LIVERPOOL CITY COIJHC1L

H11-LS301<0X1C5E DISASTER WOiSlKG PART'

I N T E R I M R E P O R T

September 1989

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INDEX

Page:

•H.W.P. Response to L. J. Taylor's Report ,, ,, 1 - 1 4

H.W.P. Interim Recommendations

Introduction . .. .. .. . . •• •• 1 “ -4

PART II

Liverpool Supporters ' at 'Away7 Matches 4 - 6

Ho Conspiracy . . .. ». . . . . • ♦ 6 - ?

PART 111

The Conclusions .. . . . . . . . » » » ?

Trie Police . . . . . . . . . » . • • • 7 - 1 1

The Football Association . . .. . . . .. 11 - 12

Sheffield Wednesday F.C, ,, ». .. . , 1 2 - 1 3

Sheffield City Council . . .. .. ., 13

PART IV

L.J.T. Interim Recommendations .. .. . , 1 4 - 1 6

' H.W.P. Conclusions .. . . .. •» ,.17

H.W.P, Interim Recommendations .. . , 1 8 - 1 9

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r’baxr of the Hillsborough Working Party lias prepared^ an ̂xnt-criin t#e X*- on the findings and recommendations contained in Lord justice floor's mterim Feport of Inquiry into the Hillsborough Stadium

gastel- of XSt* April 1989.

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«as you look around Hillsborough you will appreciate why it ■has been regarded for so long as the perfect venue for all Kinds of important matches."

Bert McGee: Chairman of Sheffield Wednesday F.C., from the match programme for 15th April 1989.

Members will be aware that Phase I of the Inquiry concentrated on identifying the causal factors, their influence and significance, that led to the_death o_ 95 ̂Liverpool football supporters and over 730 injured on ana about the central sections of Hillsborough's West Terrace.L J Tavlor's findings led to 43 interim recommendations ol wAichis were required to be implemented before the 1989/90 Football League programme commenced.

The Hillsborough Interim Report was published by ohe Home Secretary on 4th August 1989. The limited scopeof Jie Report's oroposals constitute a 'holding exercise ana , in*" the light of evidence submitted to _ Phase II of ohe Incruiry, be subject to amendment or withdrawal in the full ̂ report which should be published in early 1990. The second ohase of the Inquiry, based in London,, will conbiaer wider 'issues relating to post-Hillsborough football including: aieneeds of crowd control and public safety at spores evenrs, membership schemes; identity cards? all seater staaia? super stadia; ticketiess fans; ticket touts,*_and otner specific • matters such as excessive pre-match drinKing.

L, J. Taylor, 59, was appointed a High Court Judge in 1980 and has been an Appeal Court Judge since 1987. He prosecuted in the John Poulson corruption trial and lea th_ prosecution team at the 1979 trial of Jeremy Thorpe, who was cleared of conspiracy and incitement to murder.

During the course of the Inquiry,clear evidence of thoroughness, commonsense and a sensitivity to the way the football industry operates has characterised an approach commensurate to the task in hand.

The Hillsborough tragedy was the fifth post-war soccer disaster involving multiple deaths. (The others were at Bolton, Ibrox, Bradford and Heysel.)> Eachpossessea indisputable ingredients; human tailings;_inadequate stadi »and flawed pre-match planning. What distinguishes each disaster is the fatal mixture of these ingredients.

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The Taylor report concludes: the worst disaster in thehistory of_British football directly happened because pens 3 and 4 on Hillsborough's West Terrace became * grossly overcrowded' and was subject to fatal crushing upon the opening of Gate C, to ease the unrelieved pressure at the seven West Terrace turnstiles, sometime after 2.52 p.m. The failure of the Police to block-off the central tunnel accessing pens 3 and 4, combined with an absence of monitoring to these pens and control to the numbers entering them, allowed a series of fatal surges to occur through poorly laid out crash barriers leading to the collapse of two sections of barrier 124a in pen 3 after 2.52 p.m.

At the heart of the disaster is human failing. L.J. Taylor's document grimly identifies and documents human failing on the day, in pre-match arrangements., and in the supervision of Hillsborough's General Safety Certificate. A combination of these wholly avoidable failings led to the deaths of 95 people at a stadium declared a 'premier venue' by the Football Association.

Throughout the document, L. J. Taylor applies the term 'piecemeal' to describe his view of the impact of enforced and voluntary changes to Hillsborough and the management of human traffic at football matches. This can be extended as a living metaphor for an industry - and its practices - which, as it enters the 21st century, can accommodate live satellite transmissions of its product under conditions that starkly contrast private affluence and public squalor.

