PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY

B.M. No. 1678, December 17, 2007

Ponente: J. Corona

Facts:

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004.

Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory

evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.

Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.

Issue:

Whether or not Petitioner Dacanay after losing his Filipino citizenship can still practice law in the Philippines.

Ruling:

The loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.

A Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.

Mr. Dacanay’s petition was granted subject to compliance with the conditions stated in RA 9225.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions “(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice.” Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on: (a) The updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP; (b) The payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is especially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

IN RE: PETITION of EPIFANIO B. MUNESES to RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES

B.M. NO. 2112 - July 24, 2012

Ponente: J. Reyes

Facts:

On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses with the Office of the Bar Confidant praying that he be granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.

The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on March 21, 1966; that he lost his privilege to practice law when he became a citizen of the United States of America on August 28, 1981.

On September 15, 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 or the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003" by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Washington, D.C., USA.

The petitioner submitted the conditions for the practice of profession stated in RA 9225.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner should be allowed to practice law in the Philippines

Ruling:

Mr. Muneses’ petition was granted but with the condition that he shall re-take the Lawyer’s Oath.

MICHAEL P. BARRIOS vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO P. MARTINEZ

A.C. No. 4585. November 12, 2004

Per Curiam

Facts:

The petition is for the disbarment filed against Atty. Francisco Martinez for having been convicted by final judgment in Criminal Case No. 6608 of a crime involving moral turpitude by Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City.

The respondent has been failing to comply with the procedures of the Court regarding his cases.

He was also charged with estafa as well as a civil case involving the victims of the Doña Paz tragedy in 1987. The Regional Trial Court also made particular mention of Martinez’s dilatory tactics during the trial.

Respondent Martinez also has been found guilty and convicted by final judgment for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for issuing a worthless check in the amount of P8,000.

Respondent’s conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude (estafa and/or violation of BP Blg. 22) clearly shows his unfitness to protect the administration of justice and therefore justifies the imposition of sanctions against him. Thus, the Integrated bar of the Philippines recommended to the Court that Atty. Martinez be disbarred, and his name stricken out from the Roll of Attorneys immediately.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Fransico Martinez should be disbarred and be stricken out of the Roll of Attorneys.

Ruling:

Conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, “imports deceit” and “certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person. It constitutes such willful

dishonesty and immoral conduct as to undermine the public confidence in law and lawyers. (Rule 138 Section 27 and Canon 1 Rule 1.01)

“Moral turpitude” includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals. In essence and in all respects, estafa, no doubt, is a crime involving moral turpitude because the act is unquestionably against justice, honesty and good morals.

He was disbarred and his name was removed from the Roll of Attorney.

LESLIE UI vs. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO

A.C. No. 3319, June 8, 2000

Ponente: J. De Leon Jr.

Facts:

The petition is for the disbarment filed against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for allegedly carrying on an immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant, Leslie Ui.

Leslie Ui married Carlos Ui in 1971 and had four children with him. In 1987 however, she found out that her husband is having an illicit relationship with the respondent Atty. Bonifacio with whom he begot a daughter sometime in 1986.

According to the complainant, the respondent admitted the relationship but said that it was over. The petitioner believed the respondent. However in December 1988, allegedly she discovered that the affair continued and that she gave birth to their second child.

The respondent claimed that in 1986, she left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only return occasionally to the Philippines to update her law practice and renew legal ties. During one of her trips to Manila sometime in June 1988, respondent was surprised when she was confronted by a woman who insisted that she was the lawful wife of Carlos Ui. Hurt and desolate upon her discovery of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, respondent then left for Honolulu, Hawaii sometime in July 1988 and returned only in March 1989 with her two children.

It is respondent’s contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were married abroad and that after June 1988 when respondent discovered Carlos Ui’s true civil status, she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her in Alabang. It was respondent who lived in Alabang in a house which belonged to her mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that the said house was built exclusively from her parents’ funds.

By way of counterclaim, respondent sought moral damages in the amount of Ten Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00) against complainant for having filed the present allegedly malicious and groundless disbarment case against respondent.

Respondent Atty. Bonifacio submitted a Certification of Marriage but the Court found out that it was altered. It was dated October 22, 1985, and not October 22, 1987.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Martinez should be disbarred.

