Lifeline Media: Reaching populations in crisis: A - PreventionWeb

Lifeline Media:Reaching populations in crisisA guide to developing media projects in conflict situations

Loretta Hieber

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Lifeline Media:Reaching populationsin crisisA guide to developingmedia projects in conflict situations

Loretta HieberMedia Action International

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LIFELINE MEDIA: REACHING POPULATIONS IN CRISIS

© 2001 Media Action International

Sponsored by:

Post-Conflict Unit, The World BankDepartment for International Development, Great BritainSwiss Development Corporation

Senior Researcher: Malcolm Green

Research Assistants: Bronwyn Walker, Michelle Morgan, Vladimir Bratic

Printed September 2001

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A GUIDE TO DEVELOPING MEDIA PROJECTS IN CONFLICT SITUATIONS

Table of contents

List of contributed texts .................................................................................. v

About the author ............................................................................................. vii

Preface .................................................................................................... xi

Media as a Weapon of War or a Tool of Peace:Introduction .......................................................................1

Section One: Designing Programmes forPopulations in Crisis ...............................................................7

Chapter I. Understanding conflict and post-conflict scenarios ............. 9

Chapter II. Needs assessments and project planning ...................... 151. Criteria for action ....................................................................... 182. Initial research: understanding the crisis .................................. 203. Quantitative and qualitative field research ................................. 22

Chapter III. Setting up proactive programmes in crisis situations ........ 331. Developing effective local relations ........................................... 362. Working with international relief agencies ................................ 44

Chapter IV. Choosing the right medium ........................................ 491. The case for radio ..................................................................... 502. Television and video .................................................................. 583. Information technology ............................................................. 61

Section Two: Humanitarian Information Programmes ...... 71

Chapter V. Developing effective humanitarian programme content ..... 731. Editorial policy ........................................................................... 732. Programme formats .................................................................. 80

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Chapter VI. Targeted programming ............................................. 851. Tackling public health issues in crises ...................................... 852. Special programmes for children .............................................. 903. Female-focused programming .................................................. 994. Family reunification ................................................................. 1025. Promoting humanitarian values .............................................. 106

Section Three: Media Projects for Peace-Building .......... 109

Chapter VII. Crossing community divides ..................................... 113

1. Tackling perceptions ................................................................ 1152. From competition to co-operation .......................................... 1203. Developing “connectors” ......................................................... 125

Chapter VIII. Reporting conflict ................................................. 1291. War versus peace reporting .................................................... 1292. Journalists and objectivity ....................................................... 135

Chapter IX. Examples of media projects building peace ................... 1391. Radio facilitating peace-building ............................................. 1392. Innovative uses of video ......................................................... 1493. Drama ...................................................................................... 155

Section Four: Measuring Impact ....................................... 165

Chapter X. Participatory monitoring and evaluation ....................... 167

Chapter XI. Developing indicators ............................................. 173

1. Media profile ............................................................................ 1742. Understanding the conflict ...................................................... 1763. Media approach ....................................................................... 176

Chapter XII. The rapid survey method ......................................... 181

Conclusion .................................................................. 187

Endnotes ........................................................................ 189

Glossary ........................................................................ 199

Contact list ........................................................................ 201

Bibliography ........................................................................ 205

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List of contributed texts

Section One: Designing Programmes forPopulations in Crisis

Researching hostile environments .............................................. 21by John Owen Davies

Assessing information needs in Kosovo ........................................ 27by Jonathan Walter

Designing a radio distribution campaign in Albania ......................... 31by Mary Myers

The Communication Project for the reconstructionof Armenia, Colombia ............................................................. 40

by Lina Holquin

Star Radio: promoting the humanitarians ...................................... 46by George Bennett

The Project SPEAR experience ................................................... 53by Loretta Hieber

United Nations information efforts in conflicts ................................ 56by Jeffrey Heyman

The Great Lakes: a review of the mass information activitiesof the UNHCR ....................................................................... 60

by Malcolm Green

Information technology and Internet innovations forpeace-building operations ........................................................ 69

by Heather O’Brien

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Section Two: Humanitarian Information Programmes

Making emergency programmes entertaining ................................. 83by Brian Anderson

Voice of America: Psychosocial programming for Rwanda ................. 89by Loretta Hieber

REACH: Radio education for Afghan children .................................. 98by Keith Ricketts

The ICRC: Conveying humanitarian messages in Bosnia ................... 107by Paul-Henri Arni

Section Three: Media Projects for Peace-Building

The Reporting Diversity Network ............................................... 119by Robert Leavitt, Robert Manoff and Milica Pesic

Cross-cultural journalism in Macedonia ...................................... 127by Eran Fraenkel

Journalists mediating conflict .................................................. 137by Melissa Baumann and Hannes Siebert

Qeshu, Rini, Qeshu: Youth programming in Kosovo ........................ 144by Rod Curtis

Talking Drum Studio .............................................................. 146by John Langlois

“Our neighbours, ourselves”: Drama in Burundi ............................ 158by Francis Rolt

Nashe Maalo – Youth Television in Macedonia .............................. 163by Eran Fraenkel

Section Four: Measuring Impact

Ondas Imaginativas ............................................................... 170by Lina Holquin

Evaluating Operation Lifeline Media – Mozambique ........................ 178by Nicola Harford

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About the author

Loretta Hieber is co-founder of Media Action International. Shestarted her professional career as both a journalist and radio producer,working for international broadcast organizations in Paris, Munich,and Bern. A specialist in the coverage of humanitarian issues, Lorettahas produced documentaries and news reports focusing on conflictand development themes in Somalia, South Africa, the Middle East,Yemen, and other crisis areas. In 1995, she was awarded a mid-careerJournalism Fellowship from the University of Michigan-Ann Arborwhere she pursued research on the world wide refugee crisis.Following this, Ms. Hieber undertook a Fellowship at HarvardUniversity’s Program in Refugee Trauma at the School of PublicHealth. Her focus was reaching and supporting war-traumatisedaffected populations through the media. A working collaborationwith Gordon Adam resulted in the Radio Partnership in 1997 whichsubsequently developed several initiatives on media and conflict,notably the Lifeline Media Project. In addition, Ms. Hieber hasworked as a consultant for media projects on behalf of internationalorganizations, including UNICEF and UNESCO. Ms. Hieber ismarried, with two children and lives outside Geneva, Switzerland.

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About Media Action International

Media Action International aims to promote more effective use ofthe media to help local populations in crises and to strengthen therole of information in humanitarian and development initiatives. Itbridges the gap between journalism and humanitarian, post-conflictand development activities. This unique position enables MediaAction International to develop strategies to make the best use ofthe mass media, at a time when its role is recognised widely as keyin the fight against illiteracy, poverty and disease. Whetherdistributing wind-up radios to refugees, setting up editorially-independent humanitarian and youth radio programmes duringcrises or reconstruction periods, or training local journalists, MediaAction International’s focus ranges from conflict situations to naturaldisasters. Its ultimate aim is to offer bench-mark standards in theuse of needs-based media.

Headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, Media Action Internationalis a not-for-profit international foundation registered with theFederal authorities in Bern. It has charity status as a non-governmental organisation in the United Kingdom. Media ActionInternational was founded in 1998 by professional journalists toensure that international media interventions are based on crediblejournalistic standards of objectivity and impartiality.

As a centre for media initiatives, Media Action Internationalproduces documents and books relating to the innovative use ofthe media for development and peace-building purposes. It alsomanages field-based media projects in conflict areas and organisesregular workshops and conferences.

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A Rwandan refugee boy in Goma, Zaire.Photo: UNICEF/94-0172/Betty Press.

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PREFACE

In the mid 1990s, when I first began working in the field ofhumanitarian journalism, I made a phone call to the BBC WorldService’s Africa service to ask if they would consider psycho-socialbroadcasting for the Great Lakes region. This was immediatelyfollowing the Rwandan genocide. The response was swift and clear:the BBC does not broadcast any programming which is not basedon the purest journalist traditions. “We would not even broadcastinformation telling people to boil water during a cholera epidemic,because they might need the wood for something else. This is notour role,” they said.

Attitudes quickly changed. Today, the BBC runs the Great LakesLifeline Service featuring human rights issues, tracing messages, andeven a health drama produced by the non-governmental organization(NGO), Health Unlimited. The Voice of America broadcasts aConflict Resolution programme for local journalists in Angola. Atleast half a dozen NGOs produce innovative media projects inconflict and post-conflict areas, designed, for example, to promotebetter health or peace-building.

The role of media in conflict and crisis areas – particularly broadcastmedia – is changing. No longer satisfied to remain independentoutside observers, many media professionals are now developingprogrammes which strive to be part of the solution.

It is an exciting and truly challenging field of endeavour. Theinternational community now accepts that journalists’ skills areuseful in emergency and post-conflict situations and may even beused to benefit affected populations. The “us” versus “them”relationship between media and aid professionals is evolving into agreater understanding of the need for partnerships between allplayers in the field of conflict and peace-building.

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This guide originates from a conference held by Media ActionInternational (MAI – formerly the International Centre forHumanitarian Reporting/Radio Partnership) in Cape Town, SouthAfrica, in December 1998. Entitled, Strengthening Lifeline Mediain Regions of Conflict, the workshop brought together mediaprofessionals and experts in conflict resolution to examine how themedia could impact on peace-building in conflict situations. Afterexamining and debating numerous case studies, participantsconcluded that a dynamic new field of research was emerging. Buthow best to describe it – humanitarian information; human rightsreporting; peace journalism; conflict resolution media? “LifelineMedia” is the term Media Action International has chosen to describemedia projects undertaken in conflict and post-conflict situations.

Lifeline Media: Reaching Populations in Crisis focuses on proactiveprogrammes as opposed to mainstream journalism – an importantdistinction to make. Dozens of excellent books examine howWestern media cover conflict, and the impact this has on foreignpolicy. However, this publication examines media projectsestablished to provide information to affected populations in conflictsituations, either during crisis or in the post-conflict period.

Every attempt has been made to be thorough. It has, of course,been necessary to focus on those areas which I believe to be of criticalimportance in the establishment of “lifeline media” projects, suchas needs assessments and editorial policy guidelines. I have includedcase studies which illustrate some of the most innovative work beingdone in conflict and crisis areas.

The guide has been divided into four sections. The first section,Designing Programmes for Populations in Crisis, focuses onsetting up media programmes in conflict situations. Chapter Iprovides a brief overview designed to acquaint media practitionerswith a few of the main theories related to conflict. The second chapteremphasises the need to carry out preliminary research, especiallyin-field needs assessments. Chapter III offers guidelines on how toestablish media projects in the field, with a focus on working withlocal partners. The fourth chapter offers the advantages anddisadvantages of working with radio, television/video, orinformation communication technologies.

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The second section, Humanitarian Information Programmes,relates primarily to emergency projects. Chapter V examines editorialissues, such as objectivity, and provides a short overview ofprogramme formats. The next chapter focuses on specialisedprogrammes in emergencies, including health, children, women,promotion of humanitarian values, and tracing activities.

In the third section, Media Projects for Peace-Building, specialemphasis is placed on projects which have been designed with theintent to help bring about an end to the conflict. Chapter VIIexamines several of the challenges facing programmers such as howto tackle perceptions (and misperceptions), or help bring about co-operation. In the eighth chapter, the role of reporting and questionsof objectivity are examined. Chapter IX offers examples of innovativemedia projects using radio and video.

Section Four, Measuring Impact, is designed to acquaint readerswith some of the ideas currently circulating about the difficult fieldof impact evaluation. Chapter X emphasises the role of evaluationas an on-going process of learning. Chapter XI offers suggestionson how to establish indicators and Chapter XII presents the rapidsurvey method of evaluation designed for use in rapidly changingsituations.

Lifeline Media: Strengthening Populations in Crisis was a team effort,especially in so far as the research and experience gained to providethe basis of this guide has evolved from four years of closecollaboration with my colleagues, Gordon Adam, Edward Girardetand Moyra Rushby. As the core staff of Media Action International,the four of us have explored where the skills of professionaljournalists may be best utilised in crisis situations. From this workemerged Operation Lifeline Media, a multi-year approach designedto ensure that populations in crisis always have access to impartialand well-produced humanitarian information in a manner whichenhances local media capacity. Gordon Adam greatly contributedto the section on media and peace-building and I particularlyappreciate his input.

Researchers for this guide include Malcolm Green, Bronwyn Walker,and Michelle Morgan, as well as Vladimir Bratic of Ohio University.Their enthusiasm was infectious, and their keen interest mostappreciated. In particular I would like to note Mal Green’s handling

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of the sections on the use of the Internet, and extensive contributionsthroughout the guide. Bronwyn’s research focused on tracingactivities, as well as tracking down the photographs. Michelleresearched international broadcasting activities and Vladimir helpedprovide some of the theory behind media and peace-building. I amgrateful for their hard work.

Finally, I would like to thank the dozens of contributors to thispublication. Many of these writers are friends whom I have beenprivileged enough to get to know over the past four years – often inthe field or at various conferences. The spirit of sharing informationand working in collaboration is still alive in this small professionalenvironment, and I sincerely hope that it remains so. Special thanksto Hannes Siebert and Melissa Baumann of the South African MediaPeace Centre, who have always welcomed the MAI team to SouthAfrica with such hospitality. Search for Common Ground andCommon Ground Productions are, in my mind, leaders in the fieldof media and peace-building and I greatly appreciate their sharingof insights with us. Other thanks must go to the field staff of MediaAction International programmes, particularly our team in Pristina,for their incredible dedication and hard work. The lessons we havelearned and are now sharing are the fruit of their labour, innovationand commitment.

I dedicate this guide to my own children, Elisa and Alexander, inthe hope that they may never know the tragedy of war first-hand.

Loretta Hieber

Geneva, February 15, 2001

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A refugee at the border between South Africa and Mozambique.Photo: Paul Smith/Panos Pictures; MOZ:260

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MEDIA AS A WEAPON OF WAR OR A TOOL OF PEACE: INTRODUCTION

Media as a Weaponof War or a Tool of Peace

Introduction

Throughout the course of the 20th century, the media have beencrucial players in crisis situations, often disseminating hate-propaganda and war mongering, but, increasingly, promotinghumanitarian and peace-building objectives. From the early days ofradio, when Nazi propaganda flooded the airwaves, to the morerecent use of the Internet by Serbian opposition radio, the mediaprovide a vehicle used every day around the world, as either aweapon of war or a tool of peace.

The examples of media manipulation in this century are numerous.They merit attention, for in these roots may be found the model forthe development of media as a catalyst for positive change. The mostwidely cited deployment of media, particularly radio, is propagandabroadcast in World World II.

During the Cold War period, the media was increasingly engagedby Western and Soviet bloc nations as a means of stirring up anti-and pro-communist sentiment. In the 1960s, radio in particular wasintroduced as a method of fighting colonial rule in Africa and otherparts of the developing world.

Media as a weapon of war is especially noteworthy in the conflictthat dominated the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia. Radio, incombination with television, was manipulated to provoke ethnicand nationalist sentiments and to win support of certain parties,particularly in Serbia and Croatia. To evoke the effect of Serbianstate television on the Serb population, the British historian,Noel Malcolm, has suggested that one should imagine the Ku KluxKlan taking over all the main American television networks for adecade.

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Perhaps the symbol of “hate” radio in the twentieth century is thedissemination of incitement to murder Tutsis and other opponentsof the Habyarimana regime in Rwanda in the 1990s by RadioTélévision Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM). Although its impactis difficult to quantify, RTLM has been widely recognised ascontributing significantly to the 1994 genocide, in which 800,000men, women and children were massacred.

Despite the clear potency of broadcasts such as those produced byNazi, Serb or Hutu propagandists, it is still difficult to establish adirect cause and effect link between the intent of the propagandistsand the reactions of the target audience. To date, there are no cleartools to define the impact of such media and to measure it. Even so,in all of the above cases, it is widely accepted that these mediainterventions intensified the conflict or at least increased supportfor it.

In the above examples, the media was used specifically to polariseopponents, whip up war fever, establish partisanship and disseminatewar propaganda. But there are very few examples of the media beingused to contravene these actions. For example, little media attentionwas focused in World War II on bringing opponents together or ondisseminating “peace propaganda” – to do so would probably havebeen considered treason.

In the past decade, however, there has been a movement to exploitthe best aspects of media in order to promote peace and stability inconflict-ridden areas. One of the first examples of a mediaintervention in a humanitarian crisis relates to the Rwandan genocide.In 1994, a group of European journalists, dismayed about thepresumed impact of Radio Mille Collines’ hate messages, took stepsto ensure that the Rwandan population fleeing into neighbouringcountries had immediate access to unbiased information. Theresulting effort, Radio Agataysha, heralded a new era in humanitarianinformation programming.

During the Kosovo crisis the international community began tofully appreciate the concept of information as an essential componentof relief operations. The result of Serb aggression combined withNATO’s air campaign was the largest mass refugee movement in

The media hasThe media hasThe media hasThe media hasThe media hasbeen exploitedbeen exploitedbeen exploitedbeen exploitedbeen exploitedto promote peaceto promote peaceto promote peaceto promote peaceto promote peaceand stabilityand stabilityand stabilityand stabilityand stabilityin conflictsin conflictsin conflictsin conflictsin conflicts

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Europe since World War II. The international community was ill-prepared to handle such an exodus. As the United Nations HighCommissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other international relieforganizations scrambled to provide emergency shelter, health careand food distribution, little thought was given to communicatingwith the hundreds of thousands of displaced people. Yet informationwas particularly vital for this literate, educated refugee population.Without adequate knowledge about the international relief effortunderway in Albania and Macedonia, there was little opportunityfor the refugees to make considered decisions about their futures.

Humanitarian assistance traditionally centres on five principal areasof action: food distribution, health, shelter, security, water andsanitation. Communication activities most often consist of providinginformation to Western journalists about the activities of individualagencies, frequently in a bid to build profile and attract financialsupport. Whether affected populations actually receive vitalinformation is rarely considered.

At the Sarshahi displaced persons camp in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.Photo: UNHCR/J. Fakhouri/11.1994

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As a result, the information needs of refugees or otherwiseaffected populations are not properly met. International newsbroadcasts do not provide adequate humanitarian information.Instead, programming must be locally-based, with a focus ongathering information to enable listeners to make decisions and toassume a more active role in the relief effort.

One of the reasons media are now being harnessed as potentiallypositive forces in conflict is because the traditional role of mediaand information is changing. The technological revolution of the20th century, bringing with it the Internet and satellitecommunications, has eliminated distances. News of atrocitiescommitted on one side of the world may be “beamed” almostinstantaneously to the other side, often resulting in a demand foraction. Concerned citizens, sensitised to human rights issues,are seeking innovative ways to influence behaviour to conform tothe tenets of internationally recognised standards, such as theUniversal Declaration of Human Rights or the Convention on theRights of the Child.

Therefore, the question is no longer, “Can media play a role?” butrather, “What is the best approach for media to take in promotinghumanitarianism, peace, tolerance, human rights and democracy?”

There is little doubt that tremendous potential exists to developmedia projects as effective tools for education and the building ofdemocracies. But, while many populations enjoy increasing accessto media, this doesn’t mean they are information-rich. The contentof programmes is often poor. While the quantity of informationmay increase, quality is likely to lag behind.

A distinction should be made between humanitarian and peace-building information:

● Humanitarian programming focuses on providing affectedpopulations with vital information such as health, security, land-mines awareness or basic logistical data on a relief effort.Humanitarian information is a relief tool and aims to improvethe well-being of populations in crises.

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● Peace-building programming is designed to provide a vehiclefor the peaceful resolution of conflict. Its objective is to bringabout an end to hostilities and create an atmosphere conduciveto reconciliation and reconstruction.

The decision to include both emergency/humanitarian and peace-building media projects in a single publication reflects the beliefthat clear delineations between pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflictenvironments may be artificial. In addition, Media ActionInternational’s experience, particularly in the Balkans, suggests thatby providing accurate information in the crisis phase, media-basedorganizations gain credibility which may be essential for workingwith local media in post-conflict situations.

More importantly, the techniques used for the development offield-based programmes are the same during a humanitarian crisisor post-conflict situation. The approach favoured here consists of aparticipatory model, borrowing many of the proven methodologiesof development communications.

Although this research is still very much in its infancy, there areindications that certain approaches are more likely to result inpositive audience response. Combining traditional journalism withaspects of development communications is the methodologyrecommended throughout this guide.

In practice, this means programmes in crisis situations are journalisticin that they emphasise an impartial and fair approach to content,ensure accuracy of information (and therefore credibility), andmaintain listener interest with an entertaining format. Informationthat is distorted or plainly inaccurate can have devastating effectson populations in crisis situations.

Development communication calls for careful research “to knowthe audience”. This means tailoring content to meet the expressedinterests and needs of the target audience, pre-testing programmepilots, and monitoring audience reaction to the programmes.Programmes are adjusted following evaluation. It is through theuse of development communication techniques that programmes incrisis situations can effectively respond to the needs of the targetaudience.

Distorted orDistorted orDistorted orDistorted orDistorted orinaccurateinaccurateinaccurateinaccurateinaccurateinformation caninformation caninformation caninformation caninformation canhave devastatinghave devastatinghave devastatinghave devastatinghave devastatingeffects in crisiseffects in crisiseffects in crisiseffects in crisiseffects in crisissituationssituationssituationssituationssituations

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Return of Rwandan refugees from Tanzania.Photo: UNHCR/26122/12.1996/H. J. Davies

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SECTION ONE: DESIGNING PROGRAMMES FOR POPULATIONS IN CRISIS

Section One:Designing Programmes forPopulations in Crisis

The most urgent information requirements of an affected populationare likely to change in different phases of any crisis. During theacute phase, emphasis will be placed on ensuring local populationsare provided with information that helps them withstand the effectsof the conflict. This would be humanitarian information, with lessemphasis perhaps on peace-building programming. It may even beimportant to minimise overt peace-building activities due to the riskof alienating an audience in the midst of an emergency. When apost-conflict situation has emerged, even if the peace is tenuous,more diversified programming may begin.

These are very broad rules and unlikely to fit neatly into anyparticular case study. A general understanding of conflict situationsis beneficial before establishing media programmes in the field, inorder to avoid the pitfall of developing inappropriate or ill-conceivedinterventions.

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CaptionPhoto: ICRC

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CHAPTER I UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT AND POST-CONFLICT SCENARIOS

The face of conflict is changing. Traditional wars where one countryopposes another, such as the Iran/Iraq war or, more recently,Ethiopia/Eritrea, are increasingly rare. Of the 27 conflicts worldwideat the end of the twentieth century, 25 were considered civil wars.

Since the end of the Cold War, 20 new civil wars have erupted. Eachof these conflicts has distinct characteristics. Increasingly, civil warsmay have multiple actors, and a number of different warringfactions – Somalia counted 12 such factions in 1991. At least10 different parties are involved in Liberia’s civil war.1 This meansthat media projects which aim to reach all sides of a populationinvolved in conflict will have to feature programming which ismulti-dimensional and inclusive in its approach. Programmes mayneed to be in several languages or operate out of different locationsto gain legitimacy with the entire target population.

Making a distinction between inter-state and intra-state conflictsmay be less relevant for humanitarian information programmes thanfor peace-building initiatives. Humanitarian informationprogrammes are concerned with ensuring all sides diversely affectedby the conflict receive adequate and appropriate information.Peace-building programmes are designed to help change attitudes,particularly at a community level. If attitudes between ethnic groups,for example, are part of the problem, then they must be part of thesolution. Media can help provide the tools for clashing segments ofa population to reach non-violent solutions to their problems.This is more likely to occur between groups within a singlecommunity or country, than between two opposing governments.

The key to a successful media intervention includes a thoroughunderstanding of the complexities of the situation. There may beimmediate factors that trigger a conflict but there are deeper causessuch as territorial demands, socio-economic inequality, economic

Chapter I:Understanding conflict andpost-conflict scenarios

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interests, the defense of political ideologies, burgeoning nationalism,the struggles of ethnic minorities, racism, and arms proliferation.2

One theory maintains that conflict may be understood as emanatingfrom two persistent struggles. The first concerns identity –the mobilisation of people in identity groups based on race, religion,culture, language and so on. The second concerns distribution –the means of sharing economic, social and political resources withina society.3 When the two combine, deep-seated conflict is a likelyresult.

Identity conflicts may entail widespread citizen involvement.In Tajikistan, for example, entire communes are involved in fighting.Correspondingly, victims are also likely to be common citizens.A second characteristic may be the extreme polarisation of thepopulation, whether over religious issues as in Sudan, or ethno-regional divisions as in Burundi.4

A particular facet of identity-driven conflict is that it may beemotionally charged. Such conflicts include Northern Ireland,Chechnya, and East Timor, where the conflict centres on the identityof ethnic groups, and their positions in society. Unfortunately,identity issues are often exploited for financial gain and

Afghan refugees in Sakhi Camp near Mazar-I-Sharif.Photo: UNHCR/25030/05.1995/A. Hollmann

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war-profiteering. In addition, these conflicts lead to spillage beyondborders, and the development of regional allies and internationalsponsors. By tackling some of the intractable issues which dividecommunities within a state, the media may potentially help play arole in defusing some of the underlying tension.

Other research indicates that conflict may be essentially driven byeconomic factors. For example, Paul Collier argues that conflictsare more likely to be caused by economic opportunities than byany political grievance. He believes that economic agendas are centralto understanding why civil wars begin.5 The opportunity for themedia to impact on communities’ attitudes toward each other maybe limited if the cause of the conflict is economic gain.Nevertheless, the media can certainly raise questions about who isprofiting from the conflict, eventually generating public supportfor an end to hostilities.

As the face of conflict has changed, so our understanding of conflictshas evolved. Although 85% of civil wars officially end throughunconditional surrender, the reality on the ground is often fardifferent.6 Most commentators agree that wars do not just end whenone side wins. Underlying hostilities extend deep into the post-conflict stage. “Peace” is not attained simply through treatysignatures of the political elite. The broader population must embraceit in order to avoid renewed outbreaks of violence. The media has arole to play in addressing these tensions.

For media programmes to be effective, it is preferable that they beimplemented prior to, during, and after conflicts.

To date, the international community has often focused onintervening in the early stages of post-conflict reconstruction byassisting the development of media as part of the rehabilitationprocess.7 Providing assistance to local media or establishingpro-active programmes prior to or during the conflict, has receivedless support. This is unfortunate as conflict is often of a cyclicalnature: the post-conflict stage may need as much emphasis on conflictprevention activities as a pre-conflict environment.

Identifying the onset of any crisis is a challenging task. Most conflictsbegin far before the first signs of fighting, and may be related todecades or even centuries of accumulated aggression. Natural disasters

The media canThe media canThe media canThe media canThe media canraise questionsraise questionsraise questionsraise questionsraise questionsabout who isabout who isabout who isabout who isabout who isprofiting fromprofiting fromprofiting fromprofiting fromprofiting fromthe conflictthe conflictthe conflictthe conflictthe conflict

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are often rapid onset crises, but in many places where an informationprogramme may be required, it is likely to be because theinfrastructure of the country is poorly developed,often because of conflict. One example is Mozambique, which founditself grappling with the after-effects of massive floods in a tenuouspost-conflict situation.

The following chart provides a simple diagram which characterisesthe various stages of conflict and potential pro-active mediaprogramming responses. It is not intended to be all-inclusive, butrather offers some ideas for programming possibilities.

Mozambican refugees at the Kamphata Reception Center.Photo: UNHCR/May 1988/A. Hollmann

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Pre-Conflict During Conflict Post-Conflict

IdentificationIdentificationIdentificationIdentificationIdentification Indirect communication Heightened tension, including Repatriation of refugeessignssignssignssignssigns between adversaries or fighting

issuing of threats

Increased human rights Displacement of population Implementation of peace settlementviolations

Promotion of stereotypes as Perceptions of others as non- Potential presence of peace-keepingthe “other” including us-as- human, psychopaths, etc. to forcesgood and them-as-evil justify violence

Channels of communication Demands for justice (war crimesbroken down tribunals underway)

Reconstruction

Objectives ofObjectives ofObjectives ofObjectives ofObjectives of Help prevent outbreak of Help mitigate the effects of the Promote the establishment of a civilPro-ActivePro-ActivePro-ActivePro-ActivePro-Active violence by providing an conflict on the population by society by developing programmingMediaMediaMediaMediaMedia information vehicle for ensuring they have access to which educates population onProgrammesProgrammesProgrammesProgrammesProgrammes groups in dispute credible and impartial post-war issues

humanitarian information

Develop programming which Produce programming which Render participation of individualsframes the crisis in a manner alerts population to role of in society in a positive lightwhich encourages a peaceful international reliefresolution of the conflict community

Provide accountability for Provide vehicle for discussion Re-open channels of communicationhuman rights abuses on ways of resolving conflict between parties

Promote confidence building Focus on health and security Cover issues of repatriation wherebetween parties and issues returnees are part of ethnic majorityidentify common ground or minority, and build a culture of

acceptance. Tackle friction betweenthose who stayed and those whoreturned

Foster justice and reconciliation byfocusing on war crimes coverage

Restore faith in news media

ExamplesExamplesExamplesExamplesExamples Search for Common Ground: Project SPEAR: Albania, Radio Agatashya (HirondelleMacedonia Macedonia and Kosovo (MAI) Foundation)

Operation Lifeline Media: Talking Drum Studio: LiberiaMozambique (MAI)

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Displaced persons at Sharshahi Camp in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.Photo: UNHCR/J. Fakhouri/11.1994

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CHAPTER II: NEEDS ASSESSMENTS AND PROJECT PLANNING

Chapter II:Needs assessments and project planning

Needs assessments are a crucial component in the establishment ofmedia projects. Too many media initiatives fail because they lack athorough knowledge of the local situation and culture.

An audience’s perception of a crisis can in some situations be evenmore important than the actual facts at hand. This is particularlytrue for peace-building programmes which aim to help combatmisperceptions and negative attitudes.

Therefore, the aim of the needs assessment should be to gain a precisepicture of the situation. It is essential that it contain careful research.In addition, it is important that the needs assessment is carried outby trusted colleagues, either international and local, as this workwill form the basis for the entire operation.

No matter how rapid the onset of an emergency, a feasibility studyis crucial, especially for determining the attitudes of the affectedpopulation, which must be taken into account before programmingbegins.

A needs assessment should aim to:● be carried out methodically and quickly;

● provide enough information to determine whethera humanitarian information programme is needed;

● present a simple demographic profile of the potentialaudience;

● identify local resources;

● identify necessary technical input;

● produce recommendations for further action.

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In the field of information, there are no recognised and agreedstandards against which needs can be measured. The number ofradios per household considered adequate will vary widely,depending on factors such as whether the affected population listensin groups or individually. How literate is the population? Are thereother sources of information?

It is safe to say, however, that if a significant proportion ofthe population claims not to have access to adequate humanitarianinformation (for example, more than 30%), then there islikely to be a need for programming. In Kosovo, immediatelyfollowing the cease-fire in July 1999, one needs assessment showedthat 70% of those polled felt they were not being told what theinternational relief effort was doing.1 Even without recognisablestandards of measurement, it was clear that a mass informationprogramme would be necessary.

Gauging local attitudes and practices are vital for effectiveprogramming and therefore needs assessment must be consideredan integral part of the overall programme strategy. This approachmay run counter to the long-standing practice of donors to haveseparate assessment, project and evaluation teams.

The following development communications model illustrates therole of needs assessment in the overall project development process.

1. Learn everything possible about the emergency or crisis.2. Research and analyse lifestyle and communication

preferences of the target audience.3. Assess audience needs and attitudes towards the crisis.4. Assess needs of host authorities and humanitarian agencies.5. Develop specific measurable goals.6. Select appropriate media.7. Agree on strategy.8. Develop programming style and format.9. Pre-test.10. Modify programming and proceed with transmission.11. Monitor exposure.12. Collect impact data.13. Feedback into programme and modify as necessary.2

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As the emergency develops, more assessments may be needed. Thisis to ensure that material gathered during the initial assessmentremains valid. It is especially important that the target audience isregularly involved in the development of the programming. Thismay be achieved through playing programmes to focus groups andmonitoring their reactions, then adapting material accordingly.

One of greatest challenges facing humanitarian informationprogrammes concerns timing. When a life-threatening event occurs,and a population suddenly finds itself at great risk, there is atemptation to jump in and “do something” immediately to ensurethat the population receives adequate information. For example,plans to equip emergency relief teams with portable transmitters“to get on air” as soon as they arrive have been suggested,but fortunately have not taken root. The rationale for such proposalsis that it is better to get any information to the population than toremain silent.

While this may be partially understandable, appropriate authoritiesand relief agencies need to ensure that the correct messagesreach the right audience at an appropriate time. It cannot beover-emphasised that without adequate research and data collection,information programmes are likely to miss their intended goals andobjectives. Therefore, even when time is short, a rudimentary needsassessment should be carried out among the affected populationbefore programming begins.

An exception to this rule may be to broadcast immediate life-savinginformation, for example, alerting a mobile population not to enterminefields, or how to access humanitarian assistance programmes.News and current affairs programmes which give vital informationcan also begin more or less immediately provided the material isproperly sourced. Once the assessment is completed, this data maythen be used to expand programming and develop it in a mannerthat is culturally and ethnically in tune with the target audience.

InformationInformationInformationInformationInformationprogrammes mayprogrammes mayprogrammes mayprogrammes mayprogrammes maymiss their goalsmiss their goalsmiss their goalsmiss their goalsmiss their goalsif their researchif their researchif their researchif their researchif their researchand data collectionand data collectionand data collectionand data collectionand data collectionis inadequateis inadequateis inadequateis inadequateis inadequate

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1. Criteria for action

It is questionable whether the international community should seekto establish media projects in countries where there are adequateprofessionals on the ground, particularly if, by doing so, the capacityof local journalists is undermined. But this consideration must beweighed against the possibility that local media may not be able tomeet the information needs of the affected population, and thatexternal assistance may be required.