The piecemeal way Football's vested interests have accommodated successive judicial representations for change in safety practices is underpinned by Governmental indifference. Safety should no longer be subj ect to arbitrary targetting and the hidden hand of the market. Government's responsibility should no longer be shirked.

The conditions prevailing at Hillsborough on April 15th neither occurred in a vacuum nor in isolation. The poverty of official thinking and institutionalised (mal)practices within the football industry remains undiminished less than two weeks into the new soccer season. In many ways Hillsborough is football in miniature. The fundamental malaise that afflicts the English game, condensed into the events of that one afternoon, illuminates the task in hand.

At a Press conference prior to the Inquiry's preliminary hearing, L.J. Taylor stressed his investigation would not be about apportioning blame. Yet the course and contents of the Inquiry's account of the events led him to conclude: ”The main reason for the disaster was the failure of Police control.”

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On August 5th, the day after the Report's^publication, rhief Superintendent David Duckenfleld, the ofxicer rommanding, was suspended on full-pay. Moreover, the om.y eople yet to be dismissed for their conduct arising from the disaster has been a civilian Press officer with the South Yorkshire Police, and a junior ambulanceman.

With 801 officers under Duckenfield's overall command, to control a crowd of some 54,000, the collapse of effective leadership compromised the lives of many people in the small turnstile enclave on Leppings Lane and, with fatal consequences, the lives of innocent spectators corralled into pens meant to secure their safety. A similar number of Police Officers were deemed necessary to prevent some 500 'hippies" assembling at Stonehenge intent on celebrating the summer solstice. That spring afternoon, at a Hillsborough bathed in sunshine, British football reached its lowest point. It has yet to creep out of its Victorian sewer.

The Taylor document uniquely places a multi-agency crowd management and decision-making process under uhe microscope. Weeks of planning, years of experience and decades of neglect are copiously examined. Taylor's verdict on the events (of that spring afternoon on April 15th) forms a blistering catalogue of the bankruptcy of thoughts and deeds that characterise the culture and procedures of those self-regulating 'interested parties' who administered, policed and licenced the Hillsborough Stadium.

In unravelling the complex chain of events and influences at Hillsborough, L. J . Taylor highights four salient factors which can be replicated across football:-

1. The extent to which judicial recommendations are compromised by reason of cost, indifference and complacency;

2. many of the 'Green Guides' safety provisions are _ defined in general terms and are consequently subject to minimal interpretations. Guidance must becomemandatory and be subject to a regular, annual review, based on a clearly defined 'report-back' process?

3. the degree to which 'hooligan hysteria' permeates deep into the occupational culture and operational practices of major police forces at football matches places safety consideration to the vagaries of security and segregatory practices effectively promoting a cavalier disregard for football spectators as citizens and consumers;

4. the need for what Lord Hailsham - the creator of the post of Minister of Sport in 1962 - called "a coherentbody of doctrine, perhaps even a philosophy of govern­ment encouragement."

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From the statements gathered by the Hillsborough Working Party and those advanced to this office from the F.S.A., (Football Supporters' Association) a clear picture emerged quite quickly in our reading of fans eye-witness accounts. Coupled with a review of the Inquiry's, 3,800 plus pages of transcript, the reports findings are consistent with our evaluation of the oral, written and visual evidence available to the Hillsborough Working Party.

L. J. Taylor's reconstruction of events and causal interpretation is wide-ranging and comprehensive given his terms of reference. Consequently, Parts I and II of his document should be considered an authoritive and stimulating account of the tragedies long-term, short-term and immediate causes. However, issue is taken with two points of interpretation identifiable in paragraphs 205-207 and 208. Wider observation and criticisms of Parts III and IV form the remainder of this Working Party's Interim Report.

Phase I of the Inquiry lasted a total of 34 days including the preliminary hearing and final submission from Counsel. 174 witnesses gave evidence, 65 of whom werepolice officers. From its inception and beyond genuinely held fears and misgivings were expressed as to the objectivity, fairness and reliability of a departmental inquiry. Fear of an Establishment cover-up, given the lamentable performance of South Yorkshire Police, and more pertinently, concern with a victim-blaming backlash, personified in the Chief Superintendent's original account, reinforced many people's fears. These understandable anxieties were quickly dispelled in the course of the Inquiry and in its published findings.

