Lessons From the History of Biological and Toxin Warfare

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12. Lessons from the history of biologicaland toxin warfare

ERHARD GEISSLER, JOHN ELLIS VAN COURTLAND MOON

and GRAHAM S. PEARSON

I. Introduction

This chapter compares and evaluates the information from earlier parts of this

volume dealing with national biological and toxin weapon (BTW) programmes

and then draws conclusions regarding the relevance of the pre-1945 experience

to current arms control and disarmament problems. Section II explores whystates performed BTW activities (policy and incentives); the extent to which

such activities became known to other states (intelligence successes and fail-

ures); the degree to which internal forces accelerated these programmes (organ-

ization and research and development, R&D); and the extent to which coopera-

tion and coordination functioned within alliances.

Section III focuses on the lessons drawn from history which could be useful

to current diplomatic efforts to strengthen the 1972 Biological and Toxin

Weapons Convention (BTWC) with a verification protocol.1 These lessons are

especially relevant given the post-1975 admitted violations of the BTWC andIraq’s advanced BTW programme before and after the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

As this analysis demonstrates, the history of biological warfare is obscured

and complicated by false allegations, unfounded suspicions and the repeated

difficulties of separating what is true from what is false. This task is especially

difficult in regard to biological warfare attacks before 1914 because of the scar-

city of documentary evidence, the unreliability of witnesses and the fallibility of

human memory.2 Moreover, the prevalence of naturally occurring epidemics

which accompanied warfare before the 20th century makes it difficult to distin-

guish deliberate intent from natural outbreaks. Despite the spectacular modern

advances in microbiology, the problem of identifying the origins of an epidemiccontinues. For example, although some of the charges directed against Germany

in regard to World War I biological warfare sabotage are well documented,

others remain unverified.3 It is known that in World War II Japan was the only

major belligerent to use BTW in both sabotage and military operations.4

Although charges were made by Germany that BTW sabotage was performed

by Polish and Russian resistance groups in occupied territory, and counter

allegations were made against Poland by the Soviet Union, it is impossible to

gauge whether these attacks took place.5

1 The text of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BTWC) is reproduced inGeissler, E. and Woodall, J. P. (eds), Control of Dual Threat Agents: The Vaccines for Peace Programme,SIPRI Chemical & Biological Warfare Studies, no. 15 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1994),pp. 243–45; and on the SIPRI Internet web site at URL <http://www.sipri.se/cbw/docs/bw-btwc-texts.html>.

2 See chapter 2 in this volume.3 See chapter 3 in this volume.4 See chapter 7 in this volume.5 See chapters 6 and 8 in this volume.



256 BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS

Subsequently, during the cold war, accusations were directed against the US

forces in Korea and against the USSR and its allies operating in South-East

Asia and Afghanistan. These claims have been repeatedly refuted and never

proven. The problem of verification remains.A number of caveats are necessary regarding the following historical analysis.

Soviet records are still largely unavailable. All conclusions regarding the BTW

activities of the USSR are therefore tentative. Moreover, the World War II

archives of the Western Allies and Japan are still not totally accessible because

of continuing security restrictions. Finally, a number of French, German and

Japanese documents were destroyed during or immediately after the war. As in

all historical evaluations, what follows is the clearest picture that the authors

can untangle from the available record.

II. Historical analysis

National policy

Before World War I use of biological agents in warfare was sporadic and infre-

quent. It was limited to measures designed to gain an immediate advantage over

an enemy: the poisoning of wells, the hurling of cadavers and wastes into

besieged cities, and the use of infected blankets. It is almost impossible to

determine the effectiveness of these operations, which were designed to harass,

decimate or weaken an opponent. Since recorded incidents of biological andtoxin warfare are few and isolated and since most of them took place before the

rise of states, it is not possible to characterize them as national policy.6

By 1914 the norm against the use of poisoned weapons had been established

by customary law, reinforced by the writings of international jurists. It was

codified in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. The prohibition was well

understood. It was embodied in the codes adopted by the military staffs of the

major nations. The 1902 German General Staff Handbook, for example, con-

tained a prohibition against the use of poisoned weapons and the deliberate

propagation of infectious disease. However, in World War I Germany, and pos-sibly France, undertook biological warfare sabotage, skirting their own prohibi-

tions by targeting animals and sparing humans. Suggestions that biological

weapons (BW) should be used against human targets in the United Kingdom

were emphatically rejected by German military leaders.7

The introduction of chemical warfare against military forces in World War I,

in contravention of the Hague Convention of 1899 prohibiting the use of

asphyxiating and deleterious projectiles charged with gas, had a major effect on

subsequent disarmament and arms control efforts. During the inter-war period

(1919–39), the prohibition against the use of poisonous weapons, chemical and

bacteriological, was strengthened by the widespread adoption of the 1925Geneva Protocol which outlawed ‘the use in war of asphyxiating or poisonous

or other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare’.8 By 1939 the major

6 See chapter 2 in this volume.7 See chapter 3 in this volume.8 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of

Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva 17 June 1925, entered into force 8 Feb. 1928. Thetext of the protocol is reproduced on the SIPRI Internet web site at URL <http://www.sipri.se/cbw/docs>.



LESSONS FROM BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WARFARE HISTORY 257

powers (except Japan and the United States) had ratified the Geneva Protocol:

Germany, Italy and Poland without reservation; France, the UK and the USSR

with stipulations reserving the right of retaliation and confining the pledge of

‘no first use’ to the parties to the protocol. US policy was implicitly bound bythe international norm against the first use of BTW and by the opposition of the

executive branch to initiation of chemical and biological warfare. Japan, which

initially supported a total ban on chemical and biological weapons (CBW), left

the League of Nations in 1933 as it moved towards increasing militarization.

Since the Geneva Protocol was a contract, violation by one party automatic-

ally freed the other party from any obligation to the transgressor. This under-

lying condition was emphasized at the beginning of World War II. At that time

France and the UK reaffirmed their intention of abiding by the protocol while

emphasizing that their restraint was conditioned upon reciprocity: ‘it will of

course be understood that in the event of the enemy not observing the restric-tions which the governments of the United Kingdom and France have thus

imposed on the operations of their armed forces these Governments reserve the

right to take all such action as they may consider appropriate’.9 The German

Government replied that it would adhere to the Geneva Protocol as long as its

enemies did.10 The strength of the protocol was reinforced by the almost

instinctive revulsion evoked by biological warfare. This revulsion facilitated the

addition of a prohibition against BW to the original proposed text of the proto-

col which confined itself to chemical weapons (CW).11 If possible sabotage

operations are excluded, all of the major belligerents in World War II, exceptJapan, adhered to the no-first-use prohibition of the Geneva Protocol.

