Political Studies Association (PSA-UK)

66th Annual International Conference,

21 – 23 March 2016, Hilton Brighton Metropole,

Brighton, UK

LEGISLATIVE AND HEALTH IN BRAZIL: HOW DO PARLIAMENTARIANS BEHAVE?

Barbara Salatiel Borges,

Master student at Programme of Post-Graduation in Political Science

(PPG-CP), Federal University of Goias (UFG),

Dr. Fabiana da Cunha Saddi

PNPD-CAPES Research Fellow, Programme of Post-Graduation in

Political Science (PPG-CP), Federal University of Goias (UFG), Brazil

Research paper – work in progress

INDEX

Abstract .................................................................................................................................................. 2

1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 3

2 THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND ITS IMPLICATIOINS FOR THE POLITICAL SYSTEM ..................................... 5

3. PRESIDENTIALISM OF COALITIONS AND THE REGIMENTAL RULES OF THE FEDERAL CHAMBER............. 8

4. SOCIAL BACKGROUND: A NEW LOOK AT PARLIAMENTARY BEHAVIOUR ......................................... 12

5. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS .................................................................................................................... 17

6. Bibliography ...................................................................................................................................... 18

ABSTRACT

Most studies of the Brazilian political system point to a relationship between electoral

rules and the performance of parliamentarians. Therefore, how voters make their

choices interfere in the behavior of political actors and the party system. However, since

the 90s, a number of other studies have begun to be made in the opposite direction to

this analytical orientation. In this new approach, it is assumed that the links between

electoral and legislative arenas are extremely weak.

From what has been said, we can observe that the literature on the

Legislativeemphasizes the influence that both political parties and electoral connections

can exert on parliamentary decisions and behavior. However, little attention has been

given to another dimension: the force that the group he belongs to or has belonged to,

exerts on his activities.

Therefore, the purpose of this paper, fruit of ongoing research, is to observe how the

behavior of federal deputies varies depending on their social background related to

health. We will analyze the roll call votes of Brazilian federal deputies during the 54th

Legislature, who declared their profession to be, exclusively or not, the exercise of

Medicine and/or development of other activities in institutions related to health policy

and services.

The intent is to verify to what extent representatives with a social background in

Medicine and health public policy acted, during the 54th Legislature, either in favor of the

private or public health sector in Brazil. The prominence of the latter indicates that

deputies are voting in favor of the Constitutional Unifying System of Health.

1. INTRODUCTION

What factors influence the behavior of our legislators? Within the ambit of diverse

interests: executive, party leaders, electoral districts, and governors, what proportion

does their social background constitute in the conduct of parliamentarians? The aim of

this study is to investigate to what extent Brazilian federal deputies’ backgrounds

influences their behavior in the legislative arena, more specifically, the variation in their

conduct in the nominal voting in the Chamber of Deputies during the period that

corresponds to the 54th legislature.

A large part of the studies into the Brazilian political system point to a relationship

between the electoral rules and the conduct of parliamentarians. This being the case,

the way in which, in a determined election, voters make their choices, and how votes

are tallied to become mandates, interferes in the behavior of political actors and in the

party system (Ames, 1995a; 1995b; 2001; Mainwaring, 2001; Haggard, 1995). The work

of Anthony Downs (1957) and David R. Mayhew (1974) was the first to point out this

electoral connection, which would be elections as a modulating factor in the behavior of

politicians.

One of the main and initial contributions about the electoral connection is the study by

David R. Mayhew (1974). According to this author, there exist two arenas (the two-

arena model): the electoral and the legislative, given that the first conditions the

behavior of the politicians in the second.

Beginning in the 90’s, other studies began to be undertaken in the opposite

direction to this analytical orientation. These point toward two problems: one conceptual

and the other empirical. The conceptual one arose because variables such as the role

of party politics, the role of leadership, and the internal regimental rules of the

Congress, were excluded from the analysis (FIGUEIREDO, LIMONGI, 1995; SANTOS,

1997). The empirical one emerged because there was evidence that it is not only the

electoral arena that conditions the legislative arena, nor is the legislative production of

the National Congress only characterized by law reforms of a parochial nature

(FIGUEIREDO, LIMONGI, 1999).

