Leon Commission (1995) - Clark Baker · LEON - Volume 1 1995 Report Of The ... If you spot any mistakes in this copy of the Leon Commission Report ... CHAPTER 7 RESEARCH POLICY AND

The South African OHS Commissions

LEON - Volume 1

1995

Report Of The Commission Of Inquiry Into Safety And Health

In The Mining Industry

Volume 1

Electronic Copy By

David W. Stanton

PDF File Version 1.0 October 2003

Notes This electronic copy (Version 1.0 October 2003) of the Report of the

Commission of Inquiry into Safety and Health in the Mining Industry

Volume 1 (1995) has been prepared from a photocopy of the original report.

The text was captured with a flat bed scanner (HP OfficeJet G85) and Optical

Character Recognition Software (OmniPage Pro 12). The captured text was

proofread in printed form and via text to speech. The file was exported to

Microsoft Word 2002 for text and layout editing and then published as an Adobe

PDF file.

Care was taken to ensure that the text in this PDF file is an exact reproduction

of the text in the original Commission report (some spelling errors have been

corrected).

The author is grateful to the DME for arranging proofreading of the electronic

copy.

If you spot any mistakes in this copy of the Leon Commission Report (Vol 1)

please notify the contact below who will update the PDF file which is available

on the Internet (Commissions section at asosh.org). The original report has text

missing at the bottom of pages 28 and 30 and at the top of page 33. The text

missing from pages 30 and 33 has been added (obtained from a DME retyped

copy). The section number 4.3.1 is missing on page 44.

Dr. David W. Stanton

Association of Societies for Occupational Safety and Health (ASOSH) and

Chamber of Mines of South Africa

Email: [email protected]

Web: http://www.asosh.org 21 October 2003

COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO SAFETY AND HEALTH IN THE MINING INDUSTRY

Commission of Inquiry into Safety and Health in the Mining Industry

TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA MR PRESIDENT MAY IT PLEASE YOU In consequence of a statement made by the Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs, Mr G. Bartlett, on 28 MAY 1993, you deemed it expedient to appoint a commission of inquiry into safety and health in the mining industry, hereinafter referred to as "the Commission", consisting of the following members:

RAMON NIGEL LEON ALBERT WILLIAM DAVIES MIKLOS DEZSO GYORGY SALAMON JOHN CAROL ANTHONY DAVIES

and with the following terms of reference as published under Government Notice R.889 of 6 May 1994:

To investigate all aspects of the legal regulation of health and safety in the mining industry as defined in the Minerals Act, 1991 (Act No 50 of 1991)

To make recommendations to the State President on improvements to the existing regulations and implementation thereof in the light of the circumstances prevailing in the industry and of international standards.

The Commission undertook and discharged its assigned task to the best of its ability. We, the undersigned, have the honour to present herewith the Commission's report together with its recommendations, a summary of which is given in Chapter 12.

Private Bag X5 Braamfontein 2017 Fax (011) 339-1858 Tel (011) 339-4414 X 210

REPORT

OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO

SAFETY AND HEALTH

IN THE

MINING INDUSTRY

VOLUME 1

COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

INTO

HEALTH AND SAFETY

IN THE MINING INDUSTRY

REPORT - VOLUME 1 CONTENTS PAGES CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1 - 8 CHAPTER 2 A REVIEW OF THE STATE OF THE INDUSTRY 9 - 21 CHAPTER 3 MINE SAFETY HAZARDS 22 - 39 CHAPTER 4 HEALTH AT WORK IN THE MINING INDUSTRY 40 - 67 CHAPTER 5 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE INTERESTED

PARTIES 68 CHAPTER 6 COMMISSION’S VIEWS ON FURTHER CRITICAL ISSUES 69 - 91 CHAPTER 7 RESEARCH POLICY AND RESEARCH MANAGEMENT 92 - 100 CHAPTER 8 THE CURRENT MINERALS ACT 101 - 105 CHAPTER 9 ACCIDENT INQUIRIES 106 - 112 CHAPTER 10 PROPOSED STRUCTURE OF A NEW ACT 113 - 139 CHAPTER 11 ENFORCEMENT 140 - 156 CHAPTER 12 SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 157 - 170 CHAPTER 13 A MINORITY VIEW ON SOME ISSUES BY PROFESSOR M D G SALAMON 171 - 172 Appendices 173 - 191 List of Tables 192


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CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION The members appointed to the Commission were:

The Honourable Mr. Justice Ramon Nigel Leon (Chairperson)

Professor Miklos Dezso Gyorgy Salamon

Professor Albert William Davies

Professor John Carol Anthony Davies

The Terms of Reference of the Commission as stated in Government Notice Number R889 were as follows: 1.1 To investigate all aspects of the legal regulation of health and safety in the mining industry

as defined in the Minerals Act 1991 (Act No 50 of 1991). 1.2 To make recommendations to the state President on improvements to the existing

regulations and the implementation thereof in the light of the circumstances prevailing in the industry and of international standards.

1.2.1 Regulations governing the conduct of the Commission were established when the

Commissions Act, 1947 (Act No 8 of 1947) was made applicable to the Commission by Proclamation No R78 of 1994.

1.2.2 Mr T M Doyle, an officer in the department of Mineral and Energy Affairs was

appointed Secretary to the Commission, to deal with administrative matters, and Advocate R Chinner was appointed to lead the evidence.

1.3 The terms of reference given in paragraph 1.1 and 1.2 did not precisely and accurately

reflect the agreement of all parties to the Mining Industry Summit as to what the terms should be, and which were subsequently approved by the Cabinet. What had been agreed and approved was as follows. The Commission should:

1.3.1 Investigate all aspect of the legal regulation of occupational health and safety in the

mining industry of South Africa excluding the question of compensation for injury, illness and death, which was to be deferred until the inquiry into safety and health had been completed. The second inquiry was to be motivated de novo.

1.3.2 Make recommendations to the State President on improvements to the existing

legislation and the implementation thereof in the light of the circumstances prevailing in the industry and of international standards.

1.3.3 The Commission should not undertake investigations into any accident or other

dangerous occurrences or conditions at a particular mine occurring during the course of the Commission as such matters can be dealt with in terms of inquiries under the existing legislation.


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1.3.4 In the light of ambiguities and lack of precision in the terms of reference, the

Chairperson agreed to interpret the terms of reference as agreed to between the parties to the Summit, approved by the Cabinet and set forth in paragraphs 1.3.1 to 1.3.3 above.

1.4 A meeting was held between the Chairperson, Advocate Chinner and the Secretary Mr

Doyle in Johannesburg on May 8, 1994, when it was agreed that all interested parties be invited to make written submissions to the Commission by June 15, 1994, and that written responses to these be furnished by July 7, 1994.

1.4.1 As a result of the publicised invitation the Commission received written submissions

and responses running to about 3 500 pages of text. The 37 organisations and persons who made written submissions are listed in Appendix 1.

1.5 At the request of the parties to the Mining Industry Summit, the Chairperson agreed to a

meeting on July 14, 1994. One of the Commissioners, Professor J C A Davies attended, but Professors Albert Davies and Miklos Salamon had not at that time arrived in the country, and the proceedings were therefore recovered, transcribed and made available to them. The parties to the Summit had requested the meeting to discuss procedural matters.

1.5.1 At the meeting the Chairperson dealt with the following issues:

-SECRECY: The Chairperson stated that whatever the precise meaning and effect of Regulations 4 and 5 might be, he intended the Inquiry to proceed in an open and transparent manner and the members of the press and the public would be allowed to attend the hearings; -he would allow cross-examination of witnesses; -he proposed the hours of sitting; -he thought that it would be necessary for one or more inspections in loco to be held; -counsel for the parties or Advocate Chinner could lead the evidence. If the parties preferred it then Council could lead their evidence while Advocate Chinner could lead the evidence at the other witnesses; -it was important that a time table be prepared by the parties in consultation with Advocate Chinner and Mr Doyle.

1.5.2 In view of the fact that the Commissioners from aboard could not, for the initial

hearing, stay beyond the end of August, the Chairperson proposed that:

-the issues be dealt with topic by topic so that at least an interim report could be prepared; -the parties get together after the meeting to agree on matters that were common cause, matters which were in dispute and a time table.


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1.5.3 At the meeting Senior Counsel for the Chamber of Mines handed in written

proposals. These identified topics and expressed views on how the Commission should be conducted. These views were substantially similar to those expressed by the Chairperson, with the additional suggestion that working groups be established to discuss priorities, or to try and achieve agreement on various issues and report back to their principals.

The view was expressed that such groups could work in tandem with the work of the Commission. After discussion it was agreed the parties would endeavour to provide, before the Commission commenced its public hearings on July 18 1994: -a time table on a topic by topic basis; -the issues that were in common cause; -the issues that were in dispute.

1.6 THE HEARINGS

The hearings commenced in the Mineralia building, Braamfontein, Johannesburg, on July 18 1994 and continued until August 24 1994. In consequence of certain matters being agreed between the parties, and by sitting long hours when necessary, the parties were able to present all the oral evidence which was found to be necessary by August 24 1994.

1.6.1 The parties were represented as follows:

THE NATIONAL UNION OF MINEWORKERS by Mr E Cameron SC, instructed by Mr P Benjamin, of Cheadle, Thompson and Haysom; SASOL by Mr J Viljoen; THE CHAMBER OF MINES by Mr C D A Loxton SC, with him Mr D M A Antrobus, instructed by Mr W P le Roux of Brink, Cohen, le Roux and Roodt Inc.; THE DEPARTMENT OF MINERAL AND ENERGY AFFAIRS by Mr J B Raath, Government Mining Engineer; THE CHEMICAL WORKERS’ UNION by Mr Richard Spoor; and THE COMMISSION by Mr R Chinner, who also led the evidence of all the witnesses other than those who were being led by the legal representatives of the parties.

Mr T M Doyle acted as Secretary to the Commission.

1.6.2 Acknowledgements

The Commission would like to record its great indebtedness to all the legal representatives, to the Government Mining Engineer (GME) and the Secretary, for the thorough and able manner in which they discharged their functions.


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The Commission wishes to add that, not only were the hearings conducted in a manner which accords with the best traditions of the Bar, but the hearings had the effect of bringing the parties together as did the openness and transparency of the proceedings.

1.6.3 Transcript of evidence

The oral evidence was recorded electronically and transcribed during the evenings and nights into 25 volumes running into about 2 600 pages. The Commission wishes to record its thanks and appreciation for the way in which this work was done. The transcript of evidence is not annexed to this report, but will remain available to the public and interested parties at the offices of the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs, both at Pretoria and Johannesburg. Reference will be made to the evidence in the course of this report, and also to certain written submissions received by the Commission.

1.6.4 Witnesses who gave oral evidence

Thirty-three witnesses gave oral evidence before the Commission. Their names and the capacity in which they gave their evidence are recorded in Appendix 2, together with the Volume of the Transcript and the pages where their evidence appears.

1.6.5 Exhibits handed in during evidence

A large number of exhibits were handed in. The nature of the exhibits and the numbers allocated to them are detailed in Appendix 3. As with the Transcript of Evidence, these exhibits will be held at the offices of the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs (DMEA) in their Pretoria and Johannesburg offices, where they may be examined.

1.6.6 Visits made by the Commission

In addition to hearing evidence and the arguments the Commission undertook the following visits: July 19 1994: Western Deep Levels South Mine: The Commission was able to descend a shaft at a large gold mine, over 2 000 metres deep and see a working stope with systematic support and backfill of the extracted area. It was also able to see adult basic education facilities on the surface, listen to a presentation describing seismic monitoring arrangements at a group of mines, and visit hostel accommodation provided by the mine for black employees. July 22 1994: Matla Coal Mine: The Commission was able to see two types of coal production methods used in South Africa. A continuous miner was seen operating the bord and pillar system, and the longwall system using powered supports. Both systems were operating in


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thick seams. Remote environmental monitoring systems were shown on the surface, as well as some accommodation arrangements. July 27 1994: The G P Badenhorst Facility: The purpose of this unit, part of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) facilities, located outside Pretoria, is for research into methane and coal dust explosions. Tests used to establish the potential of coal mine explosives to initiate explosions, and tests in the coal dust gallery were demonstrated. August 15 1994: Elandsrand Gold Mining Co Ltd.: The novel methods used in an industrial theatre were seen, showing how simple play was used to demonstrate essential aspect of health, safety and industrial relations. The training centre on the surface at this mine was also seen at work. The hostels and dining arrangements at the older Blyvooruitzicht Mine were also visited on the same day. The Commission wishes to acknowledge with thanks the efforts of the many persons who helped to organise these visits, and the companies and staff at the mines and other facilities who allowed the visits to take place, and helped to make them interesting and informative. The visits assisted the Commission materially in understanding some of the problems facing the mining industry.

1.7 PREVIOUS COMMISSIONS

This Commission is the first to inquire into occupational health and safety in the South African mining industry for over 30 years. No Commission with such wide ranging terms of reference to inquire into all aspects of the regulation of occupational health and safety has ever been appointed. Certain of the earlier Commissions considered similar issues to the ones that are dealt with in this report. Full notes on the early Commissions were provided by the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) in their General Submissions and are to be found at Annexure 2 in Volume 1 of the submissions. In Annexure 3 of the same Volume reference is made to the Marais Commission which we later comment on briefly. 1.7.1 Earlier Commissions

The Krause Commission was appointed by the Transvaal Government in 1907 under the Chairmanship of Dr. F E T Krause (later a Judge of the Supreme Court of South Africa), assisted by Dr. Porter, the Medical Officer of Health for Johannesburg, and Mr Alexander Heymann, a consulting analytical chemist. That Commission produced a draft Bill which was almost identical to the subsequently enacted Mines and Works Act of 1911. The Commission’s work had the effect of extending the system which had been developed in the Transvaal for regulating mine safety to the whole of what was then the Union of South Africa.


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The recommendations which the Commission made concerning the holding of inquiries were not incorporated into the 1911 Act. That Commission proposed the appointment of a special prosecutor for all mining cases, and the appointment of a single magistrate to try all such cases. Later in this report we shall consider whether there is merit in re-establishing a Mining Court.

1.7.2 Other Early Commissions

A Commission was appointed in 1911 to inquire into and report upon the most practical means to be adopted for the prevention of explosions of gas and coal dust in Natal collieries. In its conclusions the Commission referred, inter alia, to the inadequacy of mining law, the importance of good relationships between the inspectorate and mine officials, the general administration of a mine and the importance of the relationship between the mine officials and the workforce. A Mining Regulation Commission reported in 1925. It had been empowered to inquire into the effect of regulations dealing with the supervision of underground working places, on the accident rate, the safety and health conditions in the mines, and the extent to which mining regulations affected good relations between employers and employees. This Commission agrees with the submission of the NUM that some of the recommendations and comments of the 1925 Commission remain apposite to the present debate. The 1925 Commission commented on the vagueness of the language of a number of regulations. It inquired into the causes of contravention of regulations, and its main conclusions can be summarised as follows: -a major factor was “the growing practice of assigning to European miners too large a measure of responsibility”; -the inspectorate was understaffed, making it impossible to carry out an adequate system of inspections to assess compliance with regulations. The inspectorate relied on reports of managers and records of accidents. This resulted in disregard of regulations where observance was irksome or costly and there was little risk of contraventions being detected; Today, seventy years later, the problems of an understaffed, underpaid inspectorate remain. We will deal with this problem in Chapter 11 where we will propose a restructuring of the inspectorate. -the report criticised inspectors for not keeping management at arms length, and for failure to prosecute managers; It is of interest to record that in the evidence heard by that Commission there was reference to the inspectorate being perceived by the workers of the day as being allied to management. -the vague wording of the regulations was also considered by the 1925 Commission as a factor preventing enforcement and observance.


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1.7.3 The Marais Commission

On January 21 1960 a disaster occurred at Coalbrook Colliery in which 437 persons lost their lives when a general failure of support pillars allowed a large area of the mine to collapse. Following the disaster the then Governor General of the Union of South Africa appointed a Commission of Inquiry under the Chairmanship of the Honourable Mr Justice J F Marias. The commission was given five terms of reference but only one of them, the fourth, was dealt with in the Interim Report of the Commission produced on December 20 1960. No other report was published by the Marias Commission for reasons that are not known. The term of reference on which it reported reads: “(4) Whether the supervision of mines exercised by the Department of Mines in terms of the said Act and regulations is adequate; if not, in what respects it should be improved in the interests of safety”. The Department of Mines was the predecessor of the present Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs. We consider it to be important to make reference to the main recommendations of the Marais Commission, as some of them are in line with proposals which appears in this report. All of them refer to the problems involving the enforcement agency, to which we refer to as the Inspectorate of Mines and the vital role which it must play in health and safety in the mining industry. The principal recommendations of the Marais Commission on its fourth term of reference were that: -the status of the Government Mining Engineer should be restored to its pre-1937 level; -the salary of the GME and of all the technical officers of the Division should be adapted to the restored status level; and -the Department of Mines should be re-organised so that: -the posts of GME and Secretary for Mines are combined in one person, assisted by a Deputy Secretary; -the Division of Geological Survey forms an integral part of the GME’s Division; -the Inspectors of Explosives should come under the direction of the GME; -the GME’s Division should move to Pretoria; -there should be four Assistant GME’s; -every effort should be made to restore the confidence of mineworkers in the competency and integrity of inspectors; -special Commissions should have a worker’s representative as a fifth member. They should have prescribed procedures. Appeals to the GME should be abolished;


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-the powers of inspectors to close mines or parts of mines should be circumscribed in the Act; -the GME should have a panel of experts on safety problems to help him in special enquiries into accidents; -procedures at inspector’s inquiries should be simplified and achieve results; -the jurisdiction of inspector’s courts should be increased, but ensure a fair hearing; -a Ministerial Commission should hear appeals from GME’s decisions; -Sub Inspectors should be restricted to welfare work; -a new grade of Senior Sub Inspector should be appointed, one to each inspectorate; -mine plans should be inspected more thoroughly and frequently. Systematic inspection should be resumed; and -the Welkom inspectorate should be divided into two. We consider that it is relevant by way of background to report what was said in paragraph 29 of the Marais Commission Report: “Mining is inherently dangerous both to life and health. Those who wish to extract anything from under the surface of the earth by digging a hole must be prepared to devote some of their resources to safety. It is an unnatural activity giving rise to unnatural conditions. But safety measures invariably cost money and the employer must bear its expenditure. Thus a perpetual conflict of interest arises between employer and employee as to the nature and extent of the safety measures that may be considered reasonably practical and reasonably necessary”.


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CHAPTER TWO

A REVIEW OF THE STATE OF THE INDUSTRY 2.1 HISTORY AND ORGANISATION

2.1.1 The Chamber of Mines (COM), and the influence of the migratory labour system which led to the establishment of compounds and hostels.

The Chamber was formed over 100 yeas ago. It is a voluntary association of private sector mining finance houses, mining companies and mines. It has over 80 members drawn from South Africa’s gold, coal, diamond, platinum, antimony, asbestos, maganese, lead and copper mining sections (Appendix 4). The members account for about 85% of the mineral output of South Africa. Some significant mining organisations such as SASOL remain outside the Chamber, together with a large number of small mines.

The Chamber’s primary function is to promote and protect the interests of its members, doing this through joint action, at industry level, in areas where it is considered by the Chamber to be economically beneficial, prudent, and desirable for members to co-operate and act in concert. The services it offers members extend over a wide range of technical, legal, medical, social and environmental issues. It operates through a range of committees on which sit representatives of the major finance houses and mining companies, and at which policy agreements are arrived at.

The Commission heard evidence (Wilson pp 730/824) on the historical perspective concerning the employment of labour in South African mines. Professor Francis Wilson is an authority on this subject, being the founder Director of the South African Labour and Development Research Unit in the University of Cape Town, and the author of many books on the subject.

A central feature of the gold mining industry is that there has been an oscillating migratory labour system in South Africa. Labour has been brought in on a temporary basis for a fixed period and then returned to the rural areas. In the first phase of this development, for many decades, men came for short contracts of nine to twelve months and many did not return at all, or returned only once or twice. More recently, in the second phase of this development, some 90% of mineworkers spend more than 10 years of their lives on the mines in total, but they remain migratory workers. Their position is akin to “guest workers” in Germany and elsewhere in Europe and the USA. This distinction is important from the point of view of training and environmental exposure to dust, radiation, noise and other contaminants. From the point of view of the worker himself, and particularly his family, he remains a migrant. He is divided in half as a human being; that is, a labour unit working at a mine, and a family man with his family in the rural areas.

In the early days of South African mining, cheap housing was a way of controlling labour. As far back as 1890, when the COM was formed, mining compounds were established to control labour, and the Chamber established recruiting agencies. In these early days of the Chamber’s history one of its primary functions was stated to be – “to reduce native wages to a reasonable level because they wanted to prevent


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competition”, and to find ways and means of recruiting labour. The wages paid were sufficiently high to induce people to make the long journey from their homes and serve in the dangerous and arduous mines. Accordingly a whole process of recruiting labour from all over the subcontinent was established. By 1899, 100 000 black mineworkers were needed on the mines, and at that time 60% of the labour came from outside South Africa, mainly from Mozambique.

At the same time the color bar was fought for by white mineworkers and the management felt obliged to go along with their demands. The COM played a specific role in putting in place the Pass Laws, which played a critical role in maintaining the migrant labour system for over 100 years. From the employer’s point of view it was necessary to try to ensure a regular supply of labour at wages which the mining industry felt reasonable. The Commission was reminded by Professor Wilson of the quotation from Cecil John Rhodes when introducing the Glen Grey Act in support of an argument for a hut tax in order to obtain labour for the mines:

“You will remove them, the natives, from the life of sloth and laziness, you will teach them the dignity of labour, and make them contribute to the prosperity of the State and give them some good return for our wise and good government.” The mining industry was locked into the migrant labour system which gave it a control over the labour force so that there was no question of strikes, which were illegal, and there was a dominance of management over labour: what mine management said went. By 1910 workers were being recruited from all over Southern Africa but far from Johannesburg itself.

Certain historical events changed the picture.

In April 1974 some Malawian mineworkers were killed in an air crash which caused Dr. Banda, the President of Malawi, to ban further recruiting from his country. In the same month the political coup in Lisbon spelled the end of the Portuguese empire, causing Angola and Mozambique to become independent, and not wishing to be seen as being linked to the apartheid labour system in South Africa. In one month the Chamber of Mines was faced with a loss of 50% of its labour force from Malawi and Mozambique. From then on there was a rapid increase in wages, which had already been assisted by the rapid increase in the gold price since 1971, and a rise in the influence of unions.

For many years the COM expressed its opposition to the apartheid system but even today, with the apartheid system ended there exists a hangover from that system in the mining industry, where by and large black workers are at the bottom of the organisational pyramid, while white workers are further up. Job reservation for whites was formally abolished only in 1986.

From the evidence heard by the Commission it was clear that certain tensions and disagreements do still exist between the Chamber and the National Union of Mineworkers and other unions. With regard to the white mineworkers union their views are dealt with later in Chapter 2.1.2.2. However, there was a broad measure of agreement on the following matters between all the parties:


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-the parties agreed that there was some need for legislative intervention and restructuring; and that a tripartite body should be set up to review the relations on an ongoing basis;

-there should be employee participation at all levels of policy formulation and enforcement in the fields of safety and health;

-there was a need for improved, better directed and more inclusive training;

-there was agreement in principle regarding the right of a worker to refuse to work in unsafe conditions; and

-it was agreed that great importance must be attached to the question of research and development regarding health and safety matters.

2.1.2 The Trade Unions

2.1.2.1 The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM)

The Union is registered, as a trade union within the meaning of the Labour Relations Act No 28 of 1956, as amended. It was formed in 1982 and represent about 300 000 members in the mining industry.

The NUM first called for the establishment of this Commission in 1991 in discussion at the Mining Industry Summit. After investigation and lengthy discussions the COM agreed to join employee organisations in formulating proposals for the Commission in 1992. The NUM made extensive preparations following the announcement in 1993 that a Commission would be established, and submitted a wide range of papers bearing on health and safety to the Commission.

The NUM is the largest recognised collective bargaining agent representing workers in the mining industry and its membership constitutes some 60% of the workforce. The NUM has always made health and safety issues a central theme of its campaign and of its negotiations with employers. Some of its efforts are described in its submission entitled “A Thousand Ways to Die” listed in the Appendix among the NUM submissions. Other submissions clearly demonstrate the concern and determination of the union to obtain better standards of health and safety for the workforce in the mining industry. The issues raised in these publications by the union remain relevant today. The union has offices in Johannesburg and has several regional officers in mining areas.

Evidence was provided for the Commission by Mr Senzeni Zokwana, Deputy President of the NUM, which included some of his personal experiences when he was first employed as a mineworker and during his subsequent career development. He had worked at the President Steyn Gold Mine for fourteen years, and described his humiliation at the procedures that he was subjected to when he first became a miner.


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He has now risen through the ranks to be a trainee shift boss, but was now required to join another Union dominated by white miners, although still a leading member of the NUM. When he first joined the NUM his relationship with his superiors became sour. Indeed he was dismissed in 1986 without a hearing and was out of work for two months.

Later he was found not guilty but was demoted from August 1986 to February 1991 to the position of station marshal. Matters improved from 1991 when he returned from leave and he was offered assistance in training, and the relationship was much better today, and he had no problems being released from work to attend to union matters.

Professor Wilson gave his opinion, which was not seriously challenged, that the rise of the NUM had brought about the biggest single change in the mining industry. It had introduced different priorities into the collective bargaining system, with the major priority change being with regard to family life and family housing. In the past such family housing had been strictly limited by apartheid legislation. The NUM had pushed hard for stabilisation in the sense of family housing, and this had not been a priority with the industry. As a result there is a trend towards stabilisation with some men’s wives and children near enough to the mine to see each other on a more regular basis.

2.1.2.2 Other Unions

The Chemical Workers Union has a much smaller membership in mines and represents coal mine workers in the SASOL group of mines. They were represented at the inquiry by Mr Richard Spoor.

The Council of Mining Unions represents the Mineworkers Union, the Electrical Association, the Boilerworkers and Steelworkers Association, and the Amalgamated Engineering Union.

The Council represents about 21 000 members, nearly all white, and Mr K P Cronje testified on their behalf. Historically they have played an important rule in developing the legislative framework which formerly applied only to white workers. He made common cause with the NUM on most matters relating to health and safety. However, he agreed that some years ago his Council had tried to maintain racial discrimination and job reservation (Cronje pp 1440 8-10). He was concerned about the loss of discipline in the mines and believed that management had lost control of the workers. He also agreed that there were political differences between his organisation and the NUM, but Mr Zokwana testified that there was a good spirit of co-operation in mining matters between the Unions, and that the NUM met regularly with the Council.


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2.1.3 The Compound/Hostel System

This has an adverse effect on the health and well being of a person. Too many people living together in a small space with inadequate ventilation must inevitably increase the spread of disease. Professor Wilson considered that single sex hostels remained an aberration whether they house 90 to a room, as some of the old compounds used to do, or eight or twelve to a room as the more modern hostels do. Although the quality of life is relatively better hostels still contribute to the spread of tuberculosis and HIV related diseases. There is also stress and strain of a psychological nature involved. There is a lack of privacy and husbands are separated from their wives and children.

Mr Zokwana, in his evidence, illustrated the problems of living in hostels. There was no recognition of people of differing ages nor was there any privacy. He had lived in a hostel room shared by sixteen with one person above another. This created many problems. Someone might arrive drunk and late and go out in the middle of the night to relieve a call of nature, and on returning step on his neighbour in a lower bunk. If one person in the room suffers from a contagious disease the whole room is affected. The lack of privacy meant that if a wife came to stay there was very limited accommodation for her. Hostel life estranges the husband from his family. Allocation of rooms and bunks is without reference to the age of the individual, which may lead to a man of 60 having to use an upper bunk, and having great difficulty in getting in and out of bed.

Workers had no choice of who they should share rooms with, and are simply allocated their bunk. Apart from the obvious risk of airborne infection from tuberculosis or pneumonia, there was a wide range of subtle psychological and other effects on people who were required to live under these conditions.

In considering the evidence the Commission realises that the question of hostels/compounds is an exceedingly complex one for which there is no immediate solution. Conditions vary from mine to mine but the system is essentially an unnatural one. Those giving evidence acknowledged that the system could not be abolished overnight without bringing the mining industry to a grinding halt, and that about 50% of current residents in hostels would still opt for single male accommodation. Moreover there were some mines with a very limited lifespan at which it would be financially impossible to upgrade their hostels.

What was important was that a significant step should be taken in suggesting that housing at mines become part of the Reconstruction and Development Program.

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that the mining houses take a policy decision to move towards family housing over a period of time, and that in the meantime steps be taken to upgrade existing hostels whenever it is reasonably practicable to do so. The COMMISSION FURTHER RECOMMENDS that a tripartite structure be established between the State, the mining industry and representatives of employees to seek ways and means of improving the lot of workers who live on the mines, and to investigate the whole question of housing and accommodation for workers and their families at mines, with due regard for the continued viability of communities thus established. A way must be found which will enable our


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society to make changes in order to make better human beings of the workers by giving them proper and better family life, without killing off the industry.

The relationship between accommodation at mines and the health of mineworkers will be considered further in Chapter 4.

2.1.4 Constraints on Training

The question of communication and transfer of information in a dangerous occupation such as mining is of enormous importance, but there are problems and constraints involved. The great majority of the mining workforce is illiterate and innumerate. They speak a range of different languages, some in addition to the previous official languages of Afrikaans and English.

The mining industry has sought to overcome the problem of communication by using the mining lingua franca called Fanagalo as the language of the mines. The Commission considers this to be very unsatisfactory, because the language has a very limited vocabulary and is unable to convey subtle meaning. While it may be satisfactory for giving simple commands it is quite inadequate to convey the nature and extent of the dangers that lurk beneath the surface, the source of such dangers, and how best to avoid them.

Another problem concerning the use of Fanagalo was illustrated by Mr Zokwana. Although he spoke English and Afrikaans he was required and obliged to speak in Fanagalo when he took up work at the mines. Instead of addressing persons or mine officials as Mr or Meneer, he was required to use the Fanagalo expression “Baas”. Workers find this offensive as does the Commission.

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that having due regard to the complexity of the language issue all workers be given basic education and training in English. A sound basic education is a prerequisite for effective training, and training schemes may have reduced effectiveness if they do not build on an adequate educational standard. Adult education programs involving training over a period of time are to be recommended. Good examples of these were seen by the Commission at Western Deep Levels and Elandsrand mines. Similar methods and principles should be adopted and extended at all mines. There are special difficulties in training those who are illiterate and enumerate. There are institutions such as the Tembelethu Education Center in Pietermaritzburg which specialise in such matters. The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that the mining industry should avail itself of the expertise available in this and related fields.

2.2 Accident Records

Accident experience in the South African mining industry has, historically been unacceptable. The GME, Mr J B Raath, described the accident rates as “appallingly high”. Documentation presented in evidence by him to the Commission confirms this serious situation.


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The NUM submission stated that “the loss of life and the destruction of health as a result of mining is staggering”. In the first 93 years of this century over 69 000 mineworkers have died and more than a million have been seriously injured. At current accident levels it is estimated that a worker who spends 20 years underground faces a 1 in 30 chance of being injured or killed in gold mines. In 1993, 578 mineworkers died in accidents, that is more than one per thousand of the workforce. In the same year, 8 532 mineworkers were seriously injured, that is more than fifteen per thousand. In the course of evidence, Dr. Leger said that there ought to be a lower fatality rate in coal mining than in the gold mining industry, but there was no evidence of that in the 1993 figures. On the contrary the situation deteriorated in 1993, although there had been a sustained improvement over the previous decade. Moreover fatalities in the diamond mines have actually increased in the last decade. The major cause of fatalities and the single most important cause of reportable injuries has been rockfalls and rockbursts. Further analysis of accident records will be found in Chapter 3 The presentation of statistics for mining accidents in South Africa in the last decade has left much to be desired, and hampered comparison with international statistics, but the Commission feels that it is important that the following snapshot views of fatal and reportable injuries in South Africa, and in comparison with other countries should be recorded: 2.2.1 TABLE 1 - Statistics for graphs relating to the Government Mining Engineers Division

(GME submission)

Refer to Table 1 at the end of this chapter.

This table takes the year 1932 as its starting point and then reflects the change over the years 1959 to 1993.

2.2.2 TABLE 2 - Accident data: 1984 to 1993


This reflects the position relating to fatalities, reportable accidents and injury rates during this period for all mines, gold mines and coal mines.

2.2.3 For international comparison the Commission was provided with snapshots of accident

statistics. 2.2.3.1 TABLE 3 - International Labour Office (ILO) Statistics

Refer to Table 3 at the end of this chapter. This table was brought to the attention of the Commission as a snapshot of the international situation produced in the ILO report Safety and Health in Mines 1994 No 51 page 13. (Cameron p 448 14-30). This compared 19 countries regarding


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fatal accidents in mining operations taken on an annual basis between 1989 and 1991. South Africa rates are joint 14th out of 19, with only Turkey, Yugoslavia, Papua New Guinea and Pakistan appearing to have worse rates than South Africa.

2.2.3.2 TABLE 4 - Data Produced for Hard Coal Underground Mines by the

Department of Health and Working Conditions of the State Mining Authority of Poland.


These statistics and graphs were brought to the attention of the Commission (Davies pp 451 13-22) and we reproduce one of the graphs here.

In terms of fatalities per 1000 employees for 1992, South African rates were only exceeded by Turkey, and were seven times higher than the United Kingdom.

It is clear from the evidence that the number of fatalities and serious injuries in the South African Mining Industry is unacceptably high and the Commission will endeavor in this report to address this problem and make appropriate recommendations. The task of the Commission was made more difficult because of the dearth of accurate accident records.

2.3 Occupational Disease Records

While the statistics for fatal accidents and serious injuries are available, no reliable statistics are available for diseases caused by the industry, and these can only be estimated.

The Commission heard evidence that in 1992, 6 151 workers were compensated, but the NUM may be correct in saying that such figures are only the tip of the iceberg. On of the problems is that while tuberculosis is endemic to the industry, symptoms of the disease may only manifest themselves after workers have returned to their homes in the rural areas.

Valid numerator data is not available and valid denominator data does not exist. Dr. Leger (Exhibit B Vol 2 NUM page 84, and para 5.4 to para 5.7) who has tried to establish incidence rates says:- “Therefore a proxy for the incidence rate is defined here as the number of new disease cases per year per thousand employees. The denominator may be the number either in mine employment, in underground employment or who undergo periodical fitness examinations.”

In another submission (Dr. White Exhibit B V2 Ch 3 pp 47-49) the Commission noted that annual medical reports were phased out by the Anglo American Corporation in 1983 and by Rand Mines in 1986. Gencor keeps its records confidential. This cessation of publication creates a huge gap in our knowledge of trends in disease statistics among miners.

A number of factors influence the interpretation of reports issued by the Medical Bureau Occupational Diseases (MBOD) and others. Two of the most important factors are the systematic under diagnosis of occupational disease, for example by relying on small X-rays that fail to diagnose pneumoconiosis, and the changing nature of the labour force since 1975. Miners now spend a much larger part of their working lives at mines, compared with


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previous periods, leading to greater exposure to dust and the development of dust related diseases. It is sufficient in this chapter to give a broad outline of some of the statistics put before the Commission, particularly by Dr. Leger and Dr. White.

-Tuberculosis rates were about 58 per thousand after 15 years exposure. After 10 years exposure between forty and eighty per cent of workers involved in drilling operations would have hearing problems. An 18 year old man starting a career in mining at the stope face would have a one in two to one in three chance of being permanently disabled from accident or disease.

-A study of shaft sinkers, developers, stopers and shift bosses had shown that if a man were to work 8 000 shifts the probability of developing silicosis was over 30 per cent. If silicosis is severe it can develop into progressive massive fibrosis (PMF) which is one of the most feared complications of the disease.

-Asbestos is a fibrous mineral which is known to cause several kinds of lung disease. After 20 years exposure in an asbestos mine, twenty five per cent of the workforce can be detected as having lung disease. It has now been established scientifically that there is an association between asbestos exposure and lung cancer.

-Research has shown that after forty years of exposure, fifty to sixty per cent of coal miners would develop simple coal miners’ pneumoconiosis, and about 5 per cent would develop PMF.

-About 4 000 miners develop tuberculosis every year. One survey in the 1930s suggested that about 60 per cent of these may die within two years. The longer a worker works at the mines the more likely he is to develop tuberculosis. Miners with less than five years experience develop the disease to the extent of only eight per 1000, while those with more than five years experience develop it to the extent of 20 per 1000.

-Lung function is reduced by lung disease. With silicosis after fifteen years exposure, a worker will have lost about fifty percent of his lung function if he reached 65 years of age.

-There has been a significant under diagnosis of coal miners’ pneumoconiosis. Statistics from routine examinations suggested that the prevalence was 4% but autopsy studies show that it is 7,1%. Based on examinations at 61 collieries in the United Kingdom between 1990 and 1993, the prevalence for all age groups was 0,4% and for age groups below 44 years 0,1%.

Further comment on health issues in the mining industry will be made in Chapter Four.


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TABLE 1 STATISTICS FOR GRAPHS RELATING TO THE GOVERNMENT MINING ENGINEER’S DIVISION (1932 FIGURES USED AS BASIS = 100%)

STAFF X 1000

AUTHORISED

ACTUAL

% OF AUTHORISED

% INCREASE AUTHORISED

% INCREASE

ACTUAL

FATALS

REPORTABLES

YEAR LABOUR % TONNAGE % INCREASE NO RATE/1000 NO RATE/1000

1932 310963 100 47099 100 60 60 100 100 100 1959 611383 197 138000 293 118 102 86 197 170 1960 622163 200 149303 317 1961 638159 205 162500 345 1962 634269 204 174301 370 1963 617853 199 178145 378 1964 624642 201 189359 402 1965 631114 203 200096 425 1966 670000 215 144 127 88 240 212 801 1.20 31284 46.69 1967 659000 212 144 125 87 240 208 802 1.22 30351 40.06 1968 632000 203 145 132 91 242 220 1969 636000 205 151 136 90 252 227 872 1.37 30245 48.50 1970 684000 220 151 142 94 252 237 1971 1972 630100 203 1973 677668 218 201347 427 167 140 84 278 233 737 1.09 29114 42.96 1974 666693 214 202665 400 167 139 83 278 232 791 1.19 28607 42.91 1975 628315 202 160 135 84 267 225 1976 657592 211 160 139 87 267 232 1977 701434 226 160 136 85 267 227 1978 687021 221 160 139 87 267 232 1979 719444 231 244254 519 156 127 81 260 212 832 1.16 22997 31.96 1980 743152 239 246668 524 159 121 76 265 202 861 1.16 21058 28.34 1981 763553 246 160166 552 162 120 74 270 200 853 1.12 18538 24.28 1982 735984 237 266714 566 164 155 95 273 258 807 1.10 17406 23.65 1983 715053 230 164382 561 165 161 98 275 268 831 1.16 16584 23.19 1984 733581 236 290745 617 223 182 82 372 303 807 1.10 17406 23.73 1985 754701 243 300104 637 199 173 87 332 288 706 0.94 14820 19.64 1986 781621 251 299521 636 199 178 89 332 297 800 1.02 12709 16.26 1987 780016 251 290011 616 199 332 753 0.97 11473 14.71 1988 738214 237 298395 634 199 161 81 332 268 674 0.91 11357 15.38 1989 740804 238 301723 641 197 162 82 328 270 735 0.99 10097 13.63 1990 715170 230 197793 632 195 163 84 325 272 675 0.94 9858 13.78 1991 679547 219 313720 666 195 168 86 325 280 604 0.89 9103 13.40 1992 543629 175 195053 626 192 176 92 320 293 552 1.02 8801 16.19 1993 562113 181 304297 646 192 170 89 320 283 578 1.03 8532 15.18


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TABLE 2: ACCIDENT DATA 1984 - 1993

TYPE OF MINE YEAR FATALATIES FATALATY INJURIES INJURY RATE RATE ALL MINES 1984 740 1.01 15528 21.20

1985 706 0.94 14820 19.60 1986 800 1.02 12709 16.30 1987 753 0.97 11473 14.71 1988 674 0.91 11357 15.38 1989 735 0.99 10097 13.63 1990 675 1.05 9858 15.38 1991 604 0.98 9103 14.74 1992 552 1.02 8801 16.19 1993 578 1.03 8532 15.21

GOLD MINES 1984 588 1.15 13736 26.90 1985 539 1.03 13168 25.10 1986 702 1.27 11624 21.10 1987 547 0.98 9969 17.87 1988 510 0.97 9576 18.14 1989 549 1.06 8561 16.46 1990 526 1.25 8195 19.43 1991 461 1.19 7571 19.51 1992 407 1.12 7585 20.94 1993 418 1.13 7375 20.00

COAL MINES 1984 73 0.63 840 7.20 1985 93 0.78 806 6.80 1986 66 0.55 709 5.90 1987 121 1.05 550 4.86 1988 53 0.50 435 4.07 1989 54 0.52 361 3.50 1990 50 0.52 404 4.21 1991 42 0.56 361 4.80 1992 46 0.66 339 5.17 1993 90 1.71 279 5.32


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TABLE 3 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STATISTICS

Fatal accidents in mining operations

COUNTRY YEAR NUMBER OF FREQUENCY PER FATALITIES 1000 WORKERS Australia 1990 3 0.21 Belgium 1990 0 0.00 Canada 1991 26 0.24 Czechoslovakia 1990 49 0.44 France 1990 1 0.05 Germany 1989 39 0.28 India 1991 265 0.37 Malaysia 1991 9 0.27 Pakistan 1991 97 2.10 Papua New Guinea 1991 20 2.04 Peru 1991 108 1.05 Poland 1990 111 0.29 Spain 1991 30 0.38 South Africa 1991 726 1.05 Turkey 1990 902 6.90 United Kingdom 1990 11 0.16 United States 1991 95 0.25 Yugoslavia 1991 178 1.23 Zimbabwe 1991 40 0.73

Source: Compiled from various sources


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CHAPTER THREE

MAIN SAFETY HAZARDS IN MINES 3.1 BACKGROUND

It has been established in Chapter 2.2 that accident statistics for South African mines compare unfavourably with data from most other countries in the world. Here the intention is to analyse the details of the data in order to identify the main safety problems of the industry. The main objective is to establish the absolute hazards as opposed to making comparison only on the basis of accident rates (i.e. incidence per 1 000 employed). This will be done using the data provide by the GME for the period 1st January to 31st December 1993. The accident records are tabulated in various forms; breaking down the information by commodity, by geographical region and, in each case, the accidents are classified into various types. Furthermore, the type of mine is identified (i.e. surface operation or underground mining) and, in the case of underground mines, incidents occurring underground and on the surface are separated. The breakdown of the data allows the identification of the most hazardous mine types and within them, the pinpointing of the type of accidents that occur most frequently and/or are responsible for most of the injuries. The first step in this analysis is to look at the overall picture and examine the relative importance of underground and surface operations.

TABLE 5: BREAKDOWN OF ALL INJURIES INTO MAIN CATEGORIES

TYPE OF MINE INJURED KILLED TOTAL Nr. % Nr. % Nr. % Opencast Mines 47 0,6 9 1,5 56 0,6 Underground Mines: Incidents on Surface 776 9,1 35 6,0 811 8,9 Underground Mines: Incidents Underground 7692 90,3 542 92,5 8234 90,5 Underground Mines: All Incidents 8468 99,4 577 98,5 9045 99,4 TOTAL 8515 100,0 586 100,0 9101 100,0

This breakdown reveals that the overwhelming majority of accidents, some 99,4% of all injuries and deaths occur at or in underground mines. This result is partly due to the relative unimportance of surface mining in South Africa and partly attributable to the inherently safer nature of this type of operation. Thus, while injuries do occur in opencast mines, underground mines are far more hazardous. Logically, therefore, most of the attention in the report is devoted to underground operations.


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South Africa is rich in minerals, which occur in different geological environments. Consequently, minerals are mined throughout the country under various conditions and are exploited on different scales. Hence, the hazards associated with the mining of different minerals are likely to present threats of different magnitude. In order to produce the Commission’s report timeously, it will be sensible to devote a great proportion of the Commission’s attention to those mines that contribute most of the accidents. The next analysis attempts to pinpoint the most hazardous mines or groups of mines by examining the statistics associated with the exploitation of different commodities. In Table 6 the non-fatal, fatal and all injuries are examined on the basis of commodities mined. The tabulation is arranged to facilitate the identification of those mines that are employed to extract those commodities that are the main sources of mine accidents. Cumulative figures are given to make this task simpler.

TABLE 6: INJURIES CLASSIFIED BY COMMODITIES MINED

TYPE OF MINE INJURED KILLED TOTAL Nr. % Nr. % Nr. %

Gold 7368 86,5 426 72,7 7794 85,6 Coal 279 3,3 90 15,4 369 4,1 Cumulative 7647 89,8 516 88,1 8163 89,7 Platinum 492 5,8 29 5,0 521 5,7 Cumulative 8139 95,6 545 93,1 8684 95,4 Diamond 99 1,2 20 3,4 119 1,3 Cumulative 8238 96,8 565 96,5 8803 96,7 TOTAL 8515 100,0 586 100,0 9101 100,0

The tabulated data reveal some points of fundamental importance. It is obvious that the safety record of the gold mining industry virtually swamps the contribution of all other types of mining. Clearly, the safety performance in mining as a whole cannot be improved significantly unless the problems of gold mining are addressed effectively. Some 85,6% of all injuries and 72,7% of all fatalities are due to difficulties encountered in gold mines.

The next largest contributor to fatal accidents is coal mining. This branch of the industry was responsible in 1993 for 15,4% of all fatal accidents in the industry, but reported only 3,3% of non-fatal injuries and, hence, contributed 4,1% of all injuries. This lopsided performance suggests the presence of one or more causes of injuries that result in a high percentage of fatalities. This deduction necessitates a more detailed analysis of the accident record of this part of the industry.


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In the remainder of Table 6 the data relevant to two other relatively major sectors of the industry are added. The platinum and diamond industries represent 5,7% and1,3% of all mining injuries respectively. While these contributions are important in themselves, they are dwarfed by the record of gold mining. It is important to note that the branches of mining involved in the recovery of gold, coal, platinum and diamond underground contribute 96,8% of non-fatal accidents and 96,5% of fatal accidents in South African mines. These high proportions are, perhaps, not surprising since these four branches together represent a dominant part of South African mining. It is perhaps less expected that the combination of the gold and coal industries alone is responsible for nearly 90% of all injuries (non-fatal 89,8%, fatal 88,1%, total 89,7%). It is an obvious consequence of these findings that the remainder of this chapter will focus special attention on gold and coal mining.

