Lijphart, Consensus Democracy

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Linking and Integrating Corporatism and Consensus Democracy: Theory, Concepts andEvidenceAuthor(s): Markus M. L. Crepaz and Arend LijphartSource: British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Apr., 1995), pp. 281-288Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/194089 .

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Notes and Comments 281otes and Comments 281otes and Comments 281otes and Comments 281

TABLE 4 Regression of the Nine Characteristics plus

Corporatism on Consensus Democracy*

Variablet Beta T Sig.T

MINWIN - 0.34 - 5.61 0.00

ELECDIS - 0.27 - 5.23 0.00

CABDUR - 0.24 - 6.71 0.00

ISSUEDIM - 0.22 - 4.08 0.00

NPARTIES - 0.17 - 2.25 0.06

CORPORAL 0.07 1.41 0.20

CONFLEX - 0.03 - 0.86 0.42

GOVTAX 0.02 0.68 0.52REFEREND 0.01 0.19 0.85

UNICAMER 0.01 0.38 0.72(Constant) 1.13 0.29

*Adjusted R2 = 0.99

t See Table 3 for explanationof abbreviations.

consensus democracies plus the composite scale of corporatism we can determine

the relative weight of corporatism in explaining the variance of consociationalism

(Table 4).

Although the bi-variate relationship between consensus democracy and corporatismis rather

strong (r,=

0.64),the relative

weightof

corporatismis so small that it does not

fit in the model. If compared to other factors, corporatism explains a negligible part in

the variance of the features of consensus democracy as defined by Lijphart. Both

concepts should be analysed independently, together with other political variables, in

order to assess the extent to which each does indeed influence democratic decision

making. We have demonstratedthat both concepts arestrongly intertwined with the typeand the organization of the political system and also strongly related to the complexionof government and parliament. Although the concepts are apparently similar, they do

not have the same meaning and can be distinguished empirically in relation to the

features of liberal democratic decision making.

Linkingand Integrating Corporatism and ConsensusDemocracy: Theory, Concepts and EvidenceMARKUS M. L. CREPAZ AND AREND LIJPHART*

Hans Keman's and Paul Pennings's critique ('Managing Political and Societal Conflictin Democracies: Do Consensus and Corporatism Matter?', this Journal, precedingpages) of our attemptto link corporatismand consensus democracy falls essentially intothreeparts.Their firstcriticism deals with the way we measuredcorporatism.They rejectour 'composite' approach on the basis that different experts have different conceptualunderstandings of corporatism. Hence, they argue, it is unwarranted to add up thesevarious scores. Secondly, they claim that our central relationship between consensus

*Departmentof Political Science, The University of Georgia; Departmentof Political Science, The University

of California, San Diego, respectively.




MINWIN - 0.34 - 5.61 0.00

ELECDIS - 0.27 - 5.23 0.00

CABDUR - 0.24 - 6.71 0.00

ISSUEDIM - 0.22 - 4.08 0.00

NPARTIES - 0.17 - 2.25 0.06

CORPORAL 0.07 1.41 0.20

CONFLEX - 0.03 - 0.86 0.42

GOVTAX 0.02 0.68 0.52REFEREND 0.01 0.19 0.85


*Adjusted R2 = 0.99




(Table 4).


strong (r,=

0.64),the relative

weightof
















MINWIN - 0.34 - 5.61 0.00

ELECDIS - 0.27 - 5.23 0.00

CABDUR - 0.24 - 6.71 0.00

ISSUEDIM - 0.22 - 4.08 0.00

NPARTIES - 0.17 - 2.25 0.06

CORPORAL 0.07 1.41 0.20

CONFLEX - 0.03 - 0.86 0.42

GOVTAX 0.02 0.68 0.52REFEREND 0.01 0.19 0.85


*Adjusted R2 = 0.99




(Table 4).


strong (r,=

0.64),the relative

weightof
















MINWIN - 0.34 - 5.61 0.00

ELECDIS - 0.27 - 5.23 0.00

CABDUR - 0.24 - 6.71 0.00

ISSUEDIM - 0.22 - 4.08 0.00

NPARTIES - 0.17 - 2.25 0.06

CORPORAL 0.07 1.41 0.20

CONFLEX - 0.03 - 0.86 0.42

GOVTAX 0.02 0.68 0.52REFEREND 0.01 0.19 0.85


*Adjusted R2 = 0.99




(Table 4).


strong (r,=

0.64),the relative

weightof















282 Notes and Comments82 Notes and Comments82 Notes and Comments82 Notes and Comments

democracy and corporatism is a function of our particularmeasure of corporatism and,in addition, driven by two outlying cases: Italy and Austria. Thirdly, they claim that

corporatism and consensus democracy are two different phenomena, andthattherefore,

corporatism should not be integratedinto the concept of consensus democracy. We shall

address these three main criticisms in the order described.