This moral and diplomatic stricture was reinforced by other factors: personal,

organizational, political and technical. National leaders played an important

role. In Germany Adolf Hitler barred biological and toxin warfare preparations

except for defensive purposes.12 Hitler remained tenaciously opposed to bio-

logical warfare throughout World War II and did not permit offensive bio-

logical warfare preparations. Although US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, for

reasons of security, never issued any warning against BW use by the Axis

Powers, it can be assumed that his warnings regarding initiation of gas warfarecovered BW.13 Although willing to consider the initiation of chemical warfare

against Germany and pushing strongly for biological and toxin warfare pre-

paredness, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill regarded BW as a weapon

of retaliation in kind, not for initiation.14 Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin’s attitude

is unfathomable, although it is doubtful that he wanted to get into a biological

9 Quoted in Kordt, E., ‘Aufzeichnung des Vortragenden Legationsrats Erich Kordt (Büro RAM) vom3. September 1939’ [Notes of the speaker, Deputy Head of the Foreign Minister’s Office Erich Kordt(Büro RAM) from 3 Sep. 1939], ed. P. R. Sweet, Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik 1918-1945[Files on German foreign policy, 1918–1945] , Aus dem Archiv des Deutschen Auswärtigen Amtes, serieD (1937–45), Vol. 7: Die letzen Wochen vor Kriegsausbruch. 9. August bis 3. September 1939 [The lastweeks before the outbreak of war, 9 Aug.–3 Sep. 1939] (Imprimerie Nationale: Baden Baden, 1956),pp. 447–48.

10 Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 1938–39, vol. 114, p. 1058, quoted by Bothe, M., Das völker-rechtiliche Verbot des Einsatzes chemischer und bakteriologischer Waffen [The prohibition under inter-national law against the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons] (Carl Heymans Verlag: Cologne,Bonn, 1973), p. 182.

11 See chapter 4 in this volume.12 See chapter 6 in this volume.13 See chapter 11 in this volume.14 See chapter 9 in this volume.




warfare ‘duel’ with Germany. Military leaders were generally unenthusiastic

regarding BTW although they supported such programmes once political

leaders made the decisions.

Organizational restraints were built into the power structure of most of themajor belligerents. In Germany and the USSR the initiation of biological war-

fare required Hitler’s and Stalin’s permission, respectively.15 In the UK the con-

sent of the War Cabinet was required; in the USA the agreement of the presi-

dent was necessary.16 Moreover, coalition politics required consultation among

the Western Allies before a decision to use BW could be taken. As British lead-

ers and planners were well aware, the UK and its overseas possessions were

hostages to Axis retaliation. Defence of the civil population against a massive

biological attack was impossible.

The technical constraints against BW use were realized as early as the 1920s

by Germany which recognized that there were two disadvantages to BTW: bio-logical agents were slow acting, and they could boomerang against the user.17 In

the early inter-war period a report by the Temporary Mixed Commission for the

Reduction of Armaments, a constituent organization of the League of Nations,

to the League dismissed bacteriological warfare as impractical, citing the boom-

erang effect and the defence provided by modern sanitation methods against

most traditional forms of BW attack.18 Before and during World War II German

scientists cited these latter difficulties when confronted by the occasional enthu-

siastic proposal for the initiation of biological warfare.19 US scepticism regard-

ing the value of BW, especially given the relative geographical isolation of theUSA, probably delayed any early consideration of a biological warfare pro-

gramme.20

There were, of course, counterforces which could overcome these restraining

factors. Above all, military necessity (Kriegsraison) dictated that if a significant

advantage could be found in the use of a specific weapon, restraint could be

abandoned or prohibitions evaded by drawing distinctions. BW attacks against

animals and supplies had been used to justify German sabotage operations in

World War I; the distinction between asphyxiating shells and cylinders had

been used by Germany, in launching its lethal gas attack at Ypres on 22 April1915, to skirt the prohibitions of the 1899 Hague Conference. In addition,

World War I seriously eroded established rules and distinctions, especially the

prohibition against weapons ‘which would cause unnecessary suffering’. In a

struggle for national existence, all means could be advocated as legitimate.

Most scientists, military and political leaders were united in accepting retalia-

tion in kind.

In World War II there were individuals who argued that moral distinctions

between weapons were meaningless: among them Reichsführer and SS chief

Heinrich Himmler in Germany, and Sir Frederick Banting, creator of the

Canadian biological warfare team. Some of them would have been willing,under certain circumstances, to initiate biological warfare as well as to retaliate.

15 See chapters 6 and 8 in this volume.16 See chapters 9 and 11 in this volume.17 See chapter 6 in this volume.18 See chapter 4 in this volume.19 See chapter 6 in this volume.20 See chapter 11 in this volume.




In the Western democracies, however, the decision-making power did not lie in

the hands of the scientists. Policy remained tied to retaliation in kind.

In Germany, policy in World War II was geared to total prohibition against

offensive BW preparation and use. Although he was powerful, Himmler couldnot overrule Hitler’s policy. In Japan no restrictions existed. A militaristic

regime that was uncontrolled by civilian authority allowed the microbiologist

Ishii Shiro free rein to develop a weapon which Ishii felt could give Japan a

military advantage over nations that were more highly developed and more

powerful. Technical difficulties were obstacles to be overcome or ignored (as

shown by operations during which Japanese soldiers suffered casualties

inflicted by their own biological weapons), not restrictions to be respected. Ishii

enjoyed the support of his superiors. Hideki Tojo, Prime Minister and Chief of

the General Staff, supported the biological and toxin warfare programme

despite his post-war denials; it could hardly have functioned throughout the warwithout his blessing. Whether the Emperor knew about the programme or not

remains an open question.21

Incentives for the development of a BTW programme

In European siege warfare the incentive to use BW agents was probably dic-

tated by the desire to gain a military advantage over a well-entrenched oppon-

ent. In frontier warfare it was devised to defeat and exterminate an enemy seen

as a savage foe to whom the laws of civilized warfare did not apply.22 In WorldWar I the motive behind the German sabotage operations was the disruption of

the supplies and logistical mobility of the Allies.23

In the inter-war and World War II periods, anxiety regarding biological and

toxin warfare activities arose, producing a cycle in which mirror images pre-

dominated. What one nation pursued was paralleled by its foes. Fears were

largely based on recognized vulnerability to BTW attack. The initial impulse

for the BTW programmes of the major World War II belligerents came from

intelligence perceptions. The British, Canadian, French, Soviet and US

endeavours were spurred by belief that other countries, notably Germany, wereengaged in BTW activities.24 These national governments therefore found it

necessary to build a retaliatory capability. German leaders were also concerned

regarding the biological warfare preparations of their opponents. However,

because of Hitler’s policy prohibition regarding biological and toxin warfare the

German programme remained putative.25

The initial incentive in regard to Japan is more complicated. Ishii claimed that

he was attracted to the advantages of biological and toxin warfare by the pro-

hibition in the Geneva Protocol (it must be valuable otherwise it would not be

prohibited), but it is hard to believe that he needed external encouragement for

the development of his programme. In addition, given the virtual independence

of the Army General Staff and Japanese field commanders in Manchuria, Ishii

had the ideal support structure for his programme. He also had no difficulty in

21 See chapter 7 in this volume.22 See chapter 2 in this volume.23 See chapter 3 in this volume.24 See chapters 5, 8, 9, 10 and 11 in this volume.25 See chapter 6 in this volume.




recruiting dedicated subordinates and colleagues who devoted themselves to the

biological and toxin warfare programme out of patriotic or scientific motives.

Although the biological warfare activities were reinforced by fear of Chinese

and Soviet BW use, the dynamism in Japan was largely internal.

