug.1966;Webb,handwrittenannotationonSeaman’smemo,3Aug.1966;NASArelease66–223,19Aug.1966;Kleinknechttodep.dir.,MSC,“ChangestoContractNAS9–6555,Airlock,”23Sept.1966;Thompsoninterview.

33. JamesC.McCulloch toDouglasAircraftCo., “S-IVBWorkshop,” 15Dec. 1965;DouglasAircraftCo., “Quick Response Estimate 202,” 17 Dec. 1965;McCulloch to Douglas Aircraft Co., “S-IVBWorkshop,”22Dec.1965;JohnE.Biby,Jr.,toMcCulloch,withenclosure,“StatementofWorkforS-IVB Stage Modifications,” 14 Jan. 1966; Williams, “Spent Stage Airlock Presentation atHeadquarters,”27Jan.1966.

34.Williams,“Notes,”3Jan.1966;RobertstoWilliams,“S-IVBWorkshop,”21Feb.1966.

35.WernerKuers,“Notes,”26July1965;vonBraun,annotationonKuers’s“Notes”of28June1965;vonBraun,annotationonStanleyReinartz’s“Notes”of1Nov.1965;LeeB.James,“Notes,”8Nov.1965;Douglas Aircraft Co., Saturn Payload Applications Off., “S-IVB Enlarged Hydrogen Tank DomeAccessOpeningModificationProgram,”professionalpaper144,12Oct.1965;HansHeuter tovonBraun,4Nov.1965;TedSmith,telephoneinterview,1May1975.

36.Thompson,“S-IVBWorkshopMeeting,February15,1966,”19Feb.1966;WilliamB.Lucas,“Notes,”14Mar.1966;James,“Notes,”22Aug.1966.

37. JohnH.Disher to assoc. adm. forMSF, “OrbitalWorkshopLH2Tank InternalCoatings,” 22Nov.1966;Ferguson,“MinutesofOrbitalWorkshopMeetingatMSFConFriday,October14,1966,”26Oct.1966.

38.Mueller toGilruth, 22Dec. 1966,with enclosure, “GasAtmospheres forProlongedMannedSpaceMissionsintheS-IVBWorkshop”;StructuresDiv.,P&VELaboratory,MSFC,“MeteoroidPenetrationProbabilities for theS-IVBWorkshop,”4 Jan. 1967;draft letter, vonBraun toMueller, ca. 12 Jan.1967,withenclosure,“AnalysisofRequirementforTwo-GasAtmosphereintheOrbitalWorkshop.”

39.KleinknechttoDisher,“RecommendationforReductioninOrbitalWorkshopActivationWorkload,”21Sept.1966;DonaldL.Jacobstodep.mgr.,GeminiProgram,“Mid-TermReport,ContractNAS9–6584,”19Oct1966;LelandF.BelewtoDisher,“ReductioninOrbitalWorkshopEVAWorkload,”16Nov.1966;FergusontoRoberts,“QuickOpeningHatchforS-IVBOrbitalWorkshop,”16Nov.1966.

40. Homer E. Newell, “Solicitation of Experiment Study Proposals for Astronomical InstrumentsRequiringPreciseOrientation,”withenclosure,“ApolloTelescopeMount,”20Dec.1965.

41. Dixon L. Forsythe to acting dir., Phys. & Astron. Programs, “ATM Recommendations andComments,” 22 Mar. 1966; Belew, “Notes,” 6, 13 June, 5 July 1966; Newell to dep. adm.,“Establishment of Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM) Project,” 17 Mar. 1966; Seamans to Newell,“ATM,” 22Apr. 1966;Mueller to Seamans, “Apollo TelescopeMount Installation,” 19 July 1966;Seamans toMueller, “Apollo TelescopeMount (ATM),” 29 Aug. 1966, with attachment, “ProjectApprovalDocument,ResearchandDevelopment,”25Aug.1966.

42.GilruthtoMueller,25Mar.1966;LowtoDisher,22July1966.

43.Disher,“ApolloApplicationsFlightMissionPlanning,”in“ApolloApplicationsStatusReviewfortheDeputy Administrator,” 11 Mar. 1966, p. 23; Robert R. Gilruth interview, 6 Aug. 1975; Belew,“Notes,”22Aug.1966;DishertoMSFC,MSC,andKSC,TWX,22Sept.1966;DishertoMSFCandMSC,TWX,22Sept.1966;DishertoRobertF.Thompson,TWX,29Sept.1966;Disher,“NoteforMLA/WilliamB.Taylor,”5Oct.1966.

44.Taylor,“SAAReviewwithDr.Mueller,May18,1966,”memoforrecord,20May1966.

45.MuellertovonBraunandGilruth,2Nov.1966;DishertoMSFC,MSC,andKSC,TWX,8Nov.1966.46. Disher, “Action Items fromApolloApplicationsMeeting at KSC,November 9–10, 1966,” 5Dec.

1966;Belew,“NotesonMeetingatMSCNovember16,1966,ApolloApplicationsProgram,”memoforrecord,17Nov.1966;Belew,“Notes,”28Nov.,19Dec.1966;OMSF,“AAPProgramReview,”24Jan.1967.

47.OMSF, “Saturn/ApolloApplications ProgramDirectiveNo. 3A,” prog. dir.M-DML3200.055, 30Dec.1966;FredS.RobertstoRalphI.LaRock,“CommentsonMissionDirectiveforSAA209and210,” with enclosure, “Position Paper on Assignment of Responsibility of the Multiple DockingAdapter,”22Nov.1966.

Chapter31.AstronauticsandAeronautics,1965:ChronologyonScience,Technology,andPolicy,NASASP-4006

(Washington,1966),pp.132,188,265–66,358.2.CongressionalQuarterlyService,CongressandtheNation,vol.2,1965–68 (Washington,1969),pp.

28–29,53,345;MSFC,“MinutesofCombinedStaffandBoardMeeting,”23July1965.

3.MuellertoMSFctr.dirs.,“SaturnApolloApplicationsProgram,”10Aug.1965.4.Ibid.

5.SenateCommitteeonAeronauticalandSpaceSciences,NationalSpaceGoals, 89/1, 1965, pp. 1–2;HouseSubcommitteeonNASAOversight,FutureNationalSpaceObjectives,89/2,1966,pp.ix-xiv.

6.SenateCommitteeonAeronauticalandSpaceSciences,NationalSpaceGoals,pp.47–104.

7.Ibid.,pp.10,18,37–38,71;GeorgeMuellerinterview,26Aug.1975;J.PembleField,Jr.,interview,10July1975;WillisH.Shapleyinterview,27Jan.1976.

8.HouseSubcommitteeonNASAOversight,FutureNationalSpaceObjectives, pp.15,64–66;SenateCommitteeonAeronauticalandSpaceSciences,NationalSpaceGoals,pp.69–70;HomerE.Newellinterview,21July1975.

9.MuellertoSeamans,“ApolloApplicationsFiscalYear1967Budget,”undateddraft;“ApolloExtensionSystems (AES) Options to Mr. Webb,” transcript, 22 Sept. 1965; Sam Ingram to Mueller, “AESPresentationtoMr.Webb,21Sept.1965,AfternoonSession,”24Sept.1965.

10.WilliamA.Fleming,“DiscussionPaperonAESProgramBudgetMaterial,”28Sept.1965;AviationWeekandSpaceTechnology,11Oct.,pp.65–67;8Nov.,p.23;6Dec,pp.26–27’;20Dec.1965,p.15;E.S.RedfordandO.F.White,“WhatMannedSpaceFlightProgramafterReachingtheMoon?GovernmentAttemptstoDecide:1962–1968,”(Syracuse,Dec.1971),pp.181–88.

11.ClintonAndersontoWebb,27Jan.1966.

12.MuellertoRobertGilruth,“SummaryofCommentsofApolloExecutives,”28Jan.1966.13.HenrySimmons,“AAP—Wednesday’sChild,”AstronauticsandAeronautics,Feb.1966,pp.5,9.

14.GilruthtoMueller,25Mar.1966.15.Ibid.

16.Ibid.17. Air Force Systems Cmd. to subordinate units, “Statement of Deputy Secretary of Defense David

PackardRegardingCancellationofMOL,”TWX,10June1969.

18. Hq., Space and Missile Systems Organization, Air Force Systems Cmd., “History of the SpaceSystemsDivision,July-December1965,”1:25–26,53;idem,“HistoryoftheSpaceSystemsDivision,January-June1966,”1:69–71.

19.WilliamF.Moore,dir.,OMSFTechnicalStaff,toSamuelHubbard,“MSF/USAFMOLAgreement,”22Oct.1965;AstronauticsandAeronautics,1965,p.484;NASAmgt. instruction1154.2, “MannedSpaceFlightPolicyCommittee,”14Jan.1966;NASArelease66–26,“MannedSpaceFlightPolicyCommitteeFormedbyNASA,DoD,”4Feb.1966.

20.AndersontoWebb,27Jan.1966;HouseCommitteeonGovernmentOperations,Hearings,MissileandSpaceGroundSupportOperations,89/2,1966,pp.46–47.

21.President’sScienceAdvisoryCommittee,TheSpacePrograminthePost-ApolloPeriod(Washington,Feb.1967),pp.23–25.

22.EdwardZ.GraytoMaxFaget,TWX,28Dec.1966;HouseCommitteeonScienceandAstronautics,Hearings,1968NASAAuthorization,90/1,1967,pt.2,pp.563–65.

23.HouseCommitteeonScienceandAstronautics,Hearings,1968NASAAuthorization,pt.2,pp.563–65;SenateCommitteeonAeronauticalandSpaceSciences,Hearings,NASAAuthorizationforFiscalYear1968,90/1,1967,pp.86,143,981–83.

24.RobertF.Thompsoninterview,18Dec.1975;WilliamA.Fergusoninterview,6Oct.1975.25.J.PembleFieldinterview,10July1975;HaroldGouldandJamesWilsoninterview,17July1975.

26.MuellertoMSFctr.dirs.,“SaturnApolloApplicationsProgram,”10Aug.1965;MuellertoMSFctrs.“Saturn/ApolloApplicationsProgram,”TWX,13Sept.1965.

27.HoustonPost,14Oct.1965,sec.1,p.22;OlinTeaguetoWilliamHobby,exec,ed.,HoustonPost,27Oct. 1965; Gilruth to Teague, 19 Nov. 1965; MSFC, “Minutes of Combined Staff and BoardMeeting,”19Nov.1965.

28.MuellertoWebbthroughSeamans,“RecommendationforApolloApplicationsProgramFieldCenterResponsibilities,”18Nov.1965;Seamans toMueller, “ApolloApplicationsManagement,”19Dec.1965;NASArelease65–381,“NASAAssignsManagementWorkforApolloApplications,”17Dec.1965.

29.MSFC, “MinutesofCombinedStaff andBoardMeeting,”17Dec. 1965;McCall tovariousMSFCoffices, “AAP Status Report #1,” 6 Jan. 1966;Mueller to von Braun, 1 July 1966; Leland Belewinterview,6Nov.1974;WilliamFergusoninterview,6Oct.1975.

30.GraytoMSC,MSFC,andKSCdirs.,“AESMissionPlanningandPayloadIntegration,”22July1965;WilliamstovonBraun,“MSFCWeeklyNotes,”1Nov.1965;BelewtovonBraun,“MSFCWeeklyNotes,”June-Dec.1966(seechap.1,n.41);McCall tovariousMSFCoffices,“AAPStatusReport#1,”6Jan.1966;NASArelease66–137,“TwoFirmstoStudyApolloIntegration,”27May1966.

31.LowtoJohnDisher,31Mar.1966.AfterdiscussingthematterwithJamesElms,dep.assoc.admin,formannedspaceflight,Lownotedthatthe“problemisnearlysettledinourfavor”andtheletterwasnotsent.LowtoFaget,31Mar.1966;RobertF.Thompsoninterview,18Dec.1975;GilruthtoMueller,15Apr.1966.

32. Gilruth to Mueller, 21 Apr. 1966; MSC announcement 66–92, “Establishment of the ApolloApplicationsProgramOfficeandDesignationoftheActingManagerandtheAssistantManager,”6July1966.

33. Harold Gartrell to various MSC offices, “MSC Mission Programs for the Apollo ApplicationsProgram,”2Dec.1965;Rees toGilruth,5Apr.1966;Kraft toLow,“InterfaceResponsibilities forAAPOperationsPlanning,”28Nov.1966;ChristopherKraftinterview,25Feb.1977.

34.MauriceRaffensperger toMSFCandMSC, “SaturnS-IVBWorkshopExperiment,”TWX,25Feb.1966; OMSF, “Manned Space FlightManagement Council Action Items,” 19 Aug. 1966; Low tovariousMSCoffices,“MSC/MSFCRolesandMissions,”25Aug.1966.

35.LowtovariousMSCoffices,“MSC/MSFCRolesandMissions,”25Aug.1966.36. JimMaloney, “MarshallGetsSpecialProject,”HoustonPost, 17Oct. 1966;Mueller toTeague, 19

Oct.1966.

37.CongressionalQuarterlyService,CongressandtheNation,vol.2,1965–1968,pp.4–8,531–33,829,831–34,840–42.

38.StanleyReinartz’snotesontheAAPportionoftheAdministrator’sreview,15Nov.1966.

39.MSFC,“MinutesofMSFCCenterStaffandBoardMeeting,”23Dec.1966.MuellerconveyedmuchthesamemessageatameetingofGemini-ApolloExecutiveson27–28Jan.1967:seeminutesofthemeeting.AAPOff.,“HistoryoftheApolloApplicationsProgram,1966toSeptember1,1968,”pp.1–3.

40.TheBudgetoftheUnitedStatesGovernment,1968,p.21;RedfordandWhite,“WhatMannedSpaceFlightProgram?”pp.189–94;WillisShapleyinterview,27Jan.1976.

41.RedfordandWhite,“WhatMannedSpaceFlightProgram?”p.178;AAPOff.,“AAPScheduleML-5B,”5Dec.1966.

42.NASA,“BackgroundBriefing,NASAFY1968Budget,”23Jan.1967,p.32.

43.AAPOff.,“HistoryoftheApolloApplicationsProgram,1966toSeptember1,1968,”pp.1–4.44.NASA,“ApolloApplicationsBriefing,”transcript,26Jan.1967,pp.5,11–12,21–22,28–30.

45.Ibid.,pp.7–8.46.Ibid.,pp.8–12.

47.Ibid.,pp.13,15–17;AAPOff.,“ScheduleML-5B,”5Dec.1966.

48. NASA release 67–11, 26 Jan. 1967, “Apollo Applications Program,” p. 5; NASA, “ApolloApplicationsBriefing,”transcript,pp.8–12.

Chapter41.ErnstStuhlinger,“Notes,”13Dec.1965(seechap.1,n.41).

2. Homer E. Newell, Beyond the Atmosphere: Early Years of Space Science, NASA SP-4211(Washington, 1980); also his testimony before congressional committees for the FY 1968 budget,reprintedasNASA’sSpaceScienceandApplicationsProgram,NASAEP-47(Washington,1967).

3.EugeneM.Emme,AHistoryofSpaceFlight(NewYork:Holt,RinehartandWinston,1965),pp.114–34; JanevanNimmenandLeonardC.Bruno,withRobertL.Rosholt,NASAHistoricalDataBook,1958–1968,vol.1,NASAResources,NASASP-4012(Washington,1976),p.136.

4.Biographical data fromHouseCommittee onScience andAstronautics,NASAAuthorization forFY1965, pp. 164–65; responsibilities fromorganization charts inRobertL.Rosholt,AnAdministrativeHistoryofNASA,1958–1963,NASASP-4101(Washington,1966),pp.336ff.

5. Senate Committee onAeronautical and Space Sciences,NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1968,HearingsonS.1296,90/1,pt.1,p.437.

6.VanNimmenandBruno,NASAHistoricalDataBook, p. 135;HomerE.Newell interview, 21Apr.1976.

7. Charles M. Atkins, “NASA and the Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences,”NASAHistoricalNoteHHN-62(typescript,1966),p.6,passim.

8.Newellinterview.9. Lewis R. Fisher, William O. Armstrong, and Carlos S. Warren, “Special Inflight Experiments,”Mercury Project Summary Including Results of the FourthMannedOrbital FlightMay 15 and 16,1963,NASASP-45 (Houston, 1963), pp. 213–29;LoydS.Swenson, Jr., JamesM.Grimwood, andCharlesC.Alexander,ThisNewOcean:AHistoryofProjectMercury,NASASP-4201(Washington,1966),pp.414–15;MSCcircular19,“EstablishmentoftheMercuryScientificExperimentsPanel,”18Apr.1962;MSCgen.mgt. inst.2–3-1,“MannedSpacecraftCenter In-FlightScientificExperimentsCoordinationPanel,”15Oct.1962;MSCtech.mgt.inst.37–1-1,“In-FlightExperimentalPrograms,”18July1963.

10.WilliamO.Armstronginterview,24Jan.1967;Newellinterview;EdwardP.Ney(Univ.ofMinn.)toJocelynR.Gill,27Aug.1962;Gillinterview,26Dec.1967.

11. J.Trombka, J.R.Gill, andL.Lewyn,“ScientificExperimentsonGeminiandApolloEarthOrbitalFlights as Precursors to Apollo Extension and ORL Earth Orbital Missions, MS. Prepared forTechnical Papers ThatWill Later Be Published in the Proceedings of the American AstronauticalSociety,”Oct. 1965;OSSA,“ProgramReview,MannedSpaceSciences,”27Oct. 1964,pp.12–14;HomerNewell’stestimonybeforetheHouseSubcommitteeonSpaceScienceandApplications,NASAAuthorization for FY 1966, pp. 856–59, 22Mar. 1965;Willis B. Foster to dir., ProgramRev. andResourcesMgt., “Submission for 1964 President’s Annual Report,” 30 Oct. 1964, with enclosure,“ChronologicalListofHighlights,July1963through1964.”

12.EmmetteS.Redford andOrionF.White, “WhatMannedSpaceFlightProgramafterReaching theMoon?GovernmentAttemptstoDecide:1962–1968,”SyracuseUniv.,Dec.1971,pp.53–54;Newelltestimonycitedinn.11;Newellinterview;“MemorandumofAgreementbetweenOfficeofMannedSpaceFlight[and]OfficeofSpaceSciences,ScientificInterfaces,”signedbyJosephF.Shea26JulyandEdgarM.Cortright25July1963;RichardJ.AllenbytoMuellerandNewell,“MinutesofNewell-MuellerMeetingof23February1965,”19Apr.1965.

13.Newelltocolleague,20Aug.1963;enclosuretoFostermemocitedinn.11.

14.“AgreementbetweenDoDandNASAconcerningtheGeminiProgram,”21Jan.1963;“MinutesoftheSixth Meeting, Gemini Program Planning Board, June 28, 1963;” Robert C. Seamans, Jr., andBrockwayM.McMillan,“AcceptanceoftheJointNASA/DoDAdHocStudyGroupFinalReportonAirForceParticipationinGemini,”memoforrecord,6Mayand5Aug.1963.

15.WillisB.Foster tochief,LunarandPlanetaryBr.,“EstablishmentofMSFEB,”9Jan.1964;NASAmgt.inst.9000.002,“EstablishmentofMannedSpaceFlightExperimentsBoard,”14Jan.1964.

16.NMI9000.002.17.MSC,TMI37–1-1,4Mar.1964.

18. MSC, Gemini Summary Conference, NASA SP-138 (Houston, 1967), pp. 224–26, 230, 305;Armstrong and Gill interviews; Jacob Trombka interview, 27 Dec. 1966; Russell Schweickartinterview,1May1967.

19.Armstrong,Trombka,andSchweickartinterviews.

20.MercuryProjectSummary,pp.199,200,207.21.GeminiSummaryConference,pp.211–13.

22.JohnLogsdon,TheDecisiontoGototheMoon:ProjectApolloandtheNationalInterest(Cambridge:MITPress,1970),pp.17–20.

23.JeromeB.Wiesner,“ReporttothePresident-ElectoftheAdHocCommitteeonSpace”(unclassifiedversion),12Jan.1961,pp.11–12.

24. “Man’sRole in theNationalSpaceProgram:Report by theSpaceScienceBoard,March1961,” inAtkins,“NASAandtheSpaceScienceBoard,”pp.134–36,andinNationalSpaceGoalsforthePost-ApolloPeriod,hearingsbeforetheSenateCommitteeonAeronauticalandSpaceSciences,89/1,pp.242–43;“ScientistsEndorseExplorationofSpace,”WashingtonPost,7Aug.1961.

25.RobertColbyNelson,“FullMoonDebate,”ChristianScienceMonitor,14June1961.

26.NationalAcademyofSciences-NationalResearchCouncil,AReviewofSpaceResearch,NAS-NRCpub.1079(Washington,1962),pp.1–21and1–22.

27.Ibid.,p.11–19;MSFC,“CombinedStaffandBoardMeetingMinutes,”10Nov.1969.

28.NAS-NRC,ReviewofSpaceResearch,p.1–23.29.Ibid.,p.1–22.

30. Richard Hirsch and Joseph J. Trento,National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NewYork:PraegerPublishers,1973),pp.108–09;“SpaceGoalsPutStrainonBudget,”NewYorkTimes,5Nov.1962;JonathanSpivak,“ApolloArgument:CriticsSeemUnlikelytoAlterMoon-ShotProgram,”WallStreetJournal,20May1963;JamesE.Webbtothepresident,30Oct.1962.

31.P.H.A[belson],“MannedLunarLanding,”Science140(1963):267.

32.See,forexample:FrederickD.Hibben,“NASA,ScientistsDividedonSpaceGoals,”AviationWeek&Space Technology, 29 Apr. 1963, pp. 24–25; Howard Simons’s series in the Washington Post,“ScientistsDividedonApollo,”12–14May1963;WilliamJ.Perkinson,“Engineersvs.Scientists,”BaltimoreSun, 30Apr. 1963;Albert Eisele, “NobelWinners CriticizeMoon Project,”WashingtonPost,6May1963;“U.S.OfficialAnswersCriticsofMannedLunarProgram,”BaltimoreSun,30Apr.1963;RobertHotz,“ApolloandItsCritics,”AviationWeek&SpaceTechnology,29Apr.1963;“Man-on-MoonProgramBackedby8Scientists,”WashingtonEveningStar,21May1963.

33. Senate,Scientists’ Testimony on Space Goals, hearings before the Committee on Aeronautical andSpaceSciences,88/1,10–11June1963.

34.EvertClark,“ScientistDecriesMarsLifeSearch,”NewYorkTimes,13Feb.1965;D.S.G[reenberg],“Space:AdministrationOfficialSaysSomeHarshThingsaboutScientistsOpposingMoonLanding,”Science147(1965):381.

35.Newellinterview.36. “Statementof theSpaceScienceBoardof theNationalAcademyofSciencesonNationalGoals in

Space, 1971–1985,” reprinted in Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee, NASAAuthorizationforFiscalYear1966,HearingsonS.927,89/1,pt.1,pp.479–84,andinNationalSpaceGoalsforthePost-ApolloPeriod,hearingsbeforethesamecommittee,2325Aug.1965,pp.244–48.

37.NationalAcademyofSciences-NationalResearchCouncil,SpaceResearch:DirectionsfortheFuture,pub. 1403 (Washington, 1966), pp. iv, 6, 24–25, 186, 198–201, 502–03, 511–12, 623–29;HowardSimons,“6-to-8-ManOrbitingLaboratoryCalledForinSpaceResearchStudy,”WashingtonPost,15Feb.1966.

38. SenateCommittee onAeronautical and Space Sciences,NASAAuthorization for Fiscal Year 1967,HearingsonS.2909,89/1,pt.3,pp.66,145–46,308.

39. House Subcommittee on Space Sciences and Applications of the Committee on Science andAstronautics, 1966 NASA Authorization, Hearings on H.R. 3730, 89/1, pt. 3, pp. 561–78; NASArelease65–234,15July1965.

40.HouseCommitteeonScienceandAstronautics,1967NASAAuthorization,HearingsonH.R.12718,89/2,pt.1,pp.159–60.

41.NewelltoGordonJ.F.McDonald(UCLA),6Jan.1966.42. House Subcommittee on Space Sciences and Applications of the Committee on Science and

Astronautics,1967NASAAuthorization,HearingsonH.R.12718,89/2,pt.3,pp.527–60,505.

43. Jesse L. Mitchell to MSFC, LRC, GSFC, and MSC, TWX, 27 Jan. 1966; Newell to von Braun,“MSFCApollo TelescopeMountManagement Participation,” 10Mar. 1966; Newell to dep. adm.,“Establishment of the Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM) Project,” 17 Mar. 1966, with enclosure,“ProjectApprovalDocument,ResearchandDevelopment.”

44. Redford andWhite, “WhatManned Space Flight Program?” pp. 136–37; John H. Disher to JerryMcCall,9Apr.1966;RobertC.Seamans,Jr.,“MemorandumforDr.Newell,Subject:ATM,”22Apr.1966.

45.WalterHaeussermann,“Notes,”23May1966;Belew,“Notes,”6,13June1966;JesseL.Mitchelltodir.,MannedSpaceFlightExperimentsOff.,“MissionAssignmentfortheSaturn/ApolloApplicationsProgram,”23June1966.

46.Seamanstoassoc.adm.forMSFetal.,“ApolloApplicationsProgram,”30Mar.1966;Newelltodep.adm.,“ApolloTelescopeMount(ATM),”10June1966;Belew,“Notes,”5,11,18July1966;EdwardJ.Brazill,“MeetingHeldonMonday,July11,1966,byDr.Seamans,Dr.Mueller,andDr.Newell,”memoforrecord,15July1966;Belew,“July15ATMExperimentManagementDiscussionatNASAHeadquarters,”memoforrecord,18July1966.

47.Disher,“ApolloTelescopeMountInstallation,”memotofiles,30July1966(prepared18July);LowtoDisher,22July1966.

48.LowtoDisher,22July1966.

49.Gilruthinterview,6Aug.1975;CourtneyG.Brooks,JamesM.Grimwood,andLoydS.Swenson,Jr.,Chariots for Apollo: AHistory ofManned Lunar Spacecraft, NASASP-4205 (Washington, 1979),chap.8:MuellerquotationtakenfromRedfordandWhite,“WhatMannedSpaceFlightProgram?”p.134.

50.Dishertodir.,SystemsEngineering,“ATMLMvs.RackInstallation,”25July1966;Muellertodep.

adm.,“ApolloTelescopeMountProject,”2Aug.1966;EdgarM.Cortright toassoc.adm.,“ApolloTelescopeMount(ATM)ProjectApprovalDocument(PAD),”25Aug.1966.

51.Seamanstoassoc.adm.forMSF,“ApolloTelescopeMount(ATM),”29Aug.1966,withenclosure,“ProjectApprovalDocument,ResearchandDevelopment”;RichardTouseyinterview,20Apr.1976;Smith,“SolarAstronomy,”pp.20–23;OMSF,“AAPStatusReviewfortheDeputyAdministrator,”11Mar.1966,pp.iii,17.

52.MSFEB,minutes,meeting66–5,19Sept.1966;RichardTousey,“TheNRLSolarExperimentsintheApolloTelescopeMountofSkylab:Historical,Operational,andResults,”preprintofanarticletobepublished in “Report ofNRLProgress,”p. 12;WilliamB.Taylor, “SAAReviewwithDr.Mueller,May18,1966,”memoforrecord,20May1966;Belew,“Notes,”6June1966.

53.A.R.Morse,“MSFCSkylabApolloTelescopeMount,”NASATMX-64811,pp.13–7,14–10,15–8,16–9;MSFEB,minutes,meeting66–5,19Sept.1966.

54.Tousey,“NRLSolarExperiments,”pp.14–16,17–22;MSFEB,minutes,meeting66–5.

55.MSFEB,minutes,meeting66–5,Belewinterview,6Nov.1974.56.MSFC,“MinutesofCombinedStaffandBoardMeeting,”21May1965.

57.Mueller tovonBraun,“MSFExperiments,”20Jan.1966;MSFC,“MinutesofCombinedStaffandBoardMeeting,”21Jan.1966;vonBraun,“MSFExperiments,”31Jan.1966;WilliamP.HortontoMr.Weidner,“StatusReportRegardingDevelopmentofS-IVBWorkshopExperimentsList,”1Apr.1966.

58.E.Z.Gray, “ExperimentStatus,OfficeofMannedSpaceFlightExperimentsProgram,” in “ApolloApplicationsReviewfortheDeputyAdministrator,”11Mar.1966;Seamanstoassoc.adm.forMSFetal.,“ApolloApplicationsProgram,”30Mar.1966.

59. Douglas R. Lord to Warren Gillespie and William G. Johnson, “S-IVB Workshop ExperimentsProgram,” 17May 1966;E.Z.Gray toMSC andMSFC,TWX, 22 June 1966;Gray toMSC andMSFC,TWX,28June1966.

60.DouglasLordinterview,10July1975.