ON MEASURING CORPORATISM, 'EXPERT' JUDGEMENTS AND VALIDITY

Keman's and Pennings's first criticism is that producing a composite measure of

corporatismis unwarranted,since the variousexperts offering scores on corporatismhad

different meanings of thatelusive concept in mind. They point to the difference between

the institutionalaspect of corporatism within the strategic actors, labour and capital, and

the concertation aspect of corporatismbetween the strategic actors - a distinction which

Schmitter referred to as 'corporatism 1' and 'corporatism 2' . To this distinction, theyadd a third aspect: social partnership. We are well aware that our various experts

operationalized corporatism differently based on different features of corporatism. In

our original article, we explicitly mentioned Schmitter's distinction between the

institutional aspects of corporatism such as hierarchical structures, centralization,

organization, etc. (vertical corporatism), and 'concertation' which refers to the

relationship among the strategic actors (horizontal corporatism).2While this is a useful

distinction, the difference between 'concertation' and 'social partnership', which

Keman and Pennings add as a third conceptually distinct class of corporatism, is less

convincing.3 We believe thatthe 'social partnership'and 'concertation' aspects are very

closely related.In creating a broadly based measure of corporatism, we wanted to produce a measure

that was as impartial as possible. We did not want to rely on one individual measure

because thatwould have invited the criticism that we chose a particularmeasure simplybecause it best fitted our argument, and because this would have made our results

dependent on that individual's concept of corporatism. Since the level of measurement

encompassed nominal, ordinal and interval data, standardization was a suitable

statistical procedure to create a composite score.

The importantconcept of validity is defined in the social sciences as 'the extent to

which our measures correspond to the concepts they are intended to reflect'.4 Based on

1Phillippe C. Schmitter, 'Reflections oni Where the Theory of Neo-Corporatism Has Gone and Where the

Praxis of Neo-CorporatismMay Be Going', in GerhardLehmbruch and Phillippe C. Schmitter, eds, Patterns of

Corporatist Policy Making (London: Sage, 1982).2 Arend Lijphartand Markus M. L. Crepaz, 'Corporatismand Consensus Democracy in Eighteen Countries:

Conceptual and Empirical Linkages', British Journal of Political Science, 21 (1991), 235-46.3 For example, GerhardLehmbruch, 'Concertation and the Structureof CorporatistNetworks', in John H.

Goldthrope,ed., Orderand Conflict in ContemporaryCapitalism (Oxford: ClarendonPress, 1984), pp. 60-80 at

p. 62, defines corporatist concertation as having two essential features: first, 'it involves not just a single

organized interestwith privileged access to government but rathera pluralityof organizationsusually represent-

ing antagonistic interests;andsecond, these organizations manage their conflicts andco-ordinatetheir action with

that of government expressly in regard to the systemic (gesamtwirtschaftliche) requirements of the national

economy'. Peter Katzenstein's (Small Staites n WorldMarkets,Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca, NY: Comell

University Press, 1985), p. 32) definition of 'social partnership' seems to be closely related to Lehmbruch's

notion of concertation: 'This ideology [social partnership]mitigates class conflict between business and unions;

it integrates differing conceptions of group interest with vaguely held notions of the public interest'.4

JarolB. Manheim andRichardC. Rich, Empirical Political Analysis: Research Methods in Political Science

(New York: Longman, 1991), p. 62.


































































































































this definition we measured exactly what we wanted to measure, which was to providean overall average score of corporatism based on the combined wisdom of different

expertson that

subject, notwithstandingdifferences

amongthose

expertswith

respectto the conceptual meaning of corporatism.Thus Keman's and Pennings's claim thatour

index is 'meaningless in terms of validity' is simply incorrect.5If the countries in our