3.2 SAFETY PERFORMANCE IN GOLD MINING

3.2.1 Analysis of Injuries

As we have already indicated in the previous section, the gold mining industry is responsible for a very large percentage of the accidents occurring in mining. To gain an insight into this depressing accident history, it will be rewarding to examine the accident records in detail. On this occasion an attempt will be made to identify the types of accidents that dominate the industry’s performance. In Table 7 the most important accident types are analysed in a format similar to that used in constructing the previous Table. The accident categories listed in Table 7 either directly correspond to the listing in the GME’s statistics or they represent the amalgamation of similar types in his tabulation. The most striking conclusion that emerges from this table is that 61,7% of gold mining fatalities, or 263 lives lost in 1993, are due to rock falls or rockbursts. This represents a rate killed of 0,98 per thousand employed underground. (This is based on the Minerals Bureau figure for average number of workers working underground in gold mines during 1993 of 269 466). This rate would be regarded as depressingly high even as the fatality rate from all sources in an advanced mining industry. It is also somewhat surprising to learn that 44,9% of all deaths in South African mining are due to rock failure in gold mines. No other mining industry appears to be known with such a preponderance of fatalities due to rock failure. It should be noted that the GME’s records show rock falls and rockbursts separately. Such discrimination is, however, often uncertain and no benefit will accrue here by maintaining this somewhat unreliable subdivision. Thus, these records are combined into a single entry in Table 7. The official records subdivide “strainbursts” and “rockbursts”. No reliable definition of such events exists, hence the classification depends entirely on those who provide the data, and seems pointless.


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TABLE 7 MOST SIGNIFICANT ACCIDENT TYPES IN GOLD MINING

TYPE OF MINE INJURED KILLED TOTAL Nr. % Nr. % Nr. % Rock falls & 2272 30,8 263 61,7 2535 32,5 Rockbursts Transport & 1578 21,4 54 12,7 1632 21,0 Mining Cumulative 3850 52,2 317 74,4 4167 53,5 Fall of material 962 13,1 11 2,6 973 12,5 & Rolling Rock Cumulative 4812 65,3 328 77,0 5140 66,0 Falling In/From 650 8,8 28 6,6 678 8,7 Slipping & Falling Cumulative 5462 74,1 356 83,6 5818 74,7 Manual handling of 967 13,1 2 0,5 969 12,4 Material/Mineral Cumulative 6429 87,2 358 84,1 6787 87,1 TOTAL 7368 100,0 426 100,0 7794 100,0

The next major category in the table is headed “Transport and Mining”. The GME’s tabulation present these under 12 headings that are all related to moving mining equipment and transport. This category is responsible for 20,9% of all accidents causing bodily injury. In view of the scattered nature of deep level mining operations (a medium to large operation mine will have 5 000 to 10 000 m of stope face) this large percentage is perhaps not surprising. The remainder of data in Table 7 reveals that a large number of mishaps relate to events such as “fall of material”, “rolling rock”, “manual handling of material, falling in / from” and “slipping and falling”. These incidents account for an unusually high proportion (33,6%) of all injuries. No details are available as no one gave evidence directly related to accidents. One can only speculate, therefore, that many of these accidents are regarded by management as those where the victim is to be blamed, because of his carelessness, lack of attention etc. It is probably true that under ideal conditions most of these events could be avoided by those present. However, their frequent occurrence suggests that this is not a satisfactory explanation. Management should do everything possible to minimise the possibility of such occurrences. In addition they should provide sufficient training so that the men on the spot can recognise the hazards and know how to take appropriate steps to avoid them.


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3.2.2 Technological Background to the Accident Records

The disappointingly high rates of fatalities and injuries, 1,54 killed and 25,82 injured (reportable injuries only) per 1 000 exposed to risk underground, represents a tragic picture. It is important to examine the background to this performance and attempt to identify the remedies so that the situation can be improved. These rates do not agree with the rates given in the Chamber of Mines submission (p 42). The difference is probably attributable to a difference in the denominator of the rate formula. In these figures the number at risk is taken as the number employed underground, which according to the Minerals Bureau records was 269 466 in 1993.

Fundamentally, the combination of three physical factors and a human problem make the South African gold mining industry unique. The physical factors are: great mining depth, brittle and abrasive rocks and the often narrow width of mineralisation. The human problem will be discussed in Chapter 3.3, as it tends to affect all branches of mining. -Depth of Mining. According to the GME’s records, the maximum mining depths in the Orange Free State, in the PWV (Gauteng) Region and in the Western Transvaal are 3 511 m, 3 940 m and 3 140 m respectively. The major gold mines are working at depths that are unusually great by international standards. Depth below surface determines the virgin rock temperature, that is rock temperature free of mining influence, and the pre-mining rock pressures. Both rock temperature and rock pressure increases approximately linearly with depth. The rate of increase is determined by the temperature gradient and rock density, respectively.

High rock temperature has both direct and indirect effects. The direct hazards are heat stroke and heat exhaustion. Accident statistics reveal that in 1993 these heat sicknesses were responsible for 5 deaths and 17 reportable injuries. These data indicate that the hazard is barely under control. The less direct, but perhaps more pervasive effect of heat is that it undermines a person’s vigilance and effectiveness in both mental and physical exertions.

Due to the higher rock density, a depth of 3 km in rock produces the same pressure that a submarine would experience at a depth of about 8 km. High rock pressure promotes rock fracture, which can be either gradual or sudden and violent. Frequent sudden rock failures, as with underground explosions, are the most insidious hazards that miners have to face. There is an obvious correlation between the great depth of mining and the shockingly high accident rate in gold mines. (see Chapter 3.2.4) -Brittle and Abrasive Rocks.

The failure of hard brittle rocks tends to occur suddenly and often with great violence. This feature of rocks surrounding gold reefs contributes greatly to the high frequency of seismic events experienced in gold circles. It should be noted that mines operating in soft rocks do not, as a rule, experience rockbursts of the type observed in hard and brittle rocks. Hardness and abrasiveness of quartzite have been major factors in retarding the development of mining methods that do not use explosives to break the ground. Lack of development in this direction has hampered the modernisation of the gold industry in South Africa for several decades.


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-Narrow Width of Mineralisation A large fraction of the reefs worked by mines in the Witwatersrand system is less than 1 m in width. This feature of the mineralisation impacts in a number of ways on the hazards of the extraction of the reefs. Firstly, the limited space obtained during the mining of these reefs prevents the application of any other mining technique employed safely and successfully elsewhere. Furthermore, as no other region of economic significance has similar geometry, no mining industry outside South Africa persues the solution to this problem. The platinum mines have essentially the same difficulty. The solution must therefore be found in South Africa. Secondly, the narrowness and lateral persistence of the reefs result in “tabular” stope excavations that are in the region of one metre in width and tens or even hundreds of metres in the other two directions. Such geometry leads to exceptionally high stress concentrations at the edges of these excavations. These areas of high stress concentration include stope faces that are the working places of many miners. High stresses cause intensive rock fracturing and frequent rockbursts, which in turn are responsible for the greatest hazards to miners. Thirdly, due to the narrow width of mineralisation a large area must be mined in each year to produce the planned tonnage of gold (e.g. 619 t in 1993). The recovery of this tonnage requires the extraction of reef over an area of some 20 to 30 km2. Due to reasons explained earlier, the extraction of such a huge area, unfortunately, must be achieved by employing a rudimentary and very labour intensive method of mining. This technology prevents the effective utilisation of stope faces, and each mine is forced to maintain excessively long stope faces, and long, often tortuous communication lines. It is difficult to control, supervise and inspect such widespread operations. In short, men working in such mines tend to be in a perilous situation.

3.2.3 Current Methods of Combating Rockbursts

Formal research into the alleviation of the rockburst hazard started in 1953 and during the following four decades a number of defensive methods have evolved. There are essentially two approaches to the mitigation of the rockburst problem, which can be considered as strategic and tactical. The aim of the strategic approach is to diminish the likelihood of encountering rockburst prone situations in mines. The common features of this approach are firstly, that they involve decisions that will affect the mine in the long term, and secondly, that the beneficial effects become significant only after the mining of a large, more or less contiguous area. Hence, the lapse of time may be measured in years.


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The known strategic measures for mitigating the seismic hazard assume two forms. The first involves the optimal layout design to reduce the theoretical stress concentrations, and the second incorporates regional support into the system to minimise the convergence of the stope walls. Two versions of regional support have been suggested and tried so far. Due to the relative simplicity of implementation, regional support based on stabilising pillars was the first system that was experimented with in some deep mines. In this system about 15% of the reef is left behind, in a predetermined pattern of pillars, to interrupt the spans and hence reduce the magnitude of stope convergence. The second involves the introduction of backfill into the stopes to minimise stope convergence through the reduction of available volume. Conceptually, if these systems are implemented well, they should bring considerable relief. Unfortunately, in practice, neither method is perfect and both have significant shortcomings. Both versions could lead to significant cost increases associated with backfill and / or loss of extractable reserves. The pillars, since they are significant stress raisers could, and sometimes do bring with them certain hazards. As a result of those and other difficulties, the strategic rockburst counter measures have not been implemented as widely or effectively as one would hope. The purpose of tactical measures is twofold. They are intended to reduce the frequency of the occurrence of rockfalls, and to minimise the destructive effect of seismic events. Essentially the use of improved face and gully support falls into this category. Effectively applied tactical control measures tend to become effective shortly after installation, but of course, their widespread introduction takes time. Several new support systems have been developed during the last few decades. The Commission heard evidence that, disappointingly, these support systems are not used as widely as they should be, and even when they are employed, they are often not used to the best advantage. The Commission’s recommendations in Chapter 10.5.1 will refer to the need for increased use of these systems.

3.2.4 Future Projection of Hazards Arising from Rock Failure

The submission of the COM contains some very disturbing information concerning the future perils associated with rock failure in deep gold mines. A safety competition operating in South African mines called the C S McLean competition, has rules which subdivide gold mines into three groups, that is, shallow, deep and ultra deep mines (p 44 of the submission). The depth limits between these groups increase from year to year, presumably due to the natural deepening of the workings due to the dip of the reefs. On page 45 a tabulation is given in which both fatality and reportable accident rates are given for the period 1989 to 1993. The arithmetic means of the rockburst fatality rates for the periods of five years are 0,13, 0,24 and 0,84 for the shallow, deep and ultra deep mines, respectively. These are very disconcerting figures. The rate for ultra deep mines is 3,5 and 6.3 times greater that those for deep and shallow mines respectively. When this information is considered in the light of the data given by the Chamber on


29

Currently eleven mines operate at depths greater than 2 100m and these produced 213 t of gold in 1993 or 34,4%. Most of the new mine projects are at depths below 2 000m. Prospecting suggests that ore bodies that might be mined in the future are at levels close to 3 000m. These numbers and predictions with respect to future trends in mining depths are cause for concern.

3.2.5 Some Environmental Factors Affecting Health

Health hazards will be discussed in Chapter 4, but no discussion of underground conditions in gold mines can avoid mentioning a group of hazards that relate to the physical conditions discussed in this chapter. These relate basically to the hard abrasive and toxic nature of the quartzite in which most of the mineralisation occurs in the Witwatersrand System. Largely because of the nature of the reefs, it has not been possible to adopt a modern mechanised mining method in most of the underground gold mines. This means that a large number of people are still involved in drilling blast holes using reciprocating compressed air drills. This drilling generates a lot of highly toxic dust (due to its quartz content). The drilling is also inherently noisy and involves a lot of vibration. While these problems can be mitigated to some extent (e.g. hydraulic drills are somewhat less noisy) the real solutions to these problems await the development of a new mechanised mining technology.

3.2.6 Conclusions and Some Remedies

This chapter has revealed that the deep gold mines operating in the Witwatersrand System are burdened by unusually onerous hazards, which have the potential to increase the perils of mining considerably. Possible trends suggest that the situation may become worse. How should the employers, the employees, and their respective associations, and the State react to this problem? This is an emotionally charged question to which there is no simple answer. The employers, in reality the shareholders in mining companies, made an investment in establishing the gold mines at a time when the morality of employing people in hazardous situations was not questioned. Their representatives, that is the company executives and managers, argue that the industry provides employment for nearly 400 000 people, and, including dependants provides a livelihood for some 1,6 to 2,8 million people who depend on the continued operation of the mines. This is a very significant number at a time when the country has several million unemployed. Furthermore, the gold mines in 1993 earned some R 23,2 billion in foreign currency, paid out R 8,4 billion in wages and salaries, spent some R 7,4 billion on purchases and paid R 1,305 billion in State revenue. In 1992 the industry paid R 1,3 billion in dividends to shareholders, and executives and managers were paid salaries. The Commission gained only a limited view of the opinions of ordinary mine workers. The statements by elected representatives raised complaints mainly about some areas of neglect and historical remnants that should be addressed as expeditiously as possible. They said relatively little about the major issues, the frightening rates of fatal and non-fatal accidents.


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There can be little doubt that mineworkers wish to see their conditions improved and the risks to which they are exposed reduced. However, they appear to realise that the speed at which changes are implemented needs to be moderated to preserve the viability of the mines. Thus there is commonality of view between the workers and employers, but of course, there are serious disagreements on the details of the implementation of the changes.

The position of the State is in the middle. The revenue, both the direct tax revenue and the generation of foreign exchange through the export of mineral commodities and products is important to the healthy growth of the South African economy. Hence the State also has a vested interest in preserving the mines. However, the State has another responsibility that must override its fiscal interest. Namely, it should ensure that its citizens and all those employed under its jurisdiction, are working in a reasonably safe and healthy environment. To this end it must create the appropriate legislation and the mechanism through which it can enforce the legislation. Thus, all parties involved have an interest in preserving a prosperous mining industry. However, all those who presented evidence to the Commission agreed, by the end of the public hearings, that the status quo can not continue any longer. Admittedly, there is a substantial, but perhaps not irreconcilable difference, in the details of the changes the parties wish to see implemented and in the rate at which they would like to see changes introduced. There is, however, another aspect of this problem that has not been covered in detail in the evidence provided by the parties. Legislative action alone will not alleviate sufficiently the problem of rockbursts, a problem that seems to become more acute as the depth of mining increases. Does the industry have the safety technology to improve the control of rockbursts despite the opposing trend arising from increased depths? This is a very pertinent question, the answer to which will probably play a determining role in the long term future of the industry. It would appear that the industry has not yet implemented fully the recommendations arising from past research. Thus some improvements could accrue from further introduction of measures discussed in Chapter 3.2.3. However, the evidence presented (Spottiswoode, Gurtunca, More O’Ferrall and others) leaves considerable doubt with regard to the efficacy of the available measures for combating the future rockburst hazard. Unless effective steps are taken to develop improvements in these defensive measures and / or in their implementation, the rockfall and rockburst problems will continue unabated and the risk may even increase over time. Unquestionably, a similar number of deaths and serious injuries would be unacceptable today in most advanced mining countries. It is predictable that the large number of injuries and fatalities will be less and less acceptable in South Africa also.

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that:- -appropriate steps should be taken to improve significantly the method of stope face and gully support using the most up to date and effective methods available (see Ch. 10.5.1); -in view of the inadequacy of training in rock engineering at all levels of the industry, comprehensive support regulations should be developed by a committee named the Mining Regulation Advisory Committee (MRAC) for enforcement by the GME’s staff (see Ch. 6 and Ch. 10.);


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-a comprehensive investigation should be instituted to determine the efficacy and relative merits of stabilising pillars and backfill as regional support; and -research should be intensified to seek ways and means of gaining better control of problems arising from rock failure as urgently as possible. Unless this is achieved within a reasonable time, the long term future of ultra deep mining is in jeopardy. 3.3 SAFETY PERFORMANCE IN COAL MINING

3.3.1 Accident Statistics

Coal mine accidents for 1993 are analysed in a similar way to that for gold mines in the following table.

TABLE 8: MOST SIGNIFICANT ACCIDENT TYPES IN COAL MINING

TYPES OF ACCIDENT INJURIES KILLED TOTAL Nr. % Nr. % Nr. %

C. Dust/Methane 1 0,4 53 58.9 54 14,6 Explosions Fall of Ground 60 21,5 21 23.3 81 22,0 Cumulative 61 21,9 74 82,2 135 36.6 Transport & Mining 94 33,7 11 12,2 105 28,5 Cumulative 155 55,6 85 94,4 240 65,1 Manual handling of 34 12,2 - 0 34 9,2 Material/Mineral Cumulative 189 67,7 85 94,4 274 74,3 Falling In/From 29 10,4 1 1,1 30 8,1 Slipping & Falling Cumulative 218 78,1 86 95,6 304 82,4 TOTAL 279 100,0 90 100,0 369 100,0

This table confirms an earlier observation. Explosions of methane and / or coal dust played a major role in the fatality statistics in coal mining for 1993. This category was responsible for one injury and 53 fatalities. Explosions of this kind are dreaded by all coal miners since they can occur even in the best managed industries and may be responsible for large numbers of fatalities. They tend to disturb the long term trend of statistics. It is tempting to suggest that trends should be examined after removing explosions from the reckoning. Unfortunately the situation in South Africa


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is not simple. Explosions seem to be part of a long term trend. The Chamber of Mines produced a research paper (COM Submissions Ch 22) entitled “Coal Mine Explosions”. In the course of the public hearing it became evident that the author of this paper was Professor H R Phillips, Professor of Mining Engineering in the University of the Witwatersrand, and to which he referred during his evidence. It contains a summary of the pertinent data concerning mine explosions in South African collieries since 1897, the year of the first recorded explosion. The table shows that the impact of explosions and the total number of fatalities has grown dramatically. To illustrate this point, the number of men killed in explosions, and the total number of fatalities were added for the 13 year period from 1981, (when an apparent lull in the occurrence of explosions ended), to 1993 inclusive. For the purposes of comparison, the exercise was repeated for two more periods of 13 years, to produce table 9.

TABLE 9: NUMBER OF PERSONS KILLED IN EXPLOSION AND TOTAL

NUMBER OF FATALITIES IN COAL MINES

PERIOD NUMBER KILLED TOTAL NUMBER PERCENTAGE (INCLUSIVE) IN EXPLOSIONS OF FATALITIES KILLED IN EXPLOSIONS 1955-1967 51 1,552 3,3 1968-1980 34 1,204 2,8 1981-1993 233 1,096 21,3

While strictly speaking the validity of choosing 13 year periods as a basis of comparison can be questioned, the inference from the table can hardly be challenged. Undoubtedly, since about the start of the 1980s mine explosions have become a major threat to safety in South African coal mines. This change is particularly significant because it represents a movement against the overall trend. The non-explosion fatalities during the periods 1968 - 80 and 1981 - 93 show a reduction of 22,1% and 42,5% respectively relative to the years 1955 - 67. Professor Phillips also provided some information to show that this phenomenon is contrary to the trends in advanced coal mining countries. He provided somewhat dated information with respect to the United Kingdom, where in more recent time no explosion causing loss of life has occurred since 1979. A similar rarity of explosions is seen in the USA, Australia, Germany and Canada. There was other information giving the impression the South Africa was not alone in its disheartening explosion record. The average number of non-explosion fatalities in coal mines was 55,5 per year during the last ten years. This is still a large number. In contrast, for example,


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during the year 1992 / 93 the total number of fatalities in New South Wales, Australia was four. According to the Annual Report for 92/93 of the Department of Mineral Resources, New South Wales, coal production in the State for that period was 84 million tons, and the number of persons employed was 15 820 for 91/92. The fatality rates in South Africa and in Australia are 0.91 (ten year average, excluding explosions) and 0,25 per 1 000 employed respectively. It is true that the proportion of surface mined coal is somewhat higher in NSW than in South Africa, but the less favourable underground conditions would tend to compensate for this advantage. The second largest cause of injuries is falls of ground. The Commission did not have much evidence with regard to this problem, which prevents the formulation of specific comments.

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that this matter be further investigated.

3.3.2 The Explosion Hazard in Coal Mines

Two of the most important lines of defence against coal mine explosions involve the avoidance of ignitions of methane, and the containment of the damaging effects that can occur if an ignition develops into an explosion. -prevention of Methane Ignitions. The evidence before the Commission indicated that the majority of ignitions occurred in bord and pillar workings. These ignitions were initiated almost exclusively near the working faces or in the goaf. It was argued that South African coals are harder to cut and therefore there is a greater likelihood that sparks are generated in the course of coal cutting. If a greater frequency of sparking is expected in South African collieries during coal cutting then much greater vigilance must be exercised to ensure that if sparks do occur, they do not encounter fuel to initiate an ignition or an explosion. The primary site for the prevention of ignitions is the working face. The greatest problem is likely to be encountered at or near the coal faces in bord and pillar workings. Due to the chequer-bord layout the faces are away from the main airflow much of the time. Unless determined efforts are made to achieve improvements, the ventilation of these headings is likely to remain inadequate to clear methane and dust. The aspects that require attention include distance from cross ventilation, minimum air velocity, height of working, recirculation, air quantity and quality, coursing of air from one working face to another and of course, the methane content of the air near the cutting picks. Evidence placed before the Commission and observations during visits appeared to indicate that insufficient vigilance is applied by management and the inspectorate to ensure the satisfactory control of the ventilation of working faces in bord and pillar workings. Less opportunity arose to examine the measures applied to control methane in goaf areas, but history and the evidence of Mr M J Deats of Eskom suggested that this problem also requires attention.


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-control of Coal Dust Explosions.

The Chamber of Mines in its submission stated categorically that the recent explosions which have devastated some of the collieries were methane explosions.

No evidence was presented to support this assertion, which was disputed by others. The Commission feels that the possibility of the involvement of coal dust in the explosions cannot be excluded. To explain the largest explosions it is necessary to postulate either the presence of a widespread accumulation of methane in a mixture with air within the explosive range, or the involvement of coal dust in the propagation. While the former explanation may be true of some of the disasters, it would reveal an incredible failure on the part of management if major accumulations of methane were the principal fuel of all explosions. Consequently the contribution of coal dust to the severity of at least some of the explosions cannot be disregarded, it is necessary, therefore, to intensify measures to prevent the spread of explosions. The primary measures of protection against the propagation of coal dust explosions are; -the cleaning up of all coal dust in the face area that can be lifted into the air to form a dust air mixture. Only very small quantities of coal dust are required to create this mixture; -dust abatement by wetting; and -stone or rock dusting so that inert dust is mixed with the coal dust in sufficient quantity to make the mixture inert. In addition to these measures in many countries, especially where longwall mining is practised, stone dust barriers or water barriers are also mandated. A notable exception in this regard is the USA where such barriers are not prescribed. In Australian coal mines barriers are used in conveyor belt roadways only. The current South African regulations make the use of barriers optional. The use of barriers has been the subject of much international debate. There can be little doubt that if they can be applied effectively, they are an important defensive measure. The debate has centred around the effectiveness of barriers in particular situations. Experts argue that, where the bord and pillar system is the primary method of mining, a multiplicity of drives is available and they are laid out on a chequer-board pattern. The application of barriers is cumbersome and expensive and, at the same time, provides doubtful protection. In the European type of longwall mining, where limited numbers of entries (gates) are used, the efficiency of barriers is not in doubt.

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that:- -methods of face ventilation should be subjected to an immediate and aggressive review; -the relevant provisions of US Code of Federal Regulations, Mineral Resources, Title 30 (Part 75 - Mandatory Safety Standards - Underground Coal Mines, Sub part D ventilation, para 75.3.) should be studied in detail;


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-tripartite groups should visit collieries in USA, Europe and Australia to study methods applied in these countries for face and goaf ventilation, stone dusting and the use of stone dust barriers. 3.4 General Safety Problems

This review of safety hazards would not be complete without mentioning other major hazards that may not occur regularly on annual statistical returns, but constitute hazards that can lead, and have in recent years in South Africa led, to major catastrophes. 3.4.1 Underground Fires

Fires in the underground environment are even more dangerous that they are on the surface. Mine ventilation has to be coursed through the elaborate workings of a mine, so that if a fire occurs anywhere in the underground working, all persons who may be working on the return side of that place, that is, all passages leading to the upcast air shaft, will be affected by the smoke and the deadly carbon monoxide or other toxic products of the fire that kill in a very short space of time. In coal mines some coals, by their nature can ignite spontaneously, and this spontaneous combustion possibility can add to the problems of fire in coal mines. It was an underground fire that caused the disaster at the Kinross Mine in 1986 when 177 mineworkers were killed by the products of combustion of the fire. The fire started when welding equipment was used and a spark ignited the highly flammable polyurethane lining of an air intake roadway. The mineworkers who were on the return side of the fire perished, although many were a long way from the seat of the fire. Underground fires always provide a reminder that flammable or combustible materials should not be used or stored below ground without the consent of the enforcing authority. There are many materials that, because of their flammability and the toxic fumes they produce when consumed in a fire, should not be used below ground. Rubber and polyurethane fall into this category. Mineral oil has featured as a fuel in many underground fires and its use in electrical equipment used below ground can form a major hazard. Some materials can be made fire resistant to approved standards to make them acceptable for use below ground. Materials and operations that produce open sparking or heat that can start a fire should be prohibited or carefully controlled by the enforcing authority. Some coals and other materials can ignite spontaneously under certain conditions, and the control of coal mine workings which are liable to spontaneous combustion calls for special management skills. Fire fighting equipment and the organisation necessary at a mine to operate fire fighting procedures are specified in regulations, and should be carefully inspected periodically by the enforcing authority. Means of escape, self rescue equipment, well equipped underground rescue bays, a good mine communication system, and a full rescue service that is available quickly in the event of an emergency are all requirements essential for dealing with the threat of fires in mines.


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3.4.2 External Dangers to Mine Workings

Mine workings sometimes encroach on adjacent old mine workings, either accidentally or as part of the working plans, and mine headings sometimes approach bodies of surface water or material which flows when wet. Disasters have occurred when such operations have gone wrong, and mining regulations set out parameters which must be followed when these hazards are present. Normally the dimensions of these workings are regulated and test drilling in advance of the leading excavation is required to prove the safety of the operation.

3.4.3 Entombment Below Ground

Many mining accidents can result in persons being trapped in remote underground workings, sometimes without communication to the outside world. Falls of ground can result in this situation, which often attracts great public and media attention. Mine regulatory codes usually limit the number of persons that can be employed in dead ends from which there is only one way of escape, in order to limit the magnitude of possible disaster. In shallow mine workings such as many of the coal mines of South Africa it may be possible to drill large diameter holes from the surface to where the persons are trapped below ground, pass food and communication to those trapped, and raise them to the surface using special capsules designed to fit the boreholes of about 0,5m diameter. The South African mining industry has already demonstrated its expertise in this technology when called to rescue men trapped underground at a mine in an adjacent territory. In deep mines this is not possible and mining operations must be designed to avoid the possibility of entombment.

3.4.4 Explosives and Blasting

Explosives and their initiating mechanisms are used in very large quantities in the South African mining industry, especially in the hard rock mines where the strata cannot be broken by other means, such as in the gold and platinum mines.

The storage, transportation and use of explosives are hazardous operations, that require well trained persons, knowledgeable in the correct method of use. This is why the issue of blasting certificates is controlled by the enforcing authority. Explosive when initiated produce large volumes of gases, some of them toxic, and considerable heat and flame which can ignite methane, flammable gasses or coal dust if present near the shothole. Historically, the use of explosives has caused many major coal mine explosions, and research efforts over the years have developed explosives and initiators that are far less likely to ignite methane or flammable gases than earlier explosives. These explosives developed for mining work where flammable gas is a hazard are termed “permitted” explosives, and have lower flame and heat emission, but they can never be made absolutely safe because of the large amount of energy that an explosive charge has to generate. They must always be used and handled with care, and mining regulations are designed to ensure this.


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3.4.5 Shafts and Winding Hazards

Mine workings must be accessed by shafts, sometimes inclined, but more usually vertical. Sinking these shafts is one of the more hazardous mining operations with large groups of men working vertically below other necessary operations, drilling rounds of holes, charging and blasting them, and removing the debris. In an operating mine large numbers of persons must be raised and lowered through these shafts, before and after each shift, and all the mineral worked in the mine must be raised to the surface through these shafts. South Africa has many of the deepest shafts in the world and is a world leader in the winding technology necessary for these operations to be performed safely. The winding operations are inherently hazardous and the Commission heard evidence (Horne pp 1175 - 1199) concerning some of the problems associated with winding systems from great depths. Clearly, there is a need for careful regulation of the design, maintenance, testing and operation of these systems, if accidents are to be avoided.

3.4.6 Mine Waste Tips and Lagoons

Mining operations require waste to be deposited on the surface, and dams and lagoons to be built to retain slimes, waste fluids or water. There have been major disasters when these structures have failed suddenly. Both solid and liquid waste can be released with great violence and engulf communities that may be housed in the path of the released waste. This escaping waste can also enter nearby shafts causing men to be trapped below ground. It is imperative therefore, that these waste tips and lagoons be treated as civil engineering structures, that their foundations be tested for suitability before they are built, that their design and shape is satisfactory for the material to be contained, and that periodic inspections by competent persons are adequate to detect any deterioration at an early stage so that remedial measures can be taken to strengthen the structure timeously. Unfortunately the sound regulations necessary to ensure that these matters receive attention are only put into effect after major catastrophes occur.

3.5 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

A review of the accident statistics and other relevant evidence reveals that the South African mining industry not only has a poor safety record but is also beset by extremely serious particular problems. The combination of rock falls and rockbursts in the gold mining industry presents a threat that is unique in its severity. The solution to this problem, if it is to be found at all, will have to come from within the industry. The coal mining industry has experienced a series of underground explosions resulting in a large number of fatalities during the last decade or so. The technical solutions to this problem are known, as attested to by the enviable record of several countries.


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It is important to emphasise that even if the accidents due to these particular problems were to be removed, the safety record is still poor. South Africa often prides itself as being amongst the most advanced mining countries in the world. This claim is true in many respects, but it is certainly not valid with regard to safety. The Commission observed with some disquiet the tendency of many senior mining officials to attribute the poor record to physical and human factors beyond the industry’s control. The COMMISSION BELIEVES that the claim of special difficulties, which undoubtedly exist in some instances, does not absolve the boards of companies, the shareholders and the management from the responsibility of caring, and the need to make a special effort to overcome these problems. The Commission recognises that the South African mining industry, together with other industries, faces a very serious human difficulty. While the educational system for the underprivileged majority was never acceptable, it has virtually broken down since the mid 1970s. As a result there is a very high degree of illiteracy in the labour force and the general level of education is dismayingly low. No other advanced mining industry appears to face a similar situation, and this is a very special problem that requires a great deal of attention. It greatly hinders the development of effective safety training and communication, and undoubtedly contributes to this poor safety record. However, the recurring management apology, when paraphrased, claims that - “the systems in place are fine and the accidents are due to human errors”. There is no moral basis for this excuse. The theoretical solutions are relatively obvious, but difficult and slow to implement in practice. Management must engineer the systems so as to minimise the opportunity for human error, and train all ranks of the workforce to act in accordance with the sound procedures in place. The report will return to these issues in Chapter 6. The severity of hazards in the industry can be measured by either a rate or by the absolute number of persons injured. The rate is a measure of risk to which a certain category of employee is exposed. Hence, for it to be meaningful, a rate should relate to a specified category of employee. A rate is a ratio, where the numerator and the denominator contain the number of incidents (e.g. injuries, fatalities etc.) and the measure of exposure, respectively. In the past the rates were often calculated by referring to the total number employed (e.g. 1000 in employment). In modern times the aim is to obtain a more meaningful measure of risk, hence the numbers employed in a particular category or workplace are used, If a rate is to be used for comparison between industries, it is advisable to give the denominator in hours of exposure per year. Both the absolute numbers and the rates have practical significance. The absolute numbers give measures to the industry and to society in general of the burden of accidents. Experience elsewhere has shown that serious injuries and fatalities are associated with ever increasing costs. Thus, as the cost of medical treatment, compensation, interruption of production, payment of fines etc. will increase in South Africa, the motivation to keep the absolute numbers of accidents as low as possible will increase. Rates are particularly relevant to a worker, as they reveal in a meaningful way his or her risk of injury or death. Thus, an employee should have a particularly strong motivation to see rates reduced.


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The Commission heard evidence that suggested that risk management was the appropriate tool to handle the safety problems of the mining industry. World wide experience supports this view. It is essential, therefore, to tackle those problems most urgently that are likely to produce the most benefits. Clearly, measures that improve accident rates significantly will reduce both the risk to the employee and the total cost of accidents to the employer. The total burden of the number injured can also be reduced by improvement in productivity, provided that change in work practices does not induce a higher risk. The introduction of longwall coal mining into the USA is a good example in this regard. This step has led to dual benefits of a lower rate of incidents and, due to higher productivity, a lower number of persons exposed to risk.

The COMMISSIONER RECOMMENDS that:- -the mining industry should develop a methodology for targeting the most pressing hazards using specific plans developed for the purpose; -risk Management is a tool that could be employed for the purpose; -the gold mining industry should not lose sight of the self evident fact that higher productivity is a crucial means of reducing the large number of serious and fatal injuries; and -when the South African Mining Regulations are reformed by MRAC, the matters raised in Chapter 3 should be taken into account.


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CHAPTER FOUR

HEALTH AT WORK IN THE MINING INDUSTRY 4.1 INTRODUCTION

4.1.1 The causes of diseases which occur among workers as a result of their occupation are, in general, well understood, even if the exact biochemical mechanism by which the disease is produced is not yet understood in detail. In almost all circumstances adverse health effects are preventable by controlling the workplace environment, and where this is not possible the worker must be removed or appropriate personal protective equipment must be provided and used. This apparently straightforward relationship between exposure and disease is often complicated by the long delay between first exposure to a potentially harmful agent and the manifestation of detectable health effects; by the failure to identify the full range of hazards to which the individual workers or groups of workers are exposed and the consequent effects; by the failure to measure actual exposures in the workplace accurately; or by the interaction of workplace and other factors. The control of occupational disease is, therefore, much more difficult than it may appear at first sight.

In South Africa no discussion of occupational disease is complete without taking into account the link between the migrant labour system and the long lag period between exposure and disease manifestation. Many workers will develop work related disease after they have returned to their rural homes, where appropriate facilities for investigation and diagnosis may be non-existent. In the absence of well equipped and appropriately staffed diagnostic or recognition centres, which are accessible to retired miners, there will be serious under ascertainment and the social costs will be carried by the spouse and children or by the extended family, or by the community at large. The importance of under ascertainment in determining attitudes towards the problem of occupational disease can not be over emphasised, and should be borne in mind throughout the reading of this chapter of the report. Current figures for the extent and severity of the problem of occupational disease among miners are certainly an underestimate.

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that a deliberate and sustained effort be made to identify the undetected cases of occupational disease among former mineworkers, in order to derive more accurate estimates of the incidence.

Sustained action to ensure a safe working environment, and to demonstrate the absence of adverse health effects among the workforce, is required over long periods of time. It may also be necessary to introduce effective control measures for diseases which are common in the community at large, including those which occur as a result of the conditions under which workers live, or to modify lifestyle in order to ensure the well-being of workers. The word well-being is used advisedly to emphasize that health is more than just the absence of disease. Carefully designed protocols for the collection of essential data are required, and expertise in epidemiological and biostatistical techniques is indispensable, if trends are to be accurately monitored. Evidence submitted to the Commission demonstrates


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clearly the general failure to collect and use data effectively. There is, as a result, uncertainty among experts as to the reliability of the numerators and denominators used to calculate the incidence, the prevalence or the severity of the disease. In addition, it is essential to ensure that the earliest evidence of disease (deviation from the normal) is detected. This will require standardised measurement techniques using calibrated instruments, and standardised methods of interpreting the results. International co-operation to ensure comparability of radiographs and lung function tests are examples which the mining industry cannot ignore any longer. The constructive use of the data which are available is further complicated by the existence of several distinct data sets which conflict because the data are collected according to differing criteria. It is also a matter of concern that in recent years the quality of the statutory reports, and the publication of regular annual medical reports by the mining houses, have declined to unacceptable levels. Even more serious is the fact that no method exists for linking environmental measurements to individual workers or to homogeneous risk groups.

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that immediate attention be given to amalgamating and reconciling the disparate data bases, to ensuring that as much data as possible be made freely available in the public domain, and that mining companies be required to publish an annual health and safety report.

The general overview of the inherent characteristics of diseases of occupation, and of the migrant labour system, leads inevitably to the conclusion that it will be necessary for regulations, or approved codes of practice, to specify the sampling strategy and the methods to be used in measuring workplace exposure; the type and frequency of medical examinations; and the statistical returns required from all mines, regardless of size. Administrative arrangements will be required to ensure that all miners have access to recognition centres after they retire, or cease to work in mines for some other reason.

4.1.2 Internationally, occupational diseases are classified into four groups:

-those that are exclusively occupational in origin; -those in which workplace exposure is one of the possible causes; -diseases originating from a combination of social, economic and environmental factors, including occupation; and -pre-existing conditions which may be made worse by workplace exposure. The interaction of quartz, tuberculosis and smoking in the causation of lung disease among miners illustrates the complexity of the situation very well, and emphasises the occupational health expertise required for effective control. Important as lung disease undoubtedly is, the variety of minerals mined in South Africa, and the large number of chemical processes employed in mines should be kept in focus if we are not to fall once again into the trap of paying attention only to dust.

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that all mines should be required to approach the problem of workplace exposure systematically by listing the hazardous substances used or produced in any part of the process, and to set out and submit their protocols for controlling exposure and monitoring the


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health of workers. This matter should be considered by MRAC when re-drafting the regulations.

4.1.3 Some of the diseases of importance in the mines are listed in the Occupational

Diseases in Mines and Works Act (Act No 78 of 1973). In addition the schedule which forms part of the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act (Act No 130 of 1993) lists the diseases compensatable in all workers, including miners. As a result occupational disease in miners must be reported to the appropriate one of two authorities responsible for certifying the presence or absence of the condition in a particular individual. Pneumoconiosis, for example, is reported to the Medical Bureau for Occupational Diseases (MBOD), whereas noise induced hearing loss is reported to the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner but is dealt with administratively by the Rand Mutual Insurance Company. This must be a source of confusion, and must, in some cases at least, penalise the worker, given the rapid turnover of medical practitioners on most large mines and the employment of part time doctors without postgraduate training in occupational health to provide services on most smaller mines.

A general lack of information about the administrative procedures for reporting cases of occupational disease leads not only to statistical errors but contributes to the prevailing inaction in dealing with adverse working conditions.

The COMMSSION RECOMMENDS that a comprehensive manual setting out the administrative procedures for reporting suspected cases of occupational disease should be published, taking into account any new provisions that result from the deliberations of the Commission.

4.1.4 The majority of mine-workers are, and will continue for some time to be, migrants. They may come from within South Africa or from any of the countries of the subcontinent. As a result it is essential to examine workers at regular intervals after they have retired from active employment. Practically no facilities exist for the examination and investigation of former mine-workers, either in this country or adjoining States.

Evidence shows that where such facilities have been established, for example at Groote Schuur Hospital, the commonest occupation associated with the diagnosis of silicosis is work on the gold mines. This is despite the huge distance between the facility and the major gold mining areas, and is due to the movement of migrant labourers from the Eastern Cape who have previously worked on gold mines in the Orange Free State and the Transvaal.

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that administrative arrangements should be made by the Department of Health to ensure that all occupational health facilities and academic medical centres offer benefit examinations to former mine-workers. In the rural areas, and in areas where a provincial or a district hospital is the only accessible health facility, special arrangements will have to be made to train and equip staff, and to ensure that the administrative procedures are understood. Liaison with the health departments of neighbouring countries will be necessary to establish facilities accessible to workers who have returned to those countries in very large numbers – in particular Lesotho, Mozambique, Malawi, Swaziland and Botswana. The existing infrastructure of the Employment Bureau of Africa, established for the recruitment of labour, could assist with these administrative arrangements.


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4.1.5 It is evident that in writing this account of the evidence submitted to the

Commission, and in attempting to arrive at a coherent set of recommendations to deal with the health problems which are recognised by all parties to the discussion, much of the work done by the Commission of Inquiry on Occupational Health (Erasmus RP 55/1976) is being repeated. It would be an oversight not to draw attention to the contents of that report, and to state clearly that the findings and recommendations put on record for industrial undertakings other than mines in the 1970s are in the main valid for the mining industry in the 1990s as regards occupational health. It may be instructive for readers of this report to re-read the report of that commission.

4.1.6 In the field of occupational health, or in any other specialised area of medical

science, argument by assertion is unlikely to prove very persuasive. In the original submission of the COM, comment on health in the mining industry is restricted to two and a half pages. It is difficult to understand why no meaningful attempt was made to provide the Commission with comprehensive information about the trends in the incidence of the diseases of importance. No references to scientific studies were added to the brief statement on pages 48 - 50 of the submission.

4.1.7 Implicit throughout the evidence led on behalf of the industry is the assertion that

society as a whole chose to exploit the mineral resources of the country, and that therefore society and the industry are jointly involved in dealing with the adverse effects because otherwise society would have remained largely agrarian (COM page 2 para 1).

This raises the question as to whether the concern of this Commission should be confined to the health and safety of the workforce, or whether some attempts should be made to determine the cost to society of the injury and disease which result from mineral exploitation.

4.1.8 The evidence presented by the organisations representing workers takes the form of

a number of expert commentaries which analyse, in the light of the scientific evidence available, the health status of the workforce, and thereby define the areas in which action is required. Inevitably the Commission is in a position in which reference will be made more frequently to evidence submitted on behalf of workers.

4.1.9 Evidence from community based studies as to the impact of the mining industry on

the societies from which migrant labour has been recruited is derived from the work of scientists working at the National Centre for Occupational Health (NCOH) and from the detailed commentary by Professor Wilson. In the absence of scientific evidence to substantiate the claim, the assertion that the industry has been, uniformly, a social benefit can not be accepted. As in so many other areas, the true situation is a trade off between the benefits and the adverse effects of a particular industrial activity. Informed opinions can only be formed, and realistic decisions be taken on the basis of accurate information. One of the major aspects on which information is lacking is the social cost of the employment of migrant labour.


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4.2 EXISTING LEGISLATION: THE MINERALS ACT (ACT NO 50 OF 1991)

It is important at the outset to examine the health content of the Act in some detail if the proposals to replace it are to be clearly understood, subject to the general proviso that the mere use of the word health does not automatically imply that it is used in an informed way. Health in the context of the workplace has specific connotations which do not necessarily apply in other health fields. Most importantly, health at work is related to the environmental conditions in which work is done, and any separation of health effects from environmental conditions is inappropriate. Despite the fact that this may add to the length of the Commission’s Report, the existing legislation must be scrutinised from two distinct points of view to establish whether it is effective or not for the control of both health and safety.

A detailed commentary on the text of the Minerals Act is contained in Appendix 7

4.2.1 It is a matter for concern that throughout the Minerals Act itself, and also in much of

the written and oral evidence given to the Commission the words “safety and health” or “health and safety” are coupled in an apparently random fashion. It is frequently the case that where the two words are used together initially, the subsequent discussion or section of the Act refers only to safety. This suggests a preoccupation with safety, and implies an inevitable neglect of health. More importantly it suggests pervasive loose thinking, not only on the part of those giving evidence but among those responsible for drafting and promulgating the legislation. There is no doubt from the evidence that this neglect of health is reflected in the activities, training and skills of the mines inspectorate, and in the attitude of management and management organisations. It also accounts for the fact that the Department responsible for the health of miners has no health professional on its staff, and for the fact that, under the guise of “rationalisation” the MBOD was transferred from the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs (DMEA) to the Department of Health (DoH). Contact between the DMEA and the DoH is confined in practice to the decision to control mines in terms of the ODMW Act and the administrative procedures involved in the determination of risk.

4.3 EXISTING REGULATIONS: MADE IN TERMS OF THE MINERALS ACT.

Discussion of the enabling statute, which is clearly inadequate leads logically to an examination of the existing Regulations, promulgated in terms of that Act, to decide whether the provisions of the Regulations compensate effectively for these deficiencies. This is a priori, unlikely.

A detailed commentary on the text of the regulations made in terms of the Minerals Act is contained in Appendix 7.

4.3.2 Ventilation is vital for the protection of health.

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that all the regulations made in connection with ventilation requirements should be scrutinised to ensure that they conform to modern standards.


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4.3.3 Regulation of exposure to diesel fumes is controversial and in view of the increasing use of diesel engines, particularly in coal mines, the COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that this matter be re-examined in detail, and that definitive research studies are essential.

4.3.4 The COMMISSIONER CONCLUDES that the content of the regulations does not

compensate for the deficiencies in the enabling Act, particularly in respect of occupational medicine. There are insufficiently detailed provisions relating to gasses and dust in Chapter 10 of the regulations, and regulations which directly concern the health of workers are interspersed among those which regulate the operation of machinery or the mechanics of ventilation.

4.3.5 Regulations for the examination of workers are made in terms of the ODMW Act for

those diseases defined in that Act. It is a matter for concern that no new regulations have been promulgated in terms of the ODMW Act since it was promulgated in 1973, and that the ODMW Act is no longer the responsibility of the DMEA.

4.3.6 The Commission is led to the conclusion that the Minerals Act and the derived

regulations are inadequate for the prevention, control and early recognition of work related health conditions. This suggests, a priori that occupational diseases will not be shown to have been satisfactorily controlled.

4.3.7 The critical point which is missing from the legislation is the risk assessment

process. Unless the legislation is amended to set in train a process enforceable in terms of explicit regulations or approved codes of practice, and unless exposure and outcome are linked through systematic data collection and analysis the present uncertain and unsatisfactory situation will continue. The opportunity to revise and rearrange the whole body of regulations under the supervision of a tripartite committee, should not be missed as the present arrangement does not make the regulations easy to use.

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS urgent revision of the whole body of the regulations in line with the many recommendations made throughout this chapter and elsewhere in the report, and that the process of revision pay due regard to practice elsewhere, and that professional and technical experts be involved ab initio. 4.4 OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES IN MINES

4.4.1 The cause of a particular disease is not always a single agent, nor is the manifestation of disease uniform in all individuals exposed to the same working conditions. Disease may be the resultant of a number of causes, some of which are specific to the workplace and others unrelated to occupation. Commonly occupational and life style factors interact to produce disease, for example, chronic obstructive airways disease in persons exposed to dust who smoke, or tuberculosis in dust exposed miners living in hostels or overcrowded slums and squatter settlements adjacent to mines.

4.4.2 Real understanding of the pattern of disease in a community or group depends not

only on determining the outcome (the incidence of a particular disease) but also on relating exposure at work to subsequent disease. This is studied to establish a dose-


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response relationship, which in turn is used to determine acceptable levels of exposure. Successful intervention to reduce the burden of disease attributable to work will depend on the accurate identification of risk, not only by agent but by task and by location.

4.4.3 All the evidence presented to the Commission supports the view that urgent action is

required to upgrade the standards of practice in respect of the measurement of workplace exposures, medical surveillance and the matching of these two data sets, and the COMMISSION RECOMMENDS accordingly. Only in this way can the workplaces which actually lead to disease in workers be identified and targeted for remedial action.

4.4.4 A safe working environment will remain a goal which cannot be reached so long as

the fundamentals of occupational health are not more widely understood than appears to be the case at present. Evidence submitted to the Commission established clearly the central role of the process of risk assessment. This process must begin with the establishment of an expert occupational health programme provided at or near work places. This is prescribed in terms of the OHS Act by Section 8(2) (d) which will be dealt with in the Commission’s Recommendations.

4.5 TRENDS IN OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE INCIDENCE OR PREVALENCE

4.5.1 All witnesses agreed (either implicitly or explicitly) that there are considerable difficulties in determining trends. As was stated elsewhere these difficulties include uncertainties in respect of both the numerators and the denominators used in making the calculations. Numerators are unreliable as a result of widespread under ascertainment, due, inter alia to defects in medical surveillance, under reporting, the migrant labour system and the characteristic long lag period of many occupational diseases. Denominator difficulties arise from the use of global figures for the number of workers employed and the difficulty in establishing the size of particular risk groups, such as stope workers, accurately. In many calculations data from mines of widely differing depth and geographical location are aggregated, and in the case of minerals other than gold, platinum and coal, a wide spectrum of mines producing anything from andalusite to zinc are treated as a single group.