61.Lord,“ResultsofWorkshopEngineeringExperimentReview,”withenclosure,“SummaryResultsofWorkshop Engineering Experiments Review, August 17, 1966,” 23 Aug. 1966; MSFEB, minutes,meeting66–5.

62.RichardS.Johnston,“LifeSupportSystems”;CharlesA.Berry,“MedicalResearchandOperations”;S.P.Winograd,“InflightMedicalExperiments,”in“ProgramReview,LifeSciences,June22,1966,”Off.ofProgramandSpecialReports,NASAHq.,1966.

63.MSFEB,minutes,meeting66–5.64.MSFEB,minutes,meeting66–6,21Nov.1966;JackWaiteinterview,7Oct.1975.

65.MSFEB,minutes,meeting66–5.66.MSFEB,minutes,meeting67–1,6Feb.1967.

67. The Space Program in the Post-Apollo Period: A Report of the President’s Science AdvisoryCommittee(Washington,1967),pp.13,14.

68.Ibid.,pp.15,20,37.

69.Ibid.,pp.37–41,23–25.70.Ibid.,pp.73–74.

71.Ibid.,p.73.72.Ibid.,pp.74–75.

73.HouseCommittee onScience andAstronautics, Subcommittee onSpaceScience andApplications,1968 NASA Authorization, Hearings on H.R. 4450, H.R. 6470, 90/1, pt. 3, pp. 25–31, 53–55;SubcommitteeonMannedSpaceFlight,1968NASAAuthorization,pt.2,pp.47–59,577–79;SenateCommitteeonAeronauticalandSpaceSciences,NASAAuthorizationforFiscalYear1968,HearingsonS.1296,90/1,pt.1,pp.164–66,169–71.

74.Brooks,Grimwood,andSwenson,ChariotsforApollo,pp.215–17.

Chapter51.CongressionalQuarterlyService,CongressandtheNation,vol.2,1965–68,pp.10–11.2.AAPOffice,“HistoryoftheApolloApplicationsProgram,1966toSeptember1,1968,”pp.1–5and4–

1;MartinMariettaCorp.,“SkylabChronologySummary”;MaximeA.Fagetinterview,12Nov.1975;CharlesW.Mathewsinterview,14July1975.

3.GeorgeMueller,“MemorandumforDr.Seamans,”10Aug.1967;Mathewsinterview.4. Mathews to ctr. AAP offs., “Minutes for Apollo Applications Program Mission Configuration

Meeting,”8Mar.1968.

5.Mathewstoctr.AAPmgrs.,TWX,16Mar.1967;Mathewstoctr.AAPmgrs.,“IntegratedSystemsTestandSchedulesMeetingonMarch30and31,”TWX,23Mar.1967;Mathewstoctr.AAPmgrs.,“AAPSchedulesMeetingActionItems,”6Apr.1967;MathewstoMueller,“ScheduleAssessmentofAAP1–4,”11Apr.1967;Mueller,“MemorandumforDr.Seamans,”10Aug.1967;Mueller toSeamans,“ATM Flight Schedule,” 16 Feb. 1967; L.W. Vogel, “SummaryMinutes ofMeeting betweenMr.WebbandMr.BergenonJune21,1967,”memoforrecord,6July1967.

6. SenateCommittee onAeronautical and Space Sciences,Hearings,ApolloAccident, 90/1, pt. 6, pp.493–95;Mathewsinterview;J.PembleField,Jr.,interview,10July1975.

7. Faget interview;Richard S. Johnston interview, 21Oct. 1975.Details on the effects of theAS-204accident on Apollo and AAP scheduling and costs are in House Subcommittee onManned SpaceFlight,CommitteeonScienceandAstronautics,1968NASAAuthorization,90/1,pt.2,pp.1415–25.

8. Mueller to Seamans, “Revised Apollo and AAP Integrated Program Plan,” 5 May 1967; Mueller,“MemorandumforDr.Seamans,”10Aug.1967.

9. Senate Committee onAeronautical and Space Sciences,NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1968,90/1, S. rpt. 353, p. 22; idem,NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1968, 90/1, pt. 1, pp. 10–286;RedfordandWhite,“WhatMannedSpaceFlightProgram?”(Syracuse,Dec.1971),pp.194–204;Rep.DonaldFuqua interview,10July1975;FrankBogart,“Note forDr.Mueller,”23May1967;HouseCommittee on Appropriations,National Aeronautics and Space Administration Appropriation Bill,1968,90/1,H.rpt.569,p.4;RedfordandWhite,“WhatMannedSpaceFlightProgram?”pp.205–08.

10.MathewstoMueller,“StatusReportonOperationsundertheContinuingResolution,”19June1967;L.W.Vogel, “SummaryMinutes ofMeeting betweenMr.Webb andMr. Bergen on June 21, 1967,”memo for record, 6 July 1967;Mueller, “Memorandum forDr. Seamans,” 10Aug. 1967;Mueller,unsignedmemoforSeamans,24Aug.1967.

11. Webb to Rep. F. Edward Hebert, 30 Sept. 1967; Senate Committee on Aeronautical and SpaceSciences,Hearings,NASA’sProposedOperatingPlanforFiscalYear1968,90/1,pp.4,8–9,19–20;AAPschedulesML-7,Oct.,andML-8,Dec.1967.

12. Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences,Hearings, Apollo Accident, p. 493; C. E.Andressen, MSFC resources mgmt. off., “February Management Council Meeting,” 6 Feb. 1967;NASAHq.,actionitemsincludedinManagementCouncilMeetingfolderfor23May67;Redfordand

White, “WhatManned Space Flight Program?” pp. 142–44;Mathews to AAP ctr. offs., “RevisedFlightSchedulesfortheLM&SS,”29May1967;MathewstoMueller,“LunarMappingandSurveySystem (LM&SS),” 22 June 1967, withMueller’s unsigned endorsement to Seamans;Mathews toMSFEB,“AAPExperimentStatusReport,”12Sept.1967.

13.RichardHaleytoMorrisTepper,“ImpressionsonBriefingonApolloApplications1A,”15Aug.1967;RedfordandWhite,“WhatMannedSpaceFlightProgram?”pp.144–46.RedfordandWhitementiontwootherconsiderationsputforwardbyOMSFofficials: the international implicationsofoverflightwithearth-resourcesensorsandthedifficultyofachievinga50°orbitfromCapeCanaveral.Funding,however,wasalwaysamajorconcern.

14.MSC, “AAP Flight 1A Configuration—System Summary,” internal note 67-ET-15, 25 Aug. 1967;MartinMariettaCorp.,“FinalReport,AAPMission1A,”20Sept.1967.

15.Mathews,“MemorandumfortheAdministrator,”22Sept.1967.16.HouseCommitteeonScienceandAstronautics,1969NASAAuthorization,90/2,pt.l,p.159;Gilruth

toassoc.adm.,“OSSAActivities—WeeklyReport,”30Nov.1967;AAPschedulesML-8,5Dec,andML-13,19Dec1967;Mathews toctr.AAPoffs., “Mission1ATermination,”27Dec.1967;“Post-Apollo Flight Canceled by NASA,”Washington Post, 16 Jan. 1968, p. A-5; Redford and White,“WhatMannedSpaceFlightProgram?”pp.144–46.

17.WilliamR.Lucas,“Notes,”27Dec.1966;Belew,“Notes,”16Jan.1967.18. Harle L. Vogel to mgr., Orbital Workshop Prog., “Meeting in Huntsville to Review Meteoroid

PenetrationProblemsRelatedtotheS-IVBOrbitalWorkshop,”2Mar.1967;WilliamTeirtoBelew,“OrbitalWorkshop,”3Mar.1967;MSFC,changeorder1178tocontractNAS7–101,13Mar.1967;BelewtoTeir,“OrbitalWorkshop,”2Mar.1967;Belew,“SupplementaryStatementtoWeeklyNotesforWeekEndingMarch3,1967,onOrbitalWorkshopMicrometeoroidShieldMeeting,”n.d.

19.Belew, “Notes,”9, 23 Jan., 20,27Mar.1967;Haeussermann, “Notes,”13,20,27Feb., 5, 19 June1967; Ernst Stuhlinger, “Notes,” 13, 20, 27 Feb., 5, 19 June 1967; Lucas, “Notes,” 12 June 1967;WilliamA. Ferguson to L. Roberts, “S-IVB StageMods for OrbitalWorkshop and PDR,” 6Mar.1967;MathewstoBelewandThompson,“ClusterElectricalPowerSupply,”13Mar.1967;Mathewstoctr.AAPmgrs.,“ElectricalPowerSupplyforS-IVBWorkshop,”24Mar.1967;CarlR.PraktishtoSeamans, “Report Covering Visits to KSC, MSFC, MTF, Michoud, and MSC, June 26-June 29,1967,”24July1967.

20.MSFEB,“Minutes,”meetings66–6(21Nov.1966),67–1(6Feb.),and67–2(20Mar.1967);DonaldK.SlaytontoThompson,“ApolloApplicationsMission‘A’Experiments,”17Mar.1967;ThompsontoSlayton,samesubj.,4Apr.1967;WilliamO.Armstrong,“ReportonActionbytheMannedSpaceFlight Experiments Board on Material Submitted for Meeting 67–3,” 26 June 1967 (no MSFEBmeetingwasheldinMay);MSFEB,“Minutes,”meetings67–4(17July)and67–5(18Sept.1967).

21.MathewstoMueller,“ScheduleAssessmentofAAP1–4,”11Apr.1967;Haeussermann,“Notes,”17July1967.

22.Mathews, “ApolloApplications,MSF ProgramReview of July 18,” 18 July 1967;Haeussermann,“Notes,”31July1967;Belew,“Notes,”31July1967.

23. Stuhlinger, “Notes,” 7 Aug. 1967; Richard Tousey, “The NRL Solar Experiments in the ApolloTelescopeMountofSkylab,Historical,Operational,andResults,”preprintofapapertobepublishedin“ReportofNRLProgress,”1June1975,p.4;MathewstoBelew,TWX,18Aug.1967;Mathewstoex. sec, MSFEB, “AAP Presentation to 67–5 MSFEB, AAP Experiment Status Report,” 12 Sept.1967; MSFC, “Combined Staff & Board Meeting Minutes,” 21 July, 24 Aug. 1967; Mueller,“MemorandumforDr.Seamans,”10Aug.1967.

24.MuellertoGilruth,28Apr.1967;GerardJ.Pesman,“InformationPertinenttoHeadquarter[s]RequestforClarificationofLag inCommitment ofMedicalExperimentFunds,”memo for record, 18May

1967;Fieldinterview;AAPOff.,“HistoryoftheApolloApplicationsProgram,1966toSeptember1,1968.”

25.Mathews,Fieldinterviews.26.Fergusoninterview.

27.RobertF.Thompson interview,18Dec.1975;MSC,“QuarterlyReport to theAdministrator for thePeriodEndingOctober31,1967,”p.4.

28.RedfordandWhite,“WhatMannedSpaceFlightProgram?”p.210;MSFC,“MinutesofaPresentationtothePresident’sScientificAdvisoryCommitteebyMSFConApril11,1967,”pp.18–20;AllanH.Brown,Univ.ofPa.,toHarryH.Hess,chairman,SSB,17July1967.

29. Praktish to Seamans, “Report Covering Visits,” 24 July 1967; Mueller, “Memorandum for Dr.Seamans,”10Aug.1967.

30.ThompsontoMathews,“ApolloApplicationsProgramPlanning,”29Aug.1967.

31.Ibid.32. JohnH.Disher interview, 9 July 1975;OMSF, “AAPPresentation toMr.Webb onDec. 6, 1967”;

EdgarM.CortrighttoKSC,LaRC,MSC,andMSFC,TWX,14Nov.1967.

33. Belew, handwritten notes onAAP review, 18Nov. 1967;OMSF, “MSCAAPEarthOrbital FlightReview (SLA-Lab Presentation), Washington, D.C., Nov. 18, 1967, Summary of Verbatim TapeRecord,”n.d.

34.OMSF,“MSCAAPEarthOrbitalFlightReview.”

35.Ibid.36.Ibid.

37.Ibid.38.JohnH.Disher,“AAPProgramDiscussionsatMSFC,November19,1967,”memoforrecord,27Nov.

1967;Belew,handwrittennoteson19Nov.meeting.

39.Ibid.40.Anon., typewritten notes on events of theweekof 27Nov. 1967, fromL.F.Belew’s file, 28Nov.

1967;OMSF,“AAPPresentationtoMr.WebbonDecember6,1967.”

41.MuellertoGilruth,1Dec.1967,withend.,draftofletter,MuellertoGilruth.42.VonBraun toMueller (retractedversion),18Dec.1967;vonBraun toMueller,19Dec.1967,with

enclosures.

43.GilruthtoMueller,14Dec.1967.44. Enclosures, “Comments on Minutes of AAP Discussions at MSFC, November 19, 1967” and

“CommentsonProsandConsofanAlternateConfigurationApproachtoMeetingAAPObjectives,DatedNov.27,1967,”toletter,GilruthtoMueller,14Dec.1967.

45.WebbtoFloydL.Thompson,6Jan.1968.46.JamesA.Long,“NotesoftheThompsonCommitteeMeetingJanuary25,1968,”memoforrecord,29

Jan.1968;R.F.Thompson,“RehearsalofBriefingforPost-ApolloAdvisoryGroup,”12Feb.1968;Jeffrey T. Hamilton to L. F. Belew, “Notes onMSC Briefing for Post Apollo Advisory Group or‘ThompsonCommittee,’”23Feb.1968;MSCinternalnote68-ET-12,“ConceptualDesignsforEarthOrbital SLA Laboratory,” 25 Apr. 1968; MDAC, “Spacecraft Lunar Module Adapter Laboratory,Feasibility Analysis for MSC,” 15 Feb. 1968; “Post-Apollo Advisory Group, Summary ofProceedings,”encl.toFloydL.Thompsontoadmin.,“ReportofthePost-ApolloAdvisoryGroup,”20July1968;J.T.ShepherdtoBelew,“MSFRetreat,”13Mar.1968.

47.FloydL.ThompsontoWebb,“ReportofthePost-ApolloAdvisoryGroup,”20July1968,withencl.,“Post-Apollo Advisory Group, Summary of Proceedings”; Webb to Thompson, “Acceptance ofReport of the Post-ApolloAdvisoryGroup,” 25 July 1968; FloydL. Thompson interview, 28 July1975.

48.Mathews,“AAPWorkshopStudies,”22Dec.1967;MuellertoKurtDebus,22Dec.1967.49.CharlesW.Mathews,“AAPWorkshopStudies,”22Dec.1967;OMSF,“SaturnVWorkshopStudy,”

vol. 1, “Summary,” 15 May 1968; F. L. Williams, “Notes,” 19 Feb. 1968; House Committee onScienceandAstronautics,1969NASAAuthorization,90/2,pt.2,pp.90–94,alsopt.1,pp.5,148–70.

50.LudieG.Richard,“Notes,”15Jan.1968;R.F.Thompson,“LunarModule/ApolloTelescopeMount(LM/ATM) Study,” 23 Jan. 1968; Mueller to Gilruth, 3 Apr. 1968; Mueller, “Note for ChuckMathews,”18Mar.1968;“LM/ATMEvaluationBoard,FinalReport,”25May1968.

51.NASA,“NASAFY1969BudgetBriefing,”29Jan.1968,pp.6,13,14,41–46,50;HouseCommitteeonScienceandAstronautics,1969NASAAuthorization,90/2,pt.1,pp.5,148–70;pt.2,pp.90–94.

52.HouseCommitteeonScienceandAstronautics,1969NASAAuthorization,90/2,pt.1,pp.9498;pt.2,pp.153–67.

53. Ibid., pt. 2, pp. 194, 247–49; Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, NASAAuthorization forFY 1969, pt. 1, pp. 2, 7–8; NASA, “Manned Space FlightManagement CouncilReview,ApolloApplications,”2Apr.1968.

54.CongressionalQuarterlyService,CongressandtheNation,1965–1968,pp.1–12;Time,10May,p.29;17May1968,p.23;MSFC,“CenterStaffandBoardMeetingMinutes,”14June1968.

55.MuellertoGilruth,3Apr.1968;Belew,“RevisedApolloApplicationsProgramPlans,”3Apr.1968.

56.Mathewstoctr.AAPmgrs.,“PlanningforaProgramSlowdown,”21Mar.1968;MSC,“MSCHoldingPlan,” 15 Apr. 1968; Swearingen to Field, “Marshall AAP Slowdown Plan, FY-68-FY-69,” n.d.;Belew toBuckner, “AAPFY68ProcurementActions,”2May1968;Mathews toR.F.Thompson,“AAPHoldingPlan,”3May1968.

57.House,AuthorizingAppropriations to theNationalAeronautics and SpaceAdministration, 90/2,H.rpt. 1181, pp. 19–28;William F.Moore, “House FloorAction on FY 1969NASAAuthorization,”memoforrecord,May1968;RedfordandWhite,“WhatMannedSpaceFlightProgram?”pp.215–19.

58. SenateCommittee onAeronautical and Space Sciences,NASAAuthorization for Fiscal Year 1969,90/2,S.rpt.1136,pp.14–17;RedfordandWhite,“WhatMannedSpaceFlightProgram?”pp.218–19.

59.Memofor record fromJohnDisher files,“RecommendedApolloApplicationsProgramwithFY69New Obligational Authority of $ 119M,” 20 June 1968; Webb to Harold Finger, 28 June 1968;DavidsontoBelew,“NotesofWebb’sSpeechatDenver,Colo.,”15July1968.

60.RedfordandWhite,“WhatMannedSpaceFlightProgram?”p.212;Muellertoctr.dirs.,3July1968.61.HaroldT.LuskintoAAPofficials,“MeetingofLM/ATMTaskTeamwithDr.Naugle,May10,1968,”

14May1968;LuskintoLeoGoldberg,HarvardCollegeObservatory,TWX,20May1968.

62.LuskintoGoldberg,20May1968;GoldbergtoNaugle,21May1968;LuskintoMueller,“Back-UpLM/ATMHardware,”17June1968;MuellertoNaugle,samesubj.,24June1968;OMSF,“Minutesof Management Council Review,” 2 July 1968; Luskin to Belew, “Harvard College Observatory(HCO)A&BExperimentsforATM,”1July1968.

63.Naugle toNewell, “Scientific Strategy for aDeferredATM-AMission,” 12 July 1968;ThomasO.Paine to assoc. admins., “Key Issues of the FY 1969 Operating Budget,” attachment to datafaxtransmission fromFrankA.Bogart tovonBraun,26July1968;Rein Ise,“Notes fromMr.Webb’sAugust5,1968,ATMProjectReviewatNASAHeadquarters,”memoforrecord;EdwardGibsontoastronauts,“HeadquartersReviewofOMSFBudgetandATMCancellation,”6Aug.1968;Paine to

assoc.admins.,“DecisionsonKeyIssuesoftheFY1969OperatingBudget,”16Aug.1968.

64.PresentationbySidneyJ.CariskitoMSFManagementCouncilReview,9Oct.1968;PainetoMueller,“ModificationofS-IBContractNAS8–4106forAAP,”30Aug.1968;MuellertoGilruth,“AirlockLetterAmendmenttoContractNAS9–6555,”TWX,5July1968.

65.Telephone interviewwith JohnDisher, 1 July 1976;H.M.Kennedy toPhilipCulbertson, “CriticalProcurementActionReleases,”23July1968;MSFC,“CenterStaffandBoardMeetingMinutes,”14June1968.

66.NeilSheehan,“WebbQuitsasHeadofSpaceAgency;NotesSovietLead,”NewYorkTimes,17Sept.1968; JohnLannan, “ActingNASAHeadOneofNewBreed,”WashingtonEvening Star, 17Sept.1968; Mueller to von Braun, 17 Oct. 1968; Disher to ctr. AAP mgrs., “Review of Major AAPStatementsofWork,”18Nov.1968;personalnotesofJohnDisher;telephoneinterviewwithDisher,1July1976.

67.NASA,AstronauticsandAeronautics,1968,pp.250–53,264,318–22,324;NASA,“FY1970BudgetBriefing,”15Jan.1969,“FY1970AmendedBudgetBriefing,”15Apr.1969;HouseCommitteeonScienceandAstronautics,7970NASAAuthorization,91/1,pts.1and2.

68.VonBrauntoMueller,20Sept.1968;GilruthtoMueller,19Sept.1968;J.P.Field,Jr.,toAAPdir.,“ProgramReplanningtoContainExpandingSpacecraftCostsandSchedules,”20Sept.1968;LuskintoR.F.Thompson,“CommentsconcerningCMandSMDevelopmentPlans,”TWX,11July1968;HowardBenedict(AP),“RacingtotheMoon…andBeyond,”NewHavenRegister,8Sept.1968.

69. John M. Logsdon, “The Space Program during the 1970’s: An Analysis of Policymaking,” draft,August1974,pp.5–6,12.

70.AAP,“ConsiderationofSaturnVinPlaceofIBforLaunchofAAPOrbitalWorkshop,”presentationtoOMSFManagementCouncil,4Feb.1969;MSFC,“CenterStaffandBoardMeetingMinutes,”7Feb.1969.

71. SenateCommittee onAeronautical and Space Sciences,NASAAuthorization for Fiscal Year 1970,91/1,pp.193–211.

72.ErnstGeissler,“Notes,”17Mar.1969;vonBraun,“SaturnVWorkshop/BoTaskTeam,”10Apr.1969;Machel to AAPmgr., “Weekly Activity Report,” 11, 24 Apr. 1969;Manned Space Flight weeklyreport,1Apr.1969;SchneidertocenterAAPmgrs.,“MinutesofAAPBaselineConfigurationReviewHeldMarch 4, 1969,” 11Mar. 1969; Faget to Gilruth, “A Study of Apollo Applications ProgramUsingSaturnVLaunchVehicles,” 23Apr. 1969; JulianE.West toGilruth, “ExtendedAAPFlightProgram,”25Apr. 1969;MSC, “WeeklyActivityReport,November23-November29, 1968,E&DDirectorate,” 29 Nov. 1968; Belew to von Braun, “Wet/Dry Workshop Discussions at the OMSFHideawayMeeting,”1May1969.

73.HaroldBecker,“Notes,”25Apr.1969.

74.BelewtovonBraun,1May1969.75.Mueller interview, 26Aug. 1975;WillisB.Mitchell, “SummaryofSaturnVWorkshopMeeting at

NASAHeadquarters,May7,1969,”9May1969.

76.BelewtoSchneider,“ImpactAssessmenttoAAPCoreProgramDuetoOMSFProposedSaturnVDryLaunchedSelf-DependentWorkshopwithanIntegratedATM,”15May1969.

77.Ibid.

78.Belew,“NotetoDr.vonBraun,”22May1969.79.VonBrauntoMueller,23May1969;GilruthtoMueller,26May1969.

80.AAPOffice,“ApolloApplicationsProgramReview,”27May1969.

81.BelewtoGen.O’Connor,“AAPReorientation,”4June1969;Schneidertoctr.AAPmgrs.,“SaturnVWorkshopStudy,”17June1969.

82. Schneider to ctr. AAP mgrs., “Saturn V Launched Workshop Planning Schedule and AAP WorkGuidelines,”27 June1969;Schneider toMueller, “WeeklyProgress andProblemSummary for theAdministrator,” 26 June 1969; MSFC, “Saturn V Workshop Program Definition Study, TechnicalConsiderations,”30June1969.

83.SchneidertoMueller,“WeeklyProgressandProblemSummaryfortheAdministrator,”11July1969;AAPBriefingfortheAdministrator,9July1969;Muellertoadm.,“SaturnVLaunchedWorkshopforAAP,”10July1969;SchneidertoR.F.Thompson,“AAPPADChangeRequest,”29July1969,withenclosedProjectApprovalDocumentChangeRequest,17July1969.

84. Air Force Systems Cmd., “Statement Made Today by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, DavidPackard,” 10 June 1969; Darrell Garwood (UPI), “MOL,” 10 June 1969; “Manned Space LabCanceled,”WashingtonEveningStar,10June1969.

85.Schneidertoctr.AAPmgrs.,TWX,22July1969.

86.Ibid.87. Interviews:FloydThompson, 28 July 1975;EberhardRees, 28 Jan. 1976;Mathews, 14 July 1975;

WalterF.Burke,27Aug.1975;J.PembleField,10July1975;RobertF.Thompson,18Dec.1975;Schneider,22July1975;Gilruth,6Aug.1975.

88.Muellertoctr.dirs.,28July1969.89. Belew to Schneider, “AAPMake or Buy Plan,” TWX, 25 Aug. 1969; Schneider to Belew, same

subject,TWX,27Aug.1969;BelewtoSchneider,samesubject,11Sept.1969;BelewtoSchneider,“In-House vs. Contractor Furnished ItemsAssociatedwith the SaturnVDryWorkshop,” 26 Sept.1969;Belew,“Notes,”13Oct.1969;HarryH.GormantoMueller,28Oct.1969.

90.HughDrydeninterview,1Sept.1965,inJSCHistoryArchives.91.JackHartsfield,“’ThinkPositive,’saysMuellerofSpaceFlight,”HuntsvilleTimes,9Dec.1969;tape

recordinginJSCHistoryArchivesofMueller’saddressatMSC,9Dec.1969.

Chapter61.MuellertoGilruth,11Sept.1969.

2.MSFC,“MinutesofOctoberMSFCStaffandBoardMeeting,”22Oct.1969;NASA,America’sNextDecades in Space,AReport for the SpaceTaskGroup,Sept. 1969;ThomasO’Toole, “ControversyExpectedonMarsLandingGoal,”WashingtonPost,10Aug.1969,pp.Al,A8;HouseCommitteeonScienceandAstronautics,Hearings,1972NASAAuthorization,92/1,1:80–86.

3.MuellertoJulianScheer,“RequesttoNASAProjectDesignationCommitteetoSelectaNewNamefortheApolloApplicationsProgram(AAP),”15Oct.1969;Dishertomembersofscreeningcommittee,“NewName for theApolloApplicationsProgram,”4Sept. 1969;Belew, “WeeklyNotes,”18Aug.1969.

4.House,Hearings,1971NASAAuthorization,1:7–8;NASA,AstronauticsandAeronautics,1970,pp.92–93,161–62,203,246,284–85;JamesL.Daniels,“MeetingonApollo/SkylabProgramOptions,”memoforrecord,15June1970.

5.GeorgeLowtoEdwardE.David,30Oct.1970.

6.HouseCommitteeonScienceandAstronautics,Hearings,1972NASAAuthorization,1:80–86;MSFC,“StaffandBoardPresentation,”12Feb.1971.

7.Schneider toBelew, “ArtificialGravityExperiment inAAP,” 22Aug. 1969;Schneider to ctr. prog,mgrs.,“PreliminaryMissionDefinitionandProgressPlanningfortheSecondSaturnWorkshopSWSII,”5Sept.1969;Schneidertoctr.prog,offs.,“DefinitionStudiesforaSecondWorkshop(SWSII),”withguidelines,25Nov.1969;RobertThompsontoMaxFaget,“SecondSaturnWorkshopPlanningActivities,”17Dec.1969;Schneidertoassoc.admin,formannedspaceflight,“WeeklyProgressandProblemSummaryfortheAdministrator—ApolloApplicationsProgram,”21Nov.1969.

8.PhilipCulbertson toW.R.Lucas,“PayloadPlanningSupport forSkylabIIMission,”15Mar.1970;Schneidertoctr.prog,offs.,“SkylabIIEstimates,”12Mar.1970.

9.Gilruth toMyers,“SkylabIIPlanning,”24Mar.1970;BelewtoSchneider,“SkylabIIEstimates,”1Apr.1970,withattached“MSCSkylabIIStudy”;ReestoMyers,“SkylabIIPlanning,”30Mar.1970;Myerstoctr.dirs.,“SkylabIIPlanning,”2Apr.1970;Belew,“PresentationtoMSFCStaffandBoardMeeting,”10Apr.1970.

10.GeorgeHardy,“SkylabB,PhaseI,Study,”memoforrecord,22Oct.1970;visualaidsusedforMSFCpresentation,“SkylabB,”10Aug.1970;SchneidertoMyers,“WeeklyProgressSummary—Skylab,”7Aug.1970;SchneidertoMyers,“SkylabBPlanningStudies,”4Sept.1970.

11.HouseCommiteeonScienceandAstronautics,Hearings,1972NASAAuthorization,1:105;Rep.DonFuquainterview,10July1975;DaleMyersinterview,25Aug.1975.

12. William Schneider interview, 22 July 1975; Schneider to Charles Wilson, Ames Research Ctr.,“ExperimentsS071CircadianRhythm—PocketMiceandS072CircadianRhythm—VinegarGnat,”14Dec.1970;Schneidertoctr.prog,mgrs.,“AAPExperimentDevelopmentandIntegration,”5Sept.1969.

13.Skylabprog.dir.7A,18Mar.1970;DishertoPembleField,“ICDResponsibilities,”5Feb.1970.