Ruling:

Atty. Martinez was reprimanded for knowingly and willfully attaching to her Answer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a stern warning that a repetition of the same will merit a more severe penalty.

Respondent was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral.

Respondent’s act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession. The complaint for Gross Immorality against Respondent was dismissed for lack of merit.

PATRICIA FIGUEROA vs. SIMEON BARRANCO, JR

SBC Case No. 519. July 31, 1997

Ponente: J. Romero

Facts:

In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the legal profession. Respondent had passed the 1970 bar examinations on the fourth attempt, after unsuccessful attempts in 1966, 1967 and 1968. Before he could take his oath, however, complainant filed the instant petition averring that respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a child out of wedlock was born to them and that respondent did not fulfill his repeated promises to marry her. Her trust in him and their relationship ended in 1971, when she learned that respondent married another woman.

On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for failure of complainant to prosecute the case for an unreasonable period of time and to allow Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyer’s oath upon payment of the required fees.

Respondent’s hopes were again dashed on November 17, 1988 when the Court, in response to complainant’s opposition, resolved to cancel his scheduled oath-taking. On June 1, 1993, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

Issue:

Whether or not the Respondent should be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath

Ruling:

The IBP stated that, “We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. His

engaging in premarital sexual relations with complainant and promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but the same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral.”

Complainant was then an adult who voluntarily and actively pursued their relationship and was not an innocent young girl who could be easily led astray. Unfortunately, respondent chose to marry and settle permanently with another woman. We cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which should be entered into because of love, not for any other reason.

Simon Barranco Jr. was allowed to take the lawyer’s oath upon payment of the proper fees.

SALVACION DELIZO CORDOVA vs. ATTY. LAURENCE D. CORDOVA

A.M. No. 3249, November 29, 1989

Facts:

In an unsworn letter-complaint dated 14 April 1988 addressed to then Mr. Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, complainant Salvacion Delizo charged her husband, Atty. Laurence D. Cordova, with immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar.

Respondent Cordova left his family as well as his job and went to Surigao with one Fely G. Holgado. Fely G. Holgado was herself married and left her own husband and children to stay with respondent.

Respondent Cordova and Fely G. Holgado lived together in Bislig as husband and wife, with respondent Cordova introducing Fely to the public as his wife, and established a sari-sari store in the public market at Bislig, while at the same time failing to support his legitimate family.

On 6 April 1986, respondent Cordova and his complainant wife had an apparent reconciliation. Respondent promised that he would separate from Fely Holgado. Respondent would, however, frequently come home from beerhouses or cabarets, drunk, and continued to neglect the support of his legitimate family.

In February 1987, complainant found out that respondent Cordova was living with another mistress, one Luisita Magallanes, and had taken his younger daughter Melanie along with him. They hid Melanie from the complinant, compelling her to go to court and to take back her daughter by habeas corpus. The RTC gave her custody of their children.

Finally the Commission received a telegram message apparently from complainant, stating that complainant and respondent had been reconciled with each other.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Cordova is guilty of immoral conduct

Ruling:

The reconciliation does not excuse and wipe away the misconduct and immoral behavior of the respondent carried out in public, and necessarily adversely reflecting upon him as a member of the Bar and upon the Philippine Bar itself. An applicant for admission to membership in the bar is required to show that he is possessed of good moral character. The requirement persists as a continuing condition for membership in the Bar in good standing. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes "a mockery of the inviolable social institution or marriage.

Respondent Cordova maintained for about two years an adulterous relationship with a married woman not his wife, in full view of the general public, to the humiliation and detriment of his legitimate family.

The Court Resolved to suspend respondent from the practice of law indefinitely. The Court will consider lifting his suspension when respondent Cordova submits proof satisfactory to the Commission and this Court that he has and continues to provide for the support of his legitimate family and that he has given up the immoral course of conduct that he has clung to.

JOSELANO GUEVARRA vs. ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA

A.C. No. 7136, August 1, 2007

Per Curiam

Facts:

On March 4, 2002, Joselano Guevarra filed a Complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala for "grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath."

He first met respondent in January 2000 when his then-fiancée Irene introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne with whom he had three children. After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from January to March 2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read "I love you," "I miss you," or "Meet you at Megamall."

In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.

On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene's birthday celebration at which he saw her and respondent celebrating with her family and friends.

Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B 11th Street, New Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned still later that when his friends saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert, she was pregnant.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Eala s guilty of grossly immoral conduct and for violating the lawyer’s oath

Ruling:

Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, was disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Lawyer’s Oath

I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood,

nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will

conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental

reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal

profession.

ROBERTO SORIANO vs. Atty. MANUEL DIZON

A.C. No. 6792, January 25, 2006

Per Curiam

Facts:

The petition is for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon filed by Roberto Soriano. Complainant alleges that the conviction of respondent for a crime involving moral turpitude, together with the circumstances surrounding the conviction, violates Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

Atty. Manuel Dizon who was apparently drunk, shot Mr. Soriano after a confrontation. The latter was then brought to the hospital by Antonio Billanes, who served as a witness. The bullet lacerated his carotid artery and he also sustained a spinal cord injury, which caused paralysis on the left part of his body and disabled him for his job as a taxi driver. The respondent was then charged and convicted with frustrated homicide.

On January 18, 2002, respondent filed an application for probation, which was granted by the court on several conditions.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Dizon is guilty of moral turpitude and should be disbarred.

Ruling:

Moral turpitude has been defined as “everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general,

contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.”

The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By his conduct, respondent revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities.

In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest and duplicitous behavior. As found by the trial court, he had sought, with the aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel Fariñas, an out-of-court settlement with complainant’s family. But when this effort failed, respondent concocted a complete lie by making it appear that it was complainant’s family that had sought a conference with him to obtain his referral to a neurosurgeon. He went on to fabricate an entirely implausible story of having been mauled by complainant and two other persons.

Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar membership is more important than truthfulness. The rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior. Hence, lawyers must not mislead the court or allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in good faith.

He was disbarred and his name was removed from the Roll of Attorneys

CRISTINO G. CALUB vs. ATTY. ABRAHAM A. SULLER

Adm. Case No. 1474, January 28, 2000

Per Curiam

Facts:

In the morning of January 20, 1975, while complainant was away, respondent Atty. Abraham A. Suller went to the complainant's abode in Aringay, La Union ostensibly to borrow a blade. As the respondent was a friend of the family and a neighbor, the complainant's wife let him in. Thereafter, respondent began touching her in different parts of her body. When she protested, respondent threatened her and forced her to have sexual intercourse with him. At that moment, complainant returned home to get money to pay for real estate taxes. When he entered the house, he saw his wife and respondent having sexual intercourse on the bed. She was kicking respondent with one foot while the latter pressed on her arms and other leg, preventing her from defending herself.

On January 23, 1975, complainant filed with the Municipal Court, Aringay, La Union a criminal complaint2 for rape against respondent. The case was later remanded to the Court of First Instance, Agoo, La Union.

On June 3, 1975, Cristino G. Calub filed with the Supreme Court the instant complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Abraham A. Suller.

On July 14, 1975, respondent filed his answer. He denied the accusation as a fabrication.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent is guilty of immoral conduct and should be disbarred.

Ruling:

The testimonies of witnesses in the criminal complaint, particularly that of the complainant suffice to show that respondent acted in a grossly reprehensible manner in having carnal knowledge of his neighbor's wife without her consent in her very home.

A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

The suspension for one year recommended by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is not sufficient punishment for the immoral act of respondent. The rape of his neighbor's wife constituted serious moral depravity even if his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt in the criminal prosecution for rape. He is not worthy to remain a member of the bar. The privilege to practice law is bestowed upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally.

"Good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but it must also be possessed at all times in order to maintain one's good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity."

The respondent was disbarred and his name was removed from the Roll of Attorneys.

PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 159486-88, November 25, 2003

Per Curiam

Facts:

Attorney Alan F. Paguia, speaking for petitioner, asserts that the inhibition of the members of the Supreme Court from hearing the petition is called for under Rule 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct prohibiting justices or judges from participating in any partisan political activity which proscription, according to him, the justices have violated by attending the ‘EDSA 2 Rally’ and by authorizing the assumption of Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to the Presidency in violation of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that the justices have thereby prejudged a case that would assail the legality of the act taken by President Arroyo. The subsequent decision of the Court in Estrada v. Arroyo (353 SCRA 452 and 356 SCRA 108) is, petitioner states, a patent mockery of justice and due process.