Table 1are ordered from most to least corporatist the following orderemerges: Austria,

Norway, Sweden, Netherlands, Denmark, Switzerland, Germany, Finland, Belgium,

Japan,Ireland,France, Italy, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Canada,United

States.6 This is very much in accordance with the conventional wisdom on the relative

strength of corporatism in various countries. In fact, even Keman's own corporatismscore,7which is not included in our composite measure correlates very strongly with our

measure (r = 0.870). Frederic Pryor's measure of corporatism, also not included in our

composite measure, correlates even more strongly with our scores (r= 0.963).8

More importantly,both elements of corporatism, i.e. within institutions and between

actors, can be observed simultaneously in practice. In order for concertation between

strategic actors to be successful, a strong institutional structure(capacity to co-operate)

organizing the interests within strategic actors is a prerequisite. We say as much in our

original article.9 Moreover, for corporatism to be successful the willingness of the

functional bodies to co-operate is equally crucial. Thus, both elements, institutional

capacity and willingness, have to be present in order successfully to intermediate

between the major functional groups in industrial societies. If this is the case, it does

not matter much whether the scores of the individual expert judgements sometimes

measure 'institutionalization' and sometimes measure 'concertation'. In fact, precisely

because we were aware that various experts attributed different features to the conceptof corporatism, our aim was to create an overall average of the experts' combined

wisdom. Lehmbruch seems to agree with this assessment when he, after describingvarious distinct forms of corporatism such as sectoral corporatism and tripartism,states

that, 'I have earlier (1982) argued that, since these different developments [of

corporatism] are interrelated, they should be integrated into a pluridimensional concept

of corporatism. This should permit a ranking of countries for the purpose of

crossnational comparison and for the investigation of empirical regularities.' We

concur with Lehmbruch's statement.

CONNECTING CORPORATISM WITH CONSENSUS DEMOCRACY

The second criticism from Keman and Pennings deals with the empirical relationshipbetween corporatism and consensus democracy and consists of two parts: first, theyclaim that our '(lump sum) measure [of corporatism] is among those that correlates

strongest with [our] own index of consensus democracy'." Implicit in this criticism isthe claim that the association between consensus democracy and corporatism is driven

Keman and Pennings, 'Managing Political and Societal Conflict', p. 5.6

Lijphartand Crepaz, 'Corporatismand Consensus Democracy', p. 239.7Latest scores used by Hans Keman, obtained by personal communication in 1994.

x Frederic Pryor, 'Corporatismas an Economic System: A Review Essay', Journal of Comparative Econom-

ics, 12 (1988), 317-44, p. 326.9

Lijphartand Crepaz, 'Corporatism and Consensus Democracy', p. 235-6.10 GerhardLehmbruch, 'Concertation and the Structure of CorporatistNetworks', p. 61 (emphasis added).l Keman and Pennings, 'Managing Political and Societal Conflict', p. 274.


expertson that


amongthose

expertswith

































ics, 12 (1988), 317-44, p. 326.9



expertson that


amongthose

expertswith

































ics, 12 (1988), 317-44, p. 326.9



expertson that


amongthose

expertswith

































ics, 12 (1988), 317-44, p. 326.9





by the fashion in which we measuredcorporatism. Secondly, they question the statistical

robustness of the empirical model pointing out that Austria and Italy are outliers

artificially enhancing the strength of the model.

Let us first examine the strength of the relationship between corporatism and

consensus democracy. A closer look at Table 1 shows that ourcomposite measure does

not correlate the strongest with consensus democracy.The individual measures of Crouch, Lehmbruch and Wilensky correlate more

strongly than our composite measure of corporatism. Four of the twelve measurements

display an association strongerthan0.5; another four observations display an association

between 0.4 and 0.5 (among them Keman's own measure), while the last third (four

observations) show associations smaller than 0.4.12 There is general agreement amongsocial scientists that correlation coefficients between + / - 0.1 and + / - 0.4 denote

'weak' associations, between + / - 0.4 and + / - 0.7 denote 'medium' ones and

between + / - 0.7 and + / - 0.9 denote 'strong' associations.Our corporatism measure does not stand out in any way in terms of its relation to

consensus democracy. Eight of the twelve individual measures fall between the 0.4 and

0.7 range which is widely considered to be the 'medium' rangeof strengthof association

and three individual scores are actually higher than our composite score. Keman's own

measure of corporatism, although not included in our composite measure, falls into the

same 'medium' class as ourown measure. Similarly, Pryor's score of corporatism, againnot part of our original composite index, shows an association of almost the same

magnitude as our own index of corporatism.