14. Schneider to ctr. prog, mgrs., “Interface Control Documents,” 17 Aug. 1970; “Procedures forProcessingICD’sandIRN’s,”17Sept.1970;and“IntercenterICDMeeting,”25Feb.1971.

15.VonBraun toMueller, “FlightMissions Planning Panel,” 30Dec. 1963; EberhardRees to SamuelPhillips, 22Nov. 1966;Mathews to ctr. prog,mgrs., “Establishment of AAP InterCenter InterfacePanelStructure,”9,24Mar.1967.

16. Schneider to ctr. prog, mgrs., “AAP Panel Revisions,” 8 July 1969; Robert Thompson to HaroldLuskin, “Reexamination of AAP Panel Organization,” 9 Dec. 1968; Skylab prog. dir. 7A,“EstablishmentofSkylabProgramInterfacePanelOrganization,”18Mar.1970.

17.NASA,ReportoftheApollo13ReviewBoard,15June1970,pp.4–23,5–9.

18.HenryB. Floyd interview, 5Nov. 1974; Skylab prog. dir. 34, “Skylab ProgramCCBControls andReporting Requirements,” 19 Jan. 1971; Schneider to ctr. prog, mgrs., “Level I CCB Review ofApolloApplicationsProgramSpecification,”23July1969.

19. AAP Off., draft agenda for AAP Executives Meeting, Michoud, 11 Aug. 1969; OMSF, “ApolloApplications Program Specification,” 15Aug. 1969; Skylab prog. dir. 5E, “Skylab ProgramWorkAuthorization,”27May1971;MSCandMSFC,“MissionRequirements,SecondSkylabMissionSL-3,” 1 Feb. 1972; J. A. Bethay to MSFC mgrs., “Management Council Meeting,” 27 Oct. 1969;SchneidertoThompson,“ApolloApplicationsProgramSpecification,”7Aug.1969.

20. PhilipCulbertson to ctr. prog,mgrs., “Agenda forBaselineRequirementsReview,” 28Aug. 1969;Schneidertoctr.prog,mgrs.,“DocumentationRequirementsReview,”25Aug.1969;Floydinterview.

21.Skylabprog.dir.11A,“SequenceandFlowofHardwareDevelopmentandKeyInspection,Review,andCertificationCheckpoints,”14Oct.1970.

22.Ibid.;RichardTrulyinterview,4Sept.1975.23. Belew, “Weekly Notes,” 17 Nov. 1969; Schneider to Mueller, “Weekly Progress and Problem

SummaryfortheAdministrator—ApolloApplicationsProgram,”11Dec.1969.

24. Schneider to Mueller, “Weekly Progress Summary for AAP,” 11 Dec. 1969; Schneider, “SkylabLessonsLearnedasApplicabletoaLargeSpaceStation,”NASAreportTMX-73073,draft,Jan.1976,pp.25–26.

25.SchneidertoBelew,“ClusterSystemsDesignReview,”16Jan.1970;BelewtovonBraun,“WeeklyNotes,”15Dec.1969;SchneidertoBelew,“TechnicalManagementMeetings,”23Dec.1969.

26.Schneider toBelew,“ClusterSystemsDesignReview,”16 Jan.1970;Belew toSchneider, “ClusterSystemsDesignReview,”10Feb.1970.

27. Belew to Schneider, “Cluster Systems Design Review,” 10 Feb. 1970; Donald Slayton to RobertThompson,“ProgressiveCrewStationReviewsofSaturnVWorkshop(SVWS)Hardware,”11Dec.1969;Belew,“WeeklyNotes,”Jan.-June1970.

28.SchneidertoBelew,“UseofProposedAAPGuidelinesforExperimentDevelopment,”24Dec.1969;Belew to Schneider, “Proposed Guideline for Skylab Program Experiment Development,” 5 Mar.1970;SchneidertoBelewandKleinknecht,“UncertifiedReviews,”20July1970.

29. Belew, “WeeklyNotes,” 25May, 17Aug., 24Aug.-28 Sept. 1970;D.M.Green, “CriticalDesignReview,” 13 Aug. 1970;MSFC releases 70–168, 27 Aug., and 70–189, 21 Sept. 1970; Disher toMathews,24Sept.1970.

30. MSF Management Council review presentations, Apollo Applications, 15 Oct. and 4 Nov. 1969;MSFC, “Minutes of Combined Staff and Board Meeting,” 10 Nov. 1969; Belew to Schneider,“PendingChangesintheApolloApplicationsProgram,”3Nov.1969.

31.MSFC,“MinutesofAugustStaffandBoardMeeting,”14Aug.1969;KennethKleinknecht,“MeetingwithDr.G.E.MuelleronAugust7,1969toDiscussApollo/ALEM/AAPCommonality,”memoforrecord,26Aug.1969;Belew,“WeeklyNotes,”15Dec.1969,25May1970.

32.Myerstoassoc.admin,forOSSA,“New/AdditionalExperimentsforSkylabI,”27Mar.1970;GilruthtoRees,10Apr.,26May1970;ReestoMathews,21July1970;ReestoGilruth,19Aug.1970.

33.Schneider toBelew,“MSFCFY71SkylabResourcesProgram,”29July1970;BelewtoSchneider,“MSFCFY71SkylabResourcesProblem,”8Sept.,9Oct.1970;BelewtoWilliamSimmonsandF.M.Drummond,“WorkshopandAirlockScheduleandResourcesProblem,”23Nov.1970.

34.Skylabprog,off., “SkylabProgramLaunchReadinessandDeliverySchedule,ML-19,”Sept.1970;KennethKleinknechtinterview,10Sept.1976.

35. Schneider to Belew, “Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM) Experiment—Naval Research Laboratory(NRL-B(S-082-B)),”15Dec.1970.

36.GeorgeE.Muellertoassoc.admin.,“Re-enteringFragmentPolicy,”13May1964.37.OMSFbriefingdocuments,22Jan.1970.

38.Ibid.39.Ibid.

40.LockheedMissiles&Space,Inc.,Huntsville,Ala.,“SurvivalAnalysisofSkylabProgramVehicles,”finalreportundercontractNAS8–24249,July1970.

41.DaleD.Myerstoactingadmin.,“ReportonSkylabOrbitalDebris,”24Nov.1970;GeorgeM.Lowtoassoc.admin,forMannedSpaceFlight,“SkylabOrbitalDebris,”3Apr.1971.

Chapter7

1.FrankBormaninterview,19Apr.1967,JSCHistoryOffice.

2.FredA.Payne,“WorkandLivingSpaceRequirementsforMannedSpaceStations,”ProceedingsoftheMannedSpaceStationsSymposium,LosAngeles,20–22Apr.1960,pp.100–03;NASA,“CompilationofPapersPresentedat theSpaceStationTechnologySymposium,LangleyResearchCenter,”11–13Feb.1969.

3. C. C. Johnson, “Skylab Experiment M487, Habitability/Crew Quarters,” paper 133 of The SkylabResults:Proceedings,vol.1,20thAmericanAstronauticalSocietyMeeting,LosAngeles,20–22Aug.1974;HouseCommitteeonScienceandAstronautics,SubcommitteeonMannedSpaceFlight,1966NASA Authorization: Hearings on H.R. 3730, 89/1, 1965, pt. 2, p. 141; idem, 1967 NASAAuthorization: Hearings on H.R. 12718, 89/2, 1966, pt. 2, p. 175; Committee on Science andAstronautics,1968NASAAuthorization:HearingsonH.R.4450,H.R.6740,90/1,1967,pt.1,p.206.

4.MSC, “AS-209,OrbitalWorkshop,MSCCorollaryExperiments,Presentation toMSFEB,”19Sept.1966.

5.CharlesW.Mathews toRobertF.ThompsonandLelandF.Belew,“Habitability andCrewQuartersExperiment,M487,”25Jan.1967;Belew,“ReestablishmentofWorkshopHabitabilityResponsibilityatMSFC,”memoforrecord,29Sept.1966;StanleyR.Reinartz,samesubject,memoforrecord,30Sept.1966;ThompsontoMathews,“ExperimentM487,Habitability/CrewQuarters,”22June1967;Mathews to asst. mgr., AAP Off., MSC, and prog, mgr., S/AAP Off., MSFC, “ExperimentImplementationPlanforM-487,Habitability/CrewQuarters,”5Sept.1967.

6.RichardS.Johnstoninterview,21Oct.1975;PaulC.Rambautinterview,2Dec.1976.7.MSFC,“S-IVBOrbitalWorkshop,StructuresandMechanicsSub-BoardPresentation,”8–9May1967,

pp.5–50,5–41to5–46;“S-IVBOrbitalWorkshop,AdvanceDataPackageforthePreliminaryDesignReview,”May1967,pp.5–8to5–11.

8.Belew,“MinutesoftheOrbitalWorkshop(OWS)PreliminaryDesignReview(PDR)duringMay2–10,1967,atMSFC,”24May1967.

9.Mathews to Thompson, Belew, andRobert C.Hock, “TwoLevelOrbitalWorkshop,” 7 July 1967;MathewstoBelew,“IndustrialConsultantforOWS,”24Aug.1967.

10.GeorgeE.Mueller interview,26Aug.1975;MSFC,“WorkStatement foran IndustrialEngineeringDesignConsultantCoveringEffortforDesignConsultationonHabitabilityAspectsofEarthOrbitalSpaceStations,”1Dec.1967.

11.CurrentBiography,1953,pp.368–70;MannedSpaceFlightweeklyreport,18Dec.1967;E.L.Field,“WashingtonD.C.Trip,RaymondLoewyInterviewatHeadquarters,”memoforrecord,20Dec.1967.

12.RaymondLoewy/WilliamSnaith,Inc.,“HabitabilityStudy,AAPProgram,”Feb.1968.13. Belew, “Report on OWS Habitability Analysis,” 16 Feb. 1968; Martin Marietta Corp., “Apollo

Applications Program (AAP) Payload Integration, Review and Recommendations, Supplement toHabitabilityStudy(ED-2002–374),”21Feb.1968.

14.WilliamA.Fergusoninterview,6Oct.1975;WilliamK.Simmons,Jr.,interview,30Oct.1974.15.Muellerinterview;DonaldK.Slaytontomgr.,OrbitalWorkshopProj.,“OrbitalWorkshopHabitability

Study,”14Mar.1968;Mathews toBelew,“IndustrialConsultantContract forOWS,”1Mar.1968;George B. Hardy to Belton Jones, Jr., “Contract NAS 8–23506, Raymond Loewy/William Snaith,Incorporated,”8Apr.1968.

16. Thompson to H. T. Luskin, “Designation of the Principal Investigator for Experiment M487,‘Habitability/Crew Quarters,’” 3 June 1968; W. A. Ferguson to Belew, “Weekly Notes for WeekEndingJune21,1968,”21June1968.

17.RobertR.Gilruthinterview,6Aug.1975;CaldwellC.Johnsoninterview,21May1975.

18.Johnsoninterview.

19.Johnson,“ExperimentM-487RequirementsGuidelines,”26Mar.1969;Johnson tomgr.,AAPOff.,“InitialGuidelines,ExperimentM-487,”5May1969.

20. MSC, “Experiment M-487, Habitability/Crew Quarters, Initial Guidelines,” May 1969; Johnsoninterview.

21.AllenJ.LouvieretoJamesW.Prim,“ExperimentM-487,Habitability/CrewQuarters,”30July1969,“CritiqueofOrbitalWorkshopHabitabilitySupportSystemforPDRatMSFCAugust26–29,1969,”22 Aug. 1969; Belew to William C. Schneider, Thomas Morgan, and Robert F. Thompson,“HabitabilitySupportSystemPreliminaryDesignReview,”8Aug.1969.

22.Johnsoninterview;Fergusoninterview.

23.SchneidertoThompson,Johnson,Belew,andMorgan,“ReviewofHabitabilityAspectsoftheSaturnWorkshop,”30Sept.1969.

24.RobertL.Lohman,“SpaceStationInputstoAAPHabitabilityExperiments,”16Oct.1969;MalcolmC.Smith,Jr.,tochief,PreventiveMedicineDiv.,“AAPHabitabilitySupportSystemStatusReview,”20Oct.1969.

25.Johnsoninterview;Muellerinterview;SchneidertoBelew,“OWSCompartmentChanges,”TWX,31Oct.1969.

26.FredToerge (RaymondLoewy/WilliamSnaith, Inc.) toSimmons,“MonthlyProgressLetterReport,ContractNAS8–23506,SupplementalAgreementNo.4,”1Mar.,2Apr.1969;JohnsontoStanleyD.Mclntyre,“Full-Scale,ModelShirtsleeveGarmentsforAAP/OWS,”21Mar.1969;LarryE.Bell tochief,SystemsSupportBr.,“SkylabGarments,”1July1970;Louviere toBell, samesubj.,21May1970; Johnson interview; M. I. Radnofsky to Joseph P. Kerwin, “Minutes of Meeting Held toDetermineSkylabClothingConfiguration,”1Sept.1970.

27. Louviere to Johnson, “Status of Off Duty Activity Equipment,” 25 Sept. 1970; Louviere to Prim,“Habitability Technology, Astronaut Off-Duty Activity for AAP,” 19 Nov. 1969; Johnson to dir.,Engineering & Development, “Engineering, Development and Supply of Off-Duty ActivityEquipmentforSkylabI,”8Apr.1970.

28.SchneidertoBelew,“RequestforProposalfora‘spaceBathTub’forAAP,”22Apr.1969;Johnsoninterview;Johnsontomgr.,AAPOff.,“’spaceBathTub,’”8May1969;BelewtoSchneider,“SpaceBath,”18Mar.1970;SchneidertoBelewandK.S.Kleinknecht,samesubj.,17Apr.1970;ThompsontoBelew,“SpaceBathTubforAAP,”29July1969;SimmonstoMcDonnellDouglasAircraftCorp.,“‘WholeBodyCleansing’fortheSaturnWorkshop,”11Sept.1969.

29.PaulJ.Weitzinterview,15Aug.1975;FerolAustin,“31DaysAdriftintheGulfStream,”ChristianScienceMonitor,21Aug.1969;MSFCrelease185–69,7Apr.1969.

30.JohnsontoKleinknecht,“HabitabilityProvisionsoftheOrbitalWorkshop,”26Feb.1970.

31. Robert A. Nanz, Edward L. Michel, and Paul A. Lachance, “The Evolution of a Space FeedingConceptforProjectGemini,”paperpresentedtoInstituteofFoodTechnologists,Washington,24–28May1964;AerospaceFoodTechnology,NASASP-202(Washington,1970),p.4.

32.Transcript ofApollo 7medical debriefing, tape 2, pp. 20–22, JSCHistoryOffice;MSC, “Apollo 8TechnicalDebriefing,” 2 Jan. 1969, p. 113;MSC, “Apollo 9 CrewTechnicalDebriefing,” 20Mar.1969, pp. 13–2, 13–5 to 13–7; Donald D. Arabian to Rita Rapp, “Evaluation of Four-Day FoodSupply,”8May1969.

33.CharlesA.Berryinterview,10Apr.1975.34.G.DonaldWhedon (Nat. Inst.ofHealth) toPaulRambaut,20Dec.1968;Schneider toThompson,

“In-FlightFoodandWaterSystemsforAAP,”22Apr.1969;JohnsontoThompson,“AAP/OWSFood

andFoodFreezerStudy,”16Apr.1969.

35.PaulC.Rambaut,“ApolloApplicationsProgramRequirements,”AerospaceFoodTechnology,pp.57–60.

36.SchneidertoThompson,“In-FlightFoodandWaterSystemsforAAP,”22Apr.1969.

37.JohnsontoThompson,“AAP/OWSFoodandFoodFreezerStudy,”16Apr.1969;SchneidertoBelew,“In-Flight Food and Water Heating and Cooling Capabilities for AAP,” 22 Apr. 1969; Simmons,“NotetoMr.Belew,”2May1969;W.W.KemmerertoR.Machell,“DevelopmentofaFoodSystemforAAP,”7May1969;ThompsontoBelew,“FoodRequirementsforAAP,”16May1969;SimmonstoBelew,“In-FlightFoodandWaterHeatingandCoolingCapabilitiesforAAP,”23July1969.

38.Rambautinterview;MalcolmC.Smith,Jr.,todir.,MedicalResearchandOperations,“EvaluationofUSAF-MOLContractforFeedingSystem,”17June1969;SmithtoMachell,“RequestforContractorManpower Increase,” 31 Oct. 1969; Rambaut to mgr., Orbital Assembly Proj. Off., “Skylab FoodManagementPlan,”6Apr.1970.

39.JohnsontoMachell,“FoodSystem—OrbitalWorkshop,”27Oct.1969.40.BelewtoSchneider,“PendingChangesintheApolloApplicationsProgram,”3Nov.1969.

41.Johnsoninterview.42.ChristopherC.Kraft,Jr.,toGilruth,“HabitabilityofSkylab,”6Apr.1970.

43.GilruthtoEberhardRees,lOApr.1970;ReestoBelew,“SkylabHabitability,”15Apr.1970;BelewtoRees,samesubj.,7May1970;ReestoGilruth,27May1970.

44. James R. Thompson, Jr., to Simmons, “Habitability Provisions of the OrbitalWorkshop,” 27May1970.

45.GaylordM.Huffman,“SkylabHabitability,”memoforrecord,12June1970.46. Gilruth to Rees, 26 May 1970, “Recommendations of the Skylab Habitability Committee,” with

enclosures,engineeringdesignchangerequests”OTO173–187.

47.ReestoGilruth,16June1970;ReestoDaleD.Myers,15June1970.48.BelewtoKleinknecht,“SkylabFoodRequirements,”TWX,13May1970;FieldtoSimmons,“Food

SystemReassessment,”22May1970;Johnsontochief,SystemsSupportBr.,“SoftMockupofSkylabWardroom,”21Apr.1970;FieldtoSimmons,“FoodSystemWorkingMeetingJune6,1970,”10June1970; Johnson toM.Smith, “Skylab Food—StorageRequirements,” 4 June1970; Johnson tomgr.,Skylab Prog., “Skylab Galley Arrangement,” 13 June 1970; Belew to Kleinknecht, “EngineeringDesignChangeRequest (EDCR) 173, Food System and Storage,” 23 June 1970; Johnson tomgr.,SkylabProg.,“SkylabFoodandBeverageStorageRequirements,”24June1970;SimmonstoBelew,“Notes,”weeksending22May,5,11June1970.

49. Myers to Gilruth, 22 June 1970; John H. Disher to Schneider et al., “2nd Draft Agenda, SkylabProgram Review at MSFC, July 7–8, 1970,” 29 June 1970; OMSF, “Minutes, Skylab ProgramReview,GeorgeC.MarshallSpaceFlightCenter,July7–8,1970,”22July1970;SchneidertoBelewandKleinknecht, “OWSStorage and Food SystemChanges,” TWX, 13 July 1970;Kleinknecht toSchneider,“FoodSystemInterfacewithOrbitalWorkshop,”17July1970;SchneidertoKleinknechtandBelew,samesubj.,TWX,6Aug.1970;KleinknechttoSchneider,“ChangesinSkylabProgramFood System Interface,” TWX, 12 Aug. 1970; Schneider to Kleinknecht and Belew, “Transfer ofSkylabFoodHeaterSystemResponsibilityfromMSFCtoMSC,”25Aug.1970.

50.ReestoMathews,21July1970.

51.MathewstoRees,31July1970.52.ReestoGilruth,19Aug.1970.

Chapter81.MSFEB,“Minutes,”meeting66–5,19Sept.1966.

2.S.P.Vinogradtoex.sec,MSFEB,“MMAgendaItemsfortheJulyMSFEBMeeting(67–4),”6July1967;MSFEB,“Minutes,”meeting67–5,18Sept.1967;J.W.Humphreystoassoc.adm.formannedspaceflight, “Organization and Designation of Medical Experiments and Personnel for MedicalExperimentsProgrambeyondApollo,”13Nov.1967;Vinogradtoactingdir.,SAAProg.,“BiomedicalExperimentsonAAPFlights1,2,3,and4,”25Nov.1966.

3. Richard S. Johnston interview, 21Oct. 1975; CharlesA. Berry toAAPmgr., “Contract Support toMR&ODforAAP,”20May1969;Berryinterview,10Apr.1975;L.F.BelewtoEberhardRees,22May1968;HenryW.FloydtoBelew,“BiomedicalExperimentHardwareTransfertoMSFC,”24May1968;BelewtoHermannK.Weidner,“BiomedicalExperimentHardwareDevelopment,”7June1968;WernhervonBrauntoRobertR.Gilruth,2Aug.1968;GilruthtovonBraun,5Sept.1968;BerrytoGilruth,“ReplytoMSFC’sOffertoDesignandDevelopAAPBiomedicalExperimentHardware,”30Aug.1968.

4.BelewtovonBraun,“AAPMedicalExperimentSupport toMSC,”6Sept.1968;WilliamR.Lucas,“Notes,”9Sept.1968;BelewtoWeidner,“BiomedicalExperimentHardwareDevelopment,”13Sept.1968; Belew to R. F. Thompson, same subj. and date; Lucas, “Notes,” 18 Nov. 1968; R. J.Schwinghamer toBioastronauticsTaskTeam, “Tuesday,November 19,TaskTeamNotes,” 20Nov.1968;Belew, “Notes,” 4Nov. 1968;Gilruth to vonBraun, 16Dec 1968,with encl., “ManagementAgreement for AAP Medical Experiment Hardware Items”; Belew to Rees, 22 Nov. 1968; KarlHeimburg,“Notes,”16Dec.1968;Lucas,“Notes,”2,9Dec1968;GeorgeG.Armstrong,Jr.,toAAPmgr., “Allocation ofMSFC Experiments Development Funds,” 17 Jan. 1969;MSC, “Statement ofWorkfortheMetabolicAnalyzer,Ergometer,andTaskBoardforExperimentM171,”23Jan.1969.

5.Johnstoninterview.

6.LoydS.Swenson,Jr.,JamesM.Grimwood,andCharlesC.Alexander,ThisNewOcean:AHistoryofProjectMercury,NASASP-420J (Washington,1966),pp.351,418;CourtneyG.Brooks, JamesM.Grimwood,andLoydS.Swenson,Jr.,ChariotsforApollo:AHistoryofLunarSpacecraft,NASASP-4205(Washington,1979),p.268.

7.PaulC.Rambauttochief,BiotechnologyDiv.,“InflightMedicalRequirementsImposedbyM071,”15Oct.1968.

8.WilliamK.Simmons,Jr.,“NotesfromGEPresentation,‘UrineSampleVolumeMeasuringSystem,’”memo for record, 4 Feb. 1969; Berry interview; Jack H.Waite to Belew, Reinartz, and Simmons,“Waste Management System (WMS) Presentation at MSG,” 3 Mar. 1969; Berry to William C.Schneider,“AAPSupportofM071andM073,”[Sept.1969].

9.R.E.AllentoStanMclntyre,“SamplingandPreservingUrineandFeces,”16Jan.1969;Mgr.,OrbitalAssemblyProj.Off.,tomgr.,AAP,“WeeklyActivityReport,”28Mar.1969;CarolynLeachinterview,3Dec. 1976;Berry interview;StanleyD.Mclntyre interview, 8Oct. 1975;OrbitalAssemblyProj.,“WeeklyActivityReport,”28Mar.1969.

10. Simmons toMcDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corp., “Immediate Actions Required as a Result of theHabitabilitySupportSystemsPreliminaryDesignReview(HSSPDR),”3Apr.1969;RambauttoR.Machell,“ModificationstoMDACTestPlanDatedApril1969,”6May1969;Mclntyreinterview.

11.RobertF.Thompson toBelew, “MedicalExperimentM073,”17 June1969;Simmons to attendees,“Minutes and Actions on the Habitability Support Systems Meeting at McDonnell DouglasAstronauticsCompany—WesternDivision(MDAC-WD)onJuly2,1969,”28July1969;SimmonstoMDAC-WD, “Habitability Support Systems Requirements,” 24 July 1969; Belew to Thompson,“UrinePreservationMethods,”29Aug.1969;PaulC.Rambautinterview,2Dec.1976.

12.W.W.Kemmerertoasst.forAAP,“AAPUrineMeasurementConcepts,”29Aug.,21Sept.1969;B.D. Newsom to mgr., Orbital Assembly Proj., same subj., 6 Oct. 1969; Rambaut, “Review ItemDiscrepancy WM-21, Habitability Support System Preliminary Design Review,” 28 Aug. 1969;NewsomtoAAPmgr.,“UrineVolumeMeasuring,”27Oct.1969.

13. Orbital Assembly Proj., “Weekly Activity Report,” 19 Dec. 1969; MSFC AAP Off., “WasteManagement System, [viewgraphs of] Presentation to MSC, Dec. 18, 1969”; Schneider to Belew,Berry, Thompson, “Medical Experiment Waste Collection and Preservation Requirements andMethods Meeting at MSC December 18, 1969,” TWX, 23 Dec. 1969; Simmons to MDAC-WD,“ImpactStudyforIncorporationofaUrinePoolingSystem,”TWX,30Dec.1969.

14.GaylordM.Huffman,“MinutesofMeeting,UrineShelfLifeTestReviewatBioneticsResearchLab,Bethesda,Md.”[15Feb.1970];H.H.AshtoG.M.Huffman,5Mar.1970;Rambauttoasst.dir.ofresearch,“UrineFreezingversusUrineDrying,”19Feb.1970.

15.Simmons,“NotetoMr.Belew”[23Feb.1970];“MannedSpaceFlightWeeklyReport,”16Mar.1970;Simmons toCraigMitchell, “WasteManagement SystemDesign,” 12Mar. 1970;A.D.Catterson,“Resultsof theSkylabProgramManagementMeetingatMSConMarch10,1970,”16Mar.1970;Belew,“Notes,”16Mar.1970.

16.Berryinterview;Mclntyreinterview;WilliamK.Simmons,Jr.,interview,30Oct.1974.

17.Mclntyre interview;Kemmerer to chief,R&DProcurementBr., “Justification forNon-CompetitiveProcurement,”2Feb.1970.

18.K.S.Kleinknecht,“MinutesofTeleconferenceMeetingonSkylabWasteManagementSystem,March20, 1970,” 24 Mar. 1970; Kemmerer to chief, R&D Procurement Br., “Justification for Non-Competitive Procurement,” 2 Feb. 1970; MSFC, “Minutes, OWS Urine Collection EquipmentEvaluation,April 3, 1970,Held atMDAC-WD,HuntingtonBeach”;A.G.Puglisi toSimmons, 13Apr.1970,withencl.detailingMDAC-WDcomments toMSFCstatementsconcerning theGEandFairchildHillerurinecollectionconcepts;anon.,“ProgramFactors”[Jan.-Mar.1970],memoinfilesof MSFC OWS proj. mgr.; Mclntyre interview; MSFC, “OWS Urine Collection EquipmentEvaluation,”9Apr.1970;ErnestE.KennedytoMclntyre,“ComparisonofDesignFeatures,”10Apr.1970; Simmons to MDAC-WD, “Urine Collection and Sampling,” 6 May 1970; Simmons,“TransmittaloftheMinutestotheUrinePoolingDesignReviewatFairchildHilleronMay27,1970,”12June1970.

19. Mclntyre to Bowden and Simmons, “Trip Report, Urine Pooling Zero-G Flight Test Review atFairchild Hiller, August 13, 1970,” 21 Aug. 1970; Fairchild Hiller, “Interim Test Report, No.MS115T0024,”7Aug.1970;Mclntyre toSimmonsandBowden, “TripReport,UrinePoolingBagDevelopmentStatusReview,September3,1970,atMSC,”15Sept.1970.

20.Simmons,“WeeklyNotesforWeekEndingSeptember4,1970”;samefor11,18Sept.1970;SimmonstoKingsbury,“UrinePoolingProblem,”24Sept.1970;BelewtoKleinknecht,“UrineCollection,”28Sept.1970;MclntyretoSimmonsandBowden,“TripReport,UrinePoolingReviewatMDAC-WD,September15–16,1970,”20Sept.1970;BelewtoSchneideretal.,“WeeklyActivityReportforWeekEnding9–15-70,”TWX,16Sept.1970;MelvynSavage,“WeeklyStatusReport[ofSkylabProgramTest Office],” 23 Sept. 1970; Schneider, “Weekly Progress and Problem Summary for theAdministrator,SkylabProgram,”30Sept.1970.

21.Simmons,“WeeklyNotesforWeekEndingOctober9,1970”;Schneider toBelewandKleinknecht,“Urine System Telecon of 10/30/70,” TWX, 3 Nov. 1970; Simmons to Mitchell, “Agreement toProceed with Three Urine Pooling Concepts at October 30, 1970, Teleconference with MessrsSchneider(NASAHeadquarters),Belew(MSFC),andKleinknecht(MSC),”6Nov.1970.