Attorney Paguia first made his appearance for petitioner when he filed an Omnibus Motion on 19 May 2003, before the Sandiganbayan, asking that ‘the appointment of counsels de officio (sic) be declared functus officio’ and that, being the now counsel de parte, he be notified of all subsequent proceedings in Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565 and No. 26905 pending therein. Finally, Attorney Paguia asked that all the foregoing criminal cases against his client be dismissed.

The request of the movant is simply for the Court to include in its Joint Resolution the TRUTH of the acts of Chief Justice Davide, et al., last January 20, 2001.

The petition for certiorari was dismissed and the Court ordered Attorney Alan Paguia, counsel for petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, to SHOW CAUSE, within ten days from notice hereof, why he should not be sanctioned for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the Court.”

On 10 October 2003, Atty. Paguia submitted his compliance with the show-cause order. In a three-page pleading, Atty. Paguia, in an obstinate display of defiance, repeated his earlier claim of political partisanship against the members of the Court.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Paguia guilty for the conduct unbecoming a lawyer

Ruling:

Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that the lawyer should observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers and, indeed, should insist on similar conduct by others. In liberally imputing sinister and devious motives and questioning the impartiality, integrity, and authority of the members of the Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded in seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert the dispensation of justice.

Atty. Paguia has also been called to the mandate of Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibiting a member of the bar from making such public statements on a case that may tend to arouse public opinion for or against a party. Unrelentingly, Atty. Paguia has continued to make public statements of like nature.

The Court has already warned Atty. Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to become mindful of his grave responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court. Apparently, he has chosen not to at all take heed.

Attorney Alan Paguia was suspended indefinitely from the practice of law for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the Court.

MR. and MRS. VENUSTIANO G. SABURNIDO vs. ATTY. FLORANTE E. MADROÑO

A.C. No. 4497, September 26, 2001

Ponenete: J. Quisumbing

Facts:

Complainant Venustiano Saburnido is a member of the Philippine National Police stationed at Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, while his wife Rosalia is a public school teacher. Respondent is a former judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Balingasag-Lagonglong, Misamis Oriental.

Complainants allege that respondent has been harassing them by filing numerous complaints against them, in addition to committing acts of dishonesty.

Previous to this administrative case, complainants also filed three separate administrative cases against respondent. Venustiano Saburnido filed charges of grave threats and acts unbecoming a member of the judiciary against respondent. Respondent was therein found guilty of pointing a high-powered firearm at complainant, who was unarmed at the time, during a heated altercation. Respondent was accordingly dismissed from the service with prejudice to reemployment in government but without forfeiture of retirement benefits.

Respondent was again administratively charged in the consolidated cases. In the first case, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Florencia Sealana-Abbu charged that respondent granted and reduced bail in a criminal case without prior notice to the prosecution. In the second case, the spouses Saburnido charged that respondent, in whose court certain confiscated smuggled goods were deposited, allowed other persons to take the goods but did not issue the corresponding memorandum receipts. Some of the goods were lost while others were substituted with damaged goods. Respondent was found guilty of both charges and his retirement benefits were forfeited.

Complainants allege that respondent filed those cases against them in retaliation, since they had earlier filed administrative cases against him that resulted in his dismissal from the judiciary. Complainants assert that due to the complaints filed against them, they suffered much moral, mental, physical, and financial damage. They claim that their children had to stop going to school since the family funds were used up in attending to their cases.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Madrono is guilty of gross misconduct and should be suspended.

Ruling:

The Court stated that: “Complainants ask that respondent be disbarred. However, we find that suspension from the practice of law is sufficient to discipline respondent. The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. While we will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, we will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end. In this case, we find suspension to be a sufficient sanction against respondent. Suspension, we may add, is not primarily intended as a punishment, but as a means to protect the public and the legal profession.”

Respondent Atty. Florante E. Madroño was found guilty of gross misconduct and is was suspended from the practice of law for one year with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS HENSON vs. PASTOR D. AGO, LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-28546, July 30, 1975

Ponente: J. Castro

Facts:

In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas Henson filed a replevin suit against Pastor Ago in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover certain machineries. In 1957 judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering Ago to return the machineries or pay definite sums of money.

The trial court issued on August 25, 1961 a writ of execution. The sheriff then advertised them for auction sale on October 25, 1961.

On April 17, 1964 the sheriff executed the final deed of sale in favor of the vendees Castañeda and Henson. Upon their petition, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued a writ of possession to the properties.

