9/2/2014

COMPILATION OF LEGAL MAXIMS STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Balmeo, Marie Dominique Cabatu, Rema Pazvia Cantos, Julie Marie Cay-an, Dorothy Joy Galano, Faith Alexis Reyes, Katherine Ann 1N

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS 1

ABSOLUTA SENTENTIA EXPOSITORE NON INDIGET 10

WHEN LANGUAGE OF THE LAW IS CLEAR, NO EXPLANATION OF IT IS REQUIRED 10 AUGUSTUS CEAZAR GAN VS. HON. ANTONIO REYES 10 G.R. No.145527, May 28, 2002 10

ACTUS ME INVITO FACTUS NON EST MEUS ACTUS 10

AN ACT DONE BY ME AGAINST MY WILL IS NOT MY ACT 10 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO 10 G.R. No. 127755, April 14, 1999 10

ACTUS NON FACIT REUM, NISI MENS SIT REA 11

THE ACT ITSELF DOES NOT MAKE A MAN GUILTY UNLESS HIS INTENTIONS WERE SO 11 LILY SY VS. HON. MERCEDITAS GUTIERREZ, ET AL. 11 G.R. No. 171579 November 14, 2012 11

AD PROXIMUM ANTECEDENS FIAT RELATION NISI IMPEDIATUR SETENTIA 12

RELATIVE WORDS REFER TO THE NEAREST ANTECEDENTS, UNLESS THE CONTEXT OTHERWISE REQUIRES. 12 MAPA VS. HON. JOKER ARROYO AND LABRADOR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 12 G.R. No. 78585 (July 5, 1989) 12

ARGUMENTUM A CONTRARIO 12

NEGATIVE-OPPOSITE DOCTRINE; WHAT IS EXPRESSED PUTS AN END TO WHAT IS IMPLIED 12 MISAEL VERA, ET AL. VS. HON. JOSE F. FERNANDEZ, ET AL. 12

CASSUS OMISSUS PRO OMISSO HABENDUS EST 13

A PERSON, OBJECT OR THING OMITTED FROM AN ENUMERATION MUST BE HELD TO HAVE BEEN OMITTED INTENTIONALLY

13 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. GUILLERMO MANANTAN 13 G.R. No. 14129, July 31, 1962 13

CESSANTE RATIONE LEGIS, CESSAT IPSA LEX 14

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WHEN THE REASON OF THE LAW CEASES, THE LAW ITSELF CEASES. 14 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ALMUETE 14 G.R. No. L-26551, February 27, 1976 14

CONTEMPORANEA EXPOSITION EST OPTIMA ET FORTISSIMO IN LEGE 14

THE CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION IS THE STRONGEST LAW. 14 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ISABELO PUNO, ET AL. 14 G.R. No. 97471 February 17, 1993 14

DISTINGUE TEMPORA ET CONCORDABIS JURA 15

DISTINGUISH TIMES AND YOU WILL HARMONIZE THE LAW 15 UNITED STATES VS. GASPAR ALVIR 15 G.R. No. L-3981, January 14, 1908 15

DURA LEX SED LEX 16

THE LAW MAY BE HARSH, BUT THAT IS THE LAW. 16 ARNEL SAGANA VS. RICHARD FRANCISCO 16 G.R. No.161952, October 2, 2009 16

EJUSDEM GENERIS 17

OF THE SAME KIND OR SPECIE 17 LIWAG VS. HAPPY GLEN LOOP HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. 17 G. R. No. 189755, July 04, 2012 17

EXCEPTIO FIRMAT REGULAM IN CASIBUS NON EXCEPTIS 17

A THING NOT BEING EXCEPTED MUST BE REGARDED AS COMING WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE GENERAL RULE 17 ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC VS. THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC CITY 17 G.R. No. L-24322; July 21, 1967 17

EX DOLO MALO NON ORITUR ACTIO 18

NO MAN CAN BE ALLOWED TO FOUND A CLAIM UPON HIS OWN WRONGDOING 18 BOUGH AND BOUGH VS. CANTIVEROS AND HANOPOL 18 G.R. No. 13300; September 29, 1919 18

EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSION ALTERIUS 19

THE EXPRESS MENTION OF ONE PERSON, THING OR CONSEQUENCE IMPLIES THE EXCLUSION OF ALL OTHERS 19

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COCONUT OIL REFINERS ASSOCIATION, INC. VS. HON. RUBEN TORRES, ET. AL. 19 G.R. No. 132527; July 29, 2005 19

EXPRESSUM FACIT CESSARE TACITUM 19

WHAT IS EXPRESSED PUTS AN END TO THAT WHICH IS IMPLIED 19 COA CEBU VS. PROVINCE OF CEBU 19 G.R. No. 141386; November 29, 2001 19

EX NECESSITATE LEGIS 20

BY NECESSARY IMPLICATION OF LAW 20 COA CEBU VS. PROVINCE OF CEBU 20 G.R. No. 141386; November 29, 2001 20

FALSA DEMONSTRATIO NON NOCET, CUM DE CORPORE CONSTAT 20

FALSE DESCRIPTION DOES NOT PRECLUDE CONSTRUCTION NOR VITIATE THE MEANING OF THE STATURE 20 DELONG VS. STARKEY 20 120 Ind. App. 288; May 9, 1950 20

FAVORES AMPLIANDI SUNT; ODIA RESTRINGENDA 21

PENAL LAWS WHICH ARE FAVORABLE TO THE ACCUSED ARE GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT 21 PEOPLE VS. QUIACHON 21 G.R. No. 170236; August 31, 2006 21

GENERALE DICTUM GENERALITER EST INTERPRETANDUM 22

A GENERAL STATEMENT IS UNDERSTOOD IN A GENERAL SENSE 22 ABDUL VS. SANDIGANBAYAN 22 G.R. No. 184496; December 2, 2013 22

GENERALIA VERBA SUNT GENERALITER INTELLIGENDA 22

WHAT IS GENERALLY SPOKEN SHALL BE GENERALLY UNDERSTOOD 22 ORCEO VS. COMELEC 22 G.R. No. 190779; March 26, 2010 22

GENERALIA SPECIALIBUS NON DEROGANT 23

A GENERAL LAW DOES NOT NULLIFY A SPECIFIC OR SPECIAL LAW 23 CUSTOMS VS. COURT OF TAX APPEALS, SMITH BELL CO., INC. 23

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G.R. No. L-41861; March 23, 1987 23

HOC QUIDEM PERQUAM DURUM EST SED ITA LEX SCRIPTA EST 23

THE LAW MAY BE EXCEEDINGLY HARD, BUT SO THE LAW IS WRITTEN 23 ROSA LIM VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 23 G.R. No. 130038. September 18, 2000 23

IMPOSSIBILIUM NULLA OBLIGATIO EST 25

THERE IS NO OBLIGATION TO DO IMPOSSIBLE THINGS 25 AKBAYAN-YOUTH VS COMELEC 25 G.R. No. 147066. March 26, 2001 25

INDEX ANIMI SERMO EST 26

SPEECH IS THE INDEX OF INTENTION 26 YOLANDA SIGNEY VS SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, EDITHA ESPINOSA-CASTILLO, AND GINA SERVANO, REPRESEN TATIVE OF GINALYN AND RODELYN SIGNEY, 26 G.R. No. 173582, January 28, 2008 26

IN EO QUOD PLUS SIT SEMPER INEST ET MINUS 27

THE GRANT OF A GREATER POWER NECESSARILY INCLUDES THE LESSER POWER 27 ELISEO F. SORIANO VS. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA 27 G.R. No. 164785, Mar 15, 2010 27

INTEREST REIPUBLICAE UT SIT FINIS LITIUM 28

PUBLIC INTEREST REQUIRES THAT BY THE VERY NATURE OF THINGS THERE MUST BE AN END TO A LEGAL CONTROVERSY 28 FELICISIMA DE LA CRUZ VS HON. EDGARDO L. PARAS 28 G.R. No. 164785, Mar 15, 2010 28

INTERPRETARE ET CONCORDARE LEGIBUS EST OPTIMUS INTERPRETANDI MODUS 29

EVERY STATUTE MUST BE SO CONSTRUED AND HARMONIZED WITH OTHER STATUTES AS TO FORM A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF

JURISPRUDENCE 29 DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC. VS CLEOFE S. JANIOLA 29 GR, 185861 30 June 2009 29

INTERPRETATIO FIENDA EST UT RES MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT 30

A LAW SHOULD BE INTERPRETED WITH A VIEW TO UPHOLDING RATHER THAN DESTROYING IT 30

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS ROMAN DERILO 30 GR, 185861 30 June 2009 30

INTERPRETATIO TALIS IN AMBIGUIS SEMPER FIENDA EST UT EVITETUR INCONVENIENS ET ABSURDUM 30

WHERE THERE IS AMBIGUITY, SUCH INTERPRETATION AS WILL AVOID INCONVENIENCE AND ABSURDITY IS TO BE ADOPTED

30 SERANA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN 30 GR NO. 162059; Jan 22, 2008 30

LEGIS INTERPRETATIO LEGIS VIM OBTINET 31

THE INTERPRETATION PLACED UPON THE WRITTEN LAW BY A COMPETENT COURT HAS THE FORCE OF LAW) 31 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PEOPLE VS JABINAL 31 GR NO. 162059; Jan 22, 2008 31

LEGES POSTERIORES PRIORES CONTRARIAS ABROGANT 32

A LATER STATUTE WHICH IS REPUGNANT TO AN EARLIER STATUTE IS DEEMED TO HAVE ABROGATED THE EARLIER ONE ON

THE SAME SUBJECT MATTER 32 CARABAO, INC. VS. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION 32 G.R. No. L-29304; Jul 3, 2014 32

LEX DE FUTURO, JUDEX DE PRATERITO 32

THE LAW PROVIDES FOR THE FUTURE, THE JUDGE FOR THE PAST. 32 DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION VS. STOCKHOLDERS OFINTERCITY SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK 32 G.R. No. 181556 ; December 14, 2009 32

LEX PROSPICIT, NON RESPICIT 33

THE LAW LOOKS FORWARD, NOT BACKWARD. 33 CLEMENTE LACESTE VS. PAULINO SANTOS, DIRECTOR OF PRISONS 33 G.R. No. L-36886; February 1, 1932 33

MALEDICTA EST EXPOSITO QUAE CORRUMPIT TEXTUM 34

IT IS DANGEROUS CONSTRUCTION WHICH IS AGAINST THE TEXT. 34 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. JUDGE PALMA AND ROMULO INTIA Y MORADA 34 G.R. No. L-44113; March 31, 1977 34

NOSCITUR A SOCIIS 34

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WORD CONSTRUED WITH REFERENCE TO ACCOMPANYING OR ASSOCIATED WORDS. 34 FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ VS. JUDICIAL BAR COUNCIL (JBC) 34 G.R. No. 202242; April 16, 2013 34

NOVA CONSTITUTIO FUTURIS FORMAM IMPONERE DEBET NON PRAETERITIS 35

A NEW STATUTE SHOULD AFFECT THE FUTURE, NOT THE PAST. 35 FERMIN MANAPAT VS. COURT OF APPEALS 35 G.R. No. 110478 35

NULLUS COMMODUM POTEST DE INJURIA PROPRIASUA 36

NO MAN SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OWN WRONG. 36 MA. AMELITA C. VILLAROSA VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL 36 G.R. No. 143351; September 14, 2000 36

NULLUM CRIMEN SINE POENA, NULLA POENA SINE LEGE 36

THERE IS NO CRIME WITHOUT A PENALTY, AND THERE IS NO PENALTY WITHOUT A LAW. 36 JUANITO R. RIMANDO VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) AND NORMA O. MAGNO 36 G.R. No. 176364 36

NULLUM TEMPUS OCCURIT REGI 37

THERE CAN BE NO LEGAL RIGHT AS AGAINST THE AUTHORITY THAT MAKES THE LAW ON WHICH THE RIGHT DEPENDS. 37 REPUBLIC VS. VILLASOR 37 G.R. No. L-30671; November 28, 1973 37

OPTIMA STATUTI INTERPRETATRIX EST IPSUM STATUTUM 38

THE BEST INTERPRETER OF A STATUTE IS THE STATUTE ITSELF 38 LOYOLA GRAND VILLAS HOMEOWNERS (SOUTH) ASSOCIATION, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS 38 G.R. No. 117188; August 7, 1997 38

OPTIMUS INTERPRES RERUM USUS 39

THE BEST INTERPRETER OF THE LAW IS USAGE. 39 JM TUASON AND CO., ET AL. VS. HON. HERMINIO MARIANO, ET AL. 39 GR No. L-33140, October 23, 1978 39

PARI MATERIA 39

RELATING TO THE SAME MATTER 39

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SIMEONA MARTIN AND HERMIN ARCEO 39 G.R. No. L-38019 May 16, 1980 39

PRIVILEGIA RECIPRINT LARGAN INTERPRETATIONEM VOLUNTATE CONSONAN CONCEDENTIS 40

PRIVILEGES ARE TO BE INTERPRETED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE WILL OF HIM WHO GRANTS THEM 40 BARRETTO VS. TUASON 40 G.R. Nos. L-36872;March 31, 1934 40

POTIOR EST IN TEMPORE, POTIOR EST IN JURE 41

HE WHO IS FIRST IN TIME IS PREFERRED IN RIGHT 41 CRUZ VS. CABANA 41 G.R. No. L-56232 June 22, 1984 41

QUANDO ALIQUID PROHIBETUR EX DIRECTO, PROHIBETUR ET PER OBLIQUUM 42

WHAT IS PROHIBITED DIRECTLY IS PROHIBITED INDIRECTLY 42 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. SEAGATE TECHNOLOGY (PHILIPPINES) 42 G.R. No. 153866 February 11, 2005 42

RATIHABITO MANDATO AQUIPARATUR 43

LEGISLATIVE RATIFICATION IS EQUIVALENT TO A MANDATE 43 THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS. THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF NEW YORK 43 G.R. No. 5876 September 1, 1911 43

RATIO LEGIS 44

INTERPRETATION ACCORDING TO THE SPIRIT 44 MANUEL UY VS. ENRICO PALOMAR, IN HIS CAPACITY AS POSTMASTER GENERAL 44 G.R. No. L-23248 February 28, 1969 44