26

Fear of the BTW capability of its potential opponents sparked the majority of

the national programmes in the inter-war and World War II periods, but once

the programme was started, it had its own momentum. Internal factors rein-

forced and sustained an interest originally based on a perceived external threat.

The French programme fluctuated according to the state of German–French

relations. However, during the dormant period (1927–34) BTW research was

continued by Professor André Trillat, Director of the Naval Chemical Research

Laboratory (Laboratoire annexe des études chimiques de la Marine) and his

associates although it was maintained on a reduced scale.27 The Soviet

programme was driven both externally and internally by a siege mentalityderived initially from the Russian civil war (1918–20) and repeatedly reinforced

during the Stalinist period (1924–53).

The Soviet leadership feared that the capitalist and fascist nations were devel-

oping BTW capabilities. In the 1920s and first half of the 1930s Jacov Fishman,

the first director of the Soviet Military Chemical Agency (MCA), therefore

received substantial encouragement from the Soviet leadership in developing

his programme. The leadership also claimed that a threat existed from bio-

logical sabotage by Russian saboteurs and foreign agents within the USSR.

These fears and allegations helped to fuel the Great Terror which paradoxicallyweakened Soviet BTW preparedness by targeting its microbiological experts. 28

During World War II, Canada, the UK and the USA built up extensive and

promising BTW programmes. Once the feasibility of the external threat was

accepted, the build up of organizations, facilities and programmes commenced.

These developments were encouraged by prominent political, military and

scientific personalities and carried their own momentum throughout the war

period.29

In conclusion, three factors fuelled the BTW programmes of the major bellig-

erents: first, a perceived threat; second, recognition of national vulnerability tobiological attack and a belief that biological and toxin warfare is feasible and

therefore may confer certain military advantages on any nation that is prepared

to use it; and third, an internal momentum once the political decision had been

taken which encouraged and supported national biological and toxin warfare

programmes.

Intelligence: successes and failures

Accurate and complete intelligence regarding BTW activities is difficult to

obtain and verify. Clues are often lost in a welter of intelligence noise which

obscures the real leads from misleading information. During World War I

British intelligence was able at times successfully to decode German cables

26 See chapter 7 in this volume.27 See chapter 5 in this volume.28 See chapter 8 in this volume.29 See chapters 9, 10 and 11 in this volume.




dealing with planned biological warfare sabotage operations,30 but intelligence

success with respect to BTW is more often the exception than the rule. Inten-

tions are usually invisible and hostile activities are easily concealed in wartime.

In World War II the Axis and the Allied powers misread one another’s inten-tions and failed to get an accurate picture of one another’s programmes. Gen-

erally, both sides misidentified the facilities, the chief agents of interest, the

proving grounds and the personnel of their opponents.

It is now well known that the Western Allies possessed a superior source of

intelligence in two teleprinter ciphers, code-named ULTRA, whereby they were

able to decode German radio messages. Although this source served them well

in compiling enemy orders of battle, gauging enemy battlefield plans and ultim-

ately in winning the Battle of the Atlantic, it did not help them to gain a clear

picture of the German or Japanese biological and toxin warfare programmes.

The US Army World War II chemical and biological warfare historians con-cluded: ‘The findings of the ALSOS Mission provided the first indication that

the truth about German BW activities was considerably at variance with earlier

intelligence reports’.31 US intelligence on Japanese biological warfare activities

was often fragmentary, inaccurate and incomplete.32 Germany was well

informed in regard to French biological warfare activities given its access to

French documents after the 1940 armistice. The accuracy of its information in

regard to the USSR is debatable. On the Western Allies, German sources of

information were scant.33

Intelligence misperceptions regarding the biological and toxin warfare pro-grammes of enemy nations are probably partly the result of the dual-use nature

of pathogens and toxins. It is difficult to determine whether they are being used

for peaceful or for military purposes. For example, botulin and toxoid produc-

tion in Germany was specifically geared to medical research. However, to the

Western Allies, these activities could understandably be interpreted as prepara-

tion for biological warfare. False information, deliberately or accidentally dis-

seminated, can lead to false conclusions. An example of this problem is the

testimony regarding Nazi biological and toxin warfare activities spread by

German émigrés in England and the wide credence given to Wickham Steed’sarticles regarding German tests in the London Underground and the Paris

Metro.34 Finally, although silence and censorship guard sensitive military pro-

grammes, national governments paradoxically often read the open literature as

though it provided a glimpse into enemy intentions. In the inter-war and World

War II period, Canada, France, the UK, the USA and the USSR took the pub-

lications of their opponents seriously.35

In order to gauge the success and failures of biological and toxin warfare

intelligence it is useful, while recognizing the limitations of the information

currently available to the authors of this chapter, to scan the belligerents’ chief

30 See chapter 3 in this volume.31 Brophy, L. P., Miles, W. D. and Cochrane, R. C., ‘Biological warfare research’, United States Army

in World War II, [X.] The Technical Services, Vol. 2: The Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory toField (Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History: Washington, D.C., 1959), p. 114.

32 Harris, S., Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare 1932–45 and the American Cover-Up(Routledge: London and New York, 1994), pp. 162–65.

33 See chapter 6 in this volume.34 See chapters 6, 9, 10 and 11 in this volume.35 See chapters 5, 8, 9, 10 and 11 in this volume.




facilities, chief agents of interest, proving grounds and personnel, and assess the

ones that were successfully identified by their opponents and those which were

totally missed.

Successes

Edgewood Arsenal was the only US facility remotely involved in biological and

toxin warfare work to be identified by Germany. However, its biological war-

fare activity was limited in scope and took place only at the beginning of the

war. In contrast to the almost total ignorance by the belligerents regarding bio-

logical and toxin warfare facilities, there was some accurate information on

agents of choice. As early as 1938 Germany knew that France was working on

anthrax; during the war it successfully identified the British anthrax programme

and the British, Canadian and US interest in botulinum toxin. Germany knewthat the UK performed trials with anthrax spores in Scotland, although it was

not able to identify Gruinard Island as the site. Germany may have correctly

identified the Soviet test site Vozrozhdeniya in Lake Aral as a BTW proving

ground. Ironically, Canada, the UK and the USA correctly identified the

German Raubkammer Proving Ground in the Lüneburger Heath. That iden-

tification may have been based on incorrect reports regarding foot-and-mouth

disease (FMD) tests held on that site during the inter-war period. Regarding

biological and toxin warfare personnel, the USA identified Ishii and many other

Japanese biological warfare experts during the course of the war.

Failures

None of the eight major British, Canadian and US facilities were identified by

German intelligence during World War II. Two US facilities—the Chemical

Warfare Service (CWS) arsenal at Huntsville, Alabama, and the Pine Bluff

Arsenal at Pine Bluff, Arkansas—were erroneously classified as BW plants.

Camp Detrick at Frederick, Maryland; the Naval Research Unit at Berkeley,

California; a CWS test site at Horn Island, Mississippi; Granite Peak Installa-

tion at Dugway Proving Ground, Dugway, Utah; and Vigo Ordnance Plant atTerre Haute, Indiana, remained invisible. Until the defeat of France in 1940

Germany had no knowledge regarding the French BTW facilities. Current

information shows that none of the putative German BTW facilities were identi-

fied by its enemies during the war; moreover, the Western Allies labelled

German facilities engaged in peaceful or defensive enterprises as committed to

BTW offensive operations. They also failed to identify Japanese facilities

although they did gain limited knowledge regarding Unit 731.