The low correlation coefficient with the score of Marks is peculiar.13Marks looked

mainly at neocorporatist incomes policy and created a weighted composite scoreaccording to the number of years in which countries displayed 'mixed', 'weak',

'moderate' or 'strong' incomes policies. His rankings indeed deviate from more

conventional views on the strength of corporatist arrangements in different countries.

For instance, he ranks Switzerland, France, Italy, the United States and Canada equally

low on neocorporatist incomes policy. Great Britain is ranked before Denmark in

neocorporatist incomes policy and Ireland is ranked between these two countries.

Nevertheless, we decided to integrate Marks's score into our overall score, despite his

'unconventional' rankings which explain his relatively low correlation coefficient with

consensus democracy.

Keman's and Pennings's second point deals with the robustness of the empiricalrelationship between corporatism and consensus democracy. They argue that 'the

location of the outliers Austria and Italy, being symmetrically aligned on either side

of the regression line also strengthens the statistical outcome of the correlation coeffi-

cient ... The central relationship is less robust and overlapping than is claimed by

Lijphart and Crepaz.'14 Their observation that two points symmetrically aligned on

either side of a regression line should strengthen a relationship, indicates a

misunderstanding of the concept of 'outliers'. They present an influence chart relying

on two black 'dots' for identification of outliers. Fortunately, Belseley, Kuh andWelsch

have devised a systematic way of not only detecting outliers but also leverage points.'5

12Lijphartand Crepaz, 'Corporatismand Consensus Democracy', p. 238.

13Gary Marks, 'Neocorporatism and Incomes Policy in Western Europe and North America', Comparative

Politics, 18 (1986), 253-78 at p. 274.14 Keman and Pennings, 'Managing Political and Societal Conflict', p. 6.15 David A. Belseley, Edwin Kuh and Roy E. Welsch, Regression Diagnostics: Identifying Influential Data

and Sources of Collinearity (New York: Wiley, 1980).































































































































T A B L E Correlation Coefficients 'r' of the Twelve Original Individual Measures

of Corporatism with Consensus Democracy Compared to the Lijphart/

Crepaz(1991)

CompositeMeasure of Corporatism and Keman 's (1994)

and Pryor's (1988) Measure of Corporatism in Descending Order

Pearson's r product

'Expertjudgement' N moment coefficient

Crouch (1985) 18 0.597

Lehmbruch(1984) 18 0.596

Wilensky (1981) 18 0.583

Lijphart/Crepaz(1991) 18 0.568

Pryor (1988) 18 0.546

Lehner(1987, 1988) 17 0.503

Czada (1983) 18 0.492

Keman (1989) 18 0.490

Bruno & Sachs (1985) 17 0.465

Schott (1984) 17 0.465

Schmidt (1982, 1986) 18 0.453

Paloheimo (1984) 17 0.395Cameron (1984) 17 0.332

Schmitter(1981) 15 0.328Marks (1986) 15 0.128

Note: N = numberof countries for which expertjudgements were provided.Keman's (latestmeasure,

obtained by personal communication in 1994) and Pryor's measure (FredericPryor, 'Corporatismas an Economic System: A Review Essay', Journal of ComparativeEconomics, 12 (1988), 317-44at p.326) were not partof the twelve original scores. They are shown here only for comparativepurposes. In order to reduce confusion we inversed the polarity of the Marks (Gary Marks,

'Neocorporatismand Incomes Policy in WesternEuropeand NorthAmerica', Comparative Politics,18(1986), 253-78 atp. 274) and Schmitter(Phillippe Schmitter,'InterestIntermediationandRegimeGovernability in Contemporary Western Europe and North America' in Suzanne Berger, ed.,

OrganizingInterestsin WesternEurope: Pluralism, Corporatism,and the Transformationof Politics

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 287-330 at p. 294) scores to achieve consistent

positive correlationcoefficients. Leaving them in their original form would have changed the sign,but not the strengthof the association.