Different to the perspective of the electoral connection, this new empirical approach

presupposes that the ties between the electoral and legislative arenas are extremely

weak, which is what Shaun Bowler (2000) calls the “one arena model”. The behavior of

the parliamentarians would not be determined by the incentives of the electoral arena,

but rather orientated by the restrictions of the centralizing rules and procedures of the

legislative arena. The political parties would have, in this way, an advantage over the

deputies considered individually; political survival would depend on the parties and on

the figure of their leaders.

Until now, one observes that the literature on legislative research, offers in a

disconnected way, contradictory responses to the action of congressmen. On one hand,

the parliamentarians would need to attend to the demands of their respective electoral

circumscriptions; on the other hand, they would be restricted by the will of the leaders of

their lobbies.

Perceiving the limitation of these frameworks and the little attention that has been given

to further dimension, this research will include one more explicative variable, which

would be: the social background of the parliamentarians. By social background, we

understand the history and trajectory of the parliamentarian. Beyond this, owing to a

methodological choice and given the limitation of this research, the social background

that interests us is that which, in a certain manner, would be connected to the health

sector.

It is also important to underline that this research is under construction, and given this,

the data that will be presented in the unfolding of the text is preliminary and refers

specifically to the profile of the parliamentarians with a social background in health.

2 THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND ITS IMPLICATIOINS FOR THE

POLITICAL SYSTEM

The study of the interactions between the electoral system and the political system has

become one of the most important subareas of contemporary Political Science. The

specialized literature has been attempting to comprehend how the electoral political

system conditions interferes in the dynamics and functioning of political representation,

as well as in the party system and in the democratic life of the country.

In democratic regimes, electoral systems can be defined as the set of rules (method)

that transform votes into mandates (political power). These rules can vary, and in fact

do, from country to country, generating a multiplicity of electoral systems. Given such

diverse possibilities of classification of electoral systems, the most classical was that of

Douglas Rae (1967), which defined three basic components: i) electoral magnitude,

which signifies the number of seats for electoral circumscription; ii) the structure of the

ballot, that is to say, the way in which voters express their choices; iii) the electoral

formula, that is, the mathematical equation that converts votes into political

representation (seats). This last component results in three types of electoral systems:

proportional representation; majority; and mixed representation.

The system of proportional representation tends to reproduce, in a consistent manner,

the will of the voter, since the number of seats gained by the party reflects with less

distortion, the number of votes that they receive. It is in this sense that the defenders of

this system affirm its democratic, representational, and inclusive character.

In contrast, the majority system guarantees for the party that they obtain the greatest

number of votes, and in a disproportional way, the majority of the seats. The formation

of this legislative majority would be, for some theorists, the most efficient way for

democracies to allow governability and to provide, beforehand, alternatives of coherent

government for voters. In this way, the discussion regarding which would be the better

electoral system revolves around the governability trade-off (efficiency) versus

representation.

In countries that adopt the proportional system for the Legislative seats, there are two

possible manners for the voter to vote, which would vary according to the type of list. If

the list is non-preferential or closed, the voter votes on the party instead of choosing the

candidate. This type of vote, called a party vote, strengthens the party in the electoral

arena, given that its members and party leadership would be responsible for organizing

the electoral list – the candidates found in the upper part of the list would be elected. In

this model, the ties between voters and party would be clear. Examples of the countries

that adopt the closed list would be those such as Spain, Portugal, Argentina, Italy, and

South Africa.

In contrast, if the list is preferential or open, the voter can choose amongst all the

candidates of the party, with no pre-established ranking. In this type of vote, called

nominal, the voter has more influence over the definition of the parliamentary lobbies

(MARENCO, 2006, p. 722). As the vote becomes personalized however, clientalist

relations become recurrent.