22.Simmons, “WeeklyNotes,”13Nov.1970;Belew toSchneider, “OneBagConcept forOWSUrineCollection,”11 Jan.1971;Wm. J.Huffstetler to actingchief,Proj.SupportDiv., “UrineCollectionMeasuringSystem,”13Jan.1971;SchneidertoBelewandKleinknecht,“UrineSystems,”TWX,15

Jan. 1971; Simmons toMitchell, “Suspension of Contractor Effort on the One-Bag Urine PoolingConcept,”15Jan.1971;SimmonstoMDAC-WD,“UrineCollectionSystemsDevelopment,”22Jan.1971;BelewtoSchneider,“UrineSystemParallelDevelopmentPlanandFinalSelectionCriteria,”5Feb.1971.

23.R.M.MachelltoSimmons,“MinutesofUrineSystemTigerTeamMeeting,March23,1970,”2Apr.1970;E.L.FieldtoReinartz,“UrineCollection,”23Dec.1970.

24.Kleinknecht toBelew, “UrineVolumeMeasurement,TracerTechnique,”27 Jan.1971;Simmons toMDAC-WD,samesubj.,10Feb.1971;Mclntyre,“VisittoFairchildHillerFebruary10,11,and12,1971,” memo for record, n.d.; Simmons, “Note to Mr. Belew,” 13 Apr. 1971; Mclntyre, “Trip toFairchildHilleronMay6and7,1971(MeetingNotes),”memoforrecord,20May1971;FairchildHiller,“InterimReport,LithiumChlorideTracerStudy,”rpt.MSI15T0075,6May1971;Simmons,“WeeklyNotesforWeekEndingApril22,1971.”

25.MSFC, “MSFCSkylabOrbitalWorkshop,”NASATMX-64813,vol. 3, pp.2.2.11.34 to2.2.11.38,2.2.11.56to2.2.11.58.

26.Mclntyre interview; Simmons, “WorkshopWeeklyNotes forWeekEnding 11/21/69”; vonBraun’shandwrittenannotationonBelew’s“Notes”for24Nov.1969.

27.S.R.ReinartztoRees,“DisapprovalofFlyingSkylabFecalCollectoronApollo14,”21Aug.1970;Heimburg to Rees, “Flight Assignment of the Apollo [sic] Fecal Collector (AFC)” [10–14 Aug.1970];Kleinknecht toBelew,“HardwareandScheduleRequirements for theSkylabProgramFecalCollectoronApollo,”18Mar.1970;Kleinknecht toBelew, “Skylab FecalCollectorAssignment toApollo14,”28July1970;J.W.Prim,“SkylabFecalCollectoronApollo14,JustificationforUsage,”memotofile,31July1970;Kleinknechttodep.dir.,MSC,“UseofSkylabTypeFecalCollectoronApollo,”6Aug.1970;Field,“NotetoMr.Belew,Apollo[sic]FecalCollector,”12Aug.1970;C.C.Kraft,Jr.,toKleinknecht,“UseofSkylabTypeFecalCollectoronApollo,”10Aug.1970;Kleinknechttomgr.,Apollo Spacecraft Prog., “Withdrawal of Request toUseSkylab- TypeFecalCollector onApollo,”20Aug.1970;ApolloConfigurationControlBoardDir.APO-214,26Aug.1970.

28.Gilruth to vonBraun, 16Dec. 1968,with encl., “MannedSpacecraftCenter-Marshall SpaceFlightCenterManagementAgreementforAAPMedicalExperimentHardwareItems”;Johnstoninterview.

29.Schneider toThompsonandBelew,“ReviewofAAPMedicalExperiments,”18Feb.1969;OMSF,“Minutes of Medical Experiments Meeting, MSFC, February 25, 1969,” 16 Apr. 1969; Johnstoninterview.

30.E.L.MicheltoHilaryRay,“ExperimentM-171,MetabolicRateAnalyzerDevelopmentPlan,”3Feb.1969,withencl.,“MetabolicRateAnalyzerDevelopmentPlan.”

31.J.E.Bost,“MeetingwithAAPORegardingProcurementofMetabolicAnalyzerforAAPExperimentM171,” memo for record, 8 May 1969; Heimburg, “Notes,” 28 July 1969; Berry to asst. dir. forElectronic Systems, “Request for Engineering and Development Support to Develop a MassSpectrometer forAAPMedicalExperiments,”18Sept.1969;G.G.Armstrong, Jr., tomgr.,OrbitalAssemblyProj.Off.,“TransferofFundsforMedicalExperimentsDevelopment,”7Oct.1969,withencl.,“WorkingAgreementforContractNAS9–9799,MassSpectrometers”;Belew,“Notes,”7July1969.

32.Belew,“Notes,”27Apr.1970;Kleinknecht toBelew,“MetabolicAnalyzer forMedicalExperimentM171,”7May1970.

33.JeffreyT.HamiltontoBelew,“Notes,”24Feb.,13Mar.1970.34.MSC, “Request forEngineeringChangeProposalNo.OTO309,” 28 July 1970;A.D.Catterson to

mgr., Skylab Prog., “Skylab RECP #OTO309 Concerning Hardware for the Ml71 MetabolicAnalyzer,”24Sept.1970;“Minutes,SkylabLevelIIConfigurationControlBoardMeeting29RB,”25Sept.1970.

35. Berry interview; Johnston interview;MSC announcements 70–185, 28 Sept., and 70–193, 16Oct.1970.

36.Heimburg,“Notes,”10May1971;DieterGrau,“Notes,”10May1971.37. Schwinghamer toWeidner, “BiomedWeeklyStatusReports,” 14May, 1, 14, 18 June 1971; anon.,

“Note toMr. Belew, Bio-Med Problems,” 25 June 1971; “BiomedWeekly Status Report,” 9 July1971.

38.Schwinghamer,“BiomedWeeklyStatusReport,”4,12,15,22,28Oct.,30Nov.,14,23Dec.1971;MSC, “MedicalExperimentsStatusReport,October 15, 1971”;K.Natzke, “InterimTestReport—BiomedicalSystemIntegratedTestatMSFC—DVTUExperimentHardware,”2Nov.1971;SimmonstoMDAC-WD,“BiomedicalExperimentDeliveries,”28Dec.1971.

39.KleinknechttoSchneider,“ChangeinControlledMilestonesforMedicalandScienceExperiments,”TWX, 24 Jan. 1972; Schneider to Kleinknecht, same subj., TWX, 3 Feb. 1972; Kleinknecht toSchneider,“ImpactofNotFlyingExperimentMl71,MetabolicAnalyzer,”26Jan.1972;JohnstontoKleinknecht,“HeadquartersRequestforMedicalDirectoratePositionRelativetoEliminationofMl71MetabolicAnalyzerfromtheSkylabProgram,”26Jan.1972.

40.BelewtoSchneider,“EffectofMetabolicAnalyzerLateDelivery,”31Jan.1972;SchneidertoBelewandKleinknecht, “MetabolicAnalyzer ExperimentMl71,MetabolicActivity,” TWX, 7 Feb. 1972;Kraft toRees, 16Feb.1972;MSFC, “BiomedicalHardwareStatus,”12Apr. 1972;O.S.Tyson toSimmons,“M171MetabolicAnalyzer,”flashreport,13Apr.1972.

41.Berry to dir., spacemedicine, “Proposal forGround-BasedMannedChamber Study for the SkylabProgram,”24Mar.1970.

42. J.W.Humphreys, Jr., to assoc. adm. formanned spaceflight, “Ground-BasedSimulation ofSkylabMedical Experiments,” 1 July 1970;Gilruth toDaleD.Myers, 22 Sept. 1970,with encl., “SkylabMedical Experiment Test”; OMSF, “Minutes, Skylab Medical Experiments Chamber StudyPresentation,December2,1970.”

43.JSC,“SkylabMedicalExperimentsAltitudeTest(SMEAT),”NASATMX-58115,pp.2–1to2–5.

44.Ibid.,pp.3–1to3–5,20–5to20–8.45.Ibid.,p.3–27.

46.Ibid.,pp.21–5to21–8,21–19to21–21.47. Ibid., pp. 21–1 to 21–46; Karol J. Bobko interview, 18 Aug. 1975; Bobko, “Skylab Medical

Experiments Altitude Test Crew Observations,” ASME pub. 73-ENAs-30, paper presented at theIntersocietyConferenceonEnvironmentalSystems,SanDiego,16–19July1973.

48.JSC,“SkylabMedicalExperiments,”pp.21–1to21–46.49. R. S. Johnston, “Summary ofM171MetabolicAnalyzer Review,” 24 July 1972; Johnston toHq.,

“SkylabMetabolicAnalyzerDesignReviewTeam,”TWX,25July1972;J.C.Stonesifer tochmn.,BioastronauticsTaskTeam,“RequiredM171HardwareActivities,”14Aug.1972;SchwinghamertoStonesifer, same subj., 19 Aug. 1972; Schwinghamer to Stonesifer, “Damage Assessment, TrainerErgometerLoadModule,”22Aug.1972;WeidnertoJohnston,“BiomedicalHardwareUseinSMEATTest,” 15 Aug. 1972; Johnston to Weidner, same subj., 29 Sept. 1972; Stonesifer to chmn.,BioastronauticsTaskTeam,“ReworkofBiomedFlightHardware,”3Oct.1972;JohnstontoBerry,18Oct. 1972; Schwinghamer to Weidner, “Biomed Weekly Status Report,” 18 Aug.-17 Nov. 1972;Stonesifertochmn.,BioastronauticsTaskTeam,“M171MetabolicAnalyzer,”8Dec.1972.

50.JSC,“SkylabMedicalExperiments,”p.21–19;Mclntyreinterview.51. JSC, “SkylabMedical Experiments,” p. 21–19;Mclntyre interview; Richard H. Truly interview, 4

Sept.1975;CharlesConrad,telephoneinterview,18Mar.1977.

52.Belewtomgr.,SkylabProg.,MSC,“OrbitalWorkshop(OWS)UrineSystemRequirements,”8Sept.1972;BelewtoKleinknecht,samesubj.,TWX,22Sept.1972.

53. Schneider to MSC and MSFC Skylab Prog, mgrs., “Action Items from Skylab Telecon on UrineCollectionSystemonSept.27,1972,”TWX,2Oct.1972;RichardL.Sauertochief,EnvironmentalHealthBr.,“TripReport,”17Oct.1972;BelewtoKleinknecht,“UrineSystemRequirement/DesignChanges,”TWX,18Oct.1972;TrulytoSkylabastronauts,“UrineSystemRedesign(AGiantLeap),”19Oct.1972;Kleinknechttodir.,SkylabProg.,“ActionItemsfromSkylabTeleconferenceonUrineCollectionSystemHeldonSeptember27,1972,”8Nov.1972;SimmonstoMitchell,“ChangeOrderfor4000mlOWSUrineSystem,”24Oct.1972;SchneidertoSkylabProg,mgrs.,MSC,MSFC,andKSC,“MinutesofTeleconRegardingUrineCollectionSystemon10/17/72,”6Nov.1972;SauertoE.S. Harris, “Trip Report,” 21 Nov. 1972; Truly to Skylab Astronauts, “Skylab Urine CollectionSystem,”18Dec.1972.

54. Transcript of SMEAT crew press conference, 26 Sept. 1972; Mclntyre, Truly, Conrad interviews;MSFC,“MSFCSkylab,”vol.3,pp.2.2.11.165to2.2.11.170,2.2.11.147to2.2.11.152.

Chapter91. For a discussion of the purposes of solar research, see Henry J. Smith, “Solar Astronomy,” inAstronomy in Space, NASA SP-127 (Washington, 1967), a collection of papers by several NASAofficials; for AOSO, see House Subcommittee on Space Science and Astronautics, 1966 NASAAuthorization:HearingsonH.R.3730,pt.3,pp.571–77.

2.RichardS.Johnstoninterview,21Oct.1975.3.W.C.Keathley,“ApolloTelescopeMountExperimentsTechnology,”15Apr.1974,p.3;A.R.Morse,

“MSFCSkylabApolloTelescopeMount,”NASATMX-64811,pp.19–1to19–10.

4.RichardTousey,“TheNRLSolarExperiments in theApolloTelescopeMountofSkylab:Historical,Operational,andResults,”preprintofapapertobepublishedin“ReportofNRLProgress,”pp.12,14.

5.WalterFellows,“Notes,”22Aug.1966;MSFCrelease66–295,20Dec.1966;Rein Ise interview,6Nov.1974,telephoneinterview27Feb.1977.

6.Morse,“MSFCSkylab,”pp.5–13to5–19.7.Belew,“Notes,”20Feb.,13Mar.1967;WernerKuers,“Notes,”10Jan.,12Sept.1966;NASArelease

69–4, “NASAUnderwater Tests,” 15 Jan. 1969; Senate,NASAAuthorization forFiscal Year 1970:Hearings on S. 1941, 91/1, pp. 128–29; Russell Schweickart interview, July 1975. A.W. Vogeley,“Docking and Cargo Handling,” presented at the Space Station Technology Symposium, LangleyResearchCtr.,11–13Feb.1969,discussesneutralbuoyancytrainingandfacilities,p.453.

8.Morse,“MFSCSkylab,”p.11–3.9.Ibid.,pp.11–4to11–11.

10.Ibid.,11–9to11–11.11.Ibid.

12.Ibid.,11–11to11–12.13.Ibid.,11–17to11–18.

14.HaroldE.GartrelltoReinIse,“GeneralCommentsonATMDesignPhilosophy,”withencl.,“FlightCrewOperationsDirectorateRequirementsandPhilosophyonATMDisplaysandControls,”3Aug.1967.

15.Gartrell, “Design ReviewWorkingGroup-X forATMControls andDisplays,”with encl., “Notes”[draftofMSCconsolidatedpositiononC&Ddesignphilosophy],2Feb.1968;WilliamP.HortonandGlenn Smith to R. F. Thompson and L. F. Belew, “ATM Control and Display Ad Hoc WorkingGroup,”7Feb.1968;WalterHaeussermann,“Notes,”29Jan.,12,19Feb.,25Mar.,8,15Apr.,13,20May1968;Belew,“Notes,”29Jan.,20May1968.

16.DonaldK.Slaytontomgr.,SkylabProg.,“FlightATMHardwareAnomalies,”12Apr.1972;Tousey,“The NRL Solar Instruments,” p. 8; Cosimo P. Fazio, “Evolution of the Apollo TelescopeMountControl andDisplay Panel,” paper 167,AmericanAstronautical Society, 20th annualmeeting, LosAngeles,20–22Aug.1974.

17.Keathleyetal.,“MinutesofATMPrincipalInvestigators(P.I.)Meeting,”10Apr.1969.

18.WilliamC.SchneidertoBelew,“HCOProposalforAutomatedATMOperation,”7Feb.1969;D.L.Forsythetodir.,AAP,“UnofficialMinutesoftheSeptember3ATMPrincipalInvestigator’sMeeting,”10Sept.1969;Schneidertodep.assoc.adm.forMSF,“UnmannedATMOperations,”19Jan.1970;Keathley,“ATMPrincipalInvestigator(P.I.)MeetingofDecember2andDecember3,1969,”5Jan.1970;E.M.ReevestoLeoGoldberg,“UnmannedOperationforATM,”22July1970;Schneider toctr.Skylabmgrs.,“UnmannedATMExperimentOperationsMeetingofJuly16,1970,”29July1970.

19.GeorgeE.MuellertoGordonNewkirk,Jr.,28Aug.1970.

20.T.C.Winter,Jr.,“PIMeetingatMSFCon2–3December1969,”3Dec.1969,and“DryWorkshopPDR at MSFC on 2–4 December 1969,” 4 Dec. 1969; Reeves to Keathley, “Observing TimeAllocationsforATM,”21Jan.1970.

21.GoetzK.Oerteltoprog,mgr.,ATM,“ATMOperations,”2Oct.1970.

22.Tousey toA. F.White, Jr., 8Oct. 1970;White toTousey, 26Oct. 1970;Tousey, “TheExperimentCoordinatorsMeetingforATMHeldatNationalOceanicandAtmosphericAdministration(NOAA),Boulder,Colorado,on26January1971,”26Jan.1971;V.Scherrer,“ReportonCombinedExperimentCoordinationandPIMeetingatNationalOceanicandAtmosphericAdministration(NOAA),Boulder,Colorado,on26and27January1971,”27Jan.1971;GeorgeL.WithbroetoKeathley,20Aug.1971;Tousey,“TheNRLSolarExperiments,”pp.14–16;Touseyinterview,20Apr.1976.

23.Touseyinterview.

24.Schneidertoassoc.adm.forMSF,“WeeklyProgressandProblemSummaryfortheAdministrator—ApolloApplicationsProgram,”4,10,28Apr.,8,16May,12,26June,25July,11Aug.,22Sept.,18Oct.,14,21,28Nov.1969,2Feb.1970;T.C.Winter,Jr.,“ATMManagementReviewConferenceatMSFC on 22 January 1970,” 22 Jan. 1970; “Weekly Progress and Problem Summary for theAdministrator,SkylabProgram,”2Feb.,13,23Mar.1970.

25.RoyBland,“WeeklyNotes,AA-SVO-3,”18Aug.1970.

26.“WeeklyProgressandProblemSummaryfortheAdministrator,SkylabProgram,”25May,29June,20July,plusoneundated,1970;Bland,“WeeklyNotes,AA-SVO-3,”20Oct.1970.

27.Transcript,NASAbriefingonFY1972budgetrequest,28Jan.1971;OMSF,launchscheduleML-20,13Apr.1971;Bland,“WeeklyNotes,AA-SVO-3,”26Jan.1971.

28.“WeeklyProgressandProblemSummary,”14,27May,17,24June1970.29.MSFC,“SkylabProgram,Mid-TermReview,December2,1971,”p.163.

30.Belew,“Notes,”7Aug.,25Sept.1972.

Chapter10

1.For adiscussionof theunexpectedvalueof theGeminiphotographs to earth scientists, seePaulD.Lowman, Jr., “The Earth from Orbit,” National Geographic Magazine 130 (1966): 645–70 (Nov.1966);andRichardW.Underwood,“GeminiEarthPhotographs,” inGrimwoodandHacker,On theShouldersofTitans, pp.373–409.TwovolumesofGeminiphotographshavebeenpublished:EarthPhotographsfromGeminiHI,IV,andV,NASASP-129(Washington,1967),andEarthPhotographsfromGeminiVIthroughXII,NASASP-171(Washington,1968).

2.HouseSubcommitteeonNASAOversight,EarthResourcesSatelliteSystem:Report,90/2,1968,pp.11–13; George E. Mueller and Homer E. Newell to Robert R. Gilruth, 20 Sept. 1966; HouseSubcommitteeonScienceandApplications,1969NASAAuthorization,HearingsonH.R.15086,90/2,pt.3,pp.430–43.

3. Robert J.Moiloy interview, 18Aug. 1975; Ralph E. Lapp, “SendComputers,NotMen, intoDeepSpaceaftertheMoonLanding,”NewYorkTimesMagazine,2Feb.1969,pp.32–33.

4.J.PembleField,Jr.,interview,10July1975;HouseSubcommitteeonScienceandApplications,1969NASAAuthorization,pp.415–16,421–22,426–43,504,509–10.

5.R.F.Thompson toC.W.Mathews,“MSCAddendumtoMSFC’sPayloadIntegrationContractwithMartin,” TWX, 15 Jan. 1968; Harold E. Gartrell to mgr., Future Missions Proj. Off., “MDAConference/Earth Looking Sensors Integration,” 29Mar. 1968;Wyndell B. Evans to co-chairman,MissionRequirementsPanel,“EarthResourcesWorkingGroup,”27May1968;RobertO.Piland tomgr., AAP Off., “Earth Applications Package for Early AAPMissions,” 4 Apr. 1968; Thompson,“CompatibilityoftheEarthApplicationsInstrumentPackagewiththeAirlockModuleDataSystem,”5June1968;ArthurR.White,“SummaryoftheFirstMeetingofEarthResourcesWorkingGroup,”6June1968;idem,“SummaryofThirdMeetingofEarthResourcesWorkingGroup,”8July1968;idem,“SummaryofMeetingonEarthResourcesDataRequirements,”8July1968.

6.JacobE.SmarttoGeorgeE.Mueller,8May1968.7.T.A.GeorgetoLeonardJaffe,“ReviewofProposedAAPEarthResourcesSurveyMission,”26Mar.

1968.

8. National Research Council, Div. of Engineering,Useful Applications of Earth-Oriented Satellites:SummaryofPanelReports,contractNRS09–112-909(1967).

9.Gilruthtoassoc.adm.,OSSA,“ExperimentProposalforaNewAAPEarthApplicationsMultispectralPhotographic Facility to Replace Experiment SI01,” 2 Oct. 1969; Schneider to MSC and MSFC,“Earth Resource Package Review,” TWX, 14 Oct. 1969; MSF Management Council, “MeetingHighlights,” 15 Oct. 1969; John E. Naugle, “Office of Space Science and Applications EarthObservationsProgramReview,”28Oct. 1969;MorrisTepper to assoc. adm.,OSSA,“EarthSurveyExperimentsfortheFirstSaturnVDryWorkshop,”19Nov.1969.

10.MSFEB,“Minutes,”meeting69–6,8Dec.1969.11.Ibid.;LelandF.BelewandErnstStuhlinger,Skylab:AGuidebook,NASAEP-107,pp.148–57.

12. Schneider to ctr. AAP mgrs., “Guidelines for Interim Activities on EREP,” TWX, 9 Dec. 1969;Schneider to ex. sec, MSFEB, “AAP Presentation to 69–6 MSFEB, Earth Resources ExperimentPackage,” 1 Dec. 1969; Robert O. Piland to Leonard Jaffe, “AAP Earth Resources ExperimentPackage,”19Dec.1969.

13.Naugletoassoc.adm.,OMSF,“EarthObservationsExperimentsforSaturnIWorkshop,”3Feb.1970;DaleD.Myerstodir.,AAP,“ExperimentAssignments,”16Feb.1970;interimConfigurationControlBd.directive024,“AdditionofEarthResourcesExperimentPackagetoApolloApplications,”16Feb.1970;Myerstoassoc.adm.,OSSA,“PlanningforEarthResourcesExperimentPackage(EREP),”19Feb.1970.

14. Schneider to MSC Skylab mgr., “Skylab Earth Resources Experiment Package, ReferenceProcurementPlansforEREP,”2Mar.1970;Schneider toassoc.adm.,OMSF,“ProcurementAction

forSI90MultispectralPhotographyCameras/Lenses,”17Mar.1970;Naugletoassoc.adm.,OMSF,“EarthResourcesExperimentPackage(EREP)forSkylab-A,”4June1970;Myerstoadmin.,23June1970.

15.Schneidertoctr.Skylabmgrs.,“RevisedFundingforEarthResourcesExperimentPackage(EREP),”22June1970;Myerstoadmin.,“EarthResourcesExperimentPackage(EREP)forSkylab-A,”23June1970; “Project Approval Document Change,” Skylab Program, 27 July 1970; Kleinknecht toSchneider,“SkylabExperimentFunding,”13July1970.

16.Schneider toKleinknechtandBelew,“EREPCostsReview,”14Dec.1970;JohnH.Disher,“EREPCosts,”noteforfile,7Dec.1970;SchneidertoMSCandMSFCSkylabmgrs.,“EREPCosts,”11Mar.1971;KleinknechttoSchneider,samesubj.,23Apr.1971;ThomasL.Fischetti,memosforrecord,“S-193 Technical Reviewwith SA,” 12May 1971, and “S-193Review atGeneral Electric,” 12May1971;Schneidertoassoc.adm.,OMSF,“EREPCosts,”4June1971.

17.BelewandStuhlinger,Skylab:AGuidebook,pp.22–23.18.Ibid.,p.27.

19.A.R.Morse,“MSFCSkylabApolloTelescopeMount,”NASATMX-64811,pp.11–17to11–19.20.KleinknechttoBelew,“SkylabAX-IOP/Z-LVProfilesforEREPOperation,”15July1970;Belewto

Kleinknecht, same subj., 3 Aug. 1970; Belew to Schneider, “Local Vertical Control for EarthResourcesExperiments,”3Aug.1970.

21.H.E.Whitacre,“EarthResourcesMissionPlanning,”10July1970.22.EugeneF.Kranz,“EarthObservations,”22Sept.1970.

23.“AnnouncementofFlightOpportunity,”memochange33toNHB8030.1A,22Dec1970;MyerstoGilruth,11Mar.1971;KleinknechtandA. J.Calio todir.ofadm.andprog, support, “SelectionofEREPInvestigators,”14May1971.

24.Schneidertoctr.Skylabmgrs.“Z-LVStudy,”TWX,11June1971;BelewtoSchneider,“FeasibilityofIncreasingEREPMissionTime,” 24Sept. 1971;Kleinknecht to Schneider, “Operational Impact ofIncreasing theNumberofEREPPasses,”15Sept. 1971;CharlesA.Berry toKleinknecht, “ImpactStudyofIncreasedEREPPasses,”24Sept.1971;CaliotoKleinknecht,“EnhancementofEREPDataTakingOpportunities,”1Oct.1971;JohnL.Kaltenbach,“CandidateListofApprovedSkylabEREPProposals,”18Oct.1971.

25.GilruthtoMyers,23Nov.1971;O.GlennSmithtoKleinknecht,“Calio-SmithPresentationofEREPCompatibilityAssessmentResults toC.W.Mathews,December7,1971,”13Dec1971;J.P.Field,Jr.,toSchneider,“MSCManagementofEREPPi’s,”17Dec.1971;JohnM.DeNoyertoassoc.adm.,OA, “EREP Investigations,” 4 Jan. 1972; NASA release 72–150, “Skylab Earth ResourceInvestigatorsSelected,”3Aug.1972.

26.KleinknechttoBelew,“Controlled,RepeatingOrbitforSkylab,”11Jan.1972;BelewtoKleinknecht,samesubj.,19Jan.1972;MSCinternalnote72-FM-143,“SkylabReferenceTrajectory,”7June1972.

27.Schneider toassoc.adm.,OA,“FlightPlanningforEREPPasses,”31Aug.1972;Mathews toJSC,“EarthResourcesExperimentPackage(EREP),”TWX,8May1973.

28.BillBollendonckinterview,20Aug.1975.

29. Schneider to dep. assoc. adm., OSSA (Applications), “Escalation of EREPCost Runout,” 22Nov.1971;Bollendonckinterview.

30. Schneider to dep. assoc. adm., OSSA (Applications), “Escalation of EREPCost Runout,” 22Nov.1971;Mathewstoassoc.adm.,OMSF,“SkylabLaunchSchedule,”7Feb.1972.

31.KSC,“Skylab1,Post-LaunchReport,”8June1973,pp.2–37to2–41.32.Interviews:KenTimmons,20Aug.1975;HenryB.Floyd,5Nov.1974;WilliamC.Schneider,22July

1975.

33.MSFC,“SkylabStudentProjectSummaryDescription,”Mar.1973;Floydinterview;HenryB.Floyd,“Introduction to the Session on Skylab Student Science,” 20th Annual Meeting of the AmericanAstronauticalSociety,LosAngeles,20–22Aug.1974.

34.Floydinterview.

35.MSFC,“SkylabStudentProjectSummaryDescription.”36.Ibid.;Floydinterview;LeeSummerlin,“TheSkylabStudentProject:AScienceEducator’sAppraisal,”

andJeanneLeventhal,“TheSkylabStudentScienceProgramfromaStudentInvestigator’sPointofView,”20thAnnualAASMeeting,LosAngeles,20–22Aug.1974.

Chapter111.L.F.BelewtoW.C.Schneider,“In-Housevs.ContractorFurnishedItemsAssociatedwiththeSaturn

VDryWorkshop,”26Sept.1969;HarryH.GormantoGeorgeMueller,“AAPMakeorBuyItems,”TWX,31Oct.1969.

2.HouseCommitteeonScienceandAstronautics,1971NASAAuthorization,91/2,1:364–65;JohnH.Disherinterview,16July1975;CalebB.Hurttinterview,19Aug.1975.

3.Hurttinterview.

4.MSFC,“MSFCSkylabProgramEngineeringandIntegration,”NASATMX-64808,pp.III-lto111–10.

5.Ibid.

6.Ibid.7.Ibid.,p.111–38.

8.MSFC,“MSFCSkylabAirlockModule,”NASATMX-64810,vol.2,pp.2.1–3to2.1–10,2.2–4.9.MSFC,“MSFCSkylabMultipleDockingAdapter,”NASATMX-64812,pp.2–1to2–17,2–314.

10.MSFC,“SkylabProgramEngineering,”pp.111–10to111–20;MSFC,“SkylabAirlock,”vol.2,app.J,pp.38–41.

11.RonaldE.Jewell,“SkylabVibroacousticTestProgram,”20thAnnualAASMeeting,paperAAS74–106.