Needs assessments should be carried out in the very early stages ofthe crisis, particularly in the case of rapid onset disasters. But beforesending an assessment team into the field, the following criteriashould be reviewed.

a) Scope of crisis

How many people have been displaced or adversely affected by thecrisis? Humanitarian information projects, as described in this guide,refer to mass media programming which is primarily needed whena significant proportion of a region’s population is at risk. Forexample, the earthquakes which struck Turkey in 1999 left anestimated 600,000 people homeless. The majority of these, accordingto many news reports, did not receive adequate information onemergency shelter, medical assistance, temporary lodging, or otherrelief. It is not always possible to know in advance if a crisis, whichmay appear to be limited in the beginning, will indeed escalate intoa large-scale disaster, so continuous monitoring of crisis zones isnecessary.

b) Media environment

Do normal channels of information appear inadequate or disrupted?Have local journalists been imprisoned or have they fled? Is relevantinformation reaching affected populations? It may not always beeasy to determine this without a needs assessment but there are likelyto be indicators to watch out for. For example, in the case of Kosovo,it was widely known that NATO warplanes had destroyed the mainradio transmitters in the province during the military campaign. Itwas also known that most Albanian language journalists in Kosovo

Any crisis mayAny crisis mayAny crisis mayAny crisis mayAny crisis mayescalate so it mustescalate so it mustescalate so it mustescalate so it mustescalate so it mustbe monitoredbe monitoredbe monitoredbe monitoredbe monitoredcontinuouslycontinuouslycontinuouslycontinuouslycontinuously

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had been forbidden to work in their professions for the decadeleading up to the war. Therefore, there was a likelihood that good-quality local information was not reaching the population.

In situations where there have been massive population movements,local media may no longer reach those affected, particularly ifrefugees are moving into areas where a different language is spoken.A thorough needs assessment would determine this.

c) Gauging attitude of host authorities

Are host authorities amenable to outside intervention? (If not,partnerships with international broadcasters are an alternative.) Hostauthorities may include national and local governments, or evenguerrilla leaders if the programme takes place in a zone controlledby non-governmental forces. The availability of visas is already agood indication of whether the local government is open to outsideintervention. Talking to other relief players may help confirmwhether access to the local population is possible.

Arrival of tribal chiefs to identify eligible voters amongst Saharan refugees, Algeria.Photo: UNHCR/28048/03.1998/A. Hollmann

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States where the media are strictly controlled may be open to thepossibility of humanitarian information programmes, provided theystay within the framework of the existing broadcasting or mediasystem. One example concerns Chechens displaced in Ingushetia.Because this is considered to be an internal conflict, any humanitarianinformation programming may have to be sanctioned by Russianauthorities. This may raise ethical questions which producers mustbe prepared to confront, particularly over issues of editorialindependence.

d) Estimating lasting repercussions of crisis

Are the repercussions of the crisis ongoing? A one-off crisis whichhas no lasting impact is not likely to require a mass mediahumanitarian information programme. This might include a singleterrorist attack or occasional guerrilla activities as is often the casein Latin American conflicts. There, humanitarian programming islikely to be less appropriate than peace-building projects. This, ofcourse, will depend very much on the particular conflict.

2. Initial research: understanding the crisis

An outsider’s perceptions of a crisis may differ drastically from howit is perceived by the local population. These “realities” will befurther defined during the field assessment. It is essential that theresearch team prepare for the needs assessment by grasping the issuesat stake for the local population, if possible prior to leaving for thefield.

While the Internet has made it easier to acquire instantaneous dataon virtually any country in the world, a note of caution must besounded. Some “emergency websites” which provide informationon countries hit by conflict or natural disaster are maintained bypartisan groups that have a vested interest in how the internationalcommunity responds to the crisis.

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Researching hostile environmentsby John Owen Davies

Anywhere with a potential security and safetythreat can be described as a hostile environment.A war zone is the most obvious one but there areother environments that can fall into the hostilebracket. These include areas with harsh climaticconditions, terrorist activity, extreme poverty,natural or human-made disasters and inhospitableterrain.

Gone are the days when aid workers, bursting withgood intentions, can expect to enter such areaswith impunity. An increased number of deaths andinjuries among their number has put an end tothat. Still, it is evident that many of them go intothe field with little knowledge of what is to come.Without having access to the widest possibleinformation ranging from the general situation toimportant factors such as health risks, peopleoperating in hot spots can be working within adangerous vacuum. Most of the necessaryinformation is available on the Internet.

The UN’s ReliefWeb (www.reliefweb.int) and theReuter Foundation’s AlertNet (www.alertnet.org)are among the most widely used Internet sites fordisaster relief. Both offer a wide range of material,including country reports and on-the-spotassessments, but neither are one-stop shops witheverything that is needed. AlertNet caters mainlyfor the voluntary humanitarian agencies andReliefWeb for the United Nations.

Solid country reports can also be seen on theEconomist Intelligence Unit’s site (www.eiu.com)and on the US Central Intelligence Agency’swww.odci .gov/c ia/publ icat ions/factbook/index.html, the former by subscription. Real WorldRescue (www.realworldrescue.com) is a majorsource of information on danger areas, including

the latest news and tips on how to survive attacks(e.g. “become aware of security threats – beforeyou ever set foot out of your home, learn if thecountry is amenable to your visit”). Basic andsimple up-to-date news sources, such as AlertNet,CNN (www.cnn.com) and the BBC World Service(www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice) are vital tools.

Many individual countries have their own sites,often accessed by using the country name anddotcom (e.g. www.nigeria.com for Nigeria). Majorcountries often provide detailed officialinformation, including visa restrictions, securityalerts and health problems. One of these is theBritish Foreign and Commonwealth Office(www.fco.gov.uk).

Health is an important topic on its own. Some ofthe most comprehensive international sites are runby the World Health Organization (www.who.ch)and the US Centers for Disease Control andPrevention (www.cdc.gov). The InternationalFederation of Red Cross and Red CrescentSocieties (www.ifrc.org) and the InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross (www.icrc.org) offera wealth of material pertinent to disaster relief andrelated topics, including individual sites fromnational Red Cross and Red Crescent societies insome 180 countries. The World Bank’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit offers a sampling ofresearch on conflict and an update on theirnumerous activities in post-conflict areas(www.worldbank.org/postconflict). Anotherinteresting page is the US-based CBS News-Disaster Links (www.disasterlinks.net). AlthoughUS-centric, it has more than 300 sites coveringrelief agencies and organizations to satelliteimagery, severe weather, earthquakes, El Niño andtornadoes.

John Owen-Davies is the former Editor of Reuter’John Owen-Davies is the former Editor of Reuter’John Owen-Davies is the former Editor of Reuter’John Owen-Davies is the former Editor of Reuter’John Owen-Davies is the former Editor of Reuter’s AlertNets AlertNets AlertNets AlertNets AlertNet

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3. Quantitative and qualitative field research

Field researchers will normally use two different approaches tocollecting data in the field: quantitative and qualitative. Both areuseful in ensuring that adequate information is collated. Thequantitative method simply means “measuring numbers” or“measuring your audience”. The qualitative method explores “whatpeople say”, “what people think” or “what people need”.3

One hazard to avoid while interviewing local populations isincorrectly translated questionnaires. It is also essential that localassessors approach the target audience with respect andconsideration. To ensure this, an experienced evaluation expertshould be involved in training the locally-hired staff who will beexpected to carry out the survey. If there are local companiesspecialised in audience research, it may often be preferable to engagetheir services rather than relying on outside expertise.

It is also important to weigh cultural considerations in assessments.For example, in certain cultures, it may be considered impolite toanswer in the negative, so “yes/no” questions should be avoided.Open-ended questionnaires, however, may prove too time-consuming to process in a rapid manner.

Focus groups form the basis of the qualitative approach toinformation gathering. Focus groups rely on “interaction within agroup based on topics that are supplied by the researcher”.4 Thesemay prove particularly worthwhile in an emergency situation whereaccurate demographic data on populations is hard to come by oreven superfluous for the development of the programme.

Focus groups provide participants with the opportunity to beinvolved in the programme-making process and to workcollaboratively with researchers. The experience can be bothempowering and enlightening for those attempting to design aproject which responds to the needs of the audience.

There are pitfalls with focus groups, however. The methodologycan be intimidating, or support the views of dominant membersover inarticulate or shy individuals. Great care must be taken in therecruitment of participants. Recruitment should be sensitive to local

Focus groups areFocus groups areFocus groups areFocus groups areFocus groups arethe basis of thethe basis of thethe basis of thethe basis of thethe basis of thequalitativequalitativequalitativequalitativequalitativeapproach toapproach toapproach toapproach toapproach toinformationinformationinformationinformationinformationgatheringgatheringgatheringgatheringgathering

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conditions lest those who are usually voiceless within a communityremain so during the discussion.

Ensuring local power relationships are overcome during focus groupdiscussions is particularly important when designing programmingfor marginalised segments of the populations. This includes womenand children, who are often most in need of information in a crisis.

a) Determining a population’s access to informationand attitude to conflict

It is only possible to determine whether a population is receivingadequate information through normal media channels byinterviewing the target audience directly. In refugee crises, it is notonly refugees who are affected by their displacement. Often, hostpopulations may also urgently need information about the changesoccurring in their societies due to the crisis. It will be necessary toinclude both groups in the interview process.

The assessment should seek responses to the questions in the boxbelow.

/.../.../.../.../...

What information does the affected population feel it iscurrently lacking? This can be presented as an open-endedquestion or as several different options. Using multiple options,however, may prove less effective in prioritising informationneeds. Focus groups may be a preferred method.

How does the affected population perceive the crisis? Theattitudes of the local community, refugee group or any otherintended audience towards the crisis may not be readilyascertainable. But clarifying how the affected populationunderstands the crisis will help determine how to approachprogramme content. For example, a population whichunderstands a natural disaster to be “God’s will” may be lesswilling to consider taking action to mitigate the effects of a futuredisaster. Mixed perceptions concerning the conflict’s causes andthe best approach for resolving the dispute are likely to be found.Very careful analysis of perceptions is vital, particularly for peace-building programmes.

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Are there local media practitioners capable of deliveringmessages? An assessment of the media situation on the ground isvital, so time must be allotted to visit radio and television stations,or newspapers, to speak to editors about their ability andwillingness to provide humanitarian information. Importantconsiderations include the technical reach of national or localbroadcasters, and whether staff are adequately trained to provideaccurate humanitarian information to the population.

Do local media professionals need support from specialisedinternational practitioners? Weighing the ability of local mediato provide adequate humanitarian information against the needof the affected population for independent and credibleprogramming will be an important step in developing a response.It is crucial to be sensitive to local media’s role. This meansenvisaging how they may be supported, before developing anintervention which could circumvent their position in theircommunities, such as setting up an expensive new radio station.Bringing experienced trainers to work with already-existing localstations may be a better solution.

What is the attitude of local authorities towards thedissemination of humanitarian information? Preliminaryinterviews with appropriate authorities should indicate whetherthey will support an independent media project. Emphasisingthat humanitarian information is an essential part of theinternational response to the crisis, and is not designed to detractfrom national or local media capacity, may help overcomeauthorities’ resistance to programming.

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b) Determining a relief operation’s communicationneeds

A humanitarian information programme is designed to be acommunications vehicle through which the relief community caninteract with the affected population and the population can expressits reaction to the crisis. To that end, an initial assessment shouldinclude what information is likely to be crucial for the well-beingof the affected population and an indication of what other means ofdissemination will be used (e.g. one-on-one contact, communityoutreach services, poster campaigns).

To determine the communication needs of the relief effort,researchers should aim to interview officials in charge of varioussectors of the operation. It is important to get a broad range ofviews representing international and NGO interests. At the sametime, it is crucial to gain a thorough understanding of thecommunication needs of national and local relief authorities. Thefollowing box provides examples of the information to be gleanedduring the interview process.

In the Kimbumba Camp, near Goma, Rwandan refugees line up to receive water.Photo: UNICEF/94-0168/Betty Press.

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What is the attitude of the international relief communitytowards the dissemination of humanitarian information?Gauge the attitudes of relief agencies in the field, rather thanaccepting “official” attitudes stated at headquarters level. Securityconsiderations may be cited as a reason for minimisingcommunication between humanitarian agencies and the affectedpopulation. The assessment should determine the likelihood ofrelief agency support for a humanitarian information programmeand how best to co-ordinate information flows.

Who are the key players in the international and national reliefcommunities? Identifying potential partners in the assessmentstage can help provide important logistic support during theoperations component of the programme. It is vital to seek supportfrom the main agencies coordinating emergency operations (e.g.World Health Organization for health, or military peacekeepersfor security).

Are there conflicting international and/or local relief agendas?Determine whether there are likely to be conflicting approachesto handling the crisis, which may lead to confused or contradictorymessages being directed to the affected population. Thisinformation may have significance for further development ofthe project.

c) Determining a population’s material access toinformation

Information broadcast for a population which has no meansof receiving it clearly makes little sense. Since the mid-1990s,donors have increasingly provided for the distribution of radios,particularly wind-up models, for affected populations.But distribution of radios can be problematic. For example,when Liberian refugees in the Ivory Coast and Guinea receivedradios, it simply helped them listen to the sole partisan radio stationin the region.5

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Assessing information needs in Kosovoby Jonathan Walter

“Now I feel nothing”, muttered Agim Byci, “I amtalking as a robot. Every minute I am waiting for aparamilitary soldier to come to my house. I waswaiting for bullets and bombs for three months.I don’t know exactly if I am in freedom or not.”

Byci is editor of Radio Gjakova, in western Kosovo,and chairman of the town’s cultural union. We methim while conducting an information needs andcapacities assessment for Media ActionInternational in the province in July 1999, justweeks after the NATO bombing campaign hadhalted.

Over a thousand men, women and children werekilled in Djakova alone, claimed Byci, some in frontof his eyes. He showed us the photos of 20 womenand children murdered, he said, on 26 March 1999by Serb paramilitaries and tossed into a massgrave. One five-year old boy played dead and wasbeing guarded as a witness to war crimes.

Our approach to the assessment was bothquantitative and qualitative. Four hundred men andwomen of all ages, mainly ethnical Albanian butsome Serb, answered questionnaires aimed atestablishing their current information sources, thetype of information they received, whether theytrusted it, and what kind of information theyneeded. In the same five towns (Prishtina, Peja,Gjakova, Prizren, Mitrovica) we chaired a further11 focus groups of same-sex or similar age-groupparticipants. Discussions were less directed, andpeople spoke spontaneously about what was ontheir minds and what they would most like to hearon a humanitarian radio programme.

We had expected material concerns topredominate – reconstruction, food, health care.

But our preconceptions were not on target. Whilerebuilding homes remained a high priority, withwinter just months away, the key information needto emerge was news on missing family membersand on those young men taken prisoner inSerbia – numbering 1,400 by some estimates.

A second key issue was that of civil administrationand law and order. The euphoria felt at NATO’s“victory” in “liberated” Prishtina hadn’t filtered outfar from the capital. People in the ravaged town ofPeja were confused at which way to turn. “Nobodytells us anything,” said one 47 year-old resident.While international KFOR troops thundered aroundPeja in armoured personnel carriers, bristling likeporcupines with weapons and missiles, it felt likethe war hadn’t finished. Some survivors wereangry: NATO is doing nothing to return the townto normal, they accused. Landmines still litteredwrecked homes. Dead bodies lay unclaimed andunburied. Rubbish piled up.

Many Kosovars we met had no idea what aidagencies were doing, although several hundredNGOs had flooded into Prishtina in what oneobserver called a “humanitarian Klondike”. Noneof those we polled had even heard of the UnitedNations administration in Kosovo, UNMIK. Yetgiven the hunger for more news on prisoners, lawand order and aid activities, we were shocked tofind that information needs were ignored in therapid village assessments made by UN agencies,NGOs and KFOR in the weeks after the bombingstopped. Far from encountering passive victims,we found potential audiences eager for moreinformation, and potential media partners – trainedjournalists and editors – desperate for the meansto report on and broadcast local news.

/.../.../.../.../...

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Everywhere the sense of physical andpsychological normality had been shattered – lovedones murdered, families ripped apart, homes andpossessions burned, livelihoods in tatters. Yetthroughout the province, Kosovars wereattempting to re-establish a normal life against allodds. Makeshift markets sprang up in the shadowsof shattered homes and mosques from Mitrovicato Peja. Agim Byci in Gjakova had reopened hisradio station – although his main transmitter hadbeen stolen and he hadn’t a penny to pay his

14 staff. Nearly three-quarters of those weinterviewed in the town listened to hisprogrammes. Down the road, Radio Prizren wasbroadcasting two hours of news and humanitarianinformation every lunchtime, including aprogramme on missing people called, We arelooking for the people we know. Listening to thenews and reporting the news: for Agim Byci andhis journalist colleagues, recovery meant goingback to work, whether paid or not. “Perhaps”, hetold us, “this job helps me forget the time of war.”

Jonathan WJonathan WJonathan WJonathan WJonathan Walter is the Editor of the Walter is the Editor of the Walter is the Editor of the Walter is the Editor of the Walter is the Editor of the World Disasters Reportorld Disasters Reportorld Disasters Reportorld Disasters Reportorld Disasters ReportInternational Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent SocietiesInternational Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent SocietiesInternational Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent SocietiesInternational Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent SocietiesInternational Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

Assessing information needs in Kosovo, by Jonathan WAssessing information needs in Kosovo, by Jonathan WAssessing information needs in Kosovo, by Jonathan WAssessing information needs in Kosovo, by Jonathan WAssessing information needs in Kosovo, by Jonathan Walter (continued)alter (continued)alter (continued)alter (continued)alter (continued)

Bosnian refugees at the tent camp near Split, Croatia.Photo: UNICEF/5450/Edith Simmons

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To assess a population’s access to radio, television or newspaper,it is worthwhile considering any data preceding the crisis, such asliteracy rates. This data can lead to a preliminary conclusion,for example, that radio is the most appropriate means ofcommunicating humanitarian information. The next step entailsdetermining the adequacy of existing media to provide credibleinformation.

To ensure adequate data, it will be necessary to undertake randomsurveys amongst the target audience. There may not be enough timeor resources to produce data that will be statistically representativeof the entire population, but the aim here is to get enough of ageneral idea to ensure programming accurately reflects audienceneeds. Questions to be examined are listed below.

What are current sources of information for the affectedpopulation? Determining how the target audience currentlyreceives information is essential in order to establish acommunication strategy. Likely responses will be internationalradio (e.g. BBC, Voice of America, Radio France International)as well as local sources. It may be necessary to prompt theindividual interviewed to consider less obvious means(such as friends or neighbours).

What is the preferred medium of information – radio, televisionor other? This is one of the most essential pieces of informationto be gained through the assessment. There is little sense in usingvideo to reach a population which has a primarily oral/auraltradition. More than just the medium, it is also important to findout what type of programming the audience is likely to enjoy:music or youth oriented, for example, as well as preferred lengthof programme and best broadcast times.

Which family member is likely to control the medium ofinformation? Who actually has his or her hand on the dial of theradio or television set? Is listening a family event or limited tocertain individuals in the family, such as the authority figure?

/.../.../.../.../...

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Do women or other vulnerable groups all have access toinformation? Specific target groups, such as women and children,may require additional programming according to their listeninghabits and access to radio or other media.

Is there a need for additional material such as radios for theaffected population? Determining the material need of apopulation for radios or even television may be extremely difficult,depending on the type of crisis at hand. For example, an emergencyinvolving mass population movements most likely will result in aserious dearth of material possessions, as the affected are unlikelyto carry much with them. Meanwhile, a localised crisis may resultin a stable population without access to adequate electricitysupplies or batteries to power televisions or radios.

It is important to note that fleeing refugees will often take a radiowith them. What may be lacking is batteries, rather than radios.Research should examine whether there is a need to distributebatteries or cheap solar panels as well as – or rather than – radiosduring the assessment. Determine whether material shortages areshort-term or long-term before investing large sums in providingpotentially expensive equipment, such as radios, to localpopulations.

If material goods are needed, what is the most appropriatemeans of distribution? Radios are a commodity like any otherin a crisis situation and will immediately obtain a certain value.Develop a fair and equitable system of distribution, perhaps incollaboration with relief groups already distributing materialgoods in an organised fashion.

Processing the data collected in the assessment need not be acomplicated procedure. Prioritising information needs, choosing thebasic technical components of the project, and identifying partnersand stakeholders are the most importants elements. In summary,the assessment should give a solid overview of the information flow.It should also offer the basis for the development of a comprehensivestrategy for meeting the information needs of the crisis-affectedpopulation and the local relief community.

AssessmentsAssessmentsAssessmentsAssessmentsAssessmentsshould offer ashould offer ashould offer ashould offer ashould offer abasis for abasis for abasis for abasis for abasis for astrategy to meetstrategy to meetstrategy to meetstrategy to meetstrategy to meetinformation needsinformation needsinformation needsinformation needsinformation needsof populations andof populations andof populations andof populations andof populations andlocal relieflocal relieflocal relieflocal relieflocal reliefcommunitiescommunitiescommunitiescommunitiescommunities

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Designing a radio distribution campaign in Albaniaby Mary Myers

Three weeks into the Kosovo emergency, I wentto Albania to do a lightning survey of refugees’information needs and radio listening patterns onbehalf of the British Department for InternationalDevelopment. The first constraint was time, as ouraim was to get humanitarian broadcasts on airwithin a week. The second constraint waslanguage, as I do not speak Albanian. The thirdconstraint was trying to make sense of the sheerchaos created by over 350,000 refugees suddenlypouring over the border of the poorest country inEurope.

I had two basic questions: “What are the maininformation needs of the refugees?” and “On whatcriteria should we distribute 5,000 Freeplay wind-up radios?”

I decided to do a quick random survey to determinehow many refugees had radios and what theylistened to. I drew up a short six pointquestionnaire which could be “administered” inunder 10 minutes at each tent or householdgrouping. Two of us then went to as wide a rangeof different camps as possible and chose“households” at random. In the organised campsin Kukes we went to every fifth tent. In the Tiranastadium it was simply a matter of talking torandomly selected families. Over about five dayswe covered 60 families.

We found that one third had their own radios andabout half listened regularly to sets owned by otherrefugees. They were all desperate for news: abouttheir relatives and about events in Kosovo. In somecases we found over 20 people huddled aroundone car radio.

Then I organised 10 focus groups (two groups ofteenage girls, two groups of teenage boys, two

groups of women and children, four groups of menof various ages). We asked: “If we were to set upa radio programme for Kosovar refugees, whatwould you want to hear?” Inevitably these groupswere rather ad hoc and chaotic with manydistractions and difficulties (e.g. babies crying,people coming and going, new people butting in,rain and cold, etc.). Nevertheless, we arrived at ashort list of needs. Everyone’s priority was to getnews about their own families; second was adviceabout camp conditions, including health worrieslike colds and coughs. With teenagers – whosemain problem was boredom – we talked a lot aboutmusic, and one girl read us poems she had writtenabout her family’s suffering and her plight as arefugee.

Meanwhile, I tracked down as many “keyinformants” as I could. This was anyone I thoughtmight have an informed “overview” of thehumanitarian situation. These included theinformation officer from UNHCR, a camp doctor,volunteer medics, UNICEF representatives,journalists and engineers from internationalagencies. I had no set questions, but asked themtheir views on refugees’ needs and priorities. Itwas from these sources that we heard more aboutrefugees’ mental health needs – something we didnot get directly from the focus groups.

Finally, on the question of how to distribute theFreeplay radios, I decided to donate them toUNICEF’s “child-friendly spaces”. These werecommunal areas in each camp for women andchildren – the two groups who had the least accessto information and entertainment. Given that therefugee population was fluid with a rapid turnoveras new groups arrived, it seemed best that theradios remain available for shared use.

MarMarMarMarMary Myers is a communications specialist based in Londony Myers is a communications specialist based in Londony Myers is a communications specialist based in Londony Myers is a communications specialist based in Londony Myers is a communications specialist based in London

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A returnee in Rwanda waiting to be registered.Photo: Panos Pictures/Crispin Hughes

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CHAPTER III: SETTING UP PROACTIVE PROGRAMMES IN CRISIS SITUATIONS

Chapter III:Setting up proactive programmesin crisis situations

Once the needs assessment is completed, a strategy for a humanitarianinformation programme can be developed. Crucial to thedevelopment of an effective strategy is the notion of timing. Whenis the right time to set up a project?

It is difficult to produce a categoric response to that question.Programmes designed to provide emergency humanitarianinformation to affected populations must be on air as soon as theneed arises, as part of the relief effort. They will phase out aroundthe same time as humanitarian activities in the field or develop intolonger-term projects. Peace-building programmes, however, aremore difficult to time. If conflict prevention is the aim, then wheneverthere is evidence of tension within a society, such programmingmay be appropriate. But if the aim is peace-building during a conflict,the stakes become higher. One can argue that there is a real risk ofalienating part of the population if a programme begins too soonafter an armed conflict or massive human rights violations, beforethe aggrieved population has begun to resolve issues standing in theway of reconciliation. Others may argue that peace-buildingprogrammes should continue throughout the entire conflict cycle,even during the most acute phases.

Whenever a proactive programme begins, it is important that theproject is conceived as part of a carefully planned process. The JohnsHopkins University’s Center for Communication Programs hasdeveloped the following schema which is useful for developing anappropriate plan.

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Analysis: listen to potential audiences; assess existing programmes,policies, resources, strengths and weaknesses; and analysecommunication resources.

Strategic design: decide on objectives; identify audience segments;position the concept for the audience; clarify behaviour changemodel (if appropriate in humanitarian setting); select channels ofcommunication; plan for interpersonal discussion; draw up actionplan; and design evaluation.

Development, pre-testing and revision, and production:develop message concepts; pre-test with audience members andgatekeepers; revise and produce messages and materials; re-testnew and existing materials. In humanitarian information settings,messages may include landmine awareness, for example, oremergency health bulletins. Peace-building programmes willemphasise other messages, such as ethnic tolerance.

Management, implementation and monitoring: mobilise keyorganizations, such as UN coordinating agencies; create a positiveorganizational climate; implement the action plan; and monitorthe process of dissemination, transmission, and reception ofprogramme outputs.

Impact evaluation: measure impact on audiences; and determinehow to improve future projects.

Planning for continuity: adjust to changing conditions; plan forcontinuity and sustainability.1

By using such a model, humanitarian information and peace-buildingprogrammes are more likely to meet the needs of the target audience.This is because the schema is based on significant interaction andplanning revolving around the intended audience. The needsassessment, monitoring and evaluation all feed into the project designand management, resulting in what is known as “needs-basedprogramming”. This approach distinguishes both humanitarian andpeace-building programmes from mainstream journalism,which usually has little interest in whether or not the messagereceived by the audience modifies their behaviour. In peace-building,making sure the audience fully understands the message is crucial

A hostile orA hostile orA hostile orA hostile orA hostile orunfamiliarunfamiliarunfamiliarunfamiliarunfamiliar“language” loses“language” loses“language” loses“language” loses“language” losescredibility fastcredibility fastcredibility fastcredibility fastcredibility fast

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to meeting programme goals. In a crisis situation, it can mean thedifference between life and death.

Humanitarian information programmes should be developed witha clear emphasis on effectively communicating carefully designedmessages. The following easily remembered model for producingradio-serial drama, may also apply to media projects in conflict areas.

Humanitarian and peace-building programming should:

● command attention;● cater to the heart and the head;● call to action (when applicable);● clarify the message;● communicate a benefit (when applicable);● create trust;● convey a consistent message.2

Only by making the programming as interesting, credible andaccessible as possible is it likely to capture and keep an audience.This means ensuring that the content is suited to the cultural andethnic sensitivities of the target audience. There is no faster way tolose credibility than to speak in a “language” which is unfamiliar oreven hostile to the local audience.

For example, in an effort to appear neutral in the face of Kosovo’smyriad of political interests, the international community choseAlbanian and Macedonian television newscasters to present theevening news on the newly created Kosovar public television.

According to local Kosovar Albanian journalists, the newsimmediately lost credibility because it was seen as imposed fromforeign sources. In this case, the message lost its impact because themessenger (the television announcer) didn’t represent thecommunity.3

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1. Developing effective local relations

Messages perceived to emanate from within a community, in alanguage and idiom familiar to the audience, are far more likely tohave an impact than any message originating from the outside.Developing effective local partnerships should be an essentialcomponent of international media agencies’ work in the field.

Media Action International’s experience in Albania highlighted this.Partnership with The Soros Media Training Centre which washeaded by a well-respected economist, greatly facilitated access tothe broadcasting network within Albania. At the same time,suspicion over the objectives of a foreign NGO were partiallyeliminated. Often, personal contacts in crisis situations are crucialto rapidly unlocking barriers to co-operation.

International NGOs and media groups should be extremely cautiousnot to “parachute” into a local community, and simply begindisseminating programming. Information is perceived as anextremely powerful tool. It is likely that resistance will be met,

Journalist of the Instanbul newspaper, Demokrasi, with an outstanding“punishment order” against him.

Photo: Panos Pictures/O. Krikorian

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particularly in societies in crisis that have no tradition of a free press.In many cases, the lack of strong local partnerships may make itsimply impossible to establish a media project.

a) Local partners

In nearly every country, development NGOs, academic institutions,or state broadcasters are already in position prior to the outbreak ofconflict. One of the aims of the needs assessment should be toidentify such potential partners in the field, based on their expertiseand credibility. Once a project is given the green light, it is up to theproject manager to determine the best working arrangement withlocal partners.

The main criterion for choosing a local partner is its suitability forinvolvement in a humanitarian information or peace-buildingprogramme. For example, journalist training schools, press institutes,national broadcasters, radio networks, developmental orhumanitarian NGOs and academic institutions are all likelycandidates for partnership arrangements. It is important that thelocal partner should not be seen as too strongly identified with anyparticular political (or even ethnic) group. If such a partner werethe only choice, it would probably be better to establishprogramming alone. The appearance of partisanship is the quickestway to lose a substantial proportion of the audience.

In crises which involve large population movements, whereinstitutions no longer function, the concept of local partnership mayhave to be forfeited. Nevertheless, the same concepts of workingwithin the community still apply.

The roles and tasks of partner organizations must be clearlydelineated in a contractual form prior to the onset of the project.This may be difficult to do in a fast-moving environment. Yet it isabsolutely crucial, particularly if there is to be an exchange offunding. The local partnership must also be built upon the conceptof fair exchange.

When possible, it is preferable that local entities take the lead role inthe development of media projects for their own communities.Experience has shown, however, that these entities may need thesupport of an international agency, particularly in the start-up phase.

PartisanshipPartisanshipPartisanshipPartisanshipPartisanshipquickly loses aquickly loses aquickly loses aquickly loses aquickly loses asubstantialsubstantialsubstantialsubstantialsubstantialproportion ofproportion ofproportion ofproportion ofproportion ofthe audiencethe audiencethe audiencethe audiencethe audience

38


This may be for training or simply to ensure that the programmesare firmly secured in the “humanitarian space”. This concept ofprogramming belonging to the humanitarian space, rather than beingan integral part of local partisan political culture, is essential. Butthis is often a delicate balance to be reached with local institutionsand partner agencies to ensure that humanitarian programmingextends to all segments of society regardless of creed, ethnicity orpolitical orientation.

Potential roles for local institutions

Identify local personnel: Local institutions are well placed to helpset up the production and local management team for the mediaprojects. Their contacts within the community will help ensure thatqualified personnel are selected. But watch out for nepotism, whichis rife everywhere and could seriously hinder the professionalfunctioning of the programme.

Provide local logistic support: Manoeuvring through the intricaciesof a foreign system may prove impossible without the support oflocal staff. A local partner can greatly facilitate such tasks as securingregistration as a foreign NGO, setting up phone lines, arrangingtransportation, etc.

Promote the programme locally: Local institutions will be crucialfor disseminating information about the project to the local pressand affected population. This may involve writing press releases,holding press briefings, or using their network of acquaintances topass the word.

Provide office facilities or help locate space: Short-term emergenciesmay swamp local ability to respond to the crisis. Office spacebecomes tight and often over-priced. Local partners may be able toincrease their revenues by providing space for projects, providedtheir own needs are met. In Albania, the Albanian Press Centreoffered free production facilities to Project SPEAR as its contributionto the programme.

Developing an approach to working with local partners based onfairness and respect is a fundamental principle. They need to beincluded in decision-making processes and whenever possible, beencouraged to take control of the programme.

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b) International support for local humanitarianinformation initiatives

In situations where a free and fair press is able to operate unhindered,it may be counter-productive to establish international mediainitiatives that risk detracting from local capacity. Instead,international community agencies can do much to support localinitiatives by ensuring that their information officers provide as muchnews and devote as much time to local journalists as to internationalreporters.

Many local journalists, including newspaper editors in Uganda,Kenya and Tanzania, have regularly complained that their efforts tocover humanitarian activities in East Africa have been regularlyhampered. They blame this on an unwillingness on the part of aidagencies to share as much information with them as with theirWestern and Northern counterparts.4

Local initiatives face particular challenges when trying to reach allelements of a population in divided societies. Multi-cultural teamsmay lack the “protection” of an international presence, or face unduepressure from internal sources. The international community canhelp local programmes gain legitimacy by openly labelling them assignificant partners in the relief or peace-building process.

Cartoonist for Xorriya newspaper, Somaliland.Photo: Panos Pictures/Hamish Wilson

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The Communication Project for the reconstruction of Armenia, Colombiaby Lina Holquin

Developed by Viva La Ciudadañia, a ColombianNGO, the Communication Project was set upfollowing the earthquake in the town of Armenia in1999. Assessments suggested that one of the mainproblems was a failure to provide information toaffected people. An initial consultation in April 1999involving a group of more than 40 people from theregion, formed the basis for the programme design.Although also experienced in the use of televisionand print media, the NGO placed radio at the centreof the project, broad-casting a news programme,a magazine and a radio soap opera: Los NuevosVeciños (New Neighbours).

Participation from within the community wasencouraged through:

● Employing “popular correspondents” for theradio magazines: Drawn from within thecommunity, popular correspondents attendedradio and writing workshops to enable them toproduce reports on issues considered by themto be important to their communities. Popularcorrespondents were drawn from both youthgroups and elders, although most werecommunity leaders.

● Phone-in slots: Radio phone-ins were intendedto allow people to comment about issues underdiscussion.

● Focus groups for script development: The teambehind the radio soap opera Los Nuevos Veciñosincluded a creative group of five people fromcommunities living in the camps or in temporaryhousing. Focus groups from different parts of

the affected area discussed script content andcharacter development. The actors playing thesecharacters also came from the local community.

Community participation was consideredimportant to the success of each medium. VivaLa Ciudadañia successfully secured a partnershipwith commercial and community radios to ensurethat each broadcast the programmes at the sametime, achieving consistent coverage throughoutthe affected area. Newspapers were distributed bycommunity leaders, local newspapers and personalmail delivery. The television programme wasdesigned mainly to inform the rest of the countryabout the process of reconstruction.