On May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, with his wife, Lourdes Yu Ago filed a complaint. They stated that the writ of execution was issued only against husband Pastor, and that wife Lourdes was not a party to her husband's venture in the logging business which failed and resulted in the replevin suit and which did not benefit the conjugal partnership.

On May 3, 1967 the court finally, and for the third time, lifted the restraining order. The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals where they filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction. The said court gave due course to the petition and granted preliminary injunction.

Failing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners Castañeda and Henson filed the present petition for review of the aforesaid decision

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Luison violated Canon 1 Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the lawyer’s oath.

Ruling:

Yes, Atty. Luison vilolated Canon 1 Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The respondents Agos, abetted by their lawyer Jose M. Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners. The respondents, with the assistance of counsel, maneuvered for fourteen (14) years to

doggedly resist execution of the judgment thru manifold tactics in and from one court to another (5 times in the Supreme Court).

It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his clients’ propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.

ADELINO H. LEDESMA vs. HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO

G.R. No. L-23815 June 28, 1974

Ponente: J. Fernando

Facts:

Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an accused in a case pending in the sala of the respondent judge.

On October 13, 1964, Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Negros Occidental. He commenced discharging his duties, and filed a motion to withdraw from his position as counsel de parte.

The respondent Judge not only denied the motion but also appointed him as counsel de oficio for the two defendants.

On November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as on the volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense.

On November 6, Judge denied the motion. Hence, Ledesma instituted this certiorari proceeding.

Issue:

Whether or not a member of the bar may withdraw as counsel de oficio due to appointment as Election Registrar.

Ruling:

The Court stated that:

‘Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of an accused. Such a consideration could have sufficed for petitioner not being allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio. For he did betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for the task entrusted to him, to put matters mildly. He did point though to his responsibility as an election registrar. Assuming his good faith, no such excuse could be availed now. There is not likely at present, and in the immediate

future, an exorbitant demand on his time. It may likewise be assumed, considering what has been set forth above, that petitioner would exert himself sufficiently to perform his task as defense counsel with competence, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the profession in good standing. The admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that there are times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the promptings of self-interest.”

The petition for certiorari was dismissed and Atty. Ledesma was not allowed to withdraw as counsel de officio because of lack of merit.

SPOUSES ANTONIO F. ALGURA and LORENCITA S.J. ALGURA vs. THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT OF THE CITY OF NAGA

G.R. No. 150135, October 30, 2006

Ponente: J. Velasco Jr.

Facts:

On September 1, 1999, spouses Antonio F. Algura and Lorencita S.J. Algura filed a Verified Complaint dated August 30, 19994 for damages against the Naga City Government and its officers, arising from the alleged illegal demolition of their residence and boarding house and for payment of lost income derived from fees paid by their boarders amounting to PhP 7,000.00 monthly.

Finding that petitioners' motion to litigate as indigent litigants was meritorious, Executive Judge Jose T. Atienza of the Naga City RTC, in the September 1, 1999 Order,8 granted petitioners' plea for exemption from filing fees.

On October 13, 1999, respondents filed an Answer with Counterclaim dated October 10, 1999,9 arguing that the defenses of the petitioners in the complaint had no cause of action, the spouses' boarding house blocked the road right of way, and said structure was a nuisance per se.

On March 13, 2000, respondents filed a Motion to Disqualify the Plaintiffs for Non-Payment of Filing Fees dated March 10, 2000.11 They asserted that in addition to the more than PhP 3,000.00 net income of petitioner Antonio Algura, who is a member of the Philippine National Police, spouse Lorencita Algura also had a mini-store and a computer shop on the ground floor of their residence along Bayawas St., Sta. Cruz, Naga City. Also, respondents claimed that petitioners' second floor was used as their residence and as a boarding house, from which they earned more than PhP 3,000.00 a month. In addition, it was claimed that petitioners derived additional income from their computer shop patronized by students and from several boarders who paid rentals to them. Hence, respondents concluded that petitioners were not indigent litigants.

On April 14, 2000, the Naga City RTC issued an Order disqualifying petitioners as indigent litigants on the ground that they failed to substantiate their claim for exemption from payment of legal fees and to comply with the third paragraph of Rule 141, Section 18 of the Revised Rules of Court—directing them to pay the requisite filing fees.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners should be considered as indigent litigants who qualify for exemption from paying filing fees.