12. Ibid.; Wade Dorland interview, 19 Aug. 1976; MSFC, “MSFC Skylab Apollo Telescope Mount,”NASATMX-64811,pp.6–36to6–37.

13.MSFC,“SkylabAirlock,”vol.2,pp.2.13–1to2.13–25;MSFC,“SkylabMultipleDockingAdapter,”vol.1,pp.2–101to2–108.

14.MSFCSkylabProg.Off.,“Mid-TermReviewReport,IVB,TechnicalContent,”22Dec.1971.15.Belew,“Notes,”10Oct.1972.424

16.HarryMannheimertodir.,SkylabProg.,15July1971.17.Belew,“OrbitalWorkshopTaskTeam,”11Aug.1971;MSFCcharter88–1,“OrbitalWorkshopTask

Team” [Aug.1971];WilliamK.Simmons, Jr., interview,30Oct. 1974;WalterBurke interview,27Aug.1975;FredSandersinterview,28Aug.1975.

18.SimmonstoBelew,“ProgramReport,”20Aug.1971;RichardH.Trulyinterview,4Sept.1975.19.SimmonstoBelew,“ProgramReport,”20Aug.1971;Burke,Simmonsinterviews.

20.SimmonstoBelew,“OrbitalWorkshop(OWS)TaskTeamProgressReports,”30Aug.-16Dec.1971;RichardTrulytoAlanBean,“OWSTigertale#27,”24Mar.1972.

21. Eberhard Rees to Walter Burke, 14 Oct. 1971; Simmons, “Skylab Mid-Term Review, WorkshopProjectProblemSummary,”and“SkylabMid-TermReview,WorkshopProjectScheduleStatus”[Dec.1971].

22.SimmonstoBelew,“OWSTaskTeamProgressReports,”weekly,2Mar.-2June1972;“OWSStatus,”weeklyreports,16Mar.-2June1972.

23.SimmonstoBelew,“OWSTaskTeamProgressReport,”10Aug.1972;O.S.Tyson,“CompletionofAll Systems Test for OWS-1,” flash report, 10Aug. 1972; Simmons to Belew, “OWSTask TeamProgress Reports,” 18, 25, 31 Aug. 1972; MSFC Skylab Prog. Off., “Weekly Activity Report toHeadquarters,”12Sept.1972.

24.WilliamA.Fleming,“Decisions,ActionItems,andOpenIssuesResultingfromOctober18MeetingwithDr.LowonOrbitalDebris,”memoforrecord,26Oct.1972.

25.DaleD.Myerstoadmin.,“SkylabProgram,DeorbitofS-IVB,”28Nov.1972.26. William A. Fleming, “Orbital Debris Overview,” briefing documents, 30 Nov. 1972; William C.

SchneidertoMSFCandMSCSkylabprog,mgrs.,TWX,20Dec.1972.

27.M.L.Raines (dir., Safety,Reliability, andQualityAssurance,MSC) tomgr., Skylab prog. (MSC),“DeorbitingtheSWSwiththeSL-4CSM/SPS,”15Feb.1973.

28.SchneidertoMSFCandMSCSkylabprog,mgrs.,“OWSDeorbit,”TWX,30Mar.1973;L.F.BelewtoSchneider,“SaturnWorkshopDeorbit,”5Apr.1973;Schneidertoctr.prog,mgrs.,“SWSDeorbitTelecon,”17Apr.1973;F.C.Littleton(MSC),“SkylabOWSDeorbitMissionTechniquesReview,”18,26Apr.,14May1973;Schneidertoctr.prog,mgrs.,“SWSDeorbit,”13July1973.

Chapter121.JonesW.RoachandEugeneF.Kranz,“ManagementandControlofSkylabMissions,”presentedtothe

AmericanAstronauticalSociety20thAnnualMeeting,LosAngeles,2022Aug.1974,p.2.

2.Belew,“WeeklyNotes,”24Oct.1966,andSpeer,27Mar.1967.3.Speer,“WeeklyNotes,”12June,10July,27Nov.1967,9Dec.1968.

4.ThompsontoBelew,“MSC’sEngineeringRequirementsforMissionOperations,”25Feb.1969.5.Speer,“WeeklyNotes,”30June1969;Reinartz,“AAPFlightOperationsPresentationOutline,”14Apr.

1969.

6.SchneidertoMueller,“WeeklyProgressReport—AAP,”1Oct.1969.7. Eugene Kranz interview, 19 Aug. 1976; Roach and Kranz, “Management and Control of Skylab

Missions,”pp.18–19.

8. Kranz to Lynwood Dunseith, chief, Flight Support Div., “Operations/Facility Concepts for ApolloApplications Program (AAP),” 19 Aug. 1969, pp. 1–3; JSC, “Minutes of the 28th Skylab FlightOperationsPlan(FOP)Meeting,”16July1970;Kranzinterview,19Aug.1976.

9.Kranz,“AdvancedPlanningTasks,”20Nov.1969;“AdvancedPlanningIssues#3—AAP,Subj:‘KeyMissionIssues,’”inEugeneKranz’spapers.

10.Kranzinterview,19Aug.1976;RoachandKranz,“ManagementandControlofSkylabMissions,”pp.1–2.

11.LelandF.BelewandErnstStuhlinger,Skylab:AGuidebook,NASAEP-107,n.d.,pp.99–101.

12.Kranzinterview,19Aug.1976;RoachandKranz,“ManagementandControlofSkylabMissions,”pp.10–11.

13.W.M.AndersonandT.W.Holloway,“SkylabFlightPlanDevelopment,”pp.3–4;ThomasHollowayinterview,8July1977.

14.H.F.Kurtz,Jr.,W.G.Clarke,andM.Naumcheff,“MSFCEngineeringSupporttoSkylabOperations:SupportSummary,”NASATMX-64845,June1974,pp.7–11.

15.NASA,SkylabNewsReference,Mar.1973,pp.VI-9throughVI-14.16.Ibid.,p.VI-8.

17.“MinutesofMSFCCenterStaff&BoardMeeting,”10Nov.1969.18.TranscriptionofnotesmadebyHomerNewellatmeetingwithscientist-astronauts,Houston,12Jan.

1971;HomerNewellinterview,2Mar.1976.

19.TranscriptionofnotesbyNewell,12Jan.1971.20.GilruthtoMyers,29June1971.

21.MyerstoLow,“AstronautSelectionforSkylab,”6July1971;NewelltoFletcher,“RecommendationsStemmingfromAssociateAdministrator’sDiscussionswithScientist-Astronauts,”21July1971.

22.HouseCommitteeonScienceandTechnology,94/1,AstronautsandCosmonauts:BiographicalandStatisticalData,June1975,passim.

23.Schneider, “SkylabLessonsLearned asApplicable to aLargeSpaceStation,”NASATMX73073,editorialdraft,Jan.1976,pp.29–30.

24.TouseytoRobertThompson,4Feb.1970.

25.SchneidertoMyers,“SkylabWeeklyProgressReport,”15June1970.26.SchneidertoMyers,“SkylabWeeklyProgressReport,”26Oct.1970;TouseytoSlayton,26Oct.1970;

Slayton,“SolarPhysicsCourseDescriptionandSchedule,”9Oct.1970.

27.JerryCarrinterview,5Aug.1975.28.RobertKohler,“SkylabMissionTrainingProgram:Mission2,3,and4,”June1971,pp.1–23;William

Stockinginterview,19Aug.1975.

29.Kohler,“SkylabMissionTrainingProgram,”pp.5–13.30.JohnVonBockel,“SkylabFlightCrewTrainingExperienceReport,”n.d.,pp.3–4.

31.Ibid.,pp.5–6;Kohler,“SkylabMissionTrainingProgram,”pp.19–20.32.NASA,SkylabNewsReference,Mar.1973,pp.VII-3,VII-4; JSC,“SkylabCrewPressConference;

Session1,”19Jan.1972,pp.3–4.

33.Brzezinski,“CrewTrainingSummaries,”NASA,SkylabNewsReference,p.VII-1;JSC,“SkylabCrewPressConference:Session1,”19Jan.1972,pp.3–4;VonBockel,“SkylabFlightCrewTraining,”pp.4–5.

34.AndersonandHolloway,“SkylabFlightPlanDevelopment,”pp.13–15.

35.VonBockel,“SkylabFlightCrewTraining,”p.7.36. John Von Bockel interview, 8 July 1977; Roach and Kranz, “Management and Control of Skylab

Missions,”p.4.

Chapter13

1.CharlesD.BensonandWilliamBarnabyFaherty,Moonport:AHistoryofApolloLaunchFacilitiesandOperations,NASASP-4204(Washington,1978),chaps.10,17.

2.Mueller tovonBraun,13Aug.1968;Mueller toDebus,14Aug.1968;KSC,“ApolloApplicationsProgram:Concept forMaintenance of Saturn IBCapability,” presented toHq.ApolloApplicationsOff.,Oct.1968;weeklyreport,AAPOff.toassoc.adm.forOMSF,13Sept.1968;MorgantoDir.ofExecutiveStaff,3Feb.1969;vonBrauntoMueller,2Oct.1968.

3.BensonandFaherty,Moonport,pp.21–28,196–203.

4.OMSF,AAPlaunchanddeliveryschedules,ML-13A,5Mar.,ML-14A,4June1968;interviewwithRobertHock,9Nov.1976;ChryslerCorp.SpaceDiv.,“StudyReportLaunchofSaturnIB/CSMfromLaunchComplex39,”CCSD-TR-FO-800–8,15Apr.1970.p.v;BensonandFaherty,Moonport,pp.271–94.

5.BensonandFaherty,Moonport,pp.264,279–84.

6. JamesD.Phillips toR.H.Curtin,26Jan.1972;BoeingCo.,“UtilizationofLaunchComplex39 toLaunchSaturnIB/CSM,”14Feb.1969,pp.48–69,234–37;idem,“UtilizationofLaunchComplex39…, Executive Summary Report,” 7 May 1969; KSC Skylab Prog. Off., “Skylab Saturn IB/CSMLaunchesfromLC-39,”presentedtoKSCManagementCouncil23Apr.1970,p.3.

7.Morgan to Roy Godfrey, “Utilization of Launch Complex 39 for AAP,” 27 Feb. 1970;Morgan toKleinknecht,samesubj.,13Mar.1970;MorgantoKSCdirectorates,“AAPSaturnIB/CSMLaunchesfromLC-39,”27Feb.1970;WilliamstoMorgan,samesubj.,10Apr.1970.

8.KapryantoMorgan,“SkylabSaturnIB/CSMLaunchesfromLC-39,”10Apr.1970;ClarktoMorgan,samesubj.,14Apr.1970.

9. Godfrey toMorgan, “Utilization of Launch Complex 39 for Skylab/Saturn IB Launches,” 15 Apr.1970.

10.KleinknechttoMorgan,4Apr.1970.11.KSCSkylabOff., “SkylabSaturn IB/CSMLaunches fromLC-39,” 23Apr. 1970;T. F.Goldcamp,

memoforrecord,31Mar.1970;Goldcamp,“SkylabSaturnIB/CSMLaunchesfromLC-39:MinutesofMeetingHeldatKSCon23Apr.1970,”memoforrecord,19May1970.

12. Godfrey toMorgan, “Utilization of Launch Complex 39 for Skylab/Saturn IB Launches,” 27Apr.1970.

13.Goldcamp,“SkylabSaturnIB/CSMLaunchesfromLC-39:MinutesofExecutiveMeetingof27Apr.1970,”memoforrecord,19May1970.

14. Schneider to Myers, “Skylab Program Office Weekly Report,” 8 May 1970; KSC Skylab Off.,“WeeklyProgressReport,”13May1970;LowtoMyers,14May1970;LowtoAnderson,15May1970;SchneidertoMorgan,“SafetyAspectsofLaunchofSaturnIBsfromLaunchComplex39,”19June1970;MorgantoSchneider,samesubj.,9Sept.1970.

15. Schneider to Myers, “Unmanned Saturn IB Mission,” 3 Dec. 1970; OMSF, “Minutes of SkylabManagersMeeting,9–10Nov.1970”;ReestoMyers,1Dec.1970.

16.JamesD.Phillips,“SkylabFacilitiesModificationsatKSC,”pp.7–9.17.H.D.Lowrey,pres.,ChryslerCorp.,toMorgan,“LC-39SaturnIBLaunchPedestal-Tower,”16June

1970;MorgantoLowrey,samesubj.,25June1970;BuchanantoMorgan,“ChryslerProposalforLC-39SaturnIBLaunchPedestal-Tower,”18June1970;PhillipstoCurtin,“SaturnIBPedestal,”28June1972.

18.PhillipstoCurtin,“SaturnIBPedestal”;interviewswithGeorgeWalter19Nov.1976,withWalterandWilliamToisón12Jan.1977.

19.KSCdir.ofadmin, toSBAcenter rep.,“ApprovalofContractingOfficerActionforRecommended

Set-Aside,” 25Nov. 1970;KSC, “SkylabWeekly ProgressReport,” 9Dec. 1970;R.B.Krause toMorgan,“LUTPedestalContract,”22Dec.1970;Krause,“WeeklyNotes,”29Dec.1970,26Jan.,2Feb.,20Apr.,4May1971;WilliamLohseinterview,10Nov.1976.

20. Robert Hock interview, 9 Nov. 1976; KSC AAP Off., “Status Report,” 5 Dec. 1969; OMSF,“HighlightsfromMannedSpaceFlightManagementCouncil,”5Dec.1969.

21.InterviewswithRobertRaffaelliandWillardHalcomb10Nov.1976;withCharlesMars12Jan.1977;telephoneinterviewwithGeorgePage16Dec.1976;JohnLeeds,Jr.,“MinutesoftheSept.23,1970KSCApollo-SkylabProgramReview.”

22.MorgantoBelew,“SL-1LaunchPadDwellTime,”23July1970;Leeds,“MinutesoftheDec.1,1970,KSCApollo-SkylabProgramReview”;telephoneinterviewwithGeorgePage16Dec.1976.

23. RobertMoser, “Skylab Checkout and Launch Operations at KSC,” pp. 1–3; KSC, “Skylab 7&2ProcessingStudy,”25Aug.1971.

24.Moser,“SkylabCheckout,”pp.4–6;MSFC,SaturnIBLaunchVehicleFlightEvaluationReport—SA-206,Skylab2,MPR-SAT-FE-73–3,23July1973.

25.Phillips,“SkylabFacilitiesModifications,”pp.7,12;KSC,“LaunchPadAccess,OrbitalWorkshop,”presentation materials, 12 Nov. 1970; KSC, AAP Off., “Status Report,” 5 Dec. 1969; OMSF,“HighlightsfromMSFManagementCouncil,”5Dec.1969.

26. Interviewswith Brad Downs and Enice Hubble 5 Jan. 1977, withWilliamMahoney 5 Jan. 1977;Leeds, “Minutes ofDec. 1, 1970KSCApollo-Skylab ProgramReview”; Phillips, “Skylab FacilityModifications,” p. 4;Kapryan toMorgan, “EnvironmentalEnclosure onServiceArm#8,” 14May1971;MarkeytoHalcomb,“ServiceArm#8Modifications,”9June1971.

27. T. F. Goldcamp, “Skylab Saturn IB/CSM Launches from LC-39, Minutes of 23 Apr. 1970presentation,”memoforrecord,19May1970.

28.Phillips,“SkylabFacilitiesModifications,”p.14.29.KapryantoMorgan,“SkylabLaunchVehicleAccess,”14Oct.1970;P.J.Markey,“ExternalVehicle

AccessRequirementsforSL-1,”memoforrecord,2Nov.1970;R.B.KrausetoHock,“ModificationsofMSSPlatform#1forSL-3andSL-4,”briefingnote,29Dec.1970.

30.Phillips,“SkylabFacilitiesModificationsatKSC,”pp.10,13–14,17.31.Ibid.,pp.3–6;KSC,“CleanRoomunderConstructionforSkylab,”n.d.,inprogramofficenotes;KSC,

SpaceportNews, “2SkylabCleanRoomsunderConstructionHere,”30Dec.1971;RoyMcGowaninterview,25Jan.1977.

32.KSC,“DTS4-WeekCompositeSchedule,”Dec.1971;RobertKrause,“WeeklyNotes,”1971;KSC,SpaceportNews,“SkylabPedestalWorkCompletionSetinAugust,”1July1971.

33. KSC, “DTS 4-WeekComposite Schedule,” 1971;Krause, “WeeklyNotes,” 1971;KSC, SpaceportNews,“2SkylabCleanRoomsunderConstructionHere,”30Dec.1971.

34.ReedBarnett,“SkylabExperimentsProcessingatKSC,”p.6;KSCprog.dir.8030.1/AA,“KSCPolicyfortheImplementationofSkylabExperimentsRequirements,”20Mar.1972,pp.A-3-A-5,A-7,A-8,att.C-E.

35.Barnett,“SkylabExperiments,”pp.6–7.

36.KPD8030.1/AA,“KSCImplementationofSkylabExperiments,”pp.A-8,A-9.37.Ibid.,p.A-6;Barnett,“SkylabExperiments,”p.5;EdJohnsoninterview,14Jan.1977.

38.InterviewswithRobertRaffaelli29Dec.1970andwithCharlesMars12Jan.1977.39.RoyBland,“NotesonATPOPMeeting,Dec.14–15,1970,”inSVOreadingfile1970,KSCArchives.

40.Bland,“NotesonATPOPMeeting”;Bland,“BackgroundMaterialfortheATMPre-FlightOperationsProcedures,”memoforrecord,31Dec.1970,inSVO-3readingfile1970.

41.InterviewswithRaffaelliandHalcomb10Nov.1976andwithMars12Jan.1977.42.KSCLaunchOps.Dir.,“MinutesoftheLaunchOperationsCommittee,Apollo/Skylab,”3Aug.1972;

R.E.Moser, “SkylabCheckout andLaunchOperations atKSC,” p. 5;KSC, “SkylabDailyStatusReport,” 20, 31 July 1972;MSFC, “Saturn IBLaunchVehicle Flight EvaluationReport—SA-206,Skylab2.”

43.KSCLaunchOps.Dir., “MinutesofLaunchOperationsCommittee,”21Sept. 1972;KSC, “SkylabDailyStatusReport,”26July-4Aug.1972;Moser,“SkylabCheckout,”pp.2–3,5;LelandF.BelewandErnstStuhlinger,Skylab:AGuidebook,NASAEP-107,n.d.,pp.55–57.

44.NASA,NASA InvestigationBoardReport on the Initial Flight Anomalies of Skylab 1, onMay 14,1973,13July1973,pp.4-1–4-3;Barnett,“SkylabExperimentsProcessing,”p.9;KSC,“DTS4-WeekCompositeSchedule,”2Oct.1972.

45.NASA,NASAInvestigationBoardReport,pp.5-7–5-12;telephoneinterviewwithJohnHeard,26Jan.1977.

46.KSCLaunchOps.Dir.,“MinutesoftheLaunchOperationsCommittee,Apollo/Skylab,”26Oct.1972.

47. KSC, “DTS 4-Week Composite Schedule,” Oct.-Dec. 1972; Barnett, “Skylab ExperimentsProcessing,”p.9;Moser,“SkylabCheckout,”pp.2–6.

48. KSC, “DTS 4-Week Composite Schedule,” Oct. 1972-Jan. 1973; KSC, “Minutes of the LaunchOperationsCommittee,”26Oct.1972,18Jan.1973.

49.KenTimmonsinterview,20Aug.1975.50.RobertJohnsontoKSCchiefofEngineeringDiv.,“ExperimentIntegrationProblemsEncounteredin

PastPrograms,”14Aug.1975.

51. Schneider to ctr. prog, mgrs., “Launch Complex 39 Delta DCR and Integrated SWS and LaunchVehicleGSE/ESEDCR—ActionItems,”30Jan.1973;Schneider,“SkylabLaunchComplex39andMSFCIntegratedSWSGSE/ESEDesignCertificationReviews—Agenda,”17Jan.1973;SchneidertoMyers,“BackgroundSummaryInformationforKSCLC-39DCRandMSFCIntegratedGSE/ESEDCR,”15Jan.1973;MyerstoFletcher,“SkylabDesignCertificationReviews,”12Feb.1973.

52. KSC, Launch Ops. Dir., “Skylab Daily Status Report,” 2–31 Jan. 1973; Schneider to prog, offs.,“SkylabPlanning,”22Jan.1973;MyerstoFletcher,“ReschedulingofSkylabIWorkshopLaunch,”24Jan.1973;SpaceBusinessDaily,22Jan.1973.

53.KSC,“SkylabDailyStatusReport,”Feb.-Mar.1973;KSC,SpaceportNews,22Feb.,8,22Mar.1973;NASA,AstronauticsandAeronautics,1973,p.104.

54.KSC,“SkylabDailyStatusReport,”1–17Apr.1973;Moser,“SkylabCheckout,”p.4.

55.KSC, “SkylabDailyStatusReport,”17Apr.-3May1973;Moser, “SkylabCheckout,”pp.4, 7–10;KSC,SpaceportNews,19Apr.,3May1973.

56.KSC,“SkylabDailyStatusReport,”3–16May1973;Moser,“SkylabCheckout,”p.10.

Chapter141.NASA,NASAInvestigationBoardReportontheInitialFlightAnomaliesofSkylab1onMay14,1973,

table II-4; OMSF, Skylab Mission Operation Report, M-960–73, pp. 8–11; MSFC, “A NarrativeAccount of the Role Played by the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center in the Skylab 1 & 2

Emergency Operations, May 14-June22, 1973,” 24 June 1973, p. 3; John Noble Wilford, “SpaceStationinOrbit,butMalfunctionPerilsAstronautLaunchToday,”NewYorkTimes,15May1973,p.1;ThomasO’Toole,“SkylabCrewLaunchPutOffbyPowerLoss,”WashingtonPost,15May1973,p.1;WilliamSchneiderandWilliamGreen,Jr.,“SavingSkylab,”TechnologyReview,Jan.1974,pp.43–45.

2.SchneiderandGreen,“SavingSkylab,”p.45;O’Toole,“SkylabCrewLaunch,”p.1;Wilford,“SpaceStation in Orbit,” p. 1; SkylabI Postlaunch Briefing, 5/14/73 CST 13:45, p. 3A/3; Skylab PressConference,5/14/73CDT21:30,p.5D/1.

3. Leland F. Belew and Ernst Stuhlinger, Skylab: A Guidebook, NASA EP-107, n.d., pp. 107–11;Schneider and Green, “Saving Skylab,” p. 45; NASA, Skylab: News Reference, pp. 11–4011-44;MSFC,MSFCSkylabElectricalPowerSystemsMissionEvaluation,NASATMX-64818,June1974,p.177.

4.MSFC, “NarrativeAccount,” pp. 6–8;Schneider andGreen, “SavingSkylab,” p. 45;NASA,NASAInvestigationBoardReport,p.4–3;BelewandStuhlinger,Skylab:AGuidebook,pp.63,98–99.

5.SkylabIpressconference,15May1973,CST8:20a.m.,p.6A/3;MSFC,“NarrativeAccount,”pp.4–9;SkylabOps.Dir.,“SkylabStatusReviews—May14/15,1973.”

6. Skylab press conferences, 5/14/73,CDT21:10, p. 5B/2, p. 5D/1; 15May 1973,CDT8:20 a.m., p.6B/2.

7.SkylabOps.Dir.,“SkylabStatusReviews—14/15May1973”;SchneiderandGreen,“SavingSkylab,”p.45.

8.MSFC,“NarrativeAccount,”pp.2,16,33–37,45–47;JamesSplawninterview,June1973.9.MSFC,MSFCSkylabOperationsSupportSummary,NASATMX-64845,June1974,pp.4–5,8,17–

20; H. F. Kurtz, Jr., W. G. Clarke, and M. Maumcheff, “MFSC Engineering Support to SkylabOperations,”pp.5–12;MiltonClarkeinterview,16Apr.1976.

10.JSCFlightControlDiv.,“SkylabFlightWorkItemsor11DaysinMay,”May1973,onmicroficheinFlightOps.Off.

11.MSFC,“NarrativeAccount,”pp.31–35,88–91;JonesRoachandEugeneKranz,“ManagementandControlofSkylabMissions,”p.16.

12.Skylabstatusbriefing,15May1973,14:10CST,pp.7A/2–7B/1;JohnN.Wilford,“SkylabShortofPower,Overheating;FurtherDelayforAstronautsFeared,”NewYorkTimes,16May1973,p.1;JSCFlightDirector’sLog,Maroonhandover,day135(15May1973);JSCGuidanceSec.Log,days136–138;SkylabOps.Dir.,“Minutes toSkylabTeleconStatusMeeting—18May1973”; JSCchangeofshiftbriefings,16May,8:20p.m.CDT,p.11A/1;18May,9:00a.m.CDT,p.14A/1;21May1973,4:30p.m.CDT,p.19A/2.

13.W.B.Chubbetal.,“FlightPerformanceofSkylabAttitudeandPointingControlSystem,”AIAApaper74–900, pp. 4–8;MSFC,MSFC Skylab Attitude and Pointing Control SystemMission Evaluation,NASATMX-64817,pp.41–52;BelewandStuhlinger,Skylab:AGuidebook,pp.91–93;Skylabpressconference,14May1973,21:10CST,p.5B/2.

14.MSFC,MSFCSkylabAttitude, p. 52;NASA, SkylabNewsReference, p. 11–61; SkylabOps. Dir.,“SkylabPlanningMeeting—17May1973”; idem, “Minutes toSkylabTeleconStatusMeeting—18May1973”;JSC,“GuidanceandNavigationConsoleLogbook—Skylab1/2TACSUsage.”

15.JSCchangeofshiftbriefings,18May,5:20p.m.CDT,p.15A/1;20May,5:00p.m.CDT,pp.17A/2–17B/1;21May,9:15a.m.CDT,p.18A/1;21May,4:30p.m.,CDT,passim;22May,5:22p.m.CDT,p.21A/1;23May1973,5:09p.m.CDT,p.23A/1;JSCFlightControlDiv.,“SkylabFlightWork,”n.22.

16.MSFC,MSFCSkylabElectricalPower,pp.175–79;JSCchangeofshiftbriefing,24May1973,5:24p.m.CDT,p.25E/2;JSCFlightControlDiv.,“SkylabFlightWork.”

17.MSFC,Skylab7statusreport,16May1973,4:20p.m.CDT,pp.10B/1,10D/3;JSCchangeofshiftbriefing, 22May 1973, 5:22 p.m.CDT, pp. 21C/2–21E/1; JSCFlightControlDiv., “Skylab FlightWork.”

18.MSFC,“NarrativeAccount,”pp.13–14;MSFC,Skylab1statusreport,16May1973,4:20p.m.CDT,p.10B/1;JSCchangeofshiftbriefing,23May1973,5:09p.m.CDT,p.23A/1.

19.SkylabOps. dir., “Skylab status reviews—14/15May1973”; JSCchangeof shift briefing, 15May1973,8:50p.m.CDT,p.8A.

20.MSFC,“NarrativeAccount,”pp.24–28,73–76;JSCchangeofshiftbriefing,19May1973,9:45a.m.CDT,pp.16A-1,16A-2.

21.InterviewswithDaleMyers28JuneandBobSchwinghamer12June1973;JSCFlightControlDiv.,“SkylabFlightWork.”

22.MSFC,“NarrativeAccount,”pp.49–54;MaximeFagetinterview,June1973;CaldwellJohnsonandWilliamW.Petyniainterview,June1973.

23.JSCFlightControlDiv,“SkylabFlightWork,”n.2.

24.JohnsonandPetyniainterview;Skylabstatusbriefing,17May1973,12:30p.m.CDT,p.13A/2.25.JohnsonandPetyniainterview;SkylabOps.Dir.,“MinutesofSkylabProgramPlanningMeeting—16

May1973.”

26.MSFC,“NarrativeAccount,”pp.53–54,57;RussellSchweickartinterview,8July1975.27.MSFC,“NarrativeAccount,”p.54;Schweickartinterview.

28.JackKinzlerinterview,June1973.29.Ibid.

30.JohnsonandPetyniainterview;Dir.,SkylabOps,“MinutesofSkylabStatusTeleconMeeting—19and21May1973,”memoforrecord;JSCFit.ControlDiv,“SkylabFlightWork.”

31.MSFC,“NarrativeAccount,”pp.49–70;Schweickartinterview.

32.Kinzlerinterview.33.Kinzlerinterview;DonaldArabianinterview,June1973.

34. Robert Schwinghamer interview, June 1973, for the quotation; Aleck Bond interview, June 1973;GeorgeLow,“TheEffectofUVRadiationonNylon,”memoforrecord,29May1973;SkylabOps.Dir., “Minutes of Skylab Status TeleconMeeting—19May 1973”; Stephen Jacobs and Thomas J.Ballentine, Skylab Parasol Material Evaluation, NASATM X-58161, Apr. 1975; Schneider andGreen,“SavingSkylab,”p.48.

35. Schwinghamer interview; Skylab Ops. Dir., “Minutes of Skylab Telecon StatusMeeting—19May1973”;idem,“MinutesofSkylabTeleconStatusMeeting—22May1973”;Low,“EffectofUV.”