Evaluation of the newspaper and radioprogramming largely involved the use ofquestionnaires implemented by communityleaders. Questions concerned the content anddesign of the newspaper and radio programmes,but also asked participants to consider the usesto which the soap opera might be put. For example,people suggested that Los Nuevos Veciños was agood tool to initiate discussions about issues thatwere sometimes difficult to talk about (e.g. childabuse, abuse of power by some communityleaders, etc.).

It is intended that this communication project willbe used as a model for the peace-building processacross the country. Viva La Ciudadañia recognisesthe importance of promoting conflict preventionand resolution through newspaper, television andradio while, at the same time, supplying the forumfor debate surrounding the reconstruction process.

Lina Holquin is a communications specialist working in Latin AmericaLina Holquin is a communications specialist working in Latin AmericaLina Holquin is a communications specialist working in Latin AmericaLina Holquin is a communications specialist working in Latin AmericaLina Holquin is a communications specialist working in Latin America

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c) Local authorities

Gaining the support of local authorities is a challenge that any mediaproject is likely to encounter at some stage of an operation. Somesort of approval will usually be needed to ensure that the projectteam is allowed to enter the country and begin work. Humanitarianinformation programmes will probably need to position themselvesas components of the relief effort, quite distinct from the normaljournalistic activities associated with covering a crisis. Long-termprojects, particularly for peace-building, may inevitably beconsidered part of the internal media scene, potentially creatingdifficulties.

Complete transparency is one of the best means of gaining thesupport of local authorities. It may be necessary to brief theappropriate officials thoroughly as to the intent and content of theprogramme. Programme coordinators may also need to briefembassy, mission or UN officials to gain support prior toundertaking the needs assessment. In many conflict situationsprogrammes will be monitored closely by government officials. Yetif programmes remain within the humanitarian action framework,it is not unreasonable to expect support from governments orauthorities that have agreed to allow the international reliefcommunity to work in their countries.

CompleteCompleteCompleteCompleteCompletetransparencytransparencytransparencytransparencytransparencygains thegains thegains thegains thegains thesupport of localsupport of localsupport of localsupport of localsupport of localauthoritiesauthoritiesauthoritiesauthoritiesauthorities

Refugees arriving in Croatia after crossing the Sava river.Photo: UNHCR/25115/08.1995/R. LeMoyne

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One difficulty encountered in the past is that although authoritiesmay offer tacit approval, they do little to facilitate programmeproduction. For example, necessary equipment such as transmittersmay be held up for months at customs posts. If possible, it is worthobtaining some sort of official recognition that the programme ispart of the humanitarian effort. This may be best achieved throughthe UN or international agency responsible for coordinatinghumanitarian action, or through the appropriate government agencyshould one exist. Peace-building programmes will have a longer time-frame, but still may need to overcome bureaucratic blockages.

In a crisis-affected country or region, one needs to explore how towork in harmony with all parties to the conflict. There is alwaysthe danger that one side will view the geographical location of thehumanitarian programming as an indication of partisanship. Thismay prove to be fatal for the future of the programme.

From August 1994 to November 1996, the Swiss-based HirondelleFoundation ran the humanitarian radio station, Radio Agatayshain Bukavu, Zaire after being denied permission by Rwandanauthorities to establish the radio in Rwanda. Shortly after itsfounding, Radio Agataysha found itself unjustly accused ofsupporting Hutu extremists because the station was broadcastinghumanitarian information to refugee camps, composed primarilyof Hutus. This accusation on the part of the Tutsi-led Rwandangovernment proved impossible to resolve. Rwandan authoritieseventually shut down Radio Agatashya when they invaded Congoin 1996. In 2001, a Swiss court of law determined that theHirondelle Foundation operated in full legitimacy and withoutany partisan leanings during Radio Agatashya’s tenure.5

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The target community will react negatively to media projectsperceived as biased, especially peace-building programmes. As aheadline in the British press several years ago pointed out: “Oneman’s humanitarian relief is another man’s aid to the enemy.”6 Mediainitiatives can be very risky, particularly in conflict situations.Information programmes are highly visible. Staff is recognisable andmay become easily identified members of the community. At thesame time, ensuring local security by bringing in foreigners to presentthe programmes is likely to detract from the audience’s willingnessto accept and absorb the information.

Protecting staff must be the first priority of all media projects. Oneway to ensure staff security is to aim that humanitarian media projectsare perceived by the community to be an impartial form of aid notunlike the distribution of foodstuffs or blankets. This is anextraordinary challenge, however, and one that is only likely to yieldclear results after months of programming.7

Programme managers must seek to strike a careful balance betweenaccommodating the demands of local authorities, and maintainingjournalistic autonomy and integrity. In many conflict situations,the pressure for censorship, especially self-censorship, is great. Mediaprojects should not seen as playing into the hands of local authorities,or adopting an official agenda. At the same time, however, projectmanagers who incur the wrath of local officials are likely tojeopardize their programmes. It may prove best to assume arespectful, if distant relationship with local authorities, and ensurethat the project’s integrity is maintained.

It is preferable to withdraw from a country and set up operationsnearby than to bow to unfair or unprincipled demands on the partof local authorities. Above all, a programme should never adoptpolicies or behaviour that run counter to internationally acceptedhuman rights norms, such as discriminatory or racist policies, inorder to ensure the continuance of a programme.

Protecting staffProtecting staffProtecting staffProtecting staffProtecting staffmust be the firstmust be the firstmust be the firstmust be the firstmust be the firstpriority of allpriority of allpriority of allpriority of allpriority of allmedia projectsmedia projectsmedia projectsmedia projectsmedia projects

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2. Working with international relief agencies

Humanitarian programme managers will be better able to meet theirintended objectives if they can persuade stakeholders, includinginternational agencies and NGOs, to share information. Much ofthe content of humanitarian programmes will stem from specialisedagencies on the ground. These include, in particular, health agenciesor groups working with special categories of individuals such aschildren. Peace-building programmes may seek to publicisenegotiation efforts, and will need access to information to do so.

There are a variety of ways to encourage good relations with theinternational community, NGOs and national and local institutions.Foremost is to promote the concept of partnership. Ideally, thismeans identifying particular stakeholders and, when possible,incorporating them in the production process.

Saharan refugees at the Dakhla Camp, Algeria.

Photo: UNHCR/28046/03.1998/A. Hollmann

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For example, humanitarian programming in a crisis situation thatfocuses on medical relief may wish to invite a steering committee ofhealth NGOs and national health bodies to attend a weekly (ormonthly) meeting to brainstorm the most important issues to coverin upcoming programming.

The BBC’s soap opera, New Home, New Life, broadcast intoAfghanistan, has established one of the most far-reaching consultativeprocesses in the field. On a monthly basis, a group of diverse reliefagencies meet in Peshawar, Pakistan, to help devise programmingideas for upcoming episodes of the drama. Ideas tie in to relief issueson the ground, such as an outbreak of disease, or the need to promotea new agricultural programme. The aid community in Peshawar isunique, however, with many agencies working in the sameenvironment for close to 20 years.

Rapid onset disasters or fast-moving refugee crises, by contrast,involve dozens, and sometimes hundreds, of humanitarian agenciesparachuting into crisis situations to set up operations within a matterof days. Communicating with the local population is unlikely to beforemost on their agendas. Advocacy work on the part of the projectmay be required.

Another approach entails partnering with a particular agency for aspecific programme, for example, a vaccination campaign. There isa risk, however, of being perceived as too closely linked with a singleorganization, even if only for a limited amount of time. Informationprogramming should be seen as an accessible source and instrumentof dissemination for all agencies.

The occasional unwillingness of aid agencies to cooperate may stemfrom an ignorance of the role of humanitarian information during acrisis. This obstacle will most likely dissipate as humanitarianinformation programmes become an increasingly integral part ofrelief operations.

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Star Radio was set up by the Hirondelle Foundationin Monrovia from July 1997 until its forced closureby Liberian authorities in March 2000. Authoritiescited a licencing dispute for the closure but inter-national observers believe Star Radio’s emphasison factual reporting was the real reason.

Star Radio was unusual – perhaps unique – inAfrica. Our output was 100% news andinformation. Part of Star Radio’s mission was tosupport and promote the work of the humanitariancommunity. Expatriate staff member Anne Payotset about liaising with national and internationalnon-governmental organizations. She found thetask difficult. Save the Children (UK) brought agroup of former child soldiers to the Star Radiostudios to record a theme song they had writtenthemselves. Give the Little Children Joy was airedtwice a day from the time Star Radio beganbroadcasting in June 1997. The song introducedmessages from Save the Children and Don BoscoHomes that sought to reunite children who wereseparated from their families during the war years.As a result of the broadcasts, many parents foundtheir children.

But Save the Children was an exception. The largerthe organization, the less interested they seemedto be in making use of Star Radio’s services.Agencies that spent thousands of dollars oninternational publicity were not interested in tellingLiberians what they were doing for them. Oneagency’s information department published aglossy monthly pamphlet about its work – but itwas generally two months out of date. Anne Payotspent hours waiting to see people who didn’t keepappointments. After she returned to Switzerland,Sarah Brownell took over the task of liaising withNGOs. She came to see me one day close to tears

Star Radio: promoting the humanitariansby George Bennett

after being stood up for the third time by one ofthe major agencies. Meanwhile, one internationalorganization sent us a poorly recorded cassette inlegal jargon about children’s rights. Another wantedus to broadcast an interminable interview abouttheir structure and history.

We decided to hold a lunch meeting at which wewould demonstrate how radio could be used. Weplayed extracts from the tapes we’d been given.Then we played examples of how short radio itemscould encourage people to turn out for vaccinationcampaigns. We played extracts of our program-ming in some of the 14 local languages in whichStar Radio broadcasted. After this meeting, severalNGOs came to us with ideas for programmeswhich would help them. We began to target areasof the country (in the appropriate languages) forOXFAM and the International Committee of the RedCross. The Liberian Ministries of Health andEducation used us to promote polio campaignsand literacy drives.

Besides promoting specific humanitarianendeavours, Star Radio reported regularly on NGOactivities in news and programmes. In a typicalweek Star Radio broadcast nearly 40 items on NGOand agency activities. These included interviewsand packaged reports about work by the LutheranWorld Federation/World Service, the Germandevelopment agency GTZ, the European Union, theICRC, Children’s Aid Direct, UNFPA, Médécins sansFrontières, World Vision as well as many LiberianNGOs. Most of the items were recorded in the fieldor in interviews with beneficiaries or NGOmembers.

Not all of them were favourable. For example, wecovered a protest by Sierra Leone refugee studentswho demanded more help from UNHCR. As usual,

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both sides of the story were given. The items wedid not much care for were the bland, exhortatorycalls for peace and reconciliation that we weregiven by some local organizations. We would airthem if they were technically well made – it wouldhave been churlish not to. But many of these itemsdid not call for specific action on the part of thelistener. And most listeners never wanted war,anyway, and were not in conflict with anyone.

More effective were the Send your girl child toschool promotional clips with their catchy themetune. Star Radio aired these on behalf of the

Ministry of Education and UNESCO. Programmeeditor Davidetta Browne said that kids around herMonrovia apartment sang the song as they playedoutside. Clearly, it is pointless playing items thatare not listened to. It is equally pointless tobroadcast tedious material about humanitarianactivities. We strove to make our programmesattractive. We gave our listeners news andinformation that they would not otherwise havehad. There was an enormous thirst for facts in acountry that, since the fighting stopped, hasremained mostly ignored by the outside world.8

George Bennett was formerly Director of George Bennett was formerly Director of George Bennett was formerly Director of George Bennett was formerly Director of George Bennett was formerly Director of Star RadioStar RadioStar RadioStar RadioStar Radio

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Man selling carpets and television set, Jalalabad, Afghanistan.Photo: Panos Pictures/Zed Nelson.

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CHAPTER IV: CHOOSING THE RIGHT MEDIUM

Chapter IV:Choosing the right medium

Choosing the right medium is an essential part of programmestrategy, best discerned through research on the ground. Differentmedia are likely to have varying impacts on their population. Butmost often, choices will be made based on simple facts, such asliteracy rates, or access to radio.

One of the most important considerations for determining the bestmedium is “reach”. This refers to the size of the audience exposedto the medium’s programming. Clearly, the medium chosen willdepend greatly on whether or not the audience has access to thatmedium, and how many actually use it. It is important to researchwhich kinds of media are already familiar to the population.

If broadcasting is the chosen means of reaching the target audience,production standards must be kept at a level appropriate to theaudience. Being the sole user of expensive media equipment cancause tension in a community unfamiliar with such costly items. Atthe same time, however, audiences may be used to high qualityimported media and therefore demand a certain degree ofprofessionalism to secure their attention.1 A needs assessment mustbe the guide.

It is also imperative to consider the technological capacity of theproject. Electricity supply may be present but erratic. During theearly days of Project SPEAR, an emergency humanitarian radioproject in Kosovo, electricity shortages often prevented radiostations from broadcasting on a daily basis. Power cuts meantjournalists could work only when electricity was available forcomputers to operate. Eventually, UNHCR supplied a generatorto ensure production continued unhindered.

When possible, it can be fruitful to promote the use of more thanone channel of communication, ensuring that people who miss one

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piece of programming may have access to it through another source.Radio programmes, supported by a poster campaign, may be moreeffective in promoting health issues in a crisis than either mediumalone. Similarly, messages confirmed by more than one medium canestablish a greater degree of credibility.

1. The case for radio

Radio typically reaches more people caught up in conflicts thanany other medium. For example, in war-torn societies such asAfghanistan and Somalia, it is estimated that 60% of the populationlisten to radio on a regular basis. Radio requires no mains electricitynor the ability to read. It is also comparatively cheap. With radio,one can stimulate the imagination of listeners with sound images ina memorable way. It is an ideal medium for promoting social change,and thus for helping in the process of peace-building. Ideally, othermedia should also be involved. But in the constraints of a conflictor post-conflict situation, it is often radio which stands alone inassuring the kind of media intervention that will provide peoplewith the information they need in order to make decisions abouttheir lives.

While it is important to weigh the pros and cons of any medium, inmany situations the choice is a given, due to specific fieldcircumstances. For example, in Mozambique, illiteracy and lack ofinfrastructure alone rendered radio the only viable choice for anemergency media project.

The cost effectiveness of a medium depends on circumstance andcomparison with other options, but radio is usually a safe bet. It iscost effective because of the number of people it can reach. Butbatteries may be expensive and difficult to obtain, and the BayGenwind-up radio is, as yet, a relatively expensive alternative.

The means of transmitting radio programmes will depend on theresources at hand. The four most likely scenarios include:

● working through local broadcasters;● setting up independent radio stations;● international broadcasters;● United Nations information programming.

Radio reachesRadio reachesRadio reachesRadio reachesRadio reachesmore people inmore people inmore people inmore people inmore people inconflicts thanconflicts thanconflicts thanconflicts thanconflicts thanother mediumsother mediumsother mediumsother mediumsother mediums

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Strengths and limitations of radioStrengths and limitations of radioStrengths and limitations of radioStrengths and limitations of radioStrengths and limitations of radio Strengths Limitations

Familiarity:Familiarity:Familiarity:Familiarity:Familiarity: Familiarity:Familiarity:Familiarity:Familiarity:Familiarity:

● Radio builds on the oral tradition significant in ● Where radio is familiar, it may only provide wallpaper.most cultures. Listeners are accustomed to leaving the radio on in

the background.

AAAAAvailability and cost:vailability and cost:vailability and cost:vailability and cost:vailability and cost: AAAAAvailability and cost:vailability and cost:vailability and cost:vailability and cost:vailability and cost:

● Radio can cross geographical boundaries, reaching ● Many potential audiences lack access to electricity,people isolatedby language, poverty, illiteracy and and batteries can be expensive or difficult to obtain.conflict. Battery disposal may have environmental implications.

● Radio currently reaches the widest audience. ● Wind-up radios are expensive to distribute en masse.● Availability of cheap and portable receivers.● Programmes are cheap to make, especially in

comparison with television or video.

Creativity provides opportunity:Creativity provides opportunity:Creativity provides opportunity:Creativity provides opportunity:Creativity provides opportunity: Creativity provides limitations:Creativity provides limitations:Creativity provides limitations:Creativity provides limitations:Creativity provides limitations:

● The radio writer is not limited by what the audience can ● Radio as an educating tool can be seen as limited insee. The medium provides ample opportunity to invite its absence of images. The use of support material islisteners to imagine a wide range of people, places and preferable.events. Through the power of imagination, radio can ● Radio can make productive use of sound effects – butevoke images beyond reality, crossing time and space these can be over exploited, leading to confusion.without limit. ● Radio can be abused as a medium, to incite violence

or hatred by heightening audience fears or prejudicesrather than resolving them.

Positive listening habits:Positive listening habits:Positive listening habits:Positive listening habits:Positive listening habits: Negative listening habits:Negative listening habits:Negative listening habits:Negative listening habits:Negative listening habits:

● Radio can be listened to in groups, which encourages ● Radio messages are only heard once. They areaudience discussion of material, an important stage transitory and cannot be consumed at the audience’sin the process of behavioural change. pace, like newspapers, or wound back, like a cassette

● Radio has the power to speak to an individual tape.personally despite reaching out to many at one time. ● Radio is received only by the ear, compared with the

multisensory perception of everyday life.● Radio is one-way communication. Broadcasters have

no direct means of evaluating audienceunderstanding. Listeners are not granted theopportunity to ask questions in order to clarifyremaining doubts.

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a) Working through local media

When possible, co-ordinating and co-operating with already existingmedia outlets is a preferable approach. Indeed, some resistance maybe encountered by any organization or initiative which appears tocircumvent or detract from national and local media providers.

Media Action International developed a project in Albania whichentailed the independent production of a half-hour radioprogramme. Called In the Name of Humanitarianism, theprogramme was broadcast on Radio Tirana within 10 days of projectset-up. Shortly after negotiating with Radio Tirana for air-time,Media Action International then began to broadcast on severalindependent local stations, in an effort to reach as many differentaudiences as possible. Similar programmes were established inMacedonia and Kosovo. (See facing page.)

An advantage to working with local media is the development oflocal capacity. In most crisis areas, media and journalism are likelyto be in a state of infancy. With world attention focused on theemergency there is often the opportunity to train local journaliststo cover their own crises (and possible future disasters) in an effectiveand responsible manner. Independent productions, supervised byinternational staff, may also raise standards within the stations thatare broadcasting the programmes.

b) Setting up independent radio stations

Although working with existing media is a preferred option forinternational humanitarian programmes, there are certainly caseswhere there is no alternative other than to establish a new radiostation. This is particularly true in conflict situations where therewas little in the way of independent journalism prior to the crisis.

With little research provided on such stations, however, it is difficultto determine their impact on local populations and the local mediascene. Undoubtedly, however, there are situations where the onlyunbiased information is likely to originate from media external tothe region.

WWWWWorking with localorking with localorking with localorking with localorking with localmedia developsmedia developsmedia developsmedia developsmedia developslocal capacitylocal capacitylocal capacitylocal capacitylocal capacity

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The Project SPEAR experienceby Loretta Hieber

The first Project SPEAR (Support Programmingfor Emergency Assistance by Radio) was set upin Albania just weeks after the massive Kosovarexodus into Albania in May 1999. Project SPEARwas designed to enhance the local media scenerather than detract from it. Media ActionInternational aimed to find a balance betweenensuring refugees had access to impartialinformation, while also supporting the local media’scapacity to provide programming in response tothe crisis. It wasn’t easy.

The broadcasting scene in Albania was dominatedby Radio Tirana, a remnant of the Hoxha years,which was struggling to re-invent itself as a publicservice entity. Although the station employedscores of journalists, there were only twocomputers for the entire staff, and most of theequipment was out-of-date or broken. In Maced-onia, at least nine private Albanian radio stationswere on the air, and the state broadcaster, RadioMacedonia, transmitted nationwide. In Kosovo,broadcasters had to begin from scratch. Therefore,finding local partners was a mixed experience.

Our first step was to set up studios to producethe radio programmes. Local editors-in-chief wereresponsible for programme content, withinternational staff serving primarily as in situtrainers and for liason with the internationalcommunity. Local journalists took leaves ofabsence from, or in some cases left, their full-time jobs. Four radio stations in Albania and ninein Macedonia broadcast our programmes daily. Allstations received a stipend in exchange for theair-time. In Kosovo, local stations broadcast theprogramming free of charge.

Although this approach was preferable toestablishing an independent station to broadcasthumanitarian news, it wasn’t without problems.While we made every attempt to avoid distortingthe local media scene, staffing the programmesproved challenging. Radio Tirana offered to makeavailable several journalists, who were paid byMedia Action International at a rate slightly higherthan local salaries (which were abysmally low).This led to complaints among journalists at RadioTirana who were not chosen to be part of thehumanitarian programming team. In Macedonia,local radio stations were keen to make as muchmoney as possible from the operation, andappeared to be involved only as a means of earninghard currency. In Kosovo, local stations wereenthusiastic to broadcast the programme as ameans of delivering credible information on theirchannels, but were hampered by their own materialand financial weaknesses.

In hindsight, other approaches could have beenconsidered. One might have been to develop a poolof rotating journalists from local stations. Anotheroption could have been to provide training for alljournalists from the local stations which broadcastthe programmes, as well as for journalists whoworked on the humanitarian broadcasts. The realityis, however, that there are occasions when theinformation needs of the affected population maynot be fully compatible with the development needsof the local media scene at that particular time.Even so, working with and through local media,rather than independently, should be a primeconsideration for all media projects in the field.

Loretta Hieber was Director of Project SPEAR in Albania, Macedonia and KosovoLoretta Hieber was Director of Project SPEAR in Albania, Macedonia and KosovoLoretta Hieber was Director of Project SPEAR in Albania, Macedonia and KosovoLoretta Hieber was Director of Project SPEAR in Albania, Macedonia and KosovoLoretta Hieber was Director of Project SPEAR in Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo

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One of the greatest difficulties facing new radio stations relates tosustainability. Stations require significant financial resources tooperate and, in most situations, they prove impossible to sustainonce the crisis is over and donor attention has moved elsewhere.

In addition, new radio stations are likely to take months, if ever, toestablish credibility with local populations. This delay could bedamaging in the initial stages of a crisis, especially if the only way toensure an audience is to draw listeners away from local media. Eachsituation is unique and decisions to establish a new radio stationshould be based, first and foremost, on the real needs of the localpopulation.

In situations where no credible local media is available, then theestablishment of independent radio stations can bring substantialbenefits to information-starved populations, provided the stationsare set up with proper care and consideration for balance. Oneexample is Star Radio, established by the Hirondelle Foundation inMonrovia, Liberia in 1997.

c) The role of international broadcasters

Local populations, particularly in Africa, are often avid listeners ofinternational broadcasters such as the Voice of America (VOA), theBBC World Service or Radio France International, even when localstations are available.

Humanitarian and health programming is increasingly popularamong such international broadcasters. For example, VOA isinvolved in promoting a global campaign to eradicate polio as wellas programming specifically directed towards the Great Lakes regionof Africa. The BBC World Service operates similar programmesdirected towards local populations through their Great Lakes andSomali Service programmes

These international broadcasters, along with others, such as DeutscheWelle and Radio Netherlands, also provide assistance and trainingprogrammes for local journalists. Their aim is to help create anindependent and impartial media in countries which are developing,in transition to democracy, or in conflict. Often internationalbroadcasters seek to have their programmes rebroadcast by localmedia as a means of extending their reach.

New radio stationsNew radio stationsNew radio stationsNew radio stationsNew radio stationsmay take monthsmay take monthsmay take monthsmay take monthsmay take monthsto gain localto gain localto gain localto gain localto gain localcredibilitycredibilitycredibilitycredibilitycredibility

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But at the same time, ethical issues are raised about the role ofinternational broadcasters, particularly in monopolising the flowof information. Subsequently, some journalists criticise anoverreliance on international broadcasters during a crisis. VeranMatic of Radio B92 in Belgrade argues that a more effective way forlocal populations in conflict to be adequately informed is forinternational stations to rent out or offer their frequencies or satellitechannels to local media unable to obtain a frequency or whosebroadcasts are restricted. He believes it is of utmost importance thata programme be both produced in and broadcast from the conflictarea itself, with local teams.2

Even so, there are likely to be situations where it is possible to reachlocal populations only through international broadcasters.Afghanistan is a case in point, where the BBC World Service hassubstituted for local media for over two decades.

d) United Nations programming

In many conflict areas the UN is likely to be running its owninformation programmes, for either humanitarian or peace-buildingefforts.

A few examples include Cambodia where UNTAC radio was runby the UN Transitional Authority for 13 months in 1992-1993 andRadio Unamir in Rwanda which was operated by the UN AssistanceMission to Rwanda from February 1995-1996.

The aim of many of these UN radio programmes is to promote apeaceful solution to a conflict taking place and to pave the way forlonger-term peace-building efforts after the war is over. Manycountries in conflict do not have credible independent media.Broadcasters may be state owned and sympathetic to those in poweror heavily censored. The experience of the UN working in conflictareas underscores the need for vigilance when determining whetherto work through local media or to set up independent operations.

Many countriesMany countriesMany countriesMany countriesMany countriesin conflict havein conflict havein conflict havein conflict havein conflict haveno credibleno credibleno credibleno credibleno credibleindependent mediaindependent mediaindependent mediaindependent mediaindependent media

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United Nations information efforts in conflictsby Jeffrey Heyman

In most countries where conflicts broke out in the1990s, state control of the media was, before andafter, overwhelming. This is why the United Nationswent to the expense and effort of building a radiostation in Cambodia – there simply wasn’t anindependent broadcaster to work with. InCambodia, the building of Radio UNTAC, as it wasknown, did not mean that the station was notindependent nor that it did not work with localjournalists. It often broke stories as it sought tocover events in a way which would build journalisticfoundations for the future.

The UN itself wasn’t always happy with RadioUNTAC’s reporting, which says much for theindependence of the station and the tenacity of itsjournalists, the vast majority of whom wereCambodian. Perhaps more could have been doneto provide the station with the means to continueits work beyond the UN Transitional Authority’smandate in Cambodia. But this was not done andRadio UNTAC went off the air, and left behind itsequipment when the UN departed Cambodia at theend of 1993.

My experience in Cambodia and in other conflictsillustrates that all too often politicians get in theway of practitioners. In the republics of the formerYugoslavia, the governments, or more often thelocal leaders, were too strong during the war yearsto permit working with so-called independentmedia. The United Nations Protection Force,UNPROFOR, tried, but I never ran across abroadcast outlet that was totally free of bias inthese war-wracked lands.

For example, the United Nations had devised aseries of peace and reconciliation programmeswhereby journalists from different parts of formerYugoslavia could air reports via media outlets in

other areas. A good idea – and the journalistssupported it wholeheartedly – but few stationswould take the risk playing such programmes.Those that did air them often used any slightaccent, mistake or bias (it was impossible for localjournalists to be unbiased during the war) to theiradvantage – a situation that made the UN anaccomplice in the propaganda war. We finallystopped the programmes, no longer certain of theintegrity of the message.

I learned firsthand just how hard it is under conflictconditions to work with local media during a tourof radio stations in former Yugoslavia in 1995. Onebroadcaster on the Croatian island of Hvar, in theAdriatic, stands out.

While travelling along the Croatian coast from onestation to another, I heard a lengthy series ofnumbers being read out on a Hvar radio stationthat carried some of our UN programmes. Oddthat numbers were being read out over disco dancemusic, I thought, so I asked my driver what exactlythe announcer was saying. He listened closely andexplained that the announcer was reading out thetechnical and targeting characteristics of newlyacquired Croatian rocket launchers.

As I continued to listen, the song Imagine by JohnLennon, perhaps the ultimate peace song, wasplayed. The music faded and the announcer, takingon a menacing tone, said, “Imagine what theseweapons could do to the Serbs in our occupiedvillages.” This was followed by the Paul McCartneysong Live and Let Die. In a cable back to UNheadquarters later that week, I wrote, “While notall radio stations in Croatia are so extreme in theirmilitancy, I would ask whether this is the kind ofstation on which the United Nations wishes to airits radio programmes?”

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And so it was in Angola and Rwanda too. Withlittle difference, in spite of being continents apart,few stations were independent enough to workwith the United Nations in its information andmedia-building efforts. Those in power in Rwandaconstantly wanted something in return forcooperating with the United Nations or non-governmental organizations. Journalists, local aswell as those of neighboring countries, wereharassed and, at times, killed. The authorities inAngola, which operated a sophisticated nationalbroadcast network, toyed with the UN, claiming

to be morally behind the UN’s humanitarianmessages, while propagating biased program-ming.

Despite the odds, after years of side-stepping thatrole, the United Nations, it appears, is ready nowto develop and deploy the means necessary towork with – or circumvent if need be – local mediain a realistic and effective manner.

That said, there will always be those hauntingvoices – on air or via the Internet – like the radiostation on Hvar.

Jeffrey Heyman was Head of United Nations Radio for Former YJeffrey Heyman was Head of United Nations Radio for Former YJeffrey Heyman was Head of United Nations Radio for Former YJeffrey Heyman was Head of United Nations Radio for Former YJeffrey Heyman was Head of United Nations Radio for Former Yugoslavia from 1994-1995ugoslavia from 1994-1995ugoslavia from 1994-1995ugoslavia from 1994-1995ugoslavia from 1994-1995

Radio technician at Radio Bahardar in Ethiopia.Photo: Panos Pictures/Heldur Netocny

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2. Television and video

While television and video may share similar attributes, the reasonsfor selecting one or the other may be very different. The choice willvery much depend on the local instructure available, and the intendedproject needs.

Fairly substantial infrastructural requirements must be fulfilled inorder for television to be an effective choice. Nonetheless it mustnot be assumed that these simply do not exist in developingcountries.

Access to television is improving. From 1970 to 1997, televisionownership in the developing world increased from 17 to 172 per1,000 households. UNICEF in Viet Nam, for example, hasrecognised the shift from radio to television and now suggests that“television is emerging as an extremely influential communicationmedium, supplementing radio in most urban areas.”3

The importance of television versus radio is likely to be regionallyspecific. Television is a central part of many people’s lives in SouthAmerica: on average, Colombians view 23 hours of television perweek, Chileans and Argentinians 17 hours and Dominicans29 hours.4 However, reliance on such a medium could exclude manymen and women who cannot afford the time or the money to gainaccess to a television. Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa)had just 50 television sets per 1,000 in 1997.5

The other potential visual medium is video which may be viewed inthe field on an ad hoc basis, for example, at group viewing sessions.This by-passes the need for television set ownership by the targetpopulation and allows for more audience participation becausediscussion can follow presentation.

Offsetting television and video’s benefits as mediums are someserious limitations.

● Equipment can be prohibitively pricey, especially if high qualityproductions are expected. Kit tough enough to withstand therigours of the field can be particularly costly. Dust, heat andhumidity can damage sensitive equipment, not to mention therisk of theft.

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● Filmed information may be seen by some societies as the domainof men over women. In some cultures, it may be forbidden topresent the images of men or women, such as in Afghanistan.

● Visual projects can suffer from the constraints of a preconceivednotion (particularly among the donor community) that videois exclusively entertaining rather than informative. Theeducational merits of video and TV can easily be ignored becauseof this prejudice.

● Video and television also remove anonymity from participants,an attribute of some other media which may be beneficial.

Despite such limitations, the visual media have certain attributeswhich may encourage their selection. The UNHCR in the GreatLakes found the most successful method of encouraging voluntaryrepatriation was to show refugees the reality of the circumstances intheir villages. They did this by screening footage of a cross bordervisit. It should not be forgotten, however, that circumstances in aconflict can rapidly deteriorate, and places shown to be safe recentlymay quickly find their peace undermined.

The waterside market in downtown Monrovia.Photo: Panos Pictures/Martin Adler

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The Great Lakes: a review of the mass information activitiesof the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

by Malcolm Green

From April 1994 onwards, the UNHCR operatedwithin refugee camps in the Great Lakes region ofcentral Africa to help promote voluntaryrepatriation.

Initially efforts were on an ad hoc basis, but inearly 1995 a mass information campaign wasinitiated, becoming fully operational in July 1995.The campaign’s objectives were twofold: first, topenetrate the curtain of propaganda whichcontinued to prevent the refugee population fromhaving an objective view of conditions in Rwanda;and second, to encourage refugees to voluntarilyseek repatriation. Reliance on both video and radiomaterial was greater in Eastern Zaire than inTanzania and Burundi, where direct communicationand border visits reduced the need for a massinformation programme.

The campaign was initiated via the radio, becauseof the strong oral tradition in Rwanda, and theneed to reach as many people as possible. But byNovember 1995, video was chosen as a newelement of the campaign.

The UNHCR project began with pilot videoscreenings in camps in Burundi (November 1995)and Tanzania (November-December 1995). In thecamps in Zaire, the project was postponed until

May 1996, in part because of the security risksinvolved in organizing mass video viewings.Despite restrictions from the Rwandan authorities,the video project generated great interest amongrefugees. The images had obvious impact. Therefugees made many requests to the UNHCR forthe video team to film particular villages andinterview specific people known to have returnedthere. In all, more than 100 out of the 145communes from which refugees originated werecovered by radio, video or both.

In 1996, 60 videos were produced. In the fivecamps in Goma alone, some 700,000 personsviewed the material in the early months of 1996.There is anecdotal evidence that the videossuccessfully helped promote the repatriationprocess. For example, the 1996 UNHCR video Lerapatriement volontaire (voluntary repatriation)features a refugee who confirms that the videoseen by him and his family in the camp was animportant factor in their decision to go back home:“It took me one year and a half to decide, and Ihesitated because I believed that people were killedon return. My children also believed that – untilwe saw a neighbour on one of the videos. Wethought he had been killed, but he hadn’t. So wedecided to return.”6

Malcolm Green is currently working with Vuleka Productions in South Africa

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3. Information technology (IT)

The advent of the information age is beginning to have a significantimpact on populations in conflicts and crises. When governmentofficials in Belgrade clamped down on the independent station RadioB92 in the late 1990s, producers responded by taking their reportingto the Internet. When war broke out in Kosovo, the Albanianspeaking Radio 21 provided radio programming via the Internetfrom offices in Skopje, Macedonia.

The Internet is providing a means for independent voices to sidesteprestrictions and take their messages directly to the world. FromIndonesia to Cuba, authoritarian governments are finding itincreasingly difficult to thwart democracy movements, andinformation technologies are playing an increasingly important rolein the process. But in acute crises, the potential uses of the Internetare still largely unexplored.