During World War II the Western Allies were convinced that Germany

placed high priority on anthrax and botulinum toxin. One of the major alerts of

the war centred around the fear that the V-1 and V-2 weapons would be loaded

with these agents. Actually, Germany paid no attention to the development of

either agent as a weapon of war. The Allies also failed to identify properly or

evaluate Germany’s military interest in FMD and the potential use of the potato

beetle in warfare. Germany incorrectly believed that the Allies were interested

in the military uses of the FMD virus and potato beetles. Moreover, they failed

to detect the French experiments with the latter agent.




Regarding proving grounds, Germany had no intelligence regarding sites used

by the UK in the inter-war period. It did not identify any of the North American

proving grounds. Except for the German Raubkammer Proving Ground, the

Allies erroneously identified certain locations as German test fields, whilemissing the site at Lake Peipus which was used for the German open-air experi-

ments with the FMD virus. Germany remained totally ignorant of Japan’s

biological warfare programme.

Although Germany probably identified some Soviet biological warfare

experts, it did not identify Jacov Fishman as the key figure in the Soviet pro-

gramme although it was fully cognizant of his role in Soviet chemical warfare.

Germany never identified the British, Canadian or US biological warfare scien-

tists. It is also noteworthy, given its alliance with Japan, that Germany did not

know the identity of any of the Japanese biological warfare experts. The West-

ern Allies failed almost totally to identify the German biological warfareexperts, tagging scientists incorrectly as engaged in this work. Heinrich Kliewe,

a leading figure in the German effort, became known to Canada, the UK and the

USA only after they interviewed a French expert in 1944.36

Conclusions regarding intelligence

Biological and toxin warfare R&D is always an exceptionally difficult intel-

ligence target. Even today, when improved intelligence methods are available,

failures occur. A recent example is the failure, in the Persian Gulf War, of the

Coalition forces to identify the Iraqi BTW production facility at Al Hakam and

the continued uncertainty that exists regarding the biological and toxin warfare

programmes of other nations. When firm intelligence does not exist, suspicion

and speculation dominate.

Not surprisingly, the inter-war period and World War II were characterized

by rumours, fears and alerts regarding the possible use of BTW. Although today

it can be concluded that the dangers of such warfare were greatly exaggerated,

it must be remembered that intelligence officers could not take that risk. As the

War Bureau of Consultants (WBC) Committee reported to the US Secretary of

War Henry L. Stimson: ‘The wise assumption is that any method which appearsto offer advantages to that nation will be vigorously employed by that nation’.37

Once the feasibility of biological and toxin warfare was accepted, rumours and

alerts had to be taken seriously. The cost of ignoring them could be high. In one

case, the Japanese biological and toxin warfare operations in China, despite

repeated reports, wartime intelligence failed to assess accurately the extent of

the threat.

The historical balance sheet regarding successes and failures in intelligence is

not reassuring. Even specific information was often incorrect. An even greater

failure was the intelligence assessment of intentions. Unable to assess correctlythe degree of preparedness or to read the minds of their enemies, intelligence

officers were left with capability and an assessment based on the nature of their

enemy, often their only guideposts to evaluation. The Western Allies saw a

36 Barnes, J. M. et al., ‘A review of German activities in the field of biological warfare’, Alsos MissionReport no. B-C-H-H/305 (MIS [US Military Intelligence Service], War Department: Washington, DC,12 Sep. 1945), p. 2.

37 Report of the WBC [War Bureau of Consultants] Committee, 19 Feb. 1942, reproduced in the unpub-lished manuscript The Historical Report of the War Research Office, November 1944 Final.




totalitarian enemy, led by either a dictator or a military clique, as more likely to

be well prepared for biological warfare and as more likely to use it under cer-

tain circumstances. The record, however, reveals that although the Anglo-

American democracies came late into the biological warfare field, theydeveloped the most promising and extensive programmes. (The question of

Soviet BTW preparedness remains unresolved.) Although the Western Allies

stuck to a policy of retaliation, their policy of strict security, coupled with the

silence of the USA in regard to the Geneva Protocol, meant that Germany and

Japan could not assume that their enemies would not use BTW against them.

Organization

There was no biological and toxin warfare organization before 1914. The use of

BW in earlier times was at the whim of individual commanders. It was not partof any state office or bureau. Therefore, the use of biological weapons or agents

was dictated by immediate circumstance, not by long-range planning. World

War I brought a change. Most if not all biological warfare sabotage operations

against animals were directed by one bureau of the German General Staff.38 It is

currently not clear what bureau managed the alleged French sabotage opera-

tions.

During the inter-war period control of biological and toxin R&D in France

remained under the Ministry of War although liaison and cooperation was car-

ried out with various other bureaus and institutions. By the 1940 armistice,however, a degree of coordination was achieved between ministries of the

French Government. A measure of centralization was also achieved. Presum-

ably, a decision to use BW would have been taken by the prime minister in con-

sultation with his cabinet.39

In Germany in the inter-war period various military departments occasionally

considered biological warfare matters without taking any implementing deci-

sions. In September 1941 chemical and biological warfare responsibilities were

dispersed among various departments of the Army Ordnance Office and other

bureaus. From 1943 to 1945 biological and toxin warfare work was carried out

in duplicative and uncoordinated manner by the Blitzableiter Committee andthe ‘Blome network’. Because of Hitler’s prohibition, biological and toxin

warfare activity was fragmented and scattered. No firm central control was ever

established.40 In Japan the work was compartmentalized, and no adequate

coordination between the army and navy was achieved. The system, which

operated at a low command level, was more permissive than directed.41

In the USSR control was centralized. Several ministries were involved, espe-

cially the Military Chemical Agency, the People’s Ministries of Health Care

and Education, and the Institute of Chemical Defence. However, the ultimate

control rested firmly in the hands of the communist politburo which functionedunder the direction of Stalin.42 In the UK the Committee of Imperial Defence

established a Biological Warfare Sub-Committee during the late 1930s. Once

war broke out the War Cabinet formed a Committee on Biological Warfare, and

38 See chapter 3 in this volume.39 See chapter 5 in this volume.40 See chapter 6 in this volume.41 See chapter 7 in this volume.42 See chapter 8 in this volume.




the Ministry of Supply established the Biology Department at Porton. In 1944,

however, responsibility for the direction of biological and toxin warfare

activities was transferred to the Chiefs of Staff who established the Inter-

Services Sub-Committee on Biological Warfare. Since the Chiefs of Staff func-tioned directly under the Prime Minister’s War Cabinet, authority was clearly

centralized.43 In Canada, ultimate responsibility for CBW rested in the hands of

the Department of National Defence.44 In the USA final authority was held by

the president, but direction and control were in the hands of the War

Department. Although the War Research Service played an important role until

1944, it was essentially a coordinating and research organization which

funnelled promising programmes for development to the Chemical Warfare

Service, a branch of the Army Service Forces. In the final year of the war all

biological and toxin warfare operations were transferred to the CWS.45

The most efficient biological and toxin warfare programmes in World War IIwere the result of centralized direction where the lines of responsibility were

clearly understood and where various organizations worked in a coordinated

fashion with one another (e.g., in Canada, the UK and the USA, and probably in

France). The USSR had a large organization that was potentially capable of a

major biological and toxin warfare effort. Not surprisingly, the vast Soviet pro-

gramme was strictly controlled throughout most of the 1920s and 1930s by the

military and ultimately the Communist Party leadership. The Great Terror,

however, must have devastated Soviet biological and toxin warfare capabilities

organizationally since it eliminated so many microbiologists and decimated theleadership of the Soviet Army. The USSR may have been less well prepared

scientifically and militarily in 1941 than it was in 1935.46 Japan had a major

programme which did not function under lines of clear-cut authority.47

Despite the claims of totalitarian and authoritarian nations, the democracies

organized more effectively for biological and toxin warfare than their oppon-

ents.

