Legitimacy through Reform? · Legitimacy through Reform? The Impact of Authoritarian Learning on Reforms & Legitimacy of Contested Regimes. Paper&prepared&for&ECPRjointsession&in&Salamancain&April&2014.&

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Legitimacy through Reform?

The Impact of Authoritarian Learning on

Reforms & Legitimacy of Contested Regimes.

Paper prepared for ECPR joint session in Salamanca in April 2014.

Keywords

Regime Legitimacy, Reform, Contestation of Authoritarian Rule, Authoritarian Learn-‐ing, Diffusion, Authoritarian Stability, Relegitimization, institutional Change

Abstract

Expanding previous works on diffusion mechanisms in social movement theory and policy diffusion I argue that in moments of contestation a causal mechanism that links authoritarian learning through reform to increased regime legitimacy that finally translates into regime resilience can be identified. To make this point the paper proceeds in six steps. First, it debates different concepts of the diffu-‐sion processes and then introduces authoritarian learning as a specific mecha-‐nism of diffusion. Second, it points to the importance of legitimacy in authoritari-‐an contexts and points to the relevance of a procedural throughput dimension of legitimacy. In the third part the causal mechanism is spelled out. Fourthly, an empirical test for the causal mechanism is proposed. Fifth, preliminary illustra-‐tive evidence from interviews and secondary literature is given on the case of Morocco during the 2011 protests to support the hypotheses. Finally, a brief ar-‐gument for a turn to diffusion processes in authoritarian contexts is put forward.

Notice: The complete interview transcripts can be provided upon request.



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Introduction

In this paper I am going to demonstrate how diffusion through authoritarian learning influenced the regime’s response to the protest movement 2011 in Mo-‐rocco towards a religitimization strategy through a guided reform process. Institutional reforms as a means of restoring or increasing regime legitimization are a phenomenon observable not only in democracies. Authoritarian regimes often instrumentalize institutional reforms to increase their legitimacy. This can be witnessed in the process of authoritarian learning. A process of adaption to challenges through policy responses such as reforms by an incumbent authori-‐tarian regime, which are based on observations of events in other regimes’ facing similar situations of contestation and upheaval. Such adaptive learning processes are very similar to those traditionally theorized by scholars of social movements or potential challengers to authoritarian rule (Givan, Soule, and Roberts 2006; Huntington 1991a; Huntington 1991b; Della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Tarrow 2005). On the regime side, such processes can have an impact upon policy re-‐sponses and influence its stability (Heydemann and Leenders 2014; Heydemann and Leenders 2011; Heydemann 2013; Diamond 2005). Regimes’ are expected to learn primarily from fellow autocrats in the same region and traditionally dis-‐play strong economic, social and political ties (Levitsky and Way 2010).1 Political and institutional reforms are amongst the most common policy responses by au-‐thoritarian regimes facing a situation of political contestation. Can such reforms relegitimize authoritarian regimes that have come under pressure? In this paper I want to try and answer this question with reference to the exam-‐ple of Morocco during the Arab Uprisings in 2011. I will argue that authoritarian learning improves the response of the incumbent regime to challengers. Regimes that learn from their neighbours are basing their decisions on strategic assess-‐ment and increased information, which makes them more resilient (Heydemann and Leenders 2011; Heydemann and Leenders 2014). It hence describes a pro-‐cess that influences what political and institutional reforms aim to achieve and how they are designed. If authoritarian regimes are under pressure due to social mobilization, the aim of regime initiated institutional reforms is expected to aim at restoring the regime’s grip on power through political reform. During the Arab Uprisings most countries in the MENA2 Region faced some con-‐testation through social mobilization and protests. Interestingly in the beginning 1 On top of actual similarities’ of regimes cultural communities and perceived similari-‐ties of citizens and regimes alike are expected to increase the likelihood On top of ac-‐tual similarities’ perceived similarities are expected to have and impact of diffusion processes.

2 Short for Middle East and Northern Africa



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leaders tend to underestimate the gravity of the protest, which became particu-‐larly visible in the cases of Tunisia and Egypt. Whereas autocrats in the countries that were later struck by protests seemed to act more decisively, in some cases even pre-‐emptively to appease grievances and avoid large-‐scale mobilization (Heydemann and Leenders 2014). Mixed strategies through cooptation of new groups, increased public spending,3 targeted repression and institutional reform were amongst the repertoire of authoritarian response throughout the region. This paper focuses on the last of these regime reactions: The process of relegiti-‐mization through reform. Institutional changes usually in the form of govern-‐ment or constitutional changes were the most common and visible reaction to the amounting pressure from the streets.4 It is important to note here that I do not aim at explaining trajectories that lead to conflict such as in the cases of Lib-‐ya or Syria but merely focus on the impact of reform processes as a means to relegitimization and thus through that stabilization of regime rule.5 In this re-‐gard Morocco can be classified as a typical case for various reasons. The constitu-‐tional reform process adopted in Morocco was a direct response to the protests against the authorities. The reforms aimed to appease the opposition and restore the regime’s grip on power. They culminated in a constitutional reform, a refer-‐endum and early parliamentary elections (Hoffmann and König 2013; Benchemsi 2012). To illustrate the mechanism that links authoritarian learning to improved regime resilience via a process of religitimization through reform referring to the case of Morocco this paper proceeds in six steps. First, it debates different concepts of the diffusion processes and then introduces authoritarian learning as a specific mechanism of diffusion. Second, it points to the importance of legitimacy in authoritarian contexts and points to the rele-‐vance of a procedural throughput dimension of legitimacy. In the third part the causal mechanism is spelled out. Fourthly, an empirical test for the causal mech-‐anism is proposed. Fifth, preliminary illustrative evidence from interviews and secondary literature is given on the case of Morocco during the 2011 protests to support the hypotheses. Finally, a brief argument for a turn to diffusion process-‐es in authoritarian contexts is put forward.

3 Especially on commodity and basic goods subsidies as well as investments in crucial public services and infrastructure such as health care and education. Furthermore pol-‐icies such as increasing wages in the public services were observable.

4 Governmental modifications and / or institutional changes occurred all over the MENA region form Oman to Morocco. Such changes were adopted in Morocco, Syria, Jordan, Yemen, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman.