36.Schneider,“SkylabDesignCertificationReviewofNeworChangedEquipmentandProcedures forRevisedSL-l/SL-2Mission,”20June1973.

37. InterviewswithAleckBond,DonaldArabian,Caldwell Johnson andWilliamPetynia, andGordonHarris,allJune1973;NASA,“MinutesofSL-2Launch-1DayMeeting,”24May1973,10:00a.m.;SL-2 prelaunch press conference, 24 May 1973, 1:00 p.m. CDT, p. 1A/2; NASA, “Minutes ofManagementCouncilMeetingtoSelectHeatShield,”24May1973,4:00p.m.,KSC;Low,“EffectofUV.”

38.ArabianandKinzlerinterviews;SL-IIstatusbriefing,25May1973,9:00a.m.CDT,p.2–1.39.SchneiderandGreen,“SavingSkylab,”p.48;SL-2prelaunchpressconference,24May1973,1:00

p.m.CDT,p.1A/1.

40.MSFC,“NarrativeAccount,”pp.70–73.

41.Ibid.;JamesSplawninterview,June1973;Schneider,“SkylabDesignCertificationReview.”42.“SL-IIStatusBriefing,”25May1973,9:00a.m.CDT,pp.2-1-2-2.

43.“Skylab2MissionCommentaryTranscript,”25May1973,pp.38/2–41/3.44.Ibid,pp.43/1–49/5;SchneiderandGreen,“SavingSkylab,”pp.49–50.

45. “Mission Commentary Transcript,” 25 May 1973, pp. 50/1–55/4; Schneider and Green, “SavingSkylab,”pp.49–50;CharlesConradinterview,18Aug.1975.

46.“MissionCommentaryTranscript,”25May1973,pp.55/4–60/1;NASA,“SL-IIPostDockingPressConference,”25May1973,11:38p.m.CDT,pp.PC3B/1,PC-sC/l.

47.“MissionCommentaryTranscript,”26May1973,pp.80/1–112/1;NASA,“SL-IIPost-DockingPressConference,”25May1973,11:38p.m.CDT,pp.1–2.

48. “ChangeofShiftBriefings,”27May,9:50p.m.CDT,pp.5B/1–5B/3;28May,6:47p.m.CDT,pp.6E/1–6F/1;29May1973,8:01p.m.CDT,pp.7A/1–7B/2;JoeKerwininterview,8Aug.1975.

49.“ChangeofShiftBriefing,”30May1973,10:07p.m.CDT,pp.lOA/l-lOC/1;Schneider,“ManagementCouncilTelecon,31May1973.”

50.DavidC.Schultz,RobertR.Kain,andR.ScottMillican,“SkylabExtravehicularActivity,”AmericanAstronautical Society 74–120, presented at 20thAnnualMeeting, LosAngeles, 20–22Aug. 1974;Schweickart interview. Skylab officials reviewed the procedure for newsmen at several briefingsbetween4 and6 June. In particular see JSCmedical briefing, 6 June1973, 2:34p.m.CDT,whichincludedadetaileddescriptionbySchweickart.

51.GeorgeLow,“DecisiontoDeploySkylabSolarWing,”memoforrecord,11June1973;SchneiderandGreen,“SavingSkylab,”p.51.

52.“MissionCommentaryTranscript,”4June,pp.535/2–536/2;5June,pp.569/1–572/2;6June1973,pp.592/1–599/1;Conradinterview;Kerwininterview.

53.“MissionCommentaryTranscript,”7June1973,pp.638/3–644/1;“PostEVABriefing,”7June1973,3:38p.m.CDT,pp.32B/2–32D/2;Kerwininterview;Conradinterview.

54.“MissionCommentaryTranscript,”7June1973,p.652/1;MSFC,MSFCSkylabElectricalPower,pp.217–19;ConradandKerwininterviews.

55.Myers toDebus, “Skylab1 1nvestigationBoard,” 31May 1973;HouseCommittee onScience andAstronautics,Skylab 1 Investigation Report, hearings before the Subcommittee on Manned SpaceFlight,93/1,pp.2–23;RichardD.Lyons,“CongressionalInquiryonSkylabAsked,”NewYorkTimes,16May1973,p.42;SenateCommitteeonAeronauticalandSpaceSciences,Skylab—Part2,hearing,93/1,30July1973,p.1.

56.HouseCommitteeonScienceandAstronautics,Skylab1Investigation,p.52;JohnDisherinterview,16July1975.

57.HouseCommitteeonScienceandAstronautics,Skylab1Investigation,pp.5–9,19–21;RichardSmithinterview,June1973.

58.NASA,InvestigationBoardReport,pp.viii-ix,10–1through10–4.

59.Ibid,p.ix;SchneiderandGreen,“SavingSkylab,”pp.52–53.

Chapter15

1.Painetoctr.andprog,dirs,13Mar.1969;ChrisKraftinterview,25Feb.1977.

2.KrafttoMyers,“SkylabProgramPrivateCommunicationsPlanDatedJanuary1973,”9Feb.1973.3. OMSF, “Skylab Program Private Communications Policy,” attached to memo from Donnelly to

Fletcher,2Mar.1973;EugeneKranzinterview,19Aug.1976.

4.DonnellytoFletcher,“AirtoGroundCommunications,”29Jan.1973.5.GeorgeLow,“MeetingonPrivateConversations,”memoforrecord,2Mar.1973;FletchertoMyers

andDonnelly,“PrivateCommunicationsforSkylab,”29Mar,supersededbymemoofsameauthorandtitle,3May1973.

6. Skylab 2 air-to-ground tapes, 219/2, 22:21 CDT, 5/28/73; Schneider, “Private OperationalCommunications,”memoforrecord,20June1973;PeteConradinterview,18Aug.1975.

7.“Skylab2MissionCommentaryTranscript,”p.239/1,10:23a.m.CDT,5/29/73;Schneider, “PrivateOperationalCommunications,”memoforrecord,20June1973;MyertoDonnelly,“ReleaseofVoiceDataDump,”withattachedmemo,“ReleasebyDonnellyatJSC,AdvisorytoEditors,”29May1973.

8. Schneider, “Air-to-GroundRecordedTapes,”memo for record, 7 June 1973;Donnelly, “Release ofRawMedicalData,ChannelBTranscript,”attachedtoMyersmemo,“ReleaseofVoiceDataDump,”30May1973.

9.NASArelease73–110,“FletcherStatementonSkylabPrivateCommunications,”31May1973;LowtoMyers,“PrivateConversationsforSkylab,”5July1973.

10.DonnellytoFletcher,“PrivateConversationsandAllThatStuff,”29July1973.Negotiationofpublicinformation plans with the Soviets is discussed in Edward C. Ezell and Linda N. Ezell, ThePartnership: A History of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, NASA SP-4209 (Washington, 1978), pp.234–44.

11.LowtoMyers,“PrivateConversationsforSkylab,”5July1973;JerryCarrinterview,5Aug.1975.

12.MichaelCollins,CarryingtheFire,p.148;interviewswithDr.CharlesBerry10Apr.1975andwithDr.JoeKerwin8Aug.1975.

13.Kerwin interview;J.A.Rummeletal, “ExerciseandLongDurationSpaceflight through84Days,”Journal of American Medical Women’s Association 30 (Apr. 1975): 173; “Skylab 2 MedicalExperimentsStatusBriefing,”6June1973,11:00a.m.CDT,pp.29-B1,29-B2.

14. JohnA.Rummel et al, “PhysiologicalResponse toExercise afterSpaceFlight—Apollo 14 throughApollo17,”Aviation,Space,andEnvironmentalMedicine,May1975,pp.679–83; idem,“ExerciseandLongDurationSpaceflight,”andE.L.Micheletal,“ResultsofSkylabMedicalExperimentM171—MetabolicActivity,”bothinTheProceedingsoftheSkylabLifeSciencesSymposium,NASATMX-58154,Nov.1974.

15. “Change of Shift Briefing,” 6:47 p.m. CDT, 28 May 1973, pp. 6B/1–6C/2; “Skylab 2 MissionCommentary,”pp.190/1–190/2,214/3,239/1,244/3;“Skylab1/2OnboardVoiceTranscription,”pp.188,234–35;JSCSkylabMissionReport,FirstVisit,JSC-08414,pp.4–11,4–12.Duringthechange-of-shiftbriefingthedoctorindicatedthatWeitzhadcompletedthefullexerciseon28May,astatementcontradictedbytheair-to-groundtestimonyofKerwinandthepostmissionresults.Researchersshouldverify information in the news briefings since the participants were dealing with a fast-changingsituationandsometimeshadincompleteinformation.

16.“Skylab1/2OnboardVoiceTranscription,”p.235.17.JSC,SkylabMissionReport,FirstVisit,pp.4–11,4–12,“Skylab2MissionCommentary,”4June1973,

p.526/1.

18.“Skylab2MedicalBriefing,”5June1973,3:07p.m.CDT,pp.26A/1through26H/2;E.L.Michel,J.A.Rummel,andC.F.Sawin,“SkylabExperimentM-171‘MetabolicActivity’—ResultsoftheFirst

MannedMission,”ActaAstronautica 2: 356–57; interviewswithCharlesConrad 18Aug,with JoeKerwin8Aug.1975;“Skylab2MissionCommentary,”p.550/1.

19. “Skylab 2 Mission Commentary,” pp. 550/1, 558/1, 558/2; Conrad interview; Kerwin interview;ThomasO’Toole,“AstronautHeartbeatStirsFlap,”TheWashingtonPost,6June1973,p.6A.

20.“JSCChangeofShiftBriefing,”5June1973,7:08p.m.CDT,p.27D/1;“SL-IIPostflightReview—CrewHealth,”28June1973,4:47p.m.CDT,pp.80C/2,80C/3;Conradinterview.

21.JSC,Skylab1/2TechnicalCrewDebriefing,30June1973,pp.7–1,7–2,14–27;“Skylab2ChangeofShiftBriefing,”29May1973,8:01p.m.CDT,pp.7A-2,7C-2;“Skylab2ChangeofShiftBriefing,”31May1973,7:42p.m.CDT,p.12B/2;“Skylab2ChangeofShiftBriefing,”1June1973,9:00a.m.CDT,p.13-A/2;“Skylab2MissionCommentaryTranscript,”1June1973,p.396/1.

22. “Skylab 2 Mission Commentary,” 31 May 1973; pp. 337/1, 361/1, 361/2; “JSC Change of ShiftBriefing,”9:00a.m.CDT,1June1973,p.13-A/2.

23.“Skylab2ChangeofShiftBriefing,” 30May1973, 10:17p.m.CDT, p. 10K-1; “Skylab 2MissionCommentaryTranscript,”1June1973,p.395/1.

24.Kerwin interview;PaulWeitz interview19Aug.1975;“Skylab2ChangeofShiftBriefing,”8 June1973,6:51p.m.CDT,p.36A-1.

25.InterviewswithJohnDisher16July,Dr.RobertParker20Oct,Dr.KarlHenize24Sept.1975;JohnSevier and Robert Parker, “Experiment Planning during the Skylab Missions,” presented to theAmericanAstronauticalSociety20thAnnualMeeting,LosAngeles,20–22Aug.1974,p.10.

26.“Skylab2 ScienceStatusBriefing,” 8 June1973, 4:24p.m.CDT,pp. 35B/1 through35C/1;Disherinterview;Parkerinterview;JSC,SkylabMissionReport,FirstVisit,pp.14–1through14–7;“SkylabProgramPostMissionPressConference,”22June1973,11:10a.m.CDT,pp.73A/1through73B/2;“SkylabIIPostflightReview—Summary,”28June1973,1:08p.m.CDT,pp.78A/2through78C/3.

27.Parkerinterview;SevierandParker,“ExperimentPlanning,”p.10.28.JSC,Skylab1/2TechnicalCrewDebriefing,p.14–45;HenryS.F.Cooper,AHouseinSpace (New

York,1976),p.124.

29.JSC,Skylab1/2TechnicalCrewDebriefing,pp.14–37through14–40.30.“Skylab2ChangeofShiftBriefing,”14June1973,9:05a.m.CDT,p.47A/1;“Skylab2SolarFlare

Activity,” 15 June 1973, 13:30 p.m.CDT, pp. 51B/2 through 51C/1; “SkylabAir-to-GroundVoiceTranscription,”pp.1499,1523.

31.“Skylab2ATMStatusBriefing,”15June1973,10:03a.m.CDT,p.50A/2;“SL-IIIOutlook—ATM,”29June1973,1:00p.m.CDT,pp.1A/3through1B1.

32. “Skylab 2 Change of Shift Briefing,” 28 May 1973, 6:47 p.m. CDT, p. 6B/1; NASA, Skylab 1/2TechnicalCrewDebriefing,pp.14–23,14–107;Weitz interview;“SL-IIPostflightReview—EREP,”28June1973,2:09p.m.CDT,pp.79A-3through79B/1.

33.JSC,Skylab1/2TechnicalCrewDebriefing,pp.5–2,5–4,7–7through7–10.34.Ibid,pp.14–1through14–3,23–3through23–7.

35.Ibid,p.14–2.36.DavidSchultz,RobertKain, andScottMillican, “SkylabExtravehicularActivity,” presented to the

AmericanAstronauticalSociety20thAnnualMeeting,LosAngeles,20–22Aug.1974,p.24;Weitzinterview.

Chapter161.“SkylabIIILaunchBriefing,”1June1973,11:45a.m.;JamesFletcher,“DecisiontoLaunchSL-3on

July27,”memoforrecord,1June1973;“MinutesofOMSFManagementTelecon,”31May1973;Dr.StoryMusgraveinterview,4Aug.1975;“SL-IIPostflightReview—CrewHealth,”28June1973,4:47p.m., p. 80B/2; Eugene Kranz interview, 19 Aug. 1976; Richard Johnston interview, 7 July 1977;Ashton Graybiel, Earl F. Miller II, and J. L. Homick, “Experiment M-131, Human VestibularFunction,”inTheProceedingsoftheSkylabLifeSciencesSymposium,JSC,27–29Aug.1974,1:169–73; Nicholas C. Chriss, “Inner Man Is a Vexing Problem in Journeys through Outer Space,” LosAngelesTimes,6Aug.1973,pp.3–4.

2. “Skylab ProgramPostMission PressConference,” 22 June 1973, 11:10 a.m., p. 73C/2; SL-II crewpostflight press conference, 29 June 1973, 9:00 a.m., pp. 81F/2, 81F/3; “Skylab IIIMedical StatusBriefing,”29July1973,4:10p.m.,pp.16B/1,16E/1.

3.JSC,“Skylab1/3OnboardVoiceTranscription,”pp.1,18,23,38,67,147;JSC,“Skylab1/3TechnicalAir-to-GroundTranscription,”pp.79,91;Graybeil,Miller,andHomick,“ExperimentM-131,”p.182.ThearticlestatesthatLousma’sfirstsymptomscameshortlyafterremovinghishelmetandspacesuit.TheonboardtapesindicatethatLousmaremovedhissuit90minutesintoflight,70minutesafterthefirstmentionofillnessand45minutesafterhetookhisfirstmedication.

4.JohnN.Wilford,“SpaceMakingSkylabMinnowsSwimasifThey’reConfused,”NewYorkTimes,1Aug.1973;JSC,“Skylab1/3TechnicalAir-to-GrouridTranscription,”pp.91,111,116–38;“ChangeofShiftBriefing,”29July1973,9:20p.m.,p.17A/1;also30July1973,9:40a.m.,p.18A/1,and31July1973,9:54,p.21B/1.

5.“Skylab1/3TechnicalAir-to-GroundTranscription,”pp.138–39;“MedicalStatusBriefing,”30 July1973, 4:51 p.m., p. 19B/2; Thomas O’Toole, “Motion Sickness Delays Skylab Walk Again,”WashingtonPost,31July1973,p.2.

6.“Skylab3MissionCommentary,”pp.127/2,128/1;“Skylab1/3TechnicalCrewDebriefing,”pp.0–8through0–12,5–13.

7.JohnN.Wilford,“3AstronautsAppearFullyRecovered,”NewYorkTimes,2Aug.1973,p.1;“Skylab3MissionCommentary,”pp.185/1,213/1,214/1,andthefilmclip;“MedicalBriefing,”1Aug.1977,5:24p.m.,pp.25A/1and25A/2.

8.LowtoMyers,“UseofScop-DexonSkylab4,”2Oct.1973;RichardJohnstoninterview.9.“Skylab3MissionCommentary,”pp.20/2–21/l;JohnN.Wilford,“SkylabTroublesSetOffPlanning

forSpaceRescue,”NewYorkTimes,3Aug.1973,pp.4–5.

10.“Skylab3MissionCommentary,”pp.234/1–240/1;Wilford,“SkylabTroubles.”11.“RCSStatusBriefing,”2Aug.1973,9:50a.m.,pp.26A/1–26E/2;“ChangeofShiftBriefing,”2Aug.

1973,10:35a.m.,pp.27A/1–27C/2;LowtoFletcher,“SkylabReviewinHoustononAugust2,1973,”6Aug.1973.

12.StuartAuerbach,“RescueShipReadied forSkylabCrew,”WashingtonPost, 3Aug.1973,pp. 1–2;JohnN.Wilford,“PerilDiminishes,butSkylabRescuePreparationsArePressedonAcceleratedBasisatCapeKennedy,”NewYorkTimes,10Aug.1973,pp.1–2;“SkylabIIIStatusBriefing,”2Aug.1973,4:15p.m.,pp.28B-28C/2.

13.Low toFletcher, “SkylabReview inHouston,”6Aug.1973; “Skylab 3MissionCommentary,” pp.258/1–259/1;“SkylabIIIStatusBriefing,”2Aug.1973,4:15p.m.,pp.28A/1,28C/1,28E/2–28G/2.

14.“SkylabIIIStatusBriefing,”2Aug.1973,4:15p.m.,p.28B/2;“SkylabProgramDirectorBriefing,”3Aug.1973,3:10p.m.,pp.31B/2–31C/2;MarkBloom,“NASACouldHavePreventedSkylab2[sic]Crisis,”MiamiHerald,21Aug.1973,p.9.

15.GeorgeLow,“ReplacementofSkylabSunShield,”memoforrecord,18June1973;DavidC.Schultz,RobertR.Kain,andR.ScottMillican,“SkylabExtravehicularActivity,”AAS74–120presentedattheAmericanAstronauticalSociety20thAnnualMeeting,LosAngeles,20–22Aug.1974,pp.10–14.

16. Schultz, Kain, andMillican, “Skylab Extravehicular,” p. 25; “Skylab 3 Mission Commentary,” pp.412/2–413/1;MichaelBrzezinski,“CrewTrainingSummaries:Mercury,Gemini,Apollo,Skylab,andApollo-SoyuzTestProjectSummaries,”Aug.1975.

17. “Change of Shift Briefing,” 5 Aug. 1973, 5:34 p.m., p. 35A/1; “Skylab 3 Mission Commentary,”pp.378/2–390/2,405/1–422/2.

18. “Skylab 3MissionCommentary,” pp. 426/1–428/2; “Change of Shift Briefing,” 6Aug. 1973, 8:05p.m.,pp.39A/1–39A/3.

19. “Skylab 3 Mission Commentary,” pp. 429/1–431/4, 436/3–437/1; John N. Wilford, “2 SkylabAstronautsSetRecordfor‘spaceWalks,’”NewYorkTimes,7Aug.1973,pp.1–2.

20.“SkylabIIIChangeofShiftBriefing,”4Aug.1973,4:54p.m.,pp.34C/1–34C/2;RussellSchweickartinterview,8July1975.

21.“ChangeofShiftBriefing,”7Aug.1973,3:53p.m.,p.41A/1;also9Aug.1973,5:33p.m.,pp.44A/1–44A/2; “Solar Events Briefing,” 10 Aug. 1973, 4:02 p.m., pp. 45A/1–45C/1; “Skylab 3 MissionCommentary,”pp.591/1–596/1.

22.LelandF.BelewandErnstStuhlinger,Skylab:AGuidebook,NASAEP-107 (Washington,n.d.),pp.123–35;“Skylab3ChannelBTranscripts,”Z05–5000142,pp.1216–18.

23.BelewandStuhlinger,Skylab:AGuidebook,pp.122–23;“Skylab 3ChannelBTranscripts,”Z 05–5000142,pp.1216–17.

24.“ChangeofShiftBriefing,”21Aug.1973,4:25p.m.,pp.60D/2–60G/2;“GiantSunBubbleFilmedbySkylab,”NewYorkTimes,22Aug.1973,p.1.

25.“SolarEventsBriefing,”10Aug.1973,4:02p.m.,pp.45C/1–45C/2.

26.“SkylabIIIEREPReview,”15Aug.1973,pp.52A/1–52A/2;JSC,“SkylabFAODailyStatusReport,SL-3Mission”;“Skylab3MissionCommentary,”pp.624/1–624/2;BelewandStuhlinger,Skylab:AGuidebook,p.147;JSC,“SkylabMissionReport:SecondVisit,”pp.10–44.

27. “Skylab 3 Mission Commentary,” pp. 505/1–506/2; “SkylabIII-EREP Review,” 15 Aug. 1973, pp.52A/1–52F/1.

28.“Skylab3ChannelBTranscripts,”Z05–5000142,pp.887–88,919–21;JSC,“SL-3MissionAsFlownFlightPlan,Day209thru268”;JSC,“FAODailyReport,SL-3Mission.”

29.JSC,“FAODailyStatusReport”;NASA,SkylabNewsReference,pp.111-39-111-42.

30.JSC,“ChangeofShiftBriefing,”20Aug.1973,4:33p.m.,pp.59A/1–69B/1;also21Aug.1973,4:25p.m.,pp.60A/2–60B/1;“SL-3MissionAsFlownFlightPlan.”

31.JohnN.Wilford,“2SkylabAstronautsSetRecordforSpace‘Walks,’”NewYorkTimes,7Aug.1973,p.2.

32. Robert E. Pace, “Repair of Major System Elements on Skylab,” presented to the AmericanAstronauticalSociety,20thAnnualMeeting,LosAngeles,20–22Aug.1974,pp.18–19.

33.JSC,“ChangeofShiftBriefing,”16Aug.1973,4:30p.m.,p.55D/1;also21Aug.1973,4:25p.m.,pp.60C/1–60D/2;11Aug.1973,4:30p.m.,p.46C/1; and24Aug.1973,4:54p.m.,pp.66A/1–66B/1;Pace, “Repair of Major System Elements,” p. 19; Schultz, Kain, and Millican, “SkylabExtravehicular,”pp.14,30;“SkylabIII—RateGyro6-PackInstallationDemoPressConference,”pp.63A/1–36G/1.

34.W.M.AndersonandT.W.Holloway,“SkylabFlightPlanDevelopment,”presentedtotheAmerican

Astronautical Society 20thAnnualMeeting, LosAngeles, 20–22Aug. 1974, pp. 7–8;Henry S. F.Cooper,Jr.,AHouse inSpace (NewYork:Holt,Rinehart andWinston,1976),pp.6–12;“Skylab 3ChannelBTranscriptions,”Z05–5000142,pp.706–07,721,866.

35.Cooper,House inSpace,pp.25–33;JSC,“Skylab1/2TechnicalCrewDebriefing,”p.23–33;OwenGarriottinterview,27June1977;“Skylab1/3TechnicalCrewDebriefing,”p.6–2.

36.Cooper,HouseinSpace,p.38;JSC,“Skylab1/2TechnicalCrewDebriefing,”pp.23-4-23-12;Skylab3ChannelBTranscriptions,”Z05–5-5000142,pp.700–04,716–18,816–17;JSC,“SL-3MissionAsFlownFlightPlan”;OwenGarriottinterview,27June1977;PaulJ.Weitzinterview,6July1977.

37. Anderson and Holloway, “Skylab Flight Plan Development,” pp. 2, 7–8; JSC, “SL-3 Mission AsFlownFlightPlan”;JSC,“SL-3MissionDailyStatusReport.”

38.AndersonandHolloway,“SkylabFlightPlanDevelopment,”pp.2,7;NASA,SkylabNewsReference,p.11–67.

39.“Skylab1/3AirtoGroundTranscript,”12/2544,p.10.40.“Skylab1/3TechnicalCrewDebriefing,”pp.6-13-6-27.

41. “Skylab 3 Channel B Transcriptions,” Z 05–5000142, pp. 641, 1066, 1149; JSC, Skylab: FilmResourcesCatalog,Nov.1974,pp.41–42.

42.Garriottinterview;JSC,Skylab:FilmResourcesCatalog,pp.43–46.

43.JackLousmainterview,20Aug.1975;AlanBeaninterview,13Aug.1975;Garriottinterview;“Skylab3MissionCommentary,”pp.683/1,692/1–692/2.

44.JSC,“SkylabFAODailyStatusReport:SL-3Mission”;JSC,“Skylab1/3TechnicalCrewDebriefing,”pp.0-1-0-5.

Chapter171.JSCPublicAffairsOff,“SkylabIVPrimeCrewPressConference,”3Oct.1973;GeorgeAlexander,“If

You’veAlwaysWantedaComet forChristmas,”WashingtonPost, 15Apr. 1973;ThomasO’Toole,“Skylab Likely to See Comet,” Washington Post, 24 July 1973; Schneider to MSFC and JSC,“CompatibilityAssessment forConducting a Study ofCometKohoutek (1973QonSL-4Mission,”TWX,3July1973.

2.JSCPublicAffairsOff,“Skylab3andOverviewofSkylab4,”transcriptofpressbriefingatJSC,2Oct.1973.

3.JSCPublicAffairsOff,“Skylab4LaunchDelayPressConference,”transcriptofpressconferenceatKSC, 7 Nov. 1973; idem, “Skylab 4 Announcement of Second Launch Slip,” transcript of pressconferenceatKSC,12Nov.1973;“Skylab4LaunchStatusReport,”transcriptofpressconferenceatKSC, 13Nov. 1973; “Close Teamwork Pays in Repairs,” SpaceportNews, 21Nov. 1973; ThomasO’Toole,“SkylabHI[sic]CountdownRunning,”WashingtonPost,14Nov.1973.

4.KennethS.KleinknechttoSkylabProg.Dir.,“MedicalActionItems,”6Nov.1973;GeorgeM.Lowtoassoc.adm.forMSF,“UseofScop-DexonSkylab4,”2Oct.1973;DaleD.Myerstodep.adm,“Anti-Motion SicknessMedication onSkylab 4,” 11Oct. 1973; Schneider to Kleinknecht, “Action ItemsfromAdministrator’sSkylabMedicalReviewofAugust22,1973,”TWX,31Aug.1973;EdwardG.Gibsoninterview,5July1977.

5. JSC, “SkylabMissionReport,ThirdVisit,” JSC-08963 (July1974), p. 2–1; JSCPublicAffairsOff,“Skylab 4 Postlaunch Press Briefing,” transcript of press conference at KSC, 16 Nov. 1973; JSC,“Skylab 1/4 Technical Air-to-ground Voice Transcription,” JSC-08652 (hereafter cited as “Air-to-

ground”), pp. 4, 36; JSC, “Skylab i/4 Onboard Voice Transcription,” JSC-08809 (hereafter cited as“Onboard”),pp.2,28–35.

6.Onboard,pp.42–52;Air-to-ground,pp.42–43.7.Onboard,pp.60–81;Air-to-ground,pp.44–48.

8.Onboard,pp.96–103;Air-to-ground,p.54.HenryS.F.Cooper,AHouseinSpace(NewYork,1976),p.37,reportsthisincidentsomewhatdifferently.WehaveattributedthequotesastheyareinOnboard.ThetranscriptmadebytheJSCPublicAffairsOfficeattributes“betweenyou,me,andthecouch”toPogueandthefinalquotetoCarr.Wedidnotlistentothetapestoattempttosettlethematter.Foroneotherdiscrepancybetweenthesetranscripts,seen.48.Gibson,interviewed5July1977,recalledthatheandCarrcouldimaginetheconsternationPogue’sillnesswouldcauseandthedelaytheirmissionwouldsufferasaresultofthedoctors’determinationtodosomethingaboutit.Inviewoftheirdesiretogetonwiththemission,theyconcludedthattheirbestcoursewastosavethebag,processit,andreporttheaffairafterthemissionwasover—assumingthatPoguehadrecoveredbythemorningof17November.Noneofthis,however,isreflectedinthetranscriptsoftapesfromtheonboardrecorder.Amemofiledwiththeflightdirector’shandovernotes(preparedbyeachretiringflightdirectorforhisrelief) records that the astronauts’ “feeling of undue concern aboutwhat reactions the report of theemesis would generate resulted in the report delay. The emesis was saved contrary to earlierdeliberationstodismissthesignificanceoftheemesis.”JerryR.Hordinsky,“MissionSurgeon’sDailyReport onCrewHealth,” 17Nov. 1973.Later that day, the flight director (NeilHutchinson) of theSilverteamnotedthediscoveryoftheincidentinthechannelBtranscripts,commentingthatthecrew“have been chastized [sic] at privacommmed [private communication,medical]& I get to tell thepressabouttheentireincidenttonight.”Unsigned,undatednotes,“Handover,Silver[to]Bronze,”in“SkylabFlightDirectors’HandoverNotes,Day316to340,”fromJSCFlightOperationsDirectorate.