RATIO LEGIS EST ANIMA LEGIS 45

THE REASON OF THE LAW IS ITS SOUL 45 VILLASI VS. GARCIA 45 G.R. No. 190106 January 15, 2014 45

REDDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS 47

REFERRING EACH TO EACH; REFERRING EACH PHRASE OR EXPRESSION TO ITS APPROPRIATE OBJECT; OR LET EACH BE PUT IN

ITS PROPER PLACE 47

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AMADORA VS. COURT OF APPEALS 47 G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988 47

SALUS POPULI EST SUPREMA LEX 48

THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE IS THE SUPREME LAW 48 RESTITUTO YNOT VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT 48 G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987 48

SURPLUSAGIUM NON NOCET 49

SURPLUSAGE DOES NOT VITIATE A STATUTE 49 UNITED STATES VS. JULIAN SANTIAGO 49 G.R. No. L-11374 March 14, 1917 49

STARE DECISIS ET NON QUIETA MOVERE 50

FOLLOW PAST PRECEDENTS AND DO NOT DISTURB WHAT HAS BEEN SETTLED. 50 J.R.A. PHILIPPINES, INC. V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE 50 G.R. No. 177127 October 11, 2010 50

UBI JUS, IBI REMEDIUM 51

WHERE THERE IS A RIGHT, THERE IS A REMEDY. 51 LEONARDO VS. COURT OF APPEALS 51 G. R. No. 125329. September 10, 2003 51

UBI LEX NON DISTINGUIT, NEC NOS DISTINGUERE DEBEMUS 51

WHERE THE LAW DOES NOT DISTINGUISH, WE SHOULD NOT DISTINGUISH 51 GUEVARA VS. INOCENTES 51 G. R. No. L-25577, 16 SCRA 379, March 15, 1966 51

UTILE PER INUTILE NON VITIATUR 52

THE USEFUL IS NOT VITIATED BY THE NON-USEFUL. 52 PEOPLE VS. MARTIN 52 G.R. No. L-33487; May 31, 1971 52

UT RES MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT 53

THE CONSTRUCTION IS TO BE SOUGHT WHICH GIVES EFFECT TO THE WHOLE OF THE STATUTE –ITS VERY WORD 53 PEOPLE VS. MANTALABA 53

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G.R. No. 186227 53

VERBA ACCIPIENDA SUNT SECUNDUM SUBJECTAM MATERIAM 53

A WORD IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD IN THE CONTEXT IN WHICH IT IS USED 53 R (ON THE APPLICATION OF ST (ERITREA)) (FC) VS. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT 53

VERBA INTENTIONI, NON E CONTRA, DEBENT INSERVIRE 54

WORDS OUGHT TO BE MORE SUBSERVIENT TO THE INTENT AND NOT THE INTENT TO THE WORDS. 54 LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINE REPRESENTATIVE BY LCP NATIONAL PRESIDENT JERRY P. TRENAS, ET

AL. 54 GR. No. 176951 GR. No. 177499 GR. No. 178056 54

VERBA LEGIS 55

PLAIN-MEANING RULE. 55 REPUBLIC V. LACAP 55 G.R. No. 158253; March 2, 2007 55

VIGILANTIBUS ET NON DORMIENTIBUS JURA SUBVENIUNT 56

THE LAWS AID THE VIGILANT, NOT THOSE WHO SLUMBER ON THEIR RIGHTS. 56 ALONSO VS. CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC., 56 G.R. No. 130876; December 5, 2003 56

VERBA LEGIS NON EST RECEDENDUM 58

FROM THE WORDS OF THE STATUTE THERE SHOULD BE NO DEPARTURE. 58 VICTORIA VS. COMELEC AND JESUS JAMES CALISIN 58 G.R. 109005;January 10, 1994 58

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Absoluta sententia expositore non indiget When language of the law is clear, no explanation of it is required

AUGUSTUS CEAZAR GAN vs. HON. ANTONIO REYES

G.R. No.145527, May 28, 2002 Facts: Quite apprehensive that she would not be able to send to school her three (3)-year old daughter Francheska Joy S. Pondevida, Bernadette S. Pondevida wrote petitioner Augustus Caezar R. Gan demanding support for their "love child." Petitioner, in his reply, denied paternity of the child. An ex asperated Bernadette thereafter instituted in behalf of her daughter a complaint against petitioner for support with prayer for support pendente lite. Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. He argued that since Francheska' s certificate of birth indicated her father as "UNKNOWN," there was no legal or factual basis for the claim of support. His motion, however, was denied by the trial court. Now, the petitioner is ordered by the court to give P20, 000 every month as a support to his illegitimate child. The petitioner still is not satisfied on the decision so he filed an appeal concerning that the writ of execution must not be immediate on the reason that the mother of the child committed adultery which qualifies as a defense against the action for support. Issue: Whether the appeal of the petitioner against the immediate release of support will be honoured by the court. Ruling: No. Petitioner is reminded that to the plain words of a legal provision we should make no further ex planation. Absoluta sententia expositore non indiget. Indeed, the interpretation which petitioner attempts to foist upon us would only lead to absurdity, its acceptance negating the plain meaning of the provision subject of the petition. The money and property adjudged for support and education should and must be given presently and without delay because if it had to w ait the final judgment, the children may in the meantime have suffered because of lack of food or have missed and lost years in school because of lack of funds. One cannot delay the payment of such funds for support and education for the reason that if paid long afterwards, however much the accumulated amount, its payment cannot cure the evil and repair the damage caused. The children with such belated payment for support and education cannot act as gluttons and eat voraciously and unwisely, afterwards, to make up for the years of hunger and starvation. Neither may they enrol in several classes and schools and take up numerous subjects all at once to make up for the years they missed in school, due to non-payment of the funds when needed. (De Leon v. Soriano)

Actus me invito factus non est meus actus An act done by me against my will is not my act

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO

G.R. No. 127755, April 14, 1999 Facts: The accused-appellant was convicted of the robbery with homicide and sentenced to death. The conviction of the accused was based on the testimony of a tricycle driver who claimed that the accused was the one who drove the tricycle, which the suspects used as their get-away vehicle. The accused was then invited by the police for questioning and he pointed to the location where he dropped off the suspects. When the police arrived at the supposed hide-out, a shooting incident ensued, resulting to the death of some of the suspects. After the incident, the accused was taken back to the precinct where his statement was taken on May 14, 1996.However, this was only subscribed on May 22, 1996 and the accused was made to execute a waiver of

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detention in the presence of Ex-Judge Talavera. It was noted that the accused was handcuffed through all this time up on orders of the fiscal and based on the authorities' belief that the accused might attempt to escape otherwise. Issue:

(1) Whether the Miranda rights of the accused-appellant were violated. (2) Whether the warrantless arrest of the accused-appellant was lawful.

Ruling: (1) YES. It was established that the accused was not apprised of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel in the course of the investigation. The Court held that the accused should always be apprised of his Miranda rights from the moment he is arrested by the authorities as this is deemed the start of custodial investigation. In fact, the Court included “invitations” by police officers in the scope of custodial investigations. It is evident in this case that when the police invited the accused-appellant to the station, he was already considered as the suspect in the case. Therefore, the questions asked of him were no longer general inquiries into an unsolved crime, but were intended to elicit information about his participation in the crime. However, the Miranda rights may be waived, provided that the waiver is voluntary, express, in writing and made in the presence of counsel. Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to establish that the accused made such a waiver. (2) NO. There are certain situations when authorities may conduct a lawful warrantless arrest: (a) when the accused is caught in flagrante delicto; (b) when the arrest is made immediately after the crime was committed; and when the one to be arrested is an escaped convict. The arrest of the accused in this c a s e d i d n o t f a l l i n a n y o f t h e s e e x c e p t i o n s . T h e a r r e s t w a s n o t c o n d u c t e d i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r t h e consummation of the crime; rather, it was done a day after. The authorities also did not have personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the offense because they were not there when the crime was committed. They merely relied on the account of one eyewitness. Unfortunately, although the warrantless arrest was not lawful, this did not affect the jurisdiction of the Court in this case because the accused still submitted to arraignment despite the illegality of his arrest. In effect, he waived his right to contest the legality of the warrantless arrest.

Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea The act itself does not make a man guilty unless his intentions were so

LILY SY vs. HON. MERCEDITAS GUTIERREZ, ET AL.

G.R. No. 171579 November 14, 2012 Facts: In a Complaint-Affidavit filed by, petitioner, Lily Sy, she claimed that in the morning of December 16, 1999, respondents Benito Fernandez Go and Glenn Ben Tiak Sy, together with "Elmo," a security guard, went to petitioner's residence at the 10th Floor, Fortune Wealth, 612 Elcano St., Binondo, Manila and forcibly opened the door, destroyed and dismantled the door lock then replaced it with a new one, without petitioner's consent. She, likewise, declared that as a diversionary ruse, respondent, Jennifer was at the lobby of the same building who informed petitioner’s helper Geralyn Juanites that the elevator was not working. Glenn and Benito’s act of replacing the door lock appeared to be authorized by a resolution of Fortune Wealth Mansion Corporation’s Board of Directors. In the evening of the same date, petitioner supposedly saw Benito, Glenn, Jennifer, Merry and respondent Berthold Lim (Berthold) took from her residence numerous boxes containing her personal belongings without her consent and, with intent to gain, load them inside a family-owned van/truck named "Wheels in Motion. The same incident supposedly happened in January 2000 and the "stolen" boxes allegedly reached 34, the contents of which were valued at P10, 244,196.00. Respondents Benito and Berthold denied the accusations against them. They explained that petitioner made the baseless charges simply because she hated their wives Merry and Jennifer due to irreconcilable personal differences on how to go about the estates of their deceased parents then pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 51. They also manifested their doubts on petitioner’s capability to acquire the personal belongings allegedly stolen by them.

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Issue: Whether the respondent being a co-owner with the petitioner of the subject property can be charged of robbery? Ruling: NO. Indeed, on second look, we note that what is involved here is a dispute between and among members of a family corporation, the Fortune Wealth Mansion Corporation. Petitioner Lily Sy and respondents Merry, Jennifer, and Glenn, all surnamed Sy, are the owners-incorporators of said corporation, which owns and manages the Fortune Wealth Mansion where petitioner allegedly resided and where the crime of robbery was allegedly committed. As part-owners of the entire building and of the articles allegedly stolen from the 10th floor of said building … the very same properties that are involved between the same parties in a pending estate proceeding, the respondents cannot, as co-owners, be therefore charged with robbery. The fact of co-ownership negates any intention to gain, as they cannot steal properties which they claim to own.

Ad proximum antecedens fiat relation nisi impediatur setentia Relative words refer to the nearest antecedents, unless the context otherwise requires.

MAPA vs. HON. JOKER ARROYO AND LABRADOR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

G.R. No. 78585 (July 5, 1989) Facts: Mapa bought lots from Labrador Development Corporation which are payable in ten years. Mapa defaulted to pay the instalment dues and continued to do so despite constant reminders by Labrador. The latter informed Mapa that the contracts to sell the lots were cancelled, but Mapa invoked Clause 20 of the four contracts. Said clause obligates Labrador to complete the development of the lots, except those requiring the services of a public utility company or the government, within 3 years from the date of the contract. Petitioner contends that P.D. 957 requires Labrador to provide the “facilities, improvements, and infrastructures for the lots, and other forms of development” if offered and indicated in the approved subdivision plans. Issue: Whether or not Clause 20 of the said contracts include and incorporate P.D. 957 through the doctrine of last antecedent, making the cancellation of the contracts of sale incorrect. Ruling: No. Labrador has every right to cancel the contracts of sale, pursuant to Clause 7 of the said contract for the reason of the lapse of five years of default payment from Mapa. P.D. 957 does not apply because it was enacted long after the execution of the contracts involved, and, other than those provided in Clause 20, no further written commitment was made by the developer. The words “which are offered and indicated in the subdivision or condominium plans” refer not only to “other forms of development” but also to “facilities, improvements, and infrastructures”. The word “and” is not meant to separate words, but is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or a union.

Argumentum a contrario Negative-opposite doctrine; what is expressed puts an end to what is implied

MISAEL VERA, ET AL. vs. HON. JOSE F. FERNANDEZ, ET AL. G.R. No. L-31364, March 30, 1979 Facts: The BIR filed on July 29, 1969 a motion for allowance of claim and for payment of taxes representing the estate's tax deficiencies in 1963 to 1964 in the intestate proceedings of Luis Tongoy. The administrator opposed arguing that the claim was already barred by the statute of limitation, Section 2 and Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court which

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provides that all claims for money against the decedent, arising from contracts, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever. Issue: Does the statute of non-claims of the Rules of Court bar the claim of the government for unpaid taxes? Ruling: No. The reason for the more liberal treatment of claims for taxes against a decedent's estate in the form of exception from the application of the statute of non-claims, is not hard to find. Taxes are the lifeblood of the Government and their prompt and certain availability are imperious need. (CIR vs. Pineda, 21 SCRA 105). Upon taxation depends the Government ability to serve the people for whose benefit taxes are collected. To safeguard such interest, neglect or omission of government officials entrusted with the collection of taxes should not be allowed to bring harm or detriment to the people, in the same manner as private persons may be made to suffer individually on account of his own negligence, the presumption being that they take good care of their personal affairs. This should not hold true to government officials with respect to matters not of their own personal concern. This is the philosophy behind the government's exception, as a general rule, from the operation of the principle of estoppel.

Cassus omissus pro omisso habendus est A person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GUILLERMO MANANTAN

G.R. No. 14129, July 31, 1962

Facts: Guillermo Manantan is a justice of peace who violated Section 54 of the Revised Election Code which is about aiding of an election candidate on the election. Manantan argued that the words justice of peace is not included on the enumeration on Section 54 not like on the section 449of the Revised Administrative Code. The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the defendant-appellee. Under the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. If that rule is applicable to the present, then indeed, justices of the peace must be held to have been intentionally and deliberately exempted from the operation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Issue: Whether a justice of peace included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code? Ruling: Yes. The rule "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" has no applicability to the case at bar. The maxim "casus omisus" can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established. In the case under consideration, it has already been shown that the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political activities. Rather, they were merely called by another term. In the new law, or Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, justices of the peace were just called "judges."