In the elections for the Chamber of Deputies, Brazil has adopted, since 1945, the

proportional system or the open list. In this system, two options are offered to voters:

vote for one name or for one party. The seats that each party (or coalitions between

parties) obtain will be occupied by the most voted candidates in each list. A curious and

distinct difference from other countries that employ the preferential vote, such as

Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Austria, and Finland for example, is that the Brazilian ballot

never presented a complete list of all of the candidates. That is to say, in the elections

for the Chamber of Deputies, the voter always wrote, (or typed, after the implementation

of the electronic voting booths) the name or number of the candidate, without there

being any mention of the other components on the list. Beyond this, in the same

election other positions are chosen by the majority system. According to Jairo Nicolau

(2006), these factors contribute to “reinforcing in voters the false impression that the

elections for the Chamber of Deputies are made according to a majority rule in which all

the candidates compete amongst themselves”.

In this way, there is a consensus amongst specialists that the open list model offers

incentives for candidates to the Chamber of Deputies to cultivate their personal

reputation to the detriment of that of their party. As it is the majority system which

distributes the intralist seats, the members of the same party become competitors

amongst themselves. As such, it is natural that the campaign would be centered on the

candidate, and that they, in their turn, reinforce their personal attributes to distinguish

themselves from their party colleagues. One can affirm that these institutional rules

which stimulate campaigns centered on the candidate and not on the party produce: i)

extremely personalized elections and; ii) weak parties in the electoral arena.

In this sense, one expects a connection between the predominance of personalized

electoral campaigns for the Chamber of Deputies (Ames, 1995a; 1995b), and the

weakness of the party system (Mainwaring, 2001; Ames, 2001), with the formation of

political parochias with limited effect on the electoral base of the legislator (pork barrel

politics). That is to say, our “electoral rules incentivize the parliamentarians to develop

personalized and individual relationships with their electoral base, instead of mediating

them through party politics” (PEREIRA, MUELLER, 2003, p. 736). Still further, as Scott

Mainwaring (1999) points out: “when legislators are elected by personal vote, as is the

case in Brazil, they become indebted to the district that elected them. They have more

incentives for parochial attitudes than the president”. Or, in the words of Cain et al (1987

apud PEREIRA, MUELLER, 2003, p. 736), “if the actions and services oriented for the

benefit of the electoral bases have an important role in the political survival of the

politicians, they will tend to focus their actions and political decisions essentially on their

electoral bases”.

Owing to this analysis, a part of the specialized literature arrives at a negative

evaluation of the conjunction of these characteristics in the political system. In this way,

from this perspective, the combination of proportional vote with the open list would lead

to fragility and party fragmentation, a low degree of accountability, uncertainty in the

electoral process, and corruption in democratic regimes (DEUS; SANDES-FREITAS,

2014, p. 30-34).

3. PRESIDENTIALISM OF COALITIONS AND THE REGIMENTAL

RULES OF THE FEDERAL CHAMBER

One other vision regarding the behavior of the parties in the legislative arena and,

consequently, regarding parliamentary behavior, was presented to the academic

community of Brazilian Political Science in 19991. In this new thesis, the electoral

system would not be the only variable for explaining all the problems of the party

system. The structure of the decision making process, as well as the type of

constitutional power available to the President, should be taken into account in the

analysis.

The concept ‘presidentialism of the coalition’ was formulated by Sérgio Abranches in

1988 to describe the institutional model typical for South America: the president

constructs their support base through the concession of ministries to parties with

representation in the Legislative, and the parliamentarians, in exchange, provide the

necessary votes to pass the Executive’s agenda.

1 See the publication “The Executive and Legislature in the New Constitutional Order”, by Argelina Figueiredo and Fernando Limongi (1999).

With the intention of avoiding the decisional paralysis that culminated, according to the

specialized literature, in the coup of 1964 (SANTOS, 1986), the constitution of 1988

conceded various avenues of power to the Executive, such as budgetary control, a

bureaucracy constituted by commissioned positions, and control mechanisms for the

agenda of the legislature (exclusivity in the initiative of law reform in bills regarding the

organization of federal budget and administration; the possibility of adopting provisional

measures; and power for soliciting urgency in the passing of a determined bill. However,

one combined to this, “a greater capacity for veto, for investigation and for influence in

the formulation of laws of the Legislature” (RENNÓ, 2006, p. 259). In this moment of

transition and redemocratization, the Parliament returns to being the last arena for

political debate and negotiation for passing laws. This signifies that

These pathways allow the Executive to put forward legislative

proposals and formulate public policy. However, the new rules

make clear that the Executive requires the support of the

Legislative to govern (…) The Executive needs to negotiate with the

Legislative to have its agenda passed. The principal point of the

question becomes, therefore, the formation of the majority in the

Congress (RENNÓ, 2006, p. 259).