There can be no doubt that the numbers behind the “digital divide”are a stark illustration of the infrastructural restraints stillsurrounding the use of this medium. Of the 360 million people on-line in the world, 70% are in North America and Europe, home toonly 10% of the world’s population. In many Latin Americancountries less than 1% of the population is connected to the Internet.This is in sharp contrast to radio, which reaches more than 90% ofhouseholds in this region. 7

Even so, the potential uses of the Internet to bring information topopulations in need are exciting. For example, it can be especiallyeffective in information sharing, particularly between internationaland national agencies operating in the field. Collating humanitarianinformation through local reporting and then packaging it andmaking it available via the Web or through specialised e-mail lists isanother way of ensuring dissemination. Such action may also helpavoid the duplication of projects.

Another application is the Internet’s ability to provide the oftenrelatively rich and therefore powerful diaspora with informationfrom the region. This can lead to a demand for greater accountabilityon the part of the government. This was one important result of

The InternetThe InternetThe InternetThe InternetThe Internetprovides a meansprovides a meansprovides a meansprovides a meansprovides a meansfor independentfor independentfor independentfor independentfor independentvoices to sidestepvoices to sidestepvoices to sidestepvoices to sidestepvoices to sidesteprestrictionsrestrictionsrestrictionsrestrictionsrestrictions

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Star Radio in Liberia making available its news updates on a dailybasis on the Internet. The NGO, Search for Common Ground, isplanning to make its programming in Burundi available via the Webin order to reach Burundians in North America and Europe whofeed funds to the rebellion or to the government.8

With few examples of direct Internet applications in humanitariancrisis to date, the below is intended as illustration of projects thathave tried to overcome some of the limitations involved, to harnessthe benefits of the Internet.

UN peacekeepers of the Nepalese Battalion, Zebkeen village, South Lebanon.Photo: ICRC/Fred Clarke.

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When NATO’s bombing of Kosovo ended in June of 1999, thecommunications infrastructure was largely destroyed.Consequently, humanitarian agencies flooding in to provide reliefexperienced great difficulty communicating and sharinginformation. The idea for Internet Project Kosovo (IPKO) was tocreate a self-financing Internet Service Provider (ISP) that couldinitially operate as an infrastructure to meet the needs ofinternational organizations. The capital generated wassubsequently used to provide free access to key Kosovar civilsociety institutions. In an attempt to bridge the divide betweenrelief and development, IPKO intended to build a lastinginfrastructure for Kosovo’s Internet and catalyse the developmentof Kosovo’s technology sector.

With a donated satellite dish from Interpacket, a Californiansatellite company, and a $175,000 working capital loan fromInternational Rescue Committee(IRC), the project was launched.After initial resistance, the UN Mission in Kosovo gave itsapproval and IPKO began installing a wireless microwave networkin Pristina. IPKO went on line in September 1999 and proved tobe Kosovo’s only reliable communication link through the winter.

IPKO sold service to most international agencies and providedfree access to Kosovar institutions. After six months of operation,the loan was repaid and IPKO was transformed into a local NGOthat is today completely self-sustaining.

IPKO is now the leading ISP in Kosovo, providing Internetconnection to over 100 local and international organizations. Itprovides free service to more than 40 key local civil institutionsincluding the University of Pristina, hospitals, the NationalLibrary, independent media and resource centres for journalistsand NGOs.9

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The implementers of IPKO were able to benefit from certain, perhapsunique, conditions in Kosovo . Without any real form of governmentrestriction, and no existing ISP, IPKO faced little opposition to itsestablishment and few of the difficult ethical questions that mightbe relevant to future projects. For example, the humanitariancommunity must be careful not to distort the telecommunicationsmarket in host countries where local providers exist. By setting upa shared network for humanitarian agencies, the UN can disruptthe telecom-munications market in host countries where localproviders exist and deprive the local operators of their bestcustomers. One study estimates that, in Africa alone, $200 millionof the money spent each year by the UN and humanitarian agencieson international satellite communications might otherwise bechannelled to local providers.10

While the favourable circumstances of Kosovo will not exist in everycrisis, the principles IPKO followed are relevant to other situations.They are appropriate guidelines for almost all humanitarian mediaprogrammes:

● build a shared network;● rely on local capacity;● empower locals;● leave the network (or programme) in place after initiators leave.

At the same time, it is important not to stretch the uses of IT for thesake of being the most modern or up-to-date technologicallyadvanced project. At this point, the Internet is still mostly effectivein rapidly changing situations for the development of databaseprojects.

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Child Connect, a joint IRC and Markle Foundation initiative,was a shared database designed for humanitarian agencies in WestAfrica to help reunify separated refugee children with theirparents. Refugees from Sierra Leone and Liberia, spread acrosssix countries, could access a shared database open to all the agenciesengaged in tracing in the region. However, for the project to realiseits potential, it relied on the submission of data and photographsof unaccompanied children and search requests from parents.Once in the system, Child Connect was designed to find matchesand notify the relevant humanitarian workers to proceed withreunification. Without the required degree of infrastructuralconnectivity, however, agencies were forced to send informationby disc, undermining the efficacy of the project.11

One of the problems of databases is that they require that agencyinformation be “sharable”, an on-going problem in situations whereagencies may be reluctant to pool data. Another problem is thatdata collection may be limited by the need to gain the prior consentof parties for the publication of personal information concerningtheir whereabouts.

The Internet’s strength to date has been focused on developmentprojects, and it is worthwhile to briefly examine some of these, asthey may eventually be adapted for emergencies.

a) Strengthening local media

A number of development projects use the Internet to strengthenindependent and community-based radio stations. The aim is “toimprove their coverage of national and regional issues and to addressthe digital divide with the tactic of multiplying the effectiveness ofthe limited Internet access that is available.”12 This is clearly aworthwhile model for local media in crisis situations, where newscoverage can be enhanced by better access to information on theconflict. In particular, journalists would be able to transmitinformation on how the conflict is perceived by the outside world.

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This could provide ideas to producers on framing programming onthe conflict in new and fresh ways. In addition, better access toinformation, for example, on international human rights standards,may encourage local producers to increase their coverage of suchissues.

Equipping editorial offices with the Internet should be consideredprior to the outbreak of a conflict. In acute phases, access to electricityis problematic. Phone-lines needed for connectivity may bedisrupted. Ensuring local journalists in conflict-prone areas are ableto benefit from the Internet and transmit newly-gained knowledgeto the audience is worthwhile, but requires serious commitmentfrom donors. Not only is equipment required, but also adequatetraining and monthly fees for Internet access.

b) Networks

Independent radio stations are increasingly using the Internet tocombat the North American and European domination of newsproduction. This has been achieved by setting up low-cost Internet-based networks for exchanging news and information amongindependent stations.

Agencia Informativa Pulsar, based in Ecuador, began in 1996 bysending a daily regional news bulletin to 48 radio stations via theInternet. Pulsar now offers a number of different services,including audio clips in MP3 format, to 2,500 subscribers, half ofthem radio stations, in more than 50 countries worldwide. Pulsar’snews contrasts with that of the major news agencies because it isnot filtered through a US or European perspective.13

Similarily it is likely that in large geographical areas, an eventualability to link widely-spread local radio stations by Internet will bea crucial advancement in the provision of accurate information on anation-wide basis. Once this technology is available on a low-costbasis, many of the problems encountered in the timely distributionof humanitarian programmes may be reduced.

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c) Gateways

Radio stations can also make creative use of programmes that serveas gateways to the Internet, allowing the community access toinformation designed for their specific needs.

Radio Yungas, a rural station in Bolivia, has a daily programmein which listeners send in their questions. The answers used tocome from a 15-year-old encyclopaedia in the town library, butnow they come from the Internet. When a local farmer sent in adescription of an unknown worm that was eating his crops, RadioYungas sent the message out to a specialised electronic list. Sixhours later they had an answer from a Swede, a leading wormspecialist, in which he identified the offender and explained howto deal with it. The answer was broadcast to the entire community,which may certainly have been at risk from this pest.14

Although this example relates more closely to the notion of theInternet for development, it is not unreasonable to assume thatsimilar techniques may have application for communities at threatfrom conflict, or coping with a crisis.

A consideration of how ITs might be used in crisis situations requiresthat practitioners think beyond familiar notions of the Internet.Digital satellite receivers, produced by the company World Space,enable data, such as radio programmes, to be downloaded from asatellite and accessed through a laptop, or transmitted by radio toaffected populations. Such an application could help resolve theproblem of transporting programme tapes from one station to thenext in an area where such travel may be restricted by conflict orthe degradation of roads. At the same time, however, World Spaceradios remain prohibitively expensive for mass distribution to thegeneral public.

Clearly infrastructural requirements cannot be easily removed fromthe equation. Nonetheless, populations should not be denied thepossibility of access to IT by force of assumption. Craig Duncan ofReliefWeb, a UN sponsored Web site devoted to relief and emergencyinformation, notes a “trickle-down” of information from those who

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have access to the Internet to those without access.He contends that many of the site’s clients are from local populationsthat might normally be considered to be lacking access to theInternet. 15

Even the problem of illiteracy can be overcome to a certain extentthrough the use of networking, where key figures can downloadinformation and pass it by word of mouth, thus reaching the majoritywho are unlikely to have computers of their own.16

It is clear that the information age and the use of IT will have animportant impact on the flow of information to and from, andcommunication within crisis areas. Practitioners and policy makersmust carefully reflect on how best to ensure that populations inneed are no longer denied the opportunity to benefit from the latesttechnological advancements. The United Nations TransitionalAdministration in East Timor (UNTAET), the UN’s peacekeepingoperation in East Timor, has been searching for new uses for ITinnovations in crisis areas.

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Information technology and Internet innovations for peace-building operationsby Heather O’Brien

It is essential that information technology (IT)operations be set up early in the conflict resolutionphase, rather than waiting for organizations thatspecialise in long-term development programmesin post-conflict situations. Traditional areas ofpeace operations, such as provision of security,return of refugees, national reconciliation andelections, could significantly benefit from aninfusion of IT.

Effective use of new e-tools is even more essentialin peace operations which extend into unchartedwaters, such as transitional administrations in EastTimor and Kosovo. Mandates requiring fastinstitution-building, broad national administrationand reconstruction, and the provision of publicservices could benefit greatly from cost-savingpacket-switched communications systems thatsupport Voice over Internet Protocol (VOIP) anddata traffic. The Internet alone could provideopportunities for telemedicine, distance educationand the creation of a public e-banking systemwhere relatives abroad could safely send moneyto refugees at home. Opening channels ofcommunication is the first step toward nationalreconciliation.

In East Timor our achievements as a transitionaladministration included perhaps the firstexclusively mission-run web site — www.gov.east-timor.org. We hired and trained IT professionalsfor the East Timorese Civil Service. Since January2000, UNTAET has managed the first InternetService Provider (ISP) in East Timor using a 128Ksatellite connection via the company Singtel,together with UNDP and its regional project, theAsia Pacific Development Information Programme

(APDIP). This wireless ISP aims to provide thefirst post-conflict Internet access to the public andthe development community.

A peace operation has a long-term commitmentto the public it serves. Smart use of IT can ensurethe sustainable success of a mission. Through IT,a UN peace operation can help to prevent a digitaldivide between the public it serves and the IT-fortified relief operation. It can help in the longterm to close the likely digital divide between thewar-torn nation and developed countries

The golden IT project in East Timor focuses ondistrict connectivity. The plan is for UNTAET tocreate a community cyber center in all 13 districtsusing a satellite-based IP network that wouldprovide comprehensive low-cost communicationservices to the public, including Internet telephony(voice), the Internet and cyber-post. UNTAET staffand East Timorese civil servant graduates froman IT and Internet Academy could search theInternet for information needed by villagers. Thiscould include irrigation techniques, aid for failingcrops, or weather forecasts. Village doctors andnurses could benefit from telemedicine.Teachersnationwide could develop a national curriculum on-line.

Functioning as the first in a series of potential e-job centres, these facilities could enable some ofthe 80% unemployed in East Timor to earn a livingthrough data entry.

The media potential, from print to broadcast tovideo, is vast. District connectivity could be oneof UNTAET’s greatest contributions to empoweringthe local community.

Heather O’Brien was Communications Officer for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in East THeather O’Brien was Communications Officer for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in East THeather O’Brien was Communications Officer for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in East THeather O’Brien was Communications Officer for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in East THeather O’Brien was Communications Officer for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in East Timimimimimororororor

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Refugees from Banja Luka arrive in Croatia.Photo: UNHCR/25119/08.1995/R. LeMoyne

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SECTION TWO: HUMANITARIAN INFORMATION PROGRAMMES

Section Two:Humanitarian InformationProgrammes

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Rehabilitation and reconsruction project in Mozambique, supported by the World Food Programme.Photo: WFP/S. Errington

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CHAPTER V: DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE HUMANITARIAN PROGRAMME CONTENT

Chapter V:Developing effectivehumanitarian programme content

Many variables determine whether an information programme isdeemed trustworthy by the community it is designed to serve. Whileformat and presentation are two key factors, it is content which willensure the programme’s credibility as an impartial, respected mediumof communication. One of the greatest challenges is gaining accessto accurate information through international agencies, NGOs, andnational agencies working in the field and military sources. Theprogramme must then process this information in a professionaland journalistically sound manner. To avoid any ambiguity, it isworth establishing a clear editorial policy from the start.

1. Editorial policy

Many of the international and local staff that will participate in aninformation project will have a journalistic background. This mayrepresent various levels of aptitude but in nearly every society today,journalism has come to symbolise at least some representation ofthe “fourth estate”. This means the media serves as an independentwatchdog, operating in the service of the public.

Establishing a media project as a partner in the relief effort or as atool for peace-building may not sit well with those journalists whobelieve their job consists of “exposing” shortcomings of emergencyoperations, regardless of the consequences to the local population.While the programme should not shy away from reporting obviousweaknesses, their aim, nevertheless, is to ensure that the affectedpopulation obtains information that helps them better cope withcrises.

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In an acute conflict situation, remaining politically unbiased is likelyto be a requisite for the survival of the project. To say that anyprogramme is “non-political”, however, is also ambiguous, as“politics” can mean any number of things to different individuals.In most cases, however, humanitarian programming may aim toavoid extensive coverage of political events, whether local, nationalor international – unless they impact directly on the humanitarianactivities at hand.

a) Impartiality

All humanitarian activities, including media projects, should aim tobe impartial in times of crisis. According to the Sphere Project’sHumanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in DisasterResponse, impartial assistance implies that, “assistance is given onthe basis of need alone and makes no distinction as to race, creed,nationality, sex, age, physical or mental disability”. 1 This also appliesto media projects which run a great risk of being perceived by localpopulations as partisan. Clearly the amount of programming allottedto any given language group will create potential difficulties if nothandled carefully.

Immediately following the ceasefire in Kosovo, Media ActionInternational began radio programming in Pristina in both theSerb and Albanian languages. One of the greatest difficulties wasconvincing the Kosovar Albanian journalist team that the Serbpopulation also had a right to news programming. Although therewas a general understanding among Kosovar Albanian journaliststhat emergency supplies, such as food, should be distributed tothe Serb community, many rejected idea that Serbs had a right toinformation. One suggestion from the Albanian-speaking teamincluded restricting the length of news broadcasts to the Serb-speaking population in proportion to their representation withinthe province. For example, their reasoning went, if an Albanianhumanitarian news bulletin were ten minutes then the Serb bulletinshould be one minute because Albanians represent 90% of thepopulation, and the Serbs 10%! 2

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Impartiality also means giving equal airtime to varying viewpoints,often within the international relief community. The UNHCR, forexample, may maintain a position on the repatriation of refugeesthat another agency, such as Médécins sans Frontières, may oppose.One might assume that the role of humanitarian informationprogrammes is to ensure that both points are fairly represented.This journalistic approach must be carefully considered in ahumanitarian context. To what extent should the affected populationbe alerted to disagreements within the relief community? Wouldthe sharing of opposing viewpoints create confusion among theaudience? Are there serious repercussions for the population if oneposition rather than the other is adopted? These are the types ofdecision programme editors will have to consider, ideally inconsultation with local partners.

Project SPEAR reporter interviews Kosovar refugees in Kukes, Albania.Photo: Media Action International

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b) Objectivity and neutrality

The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement maintainsneutrality as a fundamental principle. Its handbook notes that “inorder to continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the Movement maynot take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies ofa political, racial, religious or ideological nature”.3

Likewise, the term “objectivity” has long underpinned the principlesof modern journalism. Not taking sides has come to mean standinga few steps away from the story, casting a neutral pair of eyes on theevent and then reporting the facts. But what is the role of objectivityin a crisis situation? Can a humanitarian information programmebe objective or neutral in the face of massive human rights abuses,or genocide, or ethnic intolerance? Should it even attempt to do so?

Many of the past decade’s conflicts, particularly in the Balkans, haveinvolved massive human rights abuses. By intervening in the crisis,the international community has taken a stand against such abuses.In the same manner, any humanitarian information programme willipso facto find itself in the position of supporting the basic principlesof international humanitarian law and human rights conventionswhich may be directly violated by one or both sides in the conflict.

At the same time, the humanitarian programme should not alienateany side of the population because of its political affiliation.Programme editors should seek to offer the affected population anopportunity to express their views on the crisis at hand.The challenge is how fairly to offer different points of view anequitable amount of airtime, particularly if they have obviouspolitical overtones.

Taking a stance in favour of democratic values, respect for humanrights, ethnic and minority tolerance, may be seen as a violation ofobjective journalism values by some. But in the case of ahumanitarian crisis or tense post-conflict situation, it is hardlypossible to assume a “neutral” role. It would be neither possiblenor ethical to remain neutral in the face of the violations ofinternational law which prompted humanitarian intervention in thefirst place.

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Even so, it is crucial to remember that journalists presenting theprogrammes must guard against even hinting at any sort of politicalpersuasion. It will be up to the local editor to ensure that theprogramme itself is not hijacked by individuals seeking to promotetheir own political agendas. This is an important challenge and onethat must be constantly met.

c) Credibility

Gaining the trust of the affected population is an essential step inhumanitarian and post-conflict programming. To achieve this, theinformation presented must be credible. Credibility means morethan just accuracy. It means that the source of the information isbelieved, and the presentation of the information is done in such away as to inspire confidence.

Imposing information on populations tends to backfire – audiencesare more likely to accept news and information from a source theyalready know and trust. But, despite all indications pointing to localbroadcasters being the best sources of humanitarian information intimes of crisis, there are clear exceptions. In the Balkans, DeutscheWelle was considered by the local population as the most trustedand credible news broadcaster.4

Credibility can be achieved if audiences feel a sense of ownership.So the programme or station must seek to offer what audiences wantor need. Extensive consultation with target populations prior to aproject’s inception is clearly vital for ensuring credibility.

Projects should:

● ensure project visibility and publish the name and address ofthe organization for feedback;

● continue participatory feedback and act on it;

● never harbour hidden agendas, as these will be noticed and shreda programme’s trustworthiness.

These steps will help ensure that the content of the programmeremains credible with the audience, provided programming isconsistently accurate, and perceived as unbiaised.

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d) Accuracy

The repercussions of inaccurate information will be particularlyserious in a crisis situation. Telling a population that a road is clearof mines when it is not, or that a water source is potable when itmay, in fact, be infected with a deadly disease, has obviousconsequences and underlines the responsibility of humanitarianinformation programming.

The rumour mill is rife during crises and a key objective of proactiveprogramming should be to combat rumours and help establish amedium for transmitting accurate data. But accuracy can meandifferent things to different people. Levels of safety or standards ofhygiene may vary according to sources, so it is up to the projectteam to set procedures to ensure accuracy.

Establishing a system of double-sourcing is one of the best ways toconfirm that information received is accurate, but this may beconstraining in situations where time is limited. Instead,programmers can work in partnership with specialised agencies.Never should a reporter go to a refugee camp, for example, andsimply draw conclusions about the situation without gaining detailedinformation from reliable sources.

In nearly every crisis, there will be operators specialised in, forexample, health, nutrition, safety, logistics, transportation, sanitationor children’s issues. If NGOs are co-ordinated by a lead agencysuch as the UNHCR, one approach would be to work with this co-ordinating body.

If misinformation is broadcast, it is important to rectify the story asquickly as possible and, if necessary, to alert relevant authorities sothey can take steps to mitigate any consequences. Just one mistake,however, could jeopardise the entire credibility of the programme.So constant vigilance is needed to ensure that accuracy is the guidingprinciple of all information programmes.

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e) External political pressures

At some stage of a humanitarian or post-conflict intervention, theinformation programme may come under external pressure. Thismight be local authorities eager to control content, or internationalagencies keen to ensure that reports about their activities takeprecedence. Another may be donor pressure to impose editorialinfluence on content.

Humanitarian aid is a competitive business. Agencies jockey fordonor support and strive to co-ordinate or lead their fields. Mediaprojects should aim to rise above this and serve as a communicationvehicle for all relevant stakeholders.

By maintaining a policy of constant transparency, the programmemay be able to avoid attempts to thwart its editorial independence.The project manager and editor should keep partner agencies andthe intended audience informed about how information is gathered,processed and disseminated. Another approach would be to establishan ombudsman panel, before which those who feel unfairlyrepresented could take their complaints.

Womens’ rights discussion programme, local West Bank television.Photo: Panos Pictures/Giacomo Pirozzi

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2. Programme formats

The ebola outbreak in northern Uganda during 2000 led topotentially conflicting programme formats. The National HealthMinistry ran a series of public service programmes which, to the earof professional western communications specialists, sounded toolong, wordy and circuitous. Their initial suggestion that messagesbe designed as short, snappy public service announcements (PSAs)was countered by the Health Ministry’s argument that Ugandansprefer longer health programmes to shorter messages. A compromisewas reached whereby longer programming was broadcast at the sametime as shorter PSAs. Unfortunately, no assessment was carried outto determine which approach was more successful in transmittinginformation about the disease to the target audience.5

The delivery of relevant information can take many forms, but it isof utmost importance that programme formats are culturally suitablefor the affected population. Attempts to impose unfamiliarprogramming risk being rejected.

Programmes demonstrating cultural sensitivity will likely beappreciated as a genuine effort to understand the needs and concernsof the audience. Broadcasting in the local language will obviouslyhelp. But it may not always be possible. A recent healthcommunications initiative for Chechen refugees in Ingushetia, forexample, has been designed in the Russian language, to circumventpotential security restrictions.

Designing programmes in a way which underscores the culturalspecificity of the target audience entails a thorough understandingof the population. The needs assessment will provide initialinformation. But pre-testing programmes with a sample audiencewill point towards any adjustments needed.

Every aspect of an information programme – the catch-phrase of ajingle, the layout of a newsletter, a signature tune – can be pre-tested,even in an emergency situation. The best means of capturing attentionis by knowing the audience’s preferences and catering to them.

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a) Humanitarian news bulletins

A humanitarian news bulletin is designed to provide short, concisesummaries of the main humanitarian news of the day. In a radioproject, it is likely to be the lead of the programme and should beapproached in the same manner as any regular news broadcast.

Knowing how to prioritise stories is critical in developing a newsbulletin strategy. The gatekeeper function of the journalist isparticularly noteworthy in a crisis and decisions over whichhumanitarian news stories to cover may have importantrepercussions for the audience. Criteria for selecting humanitariannews stories include:

Criteria Examples

● Potentially widespread impact on ● Repatriation programme beginsaudience

● Development which changes a ● Food distribution system changesmajor aspect of audience’s lifeor livelihood

● Move that represents a crucial ● Aid agencies withdraw from dangerouspolicy shift region

● Emergency information with ● Outbreak of cholera in water sourcespotentially life-savingconsequences

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The above examples are fairly obvious top news stories, but toughchoices may have to be made in the face of a multitude of newsreports. Particularly in the early stages of a crisis, it is important toliaise closely with relief officials to ensure that the humanitariannews reporting reflects the priorities of the relief effort. At the sametime, bulletins should reflect the response of the affected populationto the crisis.

b) Features

The challenge of producing humanitarian features is to make themboth informative and entertaining. A variety of options are availableand, for radio programming, it will be important to use as manyvaried feature and programming formats as possible. To capture theaudience’s attention and keep them tuning in, programmes need tocompete with other media, which may include satellite TV, play-stations and music radio channels. But it’s possible, with an upbeatstyle and high technical standards, to become part of an entertainingand informative media culture.

Features may include half-hour documentaries, examining a varietyof issues, with a multitude of speakers, and locations. Or a featuremay be a three-minute interview with a particular individual. Evenin rudimentary production studios, the technical quality of thefeature should not detract from the content. At the same time,features should aim to be topical, and entertaining. The concept of“just filling air-time” can be detrimental in a crisis, as audiences willtune out if they are exposed to irrelevant or poorly producedprogrammes while waiting for the news of the day.

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Making emergency programmes entertainingby Brian Anderson

In commercial radio we are well used to a fightand the rules are very simple. No audience – nopay. Get an audience or go drive a truck. The“audience” is never simply there. It must never betaken for granted. You must fight for it eachmoment. What you do must be relevant to thelives of the people you are trying to attract.

Kosovo was an education. I arrived in Pristina afew weeks after the end of the NATO bombing tohelp set up a daily information programme inAlbanian and another in Serbian. To put thingssimply, the programmes were intended to helpbroken people put their lives back together. For aprogramme-maker, this was an excitingopportunity.

During an emergency, people truly needinformation. There is a ready-made audience andthey need to know what is happening and howthings will affect them and their families However,emergency situations change very quickly. Every-one wants to get back to normality and the air inKosovo very quickly became filled with music. Oneof the things that surprised me most about Kosovoin the few weeks after the bombing was the inten-sity that music seemed to have. It seemed to beeverywhere, in the streets and bars, on the radio.

As the situation changed, there was an increasingdanger that the programmes we were making

would say all the right things in the wrong way,and the audience would simply disappear as peopletuned into music. As time goes on, it becomesmore and more important to produceprogramming in a professional way, to make itsound more attractive and to maintain and buildthe audience. During an emergency you may havea ready-made audience, but you must use thisshort time to build a reputation for what you’redoing. As the situation changes, you must changewith it.

People in Kosovo have grown up with state-controlled media. Media in a “western” society isa mirror to the population. We may not alwayslike what we hear and see but it is hard to argueagainst something that is real and has an“audience”. If you have a message to sell there isno point telling it to those who already know. Youmust “communicate” it to those who do not.

It is a simple fact that most people in mostcountries switch on the radio for entertainmentas much as they do for information. You couldsay that after or during a war people simply needsome escapism and even some fun, especiallyyoung people. This doesn’t conflict with informa-tion broadcasting at all. You must simply tailorthe message to the medium and that can be fun.

Brian Anderson is an independent radio producer/trainer working in the Balkans, China and South AfricaBrian Anderson is an independent radio producer/trainer working in the Balkans, China and South AfricaBrian Anderson is an independent radio producer/trainer working in the Balkans, China and South AfricaBrian Anderson is an independent radio producer/trainer working in the Balkans, China and South AfricaBrian Anderson is an independent radio producer/trainer working in the Balkans, China and South Africa

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A woman and her severely malnourished baby in Bong Mines, Liberia.Photo: UNICEF/95-0201/Giacomo Pirozzi

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CHAPTER VI: TARGETED PROGRAMMING

Chapter VI:Targeted programming

In any crisis, certain priority issues may warrant special programmes.As protecting human life is a primary objective in humanitarianinitiatives, ensuring affected populations have access to clear andaccurate information about health and security will be vital.Identifying credible sources of information is the first step indelivering trustworthy content to the target audience.

1. Tackling public health issues in crises

Humanitarian information programming is likely to focussubstantially on public health issues. In the developing world, morethan 80% of deaths and the majority of injuries caused by conflictare suffered by civilians. Disease is also more rampant during timesof conflict. Peter Piot, Executive Director of UNAIDS, recognisesthat “HIV spreads fastest wherever poverty, social disenfranchise-ment and instability prevail. And nowhere are all these conditionsmore extreme than in complex emergencies... women and girls findthemselves coerced into sex to gain access to basic needs such asfood, shelter, and security. In addition, women and children are atheightened risk of violence, including rape.” 1

In many conflict areas, health services are disrupted, and the focusshifts from preventive to curative care. Health-care workers are oftenforced to work under repressive and dangerous conditions. InRwanda, during the mid-1990s, an estimated 80% of medicalprofessionals either fled the country or were killed in the fighting,including many traditional healers. Disease spreads more rapidly indisplaced persons and refugee camps, as a massive cholera epidemicin newly established camps in Zaire in 1994 demonstrated.2 Whenmedical services are limited or absent, mass information programmescan help ensure crucial health information reaches target populations.

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In this context, humanitarian information programming maysupport health initiatives in the emergency phase. In a post-crisisenvironment, providing relevant information helps an affectedpopulation assume responsibility for its own health care.

a) General health awareness

The ICRC notes that in an emergency situation, the following publichealth programmes are likely to be initiated, particularly amongdisplaced and refugee populations:

● food provision and promotion of good nutrition, includingsupplementary feeding programmes;

● adequate provision of safe water and basic sanitationmeasures;

● waste disposal;● protection against the cold;● preventive care for mothers and infants;● immunization;● communicable disease control (prevention and control of

local epidemics);● treatment of common diseases and lesions;● provision of essential drugs.3

In all the above areas, health education by mass media can supportpreventive and primary health care management strategies. In somesituations, national health education programmes may already bein place and can be used as a base resource for emergencyprogramming. But medical needs during crises (war wounds, forexample) often differ from conventional health needs.

Media projects can also offer an indirect way of dealing with specialhealth needs. For example, providing information for women onreproductive health may be an essential role for media projects. Thisis because women of reproductive age – estimated to be 25% of anyconflict-affected group – may be reluctant to request informationon such issues, even when their health is at risk.

In addition, auxillary health issues, such as the environment, can beaddressed through a health information campaign. Subjects mayinclude the importance of burning rubbish, or maintenance ofrefugee camps.

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As with other forms of programming, health broadcasts should bebased on partnerships with medical organizations which have aprofessional and thorough understanding of the local context. Onedevelopment communications model followed in Mali, where radioproducers co-operated with health officials to produce a series ofradio spots on the benefits of breastfeeding, is a good example ofworking in close partnership.4

Successful health programming recognises the validity of localperceptions of health and illness. International relief organizationswhich arrive in a disaster situation may inadvertently dismiss localunderstanding of health as ignorant. It is important that targetaudiences are able to feed back into public health programmes toensure that their experiences and local perceptions of health arereflected in the programmes. It will also be necessary to ascertainwhere the target audience gets most of its information, in order tobuild upon existing sources. Health programmes should be designedto incorporate both traditional and modern medical practices sothat the programmes are meaningful within the framework of theaudience’s own range of possible actions.

Vulnerable groups nutrition intervention – World Food Programme, Malawi.Photo: WFP/Crispin Hughes

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b) Psychosocial needs

“Psychosocial” is a term becoming increasingly employed inconnection with the negative effects of war and catastrophe on themental health of affected populations. The psychological impact ofwar has dramatic consequences for the functioning of society as awhole, yet this dimension of conflict can be under-estimated orovershadowed by a concentration on the physical logistics ofemergency relief.

Without doubt, however, psychosocial issues play an important rolein health programming in crisis areas. Making sense out of situationswhich are seemingly senseless, and helping individuals re-establishcontrol over their lives, are essential components of mental healthwork in conflict and post-conflict societies. Educating populationsabout the symptoms of trauma is a necessary step in helpingindividuals come to terms with their experiences. Popular forms ofcommunication, such as radio, would seem to offer an importantmeans of facilitating this process. But the use of radio and otherforms of mass communication for disseminating mental healtheducation is proving controversial.

Some experts argue that mental health issues need personal attentionfor any impact to be felt – they are far too complicated for masscommunications approaches. But such a lengthy, clinical approachto psychosocial trauma is unlikely – on its own – to meet the needin conflict situations such as Congo or the Balkans, where hundredsof thousands of people may have been emotionally disturbed bysocial upheaval. A more realistic option may be a mass approach,and mass media is the most likely vehicle for such a campaign.

Even so, developing mass media as a vehicle for mental health workis still very much in a conceptual phase. Additional research andconsultation between communication professionals and mentalhealth experts is needed to formulate an appropriate methodologyfor conflict areas. But the few programmes which have beensuccessfully produced so far lend hope that, in future, media-basedpsychosocial initiatives may be more welcome in the future.

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Voice of America: Psychosocial programming for Rwandaby Loretta Hieber

In autumn 1996, the Kinyarwanda service of theVoice of America broadcast a twelve-part serieson mental health issues in Rwanda. The three-minute segments were produced by aninternational journalist in co-operation withphysicians at Harvard University’s Program inRefugee Trauma and were designed to offer basiceducation to listeners about the effects ofpsychosocial trauma on individuals and families.The programming suggested coping strategies forlisteners and reassured them that, following thestressful events of the previous two years,apparently troubled behaviour could be considereda normal response and likely to pass.

Subjects in the 12-part series focused on issuessuch as dealing with the death of a family memberand awareness of the special needs of the elderlyin crisis situations. Audience response wassurprising: the VOA reported that it received fax

messages from Kigali requesting additionalprogramming.

The approach taken by the Harvard University teamcentred on the idea that gaining an understandingabout one’s situation was the first step towardscoming to terms with what had happened. This,eventually, could help lead to recovery. Pro-grammes were designed to be simple andundramatic in delivery, avoiding any potentialexploitation of victims’ experience on air. Byproviding basic education, rather than any attemptat counselling, the initiative was a generic firstattempt to ensure that local populations in crisishave access to informative programming abouttheir plight. The programmes could have been evenmore effective had they emanated from a localsource, but this approach was not possible at thetime.

Loretta Hieber was a Fellow at HarLoretta Hieber was a Fellow at HarLoretta Hieber was a Fellow at HarLoretta Hieber was a Fellow at HarLoretta Hieber was a Fellow at Harvard University’vard University’vard University’vard University’vard University’s Program in Refugee Ts Program in Refugee Ts Program in Refugee Ts Program in Refugee Ts Program in Refugee Trauma in 1996rauma in 1996rauma in 1996rauma in 1996rauma in 1996

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2. Special programmes for children

Over the last decade, an estimated two million children have beenkilled in conflict situations, one million have been made orphans,over six million have been seriously injured or permanently disabled,and countless numbers have been left with grave psychologicaltrauma.5 Children are in special need of programmes designed tosupport them during times of great upheaval.

a) Child health during emergencies

Long-term conflicts have devastating effects on the health of children.During the 1980s, two to three million Afghan children are estimatedto have died from infectious diseases, malnutrition, diarrhoealdiseases, short birth intervals, poor infant weanings and feedingpractices and misuse of medicines. During the five years of civil warin Mozambique, an estimated 320,000 people (many of themchildren) died of easily preventable or curable diseases.6

Many deaths might have been prevented by health education andrelevant information being disseminated.