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Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex

When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALMUETE

G.R. No. L-26551, February 27, 1976 Facts: Wenceslao Almuete, Fernando Fronda, Cipriano Fronda and Fausto Durion were charged with a violation of section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law. It was alleged in the information that the accused being tenants of Margarita Fernando in her riceland, without notice to her or without her consent, pre-threshed a portion of their respective harvests of five cavans of palay each to her damage. The lower held that the information is basically deficient because it does not describe the circumstances under which the cavans of palay were found in the possession of the accused tenants; it does not specify the date agreed upon for the threshing of the harvests, and it does not allege that the palay found in the tenants' possession exceeded ten percent of their net share based on the last normal harvest. Issue: Whether or not the tenant's act of pre- reaping and pre-threshing without notice to the landlord is punishable pursuant to Section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law. Ruling: No. The prohibition against pre-reaping or pre-threshing found in section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law of 1954 is premised on the existence of the rice share tenancy system. The evident purpose is to prevent the tenant and the landholder from defrauding each other in the division of the harvests. Thus, the legal maxim, cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex (the reason for the law ceasing, the law itself also ceases) applies to this case. Section 4 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms declared agricultural share tenancy throughout the country as contrary to public policy and automatically converted it to agricultural leasehold. Presidential Decree No. 2 proclaimed the entire country "as a land reform area". The legislative intent not to punish anymore the tenant's act of pre- reaping and pre-threshing without notice to the landlord is inferable from the fact that the Code of Agrarian Reforms did not reenact section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law and that it abolished share tenancy which is the basis for penalizing clandestine pre-reaping and pre-threshing. As held in the Adillo case, the act of pre-reaping and pre-threshing without notice to the landlord, which is an offense under the Agricultural Tenancy Law, had ceased to be an offense under the subsequent law, the Code of Agrarian Reforms. To prosecute it as an offense when the Code of Agrarian Reforms is already in force would be repugnant or abhorrent to the policy and spirit of that Code and would subvert the manifest legislative intent not to punish anymore pre-reaping and pre-threshing without notice to landholder.

Contemporanea exposition est optima et fortissimo in lege The contemporary construction is the strongest law.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ISABELO PUNO, ET AL.

G.R. No. 97471 February 17, 1993 Facts: Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento owns a bakeshop in Araneta Avenue, Quezon City called Nika Cakes and Pastries. At around 5:00 in the afternoon of January 13, 1988, the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal driver

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of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband, arrived at the bakeshop. Mrs. Socorro's time to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig came and so she got into the car. After the car turned right in a corner, it stopped and then a young man, accused Enrique Amurao, and boarded the car beside the driver. Once inside, Enrique clambered on top of the back side of the front seat and went onto where Ma. Socorro was seated at the rear. He poked a gun at her and Isabelo, who earlier told her that Enrique is his nephew announced, "ma'm, you know, I want to get money from you." She said she has money inside her bag and they may get it just so they will let her go. The bag contained P7, 000.00. The two accused told her they wanted P100, 000.00more. Socorro agreed to give them that but would they drop her at her gas station in Kamagong St., Makati where the money is located. Beloy asked Socorro to issue a check for P100, 000.00.Socorro complied. She drafted 3 checks in denominations of two for P30 thousand and one forP40 thousand. Being able to escape by jumping out of the vehicle, Socorro upon reaching Balintawak, reported the matter to CAPCOM. Issue: Whether or not the said robbery can be classified as "highway robbery" under PD No.532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974) Ruling: No. PD No. 532 punishes as highway robbery only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine highways and not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined or particular victim. The mere fact that the robbery was committed inside a car which was casually operating on a highway does not make PD No 532applicable to the case.

Distingue tempora et concordabis jura Distinguish times and you will harmonize the law

UNITED STATES vs. GASPAR ALVIR

G.R. No. L-3981, January 14, 1908 Facts: This defendant was accused before the court of the justice of the peace of Bulacan, Province of Bulacan, of the crime of seduction, and, having been found guilty, he was sentenced to three months of arresto mayor, to pay an "indemnity of P1,000 to the offended party, to acknowledge the offspring, to make an allowance of P15 monthly for subsistence until the child becomes of age, and to pay the costs of the proceedings." From the above decision the defendant appealed to the Court of First Instance of said province. Upon the evidence adduced at the trial the judge also found the accused guilty of the crime of seduction and sentenced him to three months of arresto mayor, "with the accessory penalties thereof, to indemnify the girl, Maria Sempia, in the sum of P500, to recogniz e the offspring, to allow her for the subsistence of said child the sum of P15 per month, and to pay the costs." After the defendant had been served his imprisonment, he filed for a motion to the court to claim his child so that the writ of attachment that is included in his penalty will be considered moot. Issue: Whether the party who provides the subsistence is in this case entitled to claim that the person who enjoys the same shall live with him in his own house, and there receive the support which he is under obligation to provide. Ruling: Yes. The obligation prescribed by article 449 of the Penal Code was construed, prior to the enforcement of the Civil Code, in the light of the said doctrines. And after the enforcement of the last-named code it should be construed in a similar manner, because the rule of its article 149 is not absolute. As long as the father shall support the child on his care it is not in violation of article 449 of the Penal Code.

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Dura lex sed lex The law may be harsh, but that is the law.

ARNEL SAGANA vs. RICHARD FRANCISCO

G.R. No.161952, October 2, 2009 Facts: Petitioner filed a Complaint, before Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, to recover damages alleging that on November 20, 1992, respondent with intent to kill him and without justifiable reason, shot him with a gun hitting him on the right thigh. On January 31, 1995, Process Server Manuel Panlasigue attempted to personally serve summons at respondent’s address at No. 36 Sampaguita Street, Baesa Q.C., but was unsuccessful. In his Servers Return, he stated that the occupant in that house refused to give his identity and that respondent is unknown at said residence. The Trial Court also attempted to serve summons to the respondent’s office through registered mail, however, respondent failed to pick up summons. The case was dismissed by the Trial Court on account of petitioner’s lack of interest to prosecute that he did not take action since the filing of the Servers Return. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, contended that he exerted efforts to locate the respondent, it was confirmed that respondent indeed lived at No. 36 Sampaguita Street, Bausa, Q.C. Trial Court granted the Motion with a condition upon the service of summon on the respondent within 10 days from the receipt of the Order. On August 25, 1995, Process Server Jarvis Iconar tried to serve summons at respondent’s address but no avail. In his handwritten annotation, he stated that respondent’s brother, Michael Francisco, told him that respondent no longer lived at the said address, however, Iconar left a copy of the summons to Michael Francisco. Petitioner filed a Motion to Declare Respondent in Default for failure off respondent to file Answer despite the service of summons. Trial Court declared that the summons was validly served to respondent, declared that respondent in default and allowed petitioner to present his evidence ex parte. Michael Francisco, through his lawyer filed a Manifestation and Motion, he denied that he received the summons and hewas authorized to receive on behalf of his brother. He prayed his name to be stricken off the records as having received the copy of summons. In his Affidavit of Merit, he asserted that he was 19 y/o, and respondent had left the house since 1993 andrespondent would only write or call them without informing his whereabouts. On the other hand, petitioner attached in his Rejoinder, the Affidavit prepared by respondent dated December 23, 1992, where declared he was a resident of No. 36 Sampaguita St. Bausa Q.C. and the lawyer who notarized the affidavit was the same lawyer who represented his brother. Trial Court denied the Manifestation and Motion for lack of merit, it rendered a judgment in favor of the petitioner, ordered respondent to pay the damages. Respondent received the copy of the Trial Court’s Decision, he then filed a Notice of Appeal to Court of Appeals. The appellate court directed the parties to file respective briefs, a copy of which was sent by respondent at No. 36 Sampaguita St., Bausa, Q.C. Respondent prayed that the trial court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the person, despite the irregularity of the substituted service of summons by the court Process Server and in awarding of damages to petitioner. Court of Appeals rendered decision granting the Appeal of respondent and setting aside the decision of the trial court for the irregularity of the service of summons. Petitioner filed Petition for Review on Certiorari to Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the substituted service of summons was validly made upon respondent through his brother. Ruling: The Petition for Review on Certiorari was granted, Court of Appeals decision was reversed and set aside, and the Trial Court decision was reinstated and affirmed. Although, in general, the statutory requirement of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully and that any substituted service other than that authorized by Rules is considered ineffective. The Supreme Court ruled that strict application of the Rules is not warranted to this case as it would clearly frustrate the spirit of laws as well as do injustice to the parties waiting almost 15 years for resolution of this case. The respondents actively attempt to frustrate the proper service of summons by refusing to give their identity, rebuffing requests to sign for or receive documents or eluding the officers of court. Respondent tried to avoid the service of summons, prompting the court to declare that sheriff must be resourceful, but sheriffs cannot be faulted of the respondent themselves engage in deception to thwart the orderly administration of justice.

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Ejusdem generis Of the same kind or specie

LIWAG vs. HAPPY GLEN LOOP HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.

G. R. No. 189755, July 04, 2012 Facts: In 1978, F. G. R. Sales, the original developer of Happy Glen Loop, loaned from Ernesto Marcelo, owner of T. P. Marcelo Realty Corporation. The former failed to settle its debts with the latter, so, he assigned all his rights to Marcelo over several parcels of land in the Subdivision including the receivables from the lots already sold. As the successor-in-interest, Marcelo represented to lot buyers, the National Housing Authority (NHA) and the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission (HSRC) that a water facility is available in the subdivision. The said water facility has been the only source of water of the residents for thirty (30) years. In September 1995, Marcelo sold Lot 11, Block 5 to Hermogenes Liwag. As a result, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-350099was issued to the latter. In 2003, Hermogenes died. Petitioner, wife of Hermogenes, subsequently wrote to the respondent Association demanding the removal of the over headwater tank over the parcel of land. The latter refused and filed a case before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board against T. P. Marcelo Realty Corporation, petitioner and the surviving heirs of Hermogenes. The HLURB ruling was in favor of the respondent Association. One of the things it affirmed was the existence of an easement for water system/facility or open space on Lot 11, Block 5 of TCT No. C-350099 wherein the deep well and overhead tank are situated. However, on appeal before the HLURB Board of Commissioners, the Board found that Lot 11, Block 5 was not an open space. Issue: Whether or not Lot 11, Block 5 of the Happy Glen Loop is considered an “open space” as defined in P. D. 1216. Ruling: Yes, the aforementioned parcel of land is considered an “open space.” The Court used the basic statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis to determine whether the area falls under “other similar facilities and amenities” since P. D. 1216 makes no specific mention of areas reserved for water facilities. Ejusdem generis - states that where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include or to be restricted to things akin to or resembling, or of the same kind or class as, those specifically mentioned. Applying that principle, the Court found out that the enumeration refers to areas reserved for the common welfare of the community. Therefore, the phrase “other similar facilities and amenities” should be interpreted in like manner. It is without a doubt that the facility was used for the benefit of the community. Water is a basic necessity, without which, survival in the community would be impossible

Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis A thing not being excepted must be regarded as coming within the purview of the general rule

ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC vs. THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC CITY

G.R. No. L-24322; July 21, 1967 Facts:

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The Municipal Board of Ormoc City enacted and approved an ordinance providing the regulation of the City Tax. Its validity was assailed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, and the lower court sustained its validity in its decision, hence this appeal. Issue: WON the Municipal Ordinance assailed in this case is valid? Ruling: YES. Section 2 of the Local Autonomy Act enlarged the sphere of autonomy granted to chartered cities in terms of enactment of taxing measures. It covers everything excepting those which are mentioned therein. The coverage of the Ordinance does ot come under any of the specific exceptions listed in Section 2 of the Local Autonomy Act. Not being excepted, it must be regarded as coming within the purview of the general rule as the maxim goes, “Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis”.

Ex dolo malo non oritur actio No man can be allowed to found a claim upon his own wrongdoing

BOUGH and BOUGH vs. CANTIVEROS and HANOPOL

G.R. No. 13300; September 29, 1919 Facts: Defendant Matilde Cantiveros is regarded as the richest resident of Carigara, Leyte and was the owner of various parcels of realty of the value of thirty thousand pesos or more. In 1912, she sighed a marital contract of separation from her husband. Petitioner Basilia Bough is the cousin of the defendant and was married to Gustavus Bough. Through the influence of Gustavus Bough, who brought a story to Cantiveros that her husband was in town and might contest the contract fir the separation of the conjugal property, she was induced to sign a fictitious contract of sale of all her property to Basilia Bough. As an assurance, the spouses signed a document donating the said properties to Cantiveros in case of their death and their children. Petitioners Basilia Bough and Gustavus Bough sought to have themselves put in possession of the property covered by the dead of sale quoted in the complaint, and to require the defendant Matilde Cantiveros to pay them damages and costs. Cantiveros answered with a general denial and a special defense in which she asked that judgment be rendered declaring the contract of sale made between herself and Basilia Bough null. The plaintiffs, thereupon, denied under oath the genuineness and due execution of the so-called donation intervivos set forth in the answer. The Court of First Instance of Leyte, therefore, declared the deed of sale fictitious, null, and without effect. Issue: WON the Dead of Sale, hereby a fictitious document, is valid and has legal effects? Ruling: NO. As the maxim goes, “Ex dolo malo non oritur actio,” it is well settled that a party to an ellegal contract cannot come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal objects carried out. Where, however, the parties to an illegal contract are not equally guilty, and where public policy is considered as advanced by allowing the more excusable of the two to sue for relief against the transaction, relief is given to him. Cases of this character are, where they conveyance was wrongfully induced by the grantee through imposition or overreaching, or by false representations, especially by one in a confidential relation. The Court, therefore, affirmed the decision of the trial court against the petitioners.

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Expressio unius est exclusion alterius The express mention of one person, thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others

COCONUT OIL REFINERS ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. HON. RUBEN TORRES, et. al.