Ruling:

There was no hearing on the matter hence the case was remanded back to the lower court. In this case, the Supreme Court reconciled the provisions of Sec. 21, Rule 3 and Sec. 19, Rule 141 (then Sec. 16, Rule 141).

Sec. 21, Rule 3, merely provides a general statement that indigent litigants may not be required to pay the filing fees. On the other hand, Sec. 19, Rule 141 provides the specific standards that a party must meet before he can be qualified as an indigent party and thus be exempt from paying the required fees.

If Sec. 19, Rule 141 (in this case, then Sec. 16, Rule 141) is strictly applied, then the spouses could not qualify because their income exceeds P1.5k, which was the threshold prior to 2000. But if Sec. 21, Rule 3 is to be applied, the applicant (the Spouses) should be given a chance in a hearing to satisfy the court that notwithstanding the evidence presented by the opposing party (Naga), they have no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and other basic necessities for their family, and are thus, qualified as indigent litigants under said Rule. Therefore, the court should have conducted a trial in order to let the spouses satisfy the court that indeed the income they’re having, even though above the P1.5k limit, was not sufficient to cover food, shelter, and their other basic needs.

Respondent’s denial is a negative pregnant,

A denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it in affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.27 (Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of having "personal knowledge" of Irene's daughter Samantha Louise Irene Moje's Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named respondent – a "lawyer," 38 years old – as the child's father. And the phrase "NOT MARRIED" is entered on the desired information on "DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE." A comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in the certificate28 with her signature on the Marriage Certificate29 shows that they were affixed by one and the same person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating Commissioner noted, respondent never denied being the father of the child.

Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.

"Adultery" being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that "committed by any married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared void.

Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional provision, obligates the husband and the wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support."40

Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law."

In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

The commissioner found that respondent had not only been convicted of such crime, but that the latter also exhibited an obvious lack of good moral character, based on the following facts:

“1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;

“2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only because the latter, driving a taxi, had overtaken him;

“3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault, Respondent went back to his car, got a gun, wrapped the same with a handkerchief and shot Complainant[,] who was unarmed;

“4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out and fled;

“5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence, Respondent denied that he had shot Complainant;

“6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he was the one mauled by Complainant and two unidentified persons; and,

“7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has[,] to date[,] not yet satisfied his civil liabilities to Complainant.

Rule 138 Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

Moral turpitude has been defined as “everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.”

That discretion belonged to the courts, as explained thus:

Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances.

crime of homicide did not involve moral turpitude, the Court appreciated the presence of incomplete self-defense and total absence of aggravating circumstances. For a better understanding of that Decision, the circumstances of the crime are quoted as follows:

“x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI employee] was then urinating and had his back turned when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face; that the victim then forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack but was ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan knife from the left pocket of his shirt and desperately swung it at the victim who released his hold on Micosa only after the latter had stabbed him several times. These facts show that Micosa's intention was not to slay the victim but only to defend his person. The appreciation in his favor of the mitigating circumstances of self-defense and voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's character and intentions were not inherently vile, immoral or unjust.”

On 23 September 2003, this Court issued its resolution in the above-numbered case; it read:

“The case for consideration has been brought to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by Joseph Ejercito Estrada, acting through his counsel Attorney Alan F. Paguia, against the Sandiganbayan, et al. The Petition prays –

“1. That Chief Justice Davide and the rest of the members of the Honorable Court disqualify themselves from hearing and deciding this petition;

“2. That the assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan be vacated and set aside; and

“3. That Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565 and No. 26905 pending before the Sandiganbayan be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

On 2 July 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued an order denying the foregoing motion, as well as the motion to dismiss, filed by petitioner. Forthwith, petitioner filed a ‘Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon’ of the foregoing order. According to Attorney Paguia, during the hearing of his ‘Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon’ on 11 June 2003, the three justices of the Special Division of the Sandiganbayan made manifest their bias and partiality against his client. Thus, he averred, Presiding Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario supposedly employed foul and disrespectful language when she blurted out, ‘Magmumukha naman kaming gago,’ (Rollo, p. 13.) and Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro characterized the motion as insignificant even before the prosecution could file its comments or opposition thereto, (Rollo, p. 12.) remarking in open court that to grant Estrada’s motion would result in chaos and disorder. (Ibid.) Prompted by the alleged ‘bias and partial attitude’ of the Sandiganbayan justices, Attorney Paguia filed, on 14 July 2003, a motion for their disqualification. On 31 July 2003, petitioner received the two assailed resolutions, i.e., the resolution (Promulgated on 30 July 2003.) of 28 July 2003, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of 6 July 2003; viz:

‘WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused-movant Joseph Ejercito Estrada’s ‘Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon’ (Na tumutukoy sa Joint Resolution ng Hulyo 2, 2003) dated July 6, 2003 is DENIED for lack of merit.’ (Rollo, p. 37.)