Table 2 provides the studentized residuals (residuals divided by their estimated standard

deviations), which obviously follow a t-distribution, and the 'leverage points' (the

values of the diagonal 'hat'-matrix) for eighteen countries. Leverage points identifyoutliers in the independent variable space, i.e. these are observations to which parameterestimates are particularly sensitive. Contrary to the claim by Keman and Pennings, onlyAustria proves to be an 'outlier', as can be seen from Table 2.16 The removal of Austria

from the dataset does not reduce the strength of the relationship, in fact its omission

increases the strength of the bivariate relationship.Since the 'studentized residuals' follow a t-distribution, Table 2 indeed indicates that

Austria (2.564) is indeed an outlier (at the 0.05 level, two-tailed test, 16 degrees of

freedom). Outliers affect the dependent variable space and have a stronger effect on the

16We used the conventional 0.05 (two-tailed t-test) as a cut-off point to determineoutliers. Since residuals do

not follow a hypothesized direction, two-tailed t-tests are appropriate.The two-tailed t-value for 16 degrees of

freedom is + 2.120 at the 0.05 level. Only Austria's studentized residual exceeds this critical cut-off point.



Crepaz(1991)



Pearson's r product


Crouch (1985) 18 0.597

Lehmbruch(1984) 18 0.596

Wilensky (1981) 18 0.583


Pryor (1988) 18 0.546

Lehner(1987, 1988) 17 0.503

Czada (1983) 18 0.492

Keman (1989) 18 0.490

Bruno & Sachs (1985) 17 0.465

Schott (1984) 17 0.465

Schmidt (1982, 1986) 18 0.453


Schmitter(1981) 15 0.328Marks (1986) 15 0.128



















Crepaz(1991)



Pearson's r product


Crouch (1985) 18 0.597

Lehmbruch(1984) 18 0.596

Wilensky (1981) 18 0.583


Pryor (1988) 18 0.546

Lehner(1987, 1988) 17 0.503

Czada (1983) 18 0.492

Keman (1989) 18 0.490

Bruno & Sachs (1985) 17 0.465

Schott (1984) 17 0.465

Schmidt (1982, 1986) 18 0.453


Schmitter(1981) 15 0.328Marks (1986) 15 0.128



















Crepaz(1991)



Pearson's r product


Crouch (1985) 18 0.597

Lehmbruch(1984) 18 0.596

Wilensky (1981) 18 0.583


Pryor (1988) 18 0.546

Lehner(1987, 1988) 17 0.503

Czada (1983) 18 0.492

Keman (1989) 18 0.490

Bruno & Sachs (1985) 17 0.465

Schott (1984) 17 0.465

Schmidt (1982, 1986) 18 0.453


Schmitter(1981) 15 0.328Marks (1986) 15 0.128




















TABLE 2 Studentized Residuals and Leverage Points for Eighteen Countries

Studentizedesiduals

Country 'outliers'* Leveragepointst

Australia - 0.615 0.105Austria 2.564 0.064

Belgium - 0.123 0.079

Canada - 0.631 0.185Denmark 0.099 0.090

Finland - 0.519 0.182

France - 0.785 0.057

Germany 0.616 0.056

Ireland - 0.133 0.087

Italy - 1.963 0.119

Japan0.087 0.056

Netherlands 0.265 0.171New Zealand - 0.448 0.157

Norway 1.81 0.059Sweden 1.736 0.056Switzerland - 0.580 0.220UnitedKingdom - 0.188 0.147UnitedStates - 0.993 0.110

* 'Outliers' reresiduals ividedby theirestimated tandard eviation.Sincestudentizedesiduals

follow a t-distribution,he criticalcut-offpoint s + 2.120 (0.05 level, two tailed) or 16degreesof freedom.t Leveragepointsarethediagonal lementsof the 'hat' matrix.Values arger han0.222 indicate

observationswithhigh leverage, .e. theslopewill be sensitive o these observations. herearenoobservationshatexceedthatthresholdor leveragepoints.

intercept than on the parameter estimate.17 However, outliers do not exert sufficient

leverage on the parameterestimates to change the coefficients as opposed to leverage

points drastically. Belseley, Kuh and Welsch suggest as a critical threshold for leverage

points 2p/N, where p stands for the number of estimated parameters (including the

constant), N for the numberof cases. 8 The critical threshold, then, in our case is 0.222.