G.R. No. 132527; July 29, 2005 Facts: This is a Petition to enjoin and prohibit the public respondent Ruben Torres in his capacity as Executive Secretary from allowing other private respondents to continue with the operation of tax and duty-free shops located at the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) and the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ). The petitioner seeks to declare RA 7227 as unconstitutional on the ground that it allowed only tax-free (and duty-free) importation of raw materials, capital and equipment. Petitioners contend that the wording of RA 7227 clearly limits the grant of tax incentives to the importation of raw materials, capital and equipment only thereby violating the equal protection clause of the Constitution. He also assailed the constitutionality of EO 97-A for being violative of their right to equal protection. They asserted that private respondents operating inside the SSEZ are not different from the retail establishments located outside. The respondent moves to dismiss the petition on the ground of lack of legal standing and unreasonable delay in filing of the petition Issue: WON there is a violation of equal protection clause? Ruling: NO. The phrase “tax and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital and equipment” was merely cited as an example of incentives that may be given to entities operating within the zone. Public respondent SBMA correctly argued that the maxim “expressio unius est exclusio alterius", on which petitioners impliedly rely to support their restrictive interpretation, does not apply when words are mentioned by way of example. The petition with respect to declaration of unconstitutionality of EO 97-A cannot be, likewise, sustained. The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based which was based on reasonable classification. A classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinction, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. Applying the foregoing test to the present case, the Court finds no violation of the right to equal protection of the laws. There is a substantial distinctions lying between the establishments inside and outside the zone.

Expressum facit cessare tacitum What is expressed puts an end to that which is implied

COA CEBU vs. PROVINCE OF CEBU

G.R. No. 141386; November 29, 2001 Facts: The provincial governor of the province of Cebu, as chairman of the local school board, under Section 98 of the Local Government Code, appointed classroom teachers who have no items in the DECS plantilla to handle extension classes that would accommodate students in the public schools. It was charged against the provincial Special Education Fund (SEF) along with college scholarship grants of the province. Consequently, COA issued Notices of Suspension saying that disbursements for the salaries and scholarship grants are not chargeable to SEF. Faced with the Notices of Suspension, the Province of Cebu filed a petition for declaratory relief with the trial court to which a decision declaring the questioned expenses as authorized expenditures was rendered. Issue: Is RA 5447 repealed by the effectivity of the Local Government Code?

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Ruling: The SEF was created by virtue of RA 5447 which defined the activities of DECS that may exclusively be funded, and which it took effect on 1 January 1969. With the effectivity of the Local Government Code of 1991, the petitioners contend that RA 5447 was repealed. Evidently, in the repealing clause of the Code, it expressly repealed only Section 3 of RA 5447. Hence, the provisions allocating funds for the salaries of teachers under Section 1, of R.A. No. 5447, which are not inconsistent with Sections 272 and 100 (c) of the Local Government Code, remain in force and effect.

Ex necessitate legis By necessary implication of law

COA CEBU vs. PROVINCE OF CEBU

G.R. No. 141386; November 29, 2001 Facts: The provincial governor of the province of Cebu, as chairman of the local school board, under Section 98 of the Local Government Code, appointed classroom teachers who have no items in the DECS plantilla to handle extension classes that would accommodate students in the public schools. It was charged against the provincial Special Education Fund (SEF) along with college scholarship grants of the province. Consequently, COA issued Notices of Suspension saying that disbursements for the salaries and scholarship grants are not chargeable to SEF. Faced with the Notices of Suspension, the Province of Cebu filed a petition for declaratory relief with the trial court to which a decision declaring the questioned expenses as authorized expenditures was rendered. Issue: May the salaries and personnel-related benefits of public school teachers appointed by local chief executives in connection with the establishment and maintenance of extension classes as well as the expenses for college scholarship grants be charged to the SEF of the local government unit concerned? Ruling: YES. The SEF was created by virtue of RA 5447 which defined the activities of DECS that may exclusively be funded. Under the doctrine of necessary implication, the allocation of the SEF for the establishment and maintenance of extension classes logically implies the hiring of teachers who should, as a matter of course, be compensated for their services. Ex necessitate legis. Verily, the services and the corresponding compensation of these teachers are necessary and indispensable to the establishment and maintenance of extension classes.

Falsa demonstratio non nocet, cum de corpore constat False description does not preclude construction nor vitiate the meaning of the stature

DeLONG vs. STARKEY

120 Ind. App. 288; May 9, 1950 Facts: Mary Starkey was the owner of the West Half of the Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 4, Township 16 North, Range 2 East, in Marion County, Indiana. She died in 2 September 1933 leaving two children, the appellee Albert Starkey and the appellant DeLong, as her sole and only heirs at law. Appellee and his wife claim title to the abovementioned estate through a warranty deed as tenants by entireties. DeLong contends that said deed is defective in its description of the land involved that it conveys nothing and that upon the death of her mother she inherited an undivided one-half thereof. Issue: WON appellant Nellie DeLong inherited one-half of the land in question upon her mother’s death?

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Ruling: The construction the trial court placed upon the deed in question is correct by virtue of the legal maxim, “falsa demonstration non nocet, cum de corpore constat.” Therefore, the Court ruled that by her deed, Mary Starkey conveyed to the appellees the fee simple title to the land involved in the case at bar and therefore the appellant DeLong inherited no part of it at her mother’s death.

Favores ampliandi sunt; odia restringenda Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect

PEOPLE vs. QUIACHON

G.R. No. 170236; August 31, 2006 Facts: Appellant Roberto Quiachon was charged with the crime of qualified rape. On or about 12 May 2001, the accused, by means of force and intimidation had sexual intercourse with a certain Rowena Quiachon, his daughter, 8 years old, a deaf-mute. Rowel recounted that on the night of 12 May 2001, he saw his father on top of his sister Rowena and they were covered by a blanket. His father's buttocks were moving up and down, and Rowel could hear Rowena crying. He could not do anything because he was afraid of his father. Rowel remained in the room but the following morning, he told his aunt, Carmelita Mateo about what he had witnessed. Together, Carmelita and Rowel went to the police to report what had transpired. The RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape defined and penalized under Articles 266-A and B of the RPC. The court imposed death penalty against the accused. The defense argued that the benefits of RA 9346 should be extended to the accused. Issue: WON the appellant can benefit from RA 9346? Ruling: Yes. In view of the enactment of RA 9346 on 24 June 2006 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to be meted on appellant is reclusion perpetua in accordance with Section 2 thereof which reads: SECTION 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed: (a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or (b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code. The aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 9346 is applicable in this case pursuant to the principle in criminal law, [favors ampliandi sunt; odia restrigenda]. Penal laws which are favorable to accused are given retroactive effect. This principle is embodied under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides as follows: Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws, a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

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Generale dictum generaliter est interpretandum A general statement is understood in a general sense

ABDUL vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 184496; December 2, 2013 Facts: Petitioner was first elected as municipal mayor of Mulondo, Lanao del Sur in the May 1998 election and re-elected for a second term in the May 2001 election. It was while serving his second term as municipal mayor when the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao filed an Information on 5 September 2002 charging petitioner, along with Abdul and Domado, with falsification of public documents, defined and penalized under Article 171(2) of the RPC. During the arraignment, petitioner and his co-accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Before the commencement of the trial, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) moved for the suspension pendente lite of the petitioner and his co-accused as mandated under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioner asserted that he cannot be suspended as such because the crime for which he was charged is not among those enumerated under the provision, thus he moved for reconsideration but was denied by the trial court. The suspension, however, was superseded by the expiration of his second term and his unsuccessful bid for re-election during the May 2004 elections. During the May 2007 elections, he emerged as the winner in the mayoralty race in Mulondo, Lanao del Sur and so on 2008, the OSP once again moved for his and his co-accused’s suspension pendente lite to implement respondent’s final and executor suspension. Issue: WON the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in imposing suspension pendent lite on the petitioner and his co-accused? Ruling: YES. The Court ruled that the Petition be dismissed for being moot and academic. For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy, otherwise there is no justiciable controversy. In the case at bar, the acquittal of the petitioner operates as a supervening event that mooted the present Petition. This is regardless whether or not the petitioner has indeed committed an offense of "fraud or property." In construing the term "fraud" as used in Section 13 of RA 3019, nevertheless, the Court held in said case that the same is understood in its general sense that is referring to "an instance or an act of trickery or deceit especially when involving misrepresentation."

Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda What is generally spoken shall be generally understood

ORCEO vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 190779; March 26, 2010 Facts: Petitioner asserts that playing airsoft provides bonding moments among family members, and families are entitled to protection by the society and the State under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Pursuant thereto, they are free to choose and enjoy their recreational activities. These liberties, petitioner contends, cannot be abridged by the COMELEC. Thus, petitioner contends that Resolution No. 8714 is not in accordance with the State policies. As a response, COMELEC defends that constitutional freedoms are not absolute in a sense, and they may be abridged to some extent to serve appropriate and important interests.

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Issue: WON the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in including airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations in the term “firearm” in Section 2(b) of RA 8714? Ruling: NO. A word of general significance in a stature is to be taken in its ordinary sense and comprehensive sense, unless it is shown that the word is intended to be given a different or restricted meaning; what is generally spoken shall be generally understood and general words shall be understood in a general sense. The term “firearm” in Resolution No. 8714 was intended for purposes of the gun ban during the election period. The inclusion of airsoft guns in the term “firearm” and their resultant coverage by the election gun ban is to avoid the possible use of recreational guns in sowing fear, intimidation or terror during the election period. An ordinary citizen may not be able to distinguish between a real gun and an airsoft gun. It is fear subverting the will of a voter, whether brought about by the use of a real gun or a recreational gun which is sought to be averted.

Generalia specialibus non derogant A general law does not nullify a specific or special law

CUSTOMS vs. COURT OF TAX APPEALS, SMITH BELL CO., INC.

G.R. No. L-41861; March 23, 1987 Facts: The legal provisions involved in this case are Sections 1005, 2521, and 2523 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Section 1005 lays down the indispensable requirement that every vessel coming from a foreign part must have on board a complete manifest of all her cargo, further stating therein the required contents of each manifest intended to be submitted to the customs authorities while both Secs. 2521 and 2523 provide for the corresponding penalties in case Sec. 1005 is violated. Issue: In case the weight of a cargo is inaccurately or incorrectly stated in the manifest, which provision of the Tariff and Customs Code should be applied, Section 2521 or Section 2523? Ruling: If the weight of the cargo is in issue, the provision of the Tariff and Customs Code properly applicable is Sec. 2523. As the maxim goes, “Generalia specialibus non derogant,” meaning a special and specific provision prevails over a general provision irrespective of their relative position in the statute. learly, Sec. 2523 is directly applicable to the case at bar since said provision specifically applies to the situation where there is a discrepancy between the actual gross weight of any article or package described in the manifest and the gross weight as declared in the manifest or bill of lading.

hoc quidem perquam durum est sed ita lex scripta est The law may be exceedingly hard, but so the law is written

ROSA LIM vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 130038. September 18, 2000

Facts: On August 25, 1990, petitioner bought various kinds of jewelry worth P300, 000.00 from Maria Antonia Seguan. She wrote out a check with the same amount, dated August 25, 1990, payable to “cash” drawn on Metrobank and gave the check to Seguan.

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The next day, petitioner again went to Seguan’s store and purchased jewelry valued at P241,668.00. Petitioner issued another check payable to “cash” dated August 16, 1990 drawn on Metrobank in the amount of P241,668.007 and sent the check to Seguan through a certain Aurelia Nadera. Seguan deposited the two checks with her bank. The checks were returned with a notice of dishonor. Petitioner’s account in the bank from which the checks were drawn was closed. Upon demand, petitioner promised to pay Seguan the amounts of the two dishonored checks, but she never did. On June 5, 1991, an Assistant City Prosecutor of Cebu filed with the RTC, Cebu City, Branch 23, two informations against petitioner for violations of BP No. 22. After due trial, on December 29, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision in the two cases convicting petitioner. Petitioner appealed to the CA, but the same was dismissed by the CA in its October 15, 1996 Decision wherein it affirmed in toto the RTC’s Decision. Issue: WON Lim violated B.P. No. 22. Ruling: The elements of B.P. Blg. 22 are: “(1) The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; “(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and “(3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.” The gravamen of B.P. No. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or one that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment. And the accused failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its payment within 5 banking days from notice of dishonor. The act is malum prohibitum, pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Laws are created to achieve a goal intended and to guide and prevent against an evil or mischief. Why and to whom the check was issued, and the terms & conditions surrounding the issuance of the checks, are irrelevant in determining culpability. Under BP No. 22, one need not prove that the check was issued in payment of an obligation, or that there was damage. It was ruled in United States v. Go Chico, that in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, “has the law been violated?” When dealing with acts mala prohibita –“it is not necessary that the appellant should have acted with criminal intent. In many crimes, the intention of the person who commits the crime is entirely immaterial…” This case is a perfect example of an act mala prohibita. The first and last elements of the offense are admittedly present. B.P. No. 22, Section 2 creates a presumption juris tantum that the second element prima facie exists when the first and third elements of the offense are present. If not rebutted, it suffices to sustain a conviction. To escape liability, she must prove that the second element was absent. Petitioner failed to rebut this presumption and she failed to pay the amount of the checks or make arrangement for its payment within 5 banking days from receipt of notice of dishonor. B.P. No. 22 was clearly violated. Hoc quidem per quam durum est sed ita lex scripta est. The law may be exceedingly hard but so the law is written. However, the penalty imposed on petitioner must be modified. In Vaca v. Court of Appeals [298 SCRA 658 (1998)], it was held that in determining the penalty to be imposed for violation of B.P. No. 22, the philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law applies. The philosophy is to redeem valuable human material, and to prevent unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order. The prison sentence imposed on petitioners is deleted, and imposed on them only a fine double the amount of the check issued. Consequently, the prison sentences imposed on petitioner are deleted. The two fines imposed for each violation, each amounting to P200,000.00 are appropriate and sufficient. The award of moral damages and order to pay attorney’s fees are deleted for lack of sufficient basis.