4.5.2 A further complication is introduced by the division, in terms of the ODMW Act, of

mines into those which are controlled and those which are not, and by the separation of those mines which are owned by companies which are members of the COM into a separate group, and a proportion of mines do not report at all. Meaningful discussion of the health risks and the health trends in the mining industry will be difficult, if not impossible, until all mines are grouped by process and valid measurements made of the environmental conditions in all mines.

4.5.3 The detailed evidence submitted to the Commission in writing and orally,

approaches the problem in a systematic manner. No evidence was submitted to suggest that occupational diseases had been adequately controlled by the industry as a result of the existing regulatory system. The written submissions of Drs. White and Leger, supplemented by those of the Work Place Information Group and the Industrial Health Research Group, enabled the Commission to appreciate the nature and scope of the health problems in the industry.


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4.5.4 Dr. White, a specialist in the field of lung disease, in a submission running to more than 120 pages, citing 134 references to mainly South African scientific studies, demonstrated that those response relationships have been established in South Africa and elsewhere for exposure to quartz and subsequent silicosis, for exposure to asbestos fibre and subsequent non-malignant and malignant asbestos related diseases, for length of mining experience or quartz exposure and pulmonary tuberculosis, and for exposure to mine air and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. A number of other diseases are also known to be associated with work in mines. It has also been shown that severity of disease and life expectancy are negatively correlated.

4.5.5 In determining the trends in incidence there are, it is agreed by White, Leger and

others, formidable difficulties in establishing reliable numerators and denominators, as discussed above, and in piecing together fragments of information held by the various agencies involved, viz. the DMEA, the DoH, the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner, the Rand Mutual Insurance Company, individual mines or mining conglomerates, etc. On balance it appears that there is no conclusive evidence of a downward trend in the incidence or prevalence of any of the diseases of major concern in the mining industry.

4.5.6 More importantly the evidence suggests that in almost all instances there is evidence

of under ascertainment of the number of cases, and that stabilisation of the workforce is likely to increase the incidence and the prevalence of occupational diseases among the smaller number of persons now employed in mines. Leger (pp 73-77) concludes that as occupational diseases are related to prolonged exposure in the work environment, increased length of exposure on its own will result in an increased incidence of disease. However at least two other factors are likely to contribute to what may prove to be a very significant increase in the incidence of pneumoconiosis, noise induced hearing loss and tuberculosis. Prior to stabilisation workers commonly left the industry before the disease became manifest, but as an increasing proportion remain in employment for 20 years or more they will develop the disease while still within range of diagnostic services. The position will be compounded in respect of pulmonary disease by the fact that older workers are more susceptible to tuberculosis.

Leger then cites evidence from a number of sources to show that, despite the fact that “No direct measures of mine service or the age profile of the workforce as a whole exists”, the demographic change is surprisingly rapid. A series of studies of autopsy data shows that in 1988 58% of miners dying in service were between 20 and 29 years of age, but by 1992 the comparable figure was 19%.

4.5.7 Solutions to the problem depend on “the replacement of the pre-1993 system of

medical intervention with one that is equitable and not racially discriminatory, effective in both the prevention and early detection of work related diseases, accessible and affordable, participatory and non-coercive and in addition to adequate compensation, also offers retraining or alternative placement options to miners with work related diseases” (White, p 78). It is also evident that much of the information has been held in confidence by management and that access to mines for research purposes has not been easy to obtain. There is some evidence that as a result of the Commission’s deliberations this will change.


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4.5.8 Medical intervention must include “initial fitness certification, periodic examination, exit examinations and benefit examinations” (White, p 78). The term “benefit examination” is in common use to describe examinations carried out at the request of persons who are no longer in employment in the mines but who have been exposed to dust or other risks in the past.

4.5.9 Regulations should provide for both the frequency of examination and the type of

testing to be carried out. The schedule taken from Dr. White’s written submission (Table 10) illustrates the fact that a properly planned series of examinations has obvious advantages over slavish adherence to periodic X-ray examinations, and may well be more cost effective. The details of the schedule may vary from mine to mine but all will include the elements required to enable the authorities to compile a uniform data set for all mines.

TABLE 10: PROPOSED SCHEDULING OF HEALTH INTERVENTIONS FOR MINES TIMING INTERVENTION

YEARS HEALTH LARGE PULMONARY TUBERCULOSIS AUDIOGRAM OF PROMOTION CHEST FUNCTION SCREENING SERVICE X-RAY TEST 1 + + + * + 2 + + + 3 + 4 + 5 + + + * + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 10 + + + * + 11 + 12 + + + * + 13 + 14 + + + * + 15 + 16 + + + * + 17 + 18 + + + * + 19 + 20 + + + * + etc EXIT EXAM + + + * +

*CXR not required in TB screening this year


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4.5.10 Official figures for the number of cases of occupational disease certified in terms of the ODMW Act are published annually in the report to Parliament of the Director of the MBOD. Table 11 shows the total number of cases of pneumoconiosis, tuberculosis and pneumoconiosis with tuberculosis certified each year since 1974. The certifications of first and second degrees of disability in persons previously classified as white or coloured includes both pneumoconiosis and chronic obstructive lung disease, whereas in the case of those previously classified as black practically all certifications classified as compensatable disease were for pneumoconiosis.

TABLE 11: CERTIFICATION UNDER ACT 78 OF 1973

WHITES AND COLOUREDS

LIVING DECEASED PERIOD 1ST 2ND 2+T T Total 1ST 2ND 2+T T Total 10/73 - 3/74 248 14 13 19 294 40 3 5 1 49 4/74 - 3/75 525 102 35 50 712 172 21 14 2 209 4/75 - 3/76 521 114 52 59 746 227 17 18 4 266 4/76 - 3/77 558 101 58 70 787 218 17 24 6 265 4/77 - 3/78 537 102 58 74 771 222 13 14 5 254 4/78 - 3/79 480 200 64 62 806 214 18 21 9 262 4/79 - 3/80 393 176 41 74 684 258 22 20 12 312 4/80 - 3/81 376 169 32 61 638 292 23 27 6 348 4/81 - 3/82 344 149 28 45 566 255 23 22 3 303 4/82 - 3/83 370 153 36 59 618 237 30 17 4 288 4/83 - 3/84 327 141 40 55 563 229 35 36 5 305 4/84 - 3/85 422 149 34 44 649 249 24 22 7 302 4/85 - 3/86 458 157 48 67 730 169 31 30 11 241 4/86 - 3/87 583 124 52 73 832 191 25 32 7 255 4/87 - 3/88 655 160 55 58 928 169 23 21 9 222 4/88 - 3/89 543 132 59 74 808 159 21 33 13 226 4/89 - 3/90 408 108 39 83 638 154 23 22 12 211 4/90 - 12/91 1256 324 1/91 - 12/92 320 150 39 84 593 155 45 24 15 239 13619 4881


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CERTIFCATION UNDER ACT 78 OF 1973: BLACKS

LIVING DECEASED PERIOD CD CD+T T/c T/a Total 1ST 2ND 2+T T Total 10/73 - 3/74 323 578 981 192 2074 152 43 35 2 232 4/74 - 3/75 740 1055 1900 421 4116 325 55 66 6 452 4/75 - 3/76 847 1312 2293 549 5001 440 60 109 4 613 4/76 - 3/77 1077 1389 2692 508 5666 359 46 73 3 481 4/77 - 3/78 1039 1153 2795 361 5348 344 58 94 3 499 4/78 - 3/79 774 759 3042 414 4989 330 68 103 1 502 4/79 - 3/80 660 620 3071 300 4651 385 61 84 4 534 4/80 - 3/81 682 968 3175 305 5130 491 86 107 0 684 4/81 - 3/82 620 913 2978 276 4787 423 76 111 3 613 4/82 - 3/83 660 793 3273 154 4880 406 74 103 2 585 4/83 - 3/84 649 890 3424 205 5168 415 78 130 2 625 4/84 - 3/85 576 669 3217 117 4579 463 83 108 1 655 4/85 - 3/86 2282 646 3534 177 6639 414 95 119 4 632 4/86 - 3/87 2414 599 3964 152 6859 451 130 116 2 699 4/87 - 3/88 2927 606 3390 130 7053 420 97 112 2 631 4/88 - 3/89 2211 674 3678 136 6699 455 85 156 3 699 4/89 - 3/90 1215 487 3939 164 5805 277 67 126 2 472 4/90 - 12/91 4990 915 1/91 - 12/92 4628 491 99062 11014

T = TB only Tc = TB current T/a = TB antedated

In a period of about 20 years 128 575 mineworkers have been certified as having acquired occupational diseases. The actual number is certainly much higher as a result of under ascertainment among migrant labourers who have returned to their rural homes in any one of several labour reservoirs within South Africa or the neighbouring States. Practically nothing is known about the fate of the persons with certified occupational disease. A systematic study of the vital status of cases at intervals after certification is essential if appropriate services are to be provided for


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persons who have acquired disease in the course of their employment in the mines. Though there is evidence that simple silicosis progresses very slowly, if at all, once exposure has ceased, there is no doubt that tuberculosis superimposed on simple silicosis may lead to rapid deterioration, and that asbestos sets in train a progressive disease in the absence of further exposure.

Careful scrutiny of this table may lead to a number of differing conclusions. It can be said with confidence that it is not possible to demonstrate a consistent downward trend in the numbers certified in any category. In addition it is clear that the number of cases of tuberculosis certified among currently employed black miners is evidence of a failure of control in the mining industry and in the country as a whole. The table does not include cases of tuberculosis in workers employed in non-risk work. There is no information on the number of such workers, but it is reasonable to assume that the actual total of cases is considerably larger than the official figures suggest.

4.5.11 Evidence put before the Commission by Dr. White and Dr. Leger suggests similar

conclusions. In addition they show that although the time between first exposure and the diagnosis of pneumoconiosis has increased for white miners, this is not true for black miners. This is consistent with the hypothesis that white miners in a largely supervisory position are less exposed to dust whereas black miners in the stopes are as heavily exposed as they were several decades ago. Elsewhere evidence will be cited to suggest that dust levels have not changed for decades. Evidence from a recent study of pneumoconiosis among coal miner’s suggests that though fewer workers are developing coal worker’s pneumoconiosis they are developing it sooner.

The evidence demonstrates only too clearly the failure to relate dust levels to the pattern of certification, and to identify the risk areas and the groups of workers at risk. The absence of a systematic approach to the control of respiratory disease reflects the absence of appropriate analysis of available data and the long standing fragmentation of services between distinct government departments.

4.5.12 Evidence cited by Dr. White from work done by him in the early 1980s indicated

that the death rates among South African miners from all causes or from disease had not changed substantially between 1940 and 1980, despite the dramatic fall in both rates between 1920 and 1940 (White Fig 1.1 p 10).

4.5.13 Estimates of the proportion of miners employed in particular tasks who will develop

pneumoconiosis still rely heavily on the original studies carried out by Beadle, and amplified and commented on by Du Toit, Hnizdo and King, and cited in evidence to the Commission by White and Leger. There is general agreement that a worker in high dust areas such as drilling, high speed development or shaft sinking for 20 years or more may face a 20 - 30% risk of developing simple silicosis. Using a proxy measure for risk, the length of employment of certified cases of pneumoconiosis, it can be shown that the risk has not changed for black miners.

4.5.14 Attention was drawn to the fact that apart from the study referred to earlier, which

suggests that coal miners are developing disease sooner, there is very little information on the risk in gold, platinum and other mines.


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4.5.15 The risk of developing tuberculosis declined steadily among white and coloured

miners prior to 1940 but since then has remained relatively stable at about one per thousand per year. However Leger expresses concern that the rate may now be increasing (Leger pp 85-93). The best estimates of the risk of tuberculosis among black miners place this above 10 per thousand per year. Attention has also been drawn to the fact that black miners develop the disease on average after 10 years of employment, whereas among white and coloured miners the period is 20 years. There is also some evidence that the risk of developing tuberculosis is higher for drillers, winch drivers and other groups of workers exposed to high dust levels underground. It is worth repeating that the advent of HIV infection lends a sense of urgency to the control of tuberculosis on mines, in view of the fact that even before the HIV epidemic began the incidence of tuberculosis was probably rising. The annual reports of the Central Mining – Rand Mines group (cited by White p 71) shows that the incidence reached a peak at 16/1000 per year in 1912, falling to a low level of 2-4/1000 per year between 1930 and mid 1950s, and thereafter rising irregularly to just under 10/1000 in the period 1980 - 85. The annual report of the Goldfields group (the only major mining house which still publishes an annual medical report) suggests that there is considerable variation in the incidence between mines. Within the group of eight Goldfields’ mines in the Carltonville area the range is from below 10/1000 to nearly 20/1000 per annum in the period since 1990.

4.5.16 The evidence submitted to the Commission in respect of the prevalence and the

trends over time in the incidence of pneumoconiosis, tuberculosis and the two in combination should be read in its entirety. It is not possible to summarise it, and in any case the interpretation of admittedly fragmentary and some times contradictory or incomplete data sets depend on the stance of the reader. It is a matter of considerable concern to the Commission that so few really authoritative studies have been done.

4.5.17 The industry has put in place an extensive infrastructure for performing screening

audiometry since regulations were first promulgated in 1989. The effect of exposure to excessive levels of noise has therefore been documented in a very large number of miners. The number of cases of noise induced hearing loss identified (COM p 49) has nearly trebled between 1988 (226 cases) and 1992 (602 cases). Experts in the field acknowledge that the regulations have done little to reduce the damage done by noise as emphasis has been placed on audiometry and hearing protection. Compliance is widely recognised as a major problems in this field, and there is no doubt that the industry faces difficult problems in controlling noise by engineering methods. Evidence as to the extent of the problem is scanty but a study carried out in 1986 is said to have shown that two out of three men employed as rock drillers would have significant hearing loss after 10 years service.

4.5.18 Numerous other risks, including the whole range of asbestos related diseases, lung

cancer, chronic obstructive airways disease, asthma, progressive systemic sclerosis and a number of heavy metal poisonings are recognised as important problems in the mining industry. No useful purpose would be served by attempting to catalogue them all and present unreliable or incomplete evidence as to the prevalence of each. From a review of the evidence in respect of three diseases of great importance, namely pneumoconiosis, tuberculosis and noise induce hearing loss, the Commission feels confident that the following conclusions are justifiable:


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-there is no evidence to indicate a decline in the prevalence or severity of any occupational disease in the mining industry during the past 20 years;

-there is no evidence that the current legislation or the existing enforcement agencies offer any prospect of control; and

-radical steps are required to deal with the serious occupational health problems described in evidence presented to the Commission.

4.6 INTERVENTION TO CONTROL THE WORKING ENVIRONMENT AND

DISEASE

4.6.1 Intervention to ensure safety and the prevention of work related injury and disease does not automatically follow the unilateral imposition of rules and regulations by senior management or the introduction of stringent medical examinations by health professionals. This approach may in fact aggravate the situation. In one of his well known aphorisms Sir Thomas Legge, the first British medical inspector of factories, stressed that “unless and until the employer has done everything - and everything means a good deal - the workman can do next to nothing to protect himself, although he is naturally willing enough to do his share”. This suggests that the prerequisite for effective intervention is that the employer rectify, or be seen to attempt to rectify, the patent defects in the workplace which constitute risks to health or safety. This is echoed in documents submitted to the Commission, which stress that unless health and safety are seen to be important to management no amount of rhetoric will succeed in changing conditions in the work place.

Nowadays health and safety at work and industrial relations are seen as areas in which consultation in good faith between management and workers is a legitimate expectation. In respect of health and safety it is essential to begin the process of consultation by ensuring that both parties share the maximum amount of information, and understand what is actually going on in the work place. It is equally important that areas of uncertainty or ignorance be acknowledged, and that active steps be taken to answer the relevant questions through properly designed research projects if necessary. Given a basis of shared information and mutual trust the way is open for remedial action in which management and workers participate actively. This process in the work place is extended, in democratic societies, to the drafting of legislation.

From the evidence it is clear that all parties found common ground in the principle of tripartism. There are, however, formidable obstacles between the adoption of the principle and the achievement of truly participative strategies to deal with the hazards of the workplace. The historical and political determinants of the adversarial relationship between managers and workers may continue to influence the process for a long time. In South Africa the wider than usual economic gap between managers and workers is a greater impediment than it is, for example, in Japan. Defects in education, and in health and safety training at all levels, and the cross cultural effects on fundamental concepts and attitudes, all contribute to what can only be a complex situation.


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The introduction of tripartism will open the way for discussion of intractable problems which management or workers might prefer not to have to discuss face to face. Two matters illustrate this: firstly, the actions of organised workers to support their demands by means of work stoppages, and, secondly, the conditions under which miners are housed. It would be unrealistic to think that either side is able to confine discussion to those areas in which they feel secure. This has important implications for health and safety professionals. Medical practitioners are not used to having their actions or their attitudes challenged by those whom they classify as lay persons. Nor are they accustomed to having to submit their proposals for medical surveillance or biological monitoring to representatives of the workforce for approval. Nor will they, or other health professionals, be enthusiastic when their credentials are scrutinised by tripartite committees, as is the custom in, for example, Canada.

Not to labour the point unduly, the acceptance of the principle of tripartism sets in train for reaching changes in the way things are decided in industrial undertakings, and a simplistic approach is a recipe for disaster. The key role of the inspectorate in this process will be referred to in Chapter 6.

4.6.2 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that regulations, or approved codes of

practice, should ensure that a coherent process is set in train. This process must conform to the fundamental principles of modern occupational health practice. It must begin with the identification of the full spectrum of risk inherent in the process carried out at each mine. This must be followed by representative measurements of workplace conditions in respect of each identified hazard, with appropriate quality control of the measurement, and of the sampling strategy. Action to control conditions likely to lead to adverse health effects should follow, in parallel with appropriate medical surveillance of the groups of workers at risk.

4.6.3 It is clear that too much reliance has been placed on mass miniature radiography

(MMR) for the majority of workers, despite the fact that it has been demonstrated repeatedly that MMR on its own does not lead to control of tuberculosis. Nor of course would it lead to the control of pneumoconiosis unless the identification of cases led to action in the workplace.

4.6.4 The diseases of most importance, by virtue of their number, are those due to dust

exposure. The public information on dust levels in mines is slender. Reliance on old fashioned methods of dust sampling continued into the late 1980s despite the fact that most countries had changed to the gravimetric method many years ago. Work done by Beadle in the period 1950 - 70, and published in a series of papers between 1957 and 1969 is still the most frequently cited. Beadle’s work has been used as the basis for commentary and elaboration by Du Toit and by King.

4.6.5 As a result of his own work, on the basis of dust measurements made between 1956

and 1960, Beadle concluded that there was little evidence of a decline in dust levels between 1938 and 1969. As a result of the work done by Du Toit and the unpublished review by King the Commission is of the opinion that dust levels have remained roughly the same over a period of about 50 years. This constitutes a priori evidence that the absence of a downward trend in the official figures for certification is correctly interpreted as a failure to control dust related disease.


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4.6.6 It is not the role of the Commission to re-examine all the available evidence, but to

form an opinion on the basis of the evidence submitted to it. No evidence was submitted to show that dust levels had decreased. It is a matter for concern that there is undue reliance on data which is now nearly 40 years old, and that the results of the many thousands of dust measurements which have been made in recent years have not been analysed and published in a form which makes it possible for experts in the field to describe the trends accurately, nor is it possible without access to the raw data to determine whether current sampling strategies and methods used to measure dust levels succeed in identifying the highest exposures accurately.

4.6.7 The data available on the time taken to acquire certifiable dust related disease

indicates that although this has decreased steadily for white miners, it has not changed for black miners. The explanation for this is probably that white miners are now in supervisory positions and therefore less exposed to dust, whereas workers in the stopes are exposed to the same dust levels as in the past.

4.6.8 The failure to control tuberculosis in the mining industry must be a matter for grave

concern in the light of the spread of HIV, and the effect of this on the acquisition of new infections and the relapse of past disease among miners.

Certifications, in life and following autopsy, have increased in number among both white and black miners. Tuberculosis among black miners has been the commonest certification for many years, and accounted, either alone or in combination with pneumoconiosis for three quarters of the more that 6 200 certifications among black miners in the financial year 1989 - 90, the last year for which comprehensive data are available. Among white miners the comparable proportion is less than one fifth; much smaller but not unimportant considering the generally low incidence of tuberculosis among the population from which white mineworkers are drawn.

Evidence cited by Dr. White derived from studies carried out on a large gold mine indicates that the incidence of tuberculosis is highest among the workers exposed to the highest dust levels. However the Commission is not persuaded that the sole cause of the failure to control tuberculosis is dust exposure.

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that a renewed effort to control the spread of tuberculosis among mineworkers is urgently required and this should be planned and implemented after detailed scrutiny of existing practice to identify weaknesses, and a through examination of current practice in areas in which HIV prevalence is high to ensure that the control scheme proposed has the best chance of success. This should be the responsibility of the Director of the MBOD.


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4.6.9 A new dimension has been added to the importance of tuberculosis control by the

spread of the infection due to multi drug resistant mycobacteria. Though it is true that these organisms are isolated as a rule from immunocompromised persons, this is not invariably the case. The greater expense involved in treatment, and the lower success rate, apply in any case. The medical and economic importance of this matter may prove to be considerable for an industry which already faces formidable problems.

4.6.10 Noise induced hearing loss is recognised as a major problem in the mining industry.

Evidence was led which persuades the Commission that far too much reliance has been placed on the supply of personal protective equipment to workers exposed to damaging noise levels. Insufficient attention has been paid to the need to engineer lower noise levels. Action has been largely confined to audiometry to measure hearing loss, whereas more effort should be placed on the other components of a well planned hearing conservation programme, on engineering changes to diminish noise levels, on informing exposed workers adequately and on ensuring compliance.

In this matter, as in many others, the problem has been seen as one of disease detection rather than as the identification of index cases to enable intervention in the risk areas. It is also a matter for concern that so little serious scientific work has been published, despite the fact that many hundreds of thousands of workers have been examined more than once.

4.6.11 It is clearly impossible to include in regulations the details of the steps to be taken to

control each of the hazards and the resulting disease. However in view of the complexity of the majority of the issues involved, and the breadth of scientific knowledge required for successful intervention it is unlikely that the design of protocols or codes of practice can be left to the individual mines. Nor is it likely that codes of practice proposed by individual mines and approved by the existing staff of the DMEA will conform to best modern practice.

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that structures should be set up by MRAC (see Chapter 10) to design codes of practice which conform to international standards and which ensure the active participation of the workers by involving them in the design and approval of the codes. Not all the codes will have to be designed from scratch since these are widely available from the ILO or from countries in which mining is a major industrial undertaking.

4.6.12 Standards for environmental conditions and for medical examinations can be adopted from legislation elsewhere. The temptation to relax standards to minimise compliance costs as a result of representations from owners or management should be resisted. It was clear from the evidence submitted to the Commission that compliance costs in respect of health standards are never the cause of mine closure. Mines close down generally as a result of geological problems which affect the cost of production and the market situation for the mineral, not as a result of the cost of steps taken to protect the health of workers.

4.6.13 Frequent reference to the extent and cost of the health services provided by mining

companies needs to be qualified by stating that, as in the case of health services in general, the term “health service” describes a service designed to treat disease, rather than to promote health and prevent disease. As a result the medical services of the industry, while no doubt extensive and expensive, are not primarily concerned with


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conditions in the workplace and are not involved in line management decisions which determine how work shall be performed. Only a few of the major mining houses have established occupational health services. The law does not require persons appointed as medical officers on mines to be trained in occupational health.

4.6.14 Intervention to control occupational disease does not depend solely on the energy

and expertise of health professionals. Understanding of the nature of the problem and active cooperation is required from the workforce as a whole, and in particular from line managers and supervisors. Literacy is a prerequisite for the transfer of written information, but it needs to be said that literacy does not automatically ensure that written information will be acted upon. Participation is essential if workers are to adhere to desired workplace practices consistently. In an industry which employs a very large number of persons who have little or no formal education, and in which communication is by means of a didactic lingua franca, this is a major problem requiring innovative strategies.

The tacit knowledge and skills of the workers can not be communicated either, a factor of considerable importance as Leger has shown in his doctoral thesis. Evidence given by Mr Zokwana suggests that considerable improvement is required in the attitudes of line management to the majority of the workers if meaningful communication is to become possible.

4.6.15 The role of the State is not confined to the enactment of statute and regulations. If

effective intervention is to take place the resources of Government departments other that the DMEA will have to be augmented. This is especially true of the MBOD which is managed by the DoH. The MBOD has become badly run down in recent years, and is under funded. Adverse comments contained in a functional audit report commissioned by the Auditor General were cited by Dr. White, who expressed the opinion that the report be read in its entirety.

4.7 MIGRANT LABOUR, HOSTELS AND HEALTH

4.7.1 For a century or more miners have been recruited in huge numbers from all over Southern Africa and housed in compounds as “single” men. The evidence of Professor Francis Wilson dealt at length with the human consequences of this dislocation of the family unit. The system, usually referred to as the migrant labour system, has become so much a part of the pattern of society in this country that it has for a long time been taken for granted. In his view it has been a major force in shaping South African society as we know it. He crystallized the effect of the system by saying it was responsible for creating wealth in the urban areas and poverty in the rural areas simultaneously. Sociological studies have shown the many and varied deleterious effects of the system, not only on the workers themselves but on the rural areas from which they have come. The workers are housed in rooms which provide the minimum of comfort and facilities, and virtually no privacy, and the cost of changing from this system to the universal provision of family housing was agreed to be astronomical. The historical window of opportunity, when profits were very large, was missed. Nevertheless, in his opinion the appointment of this Commission presents another window of opportunity to set in place regulations which will contribute to the fundamental changes in the shape of society intended by the Reconstruction and Development Programme.


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The evidence of Professor Wilson must be read in its entirety to understand the migrant labour system, its fundamental and pervasive adverse effects, and the role the mining industry has played in developing the system.

The basic information about the way in which workers are housed on mines was not available to the Commission, so in attempting to set the direction and pace of change the Commission runs the risk of making recommendations which are for one reason or another unrealistic or ineffectual. The Commission accepts without reservation the opinion that the migrant labour system on the scale at which it operates in the mining industry is socially unsatisfactory and a serious multi-factorial adverse influence on the well-being of workers, their families and society as a whole.

4.7.2 Comprehensive information on the number of men housed in a single room, the area

or cubic capacity of the room, and the ventilation arrangements is not available for the whole industry. It is known that the number of men per room varies from eight in the better hostels to 20 in those built before 1940. The building of hostels has continued to the present and relatively new mines house workers 16 to a room.

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that for mines with a remaining life of 10 years or more the industry improves, within five years, accommodation to the point at which no more than eight men are housed in a single room on any mine.

4.7.3 During in loco inspections the Commission visited three hostels on two mines. At the worst of these 3 647 men were housed in accommodation originally designed for 4100 - a consequence of recent retrenchment. Twelve, sixteen and twenty men were housed in a single room, fitted with two decks of concrete bunks. On average there were 14.7 men per room, giving an average floor space per person of 5,1 square metres. The buildings constructed in about 1940, were originally designed to allow for ventilation via the ridge of the roof but the insertion of ceilings to mitigate the excessive heat from the corrugated iron roof and the absence of any openings in the rear wall had effectively converted them into back to back housing.

4.7.4 Historically it has been recognised that overcrowding, particularly in bedrooms,

leads to an increased risk of the spread of tuberculosis. The most recent studies from the USA confirm that this is still the case. Regrettably no work has been done to establish whether or not the epidemic of tuberculosis among miners is in part due to the way in which men are housed.

4.7.5 The large number of men in the hostels are fed from communal kitchens. Some of

these are run by catering firms on contract and are clean and well run. The Commission was shocked by the conditions in which food was prepared and served at the hostel referred to above. The fabric and maintenance of the kitchen and the dining room left a great deal to be desired and it was clear that the place had not been inspected by an environmental health officer for years.

4.7.6 Photographs of the ablution facilities at a small mine showed conditions so squalid

as to shock even the most hardened.


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4.7.7 The adverse health effects of the condition under which workers live extend well

beyond the effects of the physical surroundings. It is inevitable that a proportion of the hostel population will adopt, as part of the attempt to adapt to what must be by any standards an adverse set of social circumstances, behaviour which is damaging to health. This may include drinking excessive amounts of the alcohol which is freely available at subsidised prices, or the establishment of alternative domestic arrangements to compensate for the absence of spouse and children. Violence leading to frequent off the job assaults and accidents, or an elevated incidence of sexually transmitted diseases are obvious examples. The latter is of particular significance as sexually transmitted diseases which lead to genital ulceration predispose to the acquisition of HIV infection.

In turn this illustrates the complex interrelationship between working and living conditions, and the fact that labour policy and the health of the work force cannot be compartmentalized.

4.7.8 Estimates suggest that about 50% of the miners presently housed in hostels would

elect to occupy married accommodation with their spouses and children. If provision were made to offer five per cent of the workforce family housing each year for the next decade on mines having a life of 10 years or more, this would be major step forward as it would enable the hostel accommodation to be improved to provide more space, more privacy and better ventilation.

4.7.9 Hostels continue to be built to house workers at new mines. It would not be

unreasonable to suggest that consideration be given to the provision of married accommodation to be made available on new mines for 50 % of the workforce.

4.7.10 In deriving standards for housing it is customary to consider those used to determine

the area or cubic capacity required for sleeping. In a mine hostel the rooms occupied by groups of miners serve not only as sleeping accommodation but also as living space. Thus in the rooms inspected by the Commission there were frequently signs that considerable activity took place. Several large treadle sewing machines were seen in one room apart from all the personal property of occupants. It is therefore impossible to derive standards from existing bylaws or regulations since these refer to bedrooms rather than to accommodation which serves for both sleeping and living. The standards set out in Appendix 5 are derived from the bylaws of the City of Johannesburg. In view of the cost involved in upgrading existing hostels progress towards meeting modern public health standards will have to be carefully planned. In the absence of comprehensive data it would be unwise to attempt to set target dates, but this should not be seen as detracting from the importance of improved living conditions in ensuring the well-being of the workforce.


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4.7.11 The mining industry has in recent years adopted a policy of labour stabilisation.

This system gives experienced miners the automatic right of return to their previous job provided they return within a specified time. It does not change the fundamentals of the migrant labour system. It does mean that the individual miner will spend on average a longer time in the mine. The objective is to stabilise labour supply and to retain skills, rather than to stabilise society or families. More time exposed to the adverse circumstances of living and working on the mines will mean for many a greater chance of acquiring overt disease.

There is suggestive evidence from the analysis of autopsy findings that the ageing of the workforce is accompanied by a higher prevalence of pneumoconiosis and tuberculosis. This should add a much needed sense of urgency to proposals to improve living and working conditions, medical surveillance and the compilation of statistical returns of sufficient quality and scope to enable health trends to be determined accurately.

4.7.12 The Commission concludes that the fundamental fault which underlies the migrant

labour system, namely the dislocation of the family unit, is not changed or ameliorated by labour stabilisation. However, several companies have already made considerable progress towards providing family housing, and this should be encouraged.

4.8 RESEARCH INTO HEALTH AND DISEASE

4.8.1 The word research is widely misunderstood and is taken to mean studies devoid of any direct relevance to the everyday running of a mine. This is far from the truth. The major difficulty faced by the Commission and shared by those who gave written or oral evidence is the absence of data which can be used to define occupational risk by class of mine or mineral and by location of workplace within a particular mine. In the absence of reliable data for specific workplaces and for homogeneous risk groups remedial action to improve conditions at those sites responsible for adverse health outcomes will be impossible.

The first research task is to find out what is actually happening in each mine. The widespread practice of averaging - for example the average dust level for an entire mine, or a rate based on a denominator such as the total labour in service – serves only to confuse. Information is lost rather than gained by calculating averages or means for disparate groups of workers exposed to varying levels of risk, to different types of risk or possibly to no risk at all. The pooling of data derived from the examination of surface and underground workers is clearly wrong in principle.

4.8.2 There are nevertheless questions which need to be addressed by sophisticated and

carefully designed research projects, supervised by capable scientists who have given detailed attention to all the ethical problems posed by the proposals to carry out research on human subjects. In this respect it is essential to involve the workers and worker organisations, management and expert advisers in the projects at the design slog. In the past a great deal of ad hoc research has proved to be unsuitable for generalisation, and while valuable in its own right proved to be unsound as a basis for policy formulation.


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4.8.3 It is a matter for concern that both the name and the research programme of

SIMRAC (Safety in Mines Research Advisory Committee) indicate a preoccupation with safety and an almost complete neglect of health. This organisation has a research budget far in excess of all other organisations undertaking research in the field of occupational health and safety put together.

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that the opportunity to establish effective tripartite management of this resource and to redress the balance to enable the health problems of the industry to be tackled more effectively should not be missed.

The determination of research priorities in any scientific field is a complex process which often fails to direct resources to the areas of greatest need or to projects which are likely to benefit the community at risk rather than the scientists carrying out the studies. The control of occupational health research in this country, in state institutions in particular, has been the prerogative of public servants, scientists, owners and managers. A few notable exceptions to this rule have demonstrated that the tacit knowledge and skills of workers may be vital in the design of studies to answer questions of real consequence.

4.8.4 In order to be of real use research findings must be published in peer reviewed

scientific journals. In the list of references cited, for example, by Dr. White at the end of his evidence 40% are the result of work done by the MBOD/NCOH complex, and only 10% originate from the mining industry. Not only is there a need for more research but there is quite clearly a need for the industry to do much more of its own research. The work done at the Ernest Oppenheimer Hospital by Dr. Cowie and his colleagues, and a recent increase in research activity at this hospital demonstrates that this is possible.

4.8.5 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that official government and industry

statistics should be published regularly in a standard format to enable independent researchers to analyse and interpret them, and that it is essential to establish effective audit mechanisms to ensure that the services provided on all mines, particularly small mines in remote areas, conform to regulated standards and that the statistical returns are accurate.

4.8.6 Access to mines for bona fide research projects should be made easier.

4.8.7 The deliberations of this Commission alone serve to generate a lengthy list of

research questions, as reference to the written submissions and the verbatim transcript will show. No purpose would be served by attempting to produce a provisional list of research priorities but the COMMISSION FEELS STRONGLY that a great deal of epidemiological and biostatistical research work remains to be done before effective control of occupational diseases can be assured.

4.9 ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS IN MINES

4.9.1 The measurement of dust levels and other indices of environmental conditions in mines is carried out in the main by the management of the particular mine. In the case of dust measurements these are submitted to the GME and stored in a computerised data base. By means of a complex formula an air quality index is


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calculated for the whole mine. This index is used to determine the risk rating of the

mine, and from this the levy payable to the compensation fund is fixed by the risk committee constituted in terms of the ODMW Act.

4.9.2 The raw data is not in the public domain, nor is it easy to determine the exact

significance of the measurements, as the sampling strategy is not standardised. This is the underlying reason for the undue reliance, in the case of dust, on the work of Beadle and a few other workers, and for the assumption that dust levels in the mines have not changed for decades.

4.9.3 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that all mines regardless of size should be

required to measure the relevant environmental conditions at regular intervals and compare the results to an agreed set of standards. These standards should be internationally acceptable and incorporated into regulations or into codes of practice.

4.9.4 The key to the control of occupational diseases lies in control of the working

environment, and the identification of a case or cases of occupational disease should lead to an examination of the workplaces in which the particular worker was exposed. It may, and probably will, be said that today’s disease is the result of past exposures - this point has been made repeatedly in this report, as has the point that stabilisation of the labour force is leading to longer exposures. If successive generations of workers are not to continue to be damaged at work, then the identification of an index case must be followed by a re-examination of the conditions which may have given rise to the disease.

4.9.5 In many cases it will be necessary to do more than simply measure the level of

respirable dust in the air of the workplace. The composition of the airborne dust in terms of its mineral content needs to be determined. This has been confined largely to the determination of quartz in gold mine dust. In view of the range of minerals mined in this country there are obviously many situations in which the exact composition of an aerosol needs to be determined. Appropriate facilities for such analysis must be affordable, and available even to the smallest mine. Facilities must also be available for quality control by independent experts to ensure that measurements are valid.

4.9.6 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that the GME should have adequate

resources and staff to ensure that the process can be audited at all stages from the sampling strategy to the analysis and presentation of the results.

4.9.7 The conclusion of a report entitled “Dust in the Mines” prepared by the Workplace

Information Group reads as follows;

“Dust levels on South African mines continue to pose a risk to workers. Existing regulations and systems have proved ineffective in adequately reducing the levels of dust. If workers’ health on the mines is to be adequately protected there is a need for a comprehensive dust abatement programme…”. Similar conclusions could probably be drawn from the evidence in respect of noise, heat stress, gases, heavy metals, and a number of other hazards.


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4.10 PARTICULAR PROBLEMS

4.10.1 It was said in evidence that in South Africa the mining industry had been slow to learn lessons, if indeed they were learnt at all. This may well be a reflection of decades of isolation, and a general acceptance of the view that this country is unique. The opinion quoted above is echoed in a report on the safety system of a major industrial conglomerate which identifies the failure to learn from international practice on the ground that “it was not invented here” as an important block to progress. It is also clear that epidemiology is generally viewed as an irrelevant mystique. There is no Chair of Epidemiology in any South African University, and the capacity of the COM and many of the major mining companies to undertake serious research is very limited indeed. Any work done by those who are perceived to be worker advocates has, in the past, been automatically discounted. One of the major benefits arising from the lengthy deliberations of this Commission has been the recognition that scientific debate is much more likely to result in cost effective solutions than the traditional confrontations. The unsatisfactory nature of the situation in which attempts were made from outside the industry to focus attention on particular problems is vividly illustrated by the example of ionising radiation. The Commission is aware that its proceedings and deliberations have resulted in the publication of information which would otherwise have remained inaccessible.

4.10.2 In the case of ionising radiation in mines, for example, the fact that such

measurements of radiation levels underground as did exist were not made available to bona fide researchers in the field has impeded research significantly. Several studies have attempted to determine whether or not there is a relationship between exposure to quartz and the subsequent development of lung cancer. This matter is of considerable interest internationally, and exposure to radiation is an obvious confounder. The South African studies are, not suprisingly, contradictory. It is a matter of concern that in evidence to the Commission it was conceded that information on the levels of ionising radiation to which South African miners are exposed is still far from complete. Estimates based on the evidence available indicate that a significant proportion of miners is currently exposed to levels which would be unacceptable in Europe or the United Kingdom. At the current exposure limit more that 10 000 miners are estimated to be exposed to excessive radiation. When new levels are introduced in developed countries they are likely to be lower than the current limits, and this will mean that more that 10 000 men are exposed above the legal limit. It must also be a matter for concern that levels of ionising radiation are not yet known for many mines.

The evidence given on behalf of the Council for Nuclear Safety (CNS) is in many respects disturbing. The following paragraph from the written submission of the CNS illustrates the basis for the Commission’s view that urgent attention should be given to this matter. “Surveys of radiation levels in South African Mines, particularly radon daughter levels, were undertaken several times during the period between 1950 and 1970 by the Chamber of Mines and a very limited epidemiological study was undertaken by the Atomic Energy Board and the


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Chamber of Mines in the late 1960’s. A limited amount of information was published from these studies. However, the majority of the data gathered by the Chamber of Mines is not available to the Council.”

The paragraph continues the discussion in a way which illustrates many of the points made elsewhere in this chapter of the report.

“The overall conclusions that were published from these various studies were that, in general, radiation levels in South African mines were, on account of the relatively modest uranium ore grades and the high ventilation rates dictated by heat considerations, not of significant concern. It was also noted that, in addition, in view of the migratory work system, individual workers spent limited time in the mining environment and consequently integrated exposures would not be high. Whilst average levels did appear to be modest, from the limited information available from the time, it is clear that certain mines experienced levels well in excess of the average level.”

There is considerable uncertainty concerning these conclusions. The remainder of the evidence gives rise to increasing concern and there is little doubt that a great deal of work remains to be done. It cannot be done by ad hoc groups or by inexperienced research workers.

To determine whether or not there is an excess of lung cancer in those mines in which a radiation hazard is suspected requires reliable measurements of the environmental levels of radioactive substances, and detailed studies of outcomes among large samples of miners. South Africa may be one of the countries in most need of expert research, as the following Tables, taken from the submission of the CNS show.

TABLE 12: COMPARISON OF AVERAGE INDIVIDUAL IONISING RADIATION DOSE FROM VARIOUS WORLDWIDE AND SOUTH AFRICAN GOLD MINES SOURCES (CNS SUBMISSION)

Activity Collective Dose Number of Average (man sievert) Workers Individual dose (millisievert) Nuclear Fuel 2 500 888 000 2.2 Cycle Medical 1 000 2 200 000 0.45 Natural Source 8 600 5 200 000 1.6 S A Gold Mines (Underground) 1 210 269 000 4.5


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TABLE 13 ANNUAL INDIVIDUAL IONISING RADIATION EXPOSURE RANGE FOR MINEWORKERS (CNS SUBMISSION) FOR SOUTH AFRICA

ANNUAL INDIVIDUAL EXPOSURE RANGE NUMBER OF WORKERS (MILLISIEVERT) 0 - 1 56 700 1 - 6 168 700 6 - 20 33 900 20 - 50 9 600 50 1 100

On average the 269 000 South African miners employed underground are exposed to ten times as much ionising radiation as medical staff (attributable to their job), three times the average background level to which we are all exposed, and twice the level entailed in working in the nuclear fuel cycle.

In order to stimulate the maximum public interest in this matter on behalf of miners, and out of enlightened self interest as members of the community at large, the Commission draws attention to the statement made on behalf of the CNS that “Exposures to members of the public arising from mining operations are not well quantified at this stage but are indicated in some instances to be non-trivial.”

4.10.3 Health services - in the main disease services - are placed in an add-on position in

the management structure of most mines. In evidence to the Commission the manager of a large, and in many ways exemplary, colliery said that only the clinic attendance figures were submitted to him, and that all deaths of workers not due to accidents at work were routinely classified as “off mine” deaths. It is clear from this and other evidence given to the Commission that urgent steps need to be taken to raise the awareness of health at all levels.

4.10.4 In the light of the evidence of a general neglect of health (as opposed to safety) it is

essential that urgent attention be given to training, or retraining the mines inspectors and health professionals employed on mines. In this respect they are in the same position as inspectors or professionals in any number of fields given the radical change in the concern of Government from the preservation of privilege to a people-centred reconstruction and development programme. The promotion of health and the prevention of disease become central issues, and pre-emptive and pro-active strategies must of necessity replace bureaucratic and reactive habits.

4.10.5 It will also be necessary to train persons other than medical practitioners to inspect

and audit health services on mines. The number of staff presently available in the DMEA and DoH to carry out the statutory function required by the several Acts relating to the health of miners - not to mention any additional functions required as a result of the recommendations of this Commission - is woefully inadequate as a result of the previous government’s policies of privatisation and deregulation.


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4.11 RELATED LEGISLATIONS

4.11.1 It is more than eighteen years since the (Erasmus) Commission of Enquiry on Occupational Health (RP55/1976) put on record the evidence of witnesses as to the babel - like confusion about which department or body controlled occupational health matters, the lack of effective action due to overlapping legislation, and the incredible waste of manpower entailed in the provision of administrative structures in three government departments. This situation persists.

4.11.2 Several sections of the ODMW Act are vital for the control of adverse health effects

in the mining industry.

4.11.3 Despite the fact that the Act has been force for more than 20 years all the extant regulations were promulgated in 1973. The fact that these are still couched in racially discriminatory terms and that such important matters as the re-employment of persons receiving treatment for pulmonary tuberculosis in dusty conditions have not been regulated, despite the fact that the number of vital policy changes have been made over the years, is a matter of grave concern. However, the benefit is that the tripartite body set up to review the regulations in force in terms of the Minerals Act will be able to decide whether or not to place the regulations to do with health under that Act, or whether to write draft regulations in terms of the ODMW Act.

4.11.4 In terms of Section 121(1) regulations may be made for a number of the matters

discussed in the course of this Chapter of the Commission’s Report. These include:

-standards for the certification of compensable disease; -the employment of medical practitioners; -data collection on mines; -medical examination of miners who have left the industry; -entitlement of those persons found to have compensable disease; -notification of the results of medical examination; -repatriation; -medical examination of migrant workers; -control of compensation payments; and -other relevant matters.

4.11.5 All parties agreed that there is an urgent need for high quality research to answer the

many questions asked, but not answered during the hearings. Section 120 sets out important powers vested in the Minister of Health, to act in this respect. The scientific expertise required for such research does not exist in the organisation which presently obtains the lion’s share of the SIMRAC funding, but in terms of the


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ODMW Act an Epidemiology Research Unit has been established and offers the best chance of creating a viable research strategy.

4.11.6 The medical resource required for effective action to address the health problem of

the mining industry is the MBOD, established and until recently managed by the DMEA. To duplicate this structure within the DMEA would be prohibitively expensive, and would probably not succeed due to the difficulty in recruiting medical practitioners and other health professionals. Serious consideration should be given to the action which is require to ensure that the DoH is firmly committed to providing adequate resources if it is to be part of the action plan. If the DoH is not able or willing to guarantee the effective participation of the MBOD, which will entail considerable additional resources, the COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that the MBOD be transferred back to the DMEA.

4.12 WORKERS RIGHTS

4.12.1 All workers enjoy fundamental human rights established by international convention or entrenched in the Constitution. The exercise of these rights may be constrained by social or economic systems, notably employment, and it is usual to include explicit provision in law to safeguard those rights. This may be done by way of sections of the statute which define the duties of employers to their employees, as is the case in the South African OHSA.

Special provision may be appropriate in respect of certain types of work, and in the case of mining this is illustrated by the right to refuse to work under conditions which are perceived to be dangerous.

4.12.2 In the workplace the most important right which will enable workers to share

responsibility for their own safety or health, and for the safety of their colleagues is the right to information, or the right to know. Although this overlaps into the fields of education and training it extends much further than is usually accepted. The more the worker understands about the work process and the reasons why work should be performed in a particular manner the more likely it is that the work will be carried out without risk to safety or health. It follows that the informed worker may be the best judge of when conditions are inherently dangerous, and in the best position to decide that work should cease until remedial action has been taken.

4.12.3 The right to information and the right to refuse dangerous work should be

entrenched in legislation.

4.12.4 Worker’s rights and management prerogatives are the foundation of industrial relations. It is not the business of this Commission to enter into the field of industrial relations, but it would be an omission not to lay appropriate emphasis on the importance of good industrial relations, respect for basic human rights and for human dignity, and as clear a definition as possible of the rights of the workers and the prerogatives of managers, as vital components of health and safety at work.


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CHAPTER FIVE

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE INTERESTED PARTIES 5.1 During the course of the hearings the position of the three main parties, the Chamber of

Mines, the National Union of Mineworkers, and the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs, who were represented and were in a position to cross examine all witnesses, changed somewhat from their original submissions. Their final positions were in the form of Heads of Argument. The Commission felt that as a matter of fairness and in the interest of complete accuracy they should be reproduced, without attempting to summarise or truncate them.