“and the resolution (Promulgated on 30 July 2003.) of 25 July 2003, denying petitioner’s motion for disqualification of 14 July 2003; viz:

‘WHEREFORE, prescinding from all the foregoing, the Court, for want of merit, hereby DENIES the Motion for Disqualification.’ (Rollo, p. 48.)

Attorney Pagula went on to state that-

‘The act of the public officer, if LAWFUL, is the act of the public office. But the act of the public officer, if UNLAWFUL, is not the act of the public office. Consequently, the act of the justices, if LAWFUL, is the act of the Supreme Court. But the act of the justices, if UNLAWFUL, is not the act of the Supreme Court. It is submitted that the Decision in ESTRADA vs. ARROYO being patently unlawful in view of Rule 5.10 of the CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, is not the act of the Supreme Court but is merely the wrong or trespass of those individual Justices who falsely spoke and acted in the name of the Supreme Court. (Urbano vs. Chavez, 183 SCRA [347]). Furthermore, it would seem absurd to allow the Justices to use the name of the Supreme Court as a shield for their UNLAWFUL act.’ (Petition, Rollo, p. 11.)

“Criticism or comment made in good faith on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness, of a decision of the Court would be welcome for, if well-founded, such reaction can enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed. (In Re Sotto, 82 Phil 595.)

“The ruling in Estrada v. Arroyo, being a final judgment, has long put to end any question pertaining to the legality of the ascension of Arroyo into the presidency. By reviving the issue on the validity of the assumption of Mme. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to the presidency, Attorney Paguia is vainly seeking to breathe life into the carcass of a long dead issue.

“Attorney Paguia has not limited his discussions to the merits of his client’s case within the judicial forum; indeed, he has repeated his assault on the Court in both broadcast and print media. Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a member of the bar from making such public statements on any pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party. By his acts, Attorney Paguia may have stoked the fires of public dissension and posed a potentially dangerous threat to the administration of justice.

“It is not the first time that Attorney Paguia has exhibited similar conduct towards the Supreme Court. In a letter, dated 30 June 2003, addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, he has demanded, in a clearly disguised form of forum shopping, for several advisory opinions on matters pending before the Sandiganbayan. In a resolution, dated 08 July 2003, this Court has strongly warned Attorney Alan Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to desist from further making, directly or indirectly, similar submissions to this Court or to its Members. But, unmindful of the well-meant admonition to him by the Court, Attorney Paguia appears to persist on end.

Canon 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which Atty. Paguia has tirelessly quoted to give some semblance of validity for his groundless attack on the Court and its members, provides -

“Rule 5.10. A judge is entitled to entertain personal views on political questions. But to avoid suspicion of political partisanship, a judge shall not make political speeches, contribute to party funds, publicly endorse candidates for political office or participate in other partisan political activities.”

Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code defines the term “partisan political activities;” the law states:

“The term ‘election campaign’ or ‘partisan political activity’ refers to an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office which shall include:

“(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate;

“(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate.

“(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against the election of any candidate for public office;

“(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose the election of any candidate; or

“(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.”

CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.

Rule 11.01 - A lawyer shall appear in court properly attired.

Rule 11.02 - A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.

Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.

Rule 11.04 - A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.

Rule 11.05 - A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper authorities only.

In the present case, the spouses Saburnido allege that respondent has been harassing them by filing numerous complaints against them, namely:

1. Adm. Case No. 90-0755,[5] for serious irregularity, filed by respondent against Venustiano Saburnido. Respondent claimed that Venustiano lent his service firearm to an acquaintance who thereafter extorted money from public jeepney drivers while posing as a member of the then Constabulary Highway Patrol Group.