5 It is quite obvious that under conditions of large-‐scale violent conflict reform processes –if at all– can be expected to play a minor role with regards to regime stability.



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Diffusion through Authoritarian Learning

The concept of diffusion has mainly been applied to two different fields of re-‐search in the social sciences, both of which are relevant for this paper. First, the term has been very prominent within recent works in social movement theory. Diffusion is addressed in studies focussing on the transnational dimension of contention and the spread of protests across boarders (Della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Della Porta and Tarrow 2011; Tarrow 2005; Della Porta, Kriesi, and Rucht 2009; Walsh-‐Russo 2014). Furthermore, it has been a crucial concept in the field of political economy and policy analysis, especially in the context of policy diffu-‐sion (Pitlik 2007; B. Simmons, Garrett, and Dobbin 2008; Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse-‐Kappen 2001; Henisz, Zelner, and Guillén 2005; K. Weyland 2010; Gilardi 2012). This paper will briefly address both applications of the concept in order to gain an understanding of diffusion before turning to the particular diffusion mechanism of authoritarian learning.6 Within the social movement literature diffusion is commonly defined as “[…] the spread of movement ideas, practices, and frames from one country to another” (Della Porta and Tarrow 2005, 2). The research conducted in this tradition of scholarly work has mainly focused on movements within OECD countries. In the social movement literature there are many studies that deal with the diffusion of transnational activism. Few investigate the diffusion processes between social movements across countries that are fighting for a primarily domestic cause. In the policy diffusion literature, studies of how certain policies or reforms have diffused amongst different countries are in the focus of scholarly research. Ac-‐cording to the largely agreed-‐upon definition of diffusion in this field “interna-‐tional policy diffusion occurs when government policy decisions in a given coun-‐try are systematically conditioned by prior policy choices made in other coun-‐tries” (B. Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006, 787). Scholars in policy diffusion research have mainly focussed on the spread of certain economic, health and ed-‐ucation policies (K. Weyland 2010; K. G. Weyland 2005; Simmons and Elkins 2004; Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006; Simmons, Garrett, and Dobbin 2008; Pitlik 2007; Mintrom and Vergari 1998; Henisz, Zelner, and Guillén 2005; Me-‐seguer and Escribà-‐Folch 2011; Volden 2006). Both understandings clarify that “[…] when studying diffusion, we are interested more in the process than in the outcome. Convergence, for instance, can be a use-‐ful complement to a diffusion analysis, or it can motivate the research in the first 6 I understand the mechanism according to the definition by Hedström and Swedberg as “a systematic set of statements that provide a plausible account of how [variables] are linked” (Hedström and Swedberg 1998, 7).



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place, but is not what we are actually studying” (Gilardi 2014, 1).

For the purpose of this paper I will rely upon a definition of diffusion as the adoption of ideas, practices, frames or policies from other countries. This definition includes diffusion processes between social movements as well as between gov-‐ernmental actors but highlights the cross-‐border nature of diffusion. Empirically, both the social movement and policy diffusion literature almost ex-‐clusively deal with diffusion mechanisms among democratic states. On the other hand, despite the scholarly attention diffusion mechanisms have gained in these fields, the literature on authoritarianism has so far largely neglected to consider diffusion processes (Heydemann and Leenders 2011, 649; Gleditsch 2012, 52; Della Porta and Tarrow 2011, 120; Erdmann et al. 2013; Bunce 2003, 168). It seems that the research on authoritarianism has followed the same path as the fields of democratization and social movement studies before it: “[Reducing] ‘ex-‐ternal influences’ to simple exogenous factors” (B. Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006, 783) and thus turning a blind eye to explaining international impacts upon authoritarian regime stability (Della Porta and Tarrow 2011, 123). Weyland (2005) argues that the outcomes of the diffusion process on authoritar-‐ian regimes under pressure can be quite diverse. Successful regime restoration, preemptive reforms, determined repression and conflict but also regime change are amongst the possible outcomes. The last scenario implies that outcomes of diffusion processes can also negatively correlate. This remains a good reminder that diffusion needs not lead to convergence (Weyland 2005). Another insight from taking diffusion processes and their impacts on regime sta-‐bility seriously is that the timing of events is centrally important (Thelen 2000).7 Taking the example of the Arab Uprisings the crucial impact of sequence be-‐comes evident. The autocrats in the region, especially those hit first by the pro-‐tests, were overwhelmed by the events and misjudged their gravity and potential consequences (Volpi 2013; Heydemann and Leenders 2014). Other Arab regimes in the region that were subsequently hit by the protests during February and March recognized the failure to take this contestation seriously and adapted their reactions accordingly (Heydemann and Leenders 2014, 3). Solely domestic perspectives on regime stability do not account for the impact of sequence and diffusion mechanisms. Following Gilardi, I argue that authoritarianism research constitutes a suitable field to “[…] use the insights of diffusion research to learn something new about other phenomena” (Gilardi 2014, 4). The study of diffusion processes in authori-‐

7 From this point the observations can draw on previous work such as the work on the importance of time for institutional evolution and change from Thelen (2000).



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tarian contexts by incumbent regimes can contribute to opening the black box of “external effects” on domestic regime stability. It offers an increased understand-‐ing of how certain international developments influence the regimes’ decisions. With regard to executive branches such as the police, Della Porta and Tarrow conclude that, “few studies of contentious politics linked the diffusion of new so-‐cial movements to the coevolution of opposing forces” (Della Porta and Tarrow 2011, 124). This failure to investigate diffusion processes is just as true for au-‐thoritarian regimes. It is the aim of this paper to investigate this blind spot in the authoritarianism literature and gain an understanding of the influence of diffu-‐sion processes on decisions in contested authoritarian regimes. Social movement theory and policy diffusion research both identify specific vari-‐ants of diffusion mechanisms (Gilardi 2012). The literature refers to a typology that encompasses four distinct mechanisms of diffusion: learning, emulation, competition and coercion (Gilardi 2014; Gilardi 2012; B. Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006; D. Della Porta and Tarrow 2011).8 Following Simmons and her collegues the four mechanisms of diffusion are distinctive regarding how they are transmitted across countries and between actors (Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006). Coercion is refered to diffusion processes in which an external player or state manipulates the reasoning of the relevant actors in such a way that the diffusion of a certain behaviour or policy is adopted (Della Porta and Tarrow 2011, 126). In most cases coerced diffusion is coupled with a mechanism of conditionality by an external actor (Gilardi 2012, 13). Competition as a diffusion mechanism refers to situations in which actors compete with each other in order to gain something. Under such circumstances diffusion occurs in form of aligning policies or behaviour with those of the competitors as a result of the competetive situation itself in order to minimize the advantage of competitors through their differing actions or policies (Simmons and Elkins 2004). The diffusion mechanism of emulation refers to the adaption of preferences and actions due to their normative value (Gilardi 2012, 22). For the purpose of this study I will focus on the role of learning processes as a result of information gathering and assessment by actors (Givan, Soule, and Roberts 2006, 9; Della Porta and Tarrow 2011, 127). Other diffusion mecha-‐nisms such as competition, coercion and emulation are expected to have been less important for the diffusion of regime behaviour during the Arab Uprisings (Della Porta and Tarrow 2011, 126). 8 Commonly these four mechanisms of diffusion are mentioned. In a recent working pa-‐per Gilardi argues that coercion albeit contributing to the spread of a certain policy does not fit the definitions given in the literature on diffusion (Gilardi 2014, 3).