5.2 For the others who were represented or who gave evidence a resume of their positions has

been prepared. 5.3 These Heads of Arguments and Summaries of final positions are gathered in a separate

Volume 2 of this Report and are set out in the following order:-

5.3.1 National Union of Mineworkers

5.3.2 Other Trade Unions (Resume)

5.3.3 Chamber of Mines 5.3.4 Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs

5.3.5 SASOL (Resume)

5.3.6 Other Parties (Resume)


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CHAPTER SIX

THE COMMISSION’S VIEWS ON FURTHER CRITICAL ISSUES THAT MUST BE ADDRESSED The Commission considered that issues that were critical to the improvement of Health and Safety in the mining industry in the future included the following. 6.1 THE STANDARD OF EDUCATION IN THE WORK FORCE

The South African mining industry has two human problems that are not encountered by industries in more developed countries. Due to the unfortunate historical background of the country, the under privileged section of the population has received a spotty and, in many instances, very inadequate education. These effects are compounded by the fact that the labour force on the mines is recruited from many national and cultural backgrounds. As a result the employees do not have a common language of communication, but speak several African and European languages. It is important to establish the magnitude of this problem. No overall data were available to the Commission on the educational level of the labour force, but Dr. J D Thornton, manager of Kriel Colliery, giving evidence of behalf of the Chamber (Thornton pp 1622-1733) gave a detailed breakdown concerning the level of education among his employees. This is probably representative of the industry as a whole, and is summarised in the following Table.

TABLE 14: DISTRIBUTION OF EDUCATION LEVELS AT KRIEL COLLIERY

Level of P/G4 P/G3 P/G2 P/G1 TOTAL Education No % No % No % No % No % Nil 170 24,4 3 4,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 173 16,5 G1-S5 418 60,0 14 18,7 0 0,0 0 0,0 432 41,1 Cumulative 588 84,4 17 22,7 0 0,0 0 0,0 605 57,6 S6-S7 72 10,3 8 10,7 7 5,0 1 0,7 88 8,4 Cumulative 660 94,7 25 33,3 7 5,0 1 0,7 693 66,0 S8-S10 37 5,3 50 66,7 134 95,0 125 91,3 346 33,0 Cumulative 697 100,0 75 100,0 141 100 126 92,0 1039 99,0 +S10 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 11 8,0 11 1,0 TOTAL 697 100 75 100 141 100 137 100 1050 100 Per Cent 66,4 7,1 13,4 13,1 100


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In the Table the relationship between education level (Grades and Standards - G and S) and Pay Group (P/G) is given. Pay Group 1 includes mine officials; Group 2 are miners and artisans; Group 3 are clerical staff, and Group 4 are operators and general labourers. It is interesting to note that from a work force of 1 050, 137 or 13.2% are part of management. At the other end of the scale Pay group 4 consists of 697 workers, representing 66.4% of the work force. Since modern coal mining is less labour intensive, it is probably safe to speculate that on the more labour intensive gold mines, Pay Group 4 would form a larger percentage. Certain aspects of the table stand out. Firstly 66% of the total work force has a level of education below Standard 8, although Dr. Thornton indicated that they are currently employing people with Standard 8 or higher education. Some 94% of the men in Pay Group 4 have an education that is lower than the level at which the mine wishes to employ at present. It is probable that a very large proportion of those in this group, perhaps most of the 84% who have a level below Standard 6, are totally or functionally illiterate. Thus, unless the standard of education of these workers is elevated by further schooling of some sort, their chances for further advancement is limited. It is also noteworthy that at the other end of the scale, only 11 persons (1%) for the whole mine have some education beyond Standard 10. The general level of education of those working for this multi-million rand enterprise is woefully inadequate. Managers who are working for mining companies in more developed countries cannot comprehend fully the difficulties under which their South African counterparts have to labour to run their mines and try to maintain an acceptable level of health and safety. Dr. Thornton, who has a British background, stated on the basis of his recollection that in the 1970s new entrants to the British coal industry had “ten to eleven years of formal education... Probably very similar to Standard 8, I would think, 8 or 9”. The lack of common language must be added to this problem to appreciate the extreme seriousness of the situation. The safe, healthy and efficient operation of an industrial enterprise depends, inter alia, on effective communication. Such communication normally has oral, written and symbolic components. The lack of adequate education renders written communication with a large portion of the work force impossible. At Kriel colliery the illiterate fraction is estimated to be about 58% of all employees. The lack of a common language undermines the efficiency of oral communication. Fanagalo, the lingua franca used by the mining industry, is simply not capable of fulfilling the requirements of communication in a modern industry. Even symbolic communication is difficult when there is a large difference in cultural background between those who wish to communicate. The conclusions of this brief survey are obvious. There is an urgent need to raise the educational standards of the existing work force, and the need for a common language is unquestionably evident. Since progress in these areas is painfully slow, action should be initiated as soon as possible. Several mining companies have recognised the importance of these needs and have started commendable programmes of adult education. These are mostly private initiatives, aimed at the improvement of literacy and competency in English. Evidence put before the Commission (Burrows pp 1753-1808 and Lazare pp 2004-2021, 2116/3142) and seen during our visits showed the widespread activity in this area. The work being done as a


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national initiative to work out plans, standards etc. for technical training, and also for adult education through the establishment of a National Qualification Framework is also commendable.

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that all mining companies and others who are able to move forward the national initiative in this area should take every opportunity to advance the cause of adult education, with a view to improving communication in mines, and in turn result in improved health and safety. The COMMISSION also RECOMMENDS that the teaching of English should be actively promoted as this is the only practical way of meeting the urgent need for a common language of communication. 6.2 CHANGES IN THE MIGRATORY LABOUR SYSTEM

These have been discussed in previous Chapters, and the Commission feels that these changes can result in critical effects on the labour force, which should be taken into account when considering health and safety issues.

6.3 INADEQUATE TRAINING IN THE MINING INDUSTRY

6.3.1 Objectives of Training

Industrial training is necessary for a variety of purposes. For example, training might be done to enable a person to perform a task; to improve productivity, to avoid damage to equipment by workers and so on. The most fundamental of all training objectives is to train persons to work safely, that is, free from the threat of industrial injury and disease. The expression “operate safely” combines self protection and the avoidance of creating risks to fellow workers and others who may be affected, including the general public.

Usually, the various objectives of training can be combined into a single plan or training scheme that will cover all the required goals. It is important, however, to ensure that the multiplicity of purposes, especially that of health and safety, are clearly identified.

6.3.2 Background to Training in the Mining Industry

In the past the approach to training was divided on racial lines. Black mine workers, as was said earlier, came to the mines to work relatively short periods, say nine months, then returned home. The number of these short contracts served by a typical migrant worker was small, perhaps one to three, and the period that elapsed between contracts was often long and irregular. Consequently the mining companies had to assume that all new arrivals, with few exceptions, were novice workers, and had to be trained afresh.

It is generally recognised that in normal circumstances an employer can spend only a relatively small proportion of his own budget, and of the employee’s working time in training that person for the job.


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Thus, when workmen were only employed on contracts lasting part of a year, the period of training had to be measured in days. It was accepted that it was not possible to train, even if one wanted to, an ill educated person, coming from a non - industrial background, in all aspects of mining in a few days. Thus, circumstances led the industry to fragmentation of the job. The combined consequences of job reservation and fragmentation led to some demeaning side effects. They also prevented black employees from progressing from the lower job categories to higher ranks.

As has been discussed, developments in recent years have changed the nature of migratory labour in some material respects. Workmen are now encouraged to return to their previous place of employment, leading to the work force at most mines becoming more stable. The families of most workers still live in the rural areas, often in a different country, and the workmen return to these areas on annual leave. Workmen now spend repeated periods of duty at a mine, interspersed with home visits of a few weeks duration. This changed style of employment means that companies can rely on the availability of a person for work for many years.

Coincidentally with this changed employment pattern, black mine-worker’s pay increased substantially, so that it became increasingly important for the employer to ensure that the workman’s time was efficiently utilised. The combined effect of long term availability and higher pay resulted in the idea of “multi-skilling” in training, to make “multi-tasking” possible in the work place. Multi-skilling is an approach to training intended to impart to a trainee several skills, usually operator skills, for which he can be certified. Some workmen may be able to acquire up to three skills through training. This leads to better earning ability and is usually favoured by workmen. It appeared evident to the Commission that mine managements have noted the beneficial opportunities created by the changes in the migratory labour pattern. The advantages of flexibility achieved by being able to move away, at least partially, from fragmented work practices to multi-task working needs no explanation. No convincing evidence was provided to the Commission; however, that similar advantage was taken in the area of health and safety training, of the opportunities provided by the change in migratory labour patterns in recent years.

6.3.3 Shortcomings of, and possible improvements in Health and Safety Training.

In many countries the training of novice miners is regulated by the State. In Great Britain and Australia the training is extensive and lengthy. It takes in the order of 18 to 24 months to become a fully qualified miner. In the United States of America, the Code of Federal Regulations, Mineral Resources, Title 30, Part 48 defines the requirements of training and retraining for miners. These regulations require that a novice miner, before he or she is assigned to work duties must undergo a minimum of 40 hours of approved training. Once this initial training has been completed, miners assigned to a task in which they have had no previous experience, must undergo a course of instructions. Apart from the 40 hours of induction, the regulations are not specific in the expected duration of various training courses.


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They seem to rely on the prescription of minimum content of the programme and on the requirement that a plan for the training must be approved by the authorities. The regulations also require a brief (not less than 30 minutes) annual refresher training.

The South African Minerals Act (Act 50 of 1991) and its Regulations seem vague on the issue of training of workmen. Regulation 2.10.2 puts the onus on the manager not to permit any “..incompetent or inexperienced workman to be employed on dangerous work..”. The Act and regulations lack clarity on the training requirements and the definitions are poor. The definition of workman is not given, and a ganger or miner is defined as a person in charge of workmen. The current South African regulations do not seem to help in the definition of training requirements. The Commission considers this to be an unacceptable state of affairs. In paragraph 6.1 the standard of education at a typical South African colliery was reviewed, and the data confirmed convincingly that the standard of education in South Africa is on average, several years lower than that in the UK, Australia and the USA. Despite this advantage in those countries, they require their miners to undergo significant training. It would be difficult to counter the argument that South Africa’s training needs are much more pressing and that these countries provide a lead that the industry in South Africa must follow.

In view of the high degree of illiteracy and the lack of a common language, the scheme of training employed in South Africa, especially that for novice miners, must be more imaginative and more creative than most run of the mill industrial training programmes. The specific details of formulating these programmes must be left to experts, within the framework of regulations. There are two points however that seem important. In the special circumstances of South African mining, personal contact and hands on experience in the real environment are likely to produce better results than the conventional methods of training. Moreover, miracles can not be expected from an educationally handicapped new recruit. Success will require patience and the training programme, if it is to be successful, will require time. Serious consideration should be given to the use of training sections within mines, where the pressure of production is reduced in favour of patient instruction and explanation. So far emphasis has been focused on the problems of training of operators and labourers. There are training problems at higher levels as well. In a submission by the NUM (More O’Ferrall, NUM Submissions V) some serious omissions in the training of mine officials are highlighted. This paper states “..In 1987 an analysis of the questions asked of blasting certificate candidates in the Klerksdorp district revealed that only 5% of the questions were related to strata control. Following on this revelation an intensive programme of instruction of the lecturers at the Government Mining Training College was introduced in both hard rock and coal. A similar analysis, in October 1993, of questions asked for the same examination in the Klerksdorp and OFS districts yielded 5.3% and 3% respectively. The paper goes on to comment that “..This is not surprising as the examination is conducted by a commission comprising an inspector (chairperson), a manager and a union official. None of these persons usually has much strata control knowledge.” Even the few questions that were asked in these examinations did not refer to rockbursts or strata control practice. This is surprising in the light of the earlier discussion of hazards in


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Chapter 3.1. Rockbursts and rock falls were identified as the dominant safety threat in gold mining, and the records do not reveal even a slight improvement in this regard. The Commission finds it difficult to understand how such an important safety risk does not receive more attention from those responsible for examining future mine officials.

The submissions made to the Commission by the Chamber of Mines made it clear that some leaders of industry are fully aware of the danger posed by rock failure in the gold mines, and to a lesser degree in coal mines. The recognition of the disastrous effect of explosions in coal mines is more equivocal, but it does exist. At the same time the Commission saw evidence of some sense of denial in the feeling that.. “we are doing everything we can..”, “South African mines are burdened with special problems”..“..the labour force is uneducated..”, “the workers are ill disciplined”, “You should not compare us with first world countries”.. and so on. These responses may be a manifestation of the sad South African syndrome which was referred to by Dr. Thornton in evidence - the syndrome of accepting a high level of violence and perhaps even recognising that life is a little cheaper in South Africa than elsewhere. One certainly hopes that this is not the case. It is important to remain optimistic, as the current health and safety problems cannot be overcome without the whole hearted support of the top leadership of the industry.

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that- - existing training schemes should be reconsidered and revamped with a view to re-emphasising health and safety matters; - induction training should be redesigned, extended and should include more hands on experience under the guidance of experienced persons, largely underground, rather than in the classroom environment; - the existing work force should undergo a phased retraining and retesting programme, carried out underground, under the close personal supervision of experienced trainers; - comprehensive refresher training programmes should be designed for all ranks of mine officials. These schemes should become important elements in the training and personnel development schemes of each mining group. They should focus initially on the problems that represent the greatest risks in the industry; and - these matters should be included in Training Regulations when they are drafted. 6.4 INSUFFICIENT LAW ENFORCEMENT

Enforcement of mining law and regulations is the responsibility of the mining inspectorate under the GME. There is a history of under-resourcing of the Inspectorate of Mines in South Africa. The Mining Regulations Commission which reported in 1925 after 60 sittings at which 90 witnesses were heard over four months (NUM Submissions V1 Annexure 2) gave as one of the reasons contributing to non- observance of the law, “..the extent to which the Inspectorate was understaffed; making it impossible to carry out an adequate system of


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inspection to assess compliance with the regulations resulting in the inspectorate relying simply on the reports of managers and the records reflecting accidents in the mines. The effect was that employers and employees disregarded regulations where observance was either irksome or costly and that the risk of contraventions being detected was minimal.” The relationship between the enforcing inspectorate and mine managements is also important and the same Commission considered that another “.. factor contributing to non-compliance lay in the relations between senior inspectors, the Government Mining Engineer’s Department and mine managements.” That Commission felt that the inspectors needed to keep management more at arms length although acknowledging the good that a spirit of co-operation could do. The effect of this attitude was shown in the result of prosecutions in the event of simultaneous breaches of regulations by a manager, a miner and a black worker. “The miner and black worker were prosecuted while the manager was advised to take steps to remove the probability of the offence being repeated.” In 1960, following the disaster at the Coalbrook North Colliery, a Judicial Commission of Inquiry under Mr Justice J F Marais published its first interim report in 1963. (NUM Submissions V 1 Annexure 3). This was the only part of their report that was ever published but it made significant comments on enforcement, which remain relevant today. That Commission emphasised the role of the GME as being the sole arbiter between hundreds of thousands of lives and an industry worth hundreds of millions of pounds per year. The Commission recognised the need to provide adequate resources for the Inspectorate, and made practical recommendations as to how this should be achieved, but their recommendations were never fully implemented. This was the last Commission before the current one to consider these issues in South Africa. The Commission heard evidence that the inspectorate responsible for enforcement continues to be understaffed, (Raath pp 1846/11-15) and that far larger resources should be devoted to enforcement (Cameron pp 2453/18-20).

The recommendations of earlier Commissions were not heeded, and the record of the industry over the last 10 years shows that 6 817 persons were killed, 112 278 were seriously injured and an unknown number suffered serious impairment of health. (Ch2; Table 2). In the opening submissions to the Commission it was stated that the role of the shift boss, who has a statutory function to ensure safety, had been usurped by the mining industry, and that the appointment of safety officers and safety representatives had been made a statutory obligation to try and compensate for this, without producing any apparent improvement in the accident situation. The industry has been allowed to disregard existing law over the role of shift bosses, without being challenged by the enforcing authority, and in such circumstances it is not surprising that no improvement in accident rates has been achieved. These circumstances clearly indicate that the law in mining has not been adequately enforced. It is the role of the State to ensure that its laws are enforced, and the complement, quality and attitudes of the Inspectorate of Mines should be such as to ensure that this is done.


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6.5 HEALTH AND SAFETY CULTURE AND THE HIERARCHY OF MANAGEMENT

An acceptable health and safety culture at a mine, or in a mining company, can only be achieved by the management, from the top down committing itself to managing health and safety actively. This aspect of management must come before the other management functions, such as production or marketing. It represents an understanding by management that the people who work for the organisation are its most important asset.

The concept of a health and safety culture is increasingly accepted in organisations that give a high priority to the health and safety of the persons they employ. The first requirement of such a culture is that it must start with a deep and visible commitment from the very top of the company - the Chairman and Managing Director of the organisation, down through all the ranks of management. Health and safety should be managed like all the other functions of the organisation, such as production or marketing, and receive priority attention. The most successful firms commercially are often the ones with the strongest health and safety culture. The concentration is on people as the route to excellence, both in the commercial and the health and safety field. The actions or omissions of people account for over 90 per cent of accidents and ill health, so a strong health and safety culture concentrates on people and their actions.

Policy statements on health and safety form part of this culture. When such policy statements are a statutory requirement they often become voluminous and full of legal jargon and have little impact on the organisation. Simple statements of the commitment of chairpersons or managers to the health and safety of the work force are far more effective in conveying a genuine commitment to the welfare of the people employed by an organisation.

The organisation of health and safety must be the same structure that runs all the other functions, such as production. The health and safety committee within the normal management hierarchy must establish sound policies for improving health and safety, provide manpower, resources, materials and motivation for the task, and review progress at frequent intervals. Good information is essential for this culture to be established.

Health and safety issues can not be delegated to safety specialists and Government Inspectors. A Company safety organisation, headed by the most senior official must demand accountability, and provide resources to implement its policies.

Health and safety accountability can not be compartmentalised into Safety Departments, or left to safety specialists. Health and safety is line management’s responsibility. It can be managed in the same way as the other functions of an organisation. Health and safety is an integral part of every supervisor’s and every manager’s job. Every person who is responsible for the activity of people must accept responsibility for their health and safety. Each member of the management team should have well defined health and safety responsibilities, and each member of management should find time to be involved in and support the health and safety effort of his subordinates. Each level of management should continually show its commitment to health and safety, and hold more junior levels accountable, or praise them for a good performance. Salary increases and promotion should take into account health and safety performance.


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Objectives should be set for health and safety achievements as they are for production, and safety performance in terms of accident reduction, and health performance in terms of work days lost through ill health and other suitable criteria should be continually monitored. The Commission heard suggestions that an annual improvement in fatality rates of 3,4 per cent over a thirty year period would have provided a satisfactory situation in South African mining today (Leger pp 331/20-27). This objective would be considered very modest by many companies today. In the very neglected situation now existing in South Africa substantial improvements should be looked for in the coming years. The Commission noted evidence that showed that the value of a strong health and safety culture was well understood in some quarters (Thornton pp 1693/25-30, pp 1695/12-20), but there was also evidence that in some major mining companies the safety culture was still developing. The permission to allow Ms Hermanus to give evidence on behalf of the NUM was a major positive sign. (Loxton pp 8 and 9 / 24-12, Arthur D Little, page 11).

6.6 SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

The Commission heard evidence concerning the MBO 5 Star Safety and Health Management system operated by the National Occupational Safety Association. The system was said to be based on “Management by Objectives” principles and the expressions Safety and Loss Control are also used to describe such systems.

NOSA as an organisation has been in existence for 42 years and been used by the mining industry of South Africa for 26 years. The first step in the system is the identification of areas in the work situation that need controlling, including those covered by statutory requirements, in order to achieve the desired objective of maximising profits and minimising losses. The requirements for a good safety performance are set out in detail in a management designed system expressed as check lists, which explain the requirements for each item listed. The check lists are used for auditing purposes, both by internal auditors in the company, or by external auditors trained by the NOSA organisation. The NOSA system uses statistics of accidents causing one day’s lost work, and fatal and serious injuries are not used for control purposes. The medical records at the mine are used to check on days lost. In earlier periods much reliance was placed on performance information supplied by the mine management.

The external audit provides the recognition of the achievements of the mine in safety terms by awarding a Star Rating on a scale from one to five stars. The motivation for management is said to be the award of these star ratings accompanied by a certificate and decal.

Twenty seven percent of all the mines in South Africa use the NOSA system. There are two other similar systems that are extensively used, namely the International Safety Rating System (ISRS) and the Mine Safety Management System (MSMS) operated by the Chamber of Mines. There are also minor local variants on these systems. All use similar principles and offer Star Ratings. The NOSA system is fee earning, although the company is non profit making, and received some 60 per cent of its revenue from grants from the Workmen’s Compensation Accident Fund. At a meeting on 3 May 1994, between all the parties interested in these systems, efforts were being made to make them more effective, and to give occupational health a more prominent role. So far there is no workers’ representation on the Board of NOSA.


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Much criticism was made of these Five Star Safety Rating Systems in evidence. Although some 80 per cent of South African mines had 4 or 5 star ratings, the GME pointed out that they had unacceptable levels of accidents and fatalities. (Le Roux pp 1254 / 19-24). Mines with high star ratings had experienced major disasters - Hlobane Colliery, 1983, 4 Stars, 68 dead; Kinross mine, 1986, 5 Stars, 177 dead: Middelbult Colliery, 1993, 5 Stars, 53 dead (Cameron pp 1239 / 24-30, pp 1259 / 18-28). The comfort of being awarded many stars for excellence in safety led to a degree of complacency, which was itself a danger. (Cameron pp 1241 / 13-14). Although the NOSA Board had no worker representation, it was partly funded by the Workmen’s Compensation Accident Fund, and this fund did not make grants to workers’ safety organisations. All these systems relied on voluntary co-operation by mine management, they could not make unannounced audits or visits, and there was a perception that management arranged for everything to be in order before allowing the auditor onto the mine.

The COMMISSION CONCLUDED that, although these safety management systems may have made some contribution to improving safety at some mines, they had become largely discredited in the eyes of those employed at the mines and in public perception, because of the very large disasters that continued to occur at mines with high star ratings, and their imperceptible impact on the overall level of fatal and major injuries in South African mines.

While mining companies and mines must be free to use these systems if they feel they will assist them in improving health and safety, the COMMISSION FINDS no basis for encouraging the adoption of these systems.

6.7 ROLE OF TRADITIONAL MANAGEMENT IN IMPROVING HEALTH AND

SAFETY

Mine Management has always been seen in all countries with developing or large mining industries, as being the central point of responsibility for the control of mining activity, and as such must be held responsible for the health and safety of the persons employed in and about the mine. Mine Managers are subject to the control and direction of the Owners of the mine, and while subject to their instructions, and for their livelihood, they must also be protected against unreasonable requirements placed upon them by some owners, who may have little regard for the people they employ, or the statutory duties placed upon the manager.

6.7.1 Responsibility of the Owner

The owner of a mine, generally seen as the person for the time being entitled to work the mine, has onerous responsibilities placed on him or her in law. These duties are briefly set out in Section 31 of the Minerals Act 1991. The owners control all the investment decisions, the technical policies, the employment policies, the living conditions of the majority of employees, and the quality of the personnel who are made responsible for operating the mines. It was suggested at the hearings that South Africa should adopt the more relaxed requirements in law, relating to owner’s and manager’s duties, recently adopted in the UK and British Columbia (Loxton pp 2 243 15-17). It should be remembered that these recent changes in mining law in those countries are supported either by strong and detailed Statutory Codes of Practice, which have legal force, supported by reverse onuses or presumptions of guilt, which would be unwelcome by the


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Commission (See Ch. 9.3 and Loxton pp 2 574/5).

6.7.2 Role and Responsibility of the “agent”

Mining enterprises may start as owner/worker operations with direct contact between owner and his workforce, and in these situations the owner may appoint himself as manager to satisfy the law. As mining organisations grow the management structure expands, and so does the company structure, and the owner may become a body corporate taking action through the minutes of its board meetings. From this situation there can develop a further layer of management between the corporate body and the manager of the mine. These individuals are sometimes called “agents” but more commonly in South Africa, “consulting engineers” or “senior managers”. They are usually seasoned mine managers who have been promoted to have charge of more than one mine on behalf of the company, or to have specialised duties over groups of mines. Often these individuals have very considerable powers of direction in a mine’s affairs, but carry no statutory responsibility, as the present Minerals Act does not provide for them. While they have considerable powers over mine managers, they do not have the responsibility that the law places on the mine manager. This is an unsatisfactory situation, and the COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that this situation be corrected by requiring owners to identify individuals in the chain of command above the manager, their delegated powers and responsibilities, and provide notification of the appointments to the inspectorate.

6.7.3 Responsibilities of the mine manager and others in line management

The manager of a mine has often been compared to the captain of a ship. Because of the interaction of many factors within and exterior to the mine, such as ventilation, strata control, gas emission, water and other external dangers, radiation and so on, he must be in charge of and control all the operations at the mine. The health and safety of all the employees within and at the mine depend on the way he controls activities at the mine, where there are many hazards.

The duties of the manager of a mine are outlined in Section 31 of the Minerals Act 1991. He is responsible for the control, management and direction of the employees. He must take all reasonable measures to ensure health and safety and proper discipline at the mine. He must take all reasonable measures to ensure that the provisions of the Act are complied with. He must appoint prescribed persons to assist him, but they do not relieve him of his duty. He must report prescribed accidents.

The manager’s main duties are repeated in Regulation 2.5.1 where every mine, not abandoned, must be under a manager. Other manager’s duties are found in Regulations 2.6, 2.7, 2.8, 2.9, 2.10, 2.11 and others are scattered throughout the Regulations. The way the Regulations are codified leaves much to be desired, and this was recognised in evidence by the parties at the Inquiry. This matter will be dealt with later in Chapter 10.


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The line management prescribed by statute consists of subordinate managers, being competent persons appointed by the manager (Reg 2.6.1). A person holding a mine manager’s certificate appropriate for that mine may be appointed by the manager, if the manager himself does not hold that qualification (Reg 2.5.2.1). This implies that a person although not qualified with a manager’s certificate of competency for that class of mine can be the manager, and can appoint someone who is so qualified to be responsible for applying the law in underground workings. This provision is not satisfactory and would be unacceptable in some other countries.

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that this Regulation 2.5.2.1 be deleted when amending the law.

Mine overseers must be appointed by the manager if more than 300 persons are employed underground. Overseers must have an overseer’s certificate at least, and they share the manager’s responsibilities for the parts of the mine allocated to them. These appointments must be made in writing and notified to the Inspectorate immediately, and must clearly define the parts of the mine for which the appointee has responsibility.

The next level of supervision in line management is the shift boss (Reg 2.15.1). Here the wording of the regulation is “may” and not “shall” and gives the manager an option rather than an obligation. But when the number employed in the workings exceeds 300 the appointment is compulsory, and once appointed the shift boss shall during the shift be in charge of the workings.

The section for which the shift boss is in charge must be clearly defined in a log book provided by the manager and kept in a specific place. A shift boss must hold a permanent blasting certificate valid for the mine. The section of the mine allocated to a shift boss must be reasonable and additional duties must not encroach on his statutory duties. (Reg 2.15.3) He must enforce the law relating to health and safety in his section. He must make specified inspections in his section. The specified inspections include those to be made daily during his shift, and in coal mines require tests for flammable gas in every part of the section where men work or pass. These tests must be recorded in a shift report.

Shift boss reports made during, or at the end of his shift are detailed in regulations (Reg 2.15.6). The records or reports must be signed by the manager or overseer every day, and must be open to inspection by anyone wishing to see them (Reg 2.15.7). To ensure the primacy of his health and safety duties Reg 2.15.8 prohibits a shift boss being in charge of a gang, a duty normally undertaken by a miner or ganger. The duties of a shift boss cannot be undertaken by a manager, subordinate manager, or overseer except with the written permission of the Inspector. The position of shift boss can be seen as the first line of management in health and safety, and is clearly and well defined in the Regulations. The Commission found that the evidence that this important post in health and safety management had been “usurped” by industry (DMEA first submission 5.3 - 5.6) was alarming, and represented a very unsatisfactory situation. The duties of shift boss are standard in most international mine health and safety codes, and form the first line of defence in providing a safe working environment. South African law on this mine official is


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clear and firm, but evidence presented by the COM showed that even in an apparently well managed mine, there was no regard for these important requirements of South African regulations, in that they devised their own terminology which did not refer to the statutory requirement to employ shift bosses. (Thornton pp 1 630/3 125-14)

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that the restoration of the position of the Shift Boss in the line management to that which is firmly required in existing South African law, should be pursued by the Inspectorate without delay.

In 1989 the regulations were amended to require the appointment of safety officers. The Commission was told that the latter requirements were made to compensate for the “usurping” by industry of the shift boss, and that this change to the law had made no apparent improvement. The Commission considers that the insertion of these new statutory appointments was counter productive. The responsibility for health and safety must rest with line management, and these additional appointments outside line management can not be expected to be an effective replacement. These individuals with special training and aptitudes can help to advise management, but responsibility must remain firmly within line management.

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that these appointments should not be required in law, although they may assist in improving the health and safety environment.

Another level of supervision that may be considered the lowest level of line management, which is peculiar to South Africa, is the “ganger” or “miner”. The two expressions are synonymous and are defined in the regulations as “a person in charge of workmen”. No qualification is attached to the definition. The appointment goes back in South African history to the days when a white person, perhaps having worked in mining in another country, was given a gang of black workmen, and the tools and explosives to break ground and allowed to get on with working stope, based on a contract which paid him in accordance with the volume of ore he produced with his gang. Later a requirement for a blasting certificate was attached to some ganger or miner appointments, and as black workmen were debarred from sitting for blasting certificates this made the job of ganger or miner the preserve of the white miner. Chapter 8 of the Regulations deals with the responsibility of gangers or miners with some other important issues inserted. The anachronistic nature of this relationship between ganger and workman is illustrated in Chapter 13 of the Regulations which deals with disputes between gangers and managers and requires the Government Mining Engineer to be an arbitrator between them.


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The Commission heard evidence that this Chapter should be completely taken out of the Regulations (Raath pp 1 877 10-15), and the COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that this be done. When regulations are reconsidered, the function, duties, qualification and competence of supervisory levels below shift boss should be examined to provide improved definition of responsibilities and rules of persons below the rank of shift boss.

6.8 LEGAL CONTROL OF THE RADIATION HAZARD

Radioactivity occurs in the mining environment from several sources. Many elements which occur in nature, such as uranium or lead can have different structures to their atoms called nuclides or isotopes which have their own characteristic properties. Most isotopes are stable but some transform spontaneously from the nuclide of one element to that of another and these are called Radionuclides, and there are about fifty. This process of change from the nuclide of one element to the nuclide of another is called decay, and is accompanied by the release of energy which is called radioactivity. There are several decay processes in matter which release different forms of radiation, but the most common are the release of Alpha or Beta Particles or Gamma Rays. The first two represent larger and smaller particles emitted from atoms which can bombard surrounding tissue, and Gamma rays represent energy transmitted as a wave without mass or electric charge. In the underground mining environment, the main danger comes from the radionuclides that occur in the decay chain of uranium and thorium, often referred to as radon daughters. Radon is a gas which is breathed in underground and breathed out again without much damage to the lung, but the decay products, or daughters, released in the lung emit Alpha and Beta particles which damage the lung tissue. Measurements of radon in the mine atmosphere are taken as an indication of the associated presence of the daughters that will affect the lung. There are also other radionuclides associated with mining, that can be a hazard in milling processes, in waste products and scrap material, but these do not constitute such a large problem as radon and its daughters.

Radioactivity causes cancer and damaging genetic defects which pass from one generation to another. These effects are slow in developing and may take 20 years or more. Dose-response relationships between radioactivity and disease have been obtained from studies of the survivors exposed to the ionising radiations from the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, but there is also a body of evidence from mining populations exposed in uranium and other mines.

The effects of irradiation on the body are irreversible and incurable. The average person is exposed to both natural and artificial forms of radioactivity irrespective of where they work, from cosmic rays, foods, radon and its daughters, and from medical diagnostic procedures and nuclear fallout. This amounts to about 5% of the maximum dose equivalent now prescribed by international advice and most national laws, and the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) recommends that any additional dose from work environments should be kept as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). This principle has been accepted by over 20 governments represented on the ICRP. They also recommend no practice should be adopted unless its introduction produces a positive new benefit in terms of lower radiation exposure, and that dose equivalents to individuals should not exceed the limits recommended by that Commission.


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The ICRP revises its recommendations on maximum dose equivalents to individuals from time to time, in the light of further epidemiological studies carried out internationally. The maximum individual Annual Dose Limit advised in 1985 was 50 millisieverts (mSv) and evidence was heard that more recently this has been further amended to an average individual maximum annual dose of 100 mSv over 5 years, implying an annual average of 20 mSv. (Winkler pp 1 013 11-17.)

In South Africa the relevant Act dealing with nuclear matters is the Nuclear Energy Act 1993, and under that Act the authority responsible for radiation protection, and the setting of dose limits and other standards is the CNS which is an independent regulatory authority located within the DMEA. The South African Government accepts the recommendations of the ICRP.

The CNS had little co-operation from the mining industry until 1990 but some progress has been made since then. The method used to regulate by CNS is by the granting of licences under the 1993 Act where appropriate, and stipulating conditions to be followed in the licences. Some contradictory evidence was heard concerning the application of radiological standards to mines by the CNS and the role of the GME, who is charged with securing the health and safety of those employed in the mining industry. (Winkler/Raath pp 1 022/3)

The Commission found no reason to suggest that the Nuclear Energy Act 1993 required amendment, and accepted that the regulatory authority, the CNS, had to be satisfied that its requirements were met. The Commission felt, however, that there was a strong case for closer co-operation between the CNS and the GME and that there was a constructive role for the GME to play in the monitoring and supervision of individual dose limitation requirements, and providing practical guidance in mining engineering terms on how best to achieve satisfactory conditions. It is also important that the workforce should be given information concerning the levels of risk from ionising radiations that they face, and be helped by instruction and training to understand those risks. The CNS and GME should be able to assist with this instruction and training.

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that a closer working relationship be formed between the CNS and the GME with a view to closer monitoring of underground exposures and individual doses received annually by employees. That together, the two enforcing authorities develop a way of informing the workforce of the nature of the hazard, its extent and how it affects individuals. 6.9 THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF SELF REGULATION

The COM in its closing argument envisaged “self regulation” as encompassing a legislative framework where legislation is agreed by tripartite process, but the manager of the mine must retain a discretion with regard to the details which are required to achieve the objectives in a manner best suited to that particular mine. Self regulation even in this sense was strongly opposed by the DMEA and the NUM.

The DMEA correctly conceded that the Regulations were untidy and that some of them were over prescriptive and could be repealed without compromising safety and health. The Commission agrees with this view and this will be dealt with later in the Report.


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The DMEA however was opposed to self regulation. As an example of the extremely unsatisfactory problems to which self regulation gave rise evidence was presented by Mr Raath with regard to Regulation 2.10.2, which has been in operation since 1911. That regulation requires the manager not to permit an incompetent or inexperienced person to perform dangerous work or work upon which the safety of others may depend. That regulation was not effective and places an onus on the manager to ensure proper training, but in practice there were many sad and indeed tragic instances where this had not taken place. The proof of the pudding was in the eating.

The NUM contended that history had shown that where the industry had been left to self regulate this had failed. The alarming rate of deaths and reportable injuries in mines bore eloquent testimony to that, as did the examples in the following paragraphs.

The industry became aware, 26 years ago, of the dangers inherent in the use of polyurethane below ground. Yet repeated tragedies involving the use of this substance occurred culminating, but not ending, with the Kinross disaster eight years ago which claimed the lives of 177 persons. Today a debate is still taking place at a Western Deep Levels Inquiry as to how long it will take to remove polyurethane underground. This is a stark illustration of the danger of allowing even a well resourced industry to get on with its own regulation.

Radiation is another example. The DMEA regards radiation and dust as the two most serious underground hazards. Mining experts in the South African industry have been aware of the radiation hazard for many years but did nothing about the problem until the CNS was constituted in 1990 as an independent external agency. That was 17 years after the radiation danger in mines was ascertained.

The occupational disease figures constitute another example of the failure of self regulation.

So does the failure to install and maintain stone dust barriers in conveyor roads in coal mines, when the hazard of flammable coal dust underground has been well known to the mining industry since early this century.

The Commission is satisfied that self regulation has failed. In evidence adduced from Mr Raath and Mr Cameron reference was made to the mines particularly the smaller mines which are not members of the COM over which latter has neither control nor even moral influence. The Commission has reason to believe that the situation regarding health and safety at these smaller mines is probably worse than in the bigger, better and more forward looking mines such as Elandsrand and Kriel. Photographs presented to the Commission taken in a small privately owned diamond mine reflected a situation where the employees were living in a state of squalor and degradation which the Commission could not accept without demur.

It is the view of the Commission that self regulation is unacceptable. The issue will be discussed further when dealing with the Regulations in Chapter 10.


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6.10 THE RIGHTS OF WORKERS

This is an issue that has been neglected in the past, both in South African law and practice. The Commission is satisfied that the time has come for change in this regard. The matter is dealt with in some detail in several chapters of the Report and is not dealt with here other than to include it in the subjects the Commission considered to be critical issues.

6.11 THE ROLE OF SAFETY AND HEALTH COMMITTEES AND THE TRIPARTITE

PRINCIPLE

6.11.1 Background

A Mine Safety Committee was established by Section 26 of the Minerals Act, 1991. The Act assigned a broad role to the Committee, requiring it to “… advise the Director General on the application of the Act in respect of the safety and health of persons employed at mines or any practice or any other thing which affects or is likely to affect the safety or health of such persons.” This definition lacks specificity, but is all embracing enough to include issues such as the formulation of regulations or codes of practice.

As constituted by the Act the Committee consists of no more than ten members, appointed by the Minister, three representing the DMEA with the GME as Chairman; three nominated by the owners of mines; three representing employees who are not officials of the mine, and one representing the officials employed on the mines. The decision with regard to representativeness of the nominees is left to the discretion of the Minister.

This Committee was the first instance of full representation being given in the administration of legislation to all those who have a direct interest in a high standard of health and safety in the industry. The interested parties are the State, the owners and those who work in the mines.

6.11.2 The Role and Name of the Committee

The Minerals Act envisages an advisory role for the Mine Safety Committee. There was general agreement among the parties that a new committee should embrace both health and safety issues. The evidence presented and the arguments suggested that both the NUM and the COM wished to give a stronger role to the Committee, perhaps for different reasons. The NUM proposed the establishment of a “Mine Health and Safety Council”, which would advise the Minister and the GME on a broad range of issues, which fall into three categories: -any matter of policy concerning the development, implementation and enforcement of health and safety standards;

-any matter concerning the promotion of health and safety of employees; and

-consideration of any report prepared by a sub-committee.


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The NUM also envisaged that the Council might conduct such research or investigations as it believes appropriate from time to time. Moreover, the Council would have sub-committees, three of which would be permanent, as follows:

-Mine Regulations Review Committee (MRRC); -Safety in Mines Research Advisory Committee (SIMRAC); and -Code of Practice Committee (CPC).

The Industry representatives suggested that the most desirable legislative framework would be one in which the principal objectives are set out in the Act and “.. the generally accepted means of achieving such objectives or meeting the performance criteria which have industry wide application should be set out in regulations.” (COM - Summary of Recommendations) The COM proposed the establishment of the Mining Regulation Advisory Committee (MRAC), referred to by the NUM as MRRC, to advise the Minister in respect of legislation and other matters affecting health and safety on the mines. The COM envisaged this new Committee as forming the heart of the consultative process through which the mining industry’s regulatory framework would be formulated, monitored and reviewed. The Chamber’s intention would be to establish a framework that was flexible and allowed mine managers freedom to determine the method of achieving the desired health and safety standards. The State would interfere only if and when a manager failed to perform in accordance with expectations.

Among these proposals there are the elements of a reasonable solution. A tripartite advisory committee seems a good approach to provide a forum where the interested parties could discuss the problems of achieving improvements in the current dismal safety records. The name proposed by the NUM is more descriptive of the responsibilities envisaged, and the Commission suggests that the Mine Safety Committee should be replaced by the Mine Health and Safety Council (MHSC) in the new Act.

The Council would have a wide advisory role in the promotion of better health and safety management, and would advise, inter alia on:

-the formation of new approaches for improvements, using modern tools of safety management such as risk assessment;

-the development of methods for implementing the new systems; and

-the more effective and constructive enforcement of the control measures.

While the Council should become an important cornerstone of health and safety administration, it should remain an advisory body to the Minister, or effectively to the GME. Ultimate responsibility for the enforcement of health and safety legislation should remain with the GME and his staff. Their role is not only a policing role, but involves initiatives in the development of proposals for new regulations, and guidelines and general advice on health and safety issues. Any


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member of Council would have the right to propose any matter that could further the improvement of health and safety in the industry, and all proposals would be submitted to the Council for consideration and recommendation.

While the Commission sees a need for some flexibility in regulations to suit the specific requirements of individual mines, the past record does not provide sufficient confidence to suggest that managers of mines should have a free hand. A compromise solution would be to develop through the MHSC guidelines for all areas of health and safety concern, to be issued and published by the GME, and require managers to develop, adopt and display their individual Codes of Practice, incorporating these guidelines, and the minimum standards set in regulations.

The manager would in this way be able to incorporate measures which in his opinion would enhance health and safety. The manager’s Codes of Practice would naturally be subject to any amendments required by an inspector or the GME. The three sub-committees suggested by the NUM appear appropriate to work with the Council, and is recommended. The commission favours the name Mining Regulation Advisory Committee proposed by the Chamber.

6.11.3 The Tripartite Concept in the Committee Structure

There was general agreement in the evidence heard by the Commission that representation on the Council should be from representatives of the State, the owners and the employees. The Chamber made no specific suggestions on representation, but the NUM suggested four representatives from the State, the employers and employees not performing managerial functions. This proposal may reflect distrust which may moderate with time. The Commission considers that the body of officials employed at mines should have a useful input into the Council, as would a representative of more senior management. All these groups are employees as well as workmen who may be represented by differing organisations. In these circumstances the best way of selecting representatives would be for all the organisations representing the various classes of employees, and the owners to put forward nominations, and for the Minister, or the GME on his behalf to select names from these nominations to give a properly balanced representation of all those who can have an input into health and safety issues.

The NUM and the GME suggested in evidence that the SIMRAC should be a Subcommittee of the Council. The COM recommended that SIMRAC should be established by the Minerals Act to advise the Director General on mine safety research, and in their specific proposals they proposed that ten representatives should be appointed from owners nominations and five each to represent employees and the State. It is difficult to understand the rationale for this proposal. Until recently the gold and coal mines financed and organised their own research. Currently a lower volume of research is funded by a levy collected by the State from all the mines to support research. This fund is controlled by the State and is used for the purposes specified in legislation. There is nothing to prevent the industry continuing to fund its own research, but it cannot expect to dominate the control of the direction in which the research levies are used. Much of the expertise in research will remain in the industry and will be available to advise the GME. The


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Commission considers that the composition of SIMRAC should more or less mirror that of the Council, and the Council should have the power to appoint its own subcommittees. The selection should be governed by the expertise of the appointee in relation to the subjects to be dealt with by the Committee.

6.11.4 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that:

A Mine Health and Safety Council be established by the new Act to advise the Minister through the GME on all matters relating to health and safety in mines, the relevant legislation and enforcement thereof:

-the Council should consist of four representatives of employers, four representatives of employees working in non managerial positions, one representative of mine officials, the GME as Chairperson and a further three representatives of the DMEA; -the Minister, or the GME acting on his behalf, should appoint the required number of members from nominations made by the representative bodies;

-the Council should have standing committees and sub-committees for specific purposes, and be empowered to appoint ad hoc committees to investigate or administer the relevant business of the Council; and -in general the composition of the sub-committees should be a reflection of that of the Council, with the emphasis placed on the expertise of members in relation to the subject matter of the Committees. The formation of this Council and Committees will be dealt with further in Chapters 7 and 10.

6.12 HEALTH AND SAFETY REPRESENTATIVES, AND HEALTH AND SAFETY

COMMITTEES AT MINES

6.12.1 Safety and Health Representatives

The concept of safety representatives was introduced into the South African mining industry by the Minerals Act 1991 in Regulations 2.18.1 to 3, 2.19.5 and 2.19.6.1 and 2. These were appointed by the manager in respect of each working place or group of working places, provided that the number of persons working in these places did not exceed 50. The justification for the title “representative” is not clear, as these individuals did not represent anyone. Their sole function seemed to be to report “.. any threat or potential threat to the safety and health of any employee..”. The evidence heard by the Commission showed that both employers and employees wish to see the role of these individuals clarified and strengthened.

It is important that employees, who obviously have a major stake in improving conditions on the mines, should have an effective voice through which they can impact on the standard of health and safety in their working environment. An experienced workman who spends his shift in a working place will observe dangerous conditions or dangerous acts or omissions by fellow workers or supervisors.


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Such a person, if he is empowered and willing to act, can have a major influence in reducing risks at the working place. Experience in several countries has shown that a well organised system of representatives can assist significantly in the overall health and safety effort at the mine. There are potential problems, for example, an ill-guided safety representative using his position to create industrial friction, but on balance, the advantages outweigh the possible and occasional difficulties.

The evidence heard by the Commission indicated that there was broad agreement between the parties concerning the election of health and safety representatives. The manager of the mine in consultation would facilitate the election by the employees who are not in management grades, of the representative for each working place. There would be a representative for approximately every 100 workmen employed. The person eligible for election would be a full time employee at the working place, and should have two years experience in the relevant type of mining. The working places requiring representatives should be designated by the manager, and there should be a simple form of negotiation on the mine in the case of disagreement.

Safety representatives should be given initial and refresher training. This should be given during normal working hours at normal pay. The individuals who take on this task should be protected from discrimination or disadvantages arising from or associated with the performance of their duties.

The functions of a health and safety representative will be associated with his working place and will include: speaking on behalf of his fellow workers on any concerns they may have concerning health and safety; inspecting the workplace and the equipment and plant used; reporting untoward or unexpected events and advising fellow workers on safe practices. He may participate in, and with approval of the manager be accompanied by a technical adviser during an inspection by an inspector of the DMEA. That is, he fulfils, with the support of the manager, functions that promote health and safety in his working place and performs these duties without unreasonable hindrance to the safe and efficient working of the mine.

To be successful a health and safety representative should:

-be kept abreast by management of all information relevant to health and safety in the workplace;

-have ready access to supervisors so that he can express any concern to them; and

-have an open line of communication to the mine’s health and safety committee (see Ch. 6.12.3).

6.12.2 Full Time Health and Safety Representatives

In its closing submission to the Commission the NUM recommended the election of a full time health and safety representative for every shaft employing more than 300 persons. His proposed functions were to co-ordinate the activities of part time representatives, to “chair” the employee representative group on the mine health and safety committee, and to participate in the training of workplace representatives. The Chamber’s submissions were silent on these matters.


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There appears to be a possibility in this appointment of an overlap with organised union functions, and there should be no objection to a union employing a person in this capacity. The size and layout of mines are very variable and the Commission feels that it should make no recommendation with regard to full time shaft representatives. This matter should be left to negotiation between employer and employees at mine level.

6.12.3 Mine Health and Safety Committees

The evidence put before the Commission showed that there was agreement between the parties that there should be at least one Health and Safety Committee at a mine, and that the manager in consultation with the workplace representatives, should decide how many committees are necessary to cover the operations at the mine.