2. Adm. Case No. 90-0758,[6] for falsification, filed by respondent against Venustiano Saburnido and two others. Respondent averred that Venustiano, with the help of his co-respondents in the case, inserted an entry in the police blotter regarding the loss of Venustiano’s firearm.

3. Crim. Case No. 93-67,[7] for evasion through negligence under Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code, filed by respondent against Venustiano Saburnido. Respondent alleged that Venustiano Saburnido, without permission from his superior, took into custody a prisoner by final judgment who thereafter escaped.

4. Adm. Case No. 95-33,[8] filed by respondent against Rosalia Saburnido for violation of the Omnibus Election Code. Respondent alleged that Rosalia Saburnido served as chairperson of the Board of Election Inspectors during the 1995 elections despite being related to a candidate for barangay councilor.

At the time the present complaint was filed, the three actions filed against Venustiano Saburnido had been dismissed while the case against Rosalia Saburnido was still pending.

replevin, sometimes known as "claim and delivery," is a legal remedy for a person to recover goods unlawfully withheld from his or her possession, by means of a special form of legal process in which a court may require a defendant to return specific goods to the plaintiff at the outset of the action

CASTANEDA

In view of the private respondents' propensity to use the courts for purposes other than to seek justice, and in order to obviate further delay in the disposition of the case below which might again come up to the appellate courts but only to fail in the end, we have motu proprio examined the record of civil case Q-7986 (the mother case of the present case). We find that

(a) the complaint was filed on May 2, 1964 (more than 11 years ago) but trial on the merits has not even started;

(b) after the defendants Castañedas had filed their answer with a counterclaim, the plaintiffs Agos filed a supplemental complaint where they impleaded new parties-defendants;

(c) after the admission of the supplemental complaint, the Agos filed a motion to admit an amended supplemental complaint, which impleads an additional new party-defendant (no action has yet been taken on this motion);

(d) the defendants have not filed an answer to the admitted supplemental complaint; and

(e) the last order of the Court of First Instance, dated April 20, 1974, grants an extension to the suspension of time to file answer. (Expediente, p. 815)

The Supplemental Complaint

Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that after the filing of the complaint, the defendants, taking advantage of the dissolution of the preliminary injunction, in conspiracy and with gross bad faith and evident intent to cause

damage to the plaintiffs, caused the registration of the sheriff's final deed of sale; that, to cause more damage, the defendants sold to their lawyer and his wife two of the parcels of land in question; that the purchasers acquired the properties in bad faith; that the defendants mortgaged the two other parcels to the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation while the defendants' lawyer and his wife also mortgaged the parcels bought by them to the Rizal Commercial Bank; and that the bank also acted in bad faith.

The second cause of action consists of an allegation of additional damages caused by the defendants' bad faith in entering into the aforesaid agreements and transactions.

RULE 141

Section 18. Indigent-litigants exempts from payment of legal fees. — Indigent litigants (a) whose gross income and that of their immediate family do not exceed four thousand (P4,000.00) pesos a month if residing in Metro Manila, and three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos a month if residing outside Metro Manila, and (b) who do not own real property with an assessed value of more than fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos shall be exempt from the payment of legal fees.

The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorably to the indigent litigant, unless the court otherwise provides.

To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit that he and his immediate family do not earn a gross income abovementioned, nor they own any real property with the assessed value aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of the litigant's affidavit.

Any falsity in the affidavit of a litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to strike out the pleading of that party, without prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have been incurred. (16a)

Rule 3

Section 21. Indigent party. — A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as an indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family.

The ends of justice would be served by requiring Ledesma to continue as counsel de oficio because: the case has been postponed at least 8 times at the defense's instance; there was no incompatibility between duty of petitioner to defend the accused, and his task as an election registrar. There is not likely at present, and in the immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his time.

Ledesma's withdrawal would be an act showing his lack of fidelity to the duty required of the legal profession. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is burdened with conditions. The legal profession is dedicated to the ideal of service, and is not a mere trade. A lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio to aid in the performance of the administration of justice. The fact that such services are rendered without pay should not diminish the lawyer's zeal.

In People v. Holgado: “In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and; without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.”

The present Constitution provides not only “that the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel” but further provides that “Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.” This made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of the accused.

Thus, Ledesma should exert himself sufficiently, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the profession in good standing. The admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal

practitioners that there are times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the promptings of self-interest.