As has already been previously indicated, our electoral system produces ‘multiparty’

conjunctions in such a way that, after the presidential elections of 1989, no party of the

President alone, obtained a majority in the Congress. In this scenario, the Executive

needs to make coalitions with diverse parties to manage to pass its bills in the

Legislative. This inference finds support in the observation of the post-redemocratization

governments; the presidents exert themselves to form, to a greater or lesser degree,

ministries according to the force and the relative weight of the parties in the parliament

(Abranches, 1988; Meneguello, 1998; Amorim Neto, 2000)2. Even Collor’s government,

with its antiparty posture adopted this strategy at the end of its mandate.

2 According to Meneguello (1998 apud SANTOS, 2006, p. 226) “the necessity of matching the ministerial

formation to the heterogeneity of interests leads the government to modify, with a certain frequency, the organizational structure of the ministerial organs, increasing their number, and taking apart ministries.

Beyond the distribution of ministries, which can be understood as patronage, the

president and the party leaders maintain institutional prerogatives that induce the

cooperation of parliamentarians. Argelina Figueiredo and Fernando Limongi (1999, p.

38) argue that:

The scarce autonomy of the Legislative Power in the formulation of

Public Policy makes participation in government still more important

for the parliamentarians interested in guaranteeing electoral

returns. This being the case, the control of positions offers

mechanisms that allow the maintenance of party discipline. The

parliamentarians can incur costs, voting in favor of measures

contrary to their immediate interests, owing to the gains that they

can obtain as members of the government coalition (FIGUEIREDO;

LIMONGI, 1999, p. 38).

The power of the agenda of the Executive, combined with patronage, provides a stable

base for parliamentary support. Given this, when there is the possibility of the President

strategically manipulating the distribution of preferences of the deputies and controlling

the agenda of the plenary through provisional measures and a demand for urgency, one

has a greater degree of discipline of the parties than belongs to the coalition

government.

The right to demand urgency increases the chances of success of the Executive

because i) it stipulates deadlines for the evaluation of bills, (45 days in each of the

Legislative Houses); ii) modifies the ordinary legislative flow; iii) and diminishes the

Chamber’s time to discuss its own bills (SANTOS, 2006, p. 228). In its turn, the

provisional measures have still more consistent effects over the power of the agenda of

the Executive since it permits the President to govern without consulting the Legislative.

Another factor that contributes to cooperation within the Parliament is the centralization

of the decision making process around party leaders. The Internal Regiment of the

This is a question that takes into account much more the pressure of the diversity of interests than technical criteria properly speaking.

Chamber of Deputies foresees the distribution of parliamentary rights starting from party

criteria: i) the composition of the Directive Body is recognized by the regiment; iii)

beyond this, it is beholden to the leaders to oversee the nomination and destitution of

the members and directors of the commissions and projects. They can also use the

word in sessions for a time proportional to the size of their lobby to participate in the

work of any commission, propose votes in the plenary, register deputies of the party as

candidates for positions on the Council, orient the vote of their lobby in the plenary,

include and withdraw projects from the agenda, determine if the consideration of a bill

will have an urgent character, indicate members for parliamentary communications

before the order of the day and, fundamentally, negotiate, together with the Executive,

the demands of their cohort. (PACHECO; MENDES, 1998 apud SANTOS, 2006, p.

231).

The Executive, through its legal power and owing to its power over the agenda,

manages to bargain political support from the Congress. And, in its turn, it is the party

leaders that mediate this exchange, negotiating the demands of both. Therefore, it is

rational for the parliamentarians to act individually in the Congress, in the same way that

the Executive, owing to the high transitional cost that it sustains, does not negotiate or

bargain the vote of each parliamentarian individually (“the legislative organization was

not arranged to deal with the demands of the parliamentarians individually”

(FIGUEIREDO, LIMONGI, 1999 apud SANTOS, 2006, p. 232). In this way, it is natural

to think that the leader will act as an intermediary for the demands of the members of

his party together with the Executive, if his indication for the vote for a determinate

measure was followed. According to Carlos Pereira and Bernardo Mueller (2003, p.