Liverpool Supporters at 'Away' Matches:

In paragraphs 205-207, L. J. Taylor briefly summarises and discusses a dossier, produced by South Yorkshire Police and presented as evidence, claiming to identify a pattern of ticketless fans, some with forgeries, in attendance at Liverpool 'away' matches. Though Taylor rightly dismisses the claim that at Hillsborough this was a causal factor in the build-up to the disaster, his persistent and underlying logic throughout is that to attend or attempt to attend an 'away' fixture without a ticket constitutes deviant, troublesome behaviour. The assertion that ticketless fans are a problem, which is to be dealt with in Phase II of the Inquiry, involves a misleading understanding of the issue.

The incidence of ticketless fans at major football

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^•f-rhes is a product of a number of variables and is not Reducible to a single causal influence._ Indeed, those heople who point their finger at fans, including the F.A., | ave much to gain from locating blame with the fans alone.

The dossier does not constitute the 'whole history' of this particular problem nor does it offer a reliable account of its incidence and causation. As an account of ticketless activity amongst Liverpool supporters it is a fundamentally flawed argument and document.

A brief non—comprehensive list of influences underlying the problem are listed below:-

1. Liverpool F.C., like a number of major English clubs, draws support from all over Britain. Beyond the _ impracticalities of purchasing tickets for fans living outside the Merseyside region the market for Liverpool tickets, especialy all-ticket games, is often _ , over-subscribed. With Liverpool's huge following m_the"Capital demand is always inflated when the Club play in the London area. Games such as those detailed by L.J. Taylor _ are often advertised in Liverpool as being sold-out, when m fact seasoned fans know 'cash payment' gates are usually available. And there are obvious difficulties for fans outside of Liverpool.

2. The success of Liverpool has led to a corresponding inflation in demand for tickets at all Liverpool games which the Club cannot cope with given the capacity at Anfleld (a situation aggravated by the 15% cut in terrace capacities at all grounds). Existing stadia, including Wembley, cannot accommodate peak demand, a fact exploited by ticket touts. With all seated-stadiums and a compulsory football membership scheme on the Government's sporting agenda, stadium capacities will be further reduced. It is he Clubs' failure to invest, long-term,_in its fixed assets (i.e. stadia) that has created the situation.

3. The issue, moreover, from an 'away' fans perspective is one of inconsistent ticket practices and plain exploitation. Many clubs operate dual pricing regimes for visitors and home spectators. The F.A's humble turn-around, following Hillsborough, on allocation policy did not happen from any sense of justice. It is cynical exploitation and inherently unfair practices which fuels the problem.

4. The decision to attend an 'away' fixture is often spontaneously taken with the practical knowledge that legitimate entry can be gained to a match that is ticketed. At Luton, on Saturday, August 26th, some 1,000 Liverpool ̂fans attended a ground which had unilaterally banned away supporters. As members of this Working Party have already

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drawn attention to this issue in relation to L.J. Taylor's examples (para.206), it should be stated that it is not a criminal activity to attend an 'away' match ticketless, nor is it indicative of bad behaviour.

No Conspiracy:

In football semi-final and final matches are, for the spectators, tense but festive occasions. All are 'away fans', strangers for the duration of the game. Both ticketless fans and fans the worse for drink tend to be more noticeable at such neutral venue games. Considering the amplification of the problems associated with football and alcohol misuse in sections of the print-media it is a phenomenon not unknown to the authorities, least of all the Police in their operational planning.

Given the incidence of multiple deaths in British soccer stadia and the intensification of social control efforts in the post-Heysel period, it is incumbent on the Police, more so at matches where all spectators are strangers to a venue, to legislate for every eventuality based on known criteria. Thus every crowd management regime must take into account all problems that are likely to arise.

Paragraph 208 of the report clearly states that groups of ticketless 'fans' and a 'minority' who had drank too much "certainly aggravated the problems faced by the Police."Of all the ingredients at a turnstile facility, prone to congestion, which contained 23 turnstiles for 24,256 ticket-holding spectators, the most predictable are the aforementioned.

What aggravated 'the problem faced by the Police' was not this most foreseeable of problems but rather the ruthless fixation of the South Yorkshire Police to keep rival spectators apart causing the closure of 12 North Stand turnstiles on the Pennistone Road, which had the resultant effect of exacerbating numbers accessing the Leppings Lane turnstiles, thus impairing the efficiency of the turnstiles devoid of a controlled filtration operation.