These committees should be joint consultative committees that should discuss any matters raised either by management or safety representatives relating to health and safety. A usual arrangement would be to have equal numbers of representatives from management and workplace representatives with the manager as chairman. Their agenda would include accidents and incidents, work practice, relevant training, proposed codes of practice, accident and health statistics, and so on. It may seem appropriate from time to time with the approval of the manager, for either party to invite outsiders to participate (in a no-voting capacity) in the deliberations of the Committee. The performance of existing safety officers or health professionals may give rise for concern, and, as a result might be discussed by the committee.

However, the appointment of officers is the prerogative of the company. Effective committees can have a significant impact on the standards of health and safety in the workplace.

The committees can not detract from the statutory responsibility of the manager for all health and safety matters at the mine, or the responsibility of the mine officials in the statutory line of command, and to this extent the committees can only be advisory to the manager and the management staff.


-a system of health and safety representatives should be established at each mine, and that regulations be drafted to formalise their position, with at least one representative per 100 non-managerial employees. The manager, in consultation with the workforce, should facilitate their election, and define the workplaces to be covered.

-one or more Mine Health and Safety Committee(s) should be established by the manager on each mine, after consultation with workplace representatives, concerning the number of committees, size of membership, rules of operation, and frequency of meetings;


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-the Committees should consist in equal numbers of representatives of management including mine officials, and elected workplace representatives; and

-the Committees should be consultative in nature and make recommendations to the manager.

6.13 MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR THE ACCOMMODATION OF WORKMEN

This matter has already been dealt with in Chapters 2 and 4 and is mentioned here as an issue which the Commission considers among those that are critical and needs to be addressed.

6.14 RIGHTS OF WORKERS

This matter has already been dealt with in Chapter 4 and is mentioned here as an issue which the Commission considers among those that are critical and needs to be addressed.


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CHAPTER SEVEN

RESEARCH POLICY AND RESEARCH MANAGEMENT Historical Background The South African gold mining industry commenced some research activities in the early part of the century. Initially the work was entirely restricted to health or health related matters (effect of dust, heat physiology) and to issues such as combating fungi in underground timber, vegetation of dumps and so on. Much of this work was carried out by a relatively small staff employed by the COM. In the first half of the century issues directly related to mining, such as the rockburst problem, were tackled on an ad hoc basis mostly by mining engineers, employed in various capacities by the mining companies. The realisation came only in the early 1950s that rockbursts and similar complex problems could not be solved by uncoordinated spontaneous efforts by individuals or even by individual companies. Thus, in 1953 the COM was asked to initiate and co-ordinate a major research effort to tackle the rockburst problem. The COM commissioned the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) to form a team of scientists and begin a major investigation into the mechanics of rockbursts. Soon the industry found that the personnel at the CSIR were too remote from the mines and become somewhat disillusioned with the progress of the research. About 1960 the industry requested the advice of Sir Basil Schonland, an eminent South African scientist residing in the UK, with regard to the research policy it should follow. The advice received and accepted was that the gold industry has several major technological problems, and therefore, it should embark on a research programme of its own. In order to implement this programme it should strengthen its own research organisation considerably. The implementation of this policy commenced with the appointment of a research adviser in 1962 and the employment during the first half of the 1960s of several young engineers / scientist of international calibre. During this period the resources and the infrastructure of the Chamber of Mines Research Organisation (COMRO) were also greatly reinforced. At about the same time when these developments in the gold industry, were taking place, the Coalbrook Colliery disaster occurred in 1960. In this mine a major pillar failure caused the loss of 437 lives. Both the industry and the government felt that something must be done to avoid a repetition of such tragedy. It was decided to introduce a small safety research levy on coal production and initiate research using these funds. At the same time, the Coal Mining Research Controlling Council (CMRCC) a body on which the representatives of government and industry served, was established to oversee the research. It is worth interpolating here that this Council and this levy were the forerunners of the current SIMRAC and of the levy that funds the activities carried out under the control of this body. The current levy is collected from all sections of the mining industry. At first the research by the CMRCC was carried out by the Fuel Research Institute (later the Institute became part of the CSIR), the CSIR and the small staff attached to the Council itself. At the end of 1966 the Council’s own staff, by mutual agreement, was incorporated into COMRO and became the nucleus of the coal mining research within the COM.


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In the early 1970s COMRO’s research effort received a boost with the sudden and major increase in the price of gold. The profit of the gold mines increased considerably and it appeared that the economic base became available to develop the technological underpinning for the future of the industry. In 1974 the gold industry, through the COM, approved a 10 year capital research and development plan at an estimated cost of R 100 million. This was a great deal of money in 1974 and the decision to go ahead with the plan resulted in a three fold increase in COMRO’s activities and resources. COMRO’s new gold research programme, which was approved in June 1974, re-focussed research and development on the following four critical problem areas of the gold mining industry:

-rockbursts; -mine cooling; -mechanisation of stoping; and -human resource problems.

Without attempting to give a comprehensive list, it is noteworthy, that the 1960s produced the recommendation that stabilising pillars and / or backfill are the two main methods of combating rockbursts. The rapid yielding prop and the theoretical basis for MINSIM (a computer programme to compute mining induced stresses and energy release which is capable of analysing the complex layout of goldmines) were also developed in this period. The 1970s saw the development of new mine cooling technologies. Progress in the use of hydro-power began in the 1980s. At the same time, disappointingly slow progress was made in the development of mechanised stoping methods and in other important areas. Also, work in the human resources area made uncertain progress, mainly because white South Africa at the time was unclear as to the direction in which development in the sensitive area should progress. Generally, however, COMRO was producing exciting advances and became the envy of the rest of the mining world. However, as time went on the rate of progress slowed, the price of gold declined and the profit margin of mines was eroded by price cost inflation. As a result of these developments the industry’s enthusiasm for research dwindled. The disillusionment was aggravated by increasing efforts by some mining groups to do their own research, which inevitably led to differences of opinion concerning the direction in which research should proceed. At about the same time the then GME, facing a deteriorating safety situation, began to consider the extension to the whole industry of the CMRCC type of approach to safety research. Thus, at the beginning of the 1990s the scene was set for a fundamental change in the approach to research and to the formulation of research policy. 7.1 RESEARCH POLICY

The developments described in the previous section eventually led to major changes in the organisation and management of mining research in South Africa. The mining industry, after much internal debate and external negotiation, has decided that it can no longer afford to maintain a large research organisation. Consequently, the COM, after severely curtailing its research staff and infrastructure, has relinquished the control of COMRO. Thus, by the end of 1992 COMRO ceased to exist and its personnel, together with its resources, were merged with the CSIR. The remnants of COMRO re-emerged at the beginning of 1993 under a new name and management as Mining Technology, CSIR.

More or less in parallel with these arrangements the GME, after extensive negotiations, added a regulation to the Minerals Act (Act 50 of 1991). This regulation (Chapter 35) authorises the Director General of the DMEA to establish a safety research account to which income from three sources is to be credited. The sources of funds are firstly, research


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Levies paid by mines in terms of regulation 35.2(a)(iv), secondly fines imposed in terms of regulation 35.3 for failure to pay or late payment of the levy, and thirdly, any income accrued from investment of the money in that account. It is important to note that all sections of the industry are required to pay levies in terms of this new regulation. The new levies have two features that are important to the Commission’s business. Firstly the funds accumulated in this manner are to be “.. used for research and surveys regarding, and for the promotion of, industrial safety at mines and works”. Secondly, the magnitude of the levy for each mine is defined in terms of a safety risk which is determined annually. The important points to observe here are that apparently the research levy is neither influenced by health risk nor is it to be used for research into the alleviation of health hazards.

On the basis of this newly established framework, SIMRAC was established in 1992. According to the Annual Report of SIMRAC for 1993, the Committee has 14 members. These include four representatives of the DMEA, one of which is the GME who chairs the Committee, one representative from the COM and nine representatives from major mining houses. None of the members appear to have any connection with health in the mining industry.

It would appear even from this short survey that two important principles were adopted when the SIMRAC system was organised. Both of these principles reflect the past and probably came about because of the long isolation of South Africa from developments in the rest of the world. Firstly, the composition of these committees gives the impression that the management side of the mining industry was meant to dominate the processes involved in the formulation of research policy and the definition of the research programme. No involvement of any representative of the mine workers was planned. Secondly, safety and health issues were to be separated and SIMRAC was to deal with matters of safety only. This latter issue however, is not dealt with consistently since some of the protects formulated by the committees do, in fact, impact indirectly on human health.

When this issue was raised during the presentation of evidence, the explanation given was that committees consist of technical experts and they are not forums for industrial disputes. This explanation is unacceptable on several grounds. There was not at the time a forum which provided an opportunity for input, comment or guidance from the representatives of workers or mine officials on research priorities or any other relevant matter. The presumption that the labour force, because it is largely under-educated, cannot provide an input into research discussions is not tenable. On questions of priority workers have opinions which should not be ignored and trade unions can employ experts who can make useful contributions to the debates of technical committees. This matter is discussed further in Chapter 10.

The reason for separating health issues from safety considerations is not entirely clear. Considerable benefit could result from the consolidation of these two sides of the problem into a single system of control.

7.2 EXTENSION OF RESEARCH TO HEALTH ISSUES

It appears that insufficient funds are made available to sustain credible research into occupational health problems associated with mining. As was discussed in Chapter 4, these health problems fall into a number of categories or groups. The first includes those that are directly associated with work in the mining environment, such as dust causing lung disease,


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noise induced hearing loss, and vibration induced diseases. The second group involves diseases that may be associated with problems of inadequate living conditions and unnatural social environment on the mines, such as AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases. The third category may be termed hybrid diseases in which the origin of the disease may be unclear and may even be unrelated to mining, but working in the mining environment may aggravate the condition.

The prevention or alleviation of ailments in any of these categories may involve various activities and give rise to various costs. In this Chapter only the research costs are considered. It is a complex and unresolved socio-economic question whether the industry should be held responsible for the full burden of the costs associated with health problems. It seems reasonable to take a pragmatic view of the matter and suggest that in the present circumstances, mining should accept responsibility for research costs associated with medical conditions that are directly attributable to employment.

Diseases in the first category seem to satisfy this criterion of responsibility. The clarification of the possible aggravating effects of the mining environment and ailments in the third category could also be claimed to be the responsibility of the mining industry. However, the diseases in the second category occur commonly in the non-mining world and create a significant burden on society as a whole. The same comment can be applied to the non-compounding effects of the diseases in the third group. In the case of these diseases the mining industry can expect to be treated as a tax payer and pay its contribution towards the cost of research into these diseases through the tax system.

If the health problem is subdivided in this manner, it is reasonable to include health related research in the portfolio of SIMRAC. If this is done then the research levy should be calculated on the basis of both health and safety risks at every mine. The health and safety risk factors would determine the distribution of health and safety levies respectively.

Naturally, the implementation of this suggestion would necessitate the development of a system of record keeping that would facilitate the estimation of the health risk factor. This task should be approached in a simple and pragmatic way since the goal is merely to estimate a risk factor and not to collect moneys to fund compensation in the future.

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that: -research conducted to promote the prevention of accidents and occupational diseases, directly attributable to the mine environment should be funded by research levies. This principle should also cover those diseases that are aggravated by the mining environment. Such research should be initiated only when the need for and utility of the expected results are firmly established; -the oversight of research in these categories should be the responsibility of SIMRAC; -the health research envisaged should be financed from a levy collected from the mines on the basis of a health risk factor; and -a data collection system should be established to facilitate the mine by mine calculation of the health risk factor.


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7.3 MANAGEMENT OF RESEARCH

It is in the interests of the employees, the employers and the State to maintain acceptable levels of health and safety in one of the most important industries of the country. The tripartite principle of joint control of certain issues affecting all concerned in the industry has been generally accepted by all parties giving evidence before the Commission. Clearly, research aimed at improving health and safety falls into the category of issues in which the tripartite principle should apply.

The effective management of research involved decision making at two levels. First, it is important to formulate a clear policy with regard to the research objectives, targets and priorities. The decisions in this regard must be made on the basis of full understanding of the health and safety conditions in the industry and should involve risk assessment and the analysis of the importance of making improvements in certain areas (the aim is not to do cost-benefit analysis which is not a realistic undertaking in this type of research.) This level of decision making should be the responsibility of SIMRAC. This central Committee would also decide such issues as the method of initiating research, the system for finalising the research programme, the process of reconciling available funds with the requirements of proposed research projects, contractual arrangements with research bodies and so on.

The second level of decision making is the technical level. Once the objectives, targets and priorities are approved, it is the technical committees responsibility, inter alia, to formulate the announcements calling for project proposals, the evaluation of the proposals received and the assessment of research progress.

It should be realised that the responsibilities of the technical committees include highly specialised tasks. No one questions that the management of a mine requires specialist knowledge and considerable experience. Surprisingly, it is often overlooked that the management of research is an equally specialised occupation and demands considerable experience. The membership of the current subcommittees appears to consist mostly of mining and other types of engineers with some experience in the management of mines or plants. It is unfair to expect such groups to control and guide to the best advantage research conducted by outside bodies whose interests do not entirely coincide with those of the three parties involved in mining. To overcome this problem the subcommittees need to be reinforced by independent technical or expert advisers (see Ch. 7.5).

The SIMRAC should remain the main co-ordinating body which advises the DMEA on the conduct of mine health and safety research. The composition of the Committee should, however, be changed drastically so as to reflect the tripartite basis of all mining operations. The DMEA should have three members on the Committee, with the GME as Chairperson, employers and employees should each nominate three representatives. One representative should be nominated by the mine officials. They should be appointed by the Minister for a period of four years, and the Minister should provide SIMRAC with its terms of reference.

Since many mining companies are not members of the COM, there is no single body that can claim to represent employers, and it should be incumbent on the Chamber to agree a mechanism for selecting representatives from the whole industry. Similarly the NUM is the largest trade union, but there are others and these organisations between themselves should come to an agreement on a list of representatives. It is recognised that this system will not ensure direct representation for those who are not members of any trade union or association.


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In the event of disagreement between the parties on names to be put forward, the DMEA should request each sector representing 5% of the employers or employees to nominate not more than three persons to SIMRAC. In the case of employers the size could be measured by revenue generated, and in the case of employees by the size of membership. The final selection of representatives should be left to the Minister, acting on the advice of the GME. In terms of the above arrangements SIMRAC should have ten voting members. As the Committee would not necessarily involve only technical or medical persons, it would be essential to have in attendance one or two experts. These experts would advise SIMRAC on the technical and medical aspects of research. This responsibility would require that these experts have a thorough knowledge and understanding of research needs, monitoring the progress of research projects and operation of the relevant technical sub-committees. Probably the most appropriate way of ensuring that such expertise is available to SIMRAC is to appoint one or two research advisers for health and safety. These advisers would have a significant role in ensuring the effective operation of the system. The research advisers would either be serving in a full time capacity on the GME’s staff or would be recruited on a part time basis from elsewhere.

The existing sub-committee system of SIMRAC could be retained with some modifications and an addition. These sub-committees would be technical bodies, where membership would not depend so much on representativeness but on technical background and experience. Consequently, persons not employed in the industry could also be nominated for membership. Nominations to each sub-committee would be presented to SIMRAC by each party represented on the Committee. SIMRAC would then select and appoint the membership and chairmen of its sub-committees. The chairmen of the sub-committees should attend SIMRAC meetings in a non-voting capacity.

In view of the earlier recommendation that SIMRAC’s research programme should be enlarged to include certain health issues the formation of a health sub-committee is suggested. As the prevention of many occupational diseases is wholly or partly in the domain of mining and other engineers, the formation of an independent health sub-committee may not appear to be the appropriate solution to some. It is therefore important to ensure that there is cross-fertilisation between committees in this regard. This can be achieved partly by overlapping membership and partly by the use of independent advisers.

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that: -the existing established system of a main committee, SIMRAC, and its sub-committees be retained. SIMRAC should be responsible for advising on research policy and the sub-committees would be technical bodies which, in general would look after sectional problems; -SIMRAC should consist of ten members, reflecting the tripartite nature of the mining industry. Each of the three main parties should be represented by three persons, and the mine officials by one person with the GME as chairperson ex officio. The details of the nomination and appointment procedures should be as described above; -SIMRAC’s sphere of responsibility should be enlarged to include relevant health research matters; -the current list of sub-committees should be extended by adding a further sub-committee to look after health research issues;


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-the sub-committee should be technical bodies, where membership reflects technical background and experience rather than sectional interests. SIMRAC should appoint its sub-committees, based on nominations from the interested parties; -one or more research advisers should be appointed to assist in the administration of the programme and advise SIMRAC and its sub-committees on research issues; and -the research advisers and chairmen of sub-committees should attend SIMRAC meetings as non-voting members. 7.4 RESEARCH PROGRAMME

As SIMRAC’s Annual Report for 1993 states quite correctly, the research programme of the Committee should be “needs driven”. While this goal is easy to formulate it is not so easy to implement. The first hurdle is to define the needs. If this has been achieved, the next step is to define specific objectives and then to formulate the research and development programme to work towards the defined goals. It may be noted in passing that the discussion of SIMRAC’s affairs seem to have been restricted so far to research. It is inevitable, that sooner or later, unless an alternative solution is proposed, the scope will have to be enlarged to include development as well.

Of necessity, the industry’s needs must be defined at two levels. First, on the basis of a detailed risk assessment, the most burning safety and health problems need to be identified and must be assigned appropriate priorities. Once this step has been accomplished, the second task is to pinpoint the reasons why these problems exist, and the impediments that prevent their mitigation. Some of the reasons or the causes will be controllable, some will not. Some of the impediments to improvements will be technical or medical, but many will fall into other fields, such as management etc., hence fall outside the research field. A simple illustration may held to clarify the principles involved.

For example, it was identified some time ago (Chapter 3.1) that one of the most significant sources of fatalities in gold mining are rockbursts. Hence SIMGAP recommends and SIMRAC assigns high priority to the task of alleviating the rockburst hazard. Thus, the alleviation of rockbursts is recognised as a research need with high priority. Rockbursts are a sub-group of a much greater set of events, namely that of seismic events. Hence SIMGAP could propose that one of the possible ways of reducing the rockbursts risk is to diminish the frequency and intensity of seismic activity. Thus the reduction of seismic activity becomes the objective. The sub-committee may also conclude that the primary reasons for the high seismicity are the depth of mining; the narrow tabular shape of the stoping excavations; convergence of the walls of the excavations; geological disturbances such as faults or dykes; spread of stoping in plan and so on. Among these reasons are depth, shape of stopes, prevalence of geological disturbances, which are not subject to human influence, while the extent of mining is an economic necessity. However, the convergence of the stopes and the conditions on some faults are alterable.

For the purpose of the example, we focus now on convergence management only. Thus, the reduction of convergence becomes a sub-objective or target. Now postulate that it has been established that the magnitude of convergence can be influenced significantly by the presence of stabilising pillars and by the application of backfill. At this point the sub-committee should question the validity of the earlier conclusions concerning the efficacy of pillars and/or backfill. Supposing for the present that efficacy is confirmed, next the sub-


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committee should look for impediments that prevent the wider and / or more effective use of these counter measures. Such series of inquiries eventually may or may not lead to research projects. If they do the initiation of projects is accompanied by a reasonable assurance that the resulting research is truly needs driven.

After studying SIMRAC’s Annual Report for 1993, the Commission has not been reassured that such a rigorous process of planning has been pursued in formulating the research programmes for 1993 and 1994. For example the programmes of SIMGAP for these years seems to contain only one project entitled “Develop Improved Strategies, Layouts and Seismic Monitoring Procedures for Safer Mining in Very Highly Stressed Areas”, that targets the rockburst problem in ultra deep mines. The progress report for 1993 refers to a literature review, some 20 questionnaires completed by rock mechanics practitioners and a computer programme developed for the automatic location of seismic sources. Of the points on which progress was reported, the questionnaires could be of value, the literature survey is a surprising venture after several decades of rockburst research in South Africa and the seismic location programme is virtually irrelevant to the solution of the main problem.

Similarly, the research programme for SIMCOL for 1994 refers to pillar design, but not to general strata control. This is so despite the fact that rockfalls represented the second largest source of coal mining fatalities in 1993. There does not appear to be an attempt to identify the types of rockfall accidents encountered in collieries.

At the same time, there are indications that the programmes devote significant efforts to matters for which acceptable but not perfect solutions already exist (e.g. pillar design in SIMCOL’s programme), or to projects that are not defined in the most appropriate way. In the case of pillar design there may be some doubt concerning the research priority assigned to the investigation. An example of the second shortcoming is the project in SIMRAC’s programme entitled “Develop Seismic Techniques for Predicting Rockburst Risk and Strategies to Reduce Rockburst Induced Fatality and Injury Rates”. The description of the project suggests that an entirely seismic approach to the research is envisaged. This seems a premature objective, as the primary need at this stage is to relate the seismic observations to mining layouts and to regional support systems. Progress in this field is urgently needed, while the current project probably becomes relevant only when the interrelationship between mining and seismicity has been established.

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that: -a research planning procedure should be developed that will drive the research and development programme in the most appropriate direction in the light of the above discussion. 7.5 INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF RESEARCH PROGRAMME AND PROGRESS

At present none of the parties involved in the proposed new management of the research and development programme has an in house research organisation or research staff. The situation will improve marginally if and when the research advisers discussed earlier are in place. Due to a lack of research expertise, SIMRAC could run the risk that its programme becomes superficial, misdirected and amateurish.


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To avoid these problems and ensure that the public is satisfied that everything is being done to deal with the burning health and safety issues of the industry, it would be prudent to make independent review a formal part of the modus operandi of SIMRAC. Such review would be conducted by a group of three to five eminent researchers who have an understanding of the technical problems of the South African mining industry.

The members of the group would be selected for their knowledge of one or more important aspects of the research spectrum of SIMRAC. The appointments would be made for a minimum of three years to ensure continuity.

The tasks of the expert group would include the review of research objectives, priorities, annual research programme and progress and any other matter that would be assigned to it by SIMRAC. Members of the group would operate in close collaboration with the pertinent sub-committees and with the GME and would provide advice in the formulation of calls for research proposals and assessment of progress in particular projects.

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that: -SIMRAC should adopt the principle that it will operate using independent reviewers to assist in the more effective and more transparent execution of its tasks; -a group of three to five eminent and experienced researchers, preferably with an understanding of the South African mining problems, should be selected and appointed for a period of three years; and -the group should assist the GME and SIMRAC, inter alia, in the definition of objectives, the assignment of priorities, the evaluation of the proposed research programme and the assessment of research progress in the previous year.


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CHAPTER EIGHT

CURRENT MINERALS ACT (As amended by the Minerals Amendment Act No 103 of 1993) 8.1 BACKGROUND

The present Act with respect to the management and control of mines and quarries and for securing the health and safety of persons employed in them is the Minerals Act 1991. As a new Act that only came into force some two and a half years ago it is surprising that a Commission of Inquiry has been asked so soon to look into all aspects of the legal regulation of health and safety in the mining industry affected by that Act.

The Commission heard evidence concerning the origins of the Act. One of the Acts that it replaced was the Mines and Works Act 1956, which was described as “… an Act on its own, relating to safety and health matters in or at mines or works.” (Raath p 1 8312-6). At the time the Minerals Act was promulgated the policy of the Government was to privatise; to devolve authority to the lowest level; and to deregulate (Raath; Heads of Argument para 1.6). There was also a requirement by the DMEA that legislation should be rationalised (Raath p 2 024). The work that went into the production of the 1991 Act was felt at the time to be very successful because it led to the repeal of 29 Acts in their entirety and partial repeal of 6 others. (Schedule to Section 68 of the Minerals Act 1991). It also allowed for 14 Inspectorate offices to be re-organised into 9 offices and for 14 offices of the Mining Commissioner’s to be merged with the Inspectorate of Mines offices with economies in staff.

The Minerals Act 1991 also had the effect of removing the MBOD, established under the ODMWA 1973 from the DMEA to the Health Department, divorced from the GME (Raath p 2 023). The ODMWA, No 78 of 1973 was established “To consolidate and amend the law relating to persons employed in mines and works…”.

8.2 EVALUATION OF THE MINERALS ACT 1991

The Minerals Act 1991 attempts to deal with three things in one Act:

-to regulate the prospecting for and optimal utilisation .. etc.. of minerals;

-to provide for the safety and health of persons concerned in mines and works;

-to regulate the orderly utilisation and the rehabilitation of the surface of land, etc.

It was argued that the first and third items, optimal utilisation and rehabilitation had a bearing on the health and safety of those employed in the industry. The Commission felt that this relationship was very marginal, and the net effect of combining these three issues, was to obscure the health and safety issues, that were so important when an average of more than 600 persons were killed and 11 000 seriously injured annually in the industry over the past 10 years.

Of the 70 Sections in the Minerals Act of 1991, only some 22 relate to safety. Health is mentioned in many places but the Act makes no specific provision for how health issues and


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problems in the industry should be regulated. This has the effect of reducing the focus on the importance of safety, and of suggesting that health issues are not important.

It is well known that many serious occupational diseases occur in the mining industry and that very large numbers of workmen are affected every year by these diseases, although lack of adequate records makes quantification of the scale of these issues difficult (White pp 500/1).

The Minerals Act 1991 changed the relationship between the GME, who is charged by the Act in Section 2 with the primary functions of supervision and control over safety, health and related matters at any mine or works, and the organisation that deals with the enforcement of the Act. The Act is enforced by Regional Directors who report to the Director General and the Minister, and are not under the control of the Government Mining Engineer. Of the nine Regional Directors in post at the time of the inquiry only six had mining backgrounds, and the position in future may change.

The GME has no control over the appointment of Regional Directors who enforce the Act, but they must, when applying the Act, consult and be directed by the GME. The GME pointed out the many administrative delegations made in his favour by the Director General (Exhibit C16 of GME) which tended to resolve some of the enigmas of the statutory position, but the Commission felt that the way the Minerals Act 1991 required the GME to take full responsibility for health and safety of persons in the mining industry when the organisation for doing so was not under his control, represented an essential and serious flaw in the 1991 Act.

The same comment applies to the position of Regional Directors. The Minerals Act 1991 gives them very wide powers in health and safety matters. For example, they can overrule a Section 27 notice issued by a Regional Mining Engineer. Codes of Practice on any subject are not prepared by managers unless the Regional Director asks for them. He is the person who must trigger them, and if he omits to do so the manager is relieved of this responsibility. But the Regional Director is not under the direct control of the GME and this is a thoroughly bad arrangement. (Raath pp 2 064/5 21-1)

On the question of the publication of reports dealing with health and safety in the industry the Act is silent, and evidence was heard which suggested that Section 28 of the Act should be amended to require the publication of relevant reports. (Raath pp 1893/4)

In section 26 of Chapter V of the Minerals Act 1991 a Mine Safety Committee is established. This is a tripartite body with representation from the mine owners, the representatives of workmen, officials employed at mines and the staff of the GME’s office. Representations made by all the parties indicated a desire to extend this tripartite basis to all health and safety related fields. The Commission found these intentions by all parties to be commendable, but took note of some areas where this principle is not being applied, although there is an opportunity to do so. For example, the SIMRAC, which is seen as a sub-committee of the Mine Safety Committee, has been set up with membership dominated by representatives of the owners. It is encouraging to note that the COM in its closing submission, (para 88) recommends that the balance on this important committee should be modified and that it should be established in statutory form in an amended Minerals Act. Only the establishment of accounts and payment of levies are covered by the existing Act. These matters will be dealt with later.


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The Commission accepts that the tripartite principle should be extended wherever appropriate, and that the effective working of such arrangements can do much to secure the future prosperity of the industry.

Many of the criticisms made of the existing Act concerned the issues which it did not cover, and there was a measure of common cause between the parties on many of these. Examples were safety and health representatives, and safety and health committees, workers’ rights including the right to refuse dangerous work, the right to information on risks and hazards, the need to improve training requirements, the need for better regulation of health issues, the need for risk assessment and the need to strengthen the position of the Enforcing Authority.

Section 63 of the Minerals Act 1991, empowers the Minister, by notice in the Gazette, to make regulations regarding a wide range of subjects including “the safety, health and welfare of persons concerned in mines and works…”. The Commission heard evidence that this procedure for making or changing regulations could take months, rather than the years that could be involved in promulgating a new Act of Parliament. The desire to obtain urgently an improvement in health and safety performance in South African mines could be met, as a temporary measure, by suitable revision and extension of some existing regulations (Benjamin pp 2 504/5 29-8). The existing regulations, are very poorly presented in 35 chapters.

While there is a subject index, it is difficult to locate the regulations applying to any particular subject or hazard (Loxton pp 2 244 15-27). The present format has grown over many years, and most of the regulations are re-enactments associated with previous Acts. This makes the need for re-codification of the regulations urgent, so that they can be more readily understood by the user.

8.3 RELATED LEGISLATIONS

8.3.1 The Occupational Health and Safety Act No 85 of 1993

This Act came into force in South Africa on January 1st 1994 and applies to all work situations except those in mines and ships. It draws heavily on the structure and wording of the United Kingdom’s Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, which brought into being the Health and Safety Commission (a tripartite body) and the Health and Safety Executive (it’s operating arm) in the UK. This Act uses the qualification “as far as is reasonably practicable” when defining the duties placed on employers, the self employed and employees. It also allows presumptions when dealing with proof of certain facts.

Although the new South African Act is comparatively untried, the Commission heard evidence from several persons who enthused about the progress made with the Act. Four or five witnesses spoke in favour of this Act, and some suggested that a simple solution to the problems of health and safety in the mining industry would be to put the industry under the authority of that Act (Mulder p 1 137 17-28). The Commission felt that such a change would be premature while the state of the law in mining was so confused and unsatisfactory. When the law in mining is put into a satisfactory state, a move into a larger umbrella health and safety organisation might be appropriate. The parties all reached a similar view by the end of the hearings,


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that there should be a distinct statute for health and safety in mining, with certain provisions incorporating some of the desirable features of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1993. (Cameron p 2 449 10-20, Chamber Closing Submissions para 16).

8.3.2 The Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act No 78 of 1973

As amended this Act still sets the basis of the determination of health risk in mines and works and for determining which mines or works are controlled. The original Act was ethnically orientated, but there have been extensive amendments.

The Act sets up the MBOD and its Director is charged with the direction and control of medical examinations, and can direct medical practitioners to perform such examinations, and controls the issue of certificates of fitness, and has other extensive powers.

A major change in the statutory position occurred when the Minister responsible for the Act was changed from the Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs to the Minster of Health. The GME continues to advise on which mines or works should be designated “controlled”, and is chairperson of the Risk Committee for Mines and Works. The GME, in his capacity as chairman of the Risk Committee has extensive powers of investigation, and the committee has to determine the risk at controlled mines and works, expressed as a percentage. The measurements taken by the GME’s staff and calculations which determine the SIMRAC levy are provided under the terms of this Act, but this information is not yet in the public domain. Its publication could be useful in evaluating the extent of the respirable dust problem in mines. (Raath p 1 962 6-23)

The Commission did not hear a great deal of evidence concerning the operation of this Act. The Act was introduced to deal with compensation matters, which are outside the powers of this Commission, but the operation of the Act, in the way it determines procedures for medical examinations; issues certificates of fitness; defines diseases associated with mines and works; requires registers and statistics to be kept; and involves the GME in much of this work, has considerable relevance to the issue of health of mineworkers. (Raath pp 2 023/4) In making recommendations designed to improve the regulation of the health of mine-workers an improved relationship between the GME’s Office and the MBOD is essential, and the NUM proposal that the Mines Inspectorate should participate in a National Health and Safety Policy Council (NUM para 22, Closing Submissions) has much to commend it in this regard.

8.3.3 The Nuclear Energy Act 1999, as amended

This Act, under which the Council for Nuclear Safety operates, provides that the authority responsible for radiation protection in South Africa is the Council. This matter was discussed in Chapter 4.10.2 and Chapter 6.8.

The Commission does not find any reason to suggest an amendment to that Act, but there is a strong case for closer co-operation between the Council and the GME, and this would be to the benefit of the health of the workforce in the mining industry.


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8.4 SUMMARY OF SHORTCOMINGS

The drastic revision of so many Acts which led to the Minerals Act 1991, was to the detriment of adequate regulation of health and safety issues in mining. The changes in the structure of the GME’s department, and his loss of control over that organisation are particularly harmful. The confusion of health and safety issues with the regulation of optimal exploitation of minerals and land rehabilitation issues, which are only tenuously connected with health and safety, in the same Act, has been detrimental, both in focus, and in organisational terms.

The Act is also unsatisfactory in the issues that it omits to address, such as the need for owner and manager commitments to health and safety expressed in a written policy statement stating the safety organisation of the mine; the failure to empower the inspectorate adequately, the failure to address workmens’ rights, and the issue of elected safety representatives and safety committees; the right to information; the need to publish statistics, reports of the inspectorate and disaster reports; the need to extend the issue of tripartite participation beyond the Mine Safety Committee; the provision of safety equipment; the need for adequate health protection and monitoring, the need for adequate training, and so on.

The interface between the regulation of health and safety in mining and other related statutory requirements and enforcing authorities is not clearly defined.

The Regulations have grown over the years into a mass of detail which the user finds difficult to follow or understand. They are urgently in need of re-codification into a subject based order.

Some regulations such as Chapter 13 are irrelevant to current practice. Some regulations such as 2.17.1 to 2.17.7 requiring the appointment of safety officers were introduced in an abortive attempt to counter the usurping by industry of the legal role of shift bosses.

These would be better deleted, and such appointment left to the management, and the statutory role of shift bosses strengthened in law.

The regulation of health issues, such as the monitoring of various medical conditions, medical examinations, records and preventive occupational medicine should be specified in detail.

The function and legal standing of two other regulatory mechanisms is not fully understood or specified. These are codes of practice, and guidelines issued by the GME. The function and legal status of these two types of instruments, which contribute to better regulation of health and safety, should be properly defined.

If an improvement in the unacceptable level of death and injury in the industry is to be obtained, and a better standard of health in the workforce established, a new basis of regulation is urgently needed.


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CHAPTER NINE

ACCIDENT INQUIRIES, AND THE CONDUCT OF MINING CASES IN COURTS OF LAW 9.1 ACCIDENT INQUIRIES

The Commission received a knowledgeable submission among the originals put forward by the NUM dealing with the conduct of investigations and inquiries (Martinson, NUM Submissions Paper 10). The author, Mr Michael Martinson is a mining engineer who has worked in the mining industry since 1948, and since 1983 has been a consultant to trade unions in over seventy investigations. Evidence was not given by Mr Martinson but the criticism of the conduct of inquiries which he made was supported by Ms Hermanus and not disputed by Mr Raath. No evidence led before the Commission conflicted with Mr Martinson’s paper and the Commission is entitled to rely on that paper. The following is a brief summary of some of his main points.

There is a clear link between accident investigation and accident prevention. An eminent British structural engineer has commented that all safety rules grow out of and are amended as a result of accidents to structures. The investigation of accidents is therefore a vital step in ensuring an adequate and relevant set of safety rules, whether mandatory or only recommended.

Where accidents occur in the workings of an underground mine the subsequent investigations are often inhibited by a number of factors which include:

-the special position of the employer who has control over the release of relevant evidence relating to the accident. The employer retains control over the premises and the design and implementation of the mining operations. For safety and security reasons, access to underground mine workings by non-employees is strictly controlled by employers. The same applies to a lesser extent to employees;

-all potential witnesses are likely to be employees, who may fear reprisals if they testify against their employer’s interests, or feel that they owe a duty to their employer in the event of a dispute as to the cause of the accident;

-the presiding officer may not be able to understand highly technical evidence without expert assistance; and

-in underground mines the nature of the physical damage often makes it difficult, if not impossible, to examine the accident scene properly in order to obtain information as to the cause of the accident.

Several examples are cited in the paper where findings in accident inquiries reveal that only the most cursory consideration was given to the full causes of the accident.

The statutory provisions presently applicable to mine accident investigations are to be found in sections 28, 29 and 30 of the Minerals Act, read with the Inquest Act No 58 of 1959 where applicable, and Chapters 25 and 26 of the regulations made under the Minerals Act.


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In terms of Section 28 (1)(a) of the Minerals Act an Inquiry shall be held by a Regional Mining Engineer (RME) or other officer in the public service designated by the Director General or GME if an accident at a mine or works causes the death of, or serious bodily harm to any person. Occasionally, where a death has aroused a good deal of public interest, a Joint Inquiry and Inquest may be held in terms of Section 28 (6)(a) and (b) read with the relevant provisions of the Inquest Act, in which event a judicial officer presides, but the investigating officer is required to submit a separate report of the incident. There are other rarely used provisions relating to inquiries concerning contraventions or suspected contraventions of statutory provisions. The responsibility for providing the reports of these investigations lies with the investigating officer or the RME in the DMEA, and, in addition, with the Judicial Officer if it is jointly an inquest.

Inspections in loco often provide important clues or information relating to the cause of an accident, but other than a passing reference to them in Regulation 25.4 the regulations do not prescribe how such inspections should be conducted. In Mr Martinson’s experience RME’s who conduct inspections in loco do not formally record observations made in the course of such inspections, nor are such observations and impressions submitted as evidence at inquiries. However subjective opinions formed during inspections in loco clearly colour the questioning of witnesses by the presiding officer and influence his conclusions as to the causes of an accident. What ought to happen at such inspections is that there should be a thorough and comprehensive inspection at the scene. The presiding officers’ observations should be formally recorded by a stenographer or electronic means and the representatives of the parties should be invited to make their comments which should also be recorded.

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that Regulation 25(4) should be amended accordingly.

In many cases the NUM has not been informed that an inspection in loco is to take place because the management or the inspectorate has claimed that there is no statutory requirement that they should be informed.

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that the Act and Regulations be amended so as to ensure that all interested parties, including the NUM, must be given due and proper notice of the time and place of all inspections in loco which are held in connection with accident inquiries.

Mr Martinson’s paper makes the following criticism of the conduct of presiding officers at accident inquiries:

-allowing white witnesses, including senior management, to sit in throughout inquiries while accepting that black witnesses should remain outside until called to give evidence. The presence of management may inhibit witnesses from saying anything which criticizes the management or supervision of the mine; -allowing white witnesses to confer with other witnesses present in the room before answering questions;

-undue familiarity with management witnesses, including the use of first names, while hearings are in progress;


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-putting leading questions to witnesses during cross examination by employees’ representatives which have the effect of negating or emasculating replies adverse to the mine;

-in cross-examination, re-phrasing questions and answers in the longhand record the better to suit the presiding officer’s interpretation of events;

-failure to read aloud the evidence of each witness as recorded in longhand by the presiding officer before the document is signed by the witness;

-excessive reliance on hearsay evidence in circumstances where direct evidence is readily available;

-in general, allowing a mine manager to dictate what evidence is to be placed before the inquiry; and

-RME’s are seldom called as witnesses and on occasions the Union representatives have been denied access to relevant documents in the possession of mining companies.

The Commission considers that justice must not only be done but must manifestly be seen to be done at accident inquiries. Unless the presiding officer is seen to be thorough, fair and impartial, justice will not be seen to be done.

The Commission is aware of the provisions of Section 29 (3) of the Minerals Act which provides that any person who satisfies the investigating officer that he has a material interest in the inquiry may either personally or through a representative put questions to a witness which the presiding officer may consider relevant.

Joint Inquiries and Inquests conducted by a judicial officer, as provided for in terms of Section 28 (6) of the Minerals Act have the advantage of a court room atmosphere, but the disadvantage that the greater formality may inhibit the inquiry process.

The Commission heard much evidence which supported Mr Martinson’s paper. In Ms Hermanus’ view the inquiry process was unsatisfactory and lacked credibility, and did not achieve the aim of accident prevention. Inquiries were not sufficiently public and many interested parties were not informed that they were to be held. One of the problems was that both the mine management and the inspectorate would claim that permission to attend the inquiry was required from the other. No procedures were in place to inform the NUM of the timing of in loco inspections, and these were conducted in a casual manner. The leading of evidence was not satisfactory, and the source of the evidence was the mines themselves, and this mine information was not independently assessed. Background evidence was not provided. It was the norm for inquiries to accept written statements prepared by company lawyers which were not tested in evidence.

The Commission heard evidence concerning inquiries from the GME and also provided a copy of a Directive D1, which he had issued in February 1992 which was intended to give guidance to inspectors on how to conduct the many inquiries with which they had to deal, but he agreed that this directive had not been followed in certain instances. He conceded that in earlier years certain inquiries had been conducted in a deplorable manner, and that the polyurethane saga, which had led to the death of 177 workmen at Kinross mine, could have been avoided if previous lessons had been learnt. He agreed that the fear of


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prosecution or the revelation of bad management affected the willingness of mine management to be forthcoming at inquiries.

The Directive D1 does not mention the need to inform interested parties about a pending inquiry, where and when it would take place or whether and when inspections in loco would be held. The closing statement of the DMEA states that it would welcome a recommendation by the Commission that a MRAC should examine again the manner in which investigations and inquiries are carried out.

Mr Martinson’s paper recommended the establishment within the inspectorate of a small group of specially trained accident investigators whose main task would be accident investigation. The Commission considers that there is merit in this suggestion, but there is also a pressing need for all inspectors to upgrade the quality of their investigation and inquiry work. The Commission also feels that there would be merit in having some attorneys appointed within the inspectorate, and this subject will be dealt with when considering the restructuring of the inspectorate.

A number of recommendations made by the Marais Commission concerning investigations and inquiries were never implemented. These include:

-the GME should employ outside experts wherever and whenever there was a need for it;

-with regard to inquiries:

-the inspector must inform all interested parties of the time, date, place and nature of the inquiry;

-the inquiry is to be open to the public at all times;

-all witnesses to be excluded from the inquiry until they have testified;

-when any mine employee testifies no employee senior in rank or status shall be permitted to be present;

-the presiding officer should not frame any question to a witness called by him in such a manner as to indicate to the witness the answer expected or desired by the question;

-all evidence is to be recorded mechanically; and

-at the end of the hearing the presiding officer is to set a date and venue where details of the accident, its cause(s), persons blamed for the accident, reasons for the finding and steps taken or suggested to prevent a recurrence to be read in public.

The Commission considers that there is merit in these suggestions and the COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that they be incorporated in regulations.

9.2 REPORTS OF ACCIDENTS AND THEIR PUBLICATION

The Commission heard evidence about the unsatisfactory feature that all oral evidence was recorded in longhand by the presiding officer. Comparisons were made between the reports of presiding officers at inquiries in South Africa and those in other jurisdictions. In the case of the latter when dealing with fatal accident the reports are:


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-written in a narrative style;

-contain a full technical description of the environment in which the accident occurred;

-summarise events leading up to the accident, based on the evaluation of the evidence and the exhibits; and

-provide a systematic analysis of causal factors, and make recommendations as to the changes needed to prevent a recurrence;

By contrast the reports in South Africa which the NUM had seen were:

-short;

-failed to focus on the prevention of similar accidents in the future;

-did not consider the accident under investigation as being part of a continuum;

-accepted too often that accidents were part of an inherent risk in mining;

-fail to take into account the previous accident history of the mine, notably explosions in gold and coal mines; and

-fail to compare managerial actions and systems with standards appropriate in the particular circumstances.

Mr Martinson’s paper gives a number of examples of South African reports to support these contentions.

Publication, and the placing of reports of accidents in the public domain is a vital step in the inquiry process. It promotes accident analysis and accident prevention in three respects:-

-publication ensures that investigative systems, methods and procedures are kept to a high standard;

-it assists others to recognise dangerous practices, situations and conditions; and

-it facilitates research into mine accidents and encourages debate on accident prevention;

Publication is a prerequisite for transparency. However the DMEA and its predecessors have published only a limited number of reports. Between 1962 and 1970 it published 14 reports on selected mine accidents and there was an additional report on the Hlobane methane explosion and disaster in which 68 persons were killed in 1984. For many years the Annual Reports of the GME have included brief descriptions of accidents in which six or more persons died.

The Commission agrees with the views expressed on publication and the COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that all reports of accident inquiries be published and be disseminated throughout the mining industry, and that the regulations be amended to include this requirement.


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9.3 PRESUMPTIONS

The Commission was urged by Counsel for the NUM to recommend that in mining prosecution cases the onus should be placed on the mine management and owners, as the case may be, to show that they had taken all reasonably practicable measures to avoid the accident which had occurred notwithstanding such measures. This was opposed by the COM.

The golden thread which runs throughout the fabric of the Criminal Law is that every accused person should be presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved. Such principle should only be departed from in the most exceptional circumstances. The Commission is not satisfied that circumstances exist which would justify a departure from the general rule.

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS against the onus being placed on the accused in mining prosecution cases. 9.4 PRIVILEGE

The evidence before the Commission suggested that investigations and inquiries into causes of accidents are hampered by the reluctance of witnesses to provide relevant information and to co-operate with investigators often because of fear of subsequent prosecution.

Both the COM and the NUM suggested that offering privilege to witnesses in inquiry proceedings could enhance their willingness to assist in establishing the causes of accidents and thus prevent their recurrence. The Commission agrees with this view. This objective could be achieved either by using the device adopted in the investigation of Serious Economic Offences (see Section 5 of Act 117 of 1991), or by empowering inspectors in appropriate circumstances to extend privilege to witnesses during inquires. The latter alternative is more feasible and the COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that the regulations be amended accordingly.

9.5 MINING COURT

The question was posed during the Commission’s sittings as to whether there was merit in a recommendation that a Mining Court be re-established. Some parties favoured it, some were neutral, while Mr Human, the Deputy Attorney General in the Witwatersrand Local Division thought that it might be considered if it was practical. The NUM was opposed to the suggestion.

The Commission heard evidence concerning the history of these Courts from Mr Human. On 1 April 1934 a Mining Court was established. It was an itinerant court although operating mainly from Johannesburg. In 1948 the coal mines were incorporated into its activities and in 1952 all the mines in the country were served by it. It consisted of a Mining Court magistrate and a Mining Court Prosecutor. In 1952, the Chief Magistrate of Johannesburg decided that the Court should operate only in Johannesburg, but that was changed in 1956 when the court became itinerant again. In 1967 the Court was disbanded because it spent more time in travelling than in hearing cases.


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In 1968 a special mining court prosecution section was established in Johannesburg, and there were now two such sections, one in the Transvaal Provincial Division and one in the Witwatersrand Local Division. In the other provinces, there were no mines in the Eastern Cape, only a few in the Northern Cape and some in Natal, where prosecutions have been fairly limited with some degree of success. The special mining court prosecution sections in the Transvaal were operating successfully.

There were no mining specialist Magistrates today, but the prosecutors were specialists, and they selected the most competent magistrate to try the case in question.

The history of the Mining Court does not augur well for its resurrection. The present rate of success in mining cases which is about the same as in other prosecutions does not suggest that there will be any particular advantage in having a specialist mining court. Moreover the Commission’s recommendations concerning the inspectorate, the introduction of a legal section therein, as well as stronger regulations with regard to actual inquiries, should be sufficient for practical purposes. Accordingly the Commission does not recommend the re-introduction of a Mining Court.

The Commission heard evidence on behalf of SASOL that mining prosecutions should be conducted at Regional Court level where greater experience is found, and the COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that mining prosecution should be conducted at Court levels appropriate to the seriousness of the alleged offences.