Feeding centre for Rwandan refugees, Kisangani region.Photo: UNHCR/27038/04.1997/R. Chalasani

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Most children caught in conflict die because of its public healtheffects, rather than being killed in the crossfire. Often, lack of accessto simple medicines may be the cause.

Promoting the health of children in crisis through the media caneven have an impact on belligerents, provided there is enough goodwill on both sides. From 1985-87, El Salvador’s Catholic churchacted as an intermediary for UNICEF and other health officials tobroker a ceasefire for three days each year to facilitate the vaccinationof 80% of all children.7 Media played an essential role in alertingthe population to the vaccination event. Similar projects have beencarried out in Lebanon and Afghanistan – each time, the role ofbroadcast media was essential.

In Afghanistan, during November 1994, WHO, UNICEF andlocal NGOs undertook the biggest health campaign since warbroke out 14 years earlier. The BBC publicised details of thevaccination campaign in the Persian and Pashto languages andappealed to warlords to cease hostilities. One million childrenand 300,000 mothers were vaccinated in peaceful conditions. Themass immunization exercise was repeated twice over the next twoyears with near-complete ceasefires holding. While the BBC’sbroadcasts may not have been the only catalysts of ceasefire, thereis little doubt that, without mass awareness of the goals of theimmunization campaigns, fighters would have been less willingto lay down their guns, if only for a few days.8

In general, humanitarian information programmes for child healthwill likely focus on the prevention of disease or injuries. One of thegreatest killers of children worldwide is diarrhoea and informationdissemination is crucial in ensuring that populations are alerted tothe dangers of consuming contaminated water and food. Directingprogrammes towards those caring for children is a sensible approach.

Besides programming focused on disease prevention, media projectsmay specifically alert children to fatal dangers. Landmines, forexample, kill or injure approximately 800 children each monthworldwide. 9 Radio, in particular, is effective for landmine awarenessprogramming.

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In Afghanistan, tens of thousands of small anti-personnel mines,blanket-dropped from aircraft during the Soviet–Afghan war, havecaused many deaths and amputations because Afghan childrenthink they look like butterflies or toy birds. The BBC’s NewHome, New Life radio soap opera uses child characters to discussthis issue in Afghanistan. One storyline warned against collectingscrap metal due to the dangers of unexploded ordnance (UXO).Another story recounted how one of the production’s young andvery popular characters coped with life after his lower leg wasblown off while ploughing the family’s fields. Evaluation hasshown that many young, disabled listeners were encouraged bythe example.10

b) Psychosocial programming for children

Children who suffer stress from exposure to war-related violenceor displacement react in different ways. They may feel depressed,show signs of anxiety, or become aggressive. They may suffer frominsomnia or have nightmares. They may complain of headaches orstomach aches, or show no interest in play. They may have problemslearning. A study conducted in Lebanon in 1988 by the InternationalPeace Research Association found that over 90% of children hadbeen exposed to shelling or combat, 50% had witnessed violent actssuch as physical injury, intimidation, or the death of a friend, and26% had lost someone close to them. All of these can be consideredtraumatic war experiences potentially resulting in psychologicaldisturbances11.

Often, an important factor in determining the efficacy of programmeswhich aim to support children affected by crises will be theprogramme’s ability to reach as many children as possible. In thissense, mass media can play an important role in both supportingprojects in the field, and educating families about the effects of stresson children.

Media are tools of socialisation, and therefore programming canaim to help mitigate the effects of psychosocial distress on children.It is through the socialisation process that individuals becomefunctioning members of society. In conflict situations, this process

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may be disrupted and the social development of children risks beingarrested. Well-conceived media programmes which distract childrenfrom painful experiences and help foster better relations betweenchildren and their communities can aim to play a significant role inthe socialization process.

In Rwanda, for example, UNICEF developed a community-basedtrauma recovery programme which used culturally appropriatemethods of expression such as story telling, role playing, drawingand journal keeping. This was done in an effort to help Rwandanchildren begin the process of integrating bad memories and intrusiveimages into their lives so that they could begin to rebuild a sense ofhopefulness about the future.12

No media project should attempt to assume the role of “counsellor”for psychosocially-troubled children, or adults for that matter. Norshould it exploit the experiences of interviewees by having themneedlessly recount their stories on the air. An ideal role for

Two children in a poor neighbourhood of Guayaquil, Ecuador.Photo: UNICEF/5316/Jeremy Horner

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programmes would be educational, informing caregivers andchildren about some of the tools available to help children recoverfrom their experiences.

Research has indicated that responding as soon as possible is key tohelping promote the emotional well-being of children in crisis.13

One way to begin the process of psychosocial rehabilitation wouldbe to ensure that media programming, from the outset, targetsfamilies and caregivers with information on the likely emotionaleffects of conflict on children. Appropriate topics for broadcastingcould include focusing on the special psychological needs of childrenduring crisis: for example, the importance of keeping a child withinthe family unit (rather than fracturing the group), or the benefits ofholding and touching the child when he or she is scared.Programming may also help families understand why their childrenare behaving in unfamiliar ways, and offer them suggestions on howto cope with changed behaviour.

Girls in La Saline, Port-au-Prince’s shantytown, Haiti.Photo: UNICEF/94-0733/Nicole Toutounji

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Providing children with the possibility to express themselves andto feel affection and trust will contribute more than anything else totheir psychological recovery.14 Special programming can encouragefamilies to make time for children to describe their feelings, andsuggest ways in which parents or caregivers can listen better to theirchildren. Programmes can also ensure that families understand theneed for children to play out their experiences as a means ofunderstanding the abnormal situation they have encountered. Butprogramme producers must recognise that they are not qualified tointerview children about severely traumatic experiences. Interviewscarried out by reporters who are not adequately trained, duringwhich children recall atrocities they have experienced, can inflictadditional psychological damage on children and leave themdefenceless.15

As always, media programmes should be firmly rooted in the localculture, and top-down programming ought to be avoided. Whenpossible, children should be allowed to become active players inprogramme content, so that their voices can reach the ears of theiryoung compatriots. Programming should strive to ignite children’simaginations and focus their energies on positive activities. Projectsfor children which highlight recreational activities have proved veryeffective in helping the rehabilitation and reintegration process.16

c) Protecting children’s rights in war

The concept that children should be considered a “zone of peace”is, unfortunately, far from the reality in most contemporary conflicts.There are an estimated 20 million children displaced by war withinand outside their countries.17

Besides focusing specifically on children’s physical and mental health,media projects can also be designed to help protect the rights ofchildren in war zones.

Media projects targeting children are likely to become increasinglyimportant components of humanitarian and post-conflict mediainitiatives. In an effort to reach the target audience effectively,programmes undertaken on behalf of youth should be produced,as far as possible, by young people.

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Recruitment and child soldiers

An estimated 300,000 child soldiers are engaged in armed conflict inthe world today. Although numerous media programmes havehighlighted the dangers of child soldiering, most have been one-offproductions by western broadcasters. Undoubtedly, this, along withthe efforts of NGOs such as the Coalition to Ban Child Soldiers,has done much to sensitise the world to the plight of child soldiers.But such media attention will have had little impact on the attitudesof communities where child soldiers are recruited, or indeed on thefate of child soldiers themselves. How can humanitarian and post-conflict information projects play a role in this context?

Reaching child soldiers through the media is an extremelycomplicated task. Children in armed forces are unlikely to have accessto radio programming which would alert them to their rights. Evenif they did, listening to such programming would be dangerous andcould lead to serious repercussions for the children. Radio or othermedia might be more useful in alerting communities to the threat ofchildren being kidnapped for soldiering, and the dangers they willface if recruited.

In many cultures where youngsters are an integral part of armedforces, there is a real need to encourage populations to respect theconcept of “childhood” as inviolable. Media projects may be moreeffective focusing on traditional values protecting children ratherthan emphasising international treaties on the rights of children.

Part of the dilemma facing child-soldiers is that they risk beingmarginalised by their communities once they are demobilised. This“demonisation” may be combated by engaging former child soldiersas an integral part of programming. Their voices could potentiallylend authenticity and may promote better relations between childsoldiers and their communities – provided programming addressesthe issues most relevant to both groups in a non-threatening andconstructive manner. As always, media programmers must seek outpartner agencies experienced at working with child soldiers to ensurethe information disseminated is practical and relevant in the localcontext.

The themes of these programmes could vary from encouragingrespect for the rules of war to offering hope about the prospects ofrehabilitation once demobilisation has occurred. Media projects,

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however, should never suggest actions on the part of the child(e.g. escaping or returning home) which could lead to the child facingsubsequent punishment.

Reintegration into society after time spent in an armed unit representsone of the greatest challenges faced by child soldiers. Youngstersmay have been exposed to or forced to commit atrocities as a meansof excluding them from their communities and complicating anyreturn to normal life. The psychological effects may only emergemonths later.

The right to education

Many conflict-affected children are denied the opportunity to receiveany education until long into the post-conflict or rehabilitationphase. Yet education can play a crucial role in helping childrenwithstand the effects of a crisis situation. It is vital that the potentialof generations of children is not lost due to conflicts. Media projectscan help play a role in ensuring that opportunities to stimulate youngminds are not passed over.

The BBC/Media Action International partnership project, REACH(Radio Education for Afghan Children), is an attempt to ensurechildren’s educational needs continue to be met despite a 20-year

Displaced children in improvised classroom, Luanda.Photo: WFP/Chris Sattlberger

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REACH: Radio Education for Afghan Childrenby Keith Ricketts

Using the popular medium of BBC radio, REACH aimsto reach children aged 9-13, throughout Afghanistan,who have little or no access to either formal or non-formal education. A team of 21 Afghan writer/producers,based in Peshawar, Pakistan, has been trained toproduce radio programmes that will engage children’sinterest and help them learn. The series of programmes,entitled Our world, our future, is designed to broadenchildren’s horizons by stimulating their imagination andtheir desire to learn, using lively drama, interviews,games, poems and songs. The 15-minute programmesinclude activities which make children active participantsin their own learning. The programmes move away from“telling” children facts to engaging their natural desireto learn about the world around them. The series isdesigned to be effective and enjoyable without anyprinted support material, given the difficulties ofdistributing such material in a war-torn country likeAfghanistan.

Programmes are presented daily containing informationabout Afghanistan’s culture and history, as well ascovering present day concerns such as mine awarenessand health education. Each day the programmes havea different focus.

Stories for living: enjoyable stories aimed to stimulatethe imagination and help children learn an importantlesson about life, such as co-operation or respectingthe rights of others. The dramatized stories include atale about a boy who takes wood from a bridge to useas firewood and the consequences both for his ownfamily and the whole community. In anotherprogramme, a group of girls fall out over their dolls buteventually learn a valuable lesson about jealousy andthe resolving of conflict.

Curtain of secrets: in this programme a curtain is liftedon a secret about the physical world around Afghanchildren and how they can use this knowledge in theireveryday lives. Topics include: boosting mine awarenessby highlighting the dangers of touching unknownobjects; how night becomes day; and, why we catchcolds. This strand uses drama, games and real-lifeinterviews to achieve its learning aims.

Faces and places: a series of feature programmeswhich convey information about places in Afghanistanand stories of people who in the past or today havecontributed, in whatever way, to the development ofAfghanistan. We hear from a blind girl who attendsschool with sighted children and, in her spare time,types Braille books to earn extra income for her family.We meet the boys who work in and around the Kabulbus station. And we travel to Lashkhargar to visit amarble factory and hear how marble is cut and polished.

The pedlar’s bag: a magazine programme aimed atyounger listeners (aged 6-10). It includes stories, wordand numeracy games, jokes, riddles, and informationabout health and personal safety. The pedlar travels toa different village or town each week and producessurprises from his bag which delight the children hemeets. The surprises help them learn to count anddiscover facts about the world.

Castle of a thousand windows: a magazine programmefor older listeners (aged 11-16), set in a mythical castlewhere children wander in and out of rooms and learnabout famous figures from Afghan history and thetraditional ways and customs of different regions ofAfghanistan. The programme also features discussionsand reports on the latest topics and issues that affectthe lives of young people, both in refugee camps andinside Afghanistan.

Keith Ricketts is the Education Coordinator of Keith Ricketts is the Education Coordinator of Keith Ricketts is the Education Coordinator of Keith Ricketts is the Education Coordinator of Keith Ricketts is the Education Coordinator of REACHREACHREACHREACHREACH

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old conflict. REACH was designed to respond to the Taliban’s banon girls’ education and to strengthen the opportunities open to boysfor learning. The project is based on the assumption that, as long ashundreds of thousands of Afghan children lack access to both schoolbooks and teachers, radio may act as their substitute instructor.REACH aims to ensure that children refused a formal educationare not, at the same time, denied the opportunity to develop theirminds and learn about their environment. The programmes,produced daily in Pashto and Persian, cover a myriad of topicsranging from simple mathematics to history and culture. REACHhas been designed as a model for ensuring that children living inareas where infrastructure is destroyed can still benefit from mind-enhancing programming.

Under the current political and social conditions in Afghanistan,radio clearly offers the only possibility for children to receive someoutside stimulus. It is an example of how creative mediaprogramming can help fill the gaps left in the social fabrics of societiesdamaged by conflict.

3. Female-focused programming

Of the world’s 40-50 million displaced people, an estimated80% are women.18 Women are likely to suffer the consequences ofconflict differently from men. In many parts of the world, womenhold subservient positions that worsen during conflict. Women andgirls may be left unprotected, and the use of rape as part of warstrategy continues to have devastating effects in countries as diverseas Cambodia, Peru, and Bosnia.19

In the past decade, many humanitarian organizations have becomemore gender-sensitive, in an attempt to understand better how thedifferent roles, opportunities and constraints of men and womeninfluence their needs in times of crisis. But addressing women’sspecial needs means more than simply designing programmes aboutfemale issues, such as maternal health. It means developing projectsthat integrate women into every aspect of project management, fromemploying women supervisors to ensuring women are consideredan essential component of the target audience.

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Undoubtedly, humanitarian programming which is designed toimprove the well-being of populations in crisis will often be directedtoward the caregivers of families, usually women. But, far too often,women are still invisible members of society and special efforts mustbe undertaken to ensure that their needs are met.

In Afghanistan, the BBC’s Village Voice programme on healthissues was broadcast over a two-year period after lunch on Fridays,when men were praying in the mosque and women were left alonein the house. After audience research (including listeners’ letters)implied that this was not a popular listening time – reducing theprogramme’s audience – the Village Voice was rescheduled to theevening. It was not until later that the BBC discovered throughfocus group research with Afghan women that the Friday after-noon slot had been greatly appreciated by them, since they werefree to listen to the radio in their husbands’ absence. Conventionalaudience research had failed to pick this up because Afghanwomen in purdah are difficult to access, and very few of themwrite, so no letters containing feedback were sent to the BBC. 20

Afghan women and children.Photo: UNICEF/J. Hartley

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In the above example, women had become invisible, even thoughthey were clearly intended as part of the target audience. Makingwomen visible and active participants in information programmesin conflict areas, by all means possible, is crucial.

Meeting the needs of affected women entails being aware of theirspecial conditions at the very earliest stages of the projectdevelopment process. Needs assessments must ensure that women’slistening habits and access to radios and other media are calculatedto ensure projects favourably impact on women.

It is worthwhile to consider a gender framework which mediaprojects in conflict areas can aim to follow in an effort to supportwomen. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)incorporates the following guidelines into its progamme strategyand offers a worthy model. CIDA aims to:

● support the objectives and initiatives of women in crisissituations;

● achieve greater understanding of actual and potential roles forwomen;

● increase participation of women in the design, implementation,and evaluation of media projects;

● include women in media projects in proportion to their existingparticipation rates in target groups (especially important inrefugee populations which have a high percentage of women);

● emphasise programmes, when appropriate, which help womenin income generation, such as special programmes on jobtraining;

● support special women’s programmes through disseminationof information about their activities, goals and outputs.21

Providing support to existing women’s programmes and initiativesin conflict areas can be particularly important in dealing with genderviolence. In 1993, for example, the Women’s Victims of ViolenceProject was launched in the Dadaab camps in Kenya, where Somalirefugees were persistently subjected to sexual violence. Despiteefforts taken to protect women, such as planting thorn bushes aroundthe sites and training local police, the attacks continued. It soonbecame clear that the attackers came from within the Somalicommunity. The UNHCR established anti-rape committees

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composed of community elders. Religious leaders spoke out againstthe rapists and encouraged communities to support the victims.

What could a media project help do in such a situation? By providinga vehicle for community leaders to address the issue of rape in thecamps, media programmes might have enhanced the capacity of thecommunity to help solve serious problems by itself. The projectcould have aimed to sensitise men and women in the camp aboutviolence against women – without exploiting their experiences –and help ensure that women were not blamed for the rape.

Media projects can also help focus attention on women’s health issueswhich may often be overlooked in crisis situations. According toWHO, women present themselves to health services less frequentlythan men, yet they are the family’s main health providers. Mediacampaigns may touch women in crises who are traditionally difficultto reach, such as those living in rural areas. But information shouldbe presented in a manner relevant to rural women. In Sierra Leone,for example, women receive health information from traditionalhealers and modern health providers – so they are used to a “top-down” approach to learning health information. With low femaleliteracy rates, one might expect radio to be an effective means oftransmitting health information. However, radios are not commonlyowned by women and, because radio information is “one way”,many women do not regard it as a satisfactory tool for healtheducation.22 Without proper research directed specifically at women,information campaigns, however gender sensitive, may fail to meettheir objectives.

4. Family reunification

Not knowing where loved ones are, if they are alive, imprisoned, ordead, undoubtedly adds to the instability and confusion thatpermeates conflict situations. Organizations such as the ICRC,National Red Cross/Crescent Societies and the International RescueCommittee try to re-establish family ties, often through innovativemedia programming.

The ICRC’s Central Tracing Agency (CTA) specifically deals withfamily reunification, tracing persons and prisoners, and maintaining

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contact between people. Although it favours traditional, hand-written messages as the most effective way of carrying out itsobjectives, the CTA has regularly employed other means ofcommunication, including radio broadcasts, the Internet,publications and satellite telephones.

Such tools offer an alternative to delivered messages when addresseescannot be traced or when someone wishes to have their name andstatus made available to the public. Radio became a standardcomponent of the CTA’s tracing methods in 1995. Broadcasts havebeen used in the Balkans, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, East Timorand Liberia. Programmes have been transmitted on local andinternational stations including Radio Tirana, the BBC, RadioFrance International, the Voice of America and Deutsche Welle.

Registration of a non-accompanied child in Bukavu, Zaire.Photo: ICRC/Th. Gassman

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Within a programme, a list of names can be read two or three timesa day for a period of up to two weeks before the next rotation ismade. The frequency depends upon the number of registered namesand the extent of the crisis.

In the case of Rwanda, the CTA used radio for reunificationprogrammes. One evaluation estimated that, within the Great Lakesregion, there were 65,000 separated children registered with theICRC.23 Radio programmes encouraged parents to come to ICRC’soffices and search for any children that might be registered.

According to Olga Villarrubia, Deputy Head of the CTA, radio hasproved to be more successful than telecommunications, publicationsor the Internet. It can reach a large audience and cross borders whendelegates can not. In Kosovo, during May and June 1999, intensefighting forced delegates to leave the area. But they continued theirwork by broadcasting the names of refugees who had arrived at theAlbanian border, thus informing those people still in Kosovo oftheir arrival.24

Tracing projects can profit from radio’s cost effectiveness and itsability to bypass illiteracy and government approval – hurdles farharder to overcome with printed publications. Radio can alsocircumvent the barrier put in place by similar languages usingdifferent alphabets such as Serbian and Croatian.

Due to their non-visual and transitory nature, however, radioprogrammes do not offer a permanent and consistently accessiblesource of reference. Despite the frequent repetition of programmes,listeners may miss the names they need to hear. Time constraintsmay deny the audience access to information more significant thanjust names. And the public nature of such broadcasts may upsetthose who require the privacy of their names and personalinformation to be respected.

While satellite phones and radio have been mainstays in tracingefforts, the Internet is emerging as a cutting edge approach. Currentlythe CTA’s website, Family Links, enables people to contact eachother through a database catalogue. The transfer of names andaddresses to the World Wide Web allows people far from the conflictarea to initiate family reunification. The CTA also set up computerswithin Kosovar refugee camps, although lack of computer literacy

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curbed the project’s effectiveness. Those under the age of 25 usuallyhad little difficulty, but for the middle-aged and elderly, much timeand many staff were needed to demonstrate the process of registeringnames online. Despite setbacks, the ICRC believes the Internet doeshave potential in this field and plans on expanding its application.

A number of high technology projects were initiated to promotereunification in Kosovo. Besides the ICRC web sites for refugeesto register and search for relatives, the UNHCR and Microsoftused digital imaging equipment to register the affected population.Radio, television and newspapers announced the names of missingrelatives. Despite such efforts, the majority of refugees lacked theability to access this data. The Kosovar Family Finder Project wasdesigned to collate these valuable sources of information and “getthem into the hands of refugees”. Information was consolidatedand published in a directory, containing the names and locationsof 19,658 families, representing over 120,000 refugees spread across23 countries. Ten thousand copies were distributed to everyrefugee camp in Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro and Kosovo.The database could also be accessed by refugees in other countrieswhere resources permitted.

Names were grouped together by town of origin. In this way,those who failed to find their own missing relatives’ names onthe database were able to try to establish their likely whereaboutsby using information relating to neighbours and friends.25

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5. Promoting humanitarian values

To promote local traditions which encompass humanitarian values,media programmes should be developed with the full participationof local staff and the intended audience. Consultation with thesegroups will reveal the local norms and values which can behighlighted to encourage humanitarianism. Imposing values definedin ways unfamiliar or external to the local context is unlikely toachieve positive results. It is much more effective to promote valuesfound within the local culture, than to argue in favour of obscureconventions signed by governments decades ago!

The article in the following box reflects the challenges faced byorganizations seeking to promote humanitarian values in the midstof fighting.

Bosnian children in Zenica Collective Centre.Photo: UNHCR/24004/01.1994/A. Hollmann

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The ICRC: Conveying humanitarian messages in Bosniaby Paul-Henri Arni

In January 1993, the security situation in Bosniadeteriorated in the face of western pressure toaccept a peace plan. Highly emotional andexplosive accusations against relief teams and RedCross delegates appeared in the local media. Theaccusations provoked immediate reaction frommilitiamen who began attacking Red Cross envoys.

The ICRC responded with a massive informationcampaign on local media, with three majorobjectives: to gain better acceptance of ICRC’shumanitarian activities; to promote access tovictims in remote areas; and, to convey basicnotions of the Geneva Conventions. Workingrelationships were established with dozens of ratno(war studios) which agreed to broadcast pre-recorded radio appeals and live interviews. Thishumanitarian “counter-propaganda” targeted localradio stations as a priority and aimed to make local

people, peasants, snipers and soldiers understandwhat was being done locally and impartially toassist them. The wording and the tone used wasalso adapted to local sensitivities, for examplecalling on soldiers to respect civilians on the basisof their traditional sense of honour.

None of this prevented war crimes from takingplace, but it did help the ICRC secure a saferenvironment for aid operations in Bosnia. TheICRC’s programmes to promote humanitariannorms in 31 countries, emphasising traditionalvalues, tolerance or humanity, help local audiencesbecome more aware of the issues at stake. In everyculture there are written or oral traditions thattransmit humanitarian values. When war breaksout, they can help prevent the spread of savageryand limit massive loss of life – but only if thesevalues resonate in people’s minds.26

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Afghanistan.Photo: UNICEF/John Isaac

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SECTION THREE: MEDIA PROJECTS FOR PEACE-BUILDING

Section Three:Media Projects for Peace-building

“Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men thatthe defences of peace must be constructed.”

– UNESCO Constitution

The media alone cannot create peace. Media projects aim to altermen and women’s perceptions of conflicts, but such projects areonly vehicles. By serving as a vital communications bridge, the mediacan help communities forge new paths to peace, thus making a crucialdifference.

Essentially, when the media aim to have an impact on a conflict,their role becomes that of communications enablers as opposed tosimply being information providers. Communication has beendefined as “a process by which we make sense out of events…information has meaning to the individual only to the extent that itcan be interpreted, understood, and applied to that individualaccording to his or her own circumstances”.2

On its own, information does not necessarily lead to improvedknowledge. Much information in the media is slanted, partial,irrelevant or just plain wrong. In sensitive hands, however, the mediacan be used to promote genuine communication. This in turn canhelp lead to social change or peace-building.

What can peace-building media projects realistically aim to do?

● Increase the quantity of communication about conflict/peace-building.

● Increase the quality of communication about conflict/peace-building.

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● Provide early warning of situations that might lead to conflictand alert political leaders and attentive publics to opportunitiesfor understanding.

● Stimulate the use of mechanisms for conflict resolution, such asnegotiation, mediation, arbitration, and provide information thatwill facilitate these processes.

● Help create a model in which peaceful solutions are more likelyto be sought and accepted.

● Mobilise, or help to establish contacts among those who areinterested in finding peaceful solutions, and help build publicopinion favouring such solutions.3

Media can become exceptionally influential in conflict situationswhere traditional communications are badly disrupted or where thesense of crisis creates a thirst for reliable information. At the sametime, no matter how well intentioned, the media can open itself upto manipulation. It thus risks abandoning its role as impartialreporter and commentator.

One person’s terrorist can be another’s freedom fighter. For instance,the South African media controlled by the apartheid regime wasundoubtedly “pro-peace” in the sense that it wanted an end to thearmed struggle waged by the black independence groups such asthe African National Congress. But this was hardly a “peace-building” endeavour.4

In Afghanistan, an official from a leading international aid agencytried to persuade the BBC to broadcast “peace messages” at atime when the Soviet-supported regime of Dr Najibullah waspreaching its own crusade of “national reconciliation” as a meansof preserving its political position. Not only would suchbroadcasts have proven ineffective, they would have seriouslydamaged the BBC’s credibility among its audience.5

From the conventional journalistic point of view, reporting hasnothing to do with peace-building. Editors maintain that journalistsare there to report facts, and not to be used as tools, even if the

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SECTION THREE: MEDIA PROJECTS FOR PEACE-BUILDING

overall objective is that of peace. Such assertions, however, holdlittle water. Many media such as mainstream television networksand news magazines are, in fact, simply beholden to the commercialinterests of their owners.

For many peace negotiators, the media are more likely to be enemiesthan potential partners. Peace processes from the Dayton nego-tiations on Bosnia to the protracted Northern Ireland talks havealways taken place as far from the media limelight as possible. Mediahave the potential to do a great deal more than they are currentlyundertaking. Yet such efforts will only succeed if they are channelledwhere they are welcome, and where they will have a reasonablechance of making a genuine impact.

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Displaced children at boarding school hostel in Ganja, Azerbaijan.Photo: UNHCR/23009/05.1993/A. Hollmann

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CHAPTER VII: CROSSING COMMUNITY DIVIDES

Chapter VII:Crossing community divides

When the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) andthe BBC World Service’s Somali Section collaborated on animaginative drama series emphasising the need for humanitarianvalues in war and exploring ways of resolving the conflict, therewas a surprisingly mixed audience reaction. According to an ICRCsurvey, some listeners were positive and appreciated the emphasistowards peace in the BBC drama series. Others, however, regardedthe drama as a plot by one sub-clan to criticise its rivals.

The problem was the choice of actors, most of whom were gleanedfrom a single refugee camp in northern Kenya. Their accent gaveaway their clan. The name, too, of the programme’s supposedlyimaginary village turned out to be a real one. All this added toaudience suspicions that the drama was a veiled attack by one clanagainst the other. The humanitarian and peace-building messagesmissed their objectives, because they were perceived as judgmentaland partisan.1

The BBC Somalia experience is a revealing example of a peace-building media project that failed to cross the community dividebecause it did not consider the realities on the ground. Missingapparently insignificant details during programme planning canseverely undermine educational objectives. To be effective, therecan be no substitute for up-to-date quality target-area researchfocusing close attention on cultural and linguistic characteristics.

Another point – albeit not necessarily relevant to this case – iswhether humanitarian rules of war based on the Geneva Conventionsand other forms of international humanitarian law are regarded asan attempt to impose outside values on a proud, indigenous culture.Such perceptions are unlikely to lead to “desired outcomes”.Messages need to be framed in a local cultural context to be takenseriously. 2

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Resolving conflict is a process that should aim to embrace playersfrom all factions. Conventional conflict resolution theory maintainsthat in order to end a conflict, all sides must understand its causesand nature. They must also seek to focus on shared needs andcommunicate these needs to the other side. Media projects shouldaim to position themselves within this process in a manner that isboth realistic and achievable.

There are a number of identifiable desired outcomes in the conflictresolution process. These include the following:

● perceptions are clarified by all sides;● all sides understand the history and causes of the conflict;● lines of communication are opened by sides;● people from all sides are brought together;● people are separated from problems;● common interests are identified;● shared needs are identified;● alternatives to conflict are generated;● goals and potential solutions are identified;● confidence-building measures are enacted;● trust is built among sides;● objective criteria for resolving conflicts are applied;● third-party negotiators are agreed upon, if necessary;● options for mutual gain are generated;● win–win agreements are developed;● agreements are based on respect for minority rights;● people act on mutually beneficial decisions;● relationships are improved and improvements are durable.3

Obviously, tackling all the elements listed above will prove farbeyond the goal of any single media project. Projects should bemodest, with realistic aims such as helping to clarify perceptions, orassisting others in their understanding of the history and causes ofa particular conflict.

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1. Tackling perceptions

Already in the first century AD, the philosopher Epictutusrecognised an important component of peace-building initiatives:

“It is not the things themselves which trouble us, but the opinionsthat we have about these things.”

Helping redefine perceptions during conflict is one of the mostcritical tasks media programmes can address. In any situation,different parties will attribute the conflict to diverse causes. Oneside might speak of injustice as being the root cause, while anothermay consider lack of security to be the principal issue. Bothperceptions may be perfectly valid and must be explored duringprogramming. To ensure that as many perceptions andinterpretations of the conflict as possible are included, carefulresearch is imperative.

One approach might entail seeking responses to the followingquestions:

● What is the conflict about? Which are the groups involved inthe conflict and how do they define themselves? What are theirgoals?

● What are the major issues involved in the conflict, such aseconomic inequality or political discrimination?

● What are the needs of the parties and what are their fears?Are these realistic?

● What potential outcomes are there, other than one side imposingitself on the other?

● What is the extent of the conflict’s effects, both within andoutside the conflict areas?

● What is the history of the conflict? What are the deeper roots,especially cultural? What have been the attempts to resolve it?

● Who is initiating reconciliation efforts?

● What is the nature of the relationship between the adversaries?

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Once programme producers have grasped the issues and thecomplexities of a particular conflict, they need to explore what isalready being done to alleviate tensions. When possible, mediaprogrammes should strive to support existing peace-building effortsin the field. But they must not neglect their main objective, notablyto provide both a space and a voice for communication andunderstanding among the different conflict groups.

In Sierra Leone, the local radio station in Bo, which was listenedto both by local civilians and armed fighters in the bush, attemptedto intervene in the war in a positive manner by moving awayfrom just reporting the conflict. The station attempted to improverelations between belligerents by serving as a forum for discussionto help modify mutual perceptions within its listening area.4

In order to address the various perceptions of a conflict, a mediaproject should seek to include all parties in the design of itsprogrammes. This entails close monitoring of audience reactions toensure that no single group’s views are either ignored ormisrepresented.

The ways in which local actors and target audiences analyse andperceive their own conflicts is a crucial factor in peace-buildingprogramming. Local populations may perceive the conflict in thefollowing manners:

● Adversarial: Viewing the conflict as “us versus them”, eitherwin or lose, all or nothing.

● Reflective: Looking inward, reflecting on the hurt and pain theconflict has caused and considering the best ways to achievereal goals.

● Integrative: Looking both at one’s own side and the need tounderstand the views of the opponents.5

Peace-building media programmes will aim to encourage movementaway from the adversarial approach where each side blames the other,to the integrative approach, which is necessary for a lasting resolutionof the conflict.6

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Tackling perceptions means confronting stereotypes that may bebased on fear or ignorance. Humanising the enemy is one way inwhich stereotypes can be dismantled. Helping each party “see” theother in a new light, rather than demonising each other, is a criticalrole for media projects to play.

“The Gesher newspaper was an initiative that was established inan attempt to tackle stereotypes and open a dialogue based uponmutual recognition and mutual co-existence. A Palestinianacademic, Ziad Abu Zayyed, launched the paper in 1986. As aresult of talking to students in high schools and universities, andto people in kibbutzim and towns, he felt the need to introducethe Palestinian as a human being to the Israeli people, who thoughtof her or him only as an enemy and a terrorist. Gesher was a clearattempt to change the Palestinian stereotype in Israel.

“It was not easy at first for the paper to get a licence, and then itran into trouble over censorship. Gesher tried to explain eventson the ground and in daily life in the West Bank and Gaza thatwere not mentioned in the Israeli press. In every issue there werereports about Palestinian artists, painters and writers, presentedas part of a conscious attempt to alter the stereotype of thePalestinian people from terrorists to a people of culture andhistory. Distribution of the paper was a problem, however, withmany Israeli shop owners refusing to sell it. Gesher continueduntil 1993 when the peace treaty was signed by Yasser Arafat andYitzhak Rabin. At that stage, Ziad felt the need for a joint projectwith the Israelis to promote dialogue. There is no way ofdetermining the success of Gesher. It is clear, however, that itsapproach was designed to dismantle a Palestinian stereotype thathas long been an obstacle to peace in the Middle East.”7

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One of the reasons for the prevalence of stereotypes is that manypopulations may lack access to the media of other societies.According to the Center for War, Peace and the News Media, theleading media in Hungary reinforce the worst stereotypes of theRoma, or Gypsy, minority. Moscow’s newspapers disproportion-ately ascribe crime to people from the Caucasus, such as Chechens,thereby feeding the prejudice that crime has an ethnic, non-Russianface. Today, Colombia, Nigeria and Indonesia all suffer fromongoing ethnic and communal conflicts, on the one hand, and mediapractices that exacerbate such conflict, on the other.8

The Reporting Diversity Network (RDN) is a project managed bythe London branch of the Center for War, Peace and the NewsMedia. It has been designed to help journalists learn to tackle thestereotypes present throughout the Balkans.

