Liberty to Abode_cases

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PASEI vs Drilon Case Digest

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS VS.

DRILON

G.R. NO. L-81958

JUNE 30, 1988

FACTS: The Philippine Association of Service

Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) challenges the Constitutional

validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, ofthe Department of Labor and Employment, in the

character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE

TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF

FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in

this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically,

the measure is assailed for "discrimination against

males or females;" that it "does not apply to all

Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and

females with similar skills;" and that it is violative of

the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalidexercise of the lawmaking power, police power being

legislative, and not executive, in character.

In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes

Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution, providing

for worker participation "in policy and decision-

making processes affecting their rights and benefits as

may be provided by law." Department Order No. 1, it

is contended, was passed in the absence of prior

consultations. It is claimed, finally, to be in violation of

the Charter's non-impairment clause, in addition to

the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI members

face should the Order be further enforced.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Department Order No. 1 in

nature of the police power is valid under the

Constitution?

HELD: In the light of the foregoing, the petition must

be dismissed.

As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed

validity. In the absence of clear and convincing

evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically

stands.

The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why

the contested measure should be nullified. There is no

question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to

"female contract workers," but it does not thereby

make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is

well-settled that "equality before the law" under

Constitution does not import a perfect Identity

rights among all men and women. It admits

classifications, provided that (1) such classificati

rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germa

to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confin

to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to

members of the same class.

The Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that

befallen our female labor force abroad, especi

domestic servants, amid exploitative work

conditions marked by physical and personal abuse.

precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights,

Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitati

In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains

Government's efforts.

The same, however, cannot be said of our m

workers. In the first place, there is no evidence thexcept perhaps for isolated instances, our men abro

have been afflicted with an identical predicame

Suffice it to state, then, that insofar as classificatio

are concerned, this Court is content that distinctio

are borne by the evidence. Discrimination in this c

is justified.

There is likewise no doubt that such a classificatio

germane to the purpose behind the measu

Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the protect

for Filipino female overseas workers" this Court

no quarrel that in the midst of the terr

mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroa

ban on deployment will be for their own good a

welfare.

The Order does not narrowly apply to exist

conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply indefinit

so long as those conditions exist. This is clear from

Order itself ("Pending review of the administrat

and legal measures, in the Philippines and in the h

countries . . ."), meaning to say that should

authorities arrive at a means impressed with a grea

degree of permanency, the ban shall be lifted.

It is incorrect to say that Department Order No

prescribes a total ban on overseas deployment. Fr

scattered provisions of the Order, it is evident t

such a total ban has not been contemplated.


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The consequence the deployment ban has on the right

to travel does not impair the right. The right to travel

is subject, among other things, to the requirements of

"public safety," "as may be provided by law. Neither is

there merit in the contention that Department Order

No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative

power. It is true that police power is the domain of

the legislature, but it does not mean that such an

authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have

mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the

Department of Labor and Employment with rule-

making powers in the enforcement whereof.

The non-impairment clause of the Constitution,

invoked by the petitioner, must yield to the loftier

purposes targeted by the Government. Freedom of

contract and enterprise, like all other freedoms, is not

free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction,

where laissez faire has never been fully accepted as a

controlling economic way of life.

This Court understands the grave implications the

questioned Order has on the business of recruitment.

The concern of the Government, however, is not

necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the

ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as

a result of Government regulation. The interest of the

State is to provide a decent living to its citizens. The

Government has convinced the Court in this case that

this is its intent. We do not find the impugned Orderto be tainted with a grave abuse of discretion to

warrant the extraordinary relief prayed for.

Marcos Vs. Manglapus Case Digest

Marcos Vs. Manglapus

177 SCRA 668

G.R. No. 88211

September 15, 1989

Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus andprohibition asking the court to order the respondents

Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel

documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate

members of his family and to enjoin the

implementation of the President's decision to bar

their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that

the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines

is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections

1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without

power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses

because only a court may do so within the lim

prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their ri

to travel because no law has authorized her to do so

They further assert that under international law, th

right to return to the Philippines is guarante

particularly by the Universal Declaration of Hum

Rights and the International Covenant on Civil a

Political Rights, which has been ratified by

Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the pow

granted by the constitution, the President (Aqui

may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to

Philippines.

Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual ri

involved is not the right to travel from the Philippi

to other countries or within the Philippines. These

what the right to travel would normally connoEssentially, the right involved in this case at bar is

right to return to one's country, a distinct right un

international law, independent from although rela

to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declarat

of Human Rights and the International Covenant

Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom

movement and abode within the territory of a sta

the right to leave the country, and the right to en

one's country as separate and distinct rights. What

Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedommovement and residence within the borders of e

state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarant

the right to liberty of movement and freedom

choose his residence and the right to be free to le

any country, including his own. Such rights may o

be restricted by laws protecting the national secur

public order, public health or morals or the separ

rights of others. However, right to enter one's coun

cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be theref

inappropriate to construe the limitations to the ri

to return to ones country in the same context as th

pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right

travel.