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CHAPTER TEN

PROPOSED STRUCTURE FOR THE HEALTH AND SAFETY IN MINES ACT 199…, AND REGULATIONS. 10.1 A STAND ALONE ACT FOR MINING The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that work should start immediately on the drafting of a new Act that will be devoted to regulating health and safety only in the mining industry. We acknowledge that this will take time and that the need to follow consultative, expert legal drafting and parliamentary procedures will put the date of enactment to some time in the future.

There was general agreement in the evidence and closing submissions that such work should be undertaken by a tripartite Committee which should be established in the new Act, and the name Mining Regulation Advisory Committee (MRAC) was suggested. This committee should have equal representation from the owners and the representatives of workmen in the industry, be chaired by the GME, and have experts from his department as members. Mr Paul Benjamin on behalf of the NUM presented a draft Act in evidence (“The Mine Health, Safety and Environment Act 1995”, Benjamin pp 2 399 13 to 2 447 20) and the COM in the Enclosures attached to their closing submissions (Loxton p 2 328 16-23) provided useful comment on their views on legislative change, and these should be made available to the tripartite committee in advance of its first sitting.

Experience has shown that large committees do not make speedy progress in drafting new law. Progress would be better if, initially a small group of five consisting of the GME or his alternate, one nominee from the owners, one nominee from the workforce, and two independent experts, one in occupational health and one in safety could work as a small team to put together the first draft (one of the independent experts would be nominated by the owners and one by the representatives of the workforce). Progress in such work is almost inversely proportional to the size of the team involved in drafting. The draft when ready should be put to the full MRAC for consideration and amendment, and when agreed circulated to the interested organisations in the industry for comment. The comments should, as far as reasonably possible be incorporated in an amended draft, and when approved by MRAC should be passed to parliamentary draftsmen for preparation for the Minister’s consideration. A time limit should be set for each procedure in the preparation, so that delay is avoided. In the event of deadlock at any stage the Government Mining Engineer, should prepare a summary of the position of the parties leading to the deadlock, for consideration and decision by the Minister.

The new Act should place duties on persons defined in the Act as responsible for discharging various functions.

10.2 THE MAIN PRINCIPLES OF THE NEW FORM OF REGULATION

The new Act should be an enabling Act, and be as brief as possible. It should deal with the duties of the main participants in the industry in their respective fields of responsibility.


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The greater responsibility lies with those who initiate and organise mining activity. They employ their entrepreneurial skills, their capital, their knowledge and expertise, the labour and the equipment they use, to provide a return (on investment) for them or their shareholders. It is with them, and persons they employ in their management structures that the main responsibility for the health and safety of those who are exposed to hazards in the industry must lie.

The Act must ensure that they act in a responsible way, to ensure the health and safety of the persons that they involve in their business.

The Act, while identifying the objectives that must be achieved in all the relevant health and safety aspects, should leave the detail of how these objectives are to be achieved to regulations. Regulations have the advantage of being capable of amendment far more quickly than Acts of Parliament, and thus are able to keep up with the need for amendment when new lessons are learnt from unfortunate accidents, and with changing technology which may benefit health and safety when prescribed.

The next level of regulation that can assist in providing a good health and safety environment is the code of practice. These can be defined in several ways. Statutory Codes of Practice have been approved in law and developed in many countries to specify the best known way, at that time, for carrying out certain hazardous operations. These codes are even more flexible and responsive to changes in methods and technology than regulations, but to develop them requires teams of competent engineers and specialists to draft them in the most advanced form in the health and safety context, and they have to be approved by a consultative process. They have the advantage that they have the force of law for the enforcing authority. The enforcing authority in mining in South Africa does not have, and is not likely to be given, sufficient resources to produce this type of code of practice, which is equivalent to a leading textbook on the best practice in each subject.

The other type of code of practice is one specified by the manager of the mine, as his chosen way of dealing with hazards and mitigating or reducing risk. This is the present type of code found in South African law, and mining legislation in several countries requires managers to adopt such codes. They are sometimes known as manager’s rules rather than codes, but they serve the same purpose. They state how the manager requires things to be done to discharge his duty of responsibility for a certain operation.

A serious defect in existing South African law is that codes of practice are not required unless a Regional Director requires them. This is very unsatisfactory as it transfers the responsibility for the management of that particular function relating to health and safety from the manager, where it should rightly be, to the enforcing authority, which has no resources to deal with the matter, and has no responsibility for the management of the mine. The new Act should ensure that the duty to produce codes of practice is placed on the manager of the mine. The enforcing authority should have the right in law to object to the content of the codes and to require modifications. The list of subjects in existing law that call for codes to be established is adequate if enforced properly. Codes of practice must incorporate the requirements of the Act and regulations as a minimum requirement, and if they conflict with the Act or regulations the law must prevail. The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS accordingly.


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The other mechanism for improving requirements relating to health and safety are guidelines issued by the GME. These do not have the force of law, and represent the best opinion of the GME on what should be incorporated into codes of practice, and what best mining practice should be. The point was made in evidence that these guidelines should be published and made available to everyone in the industry, and the COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that this should be mandatory on the DMEA. The purpose of GME’s guidelines should be twofold. They should inform his inspectorate staff of the minimum standards that they should accept in codes of practice, and they should inform the manager on what he should include in his codes, if he wishes to avoid interventions by the inspectorate. If the inspectorate is sufficiently equipped to be at the leading edge of mining technology, guidelines can have a very beneficial effect in ensuring that the industry adopts the best practices.

10.3 THE MAIN SECTION OF THE ACT

The Preamble should read “An Act to provide an improved structure for the regulation and improvement of the health and safety of those employed in the mining industry”. This reflects the intention which the Commission has in recommending that a new Act be drafted. The Act should, inter alia, deal with the following matters:

GENERAL DUTIES OF OWNERS, EMPLOYERS AND MANAGERS

10.3.1 Owners of Mines

Owners of mines are defined in the Act already referred to earlier and they are essentially the persons, for the time being entitled to work the mine. Their duties should be clearly defined and should include:-

-to make financial and all other necessary provisions to ensure that the mine is worked in accordance with the Act and Regulations;

-to ensure that the planning and layout of the mine is such as to facilitate this objective;

-to appoint a sole manager of each mine in his ownership qualified to manage that class of mine. (An owner should be able to appoint himself if qualified);

-to appoint a surveyor for the mine with appropriate qualifications;

-to provide the surveyor and the manager of the mine with the information needed to ensure the accuracy of plans;

-to provide information to the owners of adjacent mines concerning the position of his mine workings;

-to notify the inspectorate of the appointments of manager and surveyor;

-to notify the inspectorate of the starting and discontinuation of mining activities;

-on the abandonment of a mine to notify the inspectorate and provide abandonment plans;


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-to provide in writing to the manager of the mine, any instruction which affects, or may affect, the health and safety of persons at the mine; -to notify the inspectorate of the construction and use of any classified waste tip or lagoon to be used, or in use, at the mine, and to ensure that it is made and kept secure;

-if the owner is a body corporate, publish the health and safety statistics for the mine, or for every one of the mines if there is more than one, in the annual report of the company required by the Companies Act; and

-with regard to other owners MRAC should give consideration as to how this information could be obtained.

10.3.2 Persons superior to manager, but inferior to the owners

Owners, especially when they are bodies corporate, sometimes appoint persons to be in charge of several mines, or aspects of the work at a mine, and these persons, sometimes called agents or consulting engineers, have a greater authority than the mine manager. It is important that they should also have statutory responsibilities.

The new Act should require these appointments, together with their nature, giving details of the subjects over which the appointee has authority, to be notified in writing to the inspectorate. The notification should make it clear that the appointee and the manager or managers over whom he has authority are aware of the situation.

10.3.3 Managers of Mines

No mine should be worked unless there is a sole manager, with the required certificate of competency, appointed and exercising daily personal supervision over the activities at the mine. Deputies who may be appointed by him should be equally qualified and should be nominated to exercise daily personal supervision when the manager is not able to do so. The time allowed to fill these appointments by the owner should be limited by the Act.

The manager’s main duties should be stated in the Act and should include:

-the appointment of qualified deputies to assist him, and to share his statutory duties. The number will depend on the size of the mine and the degree of hazards present. He should define the sphere of their responsibilities in the appointments;

-he should appoint mine overseers as at present required by regulations, so that every part of the mine is within an area defined as an overseer’s area of responsibility. The manager should be required to show these areas on a plan of the mine;

-the manager should be responsible for appointing a sufficient number of shift bosses to supervise the working sections of the mine. He should be required to show these sections on a plan of the mine, and the names of the shift bosses and


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overseers allocated to them on each shift. The shift boss’s Section Plan should be posted in the place set aside for posting notices, statutory instruments etc. The manager should ensure that a shift boss is supervising each section whenever workmen are present. The existing regulations already require that the shift boss shall during the shift be in charge of a section of the workings of a mine, and the section must be of a size to enable him to control it effectively. His statutory duties must come first (Reg 2.15). The regulations concerning the inspections and reports that must be made by shift bosses, are inadequate, but these matters should be strengthened in regulations rather than in the Act; -the manager should be responsible for appointing a suitable number of properly qualified electrical and mechanical engineers to ensure that the equipment of the mine is adequately inspected and maintained in accordance with the Regulations;

-the manager should be responsible for making a suitable and sufficient assessment of the risks to which persons may be exposed in and at the mine, and this should be brought up to date whenever any major changes take place such as changes in mining methods or layout. The hazards which have a potential to cause harm that are identified should be recorded and the risk or likelihood of the hazard causing harm. The number of persons likely to be affected by the risk should be stated, together with the proposed precautions; and

-the manager should be responsible for the preparation and application of codes of practice in respect of: underground ventilation, support systems, transport systems, use of explosives, prevention of fires and fire fighting, rescue and self-rescue procedures and any other subject identified as a hazard by his risk assessment of the mine. Where an accident or non-casualty accident occurs in a situation intended to be controlled by a code of practice, the manager should be required to amend the relevant code with a view to ensuring that such an accident does not recur. An inspector should have the right to require an amendment to any code.

10.3.4 Mine Plans

The Act should specify the essential requirements for mine plans. It should provide for checking of plans by independent surveyors, should the inspectorate think this necessary, at the expense of the owner. Abandonment plans should be certified accurate by the mine surveyor and manager before submission to the inspectorate.

10.3.5 Duties of Employers and Self-employed

For most of the workmen at a mine the employer is usually the owner, but there are often other employees working within the mine, usually as contractors, so the duties of these persons, (employer’s duties will also extend to the owners), should be specified. They should include as far as is reasonably practicable:

-the provision and maintenance of plant and systems of work that are safe and without risks to health;


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-the safe use, handling, storage and transport of articles and substances;

-the provision of information, instruction, training and supervision of a standard that will ensure the health and safety of employees;

-the provision of safe access to and egress from places of work;

-the provision and maintenance of a safe and healthy working environment; and

-the provision of suitable (taking into account ergonomic requirements) personal protective equipment to employees who may be exposed to a risk to their health or safety, without cost to the employee.

An employer with more than 50 employees should be required to prepare and display his written statement of policy with respect to the health and safety of his employees, and describe his arrangements for implementing that policy. (Raath Exhibit C20)

10.3.6 Designers, manufacturers, importers, suppliers and repairers of articles and

equipment for use in mines should have the duty to ensure as far as reasonably practicable that the items they supply are properly made and tested and that information concerning their proper use is supplied.

EMPLOYEES

10.3.7 Duties and Rights of Employees

The DUTIES of employees should be stated and should include:

-to take reasonable care for his own safety and health and that of others which may be affected by his actions; and

-to render all reasonable assistance to his employer and others who have a duty of complying with the law;

The RIGHTS of workmen, and their elected safety representatives should include:

-the right to inspect the workplace in the part of the mine for which they were elected as workmen’s representatives. Workmen’s representatives should have two or more years experience of the type of work being undertaken. They should be entitled with the permission of the manager, (which should not be unreasonably withheld) to be accompanied by their own advisers, but must allow representatives of the owner or manager to be present as well. The “workplace” in relation to a safety representative should mean any place or group of places where the group or groups of employees he is elected to represent are likely to work or frequent in the course of their work; and

-employees should have the right to elect their own representatives. The owner and manager should have a legal duty to facilitate the election of workmen's representatives.


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Experience with this type of arrangement is extensive in many parts of the world, but fairly new in South Africa. The Commission hopes that there will be a wide measure of co-operation on all sides to enable these arrangements to be introduced smoothly. A mature dialogue between workmen and management on health and safety matters can only serve to improve standards and promote understanding between the managers and those managed in the industry.

-workmen’s representatives should be elected in the ratio of 1 per 100 employees, or part thereof. While this right should be incorporated in law, the associations representing workmen may consider a lower density suitable;

-workmen’s representatives should also have the right to training to improve their effectiveness as health and safety representatives. Where they belong to an association, that body may wish to organise the training, but cooperation between management, and the inspectorate is also desirable;

-workmen’s representatives should have the right to examine any records or documents at the mine relating to health and safety;

-they should have the statutory right to be informed when any reportable accident causing death or serious bodily harm, or non-casualty accident occurs at a mine, and two representatives should be allowed to inspect the site, together with management representatives before it is disturbed;

-when workmen’s representatives make an inspection they should make a report on a statutory form provided by the manager. When complete the form should go to the manager, who should add his comments, including any proposed work to be done to meet complaints, and a copy should be posted at the appropriate place at the mine. Another copy should be sent to the inspector for that mine; -workmen’s representatives should have the right to accompany Inspectors of Mines, together with a representative of management, when inspections are made. (Provided that this does not undermine the principal of unannounced inspections);

-the manager of the mine should be required to form at least one mine health and safety committee at which workmens’ safety representatives are represented, which meets monthly, or at the request of either side. Lines of communication should be developed between management and workers’ health and safety representatives;

-workmen’s representatives should have the right to attend any inquiry into accidents or non-casualty accidents that may occur in their part of the mine;

-workmen’s representatives should be entitled to all information on health and safety matters that are relevant to their working areas, such as codes of practice, exemptions granted by the inspectorate or guidance notes, and should have the right to be consulted before any health and safety issues are determined;


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-time spent by workers’ representatives on any of the work described should be treated as time spent by them as employees on their normal duties;

-workmen and workers’ representatives should have legal protection against victimisation or retaliation by the employer when exercising their rights; and

-an employee, or a workmens’ health and safety representatives should have the right to remove himself or direct another employee in the area of his inspection to remove himself from any place where he is employed when either has reasonable cause to think that his health or safety is endangered, until the place is made safe. The employee or his health and safety representative should notify his shift boss when such action is taken, and discuss the remedies available.

The Commission heard apprehensions expressed as to how this right would be exercised. It is of the view however, that as the desire of both management and the workforce was to develop work situations that were safe and without risk to health, the fears were more theoretical than real. There is no advantage to anyone in requiring workmen to work in unsafe or unhealthy conditions, and a sound common sense approach should overcome any difficulties. Details of how this right will be exercised are better worked out at mine level than in law.

The Commission heard representations concerning the election and functions of full time health and safety representatives, at each shaft paid for by the mine. The Commission felt that there may be some advantage in such an appointment, and workers’ associations should be allowed to maintain their own salaried staff in such a post if they so desired, but the circumstances of the industry are so varied in terms of size and number of shafts, that the Commission does not make any recommendation in this respect, and leaves the issue for negotiation between representatives of employees and the management.

Much of the detail for these arrangements for workmen’s health and safety representatives should be written in regulations.

TRIPARTITE ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS

10.3.8 Establishment of Statutory Committees

In January 1992 the first tripartite committee was formed by the Minerals Act 1991 in the form of the Mine Safety Committee (Section 26, Minerals Act). The Commission heard evidence to the effect that there was a strong desire among all the interested parties to extend this development of tripartite committees, and in some cases to have wider representation.

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that this desire by the parties should be incorporated into the new Act.


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10.3.8.1 The Mine Health and Safety Council

The Mine Safety Committee should be renamed The Mine Health and Safety Council and be structured to have the following representation:

Four representatives representing mine owners, and management. One representative from associations representing mine officials. Four representatives representing workers, and workers’ organisations. Four representatives representing the DMEA, including an occupational health specialist.

The council should be in an advisory capacity to the Minister through the Government Mining Engineer, who should be the chairman. The other statutory conditions attached to this council, could remain as in the existing Act relating to the Mine Safety Committee.

The council should have three sub-committees, dealing with Research, Legislative Renewal and Health Issues, as detailed below.

10.3.8.2 The Safety in Mines Research Advisory Committee (SIMRAC)

The establishment, constitution, powers, duties and functions of this committee may be prescribed in regulations, according to Section 63 of the Minerals Act 1991, as amended by the Minerals Amendment Act No 103 of 1993. The regulations in Chapter 35 deal only with the collection of a levy authorised by Section 63(1)(v) of the Minerals Act 1991 and with the Director General’s duties in operating the levy and determining research needs. A RECOMMENDATION with respect to the financing of health research in referred to in Chapter 7.2 hereof.

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that the Government Mining Engineer should replace the Director General in the functions listed in Chapter 35 of the existing regulations as he is closer to the needs of the industry.

The Chamber of Mines in its closing submission at Enclosure 4 (sic) presented “(Existing) Terms of Reference for SIMRAC”, but the legitimacy of these terms is not clear, and they appear to lean towards the Chamber and lack a tripartite base. It was established in evidence that the proceeds of the levy were State funds.

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that: -the composition of SIMRAC be redefined in the new Act and that it should have four members representing the owners, four representatives of the employees, one representative from mine officials and four representatives of the Government Mining Engineer’s department. The GME should be the chairman, and it should be an advisory committee to him. All references to the Director General in the regulations relating to the levy and SIMRAC should be replaced by “the Government Mining Engineer” (see also Chapter 6 and 7); -the four groups represented should endeavour to include an expert on research matters, who should be independent, but nominated by them, and the expert nominated by the GME should have a background in occupational health; and


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-in the interests of transparency the new Act should require the GME to publish the levies paid by the various companies each year, the basis of the risk assessments made with supporting information relating to the companies paying the levy, and the amounts paid by each. This publication should act as a stimulus to companies to improve their health and safety performance.

10.3.8.3 The Mining Regulation Advisory Committee (MRAC)

There was general agreement among the parties, and in the evidence heard that such a Committee should be formed, and in view of the heavy workload that the Commission is recommending in legislative change, this committee will be called on to be very active, particularly in the immediate future. We have already suggested that the best way of initiating new legislation is by a group which should be as small as possible, but representing all the interested parties. When a draft is agreed it should go to MRAC before going to consultation; and when comments have been considered and the draft finalised the GME should pass it to the Minister with his recommendations. This procedure should work to a strict time table if progress is to be satisfactory, and if deadlock occurs in any debate the GME should summarise the differences and approach the Minister for resolution.

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that this committee should be an advisory committee to the Government Mining Engineer, and should meet at his call. He should take account of the advice offered before making his recommendations on new and amended legislation to the Minister.

Membership should consist of four representatives of the owners, four representatives of the employees, one representative of mine officials, and four officers from the GME’s Department.

Persons with knowledge of mining law and experience of drafting procedures should be included among the representatives.

This committee will not be established in law until the new Act is on the statute book, but in view of the general agreement among the parties for such a committee, and the urgent need for reform of the legislation, the COMMISSION STONGLY RECOMMENDS that the committee as proposed above should be constituted voluntarily, and start its work immediately.

10.3.8.4 Mining Occupational Health Advisory Committee (MOHAC)

The Commission heard much evidence as to the unsatisfactory position concerning occupational health in mining, although adequate records did not seem to be available, and they need to be kept on an historical basis to provide trends. The Commission also heard expressions of optimism concerning what could be done in terms of medical surveillance in the mining industry, if there was a co-operative tripartite approach to the problem (White pp 530/1). The enforcing authority has not been as active in this field as it should have been, and a co-operative approach is required to improve the situation.


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The COMMISSIONER RECOMMENDS that a Mining Occupational Health Advisory Committee be formed, to be an advisory committee to the Government Mining Engineer, and be chaired by him. The committee should have; the following members, preferably persons knowledgeable in occupational health: -three representatives nominated by the owners; -three representatives nominated by workmen’s organisations; -one representative from mine official’s organisations; -three representatives from the GME’s office, including the GME and the medical inspectors (see Chapter 11 of this Report); and -one representative from the Medical Bureau for Occupational Diseases (MBOD) and one representative from the National Centre for Occupational Health (NCOH).

This Committee should:

-monitor the arrangements made for occupational health surveillance in the mining industry;

-have the right to inspect arrangements for medical surveillance at mines;

-review the relationship between the GME and the MBOD as specified in the Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act No. 78 of 1973, and form a liaison forum for them, as well as the NCOH, so that the best occupational health input will be available to the GME’s Department;

-advise on how medical surveillance at mines can be improved and on what additional regulations may be necessary for this to be effective;

-advise on what medical records should be required to be kept, the frequency of medical examinations, the storage and availability of medical information produced by surveillance, and what statistics should be published annually; and

-advise on proposals for epidemiological studies that may be desirable. These recommendations should dovetail with the work of SIMRAC.

10.3.8.5 The Mining Qualifications Authority (MQA)

The present system of granting Certificates of Competency for various statutory appointments in mining relies on Commissions of Examiners, selected, appointed and discharged by the Government Mining Engineer (Chapter 28 of the Regulations). The rules for the examinations, and the syllabi are framed by the GME, who also has the power to amend them. Assistance for some certificates and qualifying examinations is provided by the Chief Inspector under the Machinery and Occupational Safety Act 1983, (now the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1993) and the Department of National Education (Reg 28.6). Fourteen types of certificates are covered by these arrangements.


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The Commission heard evidence that the work of examination and the issue of certificates put an additional work load on the inspectorate and that time spent on this work could be better utilised. (Raath p 1 882 21-26). The GME has already set up a Mining Qualifications Forum to discuss the way ahead on these issues.

The requirement for the holders of certain appointments in and at mines to be the holders of certificates of competency is an important element in ensuring that the quality of mine supervision is of an adequate standard. At the higher levels of mine manager, overseer, surveyor and engineer, the qualification is particularly important, as they may be responsible for the safety and health of hundreds or thousands of persons. The certification should ensure that the holders have satisfactory education, training, experience and character for the appointments they certify.

The Commission agrees that the work of the GME in this respect and of the many Commissions of Examiners that he is required to select and appoint should be transferred to a separate unit in the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs, and the COMMISSION RECOMMEND that the work should be controlled by a Mining Qualifications Authority appointed by the Minister. The tripartite principle should be retained and ten members should work under the chairmanship of an eminent and experienced mining engineer. Three members should be chosen from representatives of the owners, three from the representatives of workmen, one from the mining inspectorate, one representative from mine officials and two from independent academic representatives. In making the appointments the Minister should include persons who appear to him to have experience in mining engineering, mining mechanical and electrical engineering, surveying, education and administration, and provide it with a secretariat. The authority should be charged, inter alia, with:

-reviewing, from time to time, the need for each certificate, the syllabus content, the training and the experience required by candidates. In doing so they should have regard to standards in comparable international examinations. The adequacy of academic courses providing exemption from some examinations of the Authority should be examined;

-appointing panels of examiners and arranging dates and venues for examinations and interviews;

-drawing up rules to apply to each type of Certificate to be issued; and

-publish the rules, the syllabi, model questions and answers, the results after each examination and an annual report on their activities with comments on the quality of the candidates.

10.3.9 HEALTH

The existing Act is silent on health issues and the new Act and/or the Regulations made thereunder provides an opportunity to correct this serious omission.


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10.3.9.1 Medical Examinations and Surveillance

Medical examinations of new entrants, re-entrants, persons leaving the industry, and periodic examinations should be required in accordance with the regulations.

Medical surveillance (as described in Appendix 7) should be carried out by the owner of the mine in order to detect and treat any occupational disease that may become apparent.

Records of all medical examinations and their findings should be recorded in a data base for the mine, and the findings made available to the GME’s office.

Medical records: including radiographs, should be preserved by the Owners for a period of about 40 years, and deposited with the GME’s office after that period.

10.3.9.2 Medical Centres and First Aid

The manager should ensure that a medical centre, manned by a trained occupational health nurse is available at the mine to deal with accidents and cases of ill health whenever persons are employed at the mine and that transportation facilities are available to hospitals for cases that cannot be treated at the mine.

The manager should ensure that first aid equipment is available at suitable places, and in prescribed quantities at and in the mine, and that a sufficient number of trained first aiders are available in the workings as prescribed by regulations.

10.3.9.3 Substances Hazardous to Health

The manager of a mine should be required to make a suitable and sufficient assessment of the risks created by work involving hazardous substances, and the assessment should be reviewed when the situation changes.

The result of the assessment and the measures to be taken to eliminate, reduce or mitigate that risk, as required by regulations, should be recorded.

Suitable protection should be provided without the need for personal protection, but if this is not reasonably practicable, suitable personal protection to control the exposure adequately should be provided.

Exposure to substances should be monitored and should not exceed the limits set in regulations.

The manager of the mine should ensure that a monitoring system is in place for substances hazardous to health and that the results of the monitoring are recorded. Records of monitoring should be preserved for at least 40 years.


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10.3.9.4 Ionising Radiation

The manager of the mine should be required to define on a plan of the mine and by notices within the mine, the parts of the mine where radioactivity measured on an area basis by hand held instruments in such as to indicate that persons working there regularly would be exposed to doses exceeding the annual dose limits set by the CNS.

The manager of the mine should be required to record this information and return it to the inspectorate office.

The manager should take all reasonably practicable steps to reduce the level of exposure to ionising radiations.

The GME and the Mines Inspectorate should work closely with the CNS to assist in the licensing procedure, to monitor the conditions attached to licenses, to provide advice to mines on how to reduce exposure, and to ensure that records of doses received by individuals are properly recorded, preserved and made available to the MBOD.

10.3.10 Safety

10.3.10.1 Support of Strata

The manager of the mine should have the duty to ensure that in every working place and travelling road, steps are taken to control the movement of strata, and that the roof or hanging wall is supported and kept secure. The manager should ensure that he has all necessary information to enable him to discharge this duty.

Where accidents occur due to falls of hanging wall the manager should specify the systematic support that should be used at that place in his Code of Practice. The code should be specific and specify the type of support to be used and the support density.

Support materials should be made available at all times when work is being done at a working place.

When supports are to be withdrawn the operation should only be done from a position of safety, using appropriate devices.

10.3.10.2 Ventilation and Environmental Control

The manager should have a duty to ensure that ventilation is constantly provided in all parts of the mine where men work or pass, sufficient to dilute noxious and inflammable gases, and respirable dust, to concentrations below the maximum levels stated in the regulations. The ventilation must be adequate to provide sufficient oxygen.

The manager should have a duty to secure conditions that are reasonable as regards temperature and humidity, as prescribed by regulations.


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When the ventilation falls below acceptable standards as specified in regulations the manager should ensure that the place is fenced off. In fiery mines, where a goaf is formed by extracting coal by pillar extraction, or longwall methods, the manager should ensure that adequate ventilation is constantly produced in that goaf, or that steps are taken to minimise emissions of noxious or inflammable gas from that goaf.

In fiery mines and mines where flammable or noxious gas can be a hazard and where there is a goaf, barometers should be provided on the surface.

10.3.10.3 Lightning and Contraband

The manager should have the duty to provide lighting on the surface and underground to enable persons to work in safety as prescribed by regulation.

In fiery mines only approved lights should be lawful, and within a distance prescribed by regulations of a working face electrical equipment should be flameproof or intrinsically safe.

A person who takes smoking materials or matches or lighters below ground at a fiery mine should be guilty of an offence. Searching procedures should be in place at fiery mines as prescribed by regulations.

Articles designed to produce unprotected flames or sparks should only be used underground in a fiery mine with express permission of an inspector, or in accordance with regulations allowing such practice.

10.3.10.4 Shafts and Exits

It should not be lawful for persons to be employed below ground unless there are two sheaves available for exit purposes which are connected underground to provide alternate exits, and are not less than 10 m apart.

One exit from the mine should be readily available for use when persons are below ground.

There should be two ways out of working places underground, each leading to a different exit, except where no more than 9 persons work in the place, or 30 persons if the place is a shaft in the course of being sunk.

The manager should ensure that suitable barriers to prevent inadvertent entry into any place in the mine which is not safe, including shafts, are provided and maintained.

10.3.10.5 Underground Roadways

It should be the duty of the manager of the mine to ensure that roadways used underground by persons, vehicles or conveyors are maintained in a secure state, and his code of practice on transport systems should specify the minimum clearances required between vehicles, conveyors and the sides. Pedestrians should as far as reasonably practicable be separated from vehicle


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routes. Where pedestrians are allowed adequate precautions for their protection should be prescribed in the code.

10.3.10.6 Winding Engines, Rope Haulage Apparatus, Free Steered Vehicles and

Conveyors

No winding or haulage engine should be used for winding persons unless a permit has been issued by an inspector. The driver should be competent and certified, and be appointed by the manager. A driver should be available whenever persons are below ground.

Winding operations should only be conducted in accordance with regulations and shaft signals should all comply with the Code of Signals specified in the regulations.

Haulage apparatus and conveyors should be under the supervision of competent persons, trained and appointed for the purpose, and should be operated according to the regulations. Effective means of transmitting signals should be provided along the whole length of conveyors, and in lengths of roads where rope haulage apparatus is in use.

10.3.10.7 Explosives and Initiating Devices

The manager should ensure that explosives and initiating devices are only use by persons competent and qualified to do so, and that transportation and control is supervised by competent persons, appointed for the purpose. They should only be used in accordance with the regulations.

10.3.10.8 Fire Precautions, Rescue and Self Rescue Provisions

Materials and equipment used in roadways along which intake air passes to working faces and stopes should be of fire resistant material, and should not contain mineral oil.

The manager of the mine should specify arrangements for fire fighting in his code of practice, which should comply with regulations.

10.3.10.9 External Dangers to Workings

When mine workings approach within 40 m of any old working that has not been examined at that time, or that contains water or other fluid material, or approaches within 40 m of the surface or a body of water, the manager should take suitable steps to prevent a possible inrush of water or other fluid material, in accordance with the regulations. His proposals should be communicated to the workforce involved and their health and safety representatives, and discussed beforehand at the Mine Health and Safety Committee.

10.3.10.10 Dust

The manager should ensure that no significant amount of airborne dust enters the mine from surface activities, and that underground work is conducted in such a way as to minimise the production of dust. He should ensure that dust


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suppression arrangements are provided as required by regulation, and the sampling for respirable dust, and for flammable dust in roadways is in accordance with the regulations.

10.3.10.11 Noise

The manager should ensure that in selecting, maintaining and using all the equipment at the mine the emission of noise is minimised. He should arrange for noise surveys to be undertaken by competent persons to identify zones where exposure may exceed the maximum dose for the shift prescribed by regulations. The manager should consider alternative methods to reduce this exposure and provide effective hearing protection where exposure might exceed the maximum set in regulations.

10.3.10.12 Withdrawal of Workmen in Cases of Danger

If it appears to shift boss, overseer, or other person in charge of a section of the mine or a working place, that there exists a danger in that section or working place, he should require all persons in the place or section affected to leave for a place of safety and should not allow them to return until the place is made safe.

In a fiery mine, a concentration of 2% of flammable gas in the general body of the air, or the occurrence of a detectable layer of flammable gas in the explosive range, should constitute a danger requiring men to be withdrawn.

10.3.10.13 Training

The manager should ensure that no person is employed at the mine unless he is trained and competent to do the work given to him without supervision, other than for the purposes of training him to be competent. Training should be given to all workmen in accordance with the regulations.

10.3.10.14 Notification of Accidents and Diseases

The manager should notify the inspector if any accident, non-casualty accident or disease occurs at a mine, in accordance with the regulations.

Notice should also be given to the workmens’ health and safety representative for the part of the mine where the accident occurred, or the full time representative should one be available.

The site of the accident should be left undisturbed until an inspector, or the health and safety representative, or both have completed their investigations, or a period of three days has elapsed.

10.3.10.15 Inquiries into Accidents

In the event of an accident being reported the inspector should conduct an inspection in loco but such inspection in loco should not be carried out unless the workmens’ health and safety representative and anyone else involved with or related to the person killed or injured is present.


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Inquiries should be conducted in accordance with regulations to ensure that the proceedings are open to all interested parties, are transparent, that witnesses are not intimidated, and that the inspector’s or investigating officer’s report is made available timeously to the interested parties. Regulations drafted by MRAC should have regard to what is stated in chapter 9 of this report.

10.3.10.16 Regulations

The Minister should be empowered to make, revoke or amend regulations on the advise of the Government Mining Engineer, assisted by the Mines Regulation Advisory Committee, by publication in the Gazette.

10.3.10.17 Risk Assessment

The manager should be responsible for making a risk assessment for all the operations at the mine, in accordance with regulations.

10.3.11 The Inspectorate

10.3.11.1 The Government Mining Engineer (GME)

The Act should be administered in accordance with the instructions and directives and under the control of the Minister, acting on the advice of the GME.

The GME, who should be a certificated mine manager, or a certifcated mechanical or electrical engineer (mines) who has substantial experience in mines should be appointed by the Minister to be responsible for the application of this Act in mines and works, and should report directly to the Minister, in view of the very serious position regarding health and safety in the industry.

The GME should be responsible for the recruitment, deployment, instruction, performance and accountability of the Inspectorate of Mines, and for enforcing the provisions of this Act and the regulations made thereunder.

The GME should be responsible for the acquisition of all statutory statistics and information relating to accidents, non-casualty accidents and prescribed diseases, for the recording, storage and analysis of this data, and for its publication annually, and its availability to interested persons in the industry and to the public.

The GME should be obliged to publish an annual report, which should be readable and stimulate interest in the industry. It should review the position of the mining industry, and its overall comparative performance for the year in health and safety terms. It should examine and record trends in the various sectors of the industry and in the types of accidents. It should comment on progress in accident prevention, and on improvements in health as recorded in statistics and by the tripartite committees. It should review progress in technological issues that may improve safety and health


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performance, and offer advice on how the industry should direct its efforts to improve health and safety.

The GME should be responsible for the conduct and performance of his staff in carrying out inquiries or inquests into accidents and disasters. He should ensure that all inquiries are transparent and open to all interested parties. He should ensure that reports of accidents and disasters are produced timeously, are of adequate quality, diagnose the causes and point to remedies, and that they are published.

The GME should be responsible for the management and control of the Inspectorate of Mines, and should be held accountable for its performance.

10.3.11.2 Inspectors

An inspector on the staff of the GME should have, for the purpose of the execution of this Act, power to do all any of the following things:

-enter a mine or works at any time of the day or night to inspect it and any activities that may be going on;

-make any examination or inquiry he may feel necessary to determine whether the Act and regulations are being complied with;

-investigate the causes and circumstances of any accident, non-casualty accident or incidence of disease at a mine, with a view to requiring action aimed at securing a remedy;

-to take a peace officer with him if he has cause to think his work may be obstructed;

-to require any person at a mine or connected with it to answer questions, in the absence of any other person except one person nominated by the person being questioned, that the inspector thinks fit. (The person’s answers should not be admissible against him in any proceedings);

-take samples of the environment or any substances found;

-impound any machinery or apparatus for testing if he has reasonable grounds for doing so;

-require any manager to mark on a plan any information he requires;

-require the production of any register, plan, book or record required to be kept by the Act, regulations or codes of practice, or any other relevant information under the control of the manager;

-require anyone connected with the working of the mine to give him such facilities and assistance within the ambit of his appointment to enable the inspector to exercise his powers;


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-an inspector, if authorised by the GME, should have power, although not of counsel or attorney, to initiate prosecutions before a magistrate or in a regional court for an offence under this Act or Regulations; and

-exercise any other powers necessary for the performance of these duties under the Act. -it should be a statutory offence to refuse to comply with a lawful requirement made by an inspector, to attempt to prevent another appearing before an inspector, to remove or tamper with any article impounded by an inspector or obstruct an inspector in the performance of his duties;

-an inspector should have power to order any official, employee or agent to take immediate rectifying steps, or to suspend operations if he has reason to believe that any practice or thing at a mine or works could cause bodily harm, constitute a danger or be injurious to health.

Copies of such orders should be provided to the workmens’ safety representatives, and if the order is for suspension of operations, an appeal should be allowed to the Government Mining Engineer.

And for a Principal Inspector (See Chapter 11) his powers, in addition, should state that if a Principal Inspector is of the opinion on reasonable grounds that a mine, or any part of it, or any matter, thing or practice at the mine, or connected with the control or management of the mine, is or is likely shortly to become dangerous to the safety and health of the persons employed at the mine, he may serve on the manager a notice stating that he is of that opinion, and giving his reasons, and imposing on the manager such prohibitions, restrictions or requirements, of any kind, as appear to the Principal Inspector to be necessary to safeguard the safety and health of the employees.

10.3.12 Inquiries and Joint Inquests

The procedure, including the recommendations in Chapter 9 of this report, should be included in this Act, and where appropriate the regulations.

The Minister should have power to direct the inspectorate to prepare a special report on accidents of particular severity, or which cause public alarm, and should have power to direct that a public inquiry be held into the causes and circumstances. The Act should provide for regulations on how such public inquiries should be held, and how the report should be published. The regulations should provide for independent assessors to be used in such inquiries, if requested by the GME.

10.3.13 Regulations

The Minister should have powers to make, amend or revoke regulations by notice in the Gazette as is now provided for in Section 63 of the Minerals Act 1991.


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10.3.14 Offences, Penalties, Repeals

These should be stated in the Act together with any other necessary administrative matters.

10.4 Extant Regulations under the Minerals Act 1991

Senior Counsel for the Chamber of Mines (Loxton p 2 244) summed up the position of current mining legislation as follows:

“If one reads the regulations, and indeed the Act itself, if becomes quite clear that what one has, is a collection of regulations which have been inserted from time to time, in order to cope with particular problems and with very little attention to the overall objectives of the Act.

One then gets lost in the maze of regulations which have no particular order. So the most important steps in ameliorating harms or hazards are not listed in order of importance, they are simply listed in the order in which they were thought of and at some stage or another, there has got to be an overall review of those regulations and the Act so that one does not lose the primary objectives in the minutia of the casuistic inclusions”.

The Commission agrees with this analysis of the present state of mining legislation. This contributes to the problems of enforcement. A prime example of the present chaos in the regulations is that, although over half of all fatal and serious injuries were caused by falls of ground or seismically induced strata collapses in 1993, there is no chapter in the existing regulations that deals with support of strata and rockbursts. Existing legislation does not deal adequately with important issues such as health and substances hazardous to health, workmens rights, waste tips and lagoons, training standards, risk assessment, ionising radiation, and other subjects are inadequately dealt with.

The existing 35 Chapters of Regulations could be replaced by a better focused arrangement of chapters, that would allow the user to find the appropriate regulations for a particular problem more easily. The first task necessary is to abstract from the existing regulations the items that refer to the new subject list, and this would reveal the gaps that exist in the regulation of particular subjects, and enable them to be remedied more easily.

A suitable arrangement of chapter headings could be as follows, arranged alphabetically:

Definitions (To include OHS Act 1993 definitions)

1. Administration, Management and Health and Safety Inspections

2. Codes of Practice

3. Contraband and Smoking Materials

4. Conduct of Inquiries

5. Electricity

6. Explosives


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7. External dangers

8. Fire

9. First Aid 10. Flammable Dust

11. Guidelines by the GME

12. Health and Medical Examinations

13. Ionising Radiation

14. Machinery, Boilers, Pressure Vessels, Compressors and Refrigeration Plant

15. Mechanics and Electricians

16. Mining Regulation Advisory Committee

17. Mining Qualifications Authority

18. Noise

19. Occupational Diseases and Substances Hazardous to Health

20. Offshore Installations

21. Reporting of Accidents, Diseases and Non-Casualty Accidents

22. Rescue and Self-rescue

23. Respirable Dust

24. Risk Assessment

25. Safety Lamps, Instruments and Lighting

26. Health and Safety Representatives and Health and Safety Committees

27. Shafts, Outlets and Roads

28. Safety In Mines Research Advisory Committee

29. Support of Strata and Rockbursts

30. Surveyors and Plans

31. Tips, Lagoons and Dams

32. Training


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33. Underground haulage and Transport.

34. Underwater Mining and Prospecting.

35. Ventilation and Environmental Control. 36. Workmen’s Rights, Duties and Protective Equipment.

The recordified and upgraded regulations, when ready, could be brought into effect more quickly than the proposed new Act, as the Minister can announce them in the Gazette, and they will be required to remain in force when the new Act is established.

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that the work of recodification and upgrading of the regulations should begin as soon as possible, and the mechanism for doing so should be the same as for the proposed new Act. That is, a small group representing the owners, the workers’ organisations and the GME should do the initial draft, and it should be considered by MRAC. Following consultation, amendment and approval by MRAC it should go to drafting by parliamentary draftsmen and then to the Minister with the GME’s recommendation to bring into effect as soon as possible.

All the interested parties made valuable proposals for amendments to the content of regulations which have not yet appeared in the Minerals Act 1991, such as regulations on risk assessment. The group working on this recasting and upgrading of the regulations should consider these suggestions. There are also well established overseas models for regulations that could be used for guidance. For example, for regulations dealing with substances hazardous to health, there are published annually in America and in Europe lists of Maximum Permissible Exposure Limits, Occupational Exposure Standards, and Threshold Limit Values for a large array of substances that occur in working environments, and these should be used as guidelines for the new regulations. The “not invented here” syndrome should be avoided. The effects of hazardous substances, for example lead, asbestos or platinum salts, are the same in South Africa as in other countries, where the dose / response relationship of most contaminants has been well researched. International standards for limits of exposure should be adopted wherever practicable.

10.5 CRITICAL HEALTH AND SAFETY ISSUES THAT SHOULD BE ADDRESSED

WITHOUT DELAY, as an interim measure

The Commission accepted that the pleas for urgency in adopting remedial action to reduce the scale of death, injury and disease in the industry, made on behalf of the National Union of Mineworkers, were well founded.

Progress has been made recently with the acquisition, processing and analysis of statistics relating to accidents, but much remains to be done. It is inexcusable that full details of the accident and disease records of the industry have not been published annually since 1983. It is from this information that indications are found of where scarce resources have to be directed, and where the major problems lie. From the information put before the Commission it was clear that the four most prominent areas of concern are accidents from falls of ground, including rockbursts, the accidents occurring in underground haulage and transport systems, the incidence of occupational ill-health among miners, and the continuing occurrence of disasters from explosions of gas and coal dust in coal mines. The latter although small compared with the death toll from falls of ground, causes great concern, not


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only within the mining industry, but also among the public at large, and not only in South Africa but in the international mining community.

10.5.1 Falls of Ground Accidents

In gold mines rockfalls and rockbursts represent the most important cause of fatal accidents. Also, in collieries and other mines rockfalls are a large source of fatalities. The Commission is satisfied that these causes of injuries are sufficiently threatening to require immediate attention.

Most of these accidents in gold mines occur in stopes and gullies. Evidence was heard from witnesses led by the Chamber of Mines which indicated that considerable progress has been made by the gold mining industry in the development of stope support systems based on rapid yielding hydraulic props, various packs and/or hydraulically placed backfill. In spite of these advances the accident records, as was set out in Chapter 3.1 do not show any improvement in protection from the adverse effects of rock failure. In some other countries, in apparently similarly intractable situations, experience has shown that the introduction of systematic support rules and their application has resulted in significant improvement in accident statistics.

The Commission is firmly of the view that the seriousness of this situation justifies the urgent introduction of systematic stope and gully support rules and that therefore each gold mine should develop its own code of practice for this purpose.

In developing these codes five principles should be kept in mind:

-stope and gully support require immediate attention;

-the support rules should be based on the best available knowledge and experience, should include the use of hydraulic props at prescribed densities;

-the mines support rules should be framed to take into account local conditions, and that various parts of the same mine may require different support systems;

-the nature and extent of the proposed support rules should be commensurate with the accident record of the mine; and

-the support system specified in the manager’s code should be installed as expeditiously as is reasonably practicable.

Accordingly, to ensure the effective and urgent implementation of these principles, the COMMISSION RECOMMENDS the Minister’s regulations to be promulgated should require that: -the GME should advise all gold mine managers immediately of the requirement that a code of practice, specifying the mine’s stope and gully support rules, should be submitted to him not later than three months after the receipt of such advice; -the manager’s code of practice should become effective on submission, but the GME should have the right to raise objections thereto and require that the code be changed; -concurrently with the issuing of the original instruction, the GME should initiate the development of his own general support guidelines for a stope and gully support code;


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-the GME’s guidelines should be based on the advice of a small tripartite team of experts with adequate local knowledge; -these guidelines should be distributed to all managers for information within the three months; and -if a mine fails to submit an acceptable code to the inspectorate by the expiry of the deadline, the GME’s guideline should become automatically the mine’s code of practice. The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS with respect to coal mines that: -the accident records should be analysed, by the Inspectorate to determine the cause of rockfalls with the view to deciding what immediate action to ameliorate the problem is warranted. The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that when an accident occurs due to rock failure attributable to an inadequate support system the mine’s code of practice should be automatically reviewed by the GME without delay to ensure that an adequate support system is installed.

10.5.2 Accidents from Haulage and Transport Underground

Although this is the second largest category of accidents in mines, second only to falls of strata accidents, the Commission was not provided with detailed evidence as to the location or cause of this large group of accidents. This information is urgently required in order that sensible regulation of these operations can be prescribed.

The COMMISSION accepts the suggestion of the National Union of Mineworkers that an investigation into this matter should be undertaken and RECOMMENDS accordingly. This investigation should be made as soon as possible by the staff of the GME, assisted by one nominee of the owners and one nominee representing the workers and one representing mine officials. As soon as possible after the completion of this study the group should draw up proposed regulations for controlling these hazards, for consideration by MRAC and establishment as soon as possible.

10.5.3 Occupational Health

Much has already been said concerning the lack of attention in the regulatory system to health issues, and the poor record of the industry in controlling occupational disease. The Commission heard evidence that medical interventions should be possible at each mine to detect certain diseases (pneumoconiosis, asbestosis, silicosis, hard metal disease, chronic obstructive airway disease, tuberculosis), and that this would be possible by the companies, with the facilities already available. (White pp 500, 503, 506). Regulations should be promulgated as soon as possible dealing with occupational health in mines and require, inter alia:

-that the GME be given express powers to control occupational health hazards;

-that the owners of mines provide medical surveillance for the diseases that may occur at the mine; and

-that the manager of the mine be required to ensure that the owner’s surveillance scheme is properly operated, and that adequate records are kept, and supplied, subject to medical ethics, to the GME.


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10.5.4 Coal Mine Explosions and Respirable Dust

Coal mine explosions continue to occur regularly in South Africa, the most recent large explosion claiming 53 lives in 1993. Evidence given by Chamber of Mines witnesses suggested that we could not expect significant improvement based on current codes of practice (Phillips p 20 Chamber submission, Coal mine Explosions). One of the points of greatest hazard in the explosion context is the board in which a continuous miner operates. The large number of picks rotating in the cutting head can cause frictional heat and ignitions. In the period 1990 to 1992, 25,5% of the ignitions came from this source, but in 58,5% the investigation had not determined the ignitions source. A large number of continuous miners or similar machines are now used in South African coal mines. Another Chamber witness said that the method used to ventilate continuous miners in South Africa was the subject of considerable debate and research in the industry at the moment. The system may have to be changed completely (Thornton p 1 665 16-30). The same witness said that average levels of respirable airborne dust measured at continuous miners was 6 milligrams per cubic metre, much higher than the prescribed statutory level. The level of respirable dust produced by these machines is known to be high, and could produce disease after a fairly short period of exposure.