However, disconcerting for people like John Carlisle, M.P., there was nothing noteworthy in the behaviour of Liverpool fans at the turnstiles area and within the ground on the day. What the Police did not legislate for was the likelihood that their operation could so compromise basic safety that it could lead to a disaster.

It needs to be clearly stated that to the allegations of 'mass drunkenness', and the looting of the dead's

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possessions, L. J. Taylor is frankly blunt: "Not a singlewitness was called before the Inquiry to support any of these allegations, although every opportunity was afforded for any of the represented parties to have any witness called whom they wished."

H I - THE CONCLUSIONS:

The degree to which the Hillsborough Report determines responsibility is of some concern. Four organisations are clearly blamed for the tragedy yet L. J. Taylor's allocation of blame results in comparative marginalisation of the roles and obligations of the F.A., Sheffield City -Council and,Sheffield Wednesday Football Club. All were feausative agents.

The slow accumulated effects of complacency, mismanagement and piecemeal deterrent led safety strategies, coupled with operational blunders on the day, compromised human safety to the point of indifference. The findings of the Hillsborough Report and interim recommendations mirror that fact.

The basic element of a first-class football match is that predictable, even identifiable numbers of people will assemble at a clearly defined location over a specific time. On such an irreducible fact, each Saturday, during the football season, varying concentrations of people enter into human traffic control systems based on the principles and the spirit of the Safety At Sports Grounds Act, 1975, and the voluntary provisions of its supplementary 'Green Guide' (Home Office Code for Safety at Grounds). In theory, via a multi-agency approach, spectators access and take a position in a certificated controlled environment. This supposedly structured approach to spectator safety has developed on the basis of lessons claimed to have been learned from the Bolton disaster onwards. However, its application to all 92 league clubs was not effected until the Popplewell Review of 1985.

The Police:

A remarkable feature of the document is the forthright manner in which Taylor demarcates responsibility._ His findings constitute a damning and unequivocal indictment of the manner in which the South Yorkshire Police operation at Hillsborough was planned, led and administered. Even in their evidence to the Inquiry, L.J. Taylor conceded (para. 279). "Sadly, I must report that for the most part the quality of their evidence was in inverse proportion to their rank."

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Trained solely for a public order response, Police operational orders on the day and the de-facto influence of social control perceptions of safety compromised the lives of 95 people and injured many others. The document testifies to L.J. Taylor's frustration in his most revealing remark in the whole text (para. 285): "It is a matter of regret that at the hearing, and in their submissions, the South Yorkshire Police were not prepared to concede that they were in any respect at fault in what occurred ....It would have been more seemly and encouraging for the future if responsibility had been faced.11

It is this attitude of mind, deeply engrained in the operational culture of many major Police Forces in the policing of football matches - highlighted in the terms and conditions of the Operational Orders of the South Yorkshire Police for April 15th which breeds a siege mentality and a siege approach to spectator safety. The Police, in effect, have become the front-line for a Government slavish in its advocacy of repressive football regulations. On any other terrain such a strategy would stimulate a national outcry. How bitterly ironic that most major football stadiums now resemble a Gulag.

The Hillsborough Report's findings graphically detail the dangers of a public order approach rather than a public safety approach to crowd control by the Police. Taylor, because of his strict terms of reference, is unable to investigate whether this approach to crowd control is adopted by most of the other Police Forces. Evidence based on the contemporary history of Hillsborough as a premier venue endorses the claim that crowd safety is not only a patchworth guilt of half-measures but, in the hands of many Police Forces, has become a hit-and-miss affair. Indeed, with some irony, it is the South Yorkshire and West Midlands Police Forces that head the F.S.A's complaints list.

L. J. Taylor's assertion that South Yorkshire Police "have handled crowd problems sensitively and successfully" - (para. 270) at a large number of football games and during coal and steel strikes, is an interpretation - not a fact.It is a misleading statement. One has to ask: Sensitivity and success - by whose standards?

A review of Hillsborough attendance figures for all first-class matches over the last decade raises serious doubts about operational experience and expertise against a backcloth of average gates that fall far short of capacity. Semi-final ties provide the only consistent full capacities at Sheffield Wednesday F.C., who on average have less than one capacity gate for each season. A clear example of the effect this has on safety strategy is

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discernible in the dual policy of 'filling the terraces.'The practice of letting fans 'find their own level'(para. 171) - within a terrace regime that mirrors a maze - is borne out of inexperience and a disregard for the people populating those terraces.