740) “It is in this moment that parties, fragile links between the representatives and

voters, become Strong actors. Indeed strong, but within the congressional and

governmental space”.

4. SOCIAL BACKGROUND: A NEW LOOK AT PARLIAMENTARY BEHAVIOUR

As has been seen, there are different forms of analysis regarding

parliamentary behaviour, on one hand parliamentarians must attend to the demands of

their respective electorates; on the other hand, they are limited by the will of the leaders

of their parliamentary blocks. The conclusion to which scholars of the theme have

arrived seems to be different and to present certain limitations. As such, as Nicolau

(2000) has shown, more detailed research is necessary to clarify the decision making

process within these parties, as well as the phenomenon of party discipline.

It is in this context that this research constitutes itself by including one more

possible explicatory variable, which would be the social background of the

parliamentarian. By this concept, we understand the life history and trajectory of the

federal deputy. Beyond this, the specific social background of the deputy which here

interests us is that which, in a certain way, is tied to the health care sector.

Data collection was possible through the definition of the following categories:

i) profession; ii) professional activities and public positions; iii) union activities,

representation of classes and associations; iv) and councils. All the federal deputies of

the 54th legislature were considered according to profession, with graduations in

medicine, dentistry, nursing, veterinary medicine, physiotherapy, and physical education

being definitive. With the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th categories, it was possible to select all the

parliamentarians who exercised or participated in, in the period prior to the mandate in

question, any activity referent to health, be it as a leader, or as a member. From this

selection, it was concluded that 106 parliamentarians of the 54th Legislature have a

background in health3, with 46 of them being doctors.

The data presented in the following is preliminary and specifically refers to

the profile of these 106 parliamentarians with a social background in health.

3 The information for the construction of the categories was taken from the site for the Federal Chamber.

Table 1 : Political party versus sex

Source: table elaborated by the author.

The data shows us that, of the 106 parliamentarians with a background in

health, 93 are men, accounting for almost 88% of the total.

We further observe that the PT, PMDB, PSDB, and PSD, are respectively the

parties with the greatest number of parliamentarians with a social background in health.

At the other extreme, the parties with the greatest number of parliamentarians with a

social background in health are : PV, PROS, PRB, and PPR.

Gênero Total

F M

Partido DEM 0 5 5

PCdoB 4 1 5

PDT 1 4 5

PMDB 2 12 14

PP 0 6 6

PPS 1 0 1

PR 1 5 6

PRB 0 2 2

PROS 0 3 3

PSB 1 7 8

PSD 0 10 10

PSDB 0 10 10

PT 1 14 15

PTB 1 5 6

PV 1 3 4

SD 0 6 6

Total 13 93 106

Table 2. Parties and Party Ideologies of the Parliamentarians with a social background

in Health

Classification of Party Ideology Party Total % % by classification

Old Right PP 5,66 16,98

PR 5,66

PTB 5,66

New Right PRB 1,89 21,7

DEM 4,72

SD 5,66

PSD 9,43

Other Parties PPS 0,94 61,32

PROS 2,83

PV 3,77

PCdoB 4,72

PDT 4,72

PSB 7,55

PSDB 9,43

PMDB 13,21

PT 14,15

Total 100 100

Source: Organization of the author, use of classification of ideologies according to

Codato (2015).