Research and development

Biological and toxin warfare R&D did not play any major role in warfare plan-ning before the 20th century. It is significant that the customary prohibitions

and established taboos of the laws of war were developed before World War I.

The use of biological and toxin warfare was primitive and largely static. A

beginning is discernible in World War I as evidenced by the German sabotage

operations.48 However, its achievements seem rather negligible.

Biological and toxin warfare R&D continued during the inter-war period into

methods of delivery, including aerosol dispersion; use of vectors; contamination

of water supplies; and improvement of physical and medical defences. Labora-

tory and occasional field tests were conducted by France, Germany (largelycentred on the dissemination of chemical agents), Japan and the USSR.49

43 See chapter 9 in this volume.44 See chapter 10 in this volume.45 See chapter 11 in this volume.46 See chapter 8 in this volume.47 See chapter 7 in this volume.48 See chapter 3 in this volume.49 See chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 in this volume.




All countries considering biological and toxin warfare during the inter-war

period understood that offensive and defensive R&D were closely linked. In

World War II the scientists of the Axis and Allied powers were fully cognizant

that a defensive biological programme required an understanding and an assess-ment of the feasibility of biological and toxin warfare agents and weapons,

methods of dissemination and combat utility. Except for Germany, bound by

Hitler’s prohibition, the major belligerents carried out extensive defensive and

offensive R&D throughout the war.

Certain conclusions were reached through R&D during the inter-war period

and World War II. First, airborne delivery and aerosol dispersal were more

effective methods of dissemination than vectors. Second, large water reservoirs

were difficult to contaminate especially in countries protected by high hygienic

standards. Third, although defensive measures (vaccination, masks, decontam-

ination procedures, impregnates, protective clothing and therapeutic measures)were useful in reducing casualties from a BTW attack, perfect defence was

impossible, especially for the civilian population.

In World War II the Axis and Allied military coalitions studied, with some-

what different priorities, many of the same agents: the anti-personnel agents of

anthrax, botulinum toxin, brucellosis, cholera, glanders, malaria, plague,

typhoid, typhus and yellow fever. They also studied anti-plant and anti-animal

diseases: particular effort was expended by the USA on the former; Germany

paid special attention to FMD and potato beetles; and the UK developed and

stockpiled anthrax cattle cakes.50 France’s programme did not develop farenough for the establishment of clear priorities in agent choice.51 Although the

USA pursued a variety of anti-personnel agents, the emphasis of the US pro-

gramme was on anthrax, botulinum toxin and brucellosis, the first two inherited

from the British programme.52

Germany’s production of biological and toxin warfare agents was negligible;

Japan’s production, carried out in its Manchurian factories, considerable. 53

Little is currently known regarding the extent of Soviet production of these

agents. Even the Hirsch report does not provide any quantitative information.54

On the Allied side, the UK produced 5 000 000 anthrax cattle cakes at PortonDown; Canada produced 500 litres of anthrax. The USA had the largest produc-

tion capability, built a number of pilot plants at Camp Detrick and developed a

mass production plant at Vigo. However, by the end of the war, the anthrax

bomb project had not yet swung into action; and the Vigo Ordnance Plant had

not produced any weaponized anti-personnel weapons.55

Cooperation and coordination within alliances

International cooperation in the field of biological and toxin warfare was almost

non-existent on the Axis side. Limited Anglo-French cooperation took place inearly 1940, but it remained superficial, centring on defensive measures and the

50 See chapters 6, 9 and 11 in this volume.51 See chapter 5 in this volume.52 See chapters 9 and 11 in this volume.53 See chapters 6 and 7 in this volume.54 Hirsch, W., Soviet Chemical Warfare and Biological Warfare Preparations and Capabilities

(US Army Chemical Intelligence Branch: Washington, DC, 1951); and chapter 8 in this volume.55 See chapters 9, 10 and 11 in this volume.




exchange of intelligence reports on suspected German activities.56 In contrast,

collaboration between Canada, the UK and the USA was close and fruitful.

Canada and the USA profited from the British head start in biological and toxin

warfare and from the knowledge provided by British experiments. The coopera-tive programme among the three nations continued throughout the war with an

exchange of scientists. Canada and the USA provided the facilities for large-

scale testing, the US pilot plants and a large US production facility, which was

still experiencing start-up problems at the end of the war. This trilateral

collaboration continued into the post-war years.57 The USSR kept its own

counsel: it had not secured any help from Germany during the era of military

cooperation with Germany (1921–33), and it did not exchange biological and

toxin warfare information with the Western Allies after the German invasion in

1941.58 There is also no current information that Canada, the UK and the USA

shared biological and toxin warfare intelligence with the Soviet Union. It isonly possible to speculate on the reasons. Chiefly, Russia’s war was largely

fought separately from the Western campaigns. The Allies provided supplies

and shared tactical and strategic intelligence with the USSR. The Soviet Army,

under the direction of Stalin, coordinated its offensives with the Western Allied

forces in 1944 and 1945. Although the UK and the USA alerted Stalin to

possible use of chemical agents by Germany on the Eastern front, they issued

no similar warnings regarding possible BTW use. The reason for this difference

in information sharing is not hard to devise. The possibility of chemical warfare

was a public matter, openly speculated upon in the press. Allied coalition policywas deterrence publicly reinforced by pronouncements delivered by Roosevelt

and Churchill. On the other hand, the biological programme, like the Manhattan

atomic bomb project, was a closely guarded secret.

The World War II experience

It is doubtful whether any of the belligerents were adequately prepared for

large-scale biological and toxin warfare field operations in World War II. Sabo-

tage operations were feasible and were carried out at least by Japan. Japan also

carried out BTW field operations against a poorly prepared China, but there isno proof that it used these weapons in military operations against the Western

Allies. Preparedness for extensive biological and toxin warfare operations

requires both offensive and defensive capabilities. Such preparedness was not

achieved by any belligerent by the end of World War II.

A number of general conclusions can be drawn from the World War II bio-

logical and toxin warfare experience. First, once the belligerents accepted the

feasibility of BTW, they committed themselves in varying degrees to a secret

biological and toxin warfare arms race. Second, the available intelligence, often

inaccurate and incomplete, encouraged this development and at times acceler-ated the various programmes. Third, internal forces and personalities played an

important role in reinforcing the national efforts of various belligerents. Fourth,

the offensive–defensive nexus meant that the national programmes, with the

56 See chapter 5 in this volume.57 Carter, G. B. and Pearson, G. S., ‘North Atlantic chemical and biological research collaboration:

1916–1995’, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 19, no. 1 (Mar. 1996), pp. 78–108; and chapters 9, 10 and11 in this volume.