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impossibilium nulla obligatio est There is no obligation to do impossible things

AKBAYAN-YOUTH vs COMELEC

G.R. No. 147066. March 26, 2001 Facts: On January 25, 2001, AKBAYAN-Youth, together with other youth movements sought the extension of the registration of voters for the May 2001 elections. The voters registration has already ended on December 27, 2000. AKBAYAN-Youth asks that persons aged 18-21 be allowed a special 2-day registration. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) denied the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth the sued COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion for denying the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth alleged that there are about 4 million youth who were not able to register and are now disenfranchised. COMELEC invoked Section 8 of Republic Act 8189 which provides that no registration shall be conducted 120 days before the regular election. AKBAYAN-Youth however counters that under Section 28 of Republic Act 8436, the COMELEC in the exercise of its residual and stand-by powers, can reset the periods of pre-election acts including voters registration if the original period is not observed. Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC exercised grave abuse of discretion when it denied the extension of the voters registration. Ruling: No. The COMELEC was well within its right to do so pursuant to the clear provisions of Section 8, RA 8189 which provides that no voters registration shall be conducted within 120 days before the regular election. The right of suffrage is not absolute. It is regulated by measures like voters registration which is not a mere statutory requirement. Beyond this, it is likewise well-settled that the law does not require that the impossible be done. The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility, expressed in the maxim, nemo tenetur ad impossible. In other words, there is no obligation to do an impossible thing. Impossibilium nulla obligatio est. Hence, a statute may not be so construed as to require compliance with what it prescribes cannot, at the time, be legally, coincidentally, it must be presumed that the legislature did not at all intend an interpretation or application of a law which is far removed from the realm of the possible. The State, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voter’s registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner – one which is not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times. RA 8189 prevails over RA 8436 in that RA 8189’s provision is explicit as to the prohibition. Suffice it to say that it is a pre-election act that cannot be reset. Further, even if what is asked is a mere two-day special registration, COMELEC has shown in its pleadings that if it is allowed, it will substantially create a setback in the other pre-election matters because the additional voters from the special two day registration will have to be screened, entered into the book of voters, have to be inspected again, verified, sealed, then entered into the computerized voter’s list; and then they will have to reprint the voters information sheet for the update and distribute it – by that time, the May 14, 2001 elections would have been overshot because of the lengthy processes after the special registration. In short, it will cost more inconvenience than good. Further still, the allegation that youth voters are disenfranchised is not sufficient. Nowhere in AKBAYAN-Youth’s pleading was attached any actual complaint from an individual youth voter about any inconvenience arising from the fact that the voters registration has ended on December 27, 2001. Also, AKBAYAN-Youth et al admitted in their pleading that they are asking an extension because they failed to register on time for some reasons, which is not appealing to the court. The law aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights.

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index animi sermo est speech is the index of intention

YOLANDA SIGNEY vs SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, EDITHA ESPINOSA-CASTILLO, and GINA SERVANO, represen tative of GINALYN and RODELYN SIGNEY,

G.R. No. 173582, January 28, 2008 Facts: Rodolfo Signey, Sr., a member of the SSS, died on 21 May 2001. In his member’s records, he had designated Yolanda Signey (petitioner) as primary beneficiary and his four children with her as secondary beneficiaries. On 6 July 2001, petitioner filed a claim for death benefits with the public respondent SSS.She revealed in her SSS claim that the deceased had a common-law wife, Gina Servano (Gina), with whom he had two minor children namey, Ginalyn Servano (Ginalyn), born on 13 April 1996, and Rodelyn Signey (Rodelyn), born on 20 April 2000. Petitioner’s declaration was confirmed when Gina herself filed a claim for the same death benefits on 13 July 2001 in which she also declared that both she and petitioner were common-law wives of the deceased and that Editha Espinosa (Editha) was the legal wife. In addition, in October 2001, Editha also filed an application for death benefits with the SSS stating that she was the legal wife of the deceased. The SSS, through a letter dated 4 December 2001, denied the death benefit claim of petitioner. However, it recognized Ginalyn and Rodelyn, the minor children of the deceased with Gina, as the primary beneficiaries under the SSS Law. The SSS also found that the 20 March 1992 marriage between petitioner and the deceased was null and void because of a prior subsisting marriage contracted on 29 October 1967 between the deceased and Editha, as confirmed with the Local Civil Registry of Cebu City. Issue: Whether petitioner has a superior legal right over the SSS benefits as against the illegitimate minor children of the deceased. Ruling: As to the issue of who has the better right over the SSS death benefits, Section 8(e) and (k) of R. A. No. 8282 is very clear. Section 8(e) and (k) of R.A. No. 8282 provides:

SEC. 8. Terms Defined.—For the purposes of this Act, the following terms shall, unless the context indicates otherwise, have the following meanings: (e) Dependents — The dependent shall be the following: (1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member; 2) The legitimate, legitimated, or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not reached twenty-one years (21) of age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally; and 3) The parent who is receiving regular support from the member. (k) Beneficiaries — The dependent spouse until he or she remarries, the dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children, who shall be the primary beneficiaries of the member: Provided, That the dependent illegitimate children shall be entitled to fifty percent (50%) of the share of the legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted children: Provided, further, That in the absence of the dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted children of the member, his/her dependent illegitimate children shall be entitled to one hundred percent (100%) of the benefits. In their absence, the dependent parents who shall be the secondary beneficiaries of the member. In the absence of all of the foregoing, any other person designated by the member as his/her secondary beneficiary. SEC. 13. Death Benefits. — Upon the death of a member who has paid at least thirty-six (36) monthly contributions prior to the semester of death, his primary beneficiaries shall be entitled

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to the monthly pension: Provided, That if he has no primary beneficiaries, his secondary beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit equivalent to thirty-six (36) times the monthly pension. If he has not paid the required thirty-six (36) monthly contributions, his primary or secondary beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit equivalent to the monthly pension times the number of monthly contributions paid to the SSS or twelve (12) times the monthly pension, whichever is higher. (Emphasis supplied).

Hence, we need only apply the law. Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain meaning rule or verba legis, derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention), rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or, from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

in eo quod plus sit semper inest et minus the grant of a greater power necessarily includes the lesser power

ELISEO F. SORIANO vs. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA

G.R. No. 164785, Mar 15, 2010 Facts: On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made the following remarks: Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling; Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito. Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan. Forthwith, the MTRCB sent petitioner a notice of the hearing on August 16, 2004 in relation to the alleged use of some cuss words in the August 10, 2004 episode of Ang Dating Daan. After a preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared, the MTRCB, by Order of August 16, 2004, preventively suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan program for 20 days, in accordance with Section 3(d) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1986, creating the MTRCB, in relation to Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of PD 1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII of the MTRCB Rules of Procedure. The same order also set the case for preliminary investigation. Ruling: Whether or not MTRCB has the power to suspend petitioner from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months. Ruling: The grant of powers to the MTRCB under Section 3 of PD 1986 does not categorically express the power to suspend a television program or a host thereof that violates the standards of supervision, regulation and classification of television programs provided under the law. Nonetheless, such silence on the part of the law does not negate the existence of such a power.

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First, a general grant of power is a grant of every particular and specific power necessary for the exercise of such general power. Other than powers expressly conferred by law on them, administrative agencies may lawfully exercise powers that can be reasonably inferred in the wordings of the enabling law. Second, the grant of a greater power necessarily includes the lesser power. In eo quod plus sit, semper inest et minus. The MTRCB has the power to cancel permits for the exhibition or television broadcast of programs determined by the said body to be objectionable for being "immoral, indecent, contrary to law or good customs x x x." This power is a power to impose sanctions. First, a general grant of power is a grant of every particular and specific power necessary for the exercise of such general power. Other than powers expressly conferred by law on them, administrative agencies may lawfully exercise powers that can be reasonably inferred in the wordings of the enabling law.

interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium Public interest requires that by the very nature of things there must be an end to a legal controversy

FELICISIMA DE LA CRUZ vs HON. EDGARDO L. PARAS

G.R. No. 164785, Mar 15, 2010 Facts: In 1962, Pedro San Miguel filed a partition case against Pablo San Miguel involving a parcel of land (Lot A). The case was dismissed due to non-prosecution. But 11 years later, Pedro filed a second partition case this time involving the same Lot A and another parcel of land (Lot B). Judge Edgardo Paras dismissed the partition case in so far as Lot A is concerned due res judicata but he continued in hearing the issue on Lot B. Lot B was eventually partitioned but the successors-in-interest of Pedro San Miguel, Felicisima De La Cruz et al, appealed the dismissal of the case insofar as Lot A is concerned. Pablo San Miguel opposed the appeal on the ground that the order to dismiss the said case was merely interlocutory hence it is not appealable. Issue: Whether or not the order dismissing the case on Lot A is merely interlocutory. Ruling:: No. The said order is a final and appealable order. The test to determine whether an order or judgment is interlocutory or final is this: “Does it leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final.” The term “final” judgment or order signifies a judgment or an order which disposes of the cause as to all the parties, reserving no further questions or direction for future determination. In this case, the fact that the twin case for other lot (Lot B) was still under litigation when the order was issued and the respective claims of the parties thereto yet to be settled by the trial court would not affect the final nature of the subject order, because a decree, is nonetheless final although some independent branch of the case is reserved for future consideration. Nevertheless, the petition filed by De La Cruz should be dismissed because in the first place, a final order of dismissal cannot be assailed by certiorari (as what she did in this case). There was no grave abuse of discretion or lack thereof on the part of Judge Paras in dismissing the case due to res judicata. The original dismissal was based on merits (due to non litigation by Pedro San Miguel). He cannot again revive the same action by re-filing it 11 years later. Public policy and sound practice demand that “at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law.” Reipublicae ut sit finis litium.

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interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi modus every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of

jurisprudence

DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC. vs CLEOFE S. JANIOLA

GR, 185861 30 June 2009 FACTS: On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President, Roberto S. Concepcion, and Vice-President for Finance and Marketing, Normandy P. Amora, filed a Complaint Affidavit dated October 5, 2004 for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) against private respondent Cleofe S. Janiola with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 04-2526-33. Correspondingly, petitioner filed a criminal information for violation of BP 22 against private respondent with the MTC on February 2, 2005 entitled People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola. On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband, instituted a civil complaint against petitioner by filing a Complaint dated August 2006 for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. The case was filed with the RTC, Branch 197 in Las Piñas City. Notably, the checks, subject of the criminal cases before the MTC, were issued in consideration of the construction agreement. Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated July 24, 2007, alleging that the civil and criminal cases involved facts and issues similar or intimately related such that in the resolution of the issues in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. In other words, private respondent claimed that the civil case posed a prejudicial question as against the criminal cases. Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases in an undated Comment/Opposition to Accused’s Motion to Suspend Proceedings based on Prejudicial Question on the grounds that: (1) there is no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon which the bouncing checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether private respondent violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the elements of a prejudicial question is that “the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action”; thus, this element is missing in this case, the criminal case having preceded the civil case. Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT PERCEIVING GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE INFERIOR COURT, WHEN THE LATTER RULED TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS IN CRIM. CASE ON THE BASIS OF “PREJUDICIAL QUESTION” In the said CIVIL CASE. Ruling: This petition must be granted. It is a basic precept in statutory construction that a “change in phraseology by amendment of a provision of law indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from that it originally had.” In the instant case, the phrase, “previously instituted,” was inserted to qualify the nature of the civil action involved in a prejudicial question in relation to the criminal action. This interpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of “subsequent” directly before the term criminal action. There is no other logical explanation for the amendments except to qualify the relationship of the civil and criminal actions, that the civil action must precede the criminal action. Additionally, it is a principle in statutory construction that “a statute should be construed not only to be consistent with itself but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system.”This principle is consistent with the maxim, interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus or every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.

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interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat A law should be interpreted with a view to upholding rather than destroying it

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ROMAN DERILO

GR, 185861 30 June 2009 Facts: Roman Derilo, Isidoro Baldimo y Quillo, Lucas Doños, Alejandro Cofuentes and one John Doe were charged with the so-called crime of murder. Of the five accused, only accused-appellant Isidoro Q. Baldimo was apprehended and brought within the trial court's jurisdiction. At his arraignment on March 18, 1985, and after the information was translated in the Waray dialect with which he is well versed, appellant pleaded not guilty. However, by the time the People had formally finished presenting its evidence on August 6, 1986, appellant, through his counsel de parte, manifested to the court a quo that he wanted to withdraw his earlier plea of not guilty and substitute the same with one of guilty. Consequently, a re-arraignment was ordered by the lower court and, this time, appellant entered a plea of guilty to the charge of murder. Appellant does not deny his participation in the commission of the crime. Rather, in his brief pitifully consisting of two pages, he merely asks for the modification of the death penalty imposed by the lower court to life imprisonment. Responding to the alarming increase of horrible crimes being committed in the country, Congress passed a law imposing the death penalty on certain heinous offenses and further amending for that purpose the Revised Penal Code and other special penal laws. Said law was officially enacted as Republic Act No. 7659 and took effect on December 31, 1993. This is now the governing penal law at the time of this review of the case at bar. Ruling: Whether or not the penalty of reclusion perpetua can be imposed to the accused instead of death penalty. Ruling: For failure of the prosecution to prove the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation and by virtue of the command of the 1987 Constitution, the judgment of the court a quo is accordingly MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Isidoro Q. Baldimo is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 in consonance with our current case law and policy on death indemnity. It can be readily seen that the reduction of the penalty is not and was not made dependent on a law, decree, condition, or period before the aforementioned Section 19 can be applied by the courts. It cannot be inferred, either from the wordings of the subject provision or from the intention of the framers of the Constitution, that a death sentence should be brought to the Supreme Court for review within a certain time frame in order that it can be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions themselves. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. A law should be interpreted with a view to upholding rather than destroying it.

interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted

SERANA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

GR NO. 162059; Jan 22, 2008 Facts: Serana, accused of estafa, petitioned and claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not haveany jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP studentregent.She claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumeratesthe crimes or offenses over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. It has no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa. It only has jurisdiction over crimes covered by Title VII,

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Chapter II, Section 2(Crimes Committed by Public Officers), Book II of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Estafa falling under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction. Ruling: Whether or the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa; petitioner is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27 and she paid her tuition fees; the offense charged was not committed in relation to her office; the funds in question personally came from President Estrada, not from the government. Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa. Relyingon Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is not among those crime scognizable by the Sandiganbayan. We note that in hoisting this argument, petitioner isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without regard to the succeeding paragraphs of the said provision. The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. Interpretatio talis inambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted.

legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet The interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PEOPLE VS JABINAL

GR NO. 162059; Jan 22, 2008 Facts: Jabinal was found guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition. The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question. The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court’s decision in People vs. Macarandang(1959) and People vs. Lucero(1958) and not on the basis of the latest reversal and abandonment in People vs. Mapa (1967). Issue: Whether or not appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the court’s rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of the MAcarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa. Ruling: Decisions of this Court, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code states that “Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system … .” The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim “legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" — the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. Appellant was appointed as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero under which no criminal liability would attach to his

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possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.

leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant A later statute which is repugnant to an earlier statute is deemed to have abrogated the earlier one on the same

subject matter

CARABAO, INC. vs. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION

G.R. No. L-29304; Jul 3, 2014 Facts: Plaintiff had filed on October 3, 1967 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal its complaint to recover the sum of P238,500.00 representing the unpaid price of 300 units of fire extinguishers sold and delivered by it to defendant Agricultural Productivity Commission. It alleged that it had presented on June 14, 1967 a claim for payment of the sum with the Auditor General, but that since the latter had failed to decide the claim within two (2) months from date of its presentation which should have been by August 13, 1967, it had acquired the right under Act No. 3083 to file the original action for collection in the lower court Ruling: Whether or not case should be dismissed for lack of jourisdiction by the court Ruling: The sole question of law that plaintiff submits on appeal is its contention that under Act 3083 — which it claims to be still in force, not having been amended, repealed or declared unconstitutional — it had the clear right to institute its direct action in the lower court upon the Auditor General's failure to decide its claim within two months from the date of its presentation, and that the lower court's jurisdiction which had thus attached could no longer be displaced, notwithstanding the Auditor General's subsequent adverse decision of October 6, 1967. The corresponding provisions of Act 3083 which are utterly incompatible with those of Commonwealth Act must therefore be deemed superseded and abrogated, under principle of "leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant" — a later statute which is repugnant to an earlier statute is deemed to have abrogated the earlier one on the same subject matter.

Lex de futuro, judex de praterito The law provides for the future, the judge for the past.

DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. STOCKHOLDERS OFINTERCITY SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK

G.R. No. 181556 ; December 14, 2009

Facts: The Central Bank of the Philippines, now known as Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, filed on June17, 1987 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati a Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (Intercity Bank) alleging that said bank was already insolvent and its continuance in business would involve probable loss to depositors, creditors and the general public. The trial court gave it due course. Petitioner Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation was eventually substituted as the therein petitioner, liquidator of Intercity Bank. In the meantime, Republic Act No. 9302 which provides that “After the payment of all liabilities and claims against the closed bank, the Corporation shall pay any surplus dividends at the legal rate of interest, from date of takeover to date of distribution, to creditors and claimants of the closed bank in accordance with legal priority before distribution to the shareholders of the closed bank”. Relying on Republic Act No. 9302 PDIC filed on August 8, 2005 a Motion for Approval of the Final Distribution of Assets and Termination of the Liquidation Proceedings

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Issue: Whether or not Section 12 of RA 9302 should be applied retroactively in order to entitle Intercity Bank creditors to surplus dividends. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that Statutes are prospective and not retroactive in their operation, they being the formulation of rules for the future, not the past. Hence, the legal maxim lex de futuro, judex de praeterito — the law provides for the future, the judge for the past, which is articulated in Article 4 of the Civil Code: ―Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.‖ The reason for the rule is the tendency of retroactive legislation to be unjust and oppressive on account of its liability to unsettle vested rights or disturb the legal effect of prior transactions. Further, a perusal of RA 9302 shows that nothing indeed therein authorizes its retroactive application. In fact, its effectivity clause indicates a clear legislative intent to the contrary, Section 28. Effectivity Clause. “This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following the completion of its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation”.

Lex prospicit, non respicit The law looks forward, not backward.

CLEMENTE LACESTE vs. PAULINO SANTOS, DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

G.R. No. L-36886; February 1, 1932 Facts: Together with Nicolas Lachica, he had been prosecuted, found guilty, and sentenced to commitment for the crime of rape. Subsequently Nicola Lachica married the victim, Magdalena de Ocampo, and was accordingly relieved from the criminal prosecution by virtue of section 2, Act No. 1773, and article 448 of the Penal Code then in force, which provided that such a marriage extinguished penal liability, and hence, the penalty. But the petitioner herein continued serving his sentence, which was not affected by the marriage of his coaccused and the offended party. The petitioner, Clemente Laceste, prays the court to set him at liberty through the writ of habeas corpus, pleading that there is no sufficient legal ground for continuing his imprisonment any longer. Paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, now in force, provides as follows: “In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. The provisions of this paragraph shall also be applicable to the coprincipals, accomplices and accesories after the fact of the above-mentioned crimes.” Issue: Whether or not the last paragraph of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, now in force, shall apply to petitioner. Ruling: Petition granted. The law looks forward, never backward. Lex prospicit, non respicit. A new law has a prospective, not retroactive, effect However, penal laws that favor a guilty person, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be given retroactive effect. These are the rule, the exception and exception to the exception on effectivity of laws. Article 22 of the new Penal Code which provides for the retroactive effect of Penal laws is applicable to the petitioner, who comes within one of the cases especially provided for in article 344 of the Code: this is a point upon which there neither is, nor can be, any discussion between the parties to this case.

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Maledicta est exposito quae corrumpit textum It is dangerous construction which is against the text.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. JUDGE PALMA AND ROMULO INTIA Y MORADA

G.R. No. L-44113; March 31, 1977 Facts: Private Respondent Romulo, 17 years of age, was charged with vagrancy. Respondent Judge dismissed the case on the ground that her court has no jurisdiction to take further cognizance of this case without prejudice to the re-filing thereof in the Juvenile Court, because he believed that jurisdiction over 16 years olds up to under 21 was transferred to the Juvenile Court by the issuance of PD 603 or the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which defines youthful offenders as those over 9years of age but under 21 at the time of the commission of the offense. Issue: Whether or not the issuance of PD 603 transferred the case of the accused from the regular courts to the Juvenile Court. Ruling: The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court expressly confers upon it a special and limited jurisdiction over criminal cases wherein the accused is under 16 years of age at the time of the filing of the case. The subsequent issuance of PD 603 known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code and defines a youth offender as “one who is over 9 years of age but under 21 at the time of the commission of the offense” did not by such definition transfer jurisdiction over criminal cases involving accused who are 16 and under 21 years of age from the regular courts to the Juvenile Court. Maledicta est exposito quae corrumpit textum – it is dangerous construction which is against the text.

Noscitur a sociis Word construed with reference to accompanying or associated words.

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. JUDICIAL BAR COUNCIL (JBC)

G.R. No. 202242; April 16, 2013 Facts: The case is a motion for reconsideration filed by the Judicial Bar Council (JBC) in a prior decision rendered July 17, 2012 that JBC’s action of allowing more than one member of the congress to represent the JBC to be unconstitutional. Respondent contends that the phrase “a representative of congress” refers that both houses of congress should have one representative each, and that these two houses are permanent and mandatory components of “congress” as part of the bicameral system of legislature. Both houses have their respective powers in performance of their duties. Art. VIII Sec. 8 of the constitution provides for the component of the JBC to be 7 members only with only one representative from congress. Issue: Whether or not the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of Representatives to be unconstitutional as provided in Art. VIII. Sec 8 of the constitution. Ruling: The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that the phrase “a representative of congress” should be construed as to having only one representative that would come from either house, not both. Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated.

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Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. That the framers of the constitution only intended for one seat of the JBC to be allotted for the legislative. The motion was denied.

Nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis A new statute should affect the future, not the past.

FERMIN MANAPAT vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 110478 Facts: Sometime in the 1960’s, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila (RCAM) allowed a number of individuals to occupy the Grace Park property on condition that they would vacate the premises should the former push through with the plan to construct a school in the area. The plan, however, did not materialize, thus, the occupants offered to purchase the portions they occupied. Later, as they could not afford RCAM’s proposed price, the occupants, organizing themselves as exclusive members of the Eulogio Rodriguez, Jr. Tenants Association, Inc., petitioned the Government for the acquisition of the said property, its subdivision into home lots, and the resale of the subdivided lots to them at a low price, however the Government could not buy the lot due to budget constraints. RCAM then decided to effect, on its own, the subdivision of the property and the sale of the individual subdivided lots to the public. Significant turn of events however happened in 1977 when the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1072, appropriating P1.2M out of the President’s Special Operations Funds to cover the additional amount needed for the expropriation of Grace Park. The National Housing Authority (NHA), PHHC’s successor, then filed several expropriation proceedings over the already subdivided lots for the purpose of developing Grace Park under the Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) and subdividing it into small lots for distribution and resale at a low cost to the residents of the area. NHA, in its petition in G.R. Nos. 116491-503, primarily contends that the CA erred when it issued its March 2, 1994 Resolution and modified the May 27, 1993 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 10200-10212 to the extent that it applied retroactively Article VI, Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7279, thus exempting from expropriation the 300-sq m lots of respondents Loberanes, Quimque, Vega, Santos, Oracion and Mercado. Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in giving R.A. No. 7279 retroactive effect. Ruling: The CA’s ruling on this point is incorrect. R.A. No. 7279 was enacted in 1992, almost two decades after the expropriation cases against the property owners herein were instituted with the RTC in 1977. Nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet, non praeteritis. A new statute should affect the future, not the past. The law looks forward, not backward. Article 4 of the Civil Code even explicitly declares, “(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.” In these consolidated cases, the Court finds that the language of R.A. No. 7279 does not suggest that the Legislature has intended its provisions to have any retroactive application. On the contrary, Section 49 of the said law indicates that it “shall take effect upon its publication in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation. “The law’s prospective application being clearly stated, the Court cannot agree with the disposition of the appellate court that the subject lots not exceeding 300 sq m are exempt from expropriation.

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Nullus commodum potest de injuria propriasua No man should be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong.

MA. AMELITA C. VILLAROSA vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

G.R. No. 143351; September 14, 2000 Facts: Petitioner Villarosa and Private respondent Quintos were the only candidates for the office of Representative of the Lone Legislative District of Occidental Mindoro in the 11 May1998 synchronized national and local elections. The Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed VIillarosa as the winning candidate with a margin of 3,032 votes. Quintos filed an election protest against VILLAROSA contesting the results of the election in all the 882 precincts in the eleven municipalities of Occidental Mindoro. Petitioner is the wife of JOSE T. Villarosa, who was Representative of the District in question for two terms, the last of which ended on June 30, 1998; in his certificate of candidacy for the election of May 8, 1995, JOSE T. VILLAROSA wrote as his “nickname or stage name: JOE-JTV.” In her certificate of candidacy, Petitioner wrote “JTV” as her “nickname/stage name. Issue: Whether or not the “JTV” votes should be counted in favor of Petitioner Amelita c. Villarosa. Ruling: From all the foregoing, bad faith or malice on the part of VILLAROSA was evident when, in her certificate of candidacy and campaign materials, she appropriated the initials or nickname of her husband, the incumbent Representative of the district in question whom she wanted to succeed in office. She tried to make a mockery of a process whose credibility is essential in preserving democracy. Nullus commodum potest de injuria propiasua - no one should be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong. Villarosa’s use of “JTV” as her nickname was a clever ploy to make a mockery of the election process. HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that the only issue for its determination was whether "JTV" votes or variations thereof should be counted in favor of VILLAROSA and in ruling that such votes are stray votes.

Nullum crimen sine poena, nulla poena sine lege There is no crime without a penalty, and there is no penalty without a law.

JUANITO R. RIMANDO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) AND NORMA O. MAGNO

G.R. No. 176364 Facts: On July 13, 2001, herein private respondent lodged a Complaint with the COMELEC, Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Santa Cruz Laguna, accusing Jacinto Carag, Jonry Enaya and herein petitioner Juanito R. Rimando of violating Section 2, paragraph (e) and Section 3, paragraph (d) of COMELEC Resolution No. 3328 in relation to Section 261, paragraph (s) of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 32 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7166. Petitioner denied the allegation in his counter-affidavit. In a Resolution dated October 8, 2001, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Santa Cruz, Laguna, dismissed private respondent’s complaint against petitioner, private respondent then appealed to COMELEC. On May 6, 2002, the COMELEC En Banc rendered a Resolution affirming the dismissal of the complaint against security guards but directing its Law Department to file the proper information against petitioner Juanito Rimando for violation of Article XXII, Section 261, paragraph (s) of the Omnibus Election Code.

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Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was granted by COMELEC En Banc in its Resolution dated January 30, 2004. Private Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration for the aforementioned resolution which was granted by the COMELEC on October 11, 2005. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the October 11, 2005 Resolution but was denied by COMELEC. Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to reverse and set 1) Resolution promulgated on October 11, 2005 and 2) Resolution promulgated on January 5, 2007. Issue: Whether or not Public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or without or in excess of jurisdiction in disregarding the time-honored doctrine of “nullum crimen [sine poena], nulla poena sine lege.” Ruling: Under Section 261 (s) of the Omnibus Election Code, the punishable act is the bearing of arms outside the immediate vicinity of one’s place of work during the election period and not the failure of the head or responsible officer of the security agency to obtain prior written COMELEC approval. In any event, there is likewise nothing in R.A. 7166 that expressly penalizes the mere failure to secure written authority from the COMELEC as required in Section 32 thereof. Such failure to secure an authorization must still be accompanied by other operative acts, such as the bearing, carrying or transporting of firearms in public places during the election period. All told, petitioner should be absolved of any criminal liability, consistent with the doctrine of nullum crimen [sine peona], nulla poena sine lege - there is no crime when there is no law punishing it. Thus, the Court finds that respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned Resolutions. WHEREFORE, The Resolutions of the COMELEC En Banc issued on October 11, 2005 and January 5, 2007 in Election Case No. 01-130 are hereby reversed and set aside.

Nullum tempus occurit regi There can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.