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Gilardi defined learning from a policy diffusion perspective as “as the process whereby policy makers use the experience of other countries to estimate the likely consequences of policy change” (Gilardi 2012, 17). Social movement schol-‐ars might not favour this definition of learning since it is developed based on an understanding from a governmental perspective. Yet, it is precisely this back-‐ground that makes it well suited to analysing the learning processes in authori-‐tarian regimes (Gilardi 2014). Empirical research on international diffusion through learning processes has, thus far, either focused on the adaptive behavior of social movements as a result of mimicry, interaction or direct communication between the relevant actors. Or governmental adoption of policies due to the expected benefits based on the suc-‐cess in another context. With regards to the Arab Uprisings Heydemann and Leenders (2014) observe an equivalence of the learning processes between pro-‐testers and their incumbent regime counterparts:

“Just as the spread of protests was itself the product of social learn-‐ing by Arab citizens—a wave effect facilitated by the rapid diffusion of ideas, discourses, and practices from one country to another and their adaptation to local contexts—so too were the counter revolu-‐tionary strategies of regimes shaped by processes of learning and diffusion among regime elites, especially among those where pro-‐tests began later in the sequence of events that constitute the Arab awakening” (Heydemann and Leenders 2014, 2).

Authoritarian learning can be conceptualized as a learning mechanism that takes place within an authoritarian regime and translates into the adoption of ideas, practices, frames or policies from other countries (Heydemann and Leenders 2011, 649–652; Heydemann and Leenders 2014). Authoritarian learning can thus can be classified as a specific mode of the learning mechanism that occurs within authoritarian regimes. Turning to the dynamics of the Arab Uprisings in 2011 they conclude that, “[…] processes of authoritarian learning and adaptation among remaining authoritarian elites in the Arab world […] had powerful effects on their calculus of the probabilities of regime survival” (Heydemann and Leenders 2011, 652). Such lessons learned can be drawn from different examples. Learning from suc-‐cessful examples (positive learning) adopting a strategy of repression or coopta-‐tion of a certain actors relying on the certainty that a similar approach has been successful applied by another autocrat in a similar situation. This can even spread to the operational level of police practices (Della Porta and Tarrow 2011). In light of the Arab Uprisings and the focus of this paper of the legitimizing role



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of reforms the case of Jordan seems to be an interesting one as it has learned form Morocco and in this course adopted a very similar strategy to respond to the protests (Bank 2012). On the other hand learning from mistakes of fellow autocrats can be just as in-‐forming to regimes’ as copying successful one’s. If a fellow autocrat makes cru-‐cial mistakes then learning can help others avoid landing in the same pitfalls. Many autocrats in the MENA learned from the mistakes of Ben-‐Ali and Mubarak not to take the protest movements seriously from the beginning (Heydemann and Leenders 2014). They also learned from the failure of Ghaddafi in Libya who’s aggressive rhetoric and large scale repression strategy brought him down through a NATO intervention (Heydemann and Leenders 2011). It is important to note on this occasion that diffusion and here especially authoritarian learning does not necessarily lead to convergence (Weyland 2005). Some regimes learned to repress the protests but left out overly aggressive rhetoric or skilfully circum-‐vented western intervention through repressing not too much to risk a moral hazard in the international community and at the same time hurting them just enough to repress the opposition (Heydemann 2013). Other regime’s learning from the same mistakes opted for other type of responses relying less on large scale repression but more on a mix of coopting emerging actors, targeting oppo-‐sition figures and relegitimizing their grip on power through institutional reform processes (Bank 2012). The distinction between positive and negative learning already implies a certain path of learning process in itself and hence has a value as an analytical distinction. To be clear, I do not argue that the phenomenon of authoritarian learning is ei-‐ther a permanent or a regular feature of authoritarian regimes. Nevertheless au-‐thoritarian learning can be expected to be most visible as a consequence of re-‐gional upheaval and regime contestation. It is under such circumstances that re-‐gimes might even directly refer to the events in their neighbouring countries. In this regard cultural, geographical and language proximity as well as historical, political, economic and ethnic ties across borders play an important role. The de-‐scribed authoritarian learning process can be expected to be more relevant if countries are culturally similar, have comparable authoritarian regime types, are in the same region and traditionally display strong economic, social and political ties (Levitsky and Way 2010). However, if authoritarian learning takes place, it is expected to have a crucial impact on the decision making process of an authoritarian regimes as it alters their calculations and response crucially. Moreover, I am aware that there are a multitude of causal conditions that impact the decision making process of any authoritarian regime, whether it is under pressure – or not. Authoritarian learn-‐



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ing if present is thus a strong contributing causal condition to regime resilience in any case in which an authoritarian system is challenged through political con-‐testation.