The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode a

the right to travel, but it is a well considered view t

the right to return may be considered, as a gener

accepted principle of International Law and under

Constitution as part of the law of the land.


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The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or

with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the

return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family

poses a serious threat to national interest and

welfare. President Aquino has determined that the

destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses

would wipe away the gains achieved during the past

few years after the Marcos regime.

The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and

therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines,

the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Silverio v. CA

Facts:

The instant controversy stemmed from the settlementof estate of the deceased Beatriz Silverio. After her

death, her surviving spouse, Ricardo Silverio, Sr., filed

an intestate proceeding for the settlement of her

estate.

On November 16, 2004, during the pendency of the

case, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a petition to remove

Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as the administrator of the

subject estate. On January 3, 2005, the RTC issued an

Order granting the petition and removing RicardoSilverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate, while

appointing Ricardo Silverio, Jr. as the new

administrator. On January 26, 2005, Nelia S. Silverio-

Dee filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order

dated January 3, 2005, as well as all other related

orders.

On May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order

ordering Nelia Silverio-Dee to vacate the premises of

the property located at No. 3, Intsia

Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. She received a copy of

the said Order on June 8, 2005. Instead of filing a

Notice of Appeal and Record on Appeal, private

respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the

Order. This motion for reconsideration was denied in

an Order dated December 12, 2005. This Order was

received by private respondent on December 22,

2005. On January 6, 2006, private respondent filed her

Notice of Appeal while she filed her Record on

Appeal on January 23, 2006.

Thus, on April 2, 2007, the RTC issued an Or

denying the appeal on the ground that it was

perfected within the reglementary period. The R

further issued a writ of execution for the enforcem

of the Order dated May 31, 2005 against priv

respondent to vacate the premises. Consequen

private respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari a

Prohibition dated May 2, 2007 with the CA. On May2007, the CA issued the assailed Resolution grant

the prayer for the issuance of a TRO.

Issue: W/N the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 20

and the Order dated December 12, 2005

Interlocutory Orders which are not subject to app

under Sec. 1 of Rule 41.

Held: The Orders are interlocutory and thus, can

be appealed.

The denial of due course by the RTC was based on t

(2) grounds: (1) that Nelia Silverio-Dees appeal w

against an order denying a motion for reconsiderat

which is disallowed under Sec. 1(a), Rule 41 of

Rules of Court; and (2) that Nelia Silverio-Dees Rec

on Appeal was filed beyond the reglementary per

to file an appeal provided under Sec. 3 of Rule 41.

Petitioner argues that because private respond

filed a Notice of Appeal from the Order da

December 12, 2005 which denied her motion

reconsideration of the Omnibus Order dated May

2005, her appeal is of an order denying a motion

reconsideration. Thus, petitioner alleges that priv

respondent employed the wrong remedy in filin

notice of appeal and should have filed a petition

certiorari with the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules

Court instead.

A final order is one that disposes of the subject mat

in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding

action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enfo

by execution what has been determined by the co

while an interlocutory order is one which does

dispose of the case completely but leaves someth

to be decided upon.

Additionally, it is only after a judgment has be

rendered in the case that the ground for the appea


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the interlocutory order may be included in the appeal

of the judgment itself. The interlocutory order

generally cannot be appealed separately from the

judgment. It is only when such interlocutory order was

rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with

grave abuse of discretion that certiorari under Rule 65

may be resorted to.

In the instant case, Nelia Silverio-Dee appealed theMay 31, 2005 Order of the RTC on the ground that it

ordered her to vacate the premises of the property

located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City.

On that aspect the order is not a final determination

of the case or of the issue of distribution of the shares

of the heirs in the estate or their rights therein. The

purported authority of Nelia Silverio-Dee, which she

allegedly secured from Ricardo Silverio, Sr., was never

approved by the probate court. She, therefore, never

had any real interest in the specific property locatedat No. 3 Intsia Road,Forbes Park, Makati City. As such,

the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC must be

considered as interlocutory and, therefore, not

subject to an appeal. Thus, private respondent

employed the wrong mode of appeal by filing a Notice

of Appeal with the RTC. Hence, for employing the

improper mode of appeal, the case should have been

dismissed.

The implication of such improper appeal is that the

notice of appeal did not toll the reglementary period

for the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,

the proper remedy in the instant case. This means

that private respondent has now lost her remedy of

appeal from the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC.

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Liberty to Abode_cases