The collapse of operational leadership occurred under conditions that were entirely foreseeable. Under such circumstances, how can internal monitoring of Police control strategies for football be continued given the extent to which the findings of the Hillsborough Report castigate almost every feature of the Police operation?

The Police operation at Hillsborough was the product of an attitudinal approach formulated over recent years. It was, on the basis of the evidence, not the result of events on the day. In total, the Hillsborough disaster was the product of mistaken priorities and a mentality which reflects the erosion of consensus over use of Police power over football spectators. This erosion, a development of the 1980's, had its catalyst in the Heysel disaster. Its product has produced, amongst many senior and junior Police Officers, a negative stereotyping of soccer supporters.

When a group/category of people are viewed as a problem to be restrictively and strongly policed, based on a negative reputation, then correspondingly negative notions of suspicion dominate interactions with spectators (ask any 'away' fan!). This suspicion, on a practical level compromises quite radically the facility of 'benefit of doubt'. On pens 3 and 4 on 15th April 1989, many people were denied any benefit of doubt. That suspicion, institutionalised and accumulated over the recent past, has so permeated operational culture and practices that the capacity of the Police not just to recognise suffering but to understand and comprehend it, led to such a delay in their response to the crisis confronting them in pen 3 and 4.

Four specific points on Police tactics deserve to be illustrated:-

1. On the basis of Police operational orders for 1989, as influenced by the 1988 fixture, L. J. Taylor summarises the response of the Police to the immediate crisis on pens 3 and 4 thus: (para. 246) "Accordingly that prohibition (pitch access) was emphasised in the 1989 Operational Order by being put into capital letters. The combination of no instructions as to overcrowding and a strong prohibition on opening the gates was likely to make Police recognition of crushing slow and their response reluctant."

This reductionist interpretation is later qualified:(para 248) "Naturally one would hope that common sense and

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humanity would make some officers cut through the rules and open a gate if fans were clearly in distress." This, of course, was the logic initially behind the request for Gate c to be opened in the face of unrelieved pressure to the West Terrace turnstiles. But common sense and humanity are so constrained by Police rules and regulations and attitudinal appraisals of football fans that, even when confronted by a tragedy of epic proportions, the inadequate belated response of officers was to call for fans to move backwards to ease congestion at the front of the pens.

Well in advance of the kick-off, spectators within the West Terrace and the North Stand were signalling to Police Officers and amongst themselves to the difficulties on the central pens as early as 2.45. The Police were made aware of the developing and increasing fears of fans well in advance of their recognition and response to the situation as an actual emergency.

2. Through a public address system, video cameras, personal radios, and a bank of television monitors - all manned - the flow of the disaster was unheeded. From an elevated Police control box - crammed with audio-visual equipment - events unfolded unrecognised. L. J. Taylor remarks: (para. 244) "... attempts could have been made toalert Officers on the perimeter track to watch for overcrowding and report their observations. In the event, pens 3 and 4 became more and more crowded, surges tookplace, fans were showing and signallying distress. None ofthis was seen or recognised in the (Police) control room."

3. The refusal to delay the kick-off was a decision left to Chief Superintendent Duckenfield. At the correspondingfixture for 1987 (Leeds United -v- Coventry City) the Police delayed the kick-off because of the late-arrivals. This fact, not available to Chief Superintendent Duckenfield, raises questions about what did and did not influence Police operational orders and their subsequent (non)amendment.

4. On the 1988 fixture and the subject of policing to theLeppings Lane turnstile approaches, L. J . Taylor comments (para. 24) "There was a very large and consistent body of evidence that, on the day, the Police in Leppings Lane conducted an efficient filtering exercise, designed to keep away those without tickets and control the flow of fans towards the ground." However, opposition from the Police to this claim forces L. J. Taylor to conclude: (para. 215)"I think, be that whilst the policy may have been no different, in practice the policing in 1988 was more efficient and was not put to the same test and strain as a year later.'1

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With all the resources available to the Inquiry Team, we find it very surprising on the basis of 'consistent evidence' that L. J. Taylor can only provide an opinion and cannot clarify whether there was a major policy difference between policing at the Leppings Lane in 1988 and 1989.

Football Association:

The F.A. escape relatively unscathed in the Report.Lord Justice Taylor criticises the choice of grounds and believes the F.A. in future will be more sensitive and responsive to reasonable representations about their choice of grounds for semi-finals.

The F.A. received many complaints about the ticket allocation in 1988. Their response in 1989 was to do exactly the same as in 1988, displaying considerable contempt for both Liverpool F.C., who made representations and their supporters.