9.Onboard,pp.106–57.9.

10.Air-to-ground, pp. 105–06; JSC PublicAffairsOff, “SL-4Change of Shift Briefing,” transcript ofpress briefing at JSC, 17 Nov. 1973. Similar briefings were held daily (with few exceptions)throughout themission.Theyarecitedhereafteras“COS,”withdate.“AstronautsTry toMakeUpTime,”NewYorkTimes,19Nov.1973.

11.InterviewswithGeraldP.Carr,5Aug.1975;NeilB.Hutchinson,9June1977;EdwardG.Gibson,25Aug.1975.

12.COS,16,17,18Nov.1973;Air-to-ground,pp.85–89,93.13.Air-to-ground,pp.201–15;AltonSlagle,“SkylabPilotMakesAir-ConditioningRepair,”Philadelphia

Inquirer,20Nov.1973.

14.SchneidertoJSCSkylabmgr.,“AdditionalActivitiesforSL-4,”12Nov.1973;Onboard,p.439,520–21;WilliamB.Lenoirinterview,7Aug.1975.

15.Air-to-ground,pp.271,277.

16.Onboard,pp.203–20.17.Ibid,pp.236–66,281–312.

18.Ibid,pp.325–400;COS,22Nov.1973.Fordetailsofthisrepairjob,seeRobertE.Pace,Jr.,“RepairofMajorSystemElementsonSkylab,” andDavidC. Schultz,RobertR.Kain, andR. ScottMillican,“SkylabExtravehicularActivity,”20thAnnualAASMeeting,LosAngeles,20–22Aug.1974.

19.Air-to-ground,p.424;Onboard,p.410.

20.JSC,“SkylabMissionReport,ThirdVisit,”p.9–5;COS,23Nov.1973.21.Carr,Hutchinsoninterviews.

22.Onboard,pp.429–31,440–41.

23.COS,25Nov.1973.

24.COS,23Nov.1973;MSFC,“MSFCSkylabMissionReport—SaturnWorkshop,”NASATMX-64814(Oct.1974),pp.6–12,6–19.

25. COS, 23, 25 Nov. 1973; JSC Public Affairs Off, “Skylab 4 Status Briefing,” transcript of pressconference at JSC, 28 Nov. 1973; E. Liebman, “Skylab Propellant Savings during Earth ResourceExperiments viaMomentumConservation Following Loss of One CMG,” AIAAHouston SectionMini-Symposium,undated.

26.COS,26Nov.1973;Onboard,pp.445,447,448.27.Onboard,pp.484,493;Air-to-ground,pp.694–97,730.

28. Air-to-ground, p. 699; Onboard, pp. 485–87, 494, 497; John E. Naugle to chairman, MSFEB,“ObservationsoftheBariumShaped-ChargePlasmaJetduringSL-4,”15Oct.1973.

29.Onboard,pp.491–92,495,500,525;SchneidertoJSCSkylabmgr.,“AdditionalActivitiesforSL-4,”12Nov.1973.

30.Air-to-ground,pp.708,732;COS,27Nov.1973.31.Air-to-ground,pp.745–52.

32.COS,2,4Dec.1973.33.Onboard,p.550,forthequotations;Hutchinsoninterview.

34.COS,5and6Dec.1973;Air-to-ground,pp.782–85.35.JSCPublicAffairsOff,“SL-4,MissionDay28Review,”transcriptofpressconferenceatJSC,13Dec.

1973.

36.Ibid.37.Onboard,pp.1050–52,1129–30,1293–95.

38. Robert A. R. Parker interview, 20 Oct. 1975; John R. Sevier and Robert A. Parker, “ExperimentPlanning during the SkylabMissions,” 20thAnnualAASMeeting, LosAngeles, 2022Aug. 1974;“SkylabCrew,MissionControlHaveSettledTheirDifferences,”NewYorkTimes,19Dec.1973.

39.WilliamC.SnoddyandRichardJ.Barry,“CometKohoutekObservationsfromSkylab,”20thAnnualAASMeeting,LosAngeles,20–22Aug.1974.

40.COS,26Nov,17Dec.1973;Snoddytocolleagues,12Nov.1973,withencl,“KohoutekPhotometricPhotography,” change to Kohoutek Viewing Requirements Document (19 Sept. 1973); MSFC,“Kohoutek Viewing Requirements Document,” p. 4–3; JSC, “Skylab FAO End of Mission StatusReport,SL-4Mission,”15Feb.1974,pp.61–72.

41. “Kohoutek Viewing Requirements Document,” app. A; Air-to-ground, pp. 2008–15; Onboard, pp.1263–67,1363–66,1473–76,1507–11,1752–55,1761–63,1772–73;COS,19,20,21Dec.1973.

42.JSCPublicAffairsOff,“SL-4ChristmasDayEVABriefing,” transcriptofpressbriefingatJSC,24Dec.1973;Air-to-ground,pp.2133–41,2253–57.

43.Onboard,pp.1543–1642,1657–79.

44.Ibid,pp.1679–1711,1723;COS,25Dec.1973.45. Air-to-ground, pp. 2591–95; JSC Public Affairs Off, “SL-4, Dr. Lubos Kohoutek Briefing, NASA

Headquarters,” transcript of press briefing, 27Dec. 1973; “SL-4,KohoutekBriefing,” transcript ofbriefingatJSC,28Dec.1973;CharlesJ.Bierbauer,“LubosKohoutek:HisMailSuggestsCometMayCause End to Earth,”Huntsville Times, 2 Dec. 1973; “TheMan Behind the Comet,”PhiladelphiaInquirer,13Dec.1973.

46.Onboard,pp.1819–941;“FAOEndofMissionStatusReport,SL-4Mission,”pp.67–79.

47.Onboard,p.1496;“ChristmasTreeBuiltinSkylab,”PhiladelphiaInquirer,23Dec.1973;Hutchinson,Carr,Gibsoninterviews;Skylab1/4technicaldebriefing,pp.22–2to22–8.

48.Air-to-ground, p. 2559; JSCPublicAffairsOff, transcript of dump tape 362–01, time362:04:04 to362:04:10GMT,28Dec.1973.ThisentirerecordingismissingfromthecompilationofonboardtaperecordingspublishedbytheJSCTestOfficeinMarch1974(JSC-08809,“Skylab1/4OnboardVoiceTranscription”).

49.Carr,Gibsoninterviews;WilliamR.Pogue,“ThreeMonthsinSpace,”XVIIISymposiumProceedings,SocietyofExperimentalTestPilots,LosAngeles,25–28Sept.1974.

50.Parkerinterview.

51.Air-to-ground,pp.2607–08,2726–27;COS,30Dec.1973.52.Air-to-ground,pp.2798–801.

53.Ibid,pp.2803–05.54.Ibid,p.2805.

55.Ibid,p.2807.56.Ibid,pp.2808–09.

57.Ibid,p.2810.58.Parkerinterview;C.C.Kraft,Jr.,interview,25Feb.1977;Skylab1/4technicaldebriefing,p.22–7.

59.COS,1Jan.1974.60.Air-to-ground,pp.3101–02.

61.COS,10Jan.1974;“FAOEndofMissionStatusReport,SL-4Mission,”p.151.62.JSCPublicAffairsOff,“SL-456-DayMissionReview,”transcriptofpressconferenceatJSC,11Jan.

1974.

63.COS,21Dec.1973;“SL-456-DayMissionReview.”64.Air-to-ground,pp.3089–91,3147–48,3216–17,3283–85,3507–13.

65.Ibid,pp.1874–89,2465–70,3514–27,4040–54,4539–50.66.“FAOEndofMissionStatusReport,SL-4Mission,”pp.156–59;Air-to-ground,pp.4003,4011;COS,

7,10,12–18Jan.1974.

67.Air-to-ground,pp.4159,4165–67,4174–78,3435–38,3598–3605.68.Ibid,pp.4223–27,4261–69;Carr,Gibsoninterviews;Onboard,pp.3098–102.

69.JSCPublicAffairsOff,“SL-4PressBriefing,”transcriptofSchneiderpressconferenceatJSC,22Jan.1974;COS,22,23Jan.1974;EdPrickett,“LiveCoverageofReturnVetoedbyTV,”Today,23Jan.1974; Joel N. Shurkin, “Skylab 3 [sic] Prepares to Return,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 3 Feb. 1974;Thomas O’Toole, “Astronauts Returning to Earth,”WashingtonPost, 8 Feb. 1974; Robert Unger,“AstronautsGreetedbyApathy,”ChicagoTribune,9Feb.1974.

70.JSCPublicAffairsOff,“SL-4,InflightPressConference,”transcript,31Jan.1974;Air-to-ground,pp.4935–36.

71.Onboard,pp.3607–38,3696–909;COS,1Feb.1974.72.COS,3Feb.1974;Air-to-ground,pp.4955,5009–10,5055.

73.COS,4,5Feb.1974;Onboard,pp.3920–46.

74.Air-to-ground,pp.5240–41,5261–65.

75.COS,5,6,7Feb.1974.76.Onboard,pp.4043–45,4050–65.

77.Skylab1/4technicaldebriefing,pp.10–4,10–5.78.JSCPublicAffairsOff,“SL-4,Skylab4PostRecoveryBriefing,”transcript,8Feb.1974.

79.MSFC,“MSFCSkylabMissionReport—SaturnWorkshop,”TMX-64814,pp.3–29,3–30,6–13.

Chapter181. A. R. Morse, “MSFC Skylab Apollo TelescopeMount SummaryMission Report,” NASA TM X-

64815,p.3–10;JSC,“SkylabEarthResourcesDataCatalog,”JSC-09016,p.vii;RichardS.Johnston,“SkylabMedicalProgramOverview,”inProceedingsoftheSkylabLifeSciencesSymposium,NASATMX-58154,p.18.

2.RichardS.Johnstoninterview,21Oct.1975.

3. Ashton Graybiel, Earl F. Miller II, and J. L. Homick, “Experiment M-131, Human VestibularFunction,”inProceedingsoftheSkylabLifeSciencesSymposium,pp.169–94.

4.Ibid.

5. G. Donald Whedon et al, “Mineral and Nitrogen Metabolic Studies, Experiment M071,” inProceedingsof theSkylabLifeSciencesSymposium,pp.353–71;JohnM.VogelandM.W.Whittle,“BoneMineralMeasurement—ExperimentM078,”ibid,pp.387–401.

6.E.L.Micheletal,“ResultsofSkylabMedicalExperimentM171—MetabolicActivity,”inProceedingsoftheSkylabLifeSciencesSymposium,pp.723–55;seealsoJ.A.Rummeletal,“ExerciseandLongDurationSpaceflightthrough84Days,”JournalofAmericanMedicalWomen’sAssociation30(1975):173–87;andE.L.Micheletal,“SkylabExperimentM-171,‘MetabolicActivity’—ResultsoftheFirstMannedMission,”ActaAstronautica2(1975):36–165.

7. R. L. Johnson et al, “Skylab Experiment M-092: Results of the First Manned Mission,” ActaAstronautica2(1975):265–96;CharlesA.Berryinterview,10Apr.1975;Johnsonetal,“LowerBodyNegative Pressure: Third Manned Skylab Mission,” in Proceedings of the Skylab Life SciencesSymposium,pp.545–95.

8.LawrenceF.Dietlein,“Skylab:ABeginning,”inProceedingsoftheSkylabLifeSciencesSymposium,pp. 796–814; see also Carolyn S. Leach, W. Carter Alexander, and P. C. Johnson, “Endocrine,Electrolyte, andFluidVolumeChangesAssociatedwithApolloMissions,” inBiomedicalResultsofApollo,RichardS.Johnston,L.F.Dietlein,andC.A.Berry,eds,NASASP-368(Washington,1975),pp.163–84.

9.Dietlein,“Skylab:ABeginning.”10.ProceedingsoftheSkylabLifeSciencesSymposium,pp.818,831–32,834–35,842–44.

11.G. S.Vaiana et al, “X-RayObservations ofCharacteristic Structures andTimeVariations from theSolarCorona:PreliminaryResultsfromSkylab,”AstrophysicalJournal185(1973):L47-L51;R.M.MacQueenetal,“TheOuterSolarCoronaasObservedfromSkylab:PreliminaryResults,”ibid.187(1974):L85-L88;E.M.Reeveset al, “Observationsof theChromosphericNetwork: InitialResultsfromtheApolloTelescopeMount,”ibid.188(1974):L27-L29;R.Touseyetal,“APreliminaryStudyoftheExtremeUltravioletSpectroheliogramsfromSkylab,”SolarPhysics33(1973):265–80.

12.LeoGoldberg,“ResearchwithSolarSatellites,”AstrophysicalJournal191(1974):1–37.

13.E.M.Reeves,“ASolarObservatoryinSpace:InitialResultsandMissionAssessment,”inTheSkylabResults,vol.31,part2,ofAdvancesintheAstronauticalSciences,ed.byWilliamC.SchneiderandThomasE.Hanes(Tarzana,Cal,1975),pp.965–95.

14. E. Hildner, “The Solar Corona as Seen from Skylab,” AIAA paper 74–1232, presented at theAIAA/AGUConferenceonScientificExperimentsofSkylab,Huntsville,Ala,30Oct.-1Nov.1974.

15.V.E.ScherrerandR.Tousey,“FlaresObservedbytheNRL-ATMSpectrographandSpectroheliographduring the Skylab Missions,” Proceedings of the International Conference on X-Rays in Space,UniversityofCalgary,14–21Aug.1974,pp.986–95.

16. R. Tousey, “The NRL Solar Experiments in the Apollo Telescope Mount of Skylab: Historical,Operational,andResults,”preprintofareporttobepublishedinReportofNRLProgress,1July1975,pp.10–11.

17. Joe R. Eagleman and Fawwaz T. Ulaby, “Soil Moisture Detection from Skylab SI 93 and SI94Sensors,”20thAnnualAASMeeting,LosAngeles,20–22Aug.1974,paperAAS74–146;RobertS.Houston and Robert W. Marrs, “Results of the Use of S190A and S190B Skylab Sensors forPhotogeologicStudiesinWyoming,”ibid,paperAAS74–142.

18.L.L.BiehlandL.F.Silva,“AnAnalysisofaVisibleandInfraredMultilevelMultispectralDataSet,”ibid, paper AAS 74–143; F. J. Thompson, R. K. Vincent, and R. F. Nalepka, “Recent ProcessedResults from theSkylab SI92MultispectralScanner,” ibid, paperAAS74–144;A.E.Coker,R.H.Rogers, and A. L. Higer, “Automatic Geometric Land-Water Cover Types of the Green Swamp,Florida,fromSkylabS192Data,”ibid,paperAAS74–145.

19. R. I. Welch, L. R. Pettinger, and C. E. Poulton, “A Comparison of Skylab and ERTS Data forAgricultural Crop and Natural Vegetation Interpretation,” AIAA/AGU Conference on ScientificExperimentsofSkylab,Huntsville,Ala,30Oct.-lNov.1974,paper74–1219;V.Klemas,D.Bartlett,and R. Rogers, “Skylab andERTS-1 1nvestigations of Coastal Land Use and Water Properties inDelawareBay,”ibid,paper74–1220;L.KirvadaandM.Cheung,“AutomaticLandUseClassificationUsing Skylab S-192 Multispectral Data,” ibid, paper 74–1224; J. T. McGoogan et al, “SkylabAltimeterApplicationsandScientificResults,”ibid,paper74–1221.

20.JSC,abstractsoftheNASAEarthResourcesSurveySymposium,8–12June1975.21.VerlC.Wilmarth,SkylabReview,pressconferenceatJSC,21Feb.1974,transcript;RobertE.Pace,

Jr.,“RepairofMajorSystemElementsonSkylab,”20thAnnualAASMeeting,paperAAS74–122;JSC,“Skylab1/4EarthResourcesExperimentsDebriefing,”JSC-08813,pp.55–65.

22.WilliamB.Lenoiretal,“VisualObservationsfromSpace,”20thAnnualAASMeeting,paperAAS74–124.

23.Ibid.;seealsoJSC,“Skylab4VisualObservationsProjectReport,”NASATMX-58142.

24.C.C.Johnson,“SkylabExperimentM487,Habitability/CrewQuarters,”20thAnnualAASMeeting,paperAAS74–133;JSC,“Skylab1/2CorollaryExperimentsDebriefing,”JSC-08082–3,pp.52–70;“Skylab1/3CorollaryExperimentsDebriefing,” JSC-08482,pp.1–35; “Skylab1/4 EarthResourcesExperimentsDebriefing,”JSC-08813,pp.66–105.

25.“Skylab1/4EarthResourcesExperimentsDebriefing,”p.70.

26.JSC,“Skylab1/4OnboardVoiceTranscription,”JSC-08809,p.3169.27.C.C.Johnson,“SkylabExperimentM487.”

28.Ibid.;“Skylab1/4EarthResourcesExperimentsDebriefing,”pp.66–105;“Skylab1/4OnboardVoiceTranscription,”p.512.

29. C. E. Whitsett, Jr., and B. McCandless II, “Skylab Experiment M509, Astronaut ManeuveringEquipment,Orbital TestResults and FutureApplications,” 20thAnnualAASMeeting, paperAAS

74–137.

30.Ibid.;DonaldE.Hewes,“SkylabExperimentT020,PreliminaryResultsConcerningaFoot-ControlledManeuveringUnit,”20thAnnualAASMeeting,paperAAS74–138.

31. William C. Snoddy and G. Allen Gary, “Skylab Observations of Comet Kohoutek,” AIAA/AGUConferenceonScientificExperimentsofSkylab,Huntsville,30Oct.-lNov.1974,paper74–1248;G.A. Gary, ed. Comet Kohoutek: A Workshop Held at Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville,Alabama,June13–14,1974,NASASP-355(Washington,1975).

32.LeeB.Summerlin,ed,Skylab,ClassroominSpace,NASASP-401(Washington,1977),pp.95–105.SummerlinwaschairmanoftheselectionboardfortheSoutheast.

33.Ibid,pp.37–65.

34. Ibid,pp.175–76; JohnB.MacLeod, “OperationalAspectsofSkylabStudentProjectExperiments,”20th Annual AASMeeting, paper AAS 74–153; Lee Summerlin, “The Skylab Student Project, AScience Educator’s Appraisal,” ibid, paper AAS 74–155; Jeanne Leventhal, “The Skylab StudentScienceProgramfromaStudentInvestigator’sPointofView,”ibid,paperAAS74–156.

35.E.M.Reeves,“ASolarObservatoryinSpace:InitialResultsandMissionAssessment,”20thAnnualAASMeeting,paperAAS74–169;RichardTouseyinterview,20Apr.1976;JSC,SkylabExplorestheEarth,NASASP-380(Washington,1977).

Chapter191.MarshallSpaceFit.Ctr,“MSFCSkylabMissionReport:SaturnWorkshop,”NASATMX-64818(Oct.

1974),p.3–30.

2.Ibid,p.3–31.3.JosephP.Loftus,Jr.(JSC),“SkylabReboostMissiononEarlyOFTFlight,”3Jan.1977;Loftustomgr.,

PayloadDeploymentandRetrievalSystemsOff.(JSC),“SkylabReboostStudyActivities,”withencl,“SummaryofTeleconConcerningSkylabReboost,”28Feb.1977.

4.JohnH.Disher(NASAHq.)toJSCandMSFC,“SkylabRevisitProjectGo/NoGoDecision,”5Apr.1977.

5.NASArelease77–220,22Nov.1977.

6.“SunspotActivityThreattoSkylabPredicted,”AviationWeek&SpaceTechnology,19Dec.1977,p.18.

7.R.JefferySmith,“TheSkylabIsFallingandSunspotsAreBehindIt,”Science,1Apr.1979,p.28.

8.RichardD.Lyons,“SovietSpySatellitewithAtomicReactorBreaksUpinCanada,”NewYorkTimes,25Jan.1978;“Cosmos954:AnUglyDeath,”Time,6Feb.1978.

9.PeterReich,“SkylabtoOrbit21MoreMonths:NASA,”ChicagoTribune,3Feb.1978;NASArelease78–19,6Feb.1978.

10.PatsyT.Mink,asst.sec.ofstate,toFrosch,14Feb.1978.11.NASADailyActivitiesReport,27Feb.1978;NASArelease78–35,3Mar.1978.

12.Senate,NASAAuthorizationforFiscalYear1979,hearings,part1,pp.45–46,88–90,190–92.13.EverlyDriscoll,“SkylabNearsItsReentryfromOrbitinaRacewithTimeandtheSun,”Smithsonian

Magazine,May1979.

14.CharlesS.Harlaninterview,14Sept.1979.

15.Ibid.;NASADailyActivitiesReport,18,21,26July,25and26Sept,10Oct.1978.

16.W.G.Bastedotodir.,InternationalAffairs,“SkylabFinalReport,”17Aug.1979.17.“EfforttoSaveSkylabtoGoOnbutOfficialBelievesItIsDoomed,”NewYorkTimes,22July1978;

JimMaloney,“CosmosCrash,SkylabEffortLinkSuggested,”HoustonPost,22July1978.

18.Maloney,“CosmosCrash.”19.Bastedo,“SkylabFinalReport”;idem,“PegasusI—FinalReport,”4Oct.1978.

20.Harlaninterview.21.NASArelease78–191,19Dec.1978;Skylabpressconferencetranscript,19Dec.1978;JohnJ.Fialka,

“NASAGivesUpEfforttoStopFallofSkylab,”WashingtonStar,19Dec.1978;“PresidentDecidedtoAbandonEffortstoRescueSkylab,”WallStreetJournal,20Dec.1978.

22.Bastedo,“SkylabFinalReport.”23.ThomasO’Toole,“’ChickenLittle’IsLookingUp,”WashingtonPost,20Jan.1979.

24.Bastedo,“SkylabFinalReport.”25.NASArelease79–03,1Feb.1979;Harlaninterview.

26. JimMaloney, “JSC Engineer Projects Time Skylab to Fall,”HoustonPost, 21 Apr. 1979; John J.Fialka,“NASAPlansTestRunforSkylabFall,”WashingtonStar,25Apr.1979;Harlaninterview.

27.Harlaninterview;Harlan,“SummaryofRealTimeConsiderationstoTumbletheSkylabSpacecraftforanEntryTargetintheIndianOcean,”memoforrecord,10Aug.1979.

28.Harlaninterview;Harlan,“Summary.”29. Harlan interview; Robert Frosch, transcript of testimony prepared for theHouse Subcommittee on

GovernmentOperationsandTransportation,4June1979.

30.NASADailyActivitiesReports,28,29June,2,3,5July1979.31.Harlaninterview.

32.Bastedo,“SkylabFinalReport”;LeeD.Saegesser,“MemoforRecord,”NASAHistoricalOfficefiles,10July1979.

33.Harlaninterview;Harlan,“Summary.”

34.Harlaninterview.35.RichardD.Lyons,“SkylabDebrisHitsSeaandAustralia;NoHarmReported,”NewYorkTimes,12

July1979.

36.“SolitaryContestantWaitsforSkylabPiecePrize,”WashingtonPost,15July1979.37.Harlan,“Summary.”

38.NASArelease79–74,13July1979;J.M.Jones,“MarshallSkylabTeamReturnsfromAustralia,”JSCRoundup,10Aug.1979.

39.KevinKlose,“2CosmonautsBreakRecordforEndurance,”WashingtonPost,15July1979;“SalyutCrewHailedforRecordinSpace,”NewYorkTimes,4Mar.1978.

AppendixF1.Thissection isbasedonasummarybyJohnE.Naugle,associateadministratorforspacescience, in

hearings before the House Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications, 1975 NASA

Authorization,93/2,pt.3,pp.396–406.SeealsoG.A.Gary,ed.CometKohoutek:AWorkshopHeldatMarshallSpaceFlightCenter,Huntsville,Alabama,June13–14,1974,NASASP-355 (Washington,1975);“CometKohoutek—ProspectsandPlans,”SkyandTelescope46(Aug.1973):91–93.

2.JohnP.DonnellytoFletcher,20Nov.1973,withattachment,“KohoutekPlan.”3.ThomasO’Toole,“SkylabLikelytoSeeComet,”WashingtonPost,24July1973.

4.DaleF.Mead,“CometonWay,”SanJoseMercury,9Aug.1973.5.“CometKohoutek—ProspectsandPlans,”SkyandTelescope46(Aug.1973):91–93.

6.“SkylabIIILaunchSetforNov.9,”WashingtonPost,17Aug.1973.7. Joel N. Shurkin, “Spectacular New Comet Awaited,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 13 Aug. 1973; “The

Christmas Comet Begins Yielding Data,” Science News, 27 Oct. 1973; “Giant New Comet’s TailSeen,”WashingtonPost,7Oct.1973;ThomasO’Toole,“NASAtoMakeStudyofGiantComet,”ibid,19Oct. 1973; Joel N. Shurkin, “Comet Flashes toward Sun Tryst,”Philadelphia Inquirer, 29 Oct.1973.

8. “NewComet to Hove [sic] in Sight Soon,” Baltimore Sun, 10 Nov. 1973; Anthony Tucker, “WillKohoutek Live Up to Expected Brilliance?” Louisville Courier-Journal and Times, 24 Nov. 1973;“KohoutekVisibleNow,”Today,16Nov.1973.

9.“CometandCamera”and“SailingafteraComet,”WashingtonStar-News,2Dec.1973;“AComet’sArrivalProducesSomeEconomicOffshoots,”WallStreetJournal,6Dec.1973;“ABrilliantVisitorIsHeading Our Way,”Miami News, 29 Nov. 1973; “KILLER COMET? Planetarium’s New ShowFocuses on Celestial Visitors,” Miami Herald, 1 Dec. 1973; Sherwin D. Smith, “The Comet IsComing!”NewYorkTimesMagazine,11Nov.1973.

10.“WatchersofSkiesAreDisappointedinCometKohoutek,”NewYorkTimes,13Dec.1973;“Clouds,SeasicknessSpoilCometCruise,”ChicagoTribune,13Dec.1973;TomShales,“OutofThisWorld:PinningSomeTalesontheComet,”WashingtonPost,10Dec.1973.

11.FrankGannontoFletcher,“NASAChristmasTVSpecial,”5Nov.1973;JohnP.Donnellytoadmin,“TheGannonPaper,”6Nov.1973;DonnellytoFletcher,14Nov.1973;GannontoKenCole,“TheSpaceProgram:ThePresident’sDomesticPolicyandthePresident’sDomesticImage,”22May1973;[Donnelly],unsigned“MemoforMyFile,”[Nov.1973].

12.“Kohoutek’sTail toBeVeryLong,”OrlandoSentinel-Star,20Dec.1973;StuartAuerbach,“CometBrillianceRe-Assessed,”WashingtonPost, 28Dec. 1973; “KohoutekFadesOut as StarAttraction:TooClean to Shine,”Wall Street Journal, 28 Dec. 1973; “Clouds Foil Area’s Search for Comet,”ChicagoSun-Times,16Dec.1973.

13.“Kohoutek:TheFlopoftheCentury?”PhiladelphiaInquirer,5Jan.1974;ThomasO’Toole,“NeverVery Flashy, Kohoutek Is Dimming,”Washington Post, 10 Jan. 1974; Joel N. Shurkin, “MillionsSquint,butOnlyaFewSeeComet,”PhiladelphiaInquirer,9Jan.1974.

14.Tom Jacobs, “WhyWeCouldn’tSeeComet,”ChicagoTribune, 15 Jan. 1974;RussellBaker, “TheCosmic Flopperoo,”New York Times, 15 Jan. 1974; Art Buchwald, “The Sad Tale of Kohoutek,”WashingtonPost,13Jan.1974.

15.“AScientists’Comet,”SkyandTelescopeAl(Mar.1974):153–58.