58 See chapter 8 in this volume.




exception of the German programme, were as extensive as resources and time

allowed. Fifth, as far as is known, Japan and the Western Allies carried out the

two most extensive programmes during the war. The extent of the Soviet pro-

gramme is still unknown. Japan, dominated by a militaristic regime, was unfet-tered by military ethics and international law. The nationalization of ethics jus-

tified the use of any means to victory, but, despite its utilization of BTW, Japan

suffered a disastrous and total defeat. In contrast, although not bound by the

Geneva Protocol, the USA respected the prohibitions of customary and inter-

national law. However, it did lay the foundations for a formidable future bio-

logical and toxin warfare programme. If the war had continued into 1946, the

Western Allies would probably have achieved considerable BTW capability.

III. Lessons from historyThis section reviews the history of BTW arms control achievements and efforts

and the progress in prohibiting biological and toxin warfare which has been

made since 1945. It can be interesting to speculate about the difference that the

present and proposed regimes to prohibit BTW might have made if they had

been functioning in the period covered by this study, the extent to which they

might have prevented a BW arms race, the difficulties they would have met and

the problems which would have remained unsolved. This section analyses the

establishment of total prohibition, confidence-building measures (CBMs) and a

legally binding protocol to strengthen the prohibition.Such objectives can be negotiated only in peacetime. If they are enacted and

adopted they can help to prevent and deter a BTW race in wartime, especially

by those nations which have enacted national implementation legislation

against possession of BW. In considering these challenges, it is helpful to

review the post-1945 developments regarding BTW arms control.

Establishing the total prohibition

The BTWC entered into force in 1975 and was a step forward in the field of disarmament and arms control. It did not merely condemn the use of prohibited

weapons or confine itself to cutting down stocks of existing weapons or

preventing proliferation. It aimed at the total elimination of an entire class of

weapons, rather than at the mere prohibition of first use as embodied in the

Geneva Protocol. Article I is unambiguous and emphatic:

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop,

produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:

1. Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of

production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, pro-tective or other peaceful purposes;

2. Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins

for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.59

Article II of the BTWC calls for the destruction of all existing stocks of bio-

logical and toxin agents; Article III prohibits the transfer of BTW technology;

59 BTWC (note 1).




and Article IV requires national legislation for the implementation of the con-

vention. Although articles V, VI and VII call for consultation, cooperation and

aid to affected parties in dealing with problems or violations of the BTWC, the

convention does not provide a verification procedure nor does it address theissue of sanctions against violators. Like the Geneva Protocol, it makes an

appeal to the conscience of mankind. Article X seeks to ensure that the imple-

mentation of the BTWC does not harm ‘the economic or technological develop-

ment of States Parties to the Convention or international cooperation in the field

of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities’.60 This article reinforced the

universality of the BTWC, freeing it from the accusation made by some devel-

oping countries against earlier treaties: that they were created only for the

benefit of the developed nations. However, it creates potential tension between

the needs of developing nations and the non-transfer provisions of the BTWC

(Article III). The major achievement of the BTWC is its establishment of anorm against the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological

(biological) weapons, which strengthens the norm against the use of such

weapons embodied in the Geneva Protocol and reinforced by the centuries-old

abhorrence against poisonous weapons.

Review conferences are convened at five-year intervals by the parties to

examine the ‘operation of the Convention’ and to evaluate whether its purposes

are being adhered to (Article XII).61 By the time of the First Review Conference

on 3–21 March 1980, doubts had arisen as to whether the Soviet Union, co-

depositary with the UK and the USA of the BTWC, was complying with theconvention. An anthrax outbreak at Sverdlovsk in 1979 was regarded as

suspicious, and the explanations given by the USSR that the outbreak was

caused by ingestion of contaminated meat sold on the black market were

unconvincing. The 1980s were dominated by reports that the USSR and its

allies had used mycotoxins in South-East Asia and Afghanistan. Although the

evidence for the use of ‘Yellow Rain’ has increasingly been regarded as weak

and has been rejected by many scientists, the importance of strengthening the

authority of the convention through CBMs was agreed upon at the Second

Review Conference on 8–26 September 1986. In addition, the challenge posedby genetic engineering, a technology unknown before the 1970s, now seemed

more daunting.

The prohibition in Article I of the BTWC has been reaffirmed and strength-

ened by the language adopted at successive review conferences. At the Fourth

Review Conference (25 November–6 December 1996), the following language

was adopted:

The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and

technological developments, inter alia, in the fields of microbiology, biotechnology,

molecular biology, genetic engineering, and any applications resulting from genomestudies, and the possibilities of their use for purposes inconsistent with the objectives

and the provisions of the Convention, reaffirms that the undertaking given by the

States Parties in Article I applies to all such developments.

The Conference also reaffirms that the Convention unequivocally covers all microbial

or other biological agents or toxins, naturally or artificially created or altered, as well

60 BTWC (note 1).61 BTWC (note 1).




as their components, whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in

quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful

purposes.62

The review conferences made clear that the prohibition against biological andtoxin warfare agents is all inclusive. For example, the Fourth Review Confer-

ence agreed that the ‘use by the States Parties, in any way and under any cir-

cumstances, of microbial or other biological agents or toxins, that is not consis-

tent with prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, is effectively a

violation of Article I of the Convention’. It also reaffirmed that the purpose of

Article I is ‘to exclude completely and forever the possibility’ of BTW use.63

Biological and toxin sabotage activities are therefore implicitly prohibited by

the BTWC. The convention thereby guards against ambiguity which could

allow a determined violator to claim that it had adhered to the literal wording of the convention. It prohibits the kind of work on anti-personnel, anti-animal and

anti-plant agents and toxins which was undertaken in the inter-war period and

World War II. It further bars the development of all BTW and means of deliv-

ery (e.g., the spraying devices, the various bombs, the British anthrax cakes and

the Japanese parachute bombs which were produced between 1919 and 1945).

Confidence-building measures

Increased security from any biological and toxin warfare control regime is

based upon the building of confidence between the parties to that regime.

Confidence is reciprocal and depends on the desire of the observed party to

demonstrate that its activities are in full compliance with the regime and the

confidence of the observing parties that what they see is the ‘complete picture’.

Not surprisingly, the participants at the Second Review Conference, recogniz-

ing the need to enhance confidence in the implementation of the convention,

agreed on a number of CBMs ‘for the exchange of information and data’,64 and

a standardized procedure was established for the annual exchange of informa-

tion and data. The agreed measures, covered under the review of Article V of

the BTWC, included:

1. Exchange of data, including name, location, scope and general description of

activities, on research centres and laboratories that meet very high national or inter-

national safety standards established for handling, for permitted purposes, biological

materials that pose a high individual and community risk, or specialize in permitted

biological activities directly related to the Convention.

62 Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibi-tion of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weaponsand on their Destruction, BTWC Fourth Review conference document BWC/CONF.IV/9. It is reproducedat Joint Bradford–SIPRI Chemical and Biological Warfare Project, ‘Fourth Review Conference final docu-ments’, URL <http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/revconf/4final3.htm>.