Legitimacy through Reform

Legitimacy is a multidimensional concept (Bekkers and Edwards 2007; Merkel and Gerschewski 2011). Its meaning remains contested even within the social sciences. This holds particularly true for the application of the concept to author-‐itarian contexts. Starting from an authoritarian perspective Legitimacy is rein-‐forced by the relationship between the subjects and ruling elite.9 The elite has an interest in gaining and sustaining legitimacy vis-‐a-‐vis the people as this has posi-‐tive effects upon its stability. Legitimacy as a source of regime stability has been downplayed in the authoritarianism literature. Recently researchers regained interest in the issue of authoritarian legitimacy (Schmitt 1921; Arendt 1951; Barber 1969; Gerschewski 2013; Merkel et al. 2013). Gerschewski (2013, 19–20) proposes the Eastonian distinction between diffused (input) and specific (output) support as a tool to investigate the legitimacy (Easton 1965) of autocracies. Diffused support is nested into beliefs about right-‐eousness of rule and ideologies, referring to so-‐called input legitimacy. Specific support refers to the output dimension of legitimacy, which relies upon the eco-‐nomic, distributional and security performance of a regime (Merkel and Gerschewski 2012, 11; Gerschewski 2014; Easton 1965; Murphy 1998; Mayer 2001). Following this approach I have reviewed the legitimacy related literature on au-‐thoritarianism with regards to the role of reforms. The issue of reform has re-‐ceived little interest so far. The more recent authoritarianism literature has fo-‐cussed primarily on specific support by economic performance, security and sta-‐bility, development or social and public services (Gilley 2008; White 1986; Scharpf 1999). Moreover, drawing on classical works on authoritarianism, seem-‐ingly typical authoritarian modes of input legitimacy, such as ideological, char-‐ismatic or external legitimacy claims, are added to the equation of authoritarian legitimacy by other scholars (Schmitt 1921; Arendt 1951; Weber 1956; Barber 1969; Burnell 2006; Gerschewski 2013; Gerschewski 2014).10

9 I borrow the term ‘ruling elite’ from Svolik (Svolik 2012) 10 Charismatic legitimacy is based on a leader who is able to summon legitimacy through his or her charismatic character and appearance. Ideological legitimacy is rooted in an ideological construct such as nationalism, socialism, fascism or theological ideas. Final-‐ly, external legitimacy is rooted in the externalization of a threat that requires a strong (autocratic) leadership. Although these are ideal types and in reality hybrids are most



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Scholarly work on legitimacy of and through reform has largely concentrated on reform and institutional change and its effects on legitimacy under democratic conditions (Webb 2000; Moravcsik 2002; Moravcsik 2006; Kohler-‐Koch 2000; Lodge 1994). The only exemption to this is the case-‐based literature on China and its economic reforms in the last three decades (Gilley 2008; Guo 2003; O’Brien 2010; Hess 2013). In the work of these scholars impacts of reform on legitimacy are usually associ-‐ated with specific support connected to the improvements that are expected from a given reform policy or institutional change (output legitimacy). Or dif-‐fused support resting on primarily ideological grounds (input legitimacy). How-‐ever, both these perspectives do not account for the possibility that reforms can also develop an effect by themselves, without even taking the outcome into con-‐sideration. Reforms can thus create a legitimizing effect in their own right through their very nature of change and intrinsic procedures consultation and participation instruments. Reforms can have a signalling effect and institutional changes are powerful polit-‐ical acts. They by themselves can unfold an impact on the legitimacy of any given authority that is initiating or leading such a reform process. I argue that this pro-‐cedural legitimacy dimension is of particular importance within authoritarian environments. Given that most reform processes initiated in authoritarian con-‐texts –even as a response to political contestation– are initiated and led by the ruling elite. Fundamental institutional changes that could impair the authority of the ruling elite can thus not be expected. Nevertheless, political reform processes such as institutional change or constitutional reform fulfil an important function for authoritarian regimes. They signal responsiveness and the will to improve-‐ment. Such signals are of particular importance, if regimes have experienced po-‐litical contestation and are under pressure. The nexus between reform and mobi-‐lization has been notoriously understudied in authoritarian contexts.11 If applied

common, they each resemble a specific logic of input legitimacy in authoritarian con-‐texts.

11 Similar to the repression-‐mobilization relationship we could expect regime’s attempts to respond to mobilization through reform successful in reducing mobilization or turn-‐ing into the opposite if perceived as a weakness. In such cases a regime-‐led reform process could spark even more mobilization. The conditions for a successful relegiti-‐mization through reform have to be taken into account in further research on the issue of throughput legitimacy in authoritarian contexts. Perhaps reform promises in re-‐sponse to mass mobilization and contention may only be effective if there has been a preceding period of 'reform' that had some credibility or the other sources of legitima-‐cy are not too eroded so that a reform process is able to stabilize an instable equilibri-‐um of regime legitimacy.



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smartly, reforms might appease a critical juncture to the benefit of the incum-‐bent regime. In democracies constitutional reforms are ideally the result of a previous delib-‐erative and participatory legal process. Similarly, in authoritarian regimes un-‐dergoing institutional change procedures like commissions, hearings, constitu-‐tional assemblies and parliamentary debates are the norm. The crucial differ-‐ence, however remains that in authoritarian regimes such processes do hardly influence the result or magnitude of reforms. Such participatory elements in fun-‐damentally ‘guided’ reform processes are either only open to certain groups and individuals that are aligned with the regimes’ preferences or the decision-‐making procedures put the power in the hands of the regime so that despite par-‐ticipation there is no obligation to implement any of the demanded changes. These window-‐dressing reform procedures can hence –regarding there impact on regime stability– be aligned with recent institutionalist arguments (Gilley 2010; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Escriba-‐Folch 2013). Nevertheless how they impact regime stability remains different. Constitutional Reforms and institutional change as a means to create a legal or procedural, reformist type of legitimacy have, up to my knowledge, not been tak-‐en into account. To incorporate them into a concept of autocratic legitimacy of neither diffused nor specific support seems quite adequate in order to capture the nature of legitimacy reached by reform and institutional change (Easton 1965). Some scholars have been advocating the importance of a third, intermediate di-‐mension of legitimacy, which is usually referred to as “throughput legitimacy” (Scharpf 1999; Scharpf 1998; Scharpf 2003; Schmidt 2013; Papadopoulos 2003; Bekkers and Edwards 2007). Following this concept democracies can gain legit-‐imacy through inclusive, transparent, participatory and democratic procedures. The concept has so far been applied to democracies as well as inter-‐ and supra-‐national institutions (Schmidt 2013; Scharpf 1999; Scharpf 1998; Scharpf 2003; Bekkers and Edwards 2007; Papadopoulos 2003; Moravcsik 2002). I argue that even in authoritarian contexts procedural throughput legitimacy can emerge and alter the legitimacy of authoritarian rule. Further, throughput legitimacy in au-‐thoritarian contexts is likely to take either rather ceremonial forms or manifest in shape of institutional change or constitutional reform and referenda. Contrary to the rather long-‐term processes of regime legitimization through in-‐put or output legitimacy, throughput legitimacy grasps exactly regime attempts’ to increase their legitimacy in an ad-‐hoc manner. These processes are a particu-‐larly regular feature of regime responses’ in situations of political contestation. The traditional input and output legitimacy concepts are expected to be eroding