High levels of airborne dust also contribute to the levels of flammable dust that may be available in the bords to convert a small methane explosion into a coal dust explosion which is usually more violent and disastrous. (Raath Exhibit C28).

The Commission heard that the American regulations on coal mine ventilation, where the use of continuous miners is common, which were revised in May 1992, required ventilation control devices (ventilation ducting or line brattices) to be installed to a position not more than three metres from the area of deepest penetration to which the face has been advanced. Similar regulations in the United Kingdom were also brought to the attention of the Commission. This is not the standard of ventilation found in some cases in South Africa where the ventilation may be as much as 24 metres from the coal face (Thornton p 1 665 8-13). This leaves an excavated volume around the continuous miner which is not ventilated, and where concentrations of methane and dust can accumulate. Until these ventilation standards are improved, ignitions of methane will continue from time to time in continuous miner headings, respirable dust levels will be high, and disastrous explosions will occur. To reduce respirable dust levels exhaust ventilation is required and light, rigid, quick fitting plastic ventilation ducting is readily available to facilitate this. Conveyors are used to convey the coal out of the mine and the coal lying on these conveyors, even in well stone dusted roadways, can act as a fuse to transmit a coal dust explosion. Stone dust or water barriers set over the conveyor can prevent the progress of an explosion.

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that the Minister should promulgate regulations as soon as possible to provide that: -the manager of a coal mine should include in his ventilation code of practice arrangements for: -the delivery of ventilating air by ducting to within 3 metres of the coal face in bords or headings; -the volume of air delivered should be sufficient to produce a velocity of 0,4 metres per second over the cutting machine;


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-where respirable dust samples taken in the heading exceed the maximum allowed by regulation, this ventilation should be in the exhaust mode to ensure that the dust is taken out via the ducting from the bords or headings, with fans situated on the return side of the headings. Irrigated filters should be fitted to these exhaust fans to prevent the dust extracted contaminating other parts of the workings on the return side of the bord or heading; and -approved stone dust or water barriers to the extension of flame should be made mandatory in roadways where coal conveyors are used, set in positions recommended in international practice.


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CHAPTER ELEVEN

ENFORCEMENT The evidence put before the Commission was clear and uncontested that the Inspectorate of Mines was under resourced and under funded, and the Commission was satisfied that this was the case. This is a critical factor contributing to the poor performance of the mining industry in health and safety terms. Good legislation is only one aspect of enforcement. If the State does not provide an adequate enforcement agency the value of good law and regulation is lost. Some evidence indicated despondency concerning the likelihood of putting this matter right (Raath, Loxton p 1 925 10-20), and the lack of success of previous Commissions. The failure to implement the recommendations of the Marais Commission which was the last to sit in 1960-1963 (Chamber Closing submissions, para 1 and 2), was attributed to lack of resources, impracticability and lack of consultation. The Commission does not share this pessimism, and hopes that the changed political climate will see a different response by the State to the recommendations of this Commission, and that this will lead to progress in improving health and safety standards in the industry, and the lowering of the very high level of accidents. 11.1 RESTRUCTURING THE ENFORCEMENT AGENCY 11.1.1 The Present Position The Minerals Act of 1991 divided the country into nine regions for the purposes of that Act.

The mining work load and requirement for health and safety enforcement varies considerably between regions. The inspectors available, called Regional Mining Engineers, vary in number in each region, but each region is under a Regional Director, who reports to the Director General, and takes advice and direction from the Government Mining Engineer.

The mining branch within the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs, headed by the

Government Mining Engineer, consists of five directorates, which deal with mine safety and health, mine equipment safety, rehabilitation of the surface of land, mine surveying and mine environmental control. The GME had the following staff authorised in 1993, and located centrally at headquarters:

In Director, Deputy Director, and Assistant Director Grades 57

Technician, Draughtsman and

Assistant Inspector grades 12 Administrative and Clerical 31

Total 100 There were four vacancies in the Directorate grades and two in the Administrative grades.


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In the regions under the control of the Regional Directors the following post were authorised in 1993:

In Regional Director, Director Deputy Director Grades 19Chief Inspector Grades 21Inspector Grades Administrative and clerical

95164

Total 299

There were no vacancies in the Director and Chief Inspector Grades. There were 15

vacancies in the Inspector Grades, and eight in the remaining grades. (Annual Report of the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs 1993, Chapters III and IV).

The Commission heard evidence that this structure was very top heavy and wasteful of

resources, compared with some other inspectorates, and that the aim of an improved structure should be to maximise the availability of inspectors in the workplace. (McGinn pp 1 483/4/5/6).

It was argued in evidence that the existence of vacancies demonstrated the need for

upgrading the inspectorate in salary, or remuneration package terms, to enable the posts to be filled. The COMMISSION believes that the issue is more complex, and the effectiveness of the inspectorate cannot be improved by a better salary structure alone. Other matters must be addressed as well.

The regional structure deploys staff in a distribution that is not best designed to meet the

need. Using fatal accidents only as an indicator, the distribution of accidents and staff is as follows:

REGION FATALS % OF TOTAL STAFF % OF TOTAL Western Cape 2 0,35 18 6,5 Northern Cape 11 1,90 18 6,5 Orange Free S 104 17,99 35 12,7 Eastern Cape 1 0,17 7 2,5 Natal 18 3,11 22 8,0 Eastern TVL 96 16,61 35 12,7 Northern TVL 24 4,15 21 7,6 PWV (Gauteng) 222 38,41 82 29,7 Western TVL 100 17,30 38 13,8 Total 578 276

The problems caused by trying to address issues of health and safety in the mining industry on the basis of regions with directors reporting to someone other than the GME has already been dealt with, and this table illustrates the difficulty in deploying staff to where the need is greatest when they are tied to regional offices. A more flexible way of allocating and controlling staff was described in evidence. (McGinn p 1 486 6-9).


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11.1.2 Changes Required

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that a restructured Mine Health and Safety Inspectorate (MHSI), should be a separate administrative agency within the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs, and should be separated from the Regional Organisation set up by the Minerals Act of 1991.

The proposed name was suggested by the NUM (Closing submission p 24) and the Commission agrees that the change in name will serve to emphasise the focus of the new agency exclusively on health and safety in mines. The chief inspector will head this organisation, and for historical and continuity reasons the title Government Mining Engineer should remain. The title Inspector, in various grades should be used in the new organisation rather than Regional Mining Engineer, to emphasise the importance of the primary duty of the organisation, that is, to inspect working places in mines, to identify hazards and risks, and require remedies to mitigate these hazards by enforcing the legislation. Many of the existing staff employed in this work, who are suitably qualified and have appropriate experience for the grade of work, could be transferred to the new structure at an appropriate grade. The new structure must provide satisfactory career paths for inspectors. Because of the difficult situation in South Africa caused by inadequate standards within the inspectorate in the past, and the need to remedy problems caused by lack of opportunity in education and training, further education and training should feature strongly in the new Inspectorate. Opportunities for staff to move from one grade to another should be available to those who obtain further qualifications and experience.

11.1.3 The Present Work Load of the Inspectorate

Information submitted in evidence (GME Exhibit C11) showed that the mine units to be inspected were:

Underground Mines 177 6,6% Opencast Mines 804 29,9% Quarries 1708 63.5% Total 2689 100,0% The number of persons employed and at risk in these operations was: Underground Mines 454 801 85,0%Opencast Mines 49 468 9,3%Quarries 30 431 5,7%Total 534 700 100,0%

Eighty five per cent of the working population at risk are in and at underground mines. These account for only 6.6% of the mines on the workload list.

The average number of persons at risk is 2 570 at underground mines, 62 per opencast site, and 18 per quarry. These statistics provide a picture of the workload of the inspectorate. The inspectorate’s responsibility is divided between 85% of persons working at underground mines, 9.3% working at opencast mines and 5.7% working at quarries. Underground mines are few in number, but can be very large


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units employing up to 10 000 persons, with an average per unit of 2 570. The opencast units are comparatively small, and usually highly mechanised operations, and there is a very large number of small quarries.

11.1.4 The Occurrence of Accidents during 1993

The DMEA analysis of statistics for 1993, as an example, gives the following information:

OPERATION INJURED KILLED TOTAL % OF ALL Deep Mines Underground 7 692 538 8 230 90,4% Surface 776 30 806 8,9% Total Mines 8 468 568 9 036 99,3% Opencast Inc Quarries 49 9 56 0,6% (Sea/River ) 8 1 9 0,1% TOTAL 1993 8 523 578 9 101 100%

There is little change in this pattern over the past six years. The variance in the numbers killed in 1993 compared with the figure in the DMEA annual report was due to nine subsequent deaths.

A risk analysis based on these figures shows that over 99% of all the risk situations for which the mines inspectorate has responsibility occur in the 177 deep mines, and of this risk about 9% occurs on the surface of these mines.

The opencast, quarries and other operations are in comparison very safe operations, and only a small proportion of the inspectorate’s resources should be devoted to them.

11.1.5 The Allocation of Inspectorate Resources to Inspections during the year 1 July

1993 to 30 June 1994 (GME’s Exhibit C11, as amended on 17/8/94)

This evidence put before the Commission showed the analysis of Inspections made in the regions and by the Mine Environmental Control and Mine Surveying directorates.

An analysis of the inspections made by staff in the regions, shows:

INSPECTIONS

Underground Surface Opencast Quarries Total 3 516 4 657 1 353 2 200 11 726

% of Total 30,0% 39,7% 11,5% 18,8% 100%


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About ninety per cent of the risk, as demonstrated by accidents, is underground, but only 30% of the inspections took place in this area. About nine per cent of the risk occurs on the surface at mines but about 40% of the inspections took place there. Opencast mines and quarries account for 0,6% of the risk but accounted for about 30% of inspections. Excluding the 19 director grade staff in the regions there were 101 inspectors in posts giving an average inspection rate per inspector of 116 per annum.

There appears to be room for a better focus of available inspection resources on the area where the risk to the workforce is greatest, that is, in the underground workings.

11.1.6 The Geographical Distribution of the Workload.

Reference was made during the Commission’s hearings to the large area over which mines are scattered in South Africa. This is true, and involves the inspectors in considerable travelling and loss of time. There are similar situations in other countries. Some benefit can be obtained by examining the methods used in these countries to reduce the problems caused by travelling distances.

An examination of the statistics, as illustrated in Chapter 11.1.1 shows where the work load is concentrated. Four of the regions account for almost 70% of the accidents.

11.1.7 A Two Tier Inspectorate.

The comparatively low level of accidents in opencast and quarry operations shows that the hazards that occur in this type of mining are far less serious than those in underground mining. The operations are conducted in the open, without the problems of falls of ground, and machine and vehicle operation in confined spaces. Ventilation is not a problem and explosive gases do not normally occur in open pits. The complex technology of hoisting men and minerals from great depth is not involved, and the skills associated with underground mining are not required. The type of person required for this type of mining does not need to have acquired the knowledge, skills or experience that the inspector responsible for underground mines must have. The inspector required for open pits should be trained and competent in managing those operations and have experience in managing such operations. Recruitment of inspectors for such inspection work should be from this field. The salaries paid to management in opencast and quarrying are generally much lower than equivalent posts in underground mining, so that persons suitable for appointment as inspectors for these operations, who have management experience in this work, can be obtained at much lower salary scales than inspectors for underground mines, and should be easier to recruit.

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that the Mine Health and Safety Inspectorate should have a structure at two levels, one to deal with the inspection of opencast and quarry operations, and the other to deal with underground mines. The lower tier of the inspectorate should be formed from within the current staff as soon as possible, so that they can concentrate on opencast and quarry inspection, and develop their expertise in this specialised area.


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The fatal accident rate per thousand in underground mines in 1993 was about 1,27 (577 deaths among 455 thousand employed) compared with about 0,13 for opencast mines and quarries (10 deaths among 80 thousand employed), and the size of the two tiers within the Mine Health and Safety Inspectorate should be roughly in this ratio. That is, the opencast and quarry tier should be about one tenth the size of the underground mine tier. The staff for this lower tier could be established without delay from the less qualified and experienced inspectors in the current inspectorate. They should be headed and organised by a Senior Quarry Inspector, who should have the rank equivalent to an Inspector of Mines, and report to a Principal Inspector of Mines in the upper tier of the inspectorate.

The formation of this second tier within the inspectorate would lead to savings from a lower salary structure than that required to recruit for underground mines. In the United Kingdom, salaries of quarry inspectors are 60% of those of underground mine inspectors. The remaining resources of the inspectorate could be better focussed on the underground mines where the vast majority of accidents and ill-health originates. (Raath pp 2 057/8 23-24)

All the statistics collected, recorded and analysed by the GME, should be separated for opencast, quarry and other operations that do not involve employment below ground, so that the lower tier of the inspectorate can be effectively managed and its progress monitored. Although there are 2 512 units to be inspected according to current statistics, many are small operations and several units can be inspected in one day. Larger opencast sites may need several days of inspection in a year. This type of mine should be defined as a mine not involving the employment of persons below ground.

11.1.8 The Quality Factor in Underground Mine Inspection

The Commission heard evidence that the quality and calibre of the inspector who was in the front line of the inspectorate, who was able to identify underground hazards and be able to stand up to managers of mines and demand a remedy, was extremely important (Raath p 2 045 1-10, 20-24). In an extensive and meaningful study of the inspectorate submitted by the NUM there is frequent reference to the failure of inspectors to use the powers they have in law, because they hold the persons who manage the mines in awe, and do not see their role as challenging management (Plimmer pp 2 226 NUM V3 (11)). Other evidence indicated that many inspectors were only in the inspectorate on a temporary basis while they sought to return to positions in the industry. It was likely that an inspector would find it extremely difficult to take enforcement action as he is dependent on maintaining good relations with industry for his career prospects (McGinn NUM Submission V2 (3) p 5). The level of qualification and experience at which persons are recruited for the more important inspectorate posts has been inadequate.


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The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that a new position be created in the Mine Health and Safety Inspectorate, to be called the Principal Inspector. Persons who occupy this position must be well qualified, as experienced as, and of as good a calibre as the managers with whom they will have to deal. To attract persons of this calibre it is obvious that conditions offered to induce them to join the inspectorate, by way of salary and remuneration packages must be as attractive as those that they can expect in the industry. They must also see the possibility of a rewarding career, and much of their job satisfaction will come from seeing improvements in health and safety in the industry as their leadership changes the culture within the inspectorate.

These positions will not be easy to fill, and they will be few in number. The job descriptions of all the posts in the Mine Health and Safety Inspectorate should be carefully prepared, and should aim to produce the highest rate of inspections of working places below ground. For the position of Principal Inspector there should be a requirement of a university degree in Mining Engineering, corporate membership of a Professional Institution, a Certificate of Competency as a mine manager and 2 years experience as manager of an underground mine appointed under Section 31 of the Minerals Act 1991, or a person appointed under subsection (3) of that section. This experience should have been within the last 5 years, and the underground mine of which he was manager or deputy manager should be of substantial size. The remuneration package offered for this post should be 90 per cent of that currently earned by managers of large underground mines. (See graph showing current comparisons in Appendix 6)

THE COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that action be initiated as soon as possible to recruit NINE persons for the position of Principal Inspector, on the conditions described.

This position will form a bench mark in the structure of the new MHSI, and the effect that this may have on existing structures will be discussed later. As this level of recruitment has not been used before, there may be problems. The representatives of the Chamber of Mines suggested that this recruitment would denude the industry of talent, and resources available would not allow the appointments to be made. The appointments may be made difficult because the appointees should come from within the industry. The Commission is however optimistic, and looks for cooperation from current employers within the industry to fill these posts.

The efficacy of the conditions offered for holders of this new appointment will be seen from the response to advertisements, when the number of applications from the senior staff at the 177 underground mines will reflect the adequacy of the conditions offered. In the event of there being a shortage of suitable South African candidates, applicants from overseas who meet the requirements of the job description should be allowed to apply.

Six of these Principal Inspectors should lead groups of inspectors in the field and they should be located in positions that will maximise their ability to inspect workplaces in underground mines. The need for elaborate office accommodation will be reduced when later recommendations in this report are implemented. There should be substantial savings in administrative and support costs.


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Three of the nine Principal Inspectors should be located with the Government Mining Engineer to take responsibility for some of the mines which can not be conveniently included in the districts allocated to the other six. They could assist with policy matters relating to significant hazards, contribute to the tripartite involvement of the GME’s office which will be greatly increased, and take line responsibility for the second tier quarry inspectorate.

11.1.9 The Effect on Existing Inspectorate Structures.

Some of the existing inspectorate staff may meet the specifications for the post of Principal Inspector. The MHSI will rely heavily in the initial stages on the effectiveness of the new principal appointments, and in the next decade these new appointees will fill the senior ranks of the inspectorate. As time passes and the health and safety performance of the industry improves, the need will be for fewer inspectors but new appointments will be increasingly of a better standard.

The new MHSI should be organised into six districts each having about 30 underground mines, supervised by a Principal Inspector. The location from which each district will be organised should be decided by ease of access to the underground mines to be served. Existing regional offices may not be the best locations, and there should be less emphasis on town centre offices, as our recommendations are that inspectors, supported by appropriate equipment, will not rely on office accommodation or support staff. An inspector sitting behind a desk in a town office is unable to contribute much to the health and safety of the underground workplace. The emphasis in the new organisation should be to employ inspectors on visits to workplaces rather than on office work, and the way the new Act and Regulations are written should be designed to place the responsibility for healthy and safe working conditions on the owners and managers of mines, and avoid the need for exemptions that may consume the time of inspectors. The paperwork required from inspectors should be such that the individual inspector can produce it himself on his computer, and that all information he or his superiors need can be transmitted electronically.

There are at present attached to the GME’s office, three Chief Directors responsible for Directorates of Mine Health and Safety, Mine Environmental Control and Rehabilitation, and Mine equipment. (GME Exhibit C7). These Chief Directors in turn control other, or sub-directorates.

Mine Surveying has a Director and 5 Deputy Directors, to supervise 23 Senior Mine Surveyors and 3 draughtsmen. (GME Exhibit C8). Mine Environment has a Director responsible for 3 Deputy Directors, and 4 Assistant Directors, supervising 2 Control Technicians, 10 First Technicians, and 3 specialised auxiliary officers. (GME Exhibit C9).

These arrangements lead to a top heavy organisation, and as much as possible of this activity should be devolved to the districts under Principal Inspectors, to be readily available at the workplace.


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Mine plans are very important in the health and safety context, but their provision and accuracy are the responsibility of the owners and managers of mines, and the appointment of a mine surveyor is a statutory appointment made by the owner of the mine. When owners and managers discharge their statutory duties properly the enforcing authority should have no need for a survey capability for health and safety needs. At times an inspector may suspect that plans are inadequate or inaccurate. In this event the GME’s office will need to have access to facilities for a check survey, at the expense of the owner of the mine. For normal operation of a health and safety inspectorate there should be no need for a permanent survey department, but the inspectorate should have access to a survey capability when required.

The surveys made during 1993 were for State assistance and valuation purposes, matters not connected with health and safety (GME Exhibit C11 para 8.2). If a survey department is required by the DMEA for optimal exploitation or land reclamation purposes it should be located in another part of the organisation, so that the GME is not burdened with its organisation and can devote more of his time to health and safety matters.

In earlier sections of this report the Commission has said that it feels that rehabilitation of land only bears marginally on health and safety issues in underground mining, and that it should not be allowed to detract from the very important work of improving health and safety in the mines. We consider therefore that the Rehabilitation Directorate, now part of the GME’s office, should be moved to a more suitable location in the government service so that the efforts of the MHSI can be concentrated on health and safety issues.

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that the existing Survey and Rehabilitation Directorates should not form part of the new MHSI.

The terms “Director” and “Chief” should be avoided in the new MHSI as they invite the question as to who and what is directed and of what one is chief, and the numbers involved are usually small. More suitable terminology for the grades in the new MHSI would be GME, Deputy GME, Principal Inspector, Senior Inspector, Inspector, Assistant Inspector, Sub-Inspector. More comment will be made on these proposed grades later.

The Mine Environmental Control Directorate is a large centrally located unit. There is a need for a central facility for analysing samples of respirable dust, flammable dust, mine air and pollutants, but this need not be part of the MHSI but could be part of an independent support and sister organisation, which will be considered later. Mine sampling activity would be better controlled by the Principal Inspectors in charge of the districts. The work involved in calculating the risk levy by this department should be simplified so that it consumes less technical manpower. (McGinn Submission p 4)

These changes will still leave, in the GME’s Headquarters Branch, in addition to the three Chief Directors, two Directors, one Deputy Director, three Chief Regional Mining Engineers, and one Regional Mining Engineer. For the sake of this commentary no distinction is made between mining and machinery inspectors and administrative and clerical staff are not considered.


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In the existing regional organisations, assuming all vacancies are filled, there are:

9 Regional Directors 8 Chief Regional Mining Engineers 102 Regional Mining Engineers

As stated some Regional Directors, if they have had recent experience as managers or deputy managers, and have degrees and certificates of competency, may be qualified for the Principal Inspector posts. Some may wish to remain in the administrative cadre of the DMEA for optimal utilisation or land rehabilitation, and some may wish to become senior inspectors or inspectors in the new MHSI depending on their qualifications. For this commentary it is assumed that five may become available for redeployment in the MHSI. This would give a figure of 125 mining engineers available for deployment in the MHSI. Fourteen would be required for the lower tier of quarry inspectorate, leaving 112 available for the underground inspectorate.

11.1.10 Structure of the new Mine Health and Safety Inspectorate

The new inspectorate will be able to devote itself exclusively to improving the health and safety of the workforce, to reducing the currently unacceptable level of fatal and serious injuries, and to investigating non-casualty accidents so that the lessons learnt can be used to prevent recurrences. As the accident rate reduces it will be able to devote an increasing amount of its resources to proactive work, so that prevention will be more to the fore, and not remedial action following disasters and accidents. It will have a new Act and Regulations to enforce which will be devoted exclusively to health and safety matters. As its expertise increases it will be able to concentrate on its role as adviser, to those who operate and work in the mines.

At headquarters, where the GME is charged with the responsibility for the health and safety of the five to six hundred thousand persons employed in the mines, there should be three Deputy GME’s to assist him. These deputies will share the line management of six inspection districts, each containing about 30 underground mines, and the second tier of the inspectorate responsible for surface mines or quarries. They will also have responsibility for policy on specified subjects such as electrical and mechanical engineering, civil engineering including tips and lagoons, research, annual reports, statistics, incident reports, accident investigation reports, ionising radiation, underground transport, external dangers to workings, surface accidents at underground mines, health, noise, vibration, respirable dust, risk assessment, relationships with outside bodies such as the ILO, arrangements for tripartite committees, explosives, strata control, seismic monitoring, ventilation, ignitions and explosions, fires and fire fighting, substances hazardous to health, occupational hygiene, first aid, rescue and self rescue, training in mines, training of the inspectorate and continuing professional development.


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This list is not intended to be exhaustive. This will enable individuals to specialise in particular subjects and provide advice to the GME when preparing instructions to inspectors, guidance to the industry, and drafting regulations.

They should be assisted by three of the newly appointed Principal Inspectors who will have recent senior management experience, and have the highest qualifications in the industry. These in turn will be assisted by three Senior Inspectors and three Inspectors.

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that the headquarters staff of the MHSI should consist of the GME, three Deputy GME’s, three Principal Inspectors, three Senior Inspectors and three Inspectors to replace existing staff, together with administrative and clerical support. The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that the grades in the Mines Health and Safety Inspectorate should be:

Grade 1 Government Mining Engineer Grade 2 Deputy Government Mining Engineer Grade 3 Principal Inspector Grade 4 Senior Inspector Grade 5 Inspector/Senior Inspector of Quarries Grade 6 Assistant Inspector/Inspector of Quarries Grade 7 Sub Inspector

Existing remuneration packages are inadequate to attract candidates of the right quality and calibre in adequate numbers. The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that to ensure that suitable staff can be appointed to these grades the remuneration packages for these grades should be related to remuneration in the industry. The reference point should be at Principal Inspector level. He should be offered 90 per cent of a typical mine manager’s package. The following levels of remuneration are recommended: POST PERCENTAGE OF MINE MANAGERS REMUNERATION PACKAGE Government Mining Engineer 110% Deputy Government Mining Engineer 100% Principal Inspector 90% Senior Inspector 65% Inspector/Senior Quarry Inspector 45% Assistant Inspector/Quarry Inspector 30% Sub Inspector 15% The COMMISSION further RECOMMENDS that these relative remuneration positions should be adjusted annually to allow for changes in industry remuneration packages.

The requirements for appointment to these grades should be as follows:


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Senior Inspector - the holder of this post should have a Degree in Engineering, or the equivalent thereof, have a Certificate of Competency in mine management, and two years experience, within the last five years, as a shaft manager at a large mine.

Inspector - the holder of this post should have a Higher National Diploma, a Certificate of Competency as Mine Manager and 2 years experience in the last 5 years as an overseer at a large mine.

As is always the case when a major reorganisation occurs which aims at improving the standard and status of an organisation, there are problems in fitting existing staff into the new framework, and some latitude is required in transferring existing personnel into the appropriate posts commensurate with their ability and experience. Most present incumbents will find an improvement in their terms of service for which they may not be fully qualified. The new MHSI should strive by all methods available to provide opportunities for individuals to improve their qualifications. Improving the levels of experience in senior posts in industry is a more difficult matter, as it involves movement, on secondment, between industry posts and the inspectorate. The cooperation of the industry is called for in this respect, as it is in the industry’s interests to have a well trained, qualified and expert inspectorate. The International Labour Organisation would also be able to help in this respect as it takes an active interest in establishing good standards in inspectorates. For example, in recent years it has done much to establish an inspectorate in the emerging coal industry of Indonesia.

In the six new districts, each containing some 30 underground mines, the Principal Inspector in charge will be able to divide the underground mines into groups, allowing for the size and severity of problems at the mines. Each group of mines should be supervised by a Senior Inspector, with a mix of mining and machinery inspectors in each group. The numbers of Senior Inspectors and Inspectors available for allocation following the reorganisation should be about 125. Allowing for 14 inspectors to be deployed in the second tier quarry inspectorate, about 11 would be available for deployment in the six underground mine districts, giving a total of about 18 inspectors to work with each Principal Inspector supervising about 30 underground mines. If the emphasis on the work of each inspector is placed on underground inspections, this should allow a far higher rate of inspection of these workplaces which have the highest risk.

11.1.11 The Need for the Mine Health Safety Inspectorate to be more Proactive.

The current organisation has been swamped with the need to investigate accidents and hold inquiries and inquests (a total of 4 086 investigations are recorded for 1993/94 GME Exhibit C11 para 4.2). Inadequate resources remained for pro-active work, including the issue of notices/ prohibitions, prosecutions, the collection for analysis of incombustible and respirable dust samples and samples of atmospheric gases, and investigation of diseases and occupational ill health. This position should improve as the industry reduces the level of death, injury and disease. A pressing need at present is to increase the rate of sampling for dust, gasses and other pollutants. Most of the sampling activity up to now has been done by the central environmental control unit, and it would be far better done in the inspection districts.


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Sampling does not require a high level of understanding of mining problems, and persons who are interested in mining can be task trained for these duties.

The Commission was told that the present staff is not representative of the South African population. This is unsatisfactory in a democratic society, particularly when the bulk of those involved in mining accidents or who suffer industrial ill health are black. This is a legacy of the past, and although there are some holders of manager’s certificates among the black population who also have experience in management, none has so far come forward as applicants for the inspectorate (Raath pp 2 081/ 215-2).

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that a group of Assistant Inspectors, and Sub-Inspectors should be recruited who could be purpose trained, initially, as audit samplers for respirable dust, flammable dust in roadways, mine gas and pollutant samples. They could also do noise surveys in working places using hand held instruments. This is a very necessary and important function of any inspectorate. At present reliance is placed mainly on the results of sampling done by the owners and management of mines and this is very unsatisfactory for an enforcing authority. This group of inspectors should be recruited from among those interested in careers in mining, or from the ranks of shift bosses, miners and team leaders. They should be encouraged to study for higher qualifications so that they can move up in the Inspectorate’s structure. They should be located in the districts, and arrangements should be made for samples to be sent to a central point for independent analysis. The Commission considers that initially twelve Assistant Inspectors and twelve Sub-Inspectors should be recruited and trained for sampling purposes, and located in the six underground mining districts. They should form a valuable adjunct to inspectorate teams led by the Principal Inspector, as well as providing an opportunity for advancement in the MHSI. 11.2 STRENGTHENING OF THE ENFORCEMENT AGENCY

The Commission heard evidence concerning the need to strengthen the enforcement agency by the addition of specialist skills to assist the office of the GME, and by adopting the latest information technology methods to improve communication, reduce administrative and clerical costs, and provide quick access to statistical records.

11.2.1 Additional Specialists to Advise the Government Mining Engineer

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that the Government Mining Engineer should have on his staff: -a Medical Inspector of Mines with expertise in occupational health. -two attorneys to specialise in processing mining prosecutions and inquiry / inquests. -an expert in safety management in the mining industry, who need not be qualified in mining. Persons of this background gave very important evidence to the Commission. The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that there should be specialised scientific back up available to the GME, and that a group could be conveniently located at the G P Badenhorst facility, which already has a measure of expertise in some subjects.


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The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that consideration be given to transferring this facility to the direct control of the GME. It should be suitably expanded to provide analytical facilities for dust, gas and pollutants, and the special expertise required for investigations into mining accidents and diseases. Some of the experts already available in ventilation and gas detection, in the Environmental Control Directorate, could be attached to this group. The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that the GME be encouraged to employ consultants with expertise that is not currently accessible to the inspectorate. This will be particularly important in the transition to a new legislative framework and the new MHSI. The GME already has this power but via an elaborate tendering procedure. Funds should be made available to enable him to commission outside consultants quickly, especially when emergencies occur, subject to appropriate control procedures.

The appointment of these experts will serve many purposes. The Commission heard complaints concerning the lack of activity by the inspectorate on health issues. The employment of a Medical Inspector will provide the GME with expert advice and a leader in discussions on the tripartite Mining Occupational Health Advisory Committee (MOHAC). He would help to upgrade the inspectorate’s knowledge and understanding of occupational health issues, and be part of the internal training function of the inspectorate. He would supervise the medical surveillance system that mines should adopt, and ensure that adequate health records are kept. He would make these available to MBOD and serve as a liaison with the Bureau and the National Centre for Occupational Health. He would assist the GME in deciding policy on health, hygiene and first aid matters at mines.

The appointment of attorneys to the GME’s staff would serve to improve the legal understanding of inspectors and their knowledge of procedures, and part of their function would be in internal training of inspectors. At the same time the attorneys would gain from inspectors a close understanding of mining matters. They would relieve inspectors of much of the paper work involved with prosecutions, although inspectors would, in terms of the Commission’s proposals, be entitled to initiate prosecutions. In time they would develop special expertise in dealing with mining cases and be able to give expert instruction to Counsel in inquiries/inquests and prosecutions or conduct them themselves. The Commission has made no recommendation on administrative penalties, but the attorneys employed could pursue the advisability of such a system, and advise the Mine Health and Safety Council.

Representations were made to the Commission by consultants who were expert in many aspects of safety management in the mining industry, and who had undertaken safety audits which were of great value, although they were not themselves qualified to be inspectors of mines, as they have qualified in non-mining disciplines. The Commission felt that the appointment of persons of such calibre and background to advise on safety management, would enhance the expertise of the Inspectorate.

11.3 PROVISION OF EQUIPMENT FOR INSPECTORS

The inspectorate is currently looking at the provision of computers and data acquisition and retrieval systems for individual inspectors. This method of working has become standard in many inspectorates. The individual inspector, in addition to the provision of the personal


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protective equipment he needs to be independent of the mine, should be provided with a computer and a modem transmission facility which would enable him to write his report as soon as he has left the workplace, either in his vehicle or at home, and transmit the report instantly to the office of the Principal Inspector, or to the GME’s office. He could also retrieve any information he needs concerning the mine or workplace from the data base of the inspectorate.

He could also call up exemption forms, print them and issue them at the mine where necessary. This method of working, which is becoming increasingly used in all walks of life worldwide, has many advantages. It is very fast, can cope with a large amount of data and make it instantly available. It obviates much of the need for office accommodation and clerical support staff. These economies offset the cost of the electronic equipment and the essential training required.

Individual inspectors should also be supplied with all the instruments they need to measure, gas, ionising radiation, dust, pollutants, and ventilation survey instruments. The scientific back-up facility that the GME should have, should provide for the servicing and calibration of this equipment.

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that the GME be encouraged to make this investment in electronic and scientific equipment and that the necessary training to enable inspectors to work in this modern way be provided. 11.4 THE MINES SAFETY AND HEALTH INSPECTORATE (MSHI)

The adoption of these recommendations should result in the establishment of a new inspectorate with this approximate complement:

At Headquarters - Government Mining Engineer 1 Deputy Government Mining Engineers 3 Principal Inspectors 3 Senior Inspectors 3 Inspectors 3 Specialists - Medical 1 Legal 2 Safety Management 1 Total 17

The GME should have access to a small scientific investigatory and laboratory service under his control which will act as a back up for the inspectorate and enhance its expertise.

In the six underground mining districts For each district - Principal Inspector 1 Senior Inspectors 3 Inspectors 15 Assistant Inspectors 2 Sub-Inspectors 2 Total 23 x 6 = 138


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Second Tier Quarry Inspectorate Senior Quarry Inspector 1 Quarry Inspectors 13 Total 14 TOTAL COMPLEMENT MHSI 169

11.5 THE IMPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED RESTRUCTURING OF THE MHSI

The total complement shown is less than shown for the existing organisation (GME Exhibit C10). This is mainly because the units that have little or no involvement with health and safety, namely survey, land rehabilitation and some of the environmental control unit have been removed from the inspectorate, for relocation elsewhere.

The number of inspectors available for inspection has been increased. The issue of quality and calibre of staff has been emphasised by making nine new appointments of highly trained, qualified and experienced inspectors and four non-mining specialists to assist the GME. This emphasis on quality is not without cost, and in order to retain existing staff, encourage them to improve their qualifications and expertise, and to fill existing vacancies, the recommendation to increase remuneration packages in all grades has been made. Proper equipment and electronic data processing will also be a cost item. Proposals for additional recruitment of assistant and sub inspectors has been made to increase the proactive work of audit sampling. These arrangements will mean that the activities of the inspectorate will be focused on those areas where the risks are highest: the underground workings. A far higher rate of inspection of those places will be possible.

The existing cost of the GME’s office was said to R 22 million for 1993/94 compared with a total revenue collected from the industry by the State of R 1,305 billion or 1.7% (GME Exhibits C11 and C13). The contribution of the mining industry to the GNP was said to be R50 billion in 1992 and the mining companies in that year paid R1.3 billion in dividends to shareholders and invested R2.1 billion in capital expenditure (Benjamin p 1 941 1-20).

In relation to these figures, the State’s funding of R 22 million was seen as inadequate to deal with the problem of 578 deaths, 8 532 injuries and a large volume of ill-health in 1993.

The Commission agrees with this view, but realises that resources are not unlimited, and for that reason has given careful consideration to the issue of using existing resources to the best advantage before adding to the resource requirements. It is the duty of the State to provide an adequate protection for the mine workforce through good legislation and effective enforcement, and the funding should come from State revenue.

The Commission in forming its recommendations having regard to, inter alia, the question of cost and, after due deliberation, has concluded that its recommendations, taking into account all the circumstances, are reasonable, appropriate and necessary in the interests of the health and safety of mineworkers.


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11.6 ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE INSPECTORATE

One of the most important aspects of the work of the inspectorate is its accountability to the people who work in the mining industry, and to the public at large. There is an unfortunate history of failure to publish material that is essential if the health and safety performance of the industry is to be improved.

The absence of comparative statistics since 1983 is inexcusable. Good progress has been made recently in the acquisition, recording and analysis of statistics relating to accidents, and the COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that this work should be extended and refined to identify the greater hazards, and the trends in risk. There is still a dearth of information on health in the mining industry, and action should be initiated by the DoH and mining companies jointly and the COMMISSION RECOMMENDS accordingly.

The publication of reports of investigations of accidents and disasters, even Commissions of Inquiry, has been neglected in the past, leading to an understandable attitude of mistrust among the workforce. The annual reports of the Government Mining Engineer have not been very informative and it is important that this change. It is also important that the issues of health and safety in the industry be discussed in a transparent way, and allow contribution to discussion by those who work in the industry.

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that the Annual Report of the GME should give all available information on health and safety, discuss where problem areas lie, indicate future strategies, and be attractively written and produced. It should be available to everyone in the industry, so that the lessons learnt from the occurrence of ill health and accidents in the period under review can be learnt. Performance indices and work load tables, similar to those presented to the Commission (GME Exhibit C11) should be developed by the Inspectorate, and published in the Annual Report.

The inspectorate is in the position of arbiter between hundreds of thousands of lives and an industry worth hundreds of millions of rands per year to the national economy. Those words were taken from the only published part of the Marais Report of 1963. The same is true today, and in the present time of movement into tripartite relationship in the mining industry the role of the inspectorate is even more important.


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CHAPTER TWELVE

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS The Commission has made many detailed recommendations in this report, and for the convenience of the reader the main recommendations are summarised in the following paragraphs. 12.1 MATTERS WHICH REQUIRE URGENT ATTENTION

12.1.1 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that work should start immediately on the drafting of a new Act, the Health and Safety in Mines Act, Act No … 199 … devoted to regulating health and safety in the mining industry only. This should be undertaken by a Mining Regulation Advisory Committee (MRAC), a tripartite body to be set up in terms of the proposals for the new Act.

12.1.2 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that the preamble to the new Act should read,

“An Act to provide an improved structure for the regulation and improvement of the health and safety of those employed in the mining industry”. In drafting the Act the advice contained in Chapter 10.1 to 10.3.14 of this report should be taken into account (see Ch. 10.1 to 10.3.14).

12.1.3 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that work should begin as soon as possible

on the recodification and upgrading of the regulations under the supervision of MRAC and that when this work is undertaken the advice contained in Chapter 10.4 hereof should be taken into account. The recodified and upgraded regulations, when ready, could be brought into effect more quickly in terms of the existing Act (see Ch. 10.4)

12.1.4 CRITICAL HEALTH AND SAFETY ISSUES THAT SHOULD BE

ADDRESSED WITHOUT DELAY BY THE MINISTER OF MINERAL AND ENERGY AFFAIRS

The Commission accepts that the pleas for urgency in adopting remedial action to reduce the scale of death, injury and disease in the industry, made on behalf of the National Union of Mineworkers, are well founded.

Progress has been made recently with the acquisition, processing and analysis of statistics relating to accidents, but much remains to be done. It is inexcusable that full details of the accident and disease records of the industry have not been published annually since 1983. It is from this information that indications are found of where scarce resources have to be directed, and where the major problems lie. From the information put before the Commission it was clear that the four most prominent areas of concern are accidents from falls of ground, including rockbursts, the accident occurring in underground haulage and transport systems, the incidence of occupational ill health among miners, and the continuing occurrence of disasters from explosions of gas and coal dust in coal mines. The latter although small compared with the death toll from falls of ground, causes great concern, not only within the mining industry, but also among the public at large, and not only in South Africa but in the international mining community.


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The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that the Minister should promulgate regulations as soon as possible concerning the four matters raised in the following paragraphs, as well as those matters raised in Chapter 12.13.4. To avoid delay these regulations should be promulgated as soon as possible, in terms of the existing Act, and ahead of the formation of MRAC.

A Falls of Ground Accidents

In gold mines rockfalls and rockbursts represent the most important cause of fatal accidents. In collieries and other mines rockfalls are also a major cause of fatalities. The Commission is satisfied that these causes of injury and death are sufficiently threatening to require immediate attention.

Most of these accidents in gold mines occur in stopes and gullies. Evidence was heard from witnesses led by the Chamber of Mines which indicated that considerable progress has been made by the gold mining industry in the development of stope support systems based on rapid yielding hydraulic props, various packs and/or hydraulically placed backfill. In spite of these advances the accident records, as was set out in Chapter 3.1 do not show any improvement in protection from the adverse effects of rock failure. In some other countries in apparently similarly intractable situations, experience has shown that the introduction of systematic support rules and their application has resulted in significant improvement in accident statistics.

The Commission is firmly of the view that the seriousness of the situation justifies the urgent introduction of systematic stope and gully support rules and, that therefore each gold mine should develop its own code of practice for this purpose.

In developing these codes five principles should be kept in mind:

-stope and gully support require immediate attention;

-the support rules should be based on the best available knowledge and experience, and should include the use of hydraulic props at prescribed densities;

-the mine support rules should be framed to take into account local conditions, and thus various parts of the same mine may require different support systems;

-the nature and extent of the proposed support rules should be commensurate with the accident record of the mine; and

-the support system specified in the manager’s code should be installed as expeditiously as is reasonably practicable.


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Accordingly, to ensure the effective and urgent implementation of these principles, the COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that the Minister’s regulations to be promulgated should require that:

-the Government Mining Engineer should advise all gold mine managers immediately of the requirement that a code of practice, specifying the mine’s stope and gully support rules, should be submitted to him not later than three months after the receipt of such advice;

-the managers code of practice should become effective on submission, but the GME should have the right to raise objections thereto and require that the code be changed;

-concurrently with the issuing of the original instruction, the GME should initiate the development of his own general support guidelines for a stope and gully support code;

-the GME’s guidelines should be based on the advice of a small tripartite team of experts with adequate local knowledge;

-these guidelines should be distributed to all managers for information within the three months; and

-if a mine fails to submit an acceptable code to the inspectorate by the expiry of the deadline, the GME’s guideline should automatically become the mine’s code of practice.

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS with respect to coal and other mines that:

-the accident records should be analysed by the inspectorate to determine the cause of rockfalls with the view to decide what immediate action to ameliorate the problem is warranted.

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that when an accident occurs due to rock failure attributable to an inadequate support system the mine’s code of practice should be automatically reviewed by the GME without delay to ensure that an adequate support system be installed.

B Accidents from Haulage and Transport Underground

Although this is the second largest category of accidents in mines, second only to falls of strata accidents, the Commission was not provided with detailed evidence as to the location of cause of this large group. This information is urgently required in order that sensible regulation of these operations can be prescribed.

The COMMISSION accepts the suggestion of the National Union of Mineworkers that an investigation into this matter should be undertaken and RECOMMENDS accordingly. This investigation should be made as soon as possible by the staff of the Government Mining Engineer, assisted by one nominee of the owners and one nominee representing the workers and one representing mine officials. As soon as possible after the completion of this study the group should draw up proposed


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regulations for controlling these hazards, for promulgating as soon as possible.

C Occupational Health

Much has already been said concerning the lack of attention in the regulatory system to health issues, and the poor record of the industry in controlling occupational disease. The Commission heard evidence that medical interventions should be possible at each mine to detect certain diseases (pneumoconiosis, asbestosis, silicosis, hard metal disease, chronic obstructive airways disease, tuberculosis), and that this would be possible by the companies, with the facilities already available (White pp 500, 503, 506). Regulations should be promulgated as soon as possible dealing with occupational health in mines and require, inter alia, that:

-the GME be given express powers to control occupational health hazards;

-the owners of mines provide medical surveillance for the diseases that may occur at the mine; and

-the manager of the mine be required to ensure that the owner’s surveillance scheme is properly operated, and that adequate records are kept, and supplied, subject to medical ethics, to the GME.

D Coal Mine Explosions and Respirable Dust

Coal mine explosions continue to occur regularly in South Africa, the most recent large explosion claming 53 lives in 1993. Evidence given by the Chamber of Mines’ witnesses suggested that we could not expect significant improvement based on current codes of practice (Phillips p 20, Chamber Submission, Coal Mine Explosions). One of the points of greatest hazard in the explosion context is the bord in which a continuous miner operates. The large number of picks rotating in the cutting head can cause frictional heat and ignitions. In the period 1990 to 1992, 25,5% of the ignitions came from this source, but in 58,5% of the cases the investigation had not determined the ignition source. A large number of continuous miners or similar machines are now used in South African coal mines. Another Chamber witness said that the method used to ventilate continuous miners in South Africa was the subject of considerable debate and research in the industry at the moment. The system he said, may have to be changed completely (Thornton p 1 665 16-30). The same witness said that average levels of respirable airborne dust measured at continuous miners was 6 milligrams per cubic metre, much higher than the prescribed statutory level. The level of respirable dust produced by these machines is known to be high, and could produce disease after a fairly short period of exposure.

High levels of airborne dust also contribute to the levels of flammable dust that may be available in the bords to convert a small methane explosion into a coal dust explosion which is usually more violent and disastrous (Raath Exhibit C28).


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The Commission heard that the American regulations on coal mine ventilation, where the use of continuous miners is common, which were revised in May 1992, require ventilation control devices, ventilation ducting or line brattices, to be installed to a position not more that three metres from the area of deepest penetration to which the face has been advanced. Similar regulations in the United Kingdom were also brought to the attention of the Commission. This is not the standard of ventilation found in some cases in South Africa where the ventilation may be as much as 24 meters from the coal face (Thornton p 1 665 8-13). This leaves an excavated volume around the continuous miner which is not ventilated, and where concentrations of methane and dust can accumulate. Until these ventilation standards are improved ignitions of methane will continue from time to time in continuous miner headings, respirable dust levels will be high, and disastrous explosions will occur. To reduce respirable dust levels exhaust ventilation is required and light, rigid, quick fitting plastic ventilation ducting is readily available to facilitate this. Conveyors are used to convey the coal out of the mine and coal lying on these conveyors, even in well stone dusted roadways, can act as a fuse to transmit a coal dust explosion. Stone dust or water barriers set over the conveyor can prevent the progress of an explosion.

The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that the Minister should promulgate regulations as soon as possible to provide that the manager of a coal mine should include in his ventilation code of practice arrangements for: -the delivery of ventilating air by ducting to within three metres of the coal face in bords or headings; -the volume of air delivered should be sufficient to produce a velocity of 0,4 meters per second over the cutting machine; -where respirable dust samples taken in the heading exceed the maximum allowed by regulation, this ventilation should be in the exhaust mode to ensure that the dust is taken out via the ducting from the bords or headings, with fans situated on the return side of the heading. Irrigated filters should be fitted to these exhaust fans to prevent the dust extracted contaminating other parts of the workings on the return side of the bord or heading; -approved stone dust or water barriers to the extension of flame should be made mandatory in roadways where coal conveyors are used, set in positions recommended in international practice. 12.2 RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE

ENFORCING AGENCY

12.2.1 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that a restructured Mine Health and Safety Inspectorate (MHSI), should be a separate administrative agency within the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs, and should be separated from the Regional Organisation set up by the Minerals Act of 1991 (see Ch. 11.2.2).

12.2.2 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that the Mine Health and Safety

Inspectorate should have a structure at two levels one to deal with the inspection of opencast and quarry operations, and the other to deal with underground mines. The lower tier of the inspectorate should be formed from within the current staff as soon as possible, so that it can concentrate on opencast and quarry inspection, and develop its expertise in this specialised area (see Ch. 11.1.7).


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12.2.3 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that a new position be created in the Mine Health and Safety Inspectorate, to be called the Principal Inspector. Persons who occupy this position should be well qualified, as experienced as, and of as good a calibre as the managers with whom they will have to deal. To attract persons of this calibre it is obvious that the conditions offered to induce them to join the inspectorate, by way of salary and remuneration packages must be as attractive as those which they can expect in the industry (see Ch. 11.1.8).