Regarding the party ideology of the parliamentarians with a social background in

health, the classification of the Observatory of Social and Political Elites in Brazil

(UFPR), published in Codato (2015) states:

… the old Latin right can be classified via three descriptors: I) a connection with the military dictatorships; ii) radical defense of the non-intervention of the State in the economy; iii) defense of civil morality and the traditional family. The new right, which emerged

as a double response to the old right and the rise of the left can also be summarized in three further descriptors: I) economic liberalism, with limited intervention of the State in the economy to guarantee equality of opportunities; ii) defense of democracy; iii) radical defense of traditional family values … In “other parties” we include all of those organizations which go from the center (PSDB, PPS) to the extreme-left (PCO, PSTU, PSOL). (Codato, 2015, p. 127-128)

It is observed that 21.7% of the parliamentarians with a social background in

health make up part of the New Right, and 16.98% represent the Old Right, with

61.23% fitting into the Other Parties category. They are parties that, in total occupied 13

(New Right), 173 (Old Right), and 327 (Other Parties) chairs in the Lower House,

possessing respectively the following indexes of parliamentary growth: 1.6, 0.04, and -

0.05 (Codato, 2015).

In this manner, the Old and New Right corresponded to 38.68% of the

parliamentarians with a social background in health, as well as for a positive growth

index during the period. However, despite the parliamentary growth index being

negative for the Other Parties, they were still those that most possessed

parliamentarians with a social background in health

Table 3: Political Parties versus professional activities and public positions

Leaders

hip

Leadership;

Associated

Member

Member; Leadership

No Total

Party

PPS 0 0 0 0 1 1

PRB 1 0 0 0 1 2

PROS 1 0 0 0 2 3

PV 0 0 0 1 3 4

DEM 3 0 0 1 1 5

PCdoB 5 0 0 0 0 5

PDT 2 0 1 0 2 5

PP 5 0 0 0 1 6

PR 5 0 0 0 1 6

PTB 2 0 0 0 4 6

SD 3 0 1 0 2 6

PSB 4 0 3 1 0 8

PSD 3 0 1 0 6 10

PSDB 4 0 1 1 4 10

PMDB 3 1 1 1 8 14

PT 11 0 2 0 2 15

Total 52 1 10 5 38 106

Source: Table elaborated by the author.

Table three makes a distinction, by political party, of the role played by the

parliamentarians with a social background in Health, refering to the professional

activities and public positions which they previously occupied, that is to say, this

variable indicates if the deputies were members, leaders, associates, or none of these

categories prior to their mandate. It is observed that practically half of them occupied

leadership roles in health before they became deputies. They were in large part,

presidents of health councils, state and municipal secretaries of health, as well as acting

in leadership positions in hospitals, associations, or corporatist federations. Such data is

being organized in this research.

We also noted that only 10, amongst the total of 106 deputies, were classified as

members, either of teams or of health associations, without having occupied some sort

of leadership role.

In this research currently underway, the types of activities in health and the other

profiles of parliamentarians are still being correlated, with the aim of generating working

hypotheses. The data bank is also currently under construction.

5. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

An explanation for the behaviour of Brazilian parliamentarians is divided into two

large propositions: the first emphasizes the relation between the electoral rules and the

conduct of the legislator, and the second reinforces the importance of the regimental

rules and the power of the Executive to determine the agenda. In the first, lack of

discipline is an act free from party sanction and, owing to this, always available for any

deputy. For the second, disciplined behaviour is the norm, with the undisciplined option

being only for a few parliamentarians.

The proposal of this study was to include the explicatory variable of social

background in the classic literature about parliamentary behaviour. To this end, and

owing to methodological limitations, two selections were made: i) the first was temporal,

limiting the analysis to the 54th legislature; and the second ii) limited to deputies with a

social background in health.

Starting from these parameters, primary data about the profile of

parliamentarians with a social background in health was collected. Beyond this, it was

possible to generate a preliminary intersection between certain data points, such as:

political parties and sex; political parties and the number of parliamentarians with social

background in health; political parties, ideology of the parties, and professional activities

and public positions of the selected deputies.

This study is masters research currently underway at the UFG, also being part of

the Center for Legislative and Health Research for the Health Observatory for the

Analysis of Health Policy. The next steps will be the development of the intersections in

the data on the profiles of parliamentarians, making associations between themes of

health and parliamentary voting. Interviews will also be undertaken with the

parliamentarians selected with social background in health. Qualitative data will be

compared with quantitative data. The ultimate intention of the research, beyond

instigating a discussion with the political science literature, is to verify to what extent

parliamentarians with defined backgrounds in health have positioned themselves either

in favour of the private health sector or in support of the Constitutional, Universal Health

Care System in Brazil.

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