On the basis of Hillsborough's recent safety record, the F.A.'s belief that it was, prior to April 15th, a 'premier venue' defies belief. As the Games Governing Body and as the designators of the match itself, their failure to acquaint themselves with Hillsborough's safety certificate is a startling failure of duty. Post-Hillsborough, both the F.A. and the Football League have not introduced a mechanism to collate, assimilate and evaluate information on safety management at Football League grounds - nor do they intend to. This is a dereliction of responsibility in the light of the Hillsborough findings.

If Hillsborough personifies the best English Football can offer, then it says little for the standards and expectations of the F.A. at Hillsborough and all other League grounds. Standards of safety, comfort and spectator facilities are Dickensian compared to many other fixed leisure venues, especially as football constitutes the country's national game. Hillsborough should never have been chosen again as a neutral venue location on the basis of its pre 1989 safety record.

The West Terrace has long been criticised by supporters on Merseyside because of crushing problems and also the restricted views due to fencing. Whilst those criticisms may not have reached the ears of the F.A. certainly the events at the 1981 semi-final between Spurs and Wolves did, when many Spurs fans were injured in a crush at the West Terrace. On the next occasion (1987) the ground was used for a semi-final tie between Leeds and Coventry and this provoked complaints from Leeds fans who were allocated the West Terrace and experienced crushing problems. The

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kick-off at that game was also delayed due to the late arrival of supporters at the stadium.

The issue, primarily for L. J. Taylor, on the choice of venue, ends, and the unfairness of the F.A.'s decision to play the semi-final in Sheffield for the second consecutive year was validated in the report on the basis that the 1988 fixture "had been considered a successfully managed event", (para. 270). Clearly, the Liverpool fans present at that fixture had not been privy to these considerations. At that match severe overcrowding in pens 3 and 4 caused many fans to evacuate the terracing via the West Stand. When this became uniform, a little before kick-off time in 1988, the Police moved in to close-off the central tunnel. The pictures of fans being hauled up into the West Stand, on the Inquiry's video, were similar to the 1988 incidents.

Sheffield Wednesday Football Club:

L. J . Taylor's evaluation of the performance of the Club is brief but scathing. Whilst there is little to dispute in Taylor's remarks, the inconsistencies and failures highlighted reinforce the point that Hillsborough should never have been chosen as the venue for any game involving two 'away' sides. This is not to be wise after the event; clearly, Hillsborough, on past performances, alone was not a suitable venue given the problems associated with the West Terraces. If the Football Association had bothered to inspect the General Safety Certificate for Hillsborough, in discussion with the Club, the problems with the Certificate would have been identified. Indeed, it is remiss of the F.A. not to have done this as a matter of course following the 1981, 1987 and 1988 incidents.

_The Club's failure to provide meaningful, clear and distinct signposting is indicative of the neglect surrounding the Safety Certificate and the absence of effective critical monitoring.

The crisis at the turnstiles was rooted in the lack of turnstile facilities in an enclave incapable of coping with the demand placed upon it. Congestion at turnstiles has become the norm in football, and the authorities have, in consequence, become immune to the inadequate ratio of turnstiles to customers. It is intolerable that this situation should continue.

The performance of Sheffield Wednesday Football Club in respect of its ground safety should have been known by the F.A. L. J. Taylor is unequivocal:"The Leppings Lane end was unsatisfactory and ill-suited to admit the numbers invited."

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Sheffield Wednesday's piecemeal attitude to safety management on the West Terrace was influenced by cost and South Yorkshire Police's power of influence.

Sheffield City Council:

The poor performance of the local authority is more than "inefficient and dilatory". (para 286). The former Licensing Authority's failure (South Yorkshire County Council) take account of the 1981 and 1985 alterations - which created the 'fixed' conditions of the disaster - was a serious breach of its responsibility to update the Certificate.. That breach, and others, were compounded in the transfer of certification to Sheffield City Council.The failure of the local authority to review the history of the Certificate, certify the necessary amendments and enforce its responsibilities effectively negated the value of the Certificate. The failure to amend the Certificate on one point alone (i.e. proper maximum figures for each distinct pen) rendered the Certificate worthless.

That the relevant authorities were fully informed by Sheffield Wednesday Football Club of notifiable ground alterations without effect to the Certificate reinforces the collective failure of responsibility between both certificating authorities. In effect, the transfer of the Certificate involved a transfer of attitudes and practices.