63 Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference . . . (note 62).64 Final Declaration of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibi-

tion of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weaponsand on their Destruction is reproduced in Geissler, E. (ed.), Strengthening the Biological Weapons Con-vention by Confidence-Building Measures, SIPRI Chemical & Biological Warfare Studies, no. 10 (OxfordUniversity Press: Oxford, 1990), pp. 159–65; and on the SIPRI Internet web site at URL <http://www.sipri.se/cbw/docs/bw-btwc-reviewconf-2.html>.




2. Exchange of information on all outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar

occurrences caused by toxins, that seem to deviate from the normal pattern, as regards

type, development, place, or time of occurrence. . . .

3. Encouragement of publications of results of biological research directly related to

the Convention, in scientific journals generally available to State Parties. . . .4. Active promotion of contacts between scientists engaged in biological research

directly related to the Convention, including exchanges for joint research on a mutually

agreed basis.65

The Third Review Conference (9–27 September 1991) reaffirmed the import-

ance of the earlier CBMs and agreed on the following measures:

1. Declaration form on ‘Nothing to declare’ or ‘Nothing new to declare’.

2. Confidence-building measure ‘A’: Part 1: Exchange of data on research centres

and laboratories; Part 2: Exchange of information on national biological defenceresearch and development programmes.

3. Confidence-building measure ‘B’: Exchange of information on outbreaks of infec-

tious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins.

4. Confidence-building measure ‘C’: Encouragement of publication of results and

promotion of use of knowledge.

5. Confidence-building measure ‘D’: Active promotion of contacts.

6. Confidence-building measure ‘E’: Declaration of legislation, regulations and other

measures.

7. Confidence-building measure ‘F’: Declaration of past activities in offensive and/or

defensive biological research and development programmes.8. Confidence-building measure ‘G’: Declaration of vaccine production facilities.66

The Fourth Review Conference noted that ‘participation in the confidence-

building measures since the last Review Conference has not been universal, and

that not all responses have been prompt or complete’ and urged ‘all State Par-

ties to complete full and timely declarations in the future’.67 No new CBMs

were added nor were the existing ones extended in its Final Declaration on

Article V of the BTWC.

The results have been disappointing: by 1998 just over one-half of the parties

had made one or more declarations and approximately 10 parties have made therequired annual declarations.68 Moreover, the declarations varied greatly in

quality and quantity.69 A proposal was made at the Second Review Conference

to establish a small bureau to collate, evaluate and process the annual declara-

tions, but the proposal was rejected. Consequently, the declarations are merely

65 Final Declaration of the Second Review Conference . . . (note 64).66 Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Pro-

hibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and ToxinWeapons and on their Destruction is reproduced in Geissler and Woodall (note 1), pp. 246–54‚ and on theSIPRI Internet web site at URL <http://www.sipri.se/cbw/docs/bw-btwc-reviewconf-3.html>.

67 Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference . . . (note 62).68 Geissler, E. and Woodall, J. P., ‘Reporting of outbreaks of disease under BTWC confidence-building

measures’, eds M. R. Dando and G. S. Pearson, Scientific and Technical Means of Distinguishing between Natural and Other Outbreaks of Disease (Kluwer Academic Publisher: Dordrecht, in press).

69 Hunger, I., ‘Article V: confidence-building measures’, eds G. S. Pearson and M. R. Dando, Strength-ening the Biological Weapons Convention: Key Points for the Fourth Review Conference (Quaker UnitedNations Office: Geneva, 1996), pp. 79–92. It is reproduced at Joint Bradford–SIPRI Chemical and Bio-logical Warfare Project, ‘Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention: key points for the FourthReview Conference’, URL <http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/key4rev/ihart5.htm>.




collated and distributed to the parties, without evaluation, by the UN Center for

Disarmament Affairs.

Although the agreement on CBMs represents progress in BTW arms control

and disarmament, this disappointing response raises questions regarding theeffect CBMs would have had if they had been in place in the inter-war period. It

is difficult to determine whether they would have allayed the fear and suspicion

that some nations were carrying out covert biological and toxin warfare pro-

grammes. Trust would not have lasted once Hitler came to power and the mili-

tarists dominated Japanese politics. There would have been a steady erosion of

faith in the regimes, and such regimes must to be open for transparency to

function. Although Hitler had no interest in developing a biological and toxin

warfare programme, his intentions probably would have been judged by the

nature of his government and not by its public declarations.

Legally binding protocol

The BTWC lacks a verification mechanism, and the review conferences have

expressed increasing concern regarding this weakness. Since the Third Review

Conference the parties to the BTWC have invested considerable effort in

strengthening it through a verification regime. In its review of Article V of the

BTWC, the Third Review Conference took the first step by establishing ‘an Ad

Hoc Group of Governmental Experts open to all State parties to identify and

examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technicalstandpoint’. This group, known as VEREX, was charged with the responsibility

of identifying:

measures which could determine:

Whether a State party is developing, producing, stockpiling, acquiring or retaining

microbial or other biological agents or toxins, of types and in quantities that have no

justification for prophylactic, protective or peaceful purposes;

Whether a State party is developing, producing, stockpiling, acquiring or retaining

weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for

hostile purposes or in armed conflict.Such measures could be addressed singly or in combination. Specifically, the Group

shall seek to evaluate potential verification measures, taking into account the broad

range of types and quantities of microbial and other biological agents and toxins,

whether naturally occurring or altered, which are capable of being used as means of

warfare.70

There have been three phases of subsequent activities to strengthen the

BTWC: (a) the VEREX project carried out by the Ad Hoc Group of Govern-

mental Experts; (b) the September 1994 Special Conference which established a

further Ad Hoc Group to consider measures leading to a legally binding instru-ment designed to strengthen the BTWC; and (c) the work of this Ad Hoc

Group.

70 Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference . . . (note 66).




The VEREX project

The Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts held four meetings, two in 1992

and two in 1993, and identified 21 potential verification measures which it

grouped in two categories: off-site and on-site. The off-site measures included:(a) surveillance of publications; (b) surveillance of legislation; (c) data on trans-

fers, transfer requests and production; (d ) multilateral information sharing;

(e) exchange visits (off-site); ( f ) declarations; (g) surveillance by satellite;

(h) surveillance by aircraft; (i) ground-based surveillance (off-site); ( j) sampling

and identification (off-site); (k ) observation (off-site); and (l) auditing (off-site)

The on-site measures included (a) exchange visits (international arrangements);

(b) interviewing (on-site); (c) visual inspection (on-site); (d ) identification of

key equipment (on-site); (e) auditing (on-site); ( f ) sampling and identification

(on-site); (g) auditing (on-site); (h) sampling and identification (on-site);(i) medical examination (on-site); ( j) continuous monitoring by instruments (on-

site); and (k ) continuous monitoring by personnel (on-site).71 The off-site

inspection measures developed the ideas incorporated in the CBMs previously

agreed by the Second and Third Review Conferences.