INDEX

A.B.ChanceCo,269Abelson,PhilipH,66–68AdvancedOrbitingSolarObservatory(AOSO),69–71,74,167Agnew,SpiroT,105,115Agriculture,Dept.of,183AirForce,U.S.,15–19,28,46–48Airlock,30,31ill,32–34,38–39ill.,51,123,200–03ill.,207ill.,225ill.,245,

254ill.Allis-ChalmersManufacturingCo,110AmericanScienceandEngineering,Inc.,343Anderson,ClintonP,18,41,43,47,100ApolloApplicationsprogram(AAP;(seealsoApollotelescopemount;Contract,

(NASA); Extended Apollo program; Lake Logan Agreement; Orbitalworkshop; Remote sensing), 20–21, 26, 38, 40–41, 44, 48–54 ill., 55–56,114–15,232

AAP1A(canceled),87–88,96,182,184,198budget,36,40,42–48,53,76–77,83,86,91,99–104,105,126scientificexperiments,41,43–45,54–55,57,63,77–82,89–91

ApollomissionsApollo7,104,232Apollo8,83,105,109,142Apollo9,109,142,186,279Apollo10,109Apollo11,84,109–10,114,215Apollo12,68Apollo13,113,120,192nApollo14,158Apollo15,280

Apollo16,240Apollo17,116,216,231,238,243

Apolloprogram(seealsoCommandandservicemodule;Spacecraft,manned),1,4–5,8–9,18–19,40,64–65,68,109,114–16,129,231

Apollofire,82–86,150costs,10,20,26,58–59,66–67management,6–7,48,118–22

Apollo-SoyuzTestProgram,148Apollo telescope mount (ATM; see also Contract (NASA); Control moment

gyroscope;H-alpha telescope;Solar research),72 ill.,171 ill.,175 ill.,226ill.,301ill.337ill.

andAAP,37–38,52,71–74,108–09,111budget,77,83,102–04experiments,79,174–179,302–03,308–13,343–45hardware, 74–75 ill., 76, 85 ill., 89, 167 ill., 168–74, 179 ill., 180 ill., 181,

290–91andSkylab,117,166,238–39,253,294,300,306–07,312,317–18,334testing,169–70,180ill.,181,242–43,338

Arabian,DonaldD,140–41,267Army,U.S.,23Artificialgravity.SeeWeightlessness.Astronauts, (see also Appendix E; Ergometer; Habitability; Medical

experiments; Media coverage; Skylab missions, and names of individualastronauts),3,65,78,121n,123–24,218–21,226–30,275ill,279–83,295–98,312

Australia,371–72Badlands,S.D,358ill.BallBrothersResearchCorp,70,72Bastedo,WilliamG,365,367Bean,AlanL,220,292ill.,296–97ill.,298,300,302–05ill.,308–11Belew,LelandF.andAAP,49–50,76,85,106–08,111,169,174,214andSkylabprogram,122,124–27,194,206,209–10spacecrafthabitability,133,136,137,154,157

Bellcomm,Inc.,89BenFranklin(submarine),139–40,146Berkner,LloydV.,67Berry,CharlesA.,151,156,160,283,296Bionetics,Inc.,155BlackHills,S.D,358ill.“BlueGemini”proposal,16–17Bobko,KarolL.,163BoeingAircraftCo.,26,233Boone,WalterF.,16Borman,Frank,131BrazilCurrent,359ill.BrooklinePsychoenergeticsInstitute,368Buchanan,DonaldD.,236Budget,Bureauofthe,18,20,42–43,47,52–53Budget(NASA;seealsoApolloApplicationsprogram;Apolloprogram;Apollo

telescopemount;Skylabprogram),6,69,118,188,362andCongress,8,9,15–16,115,364,370andVietnamwar,20,40,70,83,100

Burke,WalterF.,210,211Cagle,EugeneH.,242Canada,363CanaryIslandObservatory,302–03CapCom.SeeJohnsonSpaceCenter.Carr,GeraldP.,220,226,308,332–33,334–36,348,351ill,361crewworkload,317–19,321–22,327–30motionsickness,314–16,323

Centaur(launchvehiclestage),24nCheyenneRiver,358ill.ChickenLittleAssociates,368ChryslerCorp,231,235–36Clark,RaymondL.,234Clusterconcept.SeeOrbitalworkshop.

Coen,GaryE,298ill.Collins,Michael,131,136n,283Cometresearch.SeeKohoutek(comet)andAppendixF.Commandandservicemodule(CSM),3,12,51,89,110,131,246ill.,338ill.CommandandservicemoduleConrad,Charles, Jr. (“Pete”),220,226 ill., 227

ill.,229–30ill.,287ill.-88,290ill.,293ill.,295,330medicalexperiments,164–65,281–82,284–85ill-87workshoprepair,263,269,271,273,276,294

Contract(NASA)AAP,50,104,110,133–34,157ATM,70,72,75Skylabprogram,188,195,197–99,236–37,362spacestationresearch,10,12,14,23–24,26,33–34

Contractor(NASA;seealsoAppendixBandnamesof individualcontractors),3,9,12,44,110,124–25,199,231–32

Controlmomentgyroscope(CMG),170–73,181,190,206,319–22, 330, 333,338,365

ConvairAerospaceDiv,GeneralDynamicsCorp.,24nCorona.SeeSolarresearch.Coronagraph.SeeSolarresearch.Cosmos954(Sovietsatellite),363Crippen,RobertL.,163Crystalgrowthexperiment,349ill.Daddario,EmilioQ.,100Datatransmission.SeeTelemetry.David,EdwardE.,Jr.,116Debus,KurtH.,6,95,234,237,243Defense,Dept.of,15–18,46–47,61–62,109,365,367Delta(launchvehicle),23nDisher,JohnH,20,93,96,105,288Donnelly,JohnP.,280–81,282Donnelly,PaulC.,237

DorchesterCounty,Md.,360ill.DouglasAircraftCo.,14,23–26,33–35,88Dryworkshop.SeeOrbitalworkshop.Dryden,HughL.,8,67,111DuBridge,LeeA.,67nEarthresourcesresearch.SeeRemotesensing.EllsworthAirForceBase,358ill.Enterprise(SpaceShuttleorbiter),362Ergometer, 149–50, 151 ill, 152, 159, 163–64, 209 ill, 227 ill, 279, 284, 285

ill.-86,297ill,320Explorerprogram,16n,58ExtendedApolloprogram,12,14–15,18,19,20–21,27,29,73Extravehicularactivity(EVA),40,168,273,276,300–01ill.,302,307,317–18,

350–51Faget,MaximeA.,85,106,260,267FairchildHillerCorp.,152–55,158FalklandCurrent,359ill.Fletcher,JamesC.,188,211–12,280–82,338,349ill.Flightoperations,50,86,88,177,179,193,215–17,286–90,310–13,316–24,

327–30Foodsystem,Skylab,140–43ill.,144,259,292–93ill.,308–09Ford,GeraldR.,349ill.Frosch,RobertA.,364,366–67,369Fulton,JamesG.,99–100,102Fuqua,Don,86Futurestudies.SeeSpacestation.Garriott,OwenK,143 ill.,220–21,296–97,300–01 ill.,302–04,308–11,344,

350GeminimissionsGemini4,4,40,350Gemini5,63

Gemini6,333Gemini7,63,131,283Gemini8,333nGemini9,253Gemini10,73,131

Gemini program (see also“Blue Gemini” proposal; Orbital workshop; Skylabspacecraft),2–3,11,24–25,31,128,168,170

experimentprogram,60–63,78,141,183andmilitaryprograms,6,17–20,48,61

GeneralElectricCo.,48,152,156,346GeologicalSurvey,U.S.(USGS),183,346Gibson,EdwardG.,175ill.,220,273,317–18,326,335–338,348andATM,104,221,330,332–34,344crewworkload,318–20,323–24,327,329andmotionsickness,314–16,340

Gilruth,RobertR.,3,8,59,62,119andAAP,45–46,50,72,85,91–92,95–97andMSFC,32,51,160andSkylabprogram,126,135,145–46,148,151,174n,218,220

Glennan,T.Keith,8GoddardSpaceFlightCenter(GSFC),48,58,71,73–75,216Godfrey,RoyE.,234Goldberg,Leo,102–03,177,343GoughIsland,321ill.GrandCanyon,Ariz.,358ill.Gray,EdwardZ.,77Graybiel,Ashton,296Greenberg,DanielS.,68Gruene,HansF.,239,241GrummanAircraftEngineeringCorp.,4,33,72–73,110,139,267GulfofMexico,359ill.GulfStreamDriftMission.SeeBenFranklin.Gyroscope. See Apollo telescope mount; Control moment gyroscope; Rate

gyroscope;Skylabspacecraft.H-alpha(hydrogen-alpha)telescope,168,174–75ill.,180,302Habitability, spacecraft, (see also Food system, Skylab; Waste management

system,Skylab),130–31Orbitalworkshop,131–40Skylab,139ill.,292–93,307–11,322,333–34,347–48,350

HamiltonStandardDiv,UnitedAircraftCorp.,157Hanes,ThomasE.,119Hardy,GeorgeB.,306Harlan,CharlesS.,366,369–72HarvardCollegeObservatory,76,84,90,176–77,343Hawkins,WillardRoyce,286nHEAO1(satellite),368Henize,KarlG.,289,304Hess,HarryH.,67HighAltitudeObservatory(Colo.),76,84,302,343–44Hindler,Ernest,302,303HollowayCorp.,237Holmes,D.Brainerd,60–61Horizonproject,23HouseofRepresentatives,U.S.:SelectCommitteeonSpace,7SubcommitteeonMilitaryOperations,18,47SubcommitteeonNASAOversight,184SubcommitteeonSpaceScienceandApplications,184

Huffman,GaylordM,146HuntsvilleOperationsSupportCenter(MSFC),217–18Hutchinson,NeilB,272,316,318,329–30,335IBMCorp,231Irwin,JamesB.,280Ise,Rein,169

Jaffe,Leonard,185Johnson,CaldwellC,135,137–40,142–46,261,268,284n,347Johnson,Howard,349ill.Johnson,LyndonB,19,40,52–53,68,83JohnsonSpaceCenter(JSC;seealsoMannedSpacecraftCenter),249CapCom,82,322,332mediacoverage,279,323,370MissionControl,257,271,298ill.,299,319,328–30,332Skylabprogram,256–57,267–68,362,364–65,368,372

Johnston,RichardS,160–62,165Jones,DavidM.,20Justice,Dept.of,365,367Kansas,Univ.of,345Kapryan,WalterJ.,234,239Karth,JosephE.,82Kennedy,JohnF.,2,8,64KennedySpaceCenter(KSC),5–6,48,83,84,113,116,237–39,299,355ill.launchpedestal,233–38,240,247andMSFC,119,214–15,241–43Skylabcheckout,240–41,243–48

Kerwin,JosephP.,78,143ill.,219ill-20,287ill.,288,290–92,293ill.,340medicalexperiments,227ill.,229,283ill-84,286,289ill.workshoprepair,261,269,271,273,276

KindleyNavalAirStation,Bermuda,364Kinzler,JackA.,263,266–67Kleinknecht,KennethS.,33,126–27,157,160,165,188,313,323Koelle,HeinzH.,8,15,23–24,26–27Kohler,RobertC.,226Kohoutek(comet),312,324–25ill.,236,334,351–52,AppendixFKohoutek,Lubos,312,325ill.,326Kraft,ChristopherC,Jr.,145,214,267–68,298ill.,300,329,365–66

Kranz,EugeneF,191–92,215–17,256LakeLoganAgreement,50–52,132Landsat(satellite),346LangleyResearchCenter(LaRC),2,9–10,13,26,28,74,157,268Launchaccident.SeeSkylabmissions,Skylab1.LaunchcomplexesLC-34,232LC-37,232LC-39,232–39,355ill.

Launchpedestal.SeeKennedySpaceCenter.Launchvehicles.SeeCentaur,Delta,Saturn,andTitan.LockheedCo.,14,50,128–29Loewy,RaymondF.,133–34,136–37Loewy/Snaith,Inc.,133–35,136LondonDailyMailHomeShow(1960),25–26Lord,DouglasR.,77,89,98Lousma,JackR.,139ill.,220,266ill.,295–97,300,303–04,308–10Lovell,JamesA.,Jr.,131Low,GeorgeM.,50–51,85,116,129,212,281–82,298Lunarexploration,67,80Lunarmodule(LM),4,12,37,49,71–73,89,110,168Lundin,BruceT.,277Lunney,GlynnS.,299Luskin,HaroldT.,102–03McCandless,Bruce,II,334MacDonald,GordonJ.F.,70McDonnellAircraftCo.,3,24,30–33McDonnellDouglasCorp.orbitalworkshopdevelopment,110,139,152,154,156,161,164Skylab program, 123, 127, 197, 200, 206, 209–11, 214, 227, 241, 243–45,

277–78

Mclntyre,StanleyD.,155–56McNamara,RobertS.,16–18MacQueen,RobertM.,332Maloney,Jim,51–52MannedOrbitingLaboratory(MOL),17–20andAAP,43,46–48,53,80–81,84,99,109,143launchvehicle,26,46

MannedSpaceSciencesDivision.SeeOfficeofSpaceSciences.Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC; see also Flight operations, Johnson Space

Center,LakeLoganAgreement),2–3,10,14,24,28,249nAAP,44–46,85–86,92,105,112,126ATM,37,72–73,173–74,181andMSFC,4–5,32–33,41,91,97–98,119–20,

123,130,146–48,150–52,159–60,170,213–15,217scienceexperiments,62,77,78,89,149,152–58,161–65,183,185,188–89,

192Skylabprogram,113,117,202–03,206,212,218,220–21,226,228,234workshopdevelopment,35–36,93–97,106,110,132–46

Mannedspaceflight,1,2,7–9,63–69,97,333–34,343–44,346–47,353–54MannedSpaceFlightExperimentsBoard,61–62,75,77,88,150,177,185,188Mariner2(interplanetaryprobe),16nMars(planet),19,115Mars,CharlesB,237Marshall Space FlightCenter (MSFC; see also HuntsvilleOperations Support

Center;JohnsonSpaceCenter;MannedSpacecraftCenter;Reentry,Skylab),4–5,19–20,22–29,149,262ill.,266ill.,275ill.

AAP,77–79,85–86,91,105ATM,37,72–74,169,176,180andKSC,119,241–43Skylabhardware,125–27,188–89,164–65,199–200Skylablaunch,233–35,236,237,244–45Skylabprogram,117,120,192,195–96,209–12Skylabrepair,256–57,259–63,266–69,272–74,300workshopdevelopment,30–36,39,95–98,106–11,132–37,142–47,151–62,

197–98MartinMariettaCorp,200,362

AAP,87–88,133–34,142–43,159–60,176,214Skylabprogram,119,117–79,193–94,197–99,206,227,245,247,249,256

Mathews,CharlesW.,31,84–85,88,92–93,95,101,116,119,132–34,147–48,185

Mediacoverage,Skylab(seealsoKohoutek,comet)AAP,44–45,53–56,79,105MSC,2,4,49,51–52NASApublicinformationpolicy,279,281–82Skylabmissions,260,269,286,288,316,320,323,328,333–34,338Skylabreentry,362,368,370–72

Medical experiments (see also Ergometer, Motion sickness, Weightlessness),141,150ill.,283111,289ill.,292ill.,293ill.

AAP,54–55,78–79,90–92,147–48instruments,25,149–65,292,320scientificdataanalysis,286–87,309,339–42Skylabmissions,279–82,283–84,289,313,317,319,323,334

Mercuryprogram,2,8,15,16n,24,48,59–60,63–64,130–31,140Meteoroidshield,25,28,35,88–89,212,243–44 ill.,245,251,253,255,260,

270ill.,277–78accident,251–78

Michel,EdwardL.,286Miller,GeorgeP.,41Moss,FrankE.,276–77Motionsickness,295–98,314–16,340Mueller,GeorgeE,6–7,15,117,232andAAP,21,22,26,34,44,53–56,84,92,95–96,111–12,115andATM,37–38,71–72,74,98,102,177Congressionaltestimony,41,46–47,69,80,99–100,131,106andMSC,46,49,50,93,112andMSFC,20,26–27,29,30–31,48,73,91andNASAbudget,39,40,42–43,86andspacescience,59,61,79,88–89,184workshop development, 33–34, 57, 106–08, 110, 130–31, 133–34, 136–37,

139,142

Multipledockingadapter(MDA),38–39,187ill.,197,199,200–05ill.,207ill.,225ill.

Myers,DaleD,117–18,126–29,147,188–89,220,281–82NASAHeadquarters,1,105–08,162,165,236–37andNASAcenters,6–7,10,12,32–33,48–49,120–21,147andSkylab,182,192,195,209,362,365,370,372

NationalAcademyofSciences,64,185National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA; see also Budget,

NASA;Contract,NASA;NASAHeadquarters),82,121,183,191–92,219,283

andDoD,15–19,46–47andSkylab,220–21,235,276–78,343,361–62,371–72spacepolicy,7–9,11,19–20,41–42,57,64,68–69,80,83,233

NationalAirandSpaceMuseum,353NationalOceanicandAtmosphericAdministration(NOAA),303,362–63NationalScienceTeachersAssn.(NSTA),195,196Naugle,JohnE.,103,184NavalOceanographicOffice,183NavalResearchLaboratory(NRL),84,90,169NeutralBuoyancyFacility (MSFC), 170–71 ill.,206,228 ill., 275 ill. Newell,

HomerR,47,58,60–61,69–72,82,219–20Newkirk,GordonA,Jr.,177Nixon,RichardM.,105,115,118NorthAmericanAirDefenseCommand(NORAD),364,366–71NorthAmericanAviation,Inc.,3,10,12,13,26–27,84–85,110,234NorthAmericanRockwellCorp.,234,267Oberth,Hermann,7OfficeofAdvancedResearchandTechnology(OART,NASAHq.),6Office ofManned Space Flight (OMSF,NASAHq.), 6, 57, 60–62, 116, 129,

182,279–281,367AAP,37,47–48,51,92–93,99

spacescience,70–72,74,77–78,81,90,95–96,98,184–85,189,192OfficeofPublicAffairs(NASAHq.),129,279,281,363OfficeofSpaceScience(OSS,NASAHq.),57–60OfficeofSpaceScienceandApplications(OSSA,NASAHq.),6,36–37,44,58,

60–62,70–72,74,77,90,103,177,184–85,188–89,192,194OfficeofSpaceTransportationSystems(NASAHq.),367OrbitingSolarObservatory(OSO,satellite),69Orbital workshop (see also Horizon project; Lunar module; S-IVB; Skylab

missions,program,spacecraft;Spacestation),28,32ill.,138ill.clusterconcept,36ill.,36–39,54,92–96,101ill.dryworkshop,28,84,93,96,98,105–11,130,135–40,173spentstagelaboratory,22–27,28,30,47,130–31wetworkshop,28,34,35–36,48,91,93,95–98,106–112,130,132–35,173,

255nOrion(barge),243Orrall,FrankQ.,221,226Packer,DonaldM.,304Paine,ThomasO.,83,104,108–09,115–16,128,235,279Parker,RobertA.,288–90,324,327–28Payload.Seenamesofindividualprogramsorspacecraft.Pegasus1(satellite),35,366Petrone,RoccoA.,256,300Phillips,SamuelC.,119Piccard,Jacques,139–40Planktonbloom,359ill.Pogue,WilliamR.,220,308,314–18,320,323–25,327,329–30,331 ill.,333–

38PointBarrow(Navylandingship,dock),211,243President’sScienceAdvisoryCommittee,47,63–64,79–82,99Presscoverage.SeeMediacoverage.Proxmire,William,102Puddy,DonaldR.,253,319,321PurdueUniversity,346

Radiationresearch,168,174,186,196Rambaut,PaulC.,142,154–55RapidCity,S.D.,358ill.Rategyroscope.SeeSkylabspacecraft,attitudecontrolsystem.Reentry,Skylab,127–29,212,361–72.SeealsoSpacejunk.Rees,EberhardF.M.,51,126,145–48,211Reeves,EdmondM.,176,343Remotesensing,182,184–86ill.,189ill.,190,192,321ill.,358–60ill.instruments,182–83,185–87ill.,188–89,191,193–94,206,245,247scientificvalue,339,345–47Skylabmissions,289,291–92,303–04,313,319,320,334

Rescuemission,298–99Ross,Charles,286Rumsfeld,DonaldH.,99,102Ryan,WilliamF,99S-IVB(Saturnlaunchvehiclestage;seealsoOrbitalworkshop),23–31,34–35,

38ill.,40,84,207,212,259Sanders,FredJ.,210Salyut6(Sovietspacecraft),372Sargent,Howard,362–63Sasseen,GeorgeT.(Ted),241SatelliteControlFacility,46Saturn(launchvehicle),4–5,80,102SaturnI,4,5,16n,40SaturnIB,5,10,26,40,80,84,105budgetcuts,47,99–100SkylabCSMlaunch,231–34,236,239–40,243,246ill.,247–49ill.,313ill.

SaturnV,5,7,26,80payloadcapacity,76,105,107–08,110Skylab launch,232–33,236, 239–40,

243,247–48ill.,249ill.,253,255workshoplaunchproposals,10,28,84,99,101,108,114

Schirra,WalterM.,16nSchmitt,HarrisonH.,219–20Schneider,WilliamC.,118–21,123–26,194–95,212,230,235,247budget,126–27,176–77,188–89Skylabmissions,263,268,281,300,323,330,333,338–39workshopdevelopment, 106–110,136–37,139, 142, 144, 147, 154–55, 157,

162Schriever,Bernard,46Schweickart,RussellL.,261,263,266,272–73,275ill.Schwinghamer,RobertJ.,151–52,160–61,267Seamans,RobertC.,Jr.,6,16,20,29,37,43,46–47,53,60,71–74,76–77,87,

92,95Shea,JosephF.,11–12Shepard,AlanB.,Jr.,316Shows,JamesC.,210Siepert,AlbertF.,51Simmons,Henry,44Simmons,WilliamK.,Jr.,209,211Sjoberg,SigurdA.,298ill.SkylabContingencyWorkingGroup,365–66,368SkylabCoordinationCenter,370SkylabMedicalExperimentsAltitudeTest(SMEAT),162–65Skylabmissions(seealsoAppendixA)Skylab1(workshoplaunch),253,255–69accident,251–56repair,256–71investigation,276–78

Skylab2(firstmannedmission),269,271–73,276,279–94Skylab3(secondmannedmission),295–96ill.-05ill.,306–11Skylab4(thirdmannedmission),312–31ill.,332–38

Skylabprogram(seealsoApolloApplicationsprogram;Contract,NASA;Flightoperations,Skylab;Reentry,Skylab;Skylabmissionsandspacecraft),1,9,114–16,129,198ill.,215,231,238,251

budget,116,126–27,188–89

documentation,118–19,121,199experiments. See Habitability, Medical experiments, Remote sensing, Solar

research,Spacescience,AppendixD.reviews,121–25,181,197,206schedules,125–27,161–62,180–81,210–11,238,247,256SkylabII(proposal),116–18

SkylabProgramOffice,1,121,231,234,237SkylabResultsSymposium,345–46Skylabspacecraft(seealsoAirlock;ATM;Foodsystem;Habitability;Meteoroid

shield; Multiple docking adapter; Neutral Buoyancy Facility; Orbitalworkshop;Reentry;Wastemanagement),130,208–09ill.,248ill.-49 ill.-50ill.,251–52,295,298–99,317,331ill.,335–37ill.,338,353

attitudecontrolsystem,256,257–58,306–07,319–20,320–22,330,333,365launchcheckout,238–43,245–48orbitalinclination,123,189ill.,190–91,361simulators,169,206–07,219ill.,222–25ill.,227–29ill.-30,292,300,312solararrays,245,253,255,257–58,268–70ill.,272–75Í11.-76ill.-77ill.,288sunshade,259–62 ill.,263–66 ill.,267–68,271–72,277 ill.,300–01 ill.,302,

337ill.Skylabstudentexperimentprogram,194–96,352Slayton,DonaldK.(Deke),218–21,230,263,329SmallBusinessAdministration,236–37Smart,JacobE.,184Smith,MargaretChase,100Snaith,WilliamT.,133Solarresearch(seealsoAdvancedOrbitingSolarObservatory,Apollotelescope

mount,H-alphatelescope),166,289,356–57ill.instruments,166–68,302–03,320scientificvalue,339,342–45solarflare,175ill.,290–91,302–03,331–33,345ill.,355ill.

SouthAtlanticmagneticanomaly,291,335SpaceActof1958(NationalAeronauticsandSpaceActof1958),15Spacejunk,127–29,361,369–70Spacelaw,128

Spaceprogram,U.S.,1,5,7–8,15–16,183–84,362Kennedyadministration,2,8–9,63–65Johnsonadministration,41,79–82Nixonadministration,105,115

Spacerace,7,16,40,42,64,362,372Space science (see also Gemini, experiments; Lunar exploration; Medical

experiments;Remotesensing;Solarresearch),7,57–69,79–82,354,AppendixD.

SpaceScienceandApplicationsSteeringCommittee,60–61,90,177,185SpaceScienceBoard(NationalAcademyofSciences),64,65–66,68–69SpacescientistsNASA relations, 90, 102, 118, 121, 174–79, 191–92, 194–96, 218–21, 227,

241,251,288–91,303,332researchpriorities,64–69,79–82,150–51,153–54,160,185Skylabresults,339–40,342–43,353

SpaceShuttleprogram,106,114,118,182,212,353,361,362,366Spacestation,1,7,9–15,17–19,21,80,105,106,114,130–31SpaceTaskGroup(LangleyResearchCenter),2–3,8,12SpaceTaskGroup(PresidentNixon’s),115Spacecraft,manned(seealsoAstronauts;Orbitalworkshop;Skylabspacecraft),

2–4,12–14,130–31,253Spacewalk.SeeExtravehicularactivity.Spentstagelaboratory.SeeOrbitalworkshop.Sputnik(Sovietsatellite),7State,Departmentof,128,363,365,367Steelman,DonaldL,115SuperGuppy(cargoaircraft),207Teague,OlinE,18,49,102Telemetry,216–17,318Teleprinter,292,294ill.,309,324,332–34Telescope.SeeApollotelescopemount;H-alphatelescope.Television.SeeMediacoverage.Thompson,FloydL.,97–98,103–04,184–85

Thompson,RobertF.,85,91–92,94–95,154,174Thormissilesystem,23Thornton,StanleyW.,Jr.,371Thornton,WilliamE.,163,320Timmons,KennethP.,194Tindall,HowardW.,Jr.,298ill.Titan(launchvehicle),17,26,46–47,80Toerge,Fred,133,138Tousey,RichardL.,90,178,221,226,344–45Trackingstation,190,216,253,255,365Truly,RichardH.,210–11,327–29Tsiolkowskiy,KonstantinE.,7VandenbergAirForceBase,46VehicleAssemblyBuilding,5–6,231–32,239,247–48,355ill.VonBockel,JohnJ.,221,227,230vonBraun,Wernher,7,9n,10,15,23–24,26–27,51,145nlaunchvehicles,4,76andMSFC,5,20,22,91,119workshop development, 29, 32–36, 77, 85, 88, 95–96, 106, 108, 120, 151,

174nVoskhod(Sovietspacecraft),40,295Vostok(Sovietspacecraft),16,295Wastemanagementsystem,spacecraft,152–53ill.,154–58,163,164–65Webb,JamesE,16,90–91,95–96,99Apolloprogram,49,83–85,109n,111NASAbudget,15,43,52–53,66,86–87,100,102–04post-Apolloplanning,19–20,68,97,105

Weightlessness,7,29,136n,307–08,322,348artificialgravity,10,97,116–17medicaleffectsof,11,25,63,149–50,162,317,339–40underwatersimulation,170–71ill.,206,228ill.,275ill.

Weitz,PaulJ,139,220,227ill.,229,269,271,283ill.-84,290ill.,291–93 ill.,308

WesternTestRange,46Wetworkshop.SeeOrbitalworkshop.White,EdwardH.,II,40,350Wiesner,JeromeB.,64Williams,FrankL.,23,27,29–32,34Williams,GradyF.,233–35Wilmarth,VerlRichard,304Wyoming,Universityof,345Yardley,JohnF.,367Yarymovych,MichaelI.,15Zerogravity.SeeWeightlessness.

TheAuthors

CharlesDunlapBensongrewupinWinterPark,Florida,notfarfromCapeCanaveral’s missile ranges. He attended Davidson College, earning Phi BetaKappahonorsandAll-SouthernConference selection in football.After servicewith the 82d Airborne Division, Benson entered graduate training at theUniversity of Florida (Ph.D., 1970). His dissertation concerned roles andmissions of the armed services afterWorldWar II. He is the co-author (withWilliamBarnabyFaherty)ofMoonport:AHistoryofApolloLaunchFacilitiesand Operations (NASA SP-4204), 1978. After completing his work on thepresentvolume,hewas recalled toactiveduty in theU.S.Armyand isnowalieutenantcolonel.

WilliamDavidComptonwasborn inDeLeon,Texas (1927),and receivedB.S.andM.S.degreesfromNorthTexasStateUniversityandthePh.D.fromtheUniversity of Texas (Austin). His academic training was in science, and hetaught at West Texas State University and Colorado School of Mines beforemoving to Prescott, Arizona, to help establish a science program in a newliberal-artscollege.AfterfouryearsatPrescott,hewasgrantedleavetostudyatImperialCollegeofScienceandTechnology,London,andreceivedanM.Sc.inhistory of technology from the University of London in 1972. At PrescottCollegehe inauguratedaprogramof liberal studies inscienceand technology.UponcompletionoftheSkylabhistory,heworkedforanenergyconsultantfirmin Houston and is presently under contract to NASA to write a history ofApollo’slunarexplorationmissions.

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