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or stabilizing authoritarian regimes rather in the long run. Nevertheless certain regime strategies aim to increase resilience through input or output legitimacy. On the input side for example a self-‐securitization through the externalization of a threat or on the output side for example through salary increases for the public sector or the rise of subsidies for commodities and basic goods. In the Moroccan case classical sources of regime legitimacy mentioned by schol-‐ars are manifold. In a recent study Erdmann et al conclude that “[…] the linchpin monarchies of Jordan and Morocco rely instead on strong historical religious claims to legitimate their rule.” (Erdmann et al. 2013, 14). In the Moroccan case this religious prerogative is even enshrined in the constitution (old and new) as the King is not only the head of state and the chief commander over the armed forces but also the “commander of the faithful”. The religious legitimacy of the King seems to be the defining feature of the legitimacy claims by the regime (Hoffmann and König 2013, 8–9; Bouasria 2013; Benchemsi 2012, 62; Joffé 2009, 155; Willis 2012, 145; Waterbury 1970). The socio-‐economic dimension of output legitimacy in Morocco seems to have played a rather minor role during the last decade due to high and rising socio-‐economic inequality and only moderate economic growth rates12, high unem-‐ployment13 and the highest degree of illiteracy in the entire Arab World14; the HDI see Morocco’s development in the recent decades positive but below that of the average human development.15 Stability and security are the main pillars of the regime’s output legitimacy. It has a good record providing effective domestic security. With the exemption of rare Islamist terrorist activities, the security situation has been stable. Even the con-‐flict in the Western Sahara Region has calmed down and most of its contested territory is under the control of the Moroccon government. Relations with Alge-‐ria have normalized and are increasingly less hostile. Having accounted for the classical sources of regime support in terms of the well

12 The average annual GDP growth since 2000 was around 4% with great discrepancies ranging from 1.5% up to 8% grow in subsequent years according to the IMF and has recently slowed down (23.10.2013): http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13110.pdf 13 The official unemployment rates unemployment are around 10% with actual numbers expected to be much higher. Furthermore youth unemployment is a structural issue with much higher numbers than average unemployment also amongst university graduates: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13110.pdf (IMF Report 2013) 14 Illiteracy was ranging around 48% in 2009 according to the World Bank Edstats: http://go.worldbank.org/XRUNYCJET0 (23.10.2013)

15 According to the HDI the average schooling years per adult are 4.4 and the overall rank of Morocco is 130/190.



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established categories of input and output legitimacy I will focus on Morocco’s constitutional reform process in Morocco as an example of throughput legitimi-‐zation. Initiated and guided by the regime as a response to the contestation of its authority by the 20 February protest movement in 2011 the reform process is an ideal case for relegitimization of authoritarian rule through reform. I will inves-‐tigate this reform process trying to trace evidence for a strategic regime re-‐sponse as a result of authoritarian learning. Subsequently, I will briefly assess the impact of the reform process on the legitimacy of the authoritarian regime in Morocco.

Methodological Remarks

Convergence of certain behaviour by actors oftentimes provides the backdrop of scholarly work on diffusion. Nevertheless as a phenomenon diffusion is particu-‐larly relevant as a mechanism to asocial sciences (Gilardi 2014, 1). As scholars of diffusion we are hence not only interested where diffusion occurs and what out-‐come is produces but in how it is transmitted. This is also why purely correla-‐tion-‐based probabilistic analysis does not seem well equipped to investigate dif-‐fusion processes. Although quantitative studies are valuable and even necessary to evaluate theories explaining authoritarian stability, by their nature they can-‐not account for the causal Mechanisms. Such approaches are able to point us at correlations of diffusion as for example converging behaviour or actions among a large number of actors or cases but cannot empirically trace a certain mecha-‐nism that causes this relationship. Thus in-‐depth case studies provide a more appropriate approach to studying the how diffusion occurs. Detecting the singu-‐lar steps of the process and shedding light on the causal pathway enables us to open the black box between the diffusion process and the outcome under inves-‐tigation in a deterministic manner (Mahoney 2008; Beach et al. 2014; Van Evera 1997). However what Tannenwald notes with regards to the study of the non-‐event of nuclear warfare also holds for the non-‐breakdown of authoritarian regimes. The question of why a regime stayed stable is a hard nut to crack because tracing the causes of a stable or a non-‐change event nonevent are hard to pin down (Tannenwald 1999, 440). This holds particularly true for qualitative and case study research and even more in authoritarian environments in which account evidence16 should be treated even more skeptical and regimes and their affiliates are not likely to be very outspoken about their practices of decision making in

16 Meaning evidence that is relying upon a witness or an actor that observed or partici-‐pated in the process of the investigated causal mechanism.



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the first place. Nonetheless in the following section of this paper I propose a causal mechanism focusing on the process from authoritarian learning to regime religitimization that can be operationalized through evidence based case study. The test will be designed as a multi-‐stage hoop test that resembles the parts of the causal mechanism and attaches expected evidence that should be found if the mechanism was at work. I have selected the case of Morocco for the subsequent preliminary empirical plausibility probe in order to estimate a first check on the hypothesized mechanism. Morocco as a state that has witnessed widespread protests but no change in the ruling elite and a constitutional reform in 2011 somewhat represents a typical or ideal case to investigate this link. Furthermore as the protests were inspired by a regional wave of contestation that swept over from Tunisia and Egypt to Morocco a few weeks later this makes it a most likely case for studying the mechanism of authoritarian learning. Such a conscious case selection on the presence of the conditions and the outcome might be useless for quantitative scholars but is best suited when investigating deterministic claims and conditions in form of causal conditions in a case study. Naturally the infer-‐ences that can be drawn from such a case will be minimal. Nevertheless the evi-‐dence and proof for the presence a causal mechanism in one crucial case is suffi-‐cient as a justification to study that case on its own right.