Table 2 indicates that none of the leverage points displays values largerthan the critical

threshold, indicating that none of the observations have leverage enough to sufficiently

disturb the parameterestimates. Table 3 provides furtherevidence that the omission ofAustria does not drastically change the effect on the parameterestimates. The table also

shows thatthe central relationship between consensus democracy andcorporatism holds

(in fact, its strength and significance improves) if not only Austria but also Italy are

removed from the dataset.

Contraryto Keman's and Pennings's claim, inclusion of the Austrian and Italiancase

actually weakens, ratherthan strengthens, the relationship. It is not at all the case that

Austria andItaly 'drive' the statistical relationship as they claim. Infact, removing either

Austria or Italy, or both, strengthens the parameterestimates.'9 However, we decided

17

Belseley,KuhandWelsch,RegressionDiagnostics,p. 7.18Belseley,KuhandWelsch,RegressionDiagnostics,p. 17.

19As indicated bove,Italy'sstudentizedesidual alue( - 1.963)doesnot exceedthe criticalcut-offpoint

of ? 2.12(two-tailed, 6degreesof freedom, t the0.05level),whichdoesnotqualify t foranoutlier.However,

sinceKemanandPennings rgue hatItaly s anoutlier,andsinceItaly s close to the cut-offpoint,we decided

to reportheeffectsof Italy'somissionndividuallynd nconjunctionwithAustria n theparameterstimates.


Studentizedesiduals



Belgium - 0.123 0.079

Canada - 0.631 0.185Denmark 0.099 0.090

Finland - 0.519 0.182

France - 0.785 0.057

Germany 0.616 0.056

Ireland - 0.133 0.087

Italy - 1.963 0.119

Japan0.087 0.056





















17







Studentizedesiduals



Belgium - 0.123 0.079

Canada - 0.631 0.185Denmark 0.099 0.090

Finland - 0.519 0.182

France - 0.785 0.057

Germany 0.616 0.056

Ireland - 0.133 0.087

Italy - 1.963 0.119

Japan0.087 0.056





















17







Studentizedesiduals



Belgium - 0.123 0.079

Canada - 0.631 0.185Denmark 0.099 0.090

Finland - 0.519 0.182

France - 0.785 0.057

Germany 0.616 0.056

Ireland - 0.133 0.087

Italy - 1.963 0.119

Japan0.087 0.056





















17









TABLE 3 Change in theParameter Estimates after Omitting Italy,Austria and Both

Statistics Full model Italy Austria ItalyandAustria

removed removed removed

Coefficient 0.568* 0.668** 0.611** 0.705**Standarderror 0.206 0.196 0.178 0.163t-test 2.76 3.41 3.43 4.33

AdjustedR2 0.281 0.398 0.403 0.542

Degreesof freedom 16 15 15 14

Note: Consensusdemocracys the independent ariable; orporatisms the dependent ariable.*

Significant at 0.05 level, two-tailed test. **Significant at 0.01 level, two-tailed test.

to reportthe findings with all eighteen countries and not to omit observations selectivelyso as to create a stronger fit artificially. Tables 2 and 3 provide strong evidence for the

robustness of our central relationship and invalidate Keman's and Pennings' s claim that

the association between corporatism and consensus democracy is a statistical artefact.

CORPORATISM AS AN ELEMENT OF CONSENSUS DEMOCRACY

Thirdly, Keman and Pennings argue against integrating corporatism into the concept of

consensus democracy by pointing out that these are two different phenomena. Asevidence they present correlation coefficients indicating thatcorporatismand consensus

democracy correlate distinctively with the complexion of government and parliament,and with cabinet duration.While this may be the case, we clearly did not intend to show,in the words of Keman and Pennings, that 'corporatismand consensus democracy werein fact and in theory two sides of the same coin'.20Instead, we claimed that 'corporatismis the interest group system that goes together with the consensual type of democracyand its opposite, the "pluralist" nterest group system, goes together with majoritariandemocracy.

'

After we had established an empirical link between corporatism and consensus

democracy, the next logical step was to integrate the corporatist/pluralist system ofinterest representation into the cluster of consensus/majoritarian political institutions.