The failure of the local authority to diligently and effectively monitor and enforce their obligations through its statutory powers within the Certificate and in other areas meant a pro-active, constructive and structured approach to safety was lost from the outset. The accumulative effect was to allow the South Yorkshire Police to effectively dominate the safety agenda. Ironically, on the issue of the West Terrace's capacity, the Police appeared to be the lone voice of dissent within this ethical basement.

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PART IV - INTERIM RECOMMENDATIONS - 1

In the preamble to the 43 recomendations, L. J. Taylor identifies the specific matters to be dealt with in Phase II | of his Inquiry. He dedicates the bulk of this section to a rationale for delaying a decision on pitch perimeter fencing. This is a mistake and cannot be justified on the 1 basis of an appeal for "The need to consider further expert ;| evidence." His selective quotation, from the F.S.A. (para.309) submission, is not the position of this Working Party and it is based on a falsehood; perimeter fences are not necessary for crowd control. If they were, why have at least three major first-division clubs, pre Hillsborough, not erected pitch perimeter fences?

The claim that fences, especially high perimeter fences, deter hooliganism is a fiction. What they do is contain people in a fixed area and their undesirability in the event of a disaster is well documented.

During the Standing Committee stage of the Safety at Sports Ground Act (1975) it was recognised that a pitch provided the safest and easiest means of evacuating an area.It needs to be stressed that the Hillsborough fence goes against recommendations delivered in Popplewell's full 1report. Indeed, in January 1986, Popplewell recommended and stressed "the importance of allowing full access to the pitch where this is likely to be used as a place of safety in an emergency." At Hillsborough, the Police had determined that the pitch was inviolate.

L. J. Taylor does not require further evidence to influence his thinking. Following the Popplewell Report, the Institute of Structural Engineers set up a Report Committee, including a D.O.E. representative, to look into sports ground safety. Three years after its inception, the Institute's Report, originally to be subject to final approval of the draft on 9th May 1989, still awaits the Institute's acceptance. The Institute is due to compare and contract its own findings with those of the Taylor Interim Report on September 14th next, and the full document will be the subject of a seminar on October 26th next.

The Government's public pronouncements on safety at football matches appears somewhat hollow when applied to its response to the Institution's request for funding to speed up the research project.

Based on corroborated leaks to professional 'trade' journals, the findings of the Report constitute a clear rebuke for pitch perimeter fencing and expresses "strong reservation against the present design strength of crash

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rriers." The Report also examines the issue of 'traffic

control'.

Quite clearly, the evidence currently exists to challenge the continuation of pitch perimeter fencing at football stadia. As Liverpool and Everton have shown, a dry--moat is but one of the available means to improve spectator safety in the event of a disaster.

All of the Hillsborough reports feasible and sensible proposals are to be welcomed. L. J. Taylor's grasp of the events at Hillsborough is discernible in his recommendations. This can only be seen as encouraging.

Recommendations 13-17 are clearly attributable to the lamentable role of Sheffield City Council. L.J. Taylor advocates not only a review of existing practices and ?ro?edu?L but introduces a new layer of checks and balances in the form of an Advisory Group. That Group should have an "effective procedure" which requires "regular visits to the ground and attendance at matches." It is incumbent upon this authority to accommodate these recommendations with the xoviso that we can never be over-vigilant with spectator

From the F.A. and F.S.A's submissions to the Inquiry,L j Taylor has adopted a number of the proposals advanced by these organisations. One proposal, by the F.A. for a 20% cut in terrace capacities was m fact moderated to 15°. The F.A. had hoped that L. J. Taylor would make a positive statement on travelling ticketless fans._ But the only football-led initiative he chose not to incorporate in his report was that ticketless fans should not be allowed into an all-ticket match.

The test of quality and practicality in the 43 recommendations lays in their application. The response of clubs so far, and other interested parties, is not _ encouraging. Hillsborough's lessons are already being ignored. By the season's opening day, all the clubs, including Sheffield Wednesday, had satisfied _ their local authorities that they met certification requirements in the wake of the Hillsborough Report. Yet many clubs, including Liverpool, are without a crucial Taylor recommendation: a written agreement between club and Police, identifying responsibilities for crowd management. Although at both Liverpool Clubs, all other relevant recommendations have been or are being carried out, the picture from around the country is not so encouraging. According to one survey, only 12% of grounds had a doctor and only 49s had cutting

equipment.