REPUBLIC vs. VILLASOR

G.R. No. L-30671; November 28, 1973 Facts: The decision rendered on July 3, 1961 in favor of P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation was declared final and executory by respondent Judge Guillermo P. Villasor. Pursuant to the said order dated June 24, 1969, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was issued. For the strength of the aforementioned writ, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal served notices of garnishment with several banks, especially on the ‘monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits’; the Philippine Veterans Bank received the same notice of garnishment. The fund of the AFP on deposit with the banks, particularly with the Philippine Veterans Bank and the Philippine National Bank [or] their branches are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowance of military and civilian personnel and for the maintenance of operations of the AFP. Petitioner, on certiorari, filed a petition against respondent Judge Villasor for acting in excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution against the properties of AFP, hence the notices of garnishment are null and void. Issue:

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Whether or not the Writ of Execution rendered by respondent Judge Villasor is valid. Ruling: No. What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution. It is a fundamental concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from the suit unless it gives consent because “there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends” – nullum tempus occurit regi. “The State may not be sued without its consent.” A corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense from such a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged. “Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law.”

Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum statutum The best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself

LOYOLA GRAND VILLAS HOMEOWNERS (SOUTH) ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 117188; August 7, 1997 Facts: Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Association, Inc. (LGVHAI) was organized as the association of homeowners and residents of the Loyola Grand Villas. It was organized by the developer of the subdivision and its first president was Victorio V. Soliven, himself the owner of the developer. For unknown reasons, however, LGVHAI did not file its corporate by-laws. The officers of the LGVHAI tried to register its by-laws. They failed to do so. To the officers’ consternation, they discovered that there were two other organizations within the subdivision – the North Association and the South Association. When one of the officers inquired about the status of LGVHAI, the head of the legal department of the HIGC, informed him that LGVHAI had been automatically dissolved for two reasons. First, it did not submit its by-laws within the period required by the Corporation Code and, second, there was non-user of corporate charter because HIGC had not received any report on the association’s activities. Issue: Whether or not the LGVHAI’s failure to file its by-laws within the period prescribed by Section 46 of the Corporation Code had the effect of automatically dissolving the said corporation? Ruling: No. Taken as a whole and under the principle that the best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself (optima statuli interpretatix est ipsum statutum), Section 46 reveals the legislative intent to attach a directory, and not mandatory, meaning for the word “must” in the first sentence thereof. Note should be taken of the second paragraph of the law which allows the filing of the by-laws even prior to incorporation. This provision in the same section of the Code rules out mandatory compliance with the requirement of filing the by-laws “within one (1) month after receipt of official notice of the issuance of its certificate of incorporation by the Securities and Exchange Commission.” It necessarily follows that failure to file the by-laws within that period does not imply the “demise” of the corporation. By-laws may be necessary for the “government” of the corporation but these are subordinate to the articles of incorporation as well as to the Corporation Code and related statutes. There can be no automatic corporate dissolution simply because the incorporators failed to abide by the required filing of by-laws embodied in Section 46 of the Corporation Code. There is no outright “demise” of corporate existence. Proper notice and hearing are cardinal components of due process in any democratic institution, agency or society. In other words, the incorporators must be given the chance to explain their neglect or omission and

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remedy the same. Non-filing of the by-laws will not result in automatic dissolution of the corporation. In fact, under the rules and regulations of the SEC, failure to file the by-laws on time may be penalized merely with the imposition of an administrative fine without affecting the corporate existence of the erring firm.

Optimus interpres rerum usus The best interpreter of the law is usage.

JM TUASON AND CO., ET AL. vs. HON. HERMINIO MARIANO, ET AL.

GR No. L-33140, October 23, 1978 Facts: Respondents Aquial claimed ownership of a parcel of land located in Quezon City having an area of 383 hectares. They alleged that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal and that it was registered in the names of Petitioners Tuason pursuant to a decree issued on July 6, 1914 in Case No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration. Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom be declared void due to certain irregularities in the land registration proceeding. Issue: Whether or not OCT No. 735 is valid. Ruling: OCT No. 735 is valid. The validity of OCT No. 735 was already decided upon by the Supreme Court in the cases of Benin vs Tuason, Alcantara vs Tuason and Pili vs Tuason. The ruling in these cases was also applied in other cases involving the validity of OCT No. 735. Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled) and optimus interpres rerum usus (the best interpreter of the law is usage), the court ruled that respondents cannot maintain their action without eroding the long settled holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and no longer open to attack.

Pari Materia Relating to the same matter

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SIMEONA MARTIN AND HERMIN ARCEO

G.R. No. L-38019 May 16, 1980 Facts: That on or about April 5, 1972, in the municipalities of Bocaue and Guiguinto, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Hermin Arceo and Simeona Martin, conspiring and confederating together and helping each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have in their possession such false and counterfeit science stamps worth Php 90,080.00 for, the purpose of using and selling the same in the payment of internal revenue tax, and in fact sold and offered for sale a part of the same, with intent of gain thus defrauding the government. The accused contend that their act does not constitute an offense and the Fiscal respondent judge dismissed the case. The respondent judge expressed the opinion that the word "penalties" found in Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 5448 refers to "administrative" penalties, like administrative fines provided for in the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC for short), basing this view on Sec. 5 of the same Act, which speaks of "taxes and penalties" which should be turned over by certain officials to the Treasurer of the Philippines.

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The respondent judge interpreted the word "penalties" in phrase "subject to the same penalties", as administrative fines, not penalties imposed for a criminal offense, by a court of justice after proper criminal proceedings. In this sense, "penalties" would have reference to fines to be imposed in cases of improper or incorrect collection of the tax with respect to the amount and to the time of payment thereof, not as penalties imposed on acts considered as criminal offenses under the law. Issue: Is the word "penalties" found in Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 5448 refers to "administrative" penalties? Ruling: No, the word "penalties" found in Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 5448 refers to "administrative" penalties. The penalties mentioned in the phrase "subject to the same penalties" would then refer to Sec. 240 of the NIRC, which are for specific offenses enumerated therein, thereby investing Republic Act 5448 with the character of completeness, not that of incompleteness which would be against all reasonable presumptions as to how the legislative body performs its functions. With the certainty in the mind of the Court that the legislative body, in enacting Republic Act 5448 and relating it to the documentary stamp tax provisions of the NIRC in the manner it did, intended to make the later law as effective and fool-proof as the earlier statute, considering their kindred aims and objectives, and therefore are in pari materia with each other, We have no hesitation in adopting the construction of Sec. 4 of Republic Act 5448 as providing penalties for the same acts as those enumerated in Sec. 240 of the NIRC 4 Which clearly include those charged in the information filed against private respondents. It may even be more accurate to say that more than just statutes in pari materia with each other, Republic Act 5448 is an amplification of the NIRC, as may be gleaned from the provisions of Sec. 4 of Republic Act 5448 which states that "in addition to the documentary stamp taxes imposed under Sections 211 to 235 of Commonwealth Act No. 466, as amended, otherwise known as the National Internal Revenue Code, there are hereby imposed science stamp taxes, etc." The second paragraph of the same Section 4 which provides that "that tax imposed herein shall be ... subject to the same penalties as the documentary stamp imposed under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended," should, accordingly, be interpreted as referring to the penalties imposed for the prohibited acts specified in Sec. 240 of the NIRC, designed to protect the integrity of both kind of stamp taxes, for the full attainment of the purpose and aim of both statutes as revenue measures, and prevent any form of subversion thereof.

Privilegia reciprint largan interpretationem voluntate consonan concedentis Privileges are to be interpreted in accordance with the will of him who grants them

BARRETTO vs. TUASON

G.R. Nos. L-36872;March 31, 1934 Facts: The mayorazgo was founded by Don Antonio Tuason on February 25, 1794. On June 4 of 1794, the founder died in the City of Manila. The mayorazgo was approved by Royal Cedula of August 20, 1795. On October 11, 1820, the Statute of Civil Disentailments was promulgated in Spain, was extended to the Philippine Islands, and took effect therein on March 1, 1864, by virtue of a Royal Decree of October 31, 1863. The properties of the mayorazgo consist of the Haciendas de Santa Mesa y Diliman, Hacienda de Mariquina, and two urban properties situated on Rosario Street, Manila. By agreement of the parties, the assessed value of the said properties is: (a) Haciendas de Santa Mesa y Diliman for P3,550,646.00; (b) Hacienda de Mariquina for Php 1,507,140.00; and (c) Properties on Rosario Street for Php 542,382.00. Issue:

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Who are entitled to the mayorazgo? Ruling: The recipients of the fifth of the revenues are indicated in the sixth clause of the instrument of foundation, the text of which we again transcribe: If the descendants of the younger children, subsequent to the grandchildren of the founder, are granted under certain circumstances the right to possess the mayorazgo itself, with all its properties, we do not see how it can be said that these descendants, subsequent to grandchildren, the sons of sons, were prohibited from receiving a fifth of the revenues of said properties. It is our understanding that the intention of the founder was not to restrict the grant of the usufruct of the fifth of the revenue by limiting it to a certain number of generations of the younger children, but that he intended to extend it to all of the descendants of the latter. If this is so we should apply to the case the rule of law of the Partidas (Rule 28, Title 34, 7th Partido), which says: "Privilegia recipiunt largum interpretationem voluntati consonan concedentis." (Privileges are to be interpreted with liberality in accordance with the will of him who grants them.) The foregoing paragraphs contain conclusions of fact and of law established after a careful study of the provisions found in the foundation and of the laws applicable to the case, and are squarely applicable to the facts recently proved at the new trial, except that five-eighths of the fifth should be divided among the descendants of the five (5) younger children with succession and the remaining three-eighths of the fifth among the relatives in general of the founder, because it developed that the younger daughter Eustaquia Ma. Tuason had left heirs, contrary to the stipulation of the plaintiffs and the defendants. That the said appealed decision and order be amended in the sense that the sales executed in favor of the defendants-appellants of the participations coming from the younger children without succession, are valid in their entirety, and therefore, said participations should be adjudicated in favor of said defendants-appellants.

Potior est in tempore, potior est in jure He who is first in time is preferred in right

CRUZ vs. CABANA

G.R. No. L-56232 June 22, 1984 Facts: On June 1, 1965, Leodegaria Cabana sold the subject property to respondent spouses Teofilo Legaspi and Iluminada Cabana (spouses Legaspi) under a contract entitled “Bilihang Muling Mabibili” which stipulated that Cabana can repurchase the land within one year from December 31, 1966. However, the said land was not repurchased. On October 21, 1968, Cabana formally sold the subject property to spouses Legaspi in an absolute sale. The spouses Legaspi then attempted to register the deed of sale, but failed because they could not present the owner's duplicate of title which was still in the possession of the Philippine National Bank as mortgage. Subsequently, they were able to register the sale on May 13, 1969 under Primary Entry No. 210113 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon Province. On November 29, 1968, Cabana sold the subject property to Abelardo Cruz (now deceased), who, in turn, tried to register the deed of sale on September 3, 1970. However, he was informed that Cabana had already sold the subject property to the spouses Legaspi, so he was only able to register the land in his name on February 9, 1971. Issue: Who is the true and rightful owner of the property in litigation? Ruling:

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The Court declared spouses Legaspi as the true and rightful owners of the property in litigation. As the Court held in Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals "it is essential that the buyer of realty must act in good faith in registering his deed of sale to merit the protection of the second paragraph of Article 1544." As the writer stressed in his concurring opinion therein, "The governing principle here is prius tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyer's rights except only as provided by the Civil Code and that is where the second buyer first registers in good faith the second sale ahead of the first. Such knowledge of the first buyer does not bar her from availing of her rights under the law, among them, to register first her purchase as against the second buyer. But in converso knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register the second sale, since such knowledge taints his prior registration with bad faith. This is the price exacted by Article 1544 of the Civil Code for the second buyer being able to displace the first buyer; that before the second buyer can obtain priority over the first, he must show that he acted in good faith throughout (i.e. in ignorance of the first sale and of the first buyer's rights) — from the time of acquisition until the title is transferred to him by registration or failing registration, by delivery of possession. The second buyer must show continuing good faith and innocence or lack of knowledge of the first sale until his contract ripens into full ownership through prior registration as provided by law."

Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum What is prohibited directly is prohibited indirectly

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. SEAGATE TECHNOLOGY (PHILIPPINES)

G.R. No. 153866 February 11, 2005 Facts: Respondent Seagate Technology (Philippines) is a resident foreign corporation duly registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission to do business in the Philippines, with principal office address at the new Cebu Township One, Special Economic Zone, Barangay Cantao-an, Naga, Cebu. Petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue is sued in his official capacity, having been duly appointed and empowered to perform the duties of his office, including, among others, the duty to act and approve claims for refund or tax credit. The respondent is registered with the Philippine Export Zone Authority (PEZA) and has been issued PEZA Certificate No. 97-044 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 66 (P.D. No. 66), as amended, to engage in the manufacture of recording components primarily used in computers for export. Such registration was made on June 6, 1997. The respondent is Value Added Tax (VAT)-registered entity as evidenced by VAT Registration Certification No. 97-083-000600-V issued on April 2, 1997. The respondent filed VAT returns for the period April 1, 1998 to June 30, 1999. On October 4, 1999, an administrative claim for refund of VAT input taxes in the amount of Php 28,369,226.38 with supporting documents (inclusive of the Php 12,267,981.04 VAT input taxes subject of this Petition for Review), was filed at the Revenue District Office No. 83, Talisay, Cebu. No final action has been received by the respondent from the petitioner on the respondent’s claim for VAT refund. Issue: Is the respondent entitled to the refund or issuance of Tax Credit Certificate? Ruling: Yes, the respondent is entitled to the refund or issuance of Tax Credit Certificate. As a PEZA-registered enterprise within a special economic zone, the respondent is entitled to the fiscal incentives and benefits provided for in either P.D. No. 66 or Executive Order No. 226. It shall, moreover, enjoy all privileges, benefits, advantages or exemptions under both Republic Act Nos. 7227 and 7844.