Victims of “ethnic cleansing” in northern Bosnia.Photo: UNHCR/24009/02.1994/A. Hollmann

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The Reporting Diversity Networkby Robert Leavitt, Robert Manoff and Milica Pesic

Media can contribute to the lowering of the socialtemperature. The Reporting Diversity Network(RDN) has taken up the challenge of working withthe media to forestall communal conflict.Highlighting the need for “diversity journalism” theRDN counts among its concerns, improving mediacoverage of minorities, inter-ethnic relations, andreporting of “the other”.

The RDN strategy is based on its partners’extensive research on the problems of inadequate,incompetent and destructive reporting on diverseissues.

Capacity building: Diversity reporting requiresovercoming personal stereotypes, editorial biases,language problems and inadequate backgroundsources, through extensive training for journalists.

Positive models: Development of “best-practicesjournalism” to provide examples of coverageworthy of emulation.

Marginalised voices: Support for strengtheningminority media.

Journalism education: Training the nextgeneration of journalists in effective and sensitivereporting.

Professional accountability: Setting up clearstandards of professional responsibility andaccountability in the sensitive area of diversityreporting.

Besides obvious areas such as the troubledBalkans, the RDN’s programme concentrationextends to countries such as Latvia and Slovakia.Regarding training, successful projects wereformed in Hungary and Albania due to the strengthand compatibility of local partner organizations.9

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The RDN project is focused on training journalists to report ondiverse issues in a manner that celebrates the “other” rather thandemonises differences. One message RDN Director, Milica Pesic,advocates is that “each person is a minority in some way”.

One intent of such training is to point out the stereotypes thatjournalists themselves hold. For instance, after a five-day course asmall test was given to programme participants in an effort todetermine any prejudices they might hold. The participants weresurprised at what was revealed.10

To date, the project has trained mostly young journalists. Reachingdecision-makers, such as publishers and editors, has proven moredifficult. It is far harder to convince such “gatekeepers ofinformation” to participate in media seminars or workshops – manysimply have not got the time. But a change in their attitudes isessential if there is to be positive development in the way conflict isreflected in the media.

2. From competition to co-operation

A main objective in peace-building is to ensure that the competitiverelationship that may lead to the eruption of hostilities is eventuallysupplanted by co-operation. The role of the media is to support theprocess by which the attitudes of people are altered.

Helping to forge that co-operation means encouraging differentactors to promote a view that is wider and more inclusive than thepartisan approaches that often dominate a conflict. This includesprodding opposing sides to understand each other’s motivations.However, one needs to recognise that conflict is a shifting dynamiccomposed of three main elements:

● Context: The conflict of interest between parties, such asunequal access to resources within a society. Conflict arises whenparties have incompatible goals, interests and values.

● Behaviour: Actions of people, such as aggressive behaviour thateventually spirals into war. Encouraging parties to choose co-operative rather than confrontational forms of behaviour maylead to conflict prevention.

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● Attitude: Perceptions of groups, and their images of each other.In conflicts there is an increase in misperception. Mutualperceived hostility, anger and irritation develops – escalating toviolence.11

Most media projects will probably attempt to impact on the thirdcomponent, but attitude is closely linked to both context andbehaviour. If a conflict situation is to improve, all of the aboveelements have to change.

Rwandan children from the Benaco Camp carry water containers.Photo: UNICEF/94-0078/Howard Davies

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There is little point in setting objectives that have absolutely nochance of being fulfilled, or which are totally unsuited to the medium.Media projects can realistically aim to:

● build confidence amongst warring parties;● build consensus;● allow face saving;● facilitate communication between conflicting parties;● provide an outlet for emotional expression;● analyse the conflict dispassionately and in detail;● educate people on the process of conflict resolution;● propose options and solutions to the conflict;● influence the balance of power in a conflict;● promote dialogue between cultures (or former enemies);● humanise the enemy;● address minority/majority issues;● strengthen understanding of others’ needs;● provide and promote global vision;● advocate tolerance;● encourage flexibility;● reduce prejudice;● promote dignity;● relate with the other in a non-judgemental way;● encourage sensitivity;● get acquainted with the life of others; get to know them.12

The list is long and varied. One overall aim, however, is clear: endinghostilities cannot rest solely with the leadership. It has to be theresult of a widespread desire for peace among all participants.

Northern Ireland is just one example of how the attitudes ofpopulations in conflict are just as important a component of peace-building as political agreements at the highest level. As stressed inlate 2000 by former US President Bill Clinton, who sought to lendhis support to the peace process, the main impetus came not fromoutside governments or international organizations but rather from

Ending hostilitiesEnding hostilitiesEnding hostilitiesEnding hostilitiesEnding hostilitiescannot restcannot restcannot restcannot restcannot restsolely withsolely withsolely withsolely withsolely withthe leadershipthe leadershipthe leadershipthe leadershipthe leadership

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within the disputing parties themselves. This bottom-up approachmay mean slower progress but will produce change that comes – ifand when it happens – at the behest of popular decision.

Media projects that strive for long-term impact should be establishedin a manner that takes account of the division within a given society.They must demonstrate an ability to overcome the particulardivisions that have led to conflict.

For example, Studio Ijambo was set up in Bujumbura, Burundi, bythe NGO Search for Common Ground in 1995 in an attempt topromote a better mutual understanding between Tutsis and Hutus.The approach taken was to persuade media professionals from bothethnic groups to work together to record testimony of averagecitizens caught up in the civil war.

Handicapped war victims in Kunduz, Afghanistan.Photo: UNHCR/25039/05.1995/A. Hollmann

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The studio’s beginnings were characterised by enormous distrustbetween the Hutu and Tutsi journalists involved. Eventually, theydeveloped a mutual trust that led to a significant degree ofempowerment. Their work developed on two levels: news reportingand social conscience programming. The social programmes focusedon real issues such as health care, public affairs or public dialogue.The team did not seek to create a “reconciliation radio” as themanagement believed this would not prove effective in bringingpeople together as the population was too divided.

The lessons learned from the Studio Ijambo experience underscorethe need for careful composition of editorial staff and facilitatedtrust-building between ethnically opposed factions. In addition,there is a strong argument for allowing projects to develop naturallyand according to the need of a particular situation, rather than relyingon rigid, pre-ordained guidelines.

Nevertheless, there are certain approaches that may be followed tofacilitate implementation of a peace-building media project.

● Language: This is considered a crucial element in crossing thecommunity divide. Production teams for multilingual and multi-ethnic programming should themselves be multilingual. Inparticular, team members should speak the languages used bythe conflicting parties.

● Staffing: Production teams should seek to reflect theircommunities. This, for example, means not staffing rural-basedprojects with urban elites who have little understanding of thesocial dynamics of the target audience. It is important that theaudience feels an “ownership” over the programme, and thisincludes relating to the project staff.

● Neutral space: There is a need for neutral space to be structuredinto the programme format. The team can select a venue thatcan then be regarded as “neutral” by the different partiesinvolved. This enables tensions to be released. Conflict issuescan be aired as part of an open dialogue. In South Africa, forinstance, progressive journalists have learned they can createneutral spaces for mediation by stepping out of the “warrior-culture” paradigm, and adopting instead the African

Production teamsProduction teamsProduction teamsProduction teamsProduction teamsshould reflect theirshould reflect theirshould reflect theirshould reflect theirshould reflect theircommunitiescommunitiescommunitiescommunitiescommunities

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philosophical concept of ubuntu (humanity). Folklore andhuman courage stories can be re-framed within the ubuntuconcept.

● Co-ordination: Programme managers should aim to link theirmedia projects to ongoing community activities as a way ofbuilding trust and local partnerships. Project activities shouldbe directed in a manner that will empower marginalised sectorsof society.

● New models: Provide models through which collective actioncan be taken to support positive social and political action. Byproviding new models, media projects can help populationsreach their own conclusions about resolving conflict amongstthemselves based on experiences elsewhere.13

3. Developing “connectors”

In every society at war, groups that are divided tend to remainconnected to each other. For example, people continue to trade acrosswarring lines. In northern Kosovo along the Serb border, ethnicAlbanians and Serbs converge regularly to trade without evidentfear of retribution. Sometimes, too, warring parties share and agreeto maintain basic infrastructures that benefit all sides concerned.On occasion, people from different factions form groups intendedto overcome the divisions of warfare.

There are five types of “connectors” that can link sub-groups in themidst of warfare:

● systems and institutions;● attitudes and actions;● common experiences;● shared values and interests;● symbols and occasions.

Media peace-builders need to understand the meaning of theseconnectors. They all represent positive aspects of society which canhelp to produce change. For instance, if there is a tradition in one

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part of the country of women brokering peace, it could behighlighted by the media and emulated elsewhere. This is the casein the Middle East where Palestinian and Jewish women have workedtogether on a variety of projects in an effort to promote an end tohostilities.

Building on the “connectors” that exist in all conflict situations canbe one way of using the media positively. For example, the ReportingDiversity Network consistently aims to focus on connectors as ameans of bringing populations together. These often have aneconomic basis and relate to health insurance, infrastructure,corruption, nepotism and poverty.

Analyst Mary Anderson believes that that the staff of internationalagencies who work in conflict areas are very often unaware of suchconnectors. In the midst of overwhelming and constant inter-groupviolence, there is a tendency to overlook the range of structures bywhich warring people retain some connection. There is always a“zone of order” in a chaotic situation. A thorough understandingof the context, she argues, will facilitate an understanding of thepatterns.14

The concept of connectors can be developed to include projectsdesigned to help change the nature of a media environment. Forexample, research undertaken in Northern Ireland and the MiddleEast indicates that the greater the extent of shared media, the morelikely the news media will play a constructive role in a peace process.Shared media help create a sense of collective identity which canprovide the basis for dialogue.15

The NGO, Search for Common Ground – Macedonia, has beentackling ethnic tensions by focusing on shared media.

Building onBuilding onBuilding onBuilding onBuilding on“connectors” in“connectors” in“connectors” in“connectors” in“connectors” inconflict situationsconflict situationsconflict situationsconflict situationsconflict situationsis a positive wayis a positive wayis a positive wayis a positive wayis a positive wayto use the mediato use the mediato use the mediato use the mediato use the media

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Cross-cultural journalism in Macedoniaby Eran Fraenkel

Macedonian society consists of Macedonians(66%), Albanians (23%), Turks (4%), Roma,Serbs, and Vlachs (each under 2%), who marktheir identities predominately by language.Superficially, Macedonia’s abundant private andstate-run media, print and broadcast, reflect itspluralism. This very multiplicity, however, hascreated information ghettos. Communitiesinfrequently use another community’s media, evenwhen language is not a barrier (“minorities” canaccess Macedonian-language media, but not vice-versa).

People from one region rarely know the everydayconcerns and needs of people from elsewhere,especially when they are ethnically or linguisticallydistinct. When concern is aroused, usually duringcrises, prejudicial attitudes prevail. At best,therefore, media further segregate Macedonia’sethno-linguistic communities. At worst, theyescalate inter-ethnic tensions through biased,insufficient, or inaccurate information.

Search for Common Ground – Macedonia (SCGM)has addressed the question of media and conflictwith a series of team-reporting projects. Theseconsist of journalists from three- to four-languagemedia who investigate topics pertinent to all their

audiences. Some projects last a month; others aweek per month over a year. SCGM’s fewprerequisites for participation are that materialsproduced by the teams appear with multiple by-lines, without editorial changes, and that all outletsprint (broadcast) these materials simultaneously.Since 1995, nearly 70 co-authored articles haveappeared; a 12-part, three-language radioprogramme has been broadcast nationwide; andthree television documentary series have beenaired nationally.

These activities have a transparently simpleobjective. By giving journalists from differentcommunities opportunities to “cross lines,” theyand their audiences begin understanding eachother, having shared and divergent concerns. Theimpact is two-fold. Participating journalists gainfirst-hand experience co-operating with colleaguesfrom other communities. Second, since mediararely treat issues of concern to all communities(outside formal politics), the public gains insightinto matters affecting everyone equally. Moreimportantly, a reasoned and non-inflammatoryexamination of issues of divergent interestillustrates to everyone that differences do notinevitably provoke inter-ethnic conflict.

Eran Fraenkel is Director of Search for Common Ground – – – – – Macedonia

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Dealing with media inquiries in difficult field conditions.Photo: UNHCR/26127/12.1996/H. J. Davies

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CHAPTER VIII: REPORTING CONFLICT

Chapter VIII:Reporting conflict

The manner in which journalists report conflict is likely to have animpact on how audiences perceive the situation. This supposition isat the heart of a wide range of activities designed to promote reportingskills that are less confrontational, and more solution-oriented withregard to peace-building.

1. War versus peace reporting

In the early 1990s there was an outbreak of cholera in the Afghancapital, Kabul. At least, this is what the Health Ministry reported.The President’s office, in the fractured Mujahed government,suggested on Radio Afghanistan that the illness was caused bypoisoned melons. The implication was that the melons werepoisoned by the Hazara shiite minority group, who transportedfruit around the city. The government at the time was trying todiscredit the Hazaras. Faced with the real prospect of serious ethnicviolence and distrusting the poison theory, the BBC correspondentchose to ignore the Radio Afghanistan broadcasts and emphasisedthe cholera explanation. Meanwhile the BBC Pashto and Persianservices broadcast features on how to minimise risk of catching thedisease. The population, who listened both to the BBC and RadioAfghanistan, appeared to trust the BBC explanation. There wereno attacks on Hazaras.1

This is an example of how conscientious reporting can help avoidpotential conflict. At other times, however, a conscious effort toreport conflict in a new and innovative way is needed, as illustratedby the following example.

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When fighting broke out between the Lofa and Mandingo ethnicgroups in Liberia, the Talking Drum Studio correspondent becamean integral part of the conflict resolution process. Thecorrespondent was the first to communicate the unfolding violenceto Monrovia, prior to any military or other governmentannouncements. Talking Drum Studio directors quietly alertedgovernment officials to the events rather than breaking the storyto the public. The government then invited a Talking Drum Studioproducer to participate in an official delegation sent by thegovernment to facilitate a resolution of the conflict. Eventuallythe dispute was settled peacefully, in large part because of the roleof Talking Drum Studio.2

Both of the examples cited above demonstrate how journalists canfacilitate the cause of peace. But the reality is that most journalistsstill prefer to focus on the “bang-bang”, framing conflicts as winner-take-all struggles, good versus evil, or black and white situationswith no grey in between.

The conflict resolution expert, Johan Galtung, offers the followingscenario to suggest that such an approach to the reporting of conflictis pointless:

Imagine a blackout on everything we associate with medicalpractice, never to be reported in the media. Disease, however, isreported fully, in gruesome detail, particularly when elite personsare struck. The process of disease is seen as natural, as a fightbetween the human body and whatever is the pathogenic factor –a microorganism, trauma or stress. Sometimes one side wins,sometimes the other. It is a game. Fair play means to give eitherside a fair chance, not interfering with the ways of nature wherethe stronger eventually wins. The task of journalism is to reportthis struggle objectively, hoping that our side, the body, is thevictor.3

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Galtung calls the above type of journalism “disease journalism”,reported by “disease correspondents”. Their concern is not tohighlight how diseases might be overcome but rather to focus onlyon the struggle. The implications of such a metaphor are clear.Galtung equates this to “war reporting”, which has long served asthe model for reporting conflict. He argues that the time has comefor “peace journalism” to emerge as the dominant approach.

This is also the argument of the British television journalist JakeLynch. He believes that even where there is press freedom, manyreporters simply prefer war journalism to media practices whichemphasise peace-building. It is true that mainstream journalism hasconsistently ignored significant peace efforts at the grassroots levelin their quest for dramatic television footage of hot combat. Lynchsays the classic journalist’s portrayal of conflict is as a titanic tug-of-war, a zero-sum like game between two parties, played out alonga single axis and consisting entirely of violent exchanges.4

Quality newspapers such as The Christian Science Monitor,Liberation, and Süddeutsche Zeitung, however, have consistentlysought to show that conflicts are not all “bang-bang”. Instead, theireditors have tried to encourage reporting that depicts war as notnecessarily ending with the cessation of armed hostilities, but ratheras situations with long-term consequences. Local populations,regardless of affiliation, may be affected for years – if not lifetimes –by psychosocial trauma, agricultural devastation, ruined infra-structures, or the cruel legacy of landmines.

War reporting has typical characteristics; it may:

● be reactive rather than pro-active;

● focus only on the visible and immediate effect of violence;

● dehumanise “the enemy” through accounts of atrocities;

● create an “us” and “them” scenario, helping “our” half-truthswhile denouncing “their” propaganda;

● equate peace with victory and ceasefire;

● conceal or ignore peace initiatives;

● in sum, follow the agendas of the military and political elites.

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As previously noted, many mainstream journalists will argue that itis not their role to influence opinion or attitudes, but rather to reportthe situation as is. Many also take umbrage at the expression “peacejournalism,” placing it in the same editorial barrel as civic journalism.

This said, a substantial pool of experienced reporters and foreigncorrespondents believe it is the responsibility of good journalists tohelp their audiences understand an issue as best as possible, withoutnecessarily relying on labels to describe their approaches. They willargue that accurate reporting includes framing stories in a mannerthat thoroughly explores underlying problems and possiblesolutions. This may involve emphasising what can be done to bringabout an end to conflict, rather than stressing what keeps adversariesapart.

While the print media still seem to do a relatively good job ofreporting issues, such approaches need to be impressed upongrowing numbers of mainstream journalists, particularly thoserepresenting the television networks. In the face of instant “live”coverage, there is a growing tendency among the electronic mediato do less nitty-gritty, legwork reporting as opposed to getting onthe air as quickly as possible, even at the risk of presenting unreliableinformation. Although very much a reality of the “new” media,there is clearly room for conflict analysts to provide the insight thatwill help rapid-fire journalists, with little time or patience, moreeffectively grasp what is going on.

While a broadening of reporting angles may help promote peace, itwill be the professionalism and balance of solid reporting that willmake the difference. This includes the following:

● Conflict is framed as a round table, consisting of many partiesand many issues. Complex patterns of resentment and hostilitymay be overcome by devising interlocking solutions.

● Instead of “worthy” and “unworthy” victims, there is aninsistence on parity of esteem for all parties.

● The structure and culture of a conflict are shared, avoidingplacing “blame” on any one party.5

Frame storiesFrame storiesFrame storiesFrame storiesFrame storiesby exploringby exploringby exploringby exploringby exploringunderlyingunderlyingunderlyingunderlyingunderlyingproblems andproblems andproblems andproblems andproblems andpossible solutionspossible solutionspossible solutionspossible solutionspossible solutions

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From such a perspective, reporting of the fighting in the MiddleEast, for example, would include more focus on the efforts to find apeaceful settlement. The nightly images of Palestinian youththrowing rocks and being shot at by Israeli soldiers might besupplemented by regular reports on efforts to seek innovative waysof ending the confrontation.

Developing stories about the different players from a solution-oriented perspective can help change attitudes. For example,journalists reporting about child soldiers in West Africa often focuson the atrocities committed by the children, such as their brutalityagainst ordinary civilians. A journalist seeking to explore thepossibilities for peace or conflict resolution might approach the storyby profiling the predicament faced by child soldiers seeking to escapetheir plights. The story might also show how education programmescan help reintegrate these youths into society, thus indicating thatsituations can improve through constructive intervention.6

Militia with their arms in the streets of Beyrouth.Photo: CICR/J. J. Kurz

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These examples are especially relevant to local journalists seekingto report the situations in their own countries or regions. If localjournalists frame conflicts in a manner that allows listeners or viewersto envisage solutions, peace becomes an option.

To summarise, “peace journalism”:

● consciously adopts an agenda for peace, believing it to be theonly alternative to the agenda for war;

● analyses the pre-violence conflict, identifying the differentparties and causes of the conflict, in the hope of opening up“unexpected paths” towards dialogue and peace building;

● humanises all sides in the conflict, and documents deceit andsuffering on all sides;

● functions effectively with professional “traditional” journalistsby focusing on areas that will enable audiences to better graspthe issues at hand;

● transcends “victim journalism” by devising ways to empowerthe non-elites to take part in the peace-building process.7

Women’s media group in Phnom Penh.Photo: Panos Pictures/Sean Sprague

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2. Journalists and objectivity

As previously noted, many journalists see a conflict of interest withreporting primarily from a “peace” perspective. Robert Manoff ofNew York University’s Center for War, Peace and News Media,asks if “objective” journalism is compatible with media projects astools for peace-building.

Journalist and conflict resolution theorist, Johannes Botes, arguesthat many journalists would claim that doing anything more thanreporting on parties’ positions is taking on a non-journalistic taskand stepping out of their traditional roles. Yet, he points out, alljournalism is a form of social intervention similar to third-partyfacilitation between two groups in conflict. Consequently, journalistsare always part of the social process of conflict.8

The role of journalists in conflict has many components, including:

● helping parties communicate where there is no directcommunication;

● exploring conflict by carrying messages between parties;● educating parties;● convening parties;• helping to evaluate by assessing possible solutions;● acting as enforcers by monitoring agreements;● legitimising by encouraging parties and giving them moral

support.9

In short, it is difficult for journalists to claim to be wholly objective.Even so, there is a resistance on the part of mainstream media torecognise their role in conflict. Therefore Manoff suggests turningthe question around. The usual query, “What is it possible for themedia to do to prevent conflict?” becomes: “What does conflictresolution theory and practice tell us need to be done to preventconflict?” By redirecting this focus, thus setting aside the questionof the circumstances under which the media may be able to helppromote conflict prevention, such oft-cited impediments as“objectivity” can be overcome.

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Manoff sets out the potential roles for the media to play in theprevention and management of conflict by:

● channelling communication between parties;● educating;● confidence-building;● counteracting misperceptions;● analysing conflict;● de-objectifying the protagonists for each other;● identifying the interests underlying the issues;● providing an emotional outlet;● encouraging a balance of power;● face saving and consensus building;● solution-building.

In order to ensure journalists are able to produce programming thatfulfils the roles suggested by Manoff, training is essential. The SouthAfrican Mediation Project for Journalists (MPJ), described in thenext box, trains journalists in mediation and other conflict-handlingskills. The project focuses on journalists who come from mouthpieceor adversarial traditions.

There are a number of problems that media projects are likely toface. These include difficulties in establishing editorial freedom inconflict areas and the possible high risks to independent-mindedjournalists and broadcasters. The standard of broadcasts and/orwriting has to be consistently high to make the necessary impact,and the impact of the media intervention has to be carefullymonitored in order to check that the results are not counter-productive. This implies research and the active participation ofconflict-resolution experts and community groups, which can bedifficult to organise. There is also a need to work with experiencedevaluators who can determine indicators of success to guide the mediaintervention.10

Nevertheless, there are sufficient examples of projects undertakenin conflict areas that demonstrate initially positive results. Severalare outlined in the following chapter.

Carefully monitorCarefully monitorCarefully monitorCarefully monitorCarefully monitorthe impact ofthe impact ofthe impact ofthe impact ofthe impact ofmedia intermedia intermedia intermedia intermedia interven-ven-ven-ven-ven-tionstionstionstionstions

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Journalists mediating conflictby Melissa Baumann and Hannes Siebert

“Journalists mediate conflict, whether they intendto or not.” This is the premise we started in 1990,when we began the work that became the bedrockfor the Media Peace Centre. At the heart of theproject is the idea that journalists can and shouldhelp manage conflict. The Mediation Project forJournalists (MPJ) imparts to journalists a set ofskills borrowed from mediation to help them todo so.

Bringing parties to the table: Journalists haveunparalleled access to parties and can help thembegin dialogue around conflictual issues.

Active listening: Journalists can help engageparties in better listening, through practicing itthemselves. Conflicts often persist because peoplearen’t really heard.

Moving parties off positions, towards interests:Journalists needn’t reiterate parties’ hardenedpositions but rather can explore interestsunderlying these positions identifying commonground between parties.

Agenda setting: This entails harking back to thecall for more pro-active journalism, providinganalysis and insight into critical issues.

Dispelling misperceptions and stereotypes:Journalists can explore misperceptions of the“other” with the parties on both sides.

Questioning assumptions: Journalists need toquestion not only their own assumptions but alsothe assumptions of others.

Laundering language: Recognising that words cando tremendous damage, perpetuating stereotypesand division, watch out for labels such as “victim”or “perpetrator”.

Joint problem solving: Journalists help tostructure the conflict and identify key problemareas to be addressed. This can spotlight instanceswhere joint problem-solving works, and theprocess the parties took to get there.10

Melissa Baumann and Hannes Siebert are the founders of the South African Media Peace CentreMelissa Baumann and Hannes Siebert are the founders of the South African Media Peace CentreMelissa Baumann and Hannes Siebert are the founders of the South African Media Peace CentreMelissa Baumann and Hannes Siebert are the founders of the South African Media Peace CentreMelissa Baumann and Hannes Siebert are the founders of the South African Media Peace Centre

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A Rwandan refugee near Lubutu, Zaire.Photo: UNHCR/C. Bowers/01.1997

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CHAPTER IX: EXAMPLES OF MEDIA PROJECTS BUILDING PEACE

Chapter IX:Examples of media projects building peace

The range of programming is considerable: discussions, interviews,phone-in programmes and listeners’ letter programmes,documentaries, oral testimonies, stories and dramas. All of thesecan, in creative hands, raise awareness of conflict issues and stimulatedebate. All have the potential to facilitate peace-building, providedthey follow basic guidelines for effective programming.

What follows are examples of some of the most innovative peace-building programmes to date, focusing on radio and video, with aspecial emphasis on drama. All offer fertile ground for furtherexamination of their proven effectiveness. Nevertheless, they areexciting examples of creative uses of the media to help reduce conflict.

1. Radio facilitating peace-building

The role of the facilitator in conflict may be compared to a midwife,as in Plato’s metaphor: “The midwife draws out the baby. She doesn’tcreate him or her.” The same may be said of community and localradios when they act as facilitators, namely they help in “drawingout” the potential that is already there.

a) Local and community radio

In South Africa, the politicisation of society has had an impact oncommunity broadcasting. It is more common now to find localradios taking on peace-building roles, with radio proving to be aneffective voice for community concerns.

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Bush Radio in Cape Town takes an active part in combating thevigilante group PAGAD (People against Gangsterism and Drugs).The station management has successfully avoided allowing localfaction leaders to use the radio as a platform; it has also taken thebold editorial decision not to report every single instance of streetviolence, to help prevent copycat or revenge killings. It justifiesthis editorial “censorship” on the grounds that this is what thelisteners tell them is in the best interests of the community. BushRadio management also takes part in mediation efforts aimed atdecreasing the level of community violence.1

When community broadcasters open up sensitive issues like violence,they shouldn’t be left to work in isolation. Radio broadcasters arelikely to live within these communities and may suffer from anyrepercussions from remarks that are misunderstood. Manycommunity radios in South Africa have experienced threats whenthey tackled issues of violence in their communities.

Nampula, Mozambique.Photo: Panos Pictures

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According to South African media sociologist Lesley Fordred,community radio programming can play an effective role in peace-building, providing it:• looks for solutions;• promotes commitment to implement solutions;• enables hope to sprout;• explains processes, rather than just report events.2

A good example of effective community radio stems from Mali, acountry where the development of local radio has flourished in thepast decade.

Radio Daande Douentza

In rural central Mali, whole communities exist with no runningwater and no electricity. Yet The Voice of Douentza, the country’sfirst solar-powered radio station, broadcasts daily to a populationof mostly illiterate dairy farmers and cattle herders. RadioDouentza covers around 15,000 square kilometres with its 250watt transmitter. Traditionally, sedentary farmers forming one ofthe area’s ethnic groups have been in conflict with nomadicherdsmen who come from another ethnic group. The two groupscompete for water and arable land. The herdsmen, looking forgrazing land for their cattle, allow their animals to trample thefarmers’ land. Past disputes have ended in death and other formsof violence. As part of the community, broadcasters in Douentzadecided to use air power to encourage farmers and herdsmen tospeak to each other as soon as they realised there may be a probleminstead of waiting until the damage had been done. RadioDouentza producers created a series of mini-dramas to emphasisethe importance of negotiations over violence. The communityand the authorities believed that the broadcasts contributedsubstantially to decreasing the violence.3

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This is an excellent example of a local initiative that recognised thesource of conflict in its community and developed a media-basedapproach for helping to resolve it. The broadcasts benefited fromseveral features which may be replicated in similar situations.

● They were local and from a trusted non-partisan source.

● They had the benefit of local “inside knowledge”, which allowedthem to pre-empt the conflicts.

● The programmes were imaginative and non-judgmental.

● The programmes were solution-oriented.4

Although there was no survey carried out to measure the success ofthe series, Radio Douentza has clearly met one of the major criteriafor helping to resolve conflict: ensuring local people feel anownership of the station. According to British journalist, FrancisRolt, “in 1994, when the station went off the air for several monthsdue to a technical problem, personnel were insulted on the street byradio listeners who didn’t understand the source of the problem.When the station went off the air for a week, due again to technicalreasons, village chiefs dispatched messengers from as far as70 kilometres away on foot to complain.” 5

Community radio is in a privileged position to help facilitate areduction in violence because of its insider’s position within thecommunity. It forgoes the obstacle of being seen as imposed fromoutside and therefore having to achieve credibility within acommunity. At the same time, however, staff of community radiostations attempting to deal with conflict resolution may be moresusceptible to intimidation or threats.

Local radio benefits from being part of the community which itserves and can direct programming to specific target groups. As somuch of peace-building is about helping to change attitudes,developing projects for children and youth is an especiallyworthwhile approach. Media Action International has run a popularyouth programme in Kosovo since summer 1999, which is broadcaston more than 20 local stations. The programme is called Qeshu,Rini, Qeshu which means “Smile, Youth, Smile” in the Albanianlanguage. It is the title of a popular youth song and aims to helppromote ethnic tolerance by providing young journalists with the

Community radioCommunity radioCommunity radioCommunity radioCommunity radiocab help facilitatecab help facilitatecab help facilitatecab help facilitatecab help facilitatea reduction ina reduction ina reduction ina reduction ina reduction inviolenceviolenceviolenceviolenceviolence

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opportunity to explore issues confronting their generation byfeaturing programmes for and by local youth.

Young people in Kosovo live in a province with an uncertain identity,with the growing pains of a post-war province struggling to competein a developing region. Massive levels of unemployment face mostuniversity graduates. Qeshu, Rini, Qeshu aims to offer a vehicle todiscuss and debate the future in a non-confrontational and solution-oriented manner.

Project SPEAR-Kosovo interviews international relief expert.Photo: Media Action International, Kosovo

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Qeshu, Rini, Qeshu: Youth programming in Kosovoby Rod Curtis

Nearly 70% of Kosovo’s population is under theage of 30. It is a staggering statistic. If Kosovo isto have a stable, positive future, then the majorityof its population – the youth of Kosovo – mustfeel like they have a future. Information, educationand entertainment are the keys. Today’s youth aremedia savvy, but they are also media junkies. Theysoak up radio and television, newspapers andmagazines. Hence information and media can beeffectively used to target youth and inform them:about technology and the Internet; about thedangers of AIDS, drugs and alcohol; about safedriving, safe sex, and employment opportunities;about setting goals and achieving them.

Why is Qeshu, Rini, Qeshu appreciated by youngKosovar people? It is produced for youth, by youth,covering youth issues. The vast majority of peoplewe interview for the programme are your averageyoung people on Kosovo’s streets. It’s extremelyimportant that young people here are given a voice,given the opportunity to realise their opinion doesmatter. It’s an important step, because graduallyKosovo’s youth will feel they are not excluded fromthe decision-makers, but are an essential part ofthe process.

If radio stations are playing youth programmes,discussing important youth issues and promotingpeace and tolerance in Serbian and Albanian, theybegin to play a role in the reconciliation of Kosovo.The journalists working on the programme startto change. The listeners begin to consider alterna-tives to violence. It becomes a sustainable solution.

Recently, Kosovo experienced its first free and fairelections. Media Action International, funded bythe Organization for Security and Co-operation in

Europe (OSCE), drove out to seven regional centresto educate youths on how to vote through acomedy play, and then provided a free disco,played out of the back of a truck. In all, probably30,000 people came out to party. There was not asingle incident of violence. Young Kosovars,starved for information, soaked up the info-tainment directed, finally, at them, celebrating withhands pumping the air.

Some people wondered if the programme waseffective: “Why do you aim this at the youth, whenmost of them aren’t old enough to vote?” I wasasked. Simple: If you want to promote change,peace and tolerance, and if you want to informand educate, then it is crucial to inform Kosovo’syouth. It empowers them. It gives them and theprovince a future.

In many ways, the real victims in Kosovo todayare the Serbian youth. Today they live in smallenclaves protected by KFOR troops in areas likeGracanica, and North Mitrovica. They can rarelyleave, and most don’t, and so live cooped up insmall protected zones. The youth are depressed,bored and lonely. Media Action International is nowbeginning a youth radio programme in the Serbianlanguage to help tackle this situation. It won’tchange their daily reality, but it will empower themwith information. And it will provide dailyentertainment produced for them – by them.

Youths who suffer in crises all over the world havean uncanny ability to bounce back, to look to apositive future. All too often, however, they areoverlooked in the post-crisis relief anddevelopment information phases. I believe we areproving in Kosovo why they shouldn’t be.

Rod Curtis is MAI Project Manager in Pristina, KosovoRod Curtis is MAI Project Manager in Pristina, KosovoRod Curtis is MAI Project Manager in Pristina, KosovoRod Curtis is MAI Project Manager in Pristina, KosovoRod Curtis is MAI Project Manager in Pristina, Kosovo

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The success of this programme stems from the fact that it built upona long-running humanitarian programme and hence had alreadyachieved credibility within the community. The programme featuresyoung journalists and aims to be in tune with the mood of thegeneration. It is oriented toward the future and helps establish asense of hopefulness amongst Kosovar youth about chances for abetter life.

Another important factor in Qeshu, Rini, Qeshu’s popularityconcerns the fact that the programme is broadcast over local radiostations, thereby reaching multiple audiences. This is the sameapproach taken by Search for Common Ground’s Talking DrumStudio in Liberia. As a conflict resolution organization, Search forCommon Ground advocates a media approach that includes a multi-ethnic and diverse staff, and the use of multiple conflict resolutiontechniques.

Hutu refugee in Karagwe Camp, Tanzania, gets news of the war by radio.Photo: Panos Pictures/Crispin Hughes

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Talking Drum Studioby John Langlois

Though Liberians had been fighting a brutal civilwar since late 1989, the peace process and theprospect of elections in July 1997 had created thepotential for a peaceful transition from conflict.The Dutch Foreign Ministry approached Search forCommon Ground (SFCG) and provided funds toestablish Talking Drum Studio (TDS) to help toconsolidate the peace and educate the public aboutthe election process. SFCG hired a Liberian staffand equipped a production studio with a mandateto produce and distribute radio programmes butnot to broadcast them – the studio has notransmitter of its own but works with local radiostations to play its radio programmes. The goal ofthe studio is to use its radio programmes topromote and support peacebuilding efforts andconflict resolution in a post-civil war environment.