The Special Conference

The Special Conference on the VEREX report was held in Geneva on

19–30 September 1994. The conference established an Ad Hoc Group ‘to con-

sider appropriate measures, including possible verification measures and draftproposals to strengthen the Convention to be included, as appropriate, in a

legally binding instrument’. In addition, the Ad Hoc Group was directed inter

alia to consider:

Definitions of terms and objective criteria, such as lists of bacteriological (bio-

logical) agents and toxins, their threshold quantities, as well as equipment and types of

activities, where relevant for specific measures designed to strengthen the Convention

The incorporation of existing and further enhanced confidence building and transpar-

ency measures, as appropriate, into the regime;

A system of measures to promote compliance with the Convention, including asappropriate, measures identified, examined and evaluated in the VEREX Report. Such

measures should apply to all relevant facilities and activities, be reliable, cost effective,

non-discriminatory and as non-intrusive as possible, consistent with the effective

implementation of the system and should not lead to abuse;

Specific measures designed to ensure effective and full implementation of Article X,

which also avoids any restrictions incompatible with the obligations undertaken under

the Convention, noting that the provisions of the Convention should not be used to

impose restrictions and/or limitations on the transfer for purposes consistent with the

objectives and the provisions of the Convention of scientific knowledge, technology,

equipment and materials.72

71 United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verifi-cation Measures From a Scientific and Technical Standpoint, Report, BTWC Third Review conferencedocument BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/9, 24 Sep. 1993.

72 Stock, T., Geissler, E. and Trevan, T., ‘Chemical and biological arms control’, SIPRI Yearbook 1995: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1995),pp. 746–47.




The Ad Hoc Group was mandated to study measures for the investigation of

alleged use, and it was directed to complete its work as soon as possible. Its

report, to be adopted by consensus, was to be submitted to the parties for con-

sideration at the Fourth Review Conference or later at a Special Conference.

73

The Ad Hoc Group

The Ad Hoc Group held its first meeting in January 1995, and it has since held

several substantive meetings each year. The group was initially aided by four

Friends of the Chair with responsibilities reflecting four specific elements of its

mandate: definitions and criteria, confidence-building measures, compliance

measures and measures to ensure full implementation of Article X. Further

Friends of the Chair have since been appointed to address the investigations

annexe (July 1997), legal issues (July 1997), confidentiality (September 1997),national implementation and assistance (September 1997), seat of the organiza-

tion (September/October 1998) and the preamble (September/October 1998).

Since July 1997, the Ad Hoc Group has been considering a rolling text for the

legally binding protocol to strengthen the BTWC.

The current draft protocol contains the elements of the future regime although

the final details have yet to be agreed in a number of areas. 74 These elements

include:

(a) a requirement for mandatory declarations of the facilities of greatest

relevance to the convention, including biological defence programmes andfacilities and other production facilities as well as of past offensive/defensive

programmes and facilities;

(b) a provision for the follow-up of declarations through visits to ensure that

they are complete and accurate and to ensure that ambiguities and omissions in

declarations are resolved;

(c) a provision for investigations of non-compliance concerns at facilities or

locations (e.g., when an alleged use of BW or an unusual release may have

occurred); and

(d ) provisions for promoting international cooperation in microbiology andbiotechnology for peaceful purposes to implement Article X.

In is assumed for this analysis that the nations which pursued biological and

toxin warfare programmes in 1914–45 would have been parties to such a

protocol and in compliance with its provisions. They would, therefore, have

made timely and accurate declarations which would have been confirmed

through visits to at least some of the declared facilities. In such a case, the

major World War II belligerents would have had a clear indication of the BTW

potentialities of their opponents. If the procedures to resolve ambiguities and

omissions had been successful, confidence would have been established that the

major belligerents were not engaged in prohibited covert activities.

73 Stock, Geissler and Trevan (note 72), p. 747.74 United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the

Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on theirDestruction, Procedural Report, Ad Hoc Group document BWC/AD HOC GROUP/44, 29 Jan. 1999. Forup-to-date information on the Ad Hoc Group see Joint Bradford–SIPRI Chemical and Biological WarfareProject, URL <http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc>.




No verification regime can guarantee that non-compliance with a treaty

would have been detected. In the above analysis, covert biological and toxin

warfare programmes might well have been conducted. However, a verification

regime which encompassed the above elements would have increased trans-parency and confidence regarding the compliance of the parties. Moreover, in a

functioning regime the danger of detection of cheating (heightened by the

declaration process and on-site measures such as visits or investigations) would

have served as a deterrent. The democratic nations would almost certainly have

conformed and the dictatorships would have had reason to pause before

violating the protocol.

IV. Conclusions

Study of biological and toxin warfare activities before 1945 provides some

guidance for the prevention of a new BTW arms race, and progress has been

made since World War II in arms control and disarmament. However, history

provides a number of warnings. Transparency is more feasible in a climate of

tranquillity, trust and openness. Closed societies cultivate secrecy, inspire

suspicion and breed instability. Even democratic societies, when threatened,

close up to protect themselves. In situations of armed conflict worst-case scen-

arios understandably mould decisions and actions, which are dominated by

intelligence evaluations and security chimeras. Once in place national pro-

grammes develop their own momentum. It is frequently more difficult to stop aprogramme than to start it. Analysis of the lessons of 1914–45 demonstrates the

need to strengthen the organization and the powers of the existing regime ban-

ning BTW, thereby reinforcing the norm against their use and increasing the

national and international stability upon which all arms control and disarma-

ment measures ultimately depend.

Sober warnings are provided by the difficulties of acquiring accurate and

complete intelligence, and the spur that insecurity and personal and organiza-

tional forces inevitably provide to national military programmes. Strengthening

international norms against biological and toxin warfare is vital, but it alonewill not prevent a BTW race in the future. The only lasting solution lies in inter-

national regimes and the use of effective verification measures to ensure that

biological and toxin warfare activities are totally prohibited.

In addition, new factors have altered the arms balance. The axiomatic com-

mitment to retaliate in kind, which applied until total prohibition of biological

and toxin warfare by the 1972 BTWC, and may have influenced Iraqi President

Saddam Hussein’s decision not to use his stockpiled CBW in the Gulf War—

since he could not be sure how the USA would retaliate—has been considerably

modified. It is now almost inconceivable that the parties to the 1993 Chemical

Weapons Convention (CWC)75 and the BTWC would retaliate in kind to a

CBW attack, and several nations have renounced the right of retaliation in kind

in regard to BTW. Parallel renunciations have recently been made in respect to

chemical weapons both before and after the entry into force of the CWC.

75 The text of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Useof Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction is available on the SIPRI Internet web site at URL<http://www.sipri.se/cbw/docs/cw-cwc-mainpage.html>.




Deterrence must be reinforced by the international will to take action against

violators either by the imposition of sanctions or, ultimately, through conven-

tional military intervention. Verification alone is insufficient to deter potential

violators unless it is reinforced by a credible penalty. The question of the effect-iveness of the deterrent will depend, of course, on the willingness of the parties

to enforce it. There cannot be a repetition of the passive reaction of the world

community to the gross violation of international law demonstrated by the mas-

sive use of CW by Iraq against Iran in the 1980–88 Iraq–Iran War. The chal-

lenge of such violations must be forthrightly met by parties determined to pre-

vent the use of weapons of mass destruction in any future war.

Documents

Lessons From the History of Biological and Toxin Warfare