Undoubtedly, the inclusive, accommodative and consensus-oriented corporatistpolicy-making process is conceptually related to the five more 'political' elements of consensus

democracy: the sharing of executive power; balanced executive-legislative relations; a

high degree of electoral proportionality; multi-party systems and multiple issuedimensions of partisan conflict. Similarly, the competitive, atomistic and exclusive

pluralist policy-making style is conceptually related to political structures which

encourage little sharing of executive power (minimal winning cabinets), strongexecutives, electoral disproportionality,andtwo-party systems characterizedby a singleissue dimension. We believe that the

affinitybetween

corporatism and consensusdemocracy, and between pluralism and majoritarianismis compelling, and there is noreason why the interest group system should not be linked to the political and





AdjustedR2 0.281 0.398 0.403 0.542











'








affinitybetween






AdjustedR2 0.281 0.398 0.403 0.542











'








affinitybetween






AdjustedR2 0.281 0.398 0.403 0.542











'








affinitybetween


20Keman and Pennings, 'Managing Political and Societal Conflict', p. 6.











TABLE 4 Correlation Matrix of the Five Constitutional Elements of Consensus

Democracy with Corporatism

1 2 3 4 5 6

1. %minimal 1

winningcoalitions2. Executive 0.377 1

dominance3. Electoral 0.305 0.405 1

disproportionality4. Number f -0.618 -0.394 -0.167 1

issuedimensions5. Effectivenumber -0.735 -0.619 -0.486 0.717 1

of parties6.

Corporatism(L/C)- 0.447 - 0.126 -

0.6610.488

0.4511

Note: The five constitutional lements of consensusdemocracyare based on ArendLijphart,Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarianand Consensus Government n TwentyOne Countries(NewHaven,Conn.:YaleUniversity ress,1984).L/C s theLijphart/Crepaz1991)corporatism easure.

constitutional structures. In our original article, we presented the connection between

consensus democracy and corporatism in its aggregated form. Do we also find

meaningful associations between corporatism and its disaggregated elements of

consensus democracy? How do the five original individual elements of consensus

democracy, described above, associate with corporatism?Table 4 indicates that corporatism correlates with each individual element of

consensus democracy in the hypothesized way, i.e. it is consistent with the argumentmade above that corporatism can logically be integrated into the cluster of consensus

democracy. The negative correlation between corporatism and the percentage in which

minimal winning coalitions were in power ( - 0.460) indicates thatcorporatism can be

thought of as an element of consensus democracy. The same logic applies to the other

negative correlation coefficients between corporatism and executive dominance and

electoral disproportionality. The more corporatist a country, the less dominant is the

executive (although the coefficient is a weak one, - 0.126). Also, the more corporatist

a country, the less disproportional is its electoral system (- 0.661). Moreover, thenumberof issue dimensions in partisanconflict and the effective number of parties also

correlate in a predictable way with corporatism. Corporatistcountries display a highernumber of issue dimensions of partisan conflict (0.488) while also showing a highereffective number of parties (0.451). Overall, the correlation coefficients between

corporatism and the other five elements of consensus democracy (in the bottom row of

Table 4) are about as strong as the ten correlation coefficients among these other five

elements; the means of the absolute values are 0.435 and 0.482 respectively, and the

medians are 0.451 and 0.446 respectively.Table 4 shows a consistent and predictable relationship of corporatism with each of

the disaggregated elements of consensus democracy. Given this affinity between

corporatism and the five constitutive elements of consensus democracy we perceivedit as logical to integrate it as an additional element of consensus democracy, and we

believe that integrating all six into a more comprehensive concept of consensus

democracy leads to a richer understandingof the process by which private desires are

turned into actual public policies.



1 2 3 4 5 6

1. %minimal 1





of parties6.

Corporatism(L/C)- 0.447 - 0.126 -

0.6610.488

0.4511



























1 2 3 4 5 6

1. %minimal 1





of parties6.

Corporatism(L/C)- 0.447 - 0.126 -

0.6610.488

0.4511



























1 2 3 4 5 6

1. %minimal 1





of parties6.

Corporatism(L/C)- 0.447 - 0.126 -

0.6610.488

0.4511

























Documents

Lijphart, Consensus Democracy