From Learning to Resilience: Relegitimization through the Reform process

Regime resilience is a complex phenomenon that is not explicable by one single cause or monolithic causal mechanism. Thus authoritarian learning is conceptu-‐alized as a necessary but not sufficient condition for resilience. More specifically my research focuses on explaining regime resilience in moments of severe con-‐testation of authoritarian rule. In short, I am only interested in explaining resili-‐ence of regimes under stress. But how does authoritarian learning (X) lead to regime resilience (Y)? Authoritarian learning is expected to allow any regime under stress to undertake more informed and thus smarter and more effective decisions, because they are based upon experiences of fellow autocrats in similar situations. Drawing on de-‐velopments in other cases leads to an adaptation of regime strategy in dealing with a moment of contestation.17 The changes of practices in dealing with and responding to the contestation have consequences on all domestic dimensions of authoritarian regime survival. The strategy of applying repression is adjusted. A result might be that instead of a large-‐scale oppression of an opposition move-‐ment with violence that might lead to reinvigorate the protests through outrage

17 Situations in which the survival of an incumbent authoritarian regime is challenged.



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more targeted and subtle repressive measures are favoured. Such strategies can for example be observed in two contemporary authoritarian regimes contempo-‐rary China or semi authoritarian regimes such as Russia. In both states opposi-‐tion movements are criminalized, their leading figures jailed and the media are increasingly censored and synchronized. Such ‘success stories’ can set examples for other autocrats that learn from the successful strategies of other regimes. In another pillar of authoritarian rule the elite circles are reconfigured in order to bind newly emerging groups to the regime through cooptation or to get rid of potential troublemakers. Such reconfigurations to include emerging crucial groups into the circle of beneficiaries of the regime’s rule can change the loyal-‐ties of decisive actors and hence give regimes an opportunity to bind their faith to that of the regime and avoid them joining the challenger’s party. Finally, the regime might opt for a new framing of is legitimacy in order to regain support from citizens and undermine support for the opposition.18 Such practic-‐es are manifold; as autocrats tend to play every card they own in order to regain there subjects support. From increasing public benefits or wages to securitiza-‐tion of the own regime in face of an external threat. Such attempts are illustrated in the cases Syria or Egypt. Furthermore regimes’ rely on institutional reform processes to legitimize their rule through formalized governance procedures that seem inclusive and participatory at first but put in context these responses are oftentimes instrumentalized to restore a regime’s grip on power through seemingly democratic institutions. In the following I want to elaborate on two distinct hypotheses focussing on the impact of authoritarian learning on regime legitimacy. First, on the causes of the 2011 constitutional reform process in Morocco and secondly on the impact of these reforms on the regime’s legitimacy and resilience.

H1: Diffusion through authoritarian learning caused the quick and encompassing reform processes, initiated by the regime as a response to the contestation by the 20th February movement.

H2: The 2011 institutional reform process relegitimized the regime through a procedural dimension of legitimacy (throughput) and secured its interests and authority. By the same token the regime guided procedures delegitimized the 20th February opposition movement, which boycotted the reform.

Both hypotheses are going to be conceptualized in one comprehensive causal mechanism that will then be put to the test in a case study. The first part of the

18 Repression, cooptation and legitimacy are the most prominent dimensions identified in relevant literature that determine regime stability in authoritarian contexts.



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causal mechanism from the beginning until and including the regime response is derived from the first hypothesis focussing on authoritarian learning. The second hypothesis displaying the causal pathway for a restoration of regime power through an institutional reform process relying on the concept of throughput le-‐gitimacy starts with the regime response and ultimately contributes to the out-‐come of regime resilience. The starting point for the causal mechanism is that a given regime (R) is under pressure by social mobilization of opposition groups (O) and that this contesta-‐tion is embedded in a wider regional phenomenon of contestation of authoritari-‐an rule in other countries. I want to propose a mechanism that explains how a mechanism of authoritarian learning is linked to the origination of an institu-‐tional reform process, that then had an effect upon the critical juncture and ulti-‐mately its outcome of regime resilience (Y). In the following I will go through the steps of this causal mechanism one by one (see figure 1 for illustration).

Figure-‐1: Causal Mechanism From Learning to Resilience

The backdrop of the hypothesized causal mechanism is a scenario in which a re-‐gional wave of protest is unleashed and contests several authoritarian regimes very much as witnessed during the central and Eastern European revolutions that lead to the dissolution of the eastern bloc, the coloured revolutions in Cen-‐tral Asia and eastern Europe or recently the Arab Uprisings in the MENA region.