12.2.4 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that the grades in the Mine Health and

Safety Inspectorate should be:

Grade 1 Government Mining Engineer Grade 2 Deputy Government Mining Engineer Grade 3 Principal Inspector Grade 4 Senior Inspector Grade 5 Inspector/Senior Inspector of Quarries Grade 6 Assistant Inspector/Inspector of Quarries Grade 7 Sub Inspector (see Ch. 11.1.10).

12.2.5 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that to ensure that suitable staff can be

appointed the remuneration packages for these grades should be related to remuneration in the industry. The reference point should be at the Principal Inspector level. He should be offered 90 per cent of a typical mine manager’s package (see Ch. 11.1.10).

12.2.6 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that these relative remuneration positions

should be adjusted annually to allow for changes in industry remuneration packages (see Ch 11.1.10)

12.2.7 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that the GME be encouraged to make an

investment in electronic and monitoring equipment and provide the necessary training to enable inspectors to work in a modern way (see Ch. 11.3).

12.2.8 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that action be initiated as soon as possible

to recruit 9 persons for the position of Principal Inspector, on the conditions described (see Ch. 11.1.8).

12.2.9 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that a group of Assistant Inspectors, and

Sub-Inspectors be appointed who could be purpose trained, initially, as audit samplers for respirable dust, flammable dust in roadways, gasses, and pollutant sampling. They could also do noise surveys in working places using hand held instruments. The Commission considers that initially twelve Assistant Inspectors and twelve Sub-Inspectors should be recruited and trained for sampling purposes, and located in the six underground mining districts. They should form a valuable adjunct to inspectorate teams led by the Principal Inspector, as well as providing an opportunity for advancement in the MHSI (see Ch. 11.1.11).


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12.2.10 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that the Headquarters staff of the MHSI

should consist of the GME, three Deputy GME’s, three Principal Inspectors, three Senior Inspectors and three Inspectors to replace existing staff, together with administration and clerical support (see Ch. 11.1.10).

12.2.11 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that the Government Mining Engineer

should have on his staff:

-a Medical Inspector of Mines with expertise in occupational health;

-two attorneys to specialise in processing mining prosecutions and inquiry/inquests; and

-an expert in safety management in the industry who need not be qualified in mining. Persons of this background gave very important evidence to the Commission (see Ch. 11.2.1).

12.2.12 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that the GME be encouraged to employ

consultants with expertise that is not currently accessible to the inspectorate (see Ch. 11.12.1).

12.2.13 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that there should be specialised scientific

back up available to the government Mining Engineer, and that a group could be conveniently located at the G P Badenhorst facility, which, already has a measure of expertise in some subjects. The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS further that consideration be given to placing this facility under the direct control of the GME (see Ch. 11.7.1).

12.2.14 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that the existing Survey and Rehabilitation

Directorates should not form part of the new MHSI (see Ch. 11.1.9).

12.2.15 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that the inspectorate be made more accountable in the manner set out in Chapter 11.6.

12.3 OTHER URGENT SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

12.3.1 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS the restoration of the position of the shift boss in the line management to that which is firmly required in existing South African law, should be pursued by the inspectorate without delay (see Ch. 6.7.3).


-all reports of accident inquiries be published and be made available throughout the mining industry, and that the regulations be amended to include this requirement (see Ch. 9.2 and 11.6).


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-an inquiry be made into the evidence given by Ms Hermanus that there had been no inquiries into matters other than accidents (see Appendix 7).

12.3.3 The COMMISSIONER RECOMMENDS that the Act and Regulations be

amended so as to ensure that all interested parties, including the NUM, be given due and proper notice by the inspectorate of the time and place of all inspections in loco which are held in connection with accident inquiries (see Ch. 9.1).

12.3.4 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that Regulation 25 (4) should be amended

so as to ensure that inspections in loco are conducted in the manner set forth in Chapter 9.1 hereof (see Ch. 9.1).

12.3.5 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that accident inquiries be conducted in the

manner set forth in Chapter 9.1 and that the recommendations made by the Marais Commission in this regard be incorporated into regulations (see Ch. 9.1).

12.3.6 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that relevant provisions of US Code of

Federal Regulations, Mineral Resources, Title 30 (Part 75 - Mandatory Safety Standards - Underground Coal Mines, Sub part D, ventilation, para 75.3) should be studied in detail (see Ch. 3.2.2).

12.4 OTHER URGENT HEALTH RECOMMENDATIONS

12.4.1 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that immediate attention be given to amalgamating and reconciling the disparate data bases, to ensure that as much data as possible be made freely available in the public domain, and that mining companies be required to publish an annual health and safety report (see Ch. 4.1.1).

12.4.2 The COMMSSION RECOMMENDS that all mines be required to measure a

range of airborne contaminants at specified intervals according to a written sampling strategy designed to quantify the exposure of the most heavily exposed worker (see Ch. 9.3).

12.4.3 The COMMSSION RECOMMENDS that provision should be made in

regulations for regular health inspections of facilities on the surface of all mines by the responsible public health authority (see Ch. 7.5).

12.4.4 The COMMSSION RECOMMENDS that a renewed effort to control the spread

of tuberculosis among mineworkers is urgently required (see Ch. 4.6.8). MATTERS TO BE REFERRED TO MRAC FOR TRIPARTITE DISCUSSION

12.5.1 The COMMSSION RECOMMENDS that:

-a Mine Health and Safety Council be established by the new Act to advise the Minster through the GME on all matters relating to health and safety in mines, the relevant legislation and enforcement thereof;


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-the Council should consist of four representatives of employers, four representatives of employees working in non-managerial positions, one representative of mine officials, GME as Chairman and a further three representatives of the DMEA;

-the Minister or the GME acting on his behalf, should appoint the required number of members from nominations made by the representative bodies;

-the Council should have standing committees and sub-committees for specific purposes, and be empowered to appoint ad hoc committees to investigate or administer the relevant business of the Council; and

-in general the composition of the committees should be a reflection of the Council, with the emphasis placed on the expertise of members in relation to the subject matter of the committees (see Ch 6.11.4 and 10.3.8.1).

12.5.2 When the South African Mining Regulations are reformed by MRAC, the hazards

discussed and all the matters arising in Chapter 3 should be taken into account (see Ch. 3).

12.5.3 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that no onus of proof should be placed

upon the accused in mining prosecutions (see Ch. 9.3).

12.5.4 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that in appropriate circumstances inspectors be empowered to extend privilege to witnesses during accident inquiries (see Ch. 9.4).

12.5.5 The COMMSSION RECOMMENDS that a Mining Court should not be re-

established (see Ch. 9.5).

12.5.6 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that mining prosecutions should be conducted at court levels appropriate to the seriousness of the alleged offences (see Ch. 9.5).

12.6.1 The COMMSSION RECOMMENDS that:

-research conducted to promote the prevention of accidents, and occupational diseases directly attributable to the mine environment, should be funded by research levies. This principle should also cover those diseases that are aggravated by the mining environment. Such research should be initiated only when the need for and utility of the expected results are firmly established;

-the oversight of research in these categories should be the responsibility of the Safety in Mines Research Advisory Committee (SIMRAC);

-the health research envisaged should be financed from a levy collected from the mines on the basis of a health risk factor; and

-a data collection system should be established to facilitate the mine calculation of the health risk factor (see Ch. 7.2).


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-the existing established system of a main committee, SIMRAC, and its sub-committees be retained. SIMRAC should be responsible for advising on research policy and the sub-committees would be technical bodies which, in general would look after sectional problems;

-SIMRAC should consist of ten members, reflecting the tripartite nature of the mining industry. Each of the three main parties should be represented by three persons, and the mine officials by one person with the GME as chairman ex officio;

-the current list of sub-committees should be extended by adding a further sub-committee to look after health research issues;

-one or more research advisers should be appointed to assist in the administration of the programme and advise SIMRAC and its sub-committees on research issues; and

-the research advisers and chairperson of sub-committees should attend SIMRAC meetings as non-voting members (see Ch. 7.3, 7.5 and Ch. 10.3.8.2).


-a research planning procedure should be developed that will drive the research and development programme in the most appropriate direction;

-SIMRAC should adopt the principle that it will operate using independent review to assist in the more effective and more transparent execution of its tasks (see Ch 7.5).

12.7.1 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that the situation in respect of senior

persons occupying positions between the mine manager and the owner or body corporate such as consultants, be defined by requiring the owner to identify the individuals in the chain of command, their delegated powers and responsibilities and to notify the inspectorate of the appointments (see Ch. 6.7.2 and Ch. 10.3.2).

12.7.2 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that Regulation 2.5.2.1 dealing with the

appointment of a manager without a certificate of competency be repealed when amending the regulations (see Ch. 6.7.3).

12.7.3 The COMMSSION RECOMMENDS that the proviso in Regulation 3.15.1

permitting the exemptions in respect of safety and health and other matters be amended to ensure consultation with the Director General of the Department of Health or suitable qualified staff in the DoH when dealing with health matters, unless provision is made for the DMEA to recruit staff for this purpose (see Ch. 4).

12.7.4 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that the appointment of safety officers and

specialists should not be required in law, but it recommends that such officials should be employed by the mine to assist the manager (see Ch. 6.7.3).


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12.7.5 The COMMSSION RECOMMENDS that, in the absence of an unequivocal

undertaking from the Department of Health to provide adequate resources, the Medical Bureau of Occupational Diseases be transferred back to the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs (see Ch. 4).


-a system of health and safety representatives should be established at each mine, and that regulations be drafted to formalise their position, with at least one representative per 100 non-managerial employees. The manager, in consultation with the workforce should facilitate their election, and define the workplaces to be covered;

-one or more Mine Health and Safety Committee(s) should be established by the manager at each mine, after consultation with workplace representatives, concerning the number of committees, size of membership, rules of operation, and frequency of meetings. The Committees should consist in equal numbers of representatives of management including mine officials, and elected workplace representatives;

-the Committees should be consultative in nature and make recommendations to the manager; and

-the ratio of health and safety representatives to workers might be varied for those mines employing very large numbers but it is important to ensure that small mines are adequately catered for (see Ch. 6.12.3 and Ch. 10.3.7).


-in view of the inadequacy of training in rock engineering at all levels of the industry, comprehensive support regulations should be developed by MRAC for enforcement by the GME’s staff (see Ch. 3.1.6).

12.9.2 Tripartite groups should visit collieries in America, Europe and Australia to study

methods applied in those countries for face and goaf ventilation, stone dusting and the use of stone dust barriers (see Ch. 3.2.2).

12.10.1 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that revision of the regulations should

include minimum standards for housing and feeding workers (see Ch. 2 and Ch. 4).

12.10.2 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that a tripartite structure be established

between the State, the mining industry and representatives of employees to seek ways and means of improving the lot of workers who live on the mines, and to investigate the whole question of housing and accommodation for workers and their families at mines, with due regard for the continued viability of communities thus established. A way must be found which will enable our society to make changes in order to make better human beings of the workers (see Ch. 2.1.3).


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12.10.3 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that the mining houses take a policy decision to move towards family housing over a period of time, and that in the meantime steps be taken to upgrade existing hostels whenever it is reasonably practicable to do so (see Ch. 2.1.3).

12.10.4 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that for mines with a remaining life of ten

years or more the industry improves, within five years, accommodation to the point at which no more than eight men are housed in a single room on any mine (see Ch. 2 and Ch. 4.7.2).

12.11.1 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that all mines regardless of size should be

required to measure the relevant environmental conditions at regular intervals and compare the results to an agreed set of standards. These standards should be internationally acceptable and incorporated into regulations or codes of practice (see Ch. 4.9.3).

12.11.2 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that regulations should require regular

measurement of noise levels and a demarcation of unsatisfactory noise areas (see Ch. 4).

12.11.3 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that the GME should have adequate

resources and staff to ensure that environmental monitoring can be audited at all stages from the sampling strategy to the analysis and presentation of the results (see Ch. 4).

12.11.4 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that regulations, or approved codes of

practice, should ensure that a coherent process is set in train, which conforms to the fundamental principles of modern occupational health practice (see Ch. 4.6.2).

MATTERS FOR FUTURE INVESTIGATION

12.12.1 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that all mining companies and others who

are able to move forward the national initiative in adult education should take every opportunity to advance this cause with a view to improving communication in mines, which will in turn result in improved health and safety (see Ch. 6.1).

12.12.2 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that the teaching of English should be

actively promoted as this is the only practical way of meeting the urgent need for a common language of communication (see Ch. 2.1.4 and Ch. 6.1).

12.12.3 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that having due regard to the complexity

of the language issue all workers be given basic education and training in English (see Ch. 2.4 and 6.1).


existing training schemes should be reconsidered and revamped with a view to re-emphasising health and safety matters;


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-induction training should be redesigned, and extended and should include more hands on experience under the guidance of experienced persons, largely underground, rather than in the classroom environment;

-the existing work force should undergo a phase retraining and retesting programmes, carried out underground, under the close personal supervision of experienced trainers;

-comprehensive refresher training programmes should be designed for all ranks of mine officials. These should become important elements in the training and personnel development programmes of all mining groups. They should focus initially on the problems that represent the greatest risk to health and safety; and

-these matters should be included in Training Regulations when they are drafted (see Ch. 6.3).

12.13.1 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that a closer working relationship be

formed between the CNS and the GME with a view to closer monitoring of underground exposures and the doses received annually by individuals. The two enforcing authorities should jointly develop a way of informing the workforce of the nature of the hazard, its extent and how it affects individuals (see Ch. 6.8).

12.13.2 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that the complaint book be inspected by

the manager and by a person with the requisite health expertise in order to ensure that the implications of the complaints are understood and the appropriate action taken (see Ch. 4).

12.13.3 The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that the mining industry should develop a

methodology for targeting the most pressing hazards using specific plans developed for that purpose. Risk management is a tool that could be employed therefor (see Ch. 3.4).


-research should be intensified to seek ways and means of having better control of problems arising from rock failure as urgently as possible. Unless this is achieved within a reasonable time, the long term future of ultra deep mining is in jeopardy;

-a comprehensive investigation should be instituted to determine the efficacy and relative merits of stabilising pillars and backfill as regional support; and

-the gold mining industry should not lose sight of the self evident fact that higher productivity is a crucial means of reducing the large number of serious and fatal injuries (see Ch. 3.1.6, Ch. 3.1.4 and 3.4).


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-urgent steps be taken to correct the imbalance between safety (which is stressed) and health (which is often ignored) which pervades the legislation;

-in the drafting of new legislation in the light of this Commission’s recommendations careful attention to the use of the words “health and safety” will be required;

-revision of legislation must ensure that the existing imbalance between health and safety is corrected, and that in the Department responsible therefor there is appropriate health expertise; and

-if effective provisions are to be made the terms referred to in Appendix 7 must be defined. The terms “health and safety committee”, “health and safety representative” and several other related terms should also be defined.


-a deliberate and sustained effort be made by all the agencies concerned to identify the undetected cases of occupational disease among former mineworkers, in order to derive more accurate estimates of the incidence;

-administrative arrangements should be made to ensure that all occupational health facilities and academic medical centres offer benefit examinations to former mineworkers; and

-a comprehensive manual setting out the administrative procedures for reporting suspected cases of occupational disease should be published by the State taking into account the recommendations of this Commission (see Ch. 4).

12.13.7 THE COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that, in view of the fact that exposure to

diesel fumes is controversial and in view of the increasing use of diesel engines, particularly in coal mines, this matter should be re-examined in detail (see Ch. 4).


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CHAPTER THIRTEEN A MINORITY VIEW ON SOME ISSUES BY PROFESSOR M D G SALAMON “The Commission was charged with terms of reference that were far ranging and encompassed most aspects of safety and health in the South African mining industry. It was working at the time when the country is undergoing the most important transition in its history. Members worked under considerable time pressure and were handicapped by the large geographical distances between their residences. It is not surprising, therefore, that it has not been possible to resolve all differences of opinion between the commissioners. In the course of our deliberations we all strove hard to find the most appropriate compromise in the interest of producing a useful report. I think we all agree that differences in concepts, principles and perhaps ideologies should remain private to the Commission, in order to avoid undermining the impact of the Report. However, after considerable soul searching, I have come to the view that my reservations concerning some practical issues, which touch upon the implementation of some urgent recommendations, should be voiced. SHIFT BOSS AND SAFETY OFFICER Recommendation 12.3.1 proposed the restoration, without delay, of the position of the Shift Boss to that which is firmly required in South African law. This recommendation is explained in greater detail in Section 6.7.3. It is described there that the primary legal role of the Shift Boss, namely that he represents the first line of management in safety and health, has been “usurped” by industry. Also apparently to fill the gap created by the transformation of the role of this official; in 1989 the regulations were amended to require the appointment of Safety Officers. The Commission in Section 6.7.3 recommends that the requirement in law of such appointments should be abolished. A brief paragraph in the same Section is devoted to the discussion of the duties and responsibilities of the ‘miners’ and to the elimination of some anachronistic aspects of their relation to the workers. I believe, however, that we have not devoted sufficient attention, here or anywhere else in the Report, to the impact of our recommendation that reverses the role of the Shift Boss. The impact is likely to be the greatest at the workplace. These sites are the places where the vast majority of mine workers work, most of the accidents occur and an overwhelming proportion of health hazards resides. Also, most of the interactions between workmen, team leaders, miners and Shift Bosses take place here. The political changes in South Africa add another dimension to the importance of the workplaces. It is here where the majority of workers can expect to see opportunities for advancement. Workers may become Team Leaders, Team Leaders may advance to be Miners and, of course Miners may aspire to become Shift Bosses. Thus, potentially, there are many and far-reaching ramifications of any changes that may influence the management structure at or near the work place. In this light, I would like to moderate the recommendations of the Commission. I suggest that, before the changes affecting the Shift Bosses and Safety Officers are implemented, MRAC should examine all ramifications of the proposals. It seems to me that this peculiarly South African problem, requires a South African solution. PRESCRIPTION OF HYDRAULIC PROPS A deliberate effort was made during the drafting and editing of the Report to avoid the prescription in the Act or in its regulations of the employment of specific equipment or a particular solution.


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Such specificity ages quickly, it is unlikely to be suitable in all conditions and often retards progress. Hence, its proper place is in the manager’s code which can be changed rapidly if improvement is desired. However, in Recommendation 12.1.4 (and also in Section 10.5.1) one of the five principles listed as follows:

“..the support rule should be based on the best available knowledge and experience, and should include the use of hydraulic props at prescribed densities;”

In my view the second part of the statement should be replaced by the following: “…and should include the use of the best practicable support and support density appropriate for the site;”. (The underlined words represent my changes.) The prescription of particular support means and/or density belongs to the manager’s code. ORGANISATION OF THE MINE HEALTH AND SAFETY INSPECTORATE Recommendations 12.2.1 to 12.2.15 and the whole of Chapter 11 deals with the organisation and the structure of the MHSI. The recommendations contained here are all prescriptive. Little or no room is provided for any deviation. I am not familiar with the duties and responsibilities of the Inspectorate sufficiently intimately to feel comfortable with such a dogmatic set of recommendations. A life time of experience suggests, however, that local conditions and requirements often circumscribe the manner in which an institution can be structured. Also, I venture to add that the input of the current managers into the plans for re-organisation is usually valuable and often essential. There are a number of points in the recommendations that especially worry me: * While the high level of qualifications and experience specified (Section 11.1.8 & 11.1.10) would

be ideal and desirable, these goals may not be achievable in South Africa today. Furthermore, the wholesale importation of foreign mining engineers (who are unfamiliar with conditions in South Africa and lack hard rock mining experience), as Principal or Senior Inspectors, is not an acceptable solution. Thus, we can indicate the ideal, but the actual solution will have to be found by the people who will have the responsibility to reorganise the Inspectorate.

* I am in full agreement with the notion that the intensity and frequency of mine inspections

should be linked strongly to the frequency of accidents and health violations experienced by the various mines and quarries. I am not convinced, however, that the establishment of the two tiers Inspectorate (where the lower tier is a quarry inspectorate) is an appropriate part of the solution of the problem (Recommendation 12.2.2). While this scheme appears to have worked well in Great Britain, it may not be ideal in South Africa, where the country’s geography and the nature (that is type, size etc.) of its surface mining operations are very different.

* In Recommendation 12.2.9 (see also Section 11.1.11) the opportunity is provided for the

employment of twelve Assistant Inspectors and twelve Sub Inspectors. While this proposal appears to open the door, the rigid requirements of high academic qualifications and recent mining experience at a senior level seem to restrict the advancement of these persons.

I suggest, therefore, that it would be prudent to treat the organisational structure proposed in Chapter 11 as an illustrative example of the desired goal and not as the blueprint for the new South African Mine Safety and Health Inspectorate.”


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APPENDICES TO VOLUME 1 INDEX APPENDIX CONTENTS PAGE 1. List of Organisations and Persons who submitted Written Representations 174 2. List of Witnesses who gave Oral Evidence and the Location of the Evidence in the Transcript. 175 3. List of Exhibits handed in to the Commission 178 4. List of Members of the Chamber of Mines of South

Africa (April 1994). 182 5. Standards of Accommodation in Bylaws of the City of

Johannesburg. 184 6. Comparison of Remuneration Packages in Mine Management and in the Inspectorate Graph 186 7. Further comments relating to health matters in existing legislation. 187


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APPENDIX 1 THE FOLLOWING ORGANISATIONS AND PERSONS SUBMITTED WRITTEN REPRESENTATIONS: The Chamber of Mines The National Union of Mineworkers Western Platinum Limited S A National Group of Rock Mechanics Ergotech Mr M R A Göllner MAC Performance Consulting Council of Mining Unions Mineworker’s Unions S A Society of Occupational Health Nurses NOSA - Mining Division W C H Dobbin SASOL Mine Site Technologies S A National Committee on Illumination Mr P P Nyakane Underground Official’s Association of South Africa Hallback & Braun S A (Pty) Ltd. Mr H F du Toit ASPASA (Sand Producers) Underground Railway Association Mr J J Kruger Cemtec Mining Products Mr B J Smith National Productivity Institute Mr Richard Spoor of Watters & Co. (on behalf of Chemical Workers Industrial Union) DMEA NPI ESKOM SASOHN NOSA Highveld Steel and Vanadium Corporation Ltd. Council for Nuclear Safety The Mine Ventilation Society of South Africa Mine Medical Officers Association of South Africa SGS South Africa (Pty) Ltd.


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APPENDIX 2 WITNESSES WHO GAVE ORAL EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COMMISSION. Their names and capacities are set forth below, together with the volume and the pages in the record where their evidence appears. In this regard symbols have been used for organisations which are here identified as follows: COM is the CHAMBER OF MINES; NUM is the NATIONAL UNION OF MINEWORKERS; CNS is the COUNCIL FOR NUCLEAR SAFETY; URA is the UNDERGROUND RAILWAY ASSOCIATION; NPI is the NATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY INSTITUTE; AND DMEA is the DEPARTMENT OF MINERALS AND ENERGY AFFAIRS. The Witnesses were as follows:-

LIST OF WITNESSES

RECORD VOL NO PAGE NO 1. Ian Watson 1 114 - 165 on behalf of the COM 2. Hendrik Christoffel van Zyl 2 165 - 183 on behalf of the COM 3. Stephen Morrison Spottiswoode 3 183 - 246 on behalf of the COM 4. Riza Guner Gürtunca 3 246 - 285 on behalf of the COM 5. Jean-Patrick Leger 4 288 - 453 on behalf of the NUM 6. Neil Walton White 6 454 - 566 on behalf of the NUM 7. Hugh Ronald Phillips 7 567 - 695 on behalf of the COM 8. Michael Julius Deats 8 703 - 727 on behalf of ESCOM 9. Francis Aylmer Hunter Wilson 8 730 - 824 on behalf of the NUM 10. Mavis Anne Hermanus 9 826 - 983 on behalf of the NUM


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RECORD VOL NO PAGE NO 11. Berto Christof Winkler 11 984 - 1071

on behalf of CNS 12. Johannes Jockobus Vermeulen 12 1072 - 1090 on behalf of URA 13. William George Henry Dobbin 12 1090 - 1100 14. Egbert Johannes Hendrikse 12 1101 - 1121 on behalf of ERGOTECH 15. Manie Mulder 12 1123 - 1175 on behalf of NPI 16. Peter Nesbit Horne 13 1175 - 1199 on behalf of Horne Hydraulics 17. Edward Joseph Gotrill 13 1199 - 1215 on behalf of Horne Hydraulics 18. Brian Richard Greenaway Keague 13 1215 - 1271 on behalf of NOSA 19. Burt J Smith 13 1271 - 1310 20. Alan Raubenheimer Botha 14 1311 - 1332 on behalf of Human Engineering 21. David John Rees 14 1335 - 1375 on behalf of Department of Health 22. Michael Robert Daniel 14 1376 - 1384 on behalf of Mine Site Technologies 23. Karel Fieter Cronjé 14 1385 - 1449 on behalf of the Council of Mining Unions and the Mineworker’s Union 24. Conners Owen McArdle 15 1449 - 1470 on behalf of MAC Performance Consultants 25. Ralph Wayne McGinn 15 1477 - 1616 on behalf of the NUM 26. Julian Derrick Thorton 17 1622 - 1733 on behalf of the COM


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RECORD VOL NO PAGE NO 27. Martinus Jakobus van Staden 17 1734 - 1751 van der Merwe on behalf of the COM 28 John Henry Joseph Burrows 18 1753 - 1808 on behalf of the COM 29. Abraham Christoffel Human 18 1809 - 1828 on behalf of the Department of Justice 30. Jan Bastian Raath 18 1828 - 2003 on behalf of the DMEA 20 2021 - 2082 21 2104 - 2116 31. Robert Louis Lazar 20 2004 - 2021 on behalf of the COM 21 2116 - 3142 32. Phillipus Johannes Vos 21 2083 - 2104 on behalf of the Public Service Commission 33. Senzeni Zokwana 21 2143-2266 on behalf of the NUM


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APPENDIX 3 LIST OF EXHIBITS HANDED IN TO THE COMMISSION. EXHIBIT CONTENTS NO A1 Submission of the Chamber of Mines A2 Response of the Chamber of Mines B1 Submission of the NUM B2 Response of NUM C1 Submission of the DMEA C2 Response of DMEA C3-C31 Documents handed in by Mr Raath while giving evidence D Submission of Western Platinum Limited E Submission of the NPI F Submission of ERGOTECH G Submission of J J Kruger H Submission of ASPASA J1 Submission of SASOL J2 Response of SASOL K Submission of Council of Mining Unions L Submission of Mineworker’s Union M Submission of PP Nyakane N Submission of Halbach and Braun SA (Pty) Ltd. O Submission of Underground Railway Association P Submission of H F du Toit Q Submission of MAC Performance Consulting R Submission of Mine Site Technologies S Submission of SA National Committee on Illumination T Submission of WCH Dobbin


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U Submission of Underground Official’s Association of SA V Submission of ESKOM W Submission of SASOHN X Submission of NOSA Y Submission of Cemtec Mining Products Z Submission of B J Smith AA Submission of SA National Group on Rock Mechanics BB Submission of MRA Göllner CC Submission of Highveld Steel and Vanadium Corporation Ltd DD Submission of Chemical Workers Industrial Union EE Submission of Council for Nuclear Safety FF Submission of The Mine Ventilation Society of SA GG Submission of Mine Medical Officers Association of SA HH Submission of SGS South Africa (Pty) Ltd. JJ Submission of NOSA - Mining Division KK Submission of Human Engineering LL Submission of Horne Hydraulics cc MM List of mining companies who are members of the COM NN Ian Watson presentation documents OO Arthur D Little report PP Directive B8 of Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs QQ “Importance of Human Aspect Stressed” from Mine Safety Digest No. 4, 1991 RR SIMRAC Annual Report 1993 SS Safety and Health in Mines Report (v) (1) International Labour Office TT Frequency of Fatalities in underground Hard Coal Mines in 1992 UU SIMRAC final project report (1994) Phillips & Landman


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VV Hlobane report WW Ermelo report XX Extract from the study “Towards Safer underground Coal Mines” YY Occupational Health and Safety Services of SA - First draft of the working group of

the Departments of Labour and Health ZZ “May Hermanus: Status of safety management needs upgrading” From Mine Safety

Digest No 3, 1994 AAA Behavioral Control through piece-rate wages BBB Case Study on Environmental Pollution - caused by Mechanised Mining CCC SABS Code: Occupational Noise (SABS083-1983) DDD SABS Standard Specification for Hearing Protectors Part I: Ear Muffs EEE SABS Standard Specification for Hearing Protectors Part II: Ear Plugs FFF Letter: GME to Mr Louw: Consulting Services GGG Extract Encyclopaedia of Occupational Health and Safety, ILO 1985 HHH Mining Education in South Africa JJJ Kriel Colliery Code of Practice: Minerals Act and Regulation KKK Safety Agreement Kriel Colliery LLL Test Questionnaire for Coal Cutter Operator MMM Amcoal Training Centre Courses 93-94 NNN Kriel Colliery Code of Practice for Underground Welding and Cutting OOO Standard of Education per Pay Groups PPP Bundle of Organograms for Kriel Colliery QQQ Questions and Answers about Mining Safety Representatives RRR The NUM vs The GME SSS Extract from SA Mining World - December 1990 put to witness from URA TTT1 Solutions of Mr Dobbin TTT2 Notes drafted subsequent to Mr Dobbin’s testimony


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UUU1 Horne Hydraulics Supplementary Submission UUU2 Horne Hydraulics Supplementary Submission VVV Mutation hotspot in radon-associated lung cancer WWW NOSA questionnaire XXX CMW and MWU Supplementary submission in Afrikaans YYY Extract from “The Occupational Health and Safety Act” by Paul Benjamin with title

“Liability for Offences.” ZZZ Written submission by Dr. Rees AAAA Document: “Safety and Health in opencast mines” BBBB Training documents of Elandsrand Mine CCCC Glossary of Common Gold Mining terminology DDDD Annual report of GME 1993-1994 EEEE 1 Photographs taken at a Kimberley mine

2 Photographs taken at Western Deep Levels South Mine Hostel 3 Photographs taken at Elandsrand Mine Hostel

FFFF Gold Mines with Seismic Network Systems GGGG H J van Zyl presentation documents


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APPENDIX 4 APRIL 1994 LIST OF MINING COMPANIES, MEMBERS OF THE COM OF SOUTH AFRICA GOLD MINING MEMBERS BABERTON MINES LTD HARTEBEESTFONTEIN G M CO. LTD BLYVOORUITZICHT G M CO. LTD KINROSS MINES LTD BUFFELSFONTEIN G M CO. LTD KLOOF G M CO. LTD CITY DEEP LTD LESLIE G M LTD CONS MAIN REEF MINES & EST. LTD LORAINE G M LTD CROWN MINES LTD LUIPAARDSVLEI ESTATES LTD DEELKRAAL G M CO. LTD ORYX MINE DOORNFONTEIN G M CO. LTD RANDFONTEIN ESTS G M CO. (W) DRIEFONTEIN CONS LTD ST HELINA G M LTD DURBAN ROODEPOORT DEEP LTD S A LAND & EXPLORATION CO, LTD EAST RAND PROPRIETARY MINES LTD STILFONTEIN G M CO. LTD ELANDSRAND G M CO, LTD UNISEL G M LTD FREESTATE CONS G M (OPERATIONS) LTD VAAL REEFS EXPL. & MINING CO, LTD GROOTVLEI PROPRIETARY MINES LTD WELTEVREDEN MINES LTD H J JOEL G M CO. LTD WESTERN AREAS G M CO. LTD HARMONY G M CO. LTD WESTERN DEEP LEVELS LTD COAL MINING MEMBERS AMCOAL COLLIERY & INDUSTRIAL OPERATIONS LTD SPITZKOP COLLIERY DOUGLAS COLLIERY LTD STRATHRAE COLLIERY DUIKER EXPLORATION LTD TAVISTOCK COLLIERIES LTD DURBAN NAVIGATION COLLIERIES (PTY) LTD (THE) TRANS NATAL COLLIERIES LTD INGAGANE COLLIERY (PTY) LTD TWEEWATERS FUEL (PTY) LTD KHUTALA MINING SERVICES (PTY) LTD VRYHEID (NATAL) RAILWAY COAL & IRON CO LONGRIDGE COLLIERY WELGEDACHT EXPLORATION CO. LTD MATLA COAL LTD DIAMOND MINING MEMBERS DE BEERS CONSOLIDATED MINES LTD PLATINUM MINING MEMBERS BARPLATS MINES LTD NORTHAM PLATINUM LTD EASTERN PLATINUM LTD RUSTENBURG PLATINUM MINES LTD IMPALA PLATINUM LTD WESTERN PLATINUM LTD ANTIMONY MINING MEMBERS CONSOLIDATED MURCHISON LTD ASBESTOS MINING MEMBERS AFRICAN CHRYSOTILE ASBESTOS LTD GRIQUALAND EXPLORATION & FINANCE CO.


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COPPER MINING MEMBERS O’OKIEP COPPER CO LTD LEAD MINING MEMBERS BLACK MOUNTAIN MINERAL DEVELOPMENT CO. (PTY) LTD OTHER MINING MEMBERS CEMENTATION (AFRICA CONTRACTS) (PTY) LTD SHAFT SINKERS (PTY) LTD GOLD FIELDS TRAINING SERVICES (PTY) LTD TRANSVAAL GOLD MINING ESTATES LTD RANO MINES MILLING & MINING CO. LTD


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APPENDIX 5 STANDARDS OF ACCOMODATION As was made clear in the text of Chapter 2 and 4 the accommodation provided for mineworkers in compounds (hostels) is a matter of concern to the Commission. The following information was provided by one of the mines to which the Commission made a visit.

NUMBER 2 HOSTEL NUMBER 3 HOSTEL CAPACITY (as designed) 4100 2200 PRESENT STRENGTH 3674 1818 ROOMS 250 272 20x12 -190x16 -40x20 ROOM DENSITY Av 16 8 AVERAGE PER ROOM 14,7 6,7 SQ. MTS. PER ROOM 75 40 SQ. MTS. PER PERSON (designed) 3,8 5 SQ. MTS. PER PERSON (strength) 5,1 6

The Johannesburg Municipality: By-laws for Accommodation Establishments (Administrator’s Notice 2336 of 19 December 1984) defines a “dormitory” as a bedroom in which sleeping accommodation for four or more persons is provided, and a “hostel” as an accommodation establishment in which meals are served from a communal dining room, but excluding an hotel, boarding house or dwelling house. Paragraph 5.(1) specifies that “If a dormitory is provided on the premises, a single bed made of metal or other durable material and equipped with a mattress shall be provided for each person accommodated in such dormitory.” Paragraph 5.(3) specifies that “Every bed in a dormitory shall be so placed that the sides thereof are not less than one metre from any part of any other bed.” Detailed minimum specifications are laid down for ablution facilities, the supply of hot and cold running water, power points and the like. In Local Authority Notice 4182 dated 21 November 1990, the Slums Regulations of the City of Johannesburg specifies in Paragraph 2.(a) that “No room wholly or partly used by human beings for sleeping in shall be occupied by a greater number of persons than will allow 11,3 cubic metres of free air space and 3,7 square metres of floor space for each person aged ten years or more...”. In addition these regulations prohibit the boarding-up, building up or obstruction of openings such as doors, windows or fanlights so as to interfere with lighting, cross ventilation or access.


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It is clear that under ideal conditions living and sleeping space should be allowed for separately; that bunk beds are in general outlawed, and that inter alia cross ventilation is essential. The commission has therefore recommended that a detailed survey of all mine compounds be carried out and an extensive search of regulations made in order to determine what targets for the improvement of living and sleeping accommodation are achievable.


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APPENDIX 7 FURTHER COMMENTS RELATING TO HEALTH MATTERS IN EXISTING LEGISLATION No definitions of “healthy” or “Safe” or of related concepts are contained in Chapter 1 (Definitions) of the Minerals Act. In contrast the Occupational Health and Safety Act (Act No 85 of 1993) defines the following health related terms:- “biological monitoring” means a planned programme of periodic collection and analysis of body fluid, tissues, excreta or exhaled air in order to detect and quantify the exposure to or absorption of any substance or organism by persons; “danger” means anything which may cause injury or damage to persons or property; “hazard” means a source of or exposure to danger; “healthy” means free from illness or injury attributable to occupational causes; “medical surveillance” means a planned programme of periodic examinations (which may include clinical examinations, biological monitoring or medical tests) of employees by an occupational health practitioner or in prescribed cases, by an occupational medicine practitioner; “occupational health” includes occupational hygiene, occupational medicine and biological monitoring; “occupational health practitioner” means an occupational medicine practitioner or a person who holds a qualification in occupational health, recognised as such by the South African Medical and Dental Council as referred to in the Medical, Dental and Supplementary Health Professions Act, 1974 (Act No 56 of 1974), or the South African Nursing Council as referred to in the Nursing Act 1978 (Act No 50 of 1978); “occupational hygiene” means the anticipation, recognition, evaluation and control of conditions arising in or from the workplace which may cause illness or adverse health effects to persons; “occupational medicine” means the prevention diagnosis and treatment of illness, injury and adverse health effects associated with a particular type of work; “occupational medicine practitioner” means a medical practitioner as defined in the Medical, Dental and Supplementary Health Professions Act, 1974 (Act No 56 of 1974), who holds a qualification in occupational medicine or an equivalent qualification which qualification or equivalent is recognised as such by the South African Medical and Dental Council referred to in the said Act.; “risk” means the probability that injury or damage will occur; and “safe” means free from any hazard.


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It is difficult to see how enabling legislation can ensure the prevention of disease and effectively safeguard the health of mineworkers in the absence of these and other definitions. The word “health” is used in the long title of the Act, coupled with the word “safety”, thus; “to provide for the safety and health of persons concerned in mines and works” which is an unusual (quaint) description of workers, as “concerned in” - the analogous provision in the OHS Act referred to “persons at work”. Thereafter the two words are coupled (or not) in an apparent unsystematic way, throughout the Act. In Chapter 2 (Administration) there is reference to health in Section 2(2), which allocates administrative functions to the GME whose primary function shall be supervision and control over safety, health and related matters at any mine or works. In Chapter 3 (Authorisation to prospect and to mine) the words “health” or “healthy” are used only once in Section 8 (1) and once in Section 15, though there is reference to “safe” or “safety” or “safely” in several Sections. As read in the context of the Chapter as a whole it is clear that both prospecting for, and exploitation of, minerals are to be authorised subject to provisions to safeguard health. Reference to Section 9 (3)(a) and (c) and to Section 9 (5)(e) will demonstrate how easily meaningful and appropriate reference to health could have been ensured in both places by the use of a phrase such as “safely and without danger to the health of workers or the residents of the surrounding area”. In Chapter 4 (Optimal Exploitation and Utilisation of Minerals) there is no direct reference to health, nor is there in Chapter 6 (Rehabilitation of Surface) or Chapter 7 (Transitional Provisions). Chapter 5 (Safety and health) deals, ostensibly, with safety and health and might be expected to give appropriate emphasis to each. Section 26 establishes a mine safety committee, sets out its functions, specifies the frequency of meetings and the composition of the committee. There is no reference to health nor is any member of the committee required to be expert in health matters (nor safety for that matter). In the constitution of this key committee there is manifest neglect of the need for expertise in the fields of both health and safety. Section 27(1) empowers the RME to order rectifying steps to be taken, or to suspend operations, if he “believes that any practice or any other thing at a mine or at a mine or works may cause bodily harm to any person or be injurious to his health or constitute a danger to his safety in any manner..”. As far as it is known there is no instance on record in which an operation has been suspended for a health reason. Section 28 deals with inquiries into accidents and other matters. Health is presumably, in respect of this Section an “other matter”. Section 28(1)(a) refers specifically to accidents, whereas both Section 28(1)(b) and 28(2)(a) couple the words safety or health. Much of the remainder of the Chapter deals with accidents or / and safety, but not with health. Section 37(a) couples safety and health once again, and prohibits any person from endangering the health or safety of any person by a negligent act or omission.


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In Chapter 8 (General and Miscellaneous Provisions) the Minister is empowered to make regulations. The word health is used twice in Section 63(1)(a) and once in Section 63(1)(x). Section 63(2) requires consultation on health matters with the Minister of Health prior to the making of regulations. Notably Section 63(3) makes reference specifically to “safety standards” - the words health or health standards do not appear in this sub section. The purpose of the discussion in Appendix 7 is to establish that the enabling legislation is deficient in respect of provision for safeguarding the health of workers. To ensure better control of adverse health conditions the revision will entail the incorporation of extensive new provisions. Prior to the promulgation of the Minerals Act health and safety in the mining industry were regulated by two Acts which could be seen as complementary. The Mines and Works Act was concerned primarily with the way things were done, and by whom. This Act was the basis for the revision, and was repealed in terms of the Minerals Act. The ODMWA regulated the initial, periodical and benefit examinations of active and retired mine workers, established a medical facility for this purpose, a mechanism for establishing the risk for a particular mine and the administrative and fiscal procedures for compensating persons with occupational disease. Both Acts were for many years the responsibility of the DMEA, and the MBOD was run by the DMEA. Prior to the promulgation of the Minerals Act responsibility for the ODMW Act and the MBOD were transferred to the DoH. As amended, to remove reference to ethnic groups, this Act continues to regulate many aspects of health in the mining industry. Significant changes may have to be made to the regulations promulgated in terms of the ODMW Act - of which there are, it seems, very few. Detailed examination of the Regulations made in terms of the Minerals Act also shows that health matters are neglected. Chapter 1 (Definitions) does not define any health related term, Chapter 2 (Responsibility) is concerned with the appointment, responsibilities and duties of

managers, including the appointment of environmental control officers in terms of Regulation 2.15.1.1.

(a) This regulation excludes mines with less than 1 000 employees underground on any one

shift, and coal mines producing less than 5 000 tons per shift, except as a result of a written notice by the Regional Director, based solely on his opinion. Evidence presented to the Commission, admittedly fragmentary, indicates that, as a rule, conditions in small mines are more hazardous than in large mines.

Safety representatives are appointed in terms of Section 2.18.1 and are so called despite reference to safety and health in Section 2.18.3 which requires that they should have “training in and knowledge and experience of the safety and health requirement applicable to and be conversant with the conditions at the working place or group of working places where he is to be appointed”. In addition in Section 2.19.1(b)(c) and (e) which sets out the duties of safety officers there is reference to health and safety. Similar considerations apply to Sections 2.19.2, 2.19.3(e) (f) and (j), and to 2.19.6.2. Section 3.5 deals with the treatment of gassing, heat stroke, heat exhaustion, drowning and electric shock.


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Chapter 4 (Workmen) includes provision for access to potable water in the workplace (4.2), for the provision and maintenance of change houses (4.3.1) and for the control of working clothes (4.32). These clearly have important health implications. Nowhere in the regulations is there any mention of housing or hygienic standards, despite the fact that these are known to play a crucial role in promoting health and preventing disease.

The complaint book provided for in Regulations 4.4.1 - 4.4.6 is clearly an important source of information about adverse working conditions. The requirements of Sections 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11 for latrines in underground workings, for the disinfection of working places and for the prevention of pollution of workings raise the question as to inspection and enforcement of the regulations. The expertise required is that of a health inspector, or environmental health officer, and it is unlikely that inspectors of mines are competent in this field. Section 4.17.1 - 14.17.4 make provisions for the control of noise and the introduction of a hearing conservation programme where workers are exposed to levels in excess of 85 dB (A) and for the provision of personal protective equipment. Nowhere in the regulations is there a requirement to measure noise levels, or to demarcate areas in which noise levels exceed 85 dB (A). It is clearly appropriate that in terms of Section 6.3.2.1 work necessary to ensure health and safety should take precedence over all other work. Chapter10 (Ventilation, Gasses and Dust) deals with critical issues in the prevention of occupational diseases. Section 10.1.1 prohibits entry into “Any place in which the air contains harmful smoke, gas, fumes or dust perceptible by sight, smell or other senses” without respiratory protection. This ignores the well established and absolutely fundamental fact that injurious dust is not visible, and that dangerous gases are often odourless and colourless. Where a dangerous atmosphere is likely there is no substitute for prior sampling or mandatory respiratory protection. The regulation as written may be said to be not only scientifically unsound but to encourage dangerous act. Section 10.1.2 prohibits work in areas in which the level of dust, noxious fumes or harmful gases exceeds concentrations laid down from time to time by the Director General. There is an evident inconsistency here as subsequent regulations lay down specific limits for a number of gases, and for cyanide in the effluent from tailings used for backfill, but there are no regulated limits for airborne particulate matter. Viewed as a whole Chapter 10 of the regulations may be seen as the occupational hygiene component of the entire body of regulations. The major defect throughout the Chapter is a failure to incorporate the process of hazard identification, measurement, control and subsequent monitoring. The COMMISSION CONCLUDES that unless the basic principles of occupational health inform the regulatory process remedial action will not follow unsatisfactory measurements. The drift towards an uncritical acceptance of the principle of loss control, as opposed to the well established principle of the practice of occupational health have no doubt led to this situation. To make the requirement to measure dust (Section 10.5.1) contingent upon the appointment of an environmental control officer in terms of Section 2.16.1.1 (the reference to 2.16.1 is incorrect) or dependent on the opinion of the Regional Director supports the opinion put forward in evidence that small mines are neglected.


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Though particular substances hazardous to health are dealt with in a number of regulations (for example, hard metal in drill sharpening shops [10.2.3 and 10.1.5] or cyanide [10.3.4 and 10.3.5] and others) there is no regulation to require employers to list the substances hazardous to health used in or on the mine, and to take steps to minimise exposure and to carry out the appropriate medical examination and biological monitoring of the risk groups involved. For other diseases originating in the workplace, for example heavy metals other than manganese and those incorporated in hard metal, and occupational asthma due to agents other than platinum salts, there are no provisions. Noise induced hearing loss, barotrauma, hand - arm syndrome, and asphyxia (from a number of causes) are compensated under the Compensation for Occupational Diseases and Injuries Act.


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TABLES INCLUDED IN VOLUME 1 TABLE CONTENTS NO 1. GME Accident Statistics and Accident Rates 1932 - 1959 - 1993 (2.2.1) 2. Accident Data - GME Statistics 1984 - 1993 (2.2.2) 3. International Labour Office Statistics From page 13, Table 2 of publication “Safety and Health in Mines, Report V (1)” ILO Geneva 81st Session 1994 (2.2.2) 4. Frequency of Fatalities in Underground Coal Mines in 1992 – GRAPH - From the Polish State Mining Authority, Department of Health and Working Conditions, Publication Dated 19/11/93

(2.2.2) 5. Breakdown of All Injuries into Main Categories (3.0) 6. Injuries Classified by Commodities Mined (3.0) 7. Most Significant Accidents in Gold Mining (3.1.1) 8. Most Significant Accidents in Coal Mining (3.2.1) 9. Number of Persons Killed in Explosions and Total Number of Fatalities (3.2.1) 10. Proposed scheduling of Health Intervention for Miners (After White) (4.5.9) 11. Certification Under Act 78 of 1973 Whites and Coloureds / Blacks (4.5.10) 12. Comparison of Ionising Radiation Doses Expected in

Various Activities - After CNS (4.10.2) 13. Annual Individual Exposure Range Among Mineworkers -

After CNS (4.10.2) 14. Distribution of Education Levels at Kriel Colliery (6.1)