TDS is a fully staffed production studio comprisedof Liberians from diverse regional and ethnicbackgrounds and of professionals from manyfields including scriptwriters, actors, journalists,technicians, producers, and managers. Tworecording studios are used to produce news,music, drama, and public affairs programmes. Twoevaluations, conducted in 1998 and 1999, haveproven that TDS radio programmes areenormously popular with the listening public, thatTDS programmes have had a positive impact onthe lives and attitudes of listeners, and that TDShas wide support even at official levels of theLiberian Government. Further, TDS has expandedthe role of what it means to do journalism andconflict resolution media by developing a range ofradio programmes and techniques to respond toconflict. By using its own indigenously developedforms of behavior-change communication, TDShas created what evaluators have labeled “IntendedOutcomes Journalism” (IOJ), or common ground

journalism, in which radio programmes aredesigned to actively prevent and respond toongoing conflicts.

Three critical “essentials” of the studio’s designhave helped create TDS’ unique approach andmade it possible to deliver high quality mediaconflict interventions on a regular basis:

1. The de-sanctification of objective journalism:TDS began its life by publicly acknowledging thatit was not strictly a news organization andtherefore was not bound by the conceit ofjournalistic objectivity. TDS actively promotesthe position that it is an advocate of peacethrough its radio programmes. Radio outletswere mushrooming in the pre-election period inearly to mid-1997, including Star Radio andRadio Veritas, a station with robust support fromthe Catholic Archdiocese. These stations werein addition to stations owned by politicians andthe Government of Liberia. With so many viablenews outlets with multiple editorial opinions, itwas felt by TDS management that the studiocould play a more dynamic role in Liberia if itcomplemented radio stations to focus less onstraight news and information and more onadvocacy. TDS has been able to build a strong“peace-building” brand in Liberia so thatjournalists and staff from the studio may oftenbe called on to be community facilitators ormediators.

2. Understanding the role of radio and its usefor social change: Many of the principalmanagement and production staff were originallytrained as “development journalists,” andworked in an environment that accepted thatradio programming could and should be usedas a tool for social and economic change. The

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transition to using radio for conflict resolutionand management was a very simple one for thisgroup of skilled personnel, who understood howto prepare educational and advocational radioprogrammes. Further, they were not constrainedor confounded by identities supposedlyconsistent with being “factual” journalists.

3. Talent – the Talking Drum Studio’s ace: Theprincipal strength of TDS is the talent of its staff.Its drama programming is the popularity enginefor the studio. The core members of the radioand live performance drama staff of TDS have along history of success and popularity in Liberia.They write and produce 90 minutes of uniquedrama programming each week. There are no

college degrees among the staff; yet they succeedbecause of their artistic talents. Developmentcommunications “experts” should understand thatin Hollywood a college degree is rare; yetHollywood’s machinery produces the world’s mostpopular entertainment.

Fundamental to the success of TDS has been theinstitutional development of a unique journalisticidentity and approach and the staff’s capacity to buildits own effective brand. TDS staff has used the sameskills to work with the public and government toensure its continued operation and legal standing.TDS therefore remains a continued symbol of hopefor the public in the face of one of the world’s mostoppressive governments.

John Langlois was Director of John Langlois was Director of John Langlois was Director of John Langlois was Director of John Langlois was Director of TTTTTalking Drum Studioalking Drum Studioalking Drum Studioalking Drum Studioalking Drum Studio from Januar from Januar from Januar from Januar from January 1997 to July 1999y 1997 to July 1999y 1997 to July 1999y 1997 to July 1999y 1997 to July 1999

Liberian women being repatriated from the Baala Transit Centre in Guinea.Photo: UNHCR/28295/03.1998/K. Diagne

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b) International radio programmes

International radio programmes may be effective vehicles for peace-building provided producers are aware of the limitations which arisefrom not being locally drawn.

The UNICEF-funded Radio Voice of Peace was designed tosupport the peace-building process in Somalia. One of the firstdifficulties is that the programme was broadcast from studios inAddis Ababa by broadcasters speaking Somali with Ethiopianaccents. The rule that the most effective programmes are locallygenerated was violated. Worse, however, was that the Ogadenwar between Ethiopia and Somalia had not been forgotten bySomalis, therefore making the location of the project whollyimpractical.6

There are other examples, however, of programmes which have beencarefully designed to play on the strengths of internationalbroadcasting.

VOA’s Angola initiative, Angola, Linha Directa, Linha Aberta,was designed to support the Angolan peace process. It provides anational audience with comprehensive news and information fromdiverse perspectives on issues central to Angolans. It entailsthematic programming such as coverage of democratic reforms,conflict resolution, reconciliation, humanitarian information,human rights issues, and economic inequalities. The project wasdesigned to introduce its worldwide audience to the principlesand practices of conflict resolution. For this series, journalistsmove beyond hard news toward production of stories that explorelocal efforts to resolve problems, social relations and individualand group efforts for peace. A core series of 24 documentaryprogrammes in several languages was adapted to the needs ofspecific audiences. It included a lecture series on media and conflictprevention and a workbook on conflict resolution for journalistsreporting in emerging democracies.7

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The BBC World Service operates similar programmes directedtoward local populations through their Great Lakes and SomaliService programmes.

Other international broadcasters such as Deutsche Welle, RadioFrance International, and Radio Netherlands are also involved inassistance and training programmes for local journalists. The aim isto help in the creation of pluralist, independent, and impartial mediain developing countries, countries in transition to democracy, andzones of conflict. In this way, programming can have the advantagesof local perspectives in local languages that can lead to credible andsustainable media projects for and by local populations.

2. Innovative uses of video

a) Video diaries

Between 1990 and 1994, more than 2000 people died in ThokozaTownship outside Johannesburg in pre-election violence betweenthe African National Congress and the Inkatha Freedom Party. Afterthe election, tension continued to simmer between the two groups,threatening to erupt at any moment. The Simunye Video DialogueProject was set up to promote dialogue through video.

The work was facilitated by Phillip Visser who describes how videowas used to promote dialogue:

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“Simunye translates as ‘we are one’ and this is a project that hasdrawn political adversaries together through the use of hand-heldvideo cameras. The two main peace builders within the processare two commanders who were former rivals, Thabo Kwaza ofthe ANC and Wiseman Ndebele of Inkatha. After consulting withthe community it was decided to use video as a tool to open aspace for dialogue between those in conflict. Thabo and Wisemaneach took a video camera and made a film of their interpretationof the conflict, its causes, and the suffering that both sides hadendured.

“The first layer of dialogue occurred within and between thefilmmakers as people and within the partisan groups. Having beentrained in video making and conflict handling, Thabo andWiseman began to shoot scenes, conduct interviews and recordthe stories of suffering and the hopes for the future as seen by thepeople from ‘their side’.

“The next step was the ‘cross-over’: Thabo and Wiseman had toshow their films to each other to create a joint film. What wasseparate had to become one, in a small but symbolic process forthe community. If we could get two former commanders to talk,perhaps it was possible to get others to talk, listen and understandeach other as people and as groups, while holding on to theirseparate identities.

“Though the reconciliation process was initially fraught, theThokoza community came to the conclusion after watching thevideo and discussing it, that it was only political rhetoric thatwas dividing their community and that everyone longed for peace.Following this process cross-community groups were set up tomediate on some of the key problems that had divided them,including housing provision. A community newspaper SimunyeNews was the result.” 8

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This imaginative initiative illustrates a number of pointers for asuccessful media peace-building intervention:

● It was local, and jointly mounted by trusted representatives ofboth communities.

● There was a partnership with an outside organization(Wilgespruit Fellowship Center), which worked very hard atgaining trust to help the mediation process.

● It provided a communication tool to promote dialogue, to“humanise” the opposing sides and thereby to help thereconciliation process.

In addition, the video served as an emotional catharsis for a highlytraumatised community. The production was part of an ongoingprocess aimed at easing tension between the two sides, not an isolatedevent which in itself would probably have achieved little.

For Phillip Visser there were clearly identifiable payoffs from thevideo-making process. These include:

1) Creating the capacity to record a collective history. The filmshowed the people of Thokosa that they have one history, andthey share a future.

2) Structuring the conflict. The visual forum helped people grapplewith identified issues and brainstorm solutions.

3) Providing an emotional catharsis for the highly traumatisedcommunity.

4) Assisting with relationship building.

5) Keeping pace with the community, reflecting issues importantto them and following their own agenda.

6) Serving as a substitute, rather than an official, process for dealingwith the past (as opposed to the Truth Commission9 which wasnot trusted by many in the community).10

Another important lesson learned from the Simunye dialogue projectis that video cannot be used in isolation. It can stimulate and challengebut must be used in tandem with other peace-building initiatives topromote community dialogue.

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Another interesting example of the use of video stems from the NGOInternews’ video project in Northern Ireland whereby young schoolchildren were filmed talking about their experiences in the Catholic/Protestant debate. The film aimed to show the effect of war on thoseindividuals who grow up in conflict areas. Although generally wellreceived by the viewing audience, the film does illustrate one of thedangers of working with video: highly visible throughout hercommunity after the film was show, one girl was threatened withviolence because of her views.

One of the problems of video dialogues, as indeed with many othermedia conflict intervention projects, is that their impact has not beenmeasured systematically. There are as yet no widely acceptedindicators of “success”. Intervening with a video diary project is adelicate business which has to be carefully organized, otherwise itrisks becoming an exploitative process.

b) Dramatisations

Apart from using video as a documentary tool, it can also make aneffective medium to dramatise real situations. This might beparticularly useful in situations where showing the identity ofindividuals on film could endanger them. Dramatisations are alsouseful for illustrating “what-ifs” and showing the potentialrepercussions of actions taken to either worsen or improveconflictual relationships.

Dramatisations may be used also to help lead communities to reachsettlements over conflicts by adapting behaviour similar to thecharacters in the story.

The Water Wars, a drama with local people made in 1996 inMozambique, focuses on recent conflicts within the communityand family unit. It tells four inter-linked stories of people in atown and their everyday struggles. Producer Brigitte Bagnol saysshe made the film as a response to a difficult situation: it wasimportant for people living in the towns to know the true state ofpoor water conditions in rural areas. “I wanted to show the warsafter the war, including the water war, and the gender war.”11

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The film sought to strengthen the importance of communityinvolvement in borehole maintenance by allowing ordinary peopleto have a voice. As a tool for peace-building, the Water Wars aimedto illustrate how the same issue can adversely affect everyone evenwithin the same family and therefore, finding solutions has benefitsfor everyone equally. Another strength of this approach was that itfocused on a small conflict within the context of the larger conflictin Mozambique. It demonstrated how conflicts can be resolved onestep at a time. 12

c) Video as an eye-witness

In Rwanda tens of thousands of accused perpetrators of the genocidehave been lingering in overcrowded prisons for years, waiting fortrial. Again, a wronged population is seeking justice, and some wouldsay revenge, for the deaths of hundreds of thousands. Putting peopleon trial for atrocities in Rwanda has been a difficult exercise. Besidesthe International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha,traditional local courts, called gacaca, are being set up in communitiesacross the country. If justice is to lead to reconciliation, thenRwandans must keep abreast and understand the legal and socialprocess being undertaken – a challenge in a country with anunderdeveloped media scene and high level of illiteracy. Six yearsafter the genocide, the work of these legal systems has yet to reachthe everyday lives of Rwandans. With this background, Internewshas begun production of Genocide on Trial, an innovative multi-stage media project which aims to improve the credibility of therule of law in Rwanda and lay the foundation for a genuinenationwide dialogue on justice.

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The Internews project begins with the production of The ArushaTapes, a one-hour video compilation of the critical movements ofthe first five years of the Arusha Tribunal. It then continues withpublic screenings of the tape across Rwanda. The responses ofthose audiences will be incorporated into The Arusha Tapes toculminate in a feature-length documentary called Genocide onTrial. This film will then be shown across Rwanda using a specialvideo-equipped van. Audience feedback, including videotapedinterviews with audience members, will then be integrated intoregular newsreels that Internews will produce, and showthroughout the country.

The aim of the interviews is that when people watch the newsreelsthey will learn what people from different regions, other thantheir own, are saying about the process of justice in Rwanda.

Interviewing displaced village headman in the Jejjah area of Eritrea.Photo: Panos Pictures/Heldur Netocny

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Genocide on Trial incorporates several of the prerequisites foreffective peace-building programmes, including:

● placing heavy emphasis on audience feedback;

● providing a vehicle for facilitated discussion about traumaticevents;

● working in close partnership with local organizations;

● co-ordinating with already existing reconciliation programmes.

By providing the basis for nationwide dialogue on the Rwandanconflict, the Internews project serves as a mechanism to promotereconciliation and long-term peace-building. It helps give a voice tothose ensuring prosecution of war-crimes and serves as a witness tothe process. Above all, it responds to the dilemma that in order forjustice to be meaningful, Rwandans need to have the opportunityto witness and understand the trials of those suspected of beingbehind the genocide. With video serving as the eyes of the Rwandanpopulation, it is hoped that the justice sought in Arusha will helpbring about a lasting reconciliation and peace in the region.

3. Drama

In many conflict areas, the thirst for entertainment is often neglected.Drama can play several roles: apart from providing a vehicle for thedissemination of peace-building themes, it can also help distract thelocal audience. This respite from their daily realities can become animportant part of the life of many listeners and viewers.

Drama is a favourite medium for peace-building programmes for anumber of reasons. As it is fictional, it can provide a vivid depictionof the realities of war without naming names and threatening thosein power. It provides an all-important “neutral space” in whichpeace-building options can be explored. Satire and humour can beused to maintain audience interest. Peace-building themes – such aswar causing suffering to civilians rather than fighters – can bereiterated time and again in a drama setting without boring theaudience.

The thirst forThe thirst forThe thirst forThe thirst forThe thirst forentertainment isentertainment isentertainment isentertainment isentertainment isoften neglected inoften neglected inoften neglected inoften neglected inoften neglected inconflict situationsconflict situationsconflict situationsconflict situationsconflict situations

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a) Radio

There are issues and stories which are too sensitive to put on air, orwhen subjects need to retain their anonymity. Radio dramas cancommunicate such experiences safely and powerfully. In KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa, a radio drama produced by VulekaProductions on the “taxi wars” has the production team workingwith local people to develop story-lines which are credible. Theteam then tests the pilot dramas on listeners before the final edit andbroadcast. In this way, the peace-building messages of theprogrammes remain contemporary and therefore more relevant tothe listening audience.

Developing drama as a means of reducing tension can be a laboriousprocess, yet if it is successful, its impact can be impressive. Severalbenefits appear to be emerging from the practice of using drama insupport of peace and reconciliation. These include:

Listening to BBC focus on Africa, Sierra Leone.Photo: Panos Pictures/Jon Spaull

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● giving voices to the “voiceless and marginalised”;

● engaging important stakeholders in the peace process – forexample, major financial institutions have sponsored peace-oriented dramas in Sri Lanka;

● mobilizing, motivating and guiding audiences toward positiveand pro-social actions;

● contributing to the rehabilitation of forms of creative expressionand other cultural practices;

● producing “cultural share-ability” – this means that dramasproduced in one context can be used effectively in other culturalcontexts;

● helping reduce “donor fatigue” by applying multi-methodevaluation strategies to demonstrate effectiveness;

● providing opportunities for closer collaboration with theresearchers and practitioners in the academic and artisticcommunities;

● contributing to the use of entertainment genres to promote andsupport pro-social change and development.

Search for Common Ground’s experience in Burundi hasdemonstrated that radio drama is particularly suitable for countriesthat have an oral/aural tradition. Studio Ijambo has been producinga radio soap opera that aims to break down stereotypes. Thisprogramme benefits from the credibility of Studio Ijambo, but hasdeveloped a faithful listenership on its own.

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“Our Neighbours, Ourselves”: Drama in Burundiby Francis Rolt

Studio Ijambo believes it is important to maintainpressure on the population at large, to encouragethem to think for themselves, and to avoidstereotyping the other ethnicity. A bi-weekly soap,Umubanyi Niwe Muryango (Our Neighbours,Ourselves) has an average audience of 85% ofthe population. The story-line makes it plain thatthe two main families involved are of differentethnicities, but the listener never knows which iswhich. So either or both sides can be seen to beat fault. Another such programme is InkingiY’Ubuntu (Pillars of Wisdom) which is about Hutuswho saved Tutsis, and Tutsis who saved Hutusduring the years of crisis (alternate weeks).Sometimes it incorporates more contemporaryheroes and heroines, such as the members of amixed women’s association in a starkly divided

part of the capital, or women of different ethnicitieswho have managed to maintain their self-help linksdespite numerous attacks on both sides.

One of the main tools used in conflict resolutionis to get people to put themselves in the perceivedenemy’s shoes. In Inkingi Y’Ubuntu, and in manyother programmes, Studio Ijambo journalists tryto do this, to make interviewees (and so listeners)think about the other ethnicity’s hopes and fears.Not everyone can do it, and sometimes the StudioIjambo team even have to remind each other notto generalise, to step back from blaming all Tutsisor all Hutus for a recent murderous attack. Itusually works though, and the studio, as well asbeing a source of reliable information, is a modelof co-operation.

Francis Rolt is Director of Francis Rolt is Director of Francis Rolt is Director of Francis Rolt is Director of Francis Rolt is Director of Studio IjamboStudio IjamboStudio IjamboStudio IjamboStudio Ijambo

Burundian schoolgirls outside their classroom in Bujumbura.Photo: UNICEF/95-0256/Howard Davies

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One of the advantages of using drama is that it can discuss issuesthat are simply too controversial to tackle outright.

A traditional means of settling family or clan feuds in Afghanistanis for the wronged party to accept a woman from the family ofthe perpetrator of the crime. The woman is then married into thefamily, but will often lead a miserable life as she is a constantreminder of the man who has wronged the family, in many casesthe person who has killed a family member. This inhumanepractice to women is still considered to be an effective way ofpreventing deaths through long-running blood feuds. The BBCradio soap opera New Home New Life featured this practice(known as “bad”) in a story-line. Research showed that itgenerated a great deal of interest amongst listeners as this was apractice which was well known but very rarely questioned.Interestingly, for the first time it appeared to become anappropriate topic of conversation between husbands and wives,as it could safely focus on the fictional characters of the radiodrama. The practice of “bad” was increasingly questionedthroughout the country. At the end of 1998, about a year afterthe storyline was broadcast, it was banned by the Talibanauthorities.13

The significance of this example is that the drama provided a safe“neutral space” in which an obviously unacceptable practice couldbe debated. It also highlighted social behaviour which was withinthe power of communities to influence.

If New Home, New Life’s story-lines have been able to influenceits audiences, it is because it has achieved a great deal of authorityand respect amongst its listeners. Research has shown that NewHome, New Life has been successful because people identify withthe characters. The programme attempts to repeat the same keymessages without being boring and to create role models. At thesame time, audiences are encouraged to discuss the key themes ofthe soap opera through listeners’ letters, which attest to their levelof involvement. The programme tries to link the local village wherethe story takes place with a national peace-building process. Included

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among such themes are: child soldiers, prisoners of war, and theloss of a family member who was a soldier.

b) Video and television

The aim of Nashe Maalo, a television drama produced by Searchfor Common Ground – Macedonia (SCGM) is to defuse tensionsby challenging ethnic stereotypes and prejudiced attitudes amongstthe new generation. Nashe Maalo is designed as “curriculum-basedprogramming”, that is, it has a specific learning objective. Accordingto SCGM, curriculum-based programming is useful in situationswhere the cause of the conflict is constant (such as ethnic perceptions)and not changing rapidly over time. The themes vary according tothe “curricular goals” that any particular episode is intended toachieve.

To promote the series, Common Ground Productions recentlyproduced a music video that features the children starring in theseries along with pop music stars from different ethnic groups. Thiswas the first time that these musicians ever performed together.11

The following guidelines focus on how to develop dramaprogramming to support and promote peace and reconciliationinterventions.

Staffing:

● In establishing the creative teams, build upon local culturaltraditions and practices. Pay attention to oral traditions.

● Select personnel who are known, credible, and have reputationsas popular storytellers. This helps to draw and maintainaudiences. In establishing the creative teams, ensure that theyinclude representatives of the groups engaged in the conflict.

Training:

● Expose members of the team to training in drama-writingtechniques, for example, how to write cliffhangers.

● Expose members of the creative team to training in conflictresolution and peace-building practices.

Build upon localBuild upon localBuild upon localBuild upon localBuild upon localcultural traditionscultural traditionscultural traditionscultural traditionscultural traditionsand practicesand practicesand practicesand practicesand practices

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Script development:

● Base themes on careful research. There is a range of methodsthat can be used in this process: needs assessments, writers’meetings, focus group discussions, key informant interviews,semi-structured interviews, consultations with technicaladvisers.

● Pay attention to ethical implications. Ensure that the “story” iscorrect. Ensure that you have the dynamics of the conflict right.

Message development:

● Research and use participatory methods to ensure that messagesare relevant and rest upon a solid moral foundation. Maintainactive contact (through local staff and other approaches) withaudiences to ensure that the language used is relevant.

● Ensure that production values (e.g. music) are contemporary.

● Be responsible when dealing with “dangerous themes.”

Women in sound recording studio, Phom Penh.Photo: Panos Pictures/Sean Sprague.

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● Use satire cautiously. Satire can be dangerous. Satire requiresan appreciation of audience sophistication. Embed the satire ina character.

● Use humour cautiously. Humour can build audience loyaltybut it can have a “boomerang effect”. Embed the humour in acharacter. Use empathetic themes. This can also build audienceloyalty.

● Encourage “intertextuality” – linkages with previous dramasor other “texts” in the cultural context.

● Demonstrate the mutual benefits that will be derived from thepeace process. Ensure that “messages” are translatable intoaction.

● Develop other communication materials that can complementthe drama intervention. For example: magazine radioprogrammes and print materials in Afghanistan are producedto support the New Home, New Life drama. Remember somedrama interventions can have another life in another medium,such as street theatre.

Research:

● Undertake formative research. Participatory approaches canenrich the content of the dramas and build audience loyalty.

● Share research methods, findings and conclusions with the widercommunity.

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Nashe Maalo – Youth television in Macedoniaby Eran Fraenkel

In 1999, Search for Common Ground-Macedonia(SCGM) launched Nashe Maalo, a three-yeartelevision programme for children (ages 8-12) onintercultural understanding, conflict preventionbased on greater cultural awareness, and teachingof conflict-resolution skills. Nashe Maalo differsfrom SCGM’s other projects in its character as“intended outcome” media. Using a researchmodel developed by Children’s TelevisionWorkshop for Sesame Street, SCGM createdNashe Maalo as an entertaining vehicle to conveyeducational objectives of tolerance, trust, andpositive conflict-resolution skills-building.Combining attractive television production withcurricular goals, Nashe Maalo has become perhapsthe most widely-watched programme inMacedonia, with an audience of 76% of all childrenand 50% of their parents.

Nashe Maalo has episodes that look specificallyat cultural practices and how misinterpreting themcan lead to conflict. Mali has a Little Lambjuxtaposes the Muslim celebration of Bayram withthe Macedonian Orthodox celebration of Easter.

Other shows look at specific stereotypes that existamong members of one community regardinganother. The Necklace is based on the commonstereotype that Roma are thieves and shows howmaking decisions based on this stereotype hasnegative repercussions.

The idea underlying all of this, in terms of peace-building, is that the greatest need to be addressedamong children in Macedonia is lack of knowledgeabout each other. Conflicts arise most commonlydue to ignorance, which feeds the most commonemotion felt here: fear. Fear and suspicion need tobe overcome if we want kids to begin building trust,and on that trust a peaceful future for themselves.Therefore, bridging the cultural ignorance chasmis the show’s first challenge. The second is to showkids that greater cultural awareness is a necessaryprecondition for conflict prevention. If I understandyou and your ways of living, I am less likely toreact negatively since I know WHY you do whatyou do.

Eran Fraenkel is the Director of Search for Common Ground – MacedoniaEran Fraenkel is the Director of Search for Common Ground – MacedoniaEran Fraenkel is the Director of Search for Common Ground – MacedoniaEran Fraenkel is the Director of Search for Common Ground – MacedoniaEran Fraenkel is the Director of Search for Common Ground – Macedonia

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Rwandan refugee children wait in line to be vaccinated, Benaco Camp, Tanzania.Photo: UNICEF/94-0071/Howard Davies

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SECTION FOUR: MEASURING IMPACT

Section Four:Measuring Impact

A major problem with media projects is that it is difficult todetermine indicators of success. Humanitarian programmes can beevaluated to determine whether information reached the targetaudience. But is it really possible to know whether the programmeitself helped save lives?

Even so, media projects make sense only if they achieve the intendedimpact on the audience. Therefore, successfully evaluating this impactis likely to be one of the most challenging elements of the overallproject. Is evaluating the impact of media designed to prevent conflictsimply an exercise in trying to measure the immeasurable?1

Even though undertaking evaluations in humanitarian and crisissituations clearly poses problems these should not be seen asobstacles, but rather as challenges. The most obvious is that inemergency situations the collection of data may be fraught withdifficulty. Particularly daunting in refugee situations, for example,may be determining whether a sample of the population isrepresentative of the overall audience, some of whom may beimpossible to reach.

Media projects will be concerned with two types of evaluation:formative (which identify directions to take in programme design,format, content and scheduling) and summative (which aim todetermine how well a programme succeeds in measurable outcomes).

The aim of this section is not to provide guidelines on how to evaluatemedia projects. Rather it is simply to acquaint readers with some ofthe ideas currently circulating about various evaluation approaches.It is hoped that this will incite more creative reflection on how bestto measure the impact of media projects in conflict areas.

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CaptionPhoto:

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CHAPTER X: PARTICIPATORY MONITORING AND EVALUATION

Chapter X:Participatory monitoring and evaluation

In 1998, Media Action International commissioned a study onmethodologies for the assessment of media-based programmes. Theaim was to compile a simple tool kit to guide programme makers inthe development of monitoring and evaluation strategies fordevelopment-oriented media projects. The findings are also relevantfor humanitarian and peace-building programmes.

The study, written by Andrew Skuse, focused on the use ofindicators and stressed the need for participatory monitoring andevaluation. Participatory means that there is a process of dialogueduring which communities work together to identify mutuallyacceptable approaches or solutions to problems. The Skuse studybegan with the following premises:

● Many media producers often have an unclear or undevelopedunderstanding of their audiences.

● Within the communication process the weakest point is oftenthe amount of feedback derived from audiences.

● The goal of effective communication is to build links betweenmedia producers and their audiences, enabling a continuousform of broadcast assessment and improvement to occur.1

The Skuse study stresses the need to consider evaluation as anongoing learning process whereby the programme producersconstantly gauge the reaction of the audience to the programmesand use this information to produce better and more relevant content.In his report Dr Skuse cites research that states:

“Evaluation is not about establishing ‘certainties’, or even about‘proving’ anything. Rather, it is a process, which helps us see moreclearly what it is we are doing, and the nature of the issues beingconfronted. It is a ‘way of seeing’.” 2

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The success of humanitarian and post-conflict programming dependson ensuring that the audience needs and preferences are thoroughlyreflected in the programme output. Hence, participatory monitoringand evaluation become the basis on which the programme isdesigned, developed and constantly adapted.

The model below suggests that projects should aim for an ongoingprocess of learning. The goal of this strategy is to create a virtuouscircle in which the needs of audiences and the impact of broadcastsbecome a form of permanent assessment.

This simple schema illustrates a central theme in this guide: namely,production of programming is part of a cycle that is determined bythe needs and attitudes of the target audience. The audience’s reactionto the programmes determines how the content is developed andadapted.

The Skuse study also recommends a shift from emphasis onquantitative methodology to qualitative assessment. Reliance onstatistical data serves primarily to determine the popularity of theprogramme, but offers little guidance about how to alter theprogramme to better reflect the needs and interests of the audience.

Media production and consumption circuit

Media productionand consumption

circuit

Broadcast

Consumption

Audience evaluation

Production

▲

▲

1

2

3

4

▲▲

SuccessfulSuccessfulSuccessfulSuccessfulSuccessfulprogrammesprogrammesprogrammesprogrammesprogrammesreflectreflectreflectreflectreflectaudience needsaudience needsaudience needsaudience needsaudience needs

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Ondas Imaginativasby Lina Holquin

In this project, local radio producers sought topromote positive images of their neighbourhood,a place previously associated with violence, drugsand prostitution. Further, they wanted to create adialogue that raised the issue of domestic violenceand the problems of young people. To promotetheir ideas they used urban transport as acommunication mechanism, supplying cassettesto transport workers who played them to theirpassengers, something of a captive audience.Later, this strategy was strengthened via a weeklymagazine radio programme called La Voz del Barrio(The Voice of the Neighbourhood). In order tounderstand their goals for programming and theiraudience, a simple strategy was developed inwhich these young producers initiated a groupdiscussion that sought to identify “who they were”

in terms of age, work, gender and lifestyle, as wellas their fears, aspirations and dreams. Also, theparticipants portrayed their own best friends withinthe community in similar terms. As young people,these programme producers sought to understandthemselves as a way of understanding theiraudience. The second part of the exercise was toget the participants to imagine the programme thatthey would most like to hear, including broadcaststyle, format and content. This process helpedOndas Imaginativas identify its own programmegoals and, to an extent, its own biases in a simplemanner. Having the producers ask ‘‘who they are’‘and ‘‘what they want’‘ provided an initial evaluation.It must be stressed, however, that it is equallyimportant to ask audience members these samequestions.

Lina Holquin is a communications specialist working in Latin AmericaLina Holquin is a communications specialist working in Latin AmericaLina Holquin is a communications specialist working in Latin AmericaLina Holquin is a communications specialist working in Latin AmericaLina Holquin is a communications specialist working in Latin America

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Frequently, audience engagement with mass media has been criticisedfor being overtly passive, with listeners or viewers cut off fromproducers and the ability to reply. Simple participatory media-monitoring and evaluation strategies could play an important rolein transforming this aforementioned passivity into meaningfuldialogue between media producers and consumers. Furthermore,participation would allow previously disempowered sections of anygiven organization or community to help define their own needs,goals and aspirations, as well as contribute to the definition of projectneeds, goals and aspirations.3

The process of giving a voice to the audience need not be complicatedor academic. The work of young radio producers working inBucaramanga, Colombia, is an example of how gathering audiencereaction can translate into a simple participatory monitoring andevaluation exercise (see page 170).

Working in conflict areas can raise important problems related toparticipatory methods of evaluation. The most obvious is thatsecurity considerations or mobility issues may limit access to theaudience. Even so, audience feedback should still be obtainablethrough the convening of small focus groups, even if the scope andmake-up of those groups is limited. This crucial exercise will helpeliminate many of the assumptions that are present in conflictsituations, and ensure that projects reflect the real information needsof the audience.

Give a voice toGive a voice toGive a voice toGive a voice toGive a voice tothe audience tothe audience tothe audience tothe audience tothe audience toeliminate manyeliminate manyeliminate manyeliminate manyeliminate manyassumptionsassumptionsassumptionsassumptionsassumptions

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Afghan women and children.Photo: UNICEF/J. Hartley

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CHAPTER XI: DEVELOPING INDICATORS

Chapter XI:Developing indicators

Establishing indicators (benchmarks by which a project can bemeasured) is an essential component of evaluation, yet often difficultin conflict situations. Indicators will help determine whether theprogramming has had an impact on the audience and whether itmay have made the audience change its opinions and eventually itsbehaviour. This is particularly important in programmes that aimto promote peace by encouraging the audience to alter its perceptionsof the “other”.

Developing indicators from the outset of a project can help guideinformation programmers in the management of their projects.Trying to predefine a set of generic indicators, however, is risky aseach media project will need its own set of specific benchmarks,relevant only to its locality and culture. Predefined indicators arelikely to ignore the local peculiarities of the conflict and lead toheavily skewed results as a consequence. Instead, programmeproducers will need to establish their own ideas of “what is importantfor us” and also establish from their audience “what is importantfor them”.

Even so, there are enough common aspects of humanitarian andpeace-building programmes to offer guidance to programmeevaluators. This was the aim of an exercise undertaken by MediaAction International in 1998 when it designed a set of indicators tobe used to measure the impact of media projects aimed at preventingconflict.1

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1. Media profile

A simple manner to determine whether programmes have a chanceto achieve their objectives is to carefully consider the media’s profile.The following are a key series of questions to be examined to helpdetermine whether or not the target audience is being reached andtheir information needs are being met.

Do programme producers have possession of key audience data?Has the project done its homework and learned enough about theaudience to ensure that programming is well targeted? This includesdemographic information, as well as preferences for programmingformats and airtimes. Without this essential data, even if collectedrapidly in crisis situations, programmes are hampered from theoutset.

Is the programme reaching a significant enough number of peopleto have an impact? In a crisis situation providing programming toa small portion of the population may not have enough impact toactually warrant the investment. Also, it is not unusual to find mediaprogrammes in emergency or refugee situations concentrated inurban areas (often the capitals) with rural areas left with aninformation deficit.

Can the audience actually hear (or see, or read) the programmes?Are the programmes broadcast to an audience which has access toradios, for example? And if not, have steps been taken to ensurethat this situation is rectified, by distributing radios for example?Are newsletters being printed for a largely illiterate population? Doesthe information campaign focus on television when only minuteportions of the population actually have access to television? Theseare all fairly obvious queries, but crucial. Knowing the capacity ofthe intended audience to receive the information programming isan essential component of needs assessment. During monitoringand evaluation exercises, it is important to ensure that the situationhasn’t changed because of population movements, or breakdownsin infrastructures.

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Does the programming reach the key players – on both sides –especially for peace-building programmes? It has been repeatedlyemphasised that for humanitarian and post-conflict programmes tobe successful they must not be seen as belonging to one faction orthe other. The location of the offices of the project may thereforebecome an important issue.

Does it reach influential members of the community, especiallyopinion leaders? The strategy of targeting opinion leaders may becrucial in many societies.

Are the programmes broadcast at the right time? An initial needsassessment will determine the best time to broadcast programmes,but in a fluid situation, such as mass migration, these times maychange. For example, in Albania, Project SPEAR began broadcastingthe radio programme, In the Name of Humanitarianism, at1800 hours every evening. Several months into the refugee crisis,the Kosovar government-in-exile launched a daily news bulletin onAlbanian television at the same time. It was necessary to reschedulethe humanitarian radio programmes to a more suitable time. Thescheduling time was determined by a monitoring exercise with asample group of the audience.