Mobilization by Opposition

Contestation of Regime

Assessing Options

Considering Regional Developments

Updating of stra-‐tegic measure

Institutional Reform Procedures

Relegitimiza-‐tion of Regime

Obser-‐vation

Regime Response

Protest

Evaluation

Reaction

Restoration

Regional backdrop of political contestation of authoritarian rule

Acknowl-‐edgement ofprodedur Delegitimiza-‐

tion of Opposi-‐tion

Regime Resilience



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At first, opposition groups protest against an authoritarian regime. They mobi-‐lize and organize to express their grievances and discontent with the current sit-‐uation. On the other side the regimes’ (R) main goal is to remain in power and overcome this phase of contestation. Due to the contestation of their rule by the opposition (O) the regime (R) is forced to react. The regime assesses its options. From offering guided reform to brutal crackdown or integration of parts of the opposition into the ruling circle, a variety of options for reaction are available. Given that the contestation is part of a larger regional phenomenon of contesta-‐tion where other fellow autocrats have experienced similar threats to their rule. It is likely that, in addition to weighing the options on the basis of their perceived capacities the regime also takes the observed regional developments into ac-‐count. In order to avoid following the same fate as those regimes already ousted through the protests. They evaluate the responses by other regimes to avoid making the same mistakes. Adapting on the basis of elsewhere-‐successful or un-‐successful practices they try to avoid pitfalls in responding to the challenge. Fi-‐nally the incumbent regime (R) updates its response strategy. The response of the regime consists of several dimensions. Yet to create a test for hypothesis 2, I will focus on how authoritarian learning lead to an institutional reform process-‐es that affected the regimes’ and the oppositions’ legitimacy. The institutional reform process is characterized by seemingly democratic procedures that unfold a symbolic deliberative or participatory signalling effect. Frequent procedures would include commission hearings, regional assemblies, parliamentary debates, constitutional assemblies, referenda or new elections. These procedures, even without a substantial result with regard to the reins over political authority un-‐fold an impact in their own right. Even if insignificant for the outcome, that de-‐spite all participatory procedures, remains essentially based on the veto and the consent of the regime, such processes can have a legitimizing impact. The proce-‐dures are beyond ordinary day-‐to-‐day politics and the result of severe political contestation by a challenger to such procedures. The very fact that the regime recognizes the need to act and initiates a response that creates the appearance of participatory and deliberative procedures creates acknowledgement within the population. The process of acknowledgement is closely linked to the concept of throughput legitimacy as outlined above. Furthermore, it puts the regime back into the driver’s seat as they are making the rules for any reform process and the opposition merely has the choice to play along or refuse participation. For any opposition movement that is a situation in which they can only lose. They lose credibility when they participate and the results are not substantial or loose support because boycotting the reform procedures makes them look like a kid in a huff. Thus the institutional reform process as a signalling act and through its



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procedural nature relegitimizing the regime and by the same token delegitimiz-‐ing the opposition movement. In the final step of the causal mechanism after the institutional changes have been implemented the restoration of the regime leads to an end of the critical juncture and the outcome of regime resilience (Y). I am aware that the described causal mechanism is not comprehensive, neither with regards to encompassing all relevant causal conditions that have contributed to the outcome of regime resilience, nor does this present a comprehensive collection of all relevant impacts of authoritarian learning on regime decision making or legitimacy. However, the illustrated mechanism does not only make a plausable argument for how aurthoritarian learning, institutional reform, legitimacy and regime resilience can intertwine but it provides a toolkit to operationalize and test the presence of the proposed hypothesis empirically. Overall, the effects of authoritarian learning can be expected to stabilize all pillars of authoritarian rule (Gerschewski 2013) through improved –because better informed– decisions by the regimes that unfold a strong combined effect on regime resilience (Heydemann and Leenders 2011). These effects are expected to be especially strong in moments of contestation as in such ripe moments actors and their actions are considered to be particularly decisive for regime stability (Merkel and Gerschewski 2012; Soifer 2012; Capoccia and Kelemen 2007).

Expected evidence: The fingerprints of the mechanism

A causal mechanism such as described above should leave some empirical traces. In this section of the paper I propose a test to pursue an evidence-‐based opera-‐tionalization to confirm the presence of the mechanism in an empirical case study. To operationalize the hypothesis that authoritarian learning increases re-‐gime resilience through throughput legitimacy of reform procedures I pursue mul-‐tiple hoop tests, which means that I will theorize a number of hoops that would need to be passed to increase our confidence in the aforementioned hypothesis (Beach et al. 2014). As mentioned, regime resilience (Y) is expected to be a product of multiple caus-‐al conditions that might even reinforce each other to synchronize into a suffi-‐cient explanation of the outcome. Therefore the proposed hoop test is applied as a confirming test.19 This means that the explanation -‐if validated through evi-‐

19 Although oftentimes this kind of test is also used to disconfirm alternative explana-‐tions



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dence-‐ is not mutually exclusive to alternate explanations of resilience, such as domestically rooted ones like legitimacy, cooptation, repression or the capacity and cohesion of the opposition. If proven through evidence the causal mecha-‐nism does provide us one condition that contributed positively to the regime’s resilience facing political contestation. To assess if this mechanism let alone would have been sufficient or even necessary to explain the regime’s resilience is beyond the scope of this study. Starting with the contestation of the regime I will treat mobilization by opposi-‐tion as a given as I am not primarily interested in how the contestation comes about but how the regimes response translates into its survival. Each of the parts of the causal mechanism will be assessed through a hoop test that reflects upon the expected evidence. According to the causal mechanism, the first hoop would be a confirmation of the contestation of the regime during the protests. I would expect large-‐scale pro-‐tests and media reports as well as declarations by the opposition that specify demands towards the regime. Furthermore, in interviews with opposition activ-‐ists I would expect the opposition to confirm that their aim was the contestation of the regime. The evidence could be gathered through primary sources, media and NGO reports (pattern & trace evidence) as well as interviews (account evi-‐dence). If the empirical evidence does not provide us with a lot of confidence re-‐garding the hoops being passed at every stage of the proposed mechanism this would have crucial implications for the theorized mechanism. In short, if the hoops are not passed the theory got the causal linkage wrong and either needs refinement or is simply not valid. On the other hand if we find the expected evi-‐dence and thus pass the hoops of the test this does not automatically lead us to the conclusion that the causal mechanism as designed must have been present as alternate explanations for the gathered evidence have to be taken into account. The second hoop would be the regime acknowledging the presence of contesta-‐tion and feeling pressured to react. The evidence should imply that the regime was somewhat pressured to react to the demands of the protesters and was aware of the situation as a critical juncture (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007; Merkel and Gerschewski 2012). Detecting evidence for this perception will be exceed-‐ingly difficult. Especially as the regime can be expected to retrospectively down-‐play the impact of the protests upon its decision-‐making. Evidence of a pressure to act can manifest in form of statements in interviews or speeches that refer to policy responses that are linked directly to the demands of the opposition and the protests themselves. Again, we are relying on trace and account evidence. Any regime, given that it recognizes the imminent risks of a critical juncture, will proceed to assess its options to respond to the contestation of its authority