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Already some clubs are prevaricating on the remaining measures. Prior to the season's opening day, the Secretary of Manchester United, Ken Merret, is reported as saying:"In our opinion, these were recommendations - we didn't consider them mandatory." From the country's richest club, recently involved in a successful £20 million take-over, these are prophetic words.

A loophole exploited by many clubs is contained in a Home Office circular to clubs following the publication of the Hillsborough Report. On implementing the Taylor recommendations, it stressed "before the start of the new season or immediately thereafter." Voluntary recommendations are already being voluntarily ignored. For all the pious words and sincere proposals advanced by Taylor, they are worthless unless backed by legislation.

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M CONCLUSIONS:

The Hillsborough Report is not a radical document. Itfers a forthright account of the Hillsborough tragedy and eludes findings and recommendations which reach far beyond e Hillsborough tragedy. Its proposals deserve to be'en seriously by the Government and everyone connected th the game.

On the evidence of the first two weeks of the 1989/90 tball season, this may be somewhat premature: afterall, d Justice Taylor identifies his proposals as the "minimum essary.11 (para 315) .

The terms of reference for Phase II of the Inquiry may ell disappoint many fans of the game who genuinely felt the 'servable scale of official failure at Hillsborough should ve warranted an inquiry with broader terms of reference, e promise of better things to come is not inspiring as the ■tball Spectators' Bill looms ever nearer.

The disaster at Hillsborough is located in 66 years of ficial neglect. As the lessons of the Popplewell review re compromised at Hillsborough it serves well to recount a sage from page 10 of Justice Popplewell's full report:

; ' .

"History of previous Inquiries:

When my Interim Report was published, it might have been thought by some that the suggestions which I set out had only recently been considered. It was said to be unfair to expect the football clubs to have taken earlier steps to arrange their affairs. It was urged that they should now be entitled to more time and more money in order to deal with the problems of crowd control and safety at their grounds. The problems of crowd control and safety had, so it was said, suddenly arisen. I have to say that almost all the matters into which I have been asked to inquire and almost all the solutions I have proposed, have been previously considered *in detail by many distinguished Inquiries over a period of sixty years."

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That

la)

lb)

lc)

Id)

le)

2)

3a)

3b)

4)

5)

HTT.T-c;BOROUGH w o r k i n g p a r t y i n t e r i m RECOMMENDATIONS:

the provisions within the 'Green Guide' to safety at Sports Grounds become mandatory forthwith?

the 'Green Guide' identifies the pitch area as the primary means of evacuation in a relevant emergency and becomes, at all stadia, considered as a 'suitable place of safety'?

chapter 14 of the 'Green Guide' ('Crowd Control') be redrafted on the basis that its guidelines concentrate too much on the prevention of hooliganism at the expense of spectator safety. Crowd safety must dominate crowd management strategies?

a new chapter be introduced to the 'Green Guide' specifically covering turnstile facilities and their provision?

the provision of the Green Guide be annually updated and reviewed.

All pitch-perimeter fences to be immediately withdrawn and suitable arrangements for controlled pitch access be introduced.

Following recommendation 19 of the Hillsborough Report, we request the Government recognise the futility of its proposals for a compulsory 'National Football Membership Scheme' (as outlined in Part I of the Football Spectators' Bill) and abandon this proposal.

We request the Government withdraw its proposals on a 'Football Licensing Authority' with a view to introducing separate legislation on this subject, pending meaningful negotiations with all relevant certificating local authorities and their Advisory Groups including fans representatives.

Police Operational Orders be subject to regular monitoring and scrutiny by the ground safety certificating local authority.

Request the Police to review their whole operational procedures for football matches to include a public-

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safety response built into* the basic and ongoing training of all officers detailed for match duty.

K A Royal Commission of Inquiry be set up with the 6} following terms of reference, to investigate.

(i) the financing of professional football?

(ii) the administration of professional football?

(iii) policing and public safety at football stadia?

fiv) medical, emergency and wider spectator facilities at Football League grounds,

(v) the issue of effective fans ^presentation within clubs and on the governing bodies which administer the game.

Following the scale of mismanagement, complacency, neglect and misplaced priorities detailed within .̂

Taylor's Interim Report we Relieve all commlsslon.football industry should be ^ “ ^HillsboroughThis is particularly "granted and the Club all

considered' their re^onsibilities efficiently discharged for

football needs a complete review of its operatio

Following our call for a ^ ^ “ ^ ^ n g l h o s f S i s

^ “ d ^ / S ^ e r L of reference and schedule outlined

m recommendation 6.

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DOCUMENT NOT DIGITISED

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