Are the programmes presented in a manner that indicates athorough understanding of the audiences’ preferences? The hateradio station, Radio Television Milles Collines in Rwanda, wasinitially a major success because it drew in its audience through thebroadcasting of popular Zairian music while the national Rwandanstate radio played boring and unpopular music. Radio TelevisionMilles Collines’ programming was entertaining and upbeat. Theprogrammers thoroughly understood the style of programmes whichthe audience preferred and used this to their advantage. The samemust hold true for humanitarian and peace-building programmes.Again, knowing the audience’s tastes – in music and programmeformat – and responding to those likes and dislikes will make all thedifference in achieving successful programming.

The above list of questions can provide the basis for developing asimple set of indicators to determine whether the profile of the mediabeing used in the project is appropriate. Evaluators will need toadjust questions to suit specific circumstances.

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2. Understanding the conflict

As mentioned throughout this guide, undertaking research aimedat identifying root causes of a conflict and specific attitudes andbehaviour is a fundamental step to take prior to launching a project.Therefore, programming should reflect the results obtained duringthe initial research. Indicators would include:

Does the programming reflect a clear understanding of the keycauses of the conflict? Of course, there may be a multitude ofexplanations presented for causes of the conflict, but programmingshould ensure that these are included in the content in order torespond to the perceptions of the target audience.

Have potential connectors been identified? Does programmingemphasise the connectors that link adversaries in a thoughtful andthought-provoking manner?

Is programming linked to ongoing conflict resolution processeswithin the community? Programming which is considered part ofthe community is more likely to impact on the audience, particularlyif conflict resolution processes are locally generated.

Has “common ground” between the adversaries been identified?Does programming focus on those areas where adversaries are inagreement and build upon that common ground?

Undoubtedly, each project will develop indicators specifically relatedto the circumstances at hand. The above are simply suggestions onwhich to design an appropriate strategy.

3. Media approach

A third category of indicators relates to an effective media approachto peace-building. There are a number of principles applied to themedia in health education that could also apply to media projects inhumanitarian and peace-building. These include:

Does programming take a positive approach? Not “If this conflictcontinues there will be untold misery for everyone” but rather, “Ifa ceasefire is agreed, there will be valuable business opportunitieshere which will benefit everyone”.

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Is there a concentration on key messages? Messages must becarefully selected, and be directly linked to the peace-buildingapproaches identified in the initial research. For example, if one ofthe strategies is to concentrate on “connectors”, does theprogramming offer enough room for development of this theme?

Are the messages regularly repeated? Programming should providean opportunity to repeat key messages again and again but not inboring and predictable ways. How often are some of the messagesrepeated? Does the audience remember the messages?

Is the programming entertaining? Nothing is more likely to negatethe positive effects of careful research and planning than messagesand programmes delivered in stale and dull formats. Does theaudience appreciate the way in which the programme is presented?

Is the programming interactive? Getting a dialogue going withthe audience will reinforce the pressure for peace that the vastmajority usually favours. Radio can do this through vox-pops, orphone-ins. When listeners participate in programming, throughhaving their letters read on the air, for example, the more likely itwill be that audience loyalty will be built.

Is there a multi-media approach? The greater the number of mediaacting together, the greater the impact is likely to be. A radio campaigncan be backed up by a poster campaign… a video presentation maybe followed by a series of radio programmes discussing the video.These are all likely to increase the impact of the programmes.

Has an incentive for peace been thoroughly explored inprogramming? Programming should regularly cite clear, immediateand tangible benefits for the target audience. Does the programmingencourage the audience to consider how they personally, and societyas a whole, might benefit from a peaceful resolution of the conflict?

The above indicators are designed to help project managers andevaluators establish their own evaluation strategies based on a fewcommon approaches. Again, however, it should be noted that theseindicators should be developed at the start of a project. Theevaluation process serves to determine whether the programmingfollowed through with its intent. It is hoped that these indicatorswill make the task of “measuring the immeasurable” a bit easier.

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Evaluating Operation Lifeline Media – – – – – Mozambiqueby Nicola Harford

In Mozambique, Media Action Internationaldesigned a project to improve information servicesto affected people shortly after the floods ofFebruary 2000. The main activities included thedistribution of over 7000 Freeplay clockwork/solarpowered radios, and a daily half hour programmeNdhambi (Flood) broadcast by an EmergencyBroadcasting Unit set up within RadioMozambique. The programme focused initially onthe immediate information needs of the affectedpopulation and the response of government andaid agencies to their plight.

The challenge in this situation was to assess theimpact of a relatively short-lived intervention – lessthan four months after distribution of radiosstarted and broadcasts began. The main objectivesat this stage were two-fold: (1) to assess theeffectiveness of distributing radios to be used ascommunity assets through multiple agenciesworking on the ground; and (2) to gather audiencefeedback on Ndhambi to be used to guideprogramme-making for the remainder of theproject lifetime. The evaluation objectives andmethodology were based on the original projectdocument but adapted to reflect the reality ofimplementation. Stakeholders including RadioMozambique, Freeplay Foundation, the Ministryof Health, UNICEF, WHO, World Food Programmeand ICS (Community Radio) were invited tocontribute their ideas to the design process.Giventhe constraints of time, finance and personnel, alargely qualitative approach was taken using focus-group discussions as the main tool for elicitinginformation. The different groups that werecontacted in the flood-affected areas had thefollowing characteristics: rural resettled people,rural returnees, people still living in rural

accommodation centres or in close proximity, andreturnees living in peri-urban areas. In addition,for control, rural returnees were interviewed inareas where radio distribution had not taken place.A checklist guided the discussions and findingsfocused on the following main areas:

Group listening to Freeplay radios: we wereparticularly interested to learn whether the conceptof a radio as a community asset had beenconveyed and practised, and how this wasmanaged. We found that over 85% of the radioshad been distributed to affected communities bypartner organizations working on the ground butthe main difficulty was in getting detailed feedbackfrom the multiple agencies involved as to thewhereabouts of each radio.The majority of peopleentrusted with keeping the radios understood thatthey were the custodians and not the owners ofthe asset and that it was for community use. Moreimportantly the communities themselvesunderstood this and in many cases had themselvesnominated people they trusted to be responsiblefor the radio.

Comments from many respondents about theinconvenience of going to a central location tolisten suggests that in practice, unless a group isalready meeting or coming together for anotherpre-existing reason, collective listening does notoccur spontaneously.

Radio listening patterns, especially appreciationand perceived benefit of Ndhambi: Ndhambi wasfairly frequently mentioned among theprogrammes people said they listened to on theirown radios or the wind-up radios, but it was notlistened to by all groups using wind-up radios.Ndhambi was liked both for presentation and

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content and was said by many to be valuable inbringing up problems they were facing, as well asbringing news of what was happening in otherareas. Some mentioned specific health informationthat had been of use to them but there was alsoan expressed desire for information on mother andchild health problems, and for the programme to

involve more women as reporters and presenters.People also seemed to have internalised themessage that they should not wait for aid but geton with reconstructing their lives themselves andwanted more emphasis on this, as well as for theprogramme to be closer to them and reflect theirown lives.

Nicola Harford is an independent media researcher based in Harare, ZimbabweNicola Harford is an independent media researcher based in Harare, ZimbabweNicola Harford is an independent media researcher based in Harare, ZimbabweNicola Harford is an independent media researcher based in Harare, ZimbabweNicola Harford is an independent media researcher based in Harare, Zimbabwe

Refugees from Rwanda at the Biaro Camp in Kisangani.Photo: UNHCR/27023/04.1997/R. Chalasani

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A makeshift camp at Amisi providing temporary shelter for Rwandan refugees in Zaire.Photo: UNHCR/270026/01.1997/C. Bowers

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CHAPTER XII: THE RAPID SURVEY METHOD

Chapter XII: The rapid survey method

Evaluating information projects in war zones raises extraordinarychallenges, especially concerning getting proper access to populationson the move.

It is hardly likely that evaluators will have the time or resources tointerview large numbers of respondents. In conflict situations, it islikely that access to the population will be restricted, often bysecurity considerations. Subsequently, Search for Common Ground,and its media wing, Common Ground Productions, which runprojects in some of the most difficult countries in the world,including Liberia, Burundi and Sierra Leone, commissioned thedevelopment of a rapid, low-cost, non-standard survey method. TheRapid Survey Method was created as an acceptable alternative to theuse of textbook quality methods when conducting audience surveysin war zones.1

The survey aims to combine low-cost rapid field data collection inwar conditions, and a minimal need for survey expertise on the partof the evaluation team. The survey was designed to be replicated byother organizations involved in the creation of radio and televisionprogrammes for peacemaking and related activities.

A key factor of the survey is its rapidity. For example, the evaluationprocess below was carried out in Liberia in just two weeks. Itincluded:

1) the writing of the survey questionnaire;2) pre-testing and revision of the questionnaire;3) design and administration of a training course of the local survey

team;4) identification of groups to be sampled, and setting of group

quota sizes;

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5) preparation of survey forms (duplication, and quality checks);6) creation of an audiotape with programme excerpts to be played

to respondents (for radio programmes); similar material fortelevision or print programming;

7) hand processing of data by the local survey team;8) data processing;9) report writing.

The survey consists of three categories of questions that are designedto reveal the effectiveness of any information programme:

1) identification of the amount of listening or viewing during eachhour of the broadcast day – to guide programme schedulingdecisions;

2) gathering of programme reactions and advice from members ofkey stakeholder groups (such as refugees, leaders ofgovernmental and non-governmental organizations, opinionleaders) – to identify strong and weak aspects of the subjectmatter and presentation;

3) measurement of outcomes brought about by the programmesin the categories of knowledge, attitudes and actions – to evaluateprogramme effectiveness.

The Rapid Survey Method is innovative in that it aims to resolve thethorny issue of how to ensure that sample survey groups are reflectiveof the target audience. This is extremely difficult in fluid conflictsituations where one part of the population may be displaced oractively engaged in military activities.

By developing quota samples, the Rapid Survey Method aims toensure respondents are representative of the population.

Quota sampling means specifically that a limited number of audiencecategories to include in the survey are designated. The next stepentails establishing the quota, that is, an exact specified number ofrespondents, to be surveyed in each designated audience categoryand sub-category. For example, an audience category may includewomen refugees with a sub-category being composed of womenrefugees, heads of households. Once categories are designated, thesurvey team must seek out individuals who fit into these categories.

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In a process known as interception point sampling, surveyorsquestion respondents at convenient locations, such as market places,or food distribution centres in refugee camps. Surveyors shouldseek to go to places where they are likely to meet individuals whowill fit into the pre-selected categories. These might include healthcentres for mothers, and schools for children. They then interviewa representative number of individuals within each category. In someprofessional survey organizations, 30 is considered the minimumacceptable sample size for any group whose data will be used eitherfor making a population projection or in making comparisons amonggroups.

The Rapid Survey Method was tested in Liberia, where projectmanagers identified 16 categories, ranging from university students,soldiers, schoolteachers, to housewives, taxi drivers, and farmers.Anywhere between 10 and 40 individuals were interviewed in eachcategory.

Displaced persons at Sarshahi Camp in Afghanistan.Photo: UNHCR/J. Fakhouri/11.1994

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In 1999, an evaluation was undertaken to provide guidance toTalking Drum Studio (TDS)for further programming. The RapidSurvey Method was used, as well as key informant interviewsand facilitated discussions, to map the current state of the civilconflict in Liberia, assess the role of the studio in peace-buildingand to learn about the reach, appeal and effectiveness of theprogrammes.

One of the most interesting findings from the research underlinesthe importance of not making assumptions about an audience’sperception of conflict. For example, the study revealed thatpoverty was one of the top problems people faced as a result ofthe war and there was not enough programming to address thisissue. Interestingly obvious themes, such as ethnicity andtribalism, were considered to be far less important.

Another important finding focused on the role of women in theresolution of the conflict. The survey indicated that women arestill deeply affected by the civil wars. Meeting their needs isessential for making progress towards a stable peace in the country.At the same time, however, the evaluation also indicated thatwomen’s responses were generally less enthusiastic than men’s,leading staff to conduct further research.

The evaluation revealed important details about how the audienceperceived TDS productions. For example, although 74% ofrespondents said they were aware TDS produced programmingon post-war trauma, only 63% found them effective.

There are several questions that may be raised in the application ofthis approach, such as does the sampling procedure include a wideenough range of groups to reasonably represent all the populationor is the sample size large enough to reduce the margin of samplingerror to within tolerable limits? There is also an indication that thissurvey might be most effective in the development of formative ratherthan summative evaluations because the need for statistical rigourwill not be the same.

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That said, the Rapid Survey Method is important because it highlightsthe need for new evaluation tools in conflict areas. It is a anotherstep in the process of recognising that traditional methods ofevaluation which rely heavily on statistical data may be less importantthan qualitative methods for media projects.

The Talking Drum Studio evaluation is interesting in that several ofits recommendations mirror the points made in this publication.These include ensuring that:

● reach of programmes is adequate;

● the needs of all categories of potential audiences are met (forexample, women and children);

● perceptions of the audience as to causes and effects of the warmatch the programming addressing these issues;

● there is consultation with content experts to ensure effectivenessof information on specialised matters such as health.

In conclusion, it is clear that well-conceived evaluation ofprogrammes will lead to better and more effective programming.But it is important to stress that evaluation is an ongoing process,and one that should be considered at the beginning, the middle andthe end of a project.

Much of what is known about the impact of media projects is basedon careful reasoning: if the project follows a strategy proven to beeffective in other arenas (such as health programming), the likelyresult will be similar even if it is impossible to offer statistical datato back up this assumption. As this field grows, it is hoped thatmore effective evaluation tools will be developed, lending credibilityto the notion that media can impact positively on humanitarian andconflict situations.

Evaluate atEvaluate atEvaluate atEvaluate atEvaluate atthe beginning,the beginning,the beginning,the beginning,the beginning,the middle andthe middle andthe middle andthe middle andthe middle andthe end ofthe end ofthe end ofthe end ofthe end ofa projecta projecta projecta projecta project

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Liberian refugees in Guinea are repatriated voluntarily.Photo: UNHCR/28297/03.1998/K. Diagne

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CONCLUSION

Conclusion

Access to relevant and accurate information is increasinglyrecognised as a legitimate need in humanitarian crises. But beyonda simple tool for the empowerment of affected populations, it shouldbe remembered that information is also an entitlement issue. The19th article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights providesfor the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideasthrough any media and regardless of frontiers.

Lifeline Media: Reaching Populations in Crisis was designed as aguide to encourage the development of new media projects to helpensure that this right to information is respected in conflict situations.Its aim is to offer new projects an opportunity to benefit from someof the lessons already learned in the field.

Undoubtedly, the rapidly changing face of technology will offerincreasingly sophisticated opportunities to communicate withpopulations in crisis in the next decade. Digital and satellitetechnology is becoming more affordable, and wireless media willeventually be available to all. Even so, there are likely to be severalfundamental principles which will remain, regardless of the mediumused to reach affected groups.

● Research prior to launching a media project is essential.Understanding the conflict and the audience’s perception of theconflict is key. A better-researched project will be more cost-effective in the end because it will be in an enhanced position tomeet its goals and objectives.

● Working with and through existing local media structures ispreferable to establishing new stations or other infrastructures,unless there are no credible or trustworthy local partners.

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● Local journalists should be trained to report conflict in asolution-oriented manner, and recognise that this is not acontradiction with professional standards of impartiality andobjectivity.

● Evaluation of media projects is a long-term process, whichshould aim to lead to better and more relevant content.

Above all, media projects should aim to consider the target audienceas a partner in the process of developing effective information. It isin this way that media projects have the best shot at succeeding intheir goals, and the need of the population for accurate, and effectiveinformation will best be met.

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ENDNOTES

Endnotes

Section One: Designing programmes for populations in crisis

Chapter I1 Tanner, Fred (2000) Lecture to School for International Training, World

Metereological Organisation, October.2 Handbook on War and Public Health, International Committee of the Red Cross

(undated): 380.3 Harris, P. and Ben Reilly (ed.) (1998) Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict:

Options for Negotiators, IDEA, Stockholm: 9.4 Maynard, Kimberly (1999) Healing Communities in Conflict:International Assistance

in Complex Emergencies, New York: Columbia University Press: 37.5 Accessed through «www.worldbank.org» December 12, 2000.6 Tanner, Fred (2000) Lecture to School for International Training, World

Metereological Organisation, October.7 Di Lorenzo, Amanda and Céline Meyroud (1998) Media and Conflict Prevention

Seminar Notes, Conflict Prevention Network, Brussels: 8.

Chapter II1 Unpublished needs assessment in Kosovo (1999) Media Action International, July.2 Adapted from: Mody, Bella (1992) Talking to Development Bankers: Extension

Workers Speak Up, Development Communication Report, No.79: 8.3 Skuse, Andrew (1998) Media in Development: Towards a Toolkit in

Communication, Monitoring and Impact Assessment Methodologies. ICHR-RadioPartnership, Geneva: 2.

4 Morgan, D.L. (1997) Focus Groups as Qualitative Research 2nd Edition, London:Sage: 12.

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5 Refugee Policy Group (1997) Summary of the Symposium on Communication withAffected Populations in Humanitarian Emergencies. June 31 and July 1.

Chapter III1 Piotrow, Phyllis Tilson, D. Lawrence Kincaid, Jose G. Rimon II, and Ward Rinehart

(1997) Health Communication: Lessons from Family Planning and ReproductiveHealth. Center for Communication Programs, Johns Hopkins School of PublicHealth. Praeger, Westport, Conn.: 27.

2 de Frossard, Esta (1996) How to Design and Produce Radio Serial Drama forSocial Development: A Script Writer’s Guide, Center for Communication Programs,The Johns Hopkins University School of Public Health: 4.

3 Interview with Bashkim Ramadani, Editor in Chief of Qeshu, Rini, Qeshu radioprogramme in Pristina, Kosovo, September 18, 2000.

4 Interview with Edward Girardet, Editor of Crosslines Global Report, November 16,2001.

5 For more background information on Radio Agataysha, see Domeniconi, MarcoRadio Agatashya: a victim of politics? in Crosslines Global Report, May/June 1997,Vol. 5, No. 3, Issue 29:52-53.

6 The Times leader, “Playing at peace”, 17 July 1992.7 Bennett, George (1999). Promoting the Humanitarians in Crosslines Global Report,

Number 34, September-October: 19-20.

Chapter IV1 Burke, Adam (1999) Communications and Development: a practical guide.

Department for International Development, London:2 Matic, Veran. Media and Security: Ration frequencies and satellite channels as a means

of conflict prevention and resolution. Radio B92, unpublished report; undated.3 UNICEF (2000) accessed through «www.unicef.org/vietnam/comu001.htm»,

20 November 2000.4 Burke, Adam (1999) Communications and Development: a practical guide.

London: Department for International Development: 67.5 World Development Indicators database (2000) accessed through

«www.worldbank.org», 22 November 2000.

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ENDNOTES

6 UNHCR, Review of UNHCR Mass Information Activities. Inspection andEvaluation Service. «www.unhcr.ch/evaluate/reports/98mass.htm»Accessed 6 December 1998.

7 Girard, Bruce, from the seminars, Mixed Media (Medios Enteros) and ConvergingResponsibility, presented to the UN TV Forum, 16-17 November 2000, New York.

8 Contribution by Francis Rolt, Director of Studio Ijambo, Search for CommonGround (2001).

9 Adapted from Meyer, Paul (2000) Making Better Use of Technology in HumanitarianCrises, The Markle Foundation, New York Sept 26: 4-5.

10 Zimmerman, Hans (1998) Telecommunications in the Service of HumanitarianAssistance. International Civil Defense Journal, Vol. XI : 1 April: 20-24: 10-11.

11 Meyer, Paul (2000) Making Better Use of Technology in Humanitarian Crises,The Markle Foundation, New York Sept 26: 4-5.



14 Ibid.15 Interview with Craig Duncan of ReliefWeb, 13 November 2000.16 Burke, Adam (1999) Communications and Development: a practical guide.

Department for International Development, London: 81.

Section Two: Humanitarian information programmes

Chapter V1 IFRC (1998) The Sphere Project: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in

Disaster Response, Geneva. Chapter 1, Appendix 1: 25.2 Personal experience of author in Kosovo, July 1999.3 Handbook of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (1994)

Geneva: flyleaves.4 Results from unpublished Media Action International survey carried out in July

1999.

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5 Interview with World Health Organization by Malcolm Green, November 16, 2000.

Chapter VI1 Piot, Peter (2000) HIV/AIDS in Complex Emergencies – A Call for Action. Health

in Emergencies Issue 7, 30 September, Department of Emergency and HumanitarianAction, World Health Organization: 1.

2 Maynard, Kimberly A. (1999) Healing Communities in Conflict: InternationalAssistance in Complex Emergencies, Columbia University Press, New York: 53.

3 Adapted from Handbook on War and Public Health, International Committee of theRed Cross, Geneva (undated).

4 This was a BASICS-USAID training workshop project carried out in Bamako,Mali in 1998 that brought together local radio programmers and officials from healthservices to carry out a radio spot campaign on maternal health issues. The main focuswas on ensuring that a longer-term working relationship was established betweenhealth experts and communicators.

5 International Rescue Committee (2000) The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children,Children Affected by Armed Conflict Unit, IRC brochure.

6 Draisma, Frieda (1995) Psychosocial Support for Children Healing through Play.Maputo: Mozambique Red Cross.

7 Ressler, Everett M., Tortorici, Joanne Marie, Marcelino, Alex. (1993) Children in War:A Guide to the Provision of Services, A Study for UNICEF, New York, NY: 93.

8 Adam, Gordon. Unpublished research on Media and Conflict. Media ActionInternational, October 2000: 18.


10 Adam, Gordon, and Skuse, Andrew (2000) Working with the Media in Conflicts andOther Emergencies, London: DFID: 32.

11 For more information, consult Psychosocial Distress in Ressler, Everett M., Tortorici,Joanne Marie, Marcelino, Alex. (1993) Children in War: A Guide to the Provision ofServices, A Study for UNICEF, New York, NY: 165-207.

12 Gupta, Leila. (1997) Healing the Invisible Scars. Crosslines Global Report, Volume 5.No.1:12.

13 Jareg, Elizabeth and Pal (1994) Reaching Children Through Dialogue. Radda Barnen,Macmillan Press: 50-53.

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ENDNOTES

14 Psychosocial Assistance for Children Affected by Armed Conflict Geneva (1999)International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies: 42.

15 International Save the Children Alliance (1996) Promoting Psychosocial Well-BeingAmong Children Affected by Armed Conflict and Displacement: Principles andApproaches. Working Group of Children Affected by Armed Conflict andDisplacement, November: 9-19.

16 Draisma, Frieda, Psychosocial Support for Children Healing through Play.Maputo: Mozambique Red Cross, 1995.


18 For more information consult Cohn, Roberta, Refugee and Internally DisplacedWomen: A Development Perspective, Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute.

19 Seifert, Ruth, War and Rape: Analytical Appraches (1993) Geneva: Women’sInternational League for Peace and Freedom: 1.

20 Adam, Gordon and Nicky Harford (1998) Health on Air: A guide to creative radiofor development. Health Unlimited, London: 57.

21 Adapted from CIDA (1984) Women in Development: Policy Framework, CIDA,Ottawa.

22 WHO (undated) Towards the Healthy Women Counselling Guide. Ideas from theGender and Health Research Group. UNDP/World Bank/WHO: 38.

23 Accessed from «www.icrc.org/eng/family_ties» on 8 November 2000.24 Interview with Olga Villarrubia, Deputy Head of the Central Tracing Agency,

on 7 November 2000.25 Meyer, Paul, Making Better Use of Technology in Humanitarian Crises (2000)

New York: The Markle Foundation, September: 26.

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Section Three: Media projects for peace-building

1 Mayo, John. (1993) The Third Channel, Broadening Learning Horizons.UNICEF unpublished report.

2 Accredited to Phillips Davison. Cited by Kirk Wolcott of the Carter Center,Conflict Resolution Program, in unpublished research commissioned on behalf of theStrengthening Lifeline Media research project of Media Action International, 1999.

3 Adam, Gordon. Media and Peacebuilding. Unpublished research. Media ActionInternational, October, 2000: 1.

4 Ibid.

Chapter VII1 Adam, Gordon. Media and Peacebuilding. Unpublished research. Media Action

International, October, 2000: 9.2 Ibid.3 Adapted from unpublished research by Kirk Wolcott of the Carter Center,

Conflict Resolution Program, on behalf of the Strengthening Lifeline Media researchproject of Media Action International, 1999.

4 Onadipe, Abiodum and David Lord (1998). African Conflict and the MediaConciliation Resources. «www.c_r.org/occ_papers/af_media/contents.htm»Accessed on 8/12/00: 3.

5 Harris, Peter and Ben Reilly (1998) Democracy and Deep-rooted Conflict: Options forNegotiators. International IDEA, Stockholm: 40.

6 This approach is adapted from “Analysing Conflict” in Harris, Peter andBen Reilly (1998). Democracy and Deep-rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators.International IDEA, Stockholm: 38-41.

7 Adapted from Halpérin, Daniel S. (ed.) (1997). To Live Together: Shaping NewAttitudes To Peace Through Education. UNESCO: International Bureau ofEducation, France: 39.

8 Leavitt, Robert, Robert Manoff and Milica Pesic (1999). The ReportingDiversity Network to prevent conflict, Crosslines Global Report, Number 34,September-October: 21.

9 Ibid.: 21-2410 Interview with Milica Pesic on November 16, 2000.

195

ENDNOTES

11 Harris, Peter and Ben Reilly (1998). Democracy and Deep-rooted Conflict: Optionsfor Negotiators. International IDEA, Stockholm: 45–46.

12 Manoff, Robert (1998). Role Plays: Potential media roles in conflict prevention andmanagement. Track Two Vol. 7, No.4, December: 15.

13 These guidelines were established at the Lifeline Media conference in South Africa,1996. They are contained in the final report prepared by Media Action International.

14 Adam, Gordon. Media and Peacebuilding. Unpublished research. Media ActionInternational, October, 2000: 8.

15 Wolfsfeld, Gadi. (2001). The News Media and Peace Processes: The Middle East andNorthern Ireland. United States Institute of Peace:14.

Chapter VIII1 Adam, Gordon. Media and Peacebuilding. Unpublished research. Media Action

International, October, 2000: 5.2 Common Ground Productions (1998). Impact Summary: Talking Drum Studio.

Unpublished report: 2.3 Galtung, Johan (1998). High Road, Low Road: Charting the course of peace

journalism, Track Two. Vol. 7, No. 4, December: 7-10.4 Lynch, Jake (2000). Using Conflict Analysis in Reporting, Conflict and Peace

Forums, Taplow Court, Buckinghamshire. Unpublished paper.5 Report on the Proceedings of the Roundtable Consultation on Media and War-

Affected Children. Vancouver 26-27 May 2000. Prepared for IMPACS by SuzannaHarvey: 11.

6 Lynch, Jake (1998). The Peace Journalism Option Conflict and Peace Courses.Transcend Peace and Development Network, Taplow Court, Buckinghamshire, UK.

7 Botes, Johannes (1998). Dialogue of the Deaf. Track Two. Vol. 7, No. 4,December: 6.

8 Ibid.: 46.9 Siebert, Hannes and Melissa Baumann. On the borderline of conflict. Rhodes

Journalism Review, December 1999 (3): 38-39.10 Adam, Gordon. Media and Peacebuilding. Unpublished research. Media Action

International, October, 2000: 5.

196


Chapter IX1 Presentation to the Lifeline Media Conference, Cape Town, South Africa, 1998.2 Presentation to the Lifeline Media Conference, Cape Town, South Africa, 1998.3 Windborne, Janice. (1997) The Media and Human Rights in Africa. Unpublished

research. Ohio University: 19-20.4 Adam, Gordon. Media and Peace-building. Unpublished Research. Media Action

International, October 2000: 10.5 Windborne, Janice. (1997) The Media and Human Rights in Africa. Unpublished

research. Ohio University: 19-20.6 Adam, Gordon. Unpublished research. Media and Peace-building, October 2000: 9.7 Ibid.8 Visser, Philip (1998). Simunye Dialogues: Using video to heal and rebuild.

Track Two. Vol. 7, No.4, December: 32-34.9 After decades of apartheid in South Africa, the country undertook a process of

catharsis based on the belief that seeking truth was a first step to reconciliation. Thereaction of South Africans to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, however,was quite mixed with many people believing that a commission did not have the rightto absolve supporters of the apartheid regime on behalf of the entire population. Thethirst for justice was strong, and many believe too few perpetrators of human rightscrimes in South Africa have been properly punished.

10 Visser, Philip (1998). Simunye Dialogues: Using video to heal and rebuild.Track Two. Vol. 7, No.4, December: 34.

11 Discussion with the author. Cape Town, South Africa. December, 1998.12 Ibid.13 Adam, Gordon. Media and Peace-building. Unpublished research. October 2000: 8-9.14 Common Ground Productions (2000) Nashe Maalo Music Video.

«www.cgponline.org/productions/CTW/initial_page.htm»Accessed on 14 November 2000.

197

ENDNOTES

Section Four: Measuring impact

1 Skuse, Andrew (1998). Media in Development: Towards a Toolkit in communication,monitoring and impact assessment methodologies. ICHR-Radio Partnership,Geneva: 1.

Chapter X1 Skuse, Andrew (1998). Media in Development: Towards a Toolkit in communication,

monitoring and impact assessment methodologies. ICHR-Radio Partnership,Geneva: 6.

2 Ibid: 7.3 Skuse, Andrew (1998) Media in Development: Towards a Toolkit in communication,

monitoring and impact assessment methodologies. ICHR-Radio Partnership,Geneva: 11.

Chapter XI1 This entire section is adapted from Adam, Gordon and Loretta Hieber Towards

an Evaluation and Assessment of the Media’s Role in Conflict Prevention (1998)Media Action International . Unpublished.

Chapter XII1 This section is adapted from Palmer, Edward L., Ph.D. The CGP Rapid Survey

Method: A New Survey Tool for Broadcasters in War Zones (1998) Common GroundProductions. Unpublished.

198


199


Glossary

International Committee of the Red CrossInternational Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent SocietiesInternational Rescue CommitteeMedia Action InternationalNon-governmental OrganisationOrganization for Security and Cooperation in EuropeSearch for Common Ground in MacedoniaSearch for Common GroundRadio France InternationalTalking Drum StudioUnited Nations Children’s FundUnited Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural OrganisationUnited States Agency for International DevelopmentVoice of America

ICRCIFRCIRCMAINGOOSCESCGMSFCGRFITDSUNICEFUNESCOUSAIDVOA

200


201

CONTACT LIST

Contact List

AMARC World Association of Community Radio BroadcastersInternational Scretariat3525 Boulevard St. Laurent, Bureau 611Montreal, Quebec, Canada H2X 2T7Tel: 1-514-982—0351www.amarc.com

BBC World Service TrustRoom 102 NE Bush HousePO Box 76 Strand, London WC2B 4PH, UKTel: 44 (O)20 7557 2013Fax: 44 (0)20 7379 1622www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/trust

Center for War, Peace, and News MediaDept. of Journalism and Mass Communications NYU418 Lafayette St. Suite 554New York, NY 10003, USATel: 1 212 998 7960Fax: 1 212 995 4143www.nyu.edu/cwpnm

Conciliation ResourcesPO Box 21067London, N1 1ZJ, UKTel: 44-207-359-7728www.c-r.org

Disaster Management CenterCranfield University RMCSShrivenham, Swindon SN6 8CA, UKTel: 44 179 378 5287Fax: 44 179 378 5883www.rmcs.cranfield.ac.uk/dmc

202


Fondation Hirondelle3, Rue Traversiere,CH 1018 Lausanne, SwitzerlandTel: 41 21 647 2805Fax: 4121647 4469www.hirondelle.org

Freeplay Foundation56-58 Conduit St.London WIR 9FD, UKTel: 44 207 851 2600Fax: 44 207 851 2675www.freeplayfoudation.org

Johns Hopkins University Center for Communications Programs111 Market Place, Suite 310Baltimore, MD 21202, USATel: 1 410 659 6300Fax: 1 410 656 6266www.jhuccp.org

IMPACS - The Institute for Media, Policy and Civil SocietySuite 910, 207 West Hastings StreetVancouver, British Columbia, V6B 1H6, CanadaTel: 1-604-682-1953www.impacs.org

International Committee of the Red Cross19 Avenue de la PaixCH 1202 Geneva, SwitzerlandTel: 41 22 734 6001Fax: 41 22 733 2057

International Federation of Journalists266 Rue Royale1210 Brussels, BelgiumTel: 32-2-223-2265www.ifj.org

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent SocietiesChemin des Crêts1209 Geneva, SwitzerlandTel: 730-42-22

203

CONTACT LIST

INTERNEWSP.O. Box 4448Arcata, CA 95518, USATel: 1 707 826-2030Fax: 1 707 826-2136www.internews.org

Media Action InternationalVilla de Grand Montfleury,Versoix 1290, Geneva, SwitzerlandTel: 41 22 950 0750Fax: 41 22 950 0752www.mediaaction.org

Media Peace CentreEarlgo Building, 3rd FloorCnr Kloof and Park StreetsCape Town 8002, South AfricaTel: 27-21-244402Fax: 27-21-2444402

The Panos Institute9 White Lion StreetLondon N1 9PD, UKTel: 44-207-278-1111www.oneworld.org/panos

Search for Common Ground1601 Connecticut Ave.N.W. Suite 200Washington, DC 20009, USATel: 1 202 265 4300Fax: 1 202 232 6718www.sfcg.org

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)Case postale 2500CH-1211 Geneva 2 Depot, SwitzerlandTel: 41 22 739 8943Fax: 41 22 739 73 92

204


United Nations Childrens’ Fund (UNICEF)3 United Nations PlazaNew York, NY 10017, USATel: 1 212 326 7000Fax: 1 212 887 7465

World Bank Post-Conflict UnitConflict Prevention and Reconstruction Program1818 H Street, NWWashington, DC 20433 USATelephone: 202-473-4163Fax: 202-522-1699E-mail: [email protected]

205

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Adam, Gordon. 2000. Unpublished research on Media and Conflict. Media ActionInternational.

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Lifeline Media: Reaching populations in crisis: A - PreventionWeb