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(Przeworski 1992). Evidence for such an assessment would likely materialize in form of rather informal talks within the ruling elite. It is within the intrinsic logic of this part of the mechanism that it typically happens behind closed doors. This means to find proof for this actually happening is a hard nut to crack. I hope to gather account evidence though elite interviews with former or current mem-‐bers or affiliates of the regime in order to substantiate the confidence in my claim that such an assessment takes place. A coinciding validation for an assess-‐ment of options within the regime elite in several interviews then constitutes the third hoop test. However if this piece of evidence cannot be obtained this would not mean that we would have to abolish the entire causal mechanism. In that sense it is more like a smoking gun test that would confirm the mechanism if ob-‐servable but not disproof our hypothesis if not found (Van Evera 1997). The fourth hoop to pass would be evidence for an actual observation of neigh-‐boring fellow autocrats & evaluation of their actions by the regime. Direct refer-‐ences in speeches, documents and interviews by regime actors, as well as oppo-‐sition activists shall be accumulated as evidence for observation, evaluation and strategic updating alike. However, it is crucial that the accounts of evidence do not only refer to a process of observing the general developments in the neigh-‐bourhood. They have to specifically mention processes of decision making in-‐formed through an evaluation of the responses of fellow autocrats and the re-‐sults. The regime response translates into certain political decisions, policies or chang-‐es that usually leave visible fingerprints such as the passing of new laws or de-‐crees, change in behaviour by the executive organs or the like. If an actual insti-‐tutional change occurs –as in the proposed mechanism– One would expect to find the emergence of new mechanisms of political bargaining and deliberation such as a committee for constitutional reform. Also, institutional changes are of-‐tentimes accompanied by shifts in the current government. The ousting of the residing government and subsequent fix of early re-‐elections can hence be re-‐garded as another piece of evidence for institutional change. Ultimately, rare par-‐ticipatory procedures like referenda are a regular feature of an ex post legitima-‐tion of a renewed constitutional arrangement. In combination, such processes are unlikely to have other causes than either transition and regime change or a regime initiated pre-‐emptive reform. Alternative explanations for the manifesta-‐tions of change described under similar circumstances are quite unlikely. The next hoop to pass is sufficient evidence to underpin the claim that the re-‐form process altered the attitude of the citizens as towards acknowledging the process of change as legitimate. This part of the mechanism again poses some problems with respect to empirical evidence. It might be feasible to undertake a



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questionnaire-‐based survey to get an idea of peoples’ perception of the reform process. Alternatively, one might refer to established data like the Arab barome-‐ter survey.20 Decreased support for the opposition-‐initiated protests translating into fewer numbers of protesters is surely another indicator that points towards some kind of acknowledgement of the reform process. At the same time, this could also be evidence for the subsequent part of the mechanism, which relates to the religitimization of the regime through the acknowledgement of the reform process and / or the delegitimization of the opposition movement as a credible and promising alternative for another kind of change. Beyond the decrease of mobilization in the ongoing demonstrations, a procedural justification by re-‐gime-‐affiliated interviewees would at least hint towards them expecting the ef-‐fects upon the regimes legitimacy important. The hoop for the restoration of the regime and its resilience and hence the out-‐come of the causal mechanism can be grasped through at least one rather obvi-‐ous fact: The regime remaining in power. Furthermore, the protests and with them the contestation dying down provide additional evidence for the restora-‐tion and resilience. To link this outcome back to the causal mechanism, and se-‐quence is crucial. If this is a result of religitimization through the reform process, then the loss of momentum on the side of the opposition should be starting with the implementation of the reform procedures or shortly thereafter. At least such timing could increase our confidence in the explanation put forward and thus provide sequential evidence. If the opposition is still able to mobilize large mass-‐es of people to speak out against the regime practices and the reform processes it is most likely that the regime’s aim of the reform process to religitimacy its rule has gone wrong. Such evidence would just disconfirm my causal mechanism. Reflecting upon the entire causal mechanism and the evidence collected in com-‐bination, we can establish an additional kind of evidence through taking the se-‐quence of the events into account. If the chain of the mechanism and its evidence is found in the order as hypothesized above, this would increase our confidence in the presence and the effect of the mechanism through sequence evidence. But how unique and certain is the expected evidence put forward by the de-‐scribed tests?21 In terms of certainty, I am confident that the evidence such as the regime ad-‐dressing the demands of the opposition at least through speech acts is unlikely to have other explanations than that of a severe political contestation of the regime through the protests. Furthermore, the explicit references of the regime and the 20 http://www.arabbarometer.org (last opened 19.03.2014) 21 Following Van Evera’s evaluation of tests according to their uniqueness and uncer-‐tainty (Van Evera 1997), also see:(Beach et al. 2014; 2014).



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protesters in combination with the actual changes of the customary political de-‐cision-‐making processes are unlikely to have other causes than the regime per-‐ceiving a pressure to act due to the moment of contestation. In terms of uniqueness the test remains very limited. The collected evidence may very well overlap with predictions of alternative causal theories or mechanisms. Especially with regards to the evidence described above a re-‐legitimization pro-‐cess that would account a reconfiguration of the regime on grounds of renewing and reframing the regime’s legitimacy as a cause of regime resilience may offer an alternate explanation that would rely upon similar type and content of evi-‐dence. The proposed tests and evidence still remain very limited but provide a first ap-‐proximation to operationalizing the causal mechanism in an empirically applica-‐ble manner.22 As I have stated before, the authoritarian learning mechanism is by no means is sufficient in explaining the outcome of regime resilience. But I am interested in this specific mechanism because it might have played an important role in the case of some of the Arab regimes that managed to maintain their grip on the state. It is worthwhile studying this causal mechanism in its own right even when the parameters for sufficiency or necessity might not be the case. Theorizing and checking the causal mechanism increases our understanding of how authoritarian rule under pressure is sustained and if confirmed it creates our confidence in the fact that legitimacy played a crucial role during the Arab Uprisings. Nevertheless, one should continue to think of more unique evidence in relation to authoritarian learning to avoid criticism.

Illustrative Evidence from Morocco 2011 To account for the above designed test to confirm the causal effect of the hypoth-‐esized mechanism, more comprehensive fieldwork and analysis is necessary. In this last section I am going to relate primarily on account data that was gathered in semi-‐structured interviews held in February and March 2013 in Morocco.23 In the interviews I asked actors from the opposition and regime affiliates about the causes for the regimes stability in face of the severe political contestation in 2011. The evidence presented here can thus onl

Documents

Legitimacy through Reform? · Legitimacy through Reform? The Impact of Authoritarian Learning on Reforms & Legitimacy of Contested Regimes. Paper&prepared&for&ECPRjointsession&in&Salamancain&April&2014.&