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The respondent as an entity is exempt from internal revenue laws and regulations. This exemption covers both direct and indirect taxes, stemming from the very nature of the VAT as a tax on consumption, for which the direct liability is imposed on one person but the indirect burden is passed on to another. Respondent, as an exempt entity, can neither be directly charged for the VAT on its sales nor indirectly made to bear, as added cost to such sales, the equivalent VAT on its purchases. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus. Where the law does not distinguish, we ought not to distinguish. Republic Act No. 7916 (RA 7916) states that "no taxes, local and national, shall be imposed on business establishments operating within the ecozone." Since this law does not exclude the VAT from the prohibition, it is deemed included. Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis. An exception confirms the rule in cases not excepted; that is, a thing not being excepted must be regarded as coming within the purview of the general rule. Moreover, even though the VAT is not imposed on the entity but on the transaction, it may still be passed on and, therefore, indirectly imposed on the same entity -- a patent circumvention of the law. That no VAT shall be imposed directly upon business establishments operating within the ecozone under RA 7916 also means that no VAT may be passed on and imposed indirectly. Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo prohibetur et per obliquum. When anything is prohibited directly, it is also prohibited indirectly. To summarize, special laws expressly grant preferential tax treatment to business establishments registered and operating within an ecozone, which by law is considered as a separate customs territory. As such, respondent is exempt from all internal revenue taxes, including the VAT, and regulations pertaining thereto. It has opted for the income tax holiday regime, instead of the 5 percent preferential tax regime. As a matter of law and procedure, its registration status entitling it to such tax holiday can no longer be questioned. Its sales transactions intended for export may not be exempt, but like its purchase transactions, they are zero-rated. No prior application for the effective zero rating of its transactions is necessary. Being VAT-registered and having satisfactorily complied with all the requisites for claiming a tax refund of or credit for the input VAT paid on capital goods purchased, respondent is entitled to such VAT refund or credit.

Ratihabito mandato aquiparatur Legislative ratification is equivalent to a mandate

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF NEW YORK

G.R. No. 5876 September 1, 1911 Facts: On about July 27, 1901, the defendant, The Standard Oil Company of New York, imported into the Philippine Islands 30,000 cases of refined petroleum which contained approximately 300,000 gallons. That same day, the defendant company presented to the Bureau of Customs of this city an affidavit setting forth that the said 30,000 cases of refined petroleum had been sold by the former to the commissary department of the United States Army in Manila, and that the said company retained no interest therein. From August 7 to October 28, 1901, the defendant company removed from its warehouse the 30,000 cases there deposited, which it did with the authorization of the customs authorities of the port of Manila, upon the express representation of the duly authorized agents of the defendant that the withdrawal of the said cases was for their delivery to the commissary department of the United States Army and for the exclusive use of the said Army, in conformity with the terms of the privilege of free entry granted thereto. But, of the 30,000 cases, only 10,679 were actually delivered to the commissary department of the United States Army, and the remaining 19,321 cases, which contained 193,210 gallons of refined petroleum, equivalent to 608,321.685 kilograms, were, free of customs duties, sold to private parties; the Government of the Philippine

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Islands, as alleged by the plaintiff, being, by these deceitful and fraudulent means, defrauded of the tax or duty which the defendant company should have paid upon the said cases. As prescribed by Section 30 of the Provisional Customs Tariff, then in force in the Philippine Islands, the duty chargeable was 6.318 pesos Mexican currency for each 100 kilograms; so that, for the 608,321.685 kilograms, the defendant company was indebted in the sum of 38,433.76 pesos Mexican currency which, at the exchange of one dollar for each 2 pesos in Mexican currency, make exactly 38,433.76 pesos in Philippine currency. The Government of the Philippine Islands demands of The Standard Oil Company of New York the payment of Php 38,433.76, together with the interest thereon due from October 28, 1901, and the costs and expenses occasioned by this suit, by reason of the customs duties payable by the defendant company, Issue: Is the defendant company liable to pay the obligation? Ruling: Yes, the defendant company is liable to pay the obligation. The intention and will of the legislator being so clear, so explicit, to approve, confirm, and ratify as by an act of his own prior to April 11, 1899, and even also to July 12, 1898 (the date of the order of the President), the acts of the latter and of the officials of the Government of these Islands, with respect to "the collection of all the said duties prior to March 8, 1902," and also with regard to "the import and export duties levied by the authorities of the United States or of the provisional military government of the same in the Philippine Islands prior to March 8, 1902"—two subjects that are the purpose of the said Act, it being an axiom of law, that the ratification is equivalent to a mandate (ratihabitio aequiparatur mandato), the conclusion cannot be avoided that, by the legislators will, the tariff duties demandable during the period mentioned in the complaint, are so, not by a null and void order of the President, but by an Act of Congress. Such, and no other, is for the courts the status of the established law in this matter, be whatever it may, in abstract law, the legality of the legislative act concerned, for there is no question pending before us with respect to its constitutionality. We do not treat of the question in this brief, says the appellant, as we do not consider it necessary to do so."

Ratio Legis Interpretation according to the spirit

MANUEL UY vs. ENRICO PALOMAR, IN HIS CAPACITY AS POSTMASTER GENERAL

G.R. No. L-23248 February 28, 1969 Facts: Manuel Uy is an agent of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO). PCSO is a government entity created and empowered by law to hold sweepstakes draws and lotteries for charitable and public purposes. For the Grand Christmas Sweepstakes Draw, the PCSO directed its agents to undertake every means possible to achieve its sales goal. Subsequently, Uy devised a “Grand Christmas Bonus Award” plan, where his sub-agents and the purchasers of the tickets themselves, in addition to the prize money from PCSO, would win certain items. Pursuant to this, Postmaster General Enrico Palomar issued a Fraud Order and ordered Uy’s parcels containing sweepstakes tickets and other personal mail to be refused for acceptance for mailing, on the basis of the Postal Law which proscribes the use of the mail system to conduct lotteries, gift enterprises, schemes, etc. Thus, Uy filed a complaint challenging the issuance of the Fraud Order. Issue: Does the Grand Christmas Bonus Award constitute a lottery or a gift enterprise?

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Ruling: No, Grand Christmas Bonus Award does not constitute a lottery or a gift enterprise. There is no statutory definition of the terms "lottery" and "gift enterprise". This Court, in the case of "El Debate" Inc. vs. Topacio, supra, referring to lottery, said: ... while countless definitions of lottery have been attempted, the authoritative one for this jurisdiction is that of the United States Supreme Court, in analogous cases having to do with the power of the United States Postmaster General, viz: The term "lottery" extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three essential elements of a lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize; and third, chance (Horner vs. United States [1902] 147 U.S. 449; Public Clearing House vs. Coyne [1903] 194 U.S., 497; U.S. vs. Filart and Singson [1915] 30 Phil. 80; U.S. vs. Olsen and Marker [1917] 36 Phil. 395; U.S. Vs. Baguio [1919] 39 Phil. 962: Valhalla Hotel Construction Company vs. Carmona, p. 233, ante.) Thus, for lottery to exist, three elements must concur, namely: consideration, prize, and chance. In the instant case, as stated by the lower court, the prizes offered by Uy were to be taken from his share in the agent's prize, which was 10% of the amount of the prize won by each ticket sold. Therefore, since none of the prizes (awards and bonuses) offered in Uy's plan were to come directly from the aggregate price of the sweepstakes tickets sold by Uy, as a part thereof, no consideration exists for the chance to win said prizes, there being no "contribution in kind to the fund or property to be distributed." Even in the light of the mischief or evil sought to be redressed by the Postal Law, or the ratio legis, Uy's scheme cannot be condemned as a lottery. It is merely a scheme set up to promote the sale of tickets for the Grand Christmas Sweepstakes Draw held on December 15, 1963. Should any question be raised it would be: whether or not sweepstakes draws cultivate or stimulate the gambling spirit among the people. It should be so, because it cannot be doubted that sweepstakes tickets purchasers are induced to buy said tickets because of the desire to win any of the substantial prizes offered by the PCSO. This question, however, is at once rendered moot and academic because sweepstakes draws are authorized by law.

Ratio legis est anima legis The reason of the law is its soul

VILLASI vs. GARCIA

G.R. No. 190106 January 15, 2014 Facts: Sometime in 1990, petitioner Magdalena Villasi (Villasi) engaged the services of respondent Fil-Garcia Construction, Inc. (FGCI) to construct a seven-storey condominium building located at Aurora Boulevard corner N. Domingo Street, Cubao, Quezon City. For failure of Villasi to fully pay the contract price despite several demands, FGCI initiated a suit for collection of sum of money before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. In its action, FGCI prayed, among others, for the payment of the amount of Php 2,865,000.00, representing the unpaid accomplishment billings. Served with summons, Villasi filed an answer specifically denying the material allegations of the complaint. Contending that FGCI has no cause of action against her, Villasi averred that she delivered the total amount of Php 7,490,325.10 to FGCI but the latter accomplished only 28% of the project. After the pre-trial conference was terminated without the parties having reached an amicable settlement, trial on the merits ensued.

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To enforce her right as prevailing party, Villasi filed a Motion for Execution of the November 20, 2000 Court of Appeals Decision, which was favorably acted upon by the RTC. A Writ of Execution was issued on April 28, 2004, commanding the Sheriff to execute and make effective the November 20, 2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals. To satisfy the judgment, the sheriff levied on a building located at No. 140 Kalayaan Avenue, Quezon City, covered by Tax Declaration No. D-021-01458, and built in the lots registered under Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 379193 and 379194. While the building was declared for taxation purposes in the name of FGCI, the lots in which it was erected were registered in the names of the Spouses Filomeno Garcia and Ermelinda Halili-Garcia (Spouses Garcia). After the mandatory posting and publication of notice of sale on execution of real property were complied with, a public auction was scheduled on January 25, 2006. To forestall the sale on execution, the Spouses Garcia filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim and a Motion to Set Aside Notice of Sale on Execution, claiming that they are the lawful owners of the property which was erroneously levied upon by the sheriff. Issue: Are the Spouses Garcia the lawful owners of the property? Ruling: Yes, the Spouses Garcia are the lawful owners of the property. Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. It likewise failed to escape our attention that FGCI is in actual possession of the building and as the payment of taxes coupled with actual possession of the land covered by tax declaration strongly supports a claim of ownership. Quite significantly, all the court processes in an earlier collection suit between FGCI and Villasi were served, thru the former’s representative Filomeno Garcia, at No. 140 Kalayaan Avenue, Quezon City, where the subject property is located. This circumstance is consistent with the tax declaration in the name of FGCI. The explanation proffered by the Spouses Garcia, that the City Assessor merely committed an error when it declared the property for taxation purposes in the name of FGCI, appears to be suspect in the absence of any prompt and serious effort on their part to have it rectified before the onset of the instant controversy. The correction of entry belatedly sought by the Spouses Garcia is indicative of its intention to put the property beyond the reach of the judgment creditor. Every prevailing party to a suit enjoys the corollary right to the fruits of the judgment and, thus, court rules provide a procedure to ensure that every favorable judgment is fully satisfied. It is almost trite to say that execution is the fruit and end of the suit. Hailing it as the "life of the law," ratio legis est anima, this Court has zealously guarded against any attempt to thwart the rigid rule and deny the prevailing litigant his right to savour the fruit of his victory. A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty triumph for the prevailing party. The rule on accession is not an iron-clad dictum. On instances where this Court was confronted with cases requiring judicial determination of the ownership of the building separate from the lot, it never hesitated to disregard such rule. The case at bar is of similar import. When there are factual and evidentiary evidence to prove that the building and the lot on which it stands are owned by different persons, they shall be treated separately. As such, the building or the lot, as the case may be, can be made liable to answer for the obligation of its respective owner.

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Reddendo singula singulis Referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object; or let each be put in its proper

place

AMADORA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988 Facts: A few days before graduation, Alfredo Amadora was shot and killed when his classmate, Pablito Daffron fired a gun in the auditorium of their school. Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Additionally, the petitioners filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents. The complaint against the students was later dropped. Issue: Can the school be held liable? Ruling: No, the school cannot be held liable. In the Exconde Case, Dante Capuno, a student of the Balintawak Elementary School and a Boy Scout, attended a Rizal Day parade on instructions of the city school supervisor. After the parade, the boy boarded a jeep, took over its wheel and drove it so recklessly that it turned turtle, resulting in the death of two of its passengers. Dante was found guilty of double homicide with reckless imprudence. In the separate civil action filed against them, his father was held solidarily liable with him in damages under Article 1903 (now Article 2180) of the Civil Code for the tort committed by the 15-year old boy. This decision, which was penned by Justice Bautista Angelo on June 29, 1957, exculpated the school in an obiter dictum (as it was not a party to the case) on the ground that it was riot a school of arts and trades. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, with whom Justices Sabino Padilla and Alex Reyes concurred, dissented, arguing that it was the school authorities who should be held liable under this rule, he said, was imposed on (1) teachers in general; and (2) heads of schools of arts and trades in particular. The modifying clause "of establishments of arts and trades" should apply only to "heads" and not "teachers." After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo singula singulis "teachers" should apply to the words "pupils and students" and "heads of establishments of arts and trades" to the word "apprentices." The Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record and in the light of the principles herein announced that none of the respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by Pablito Damon on Alfredo Amadora that resulted in the latter's death.

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Salus populi est suprema lex The voice of the people is the supreme law

RESTITUTO YNOT vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987 Facts: Executive Order No. 626-A (E. O. 626-A) prohibits the inter-provincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos. Any carabao or carabeef transported in violation of E.O. 626-A shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the governmentt, to be distributed to charitable institutions as Chairman of National Meat Inspection may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabao. On January 13, 1984, Restituto Ynot transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A. Issue: Is Executive Order No. 626-A constitutional? Ruling: No, Executive Order No. 626-A is not constitutional. The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, as "the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword. This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. There are instances when the need for expeditions action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has fled. Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the public morals. In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger. The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. The individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police power, which affects him even before he is born and follows him still after he is dead — from the womb to beyond the tomb — in practically everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous

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and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary. And the justification is found in the venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater number. The Court finds that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to invoke them whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a promise of protection. They become truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society, if they are kept bright and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert them. The Court declared Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.

Surplusagium non nocet Surplusage does not vitiate a statute

UNITED STATES vs. JULIAN SANTIAGO

G.R. No. L-11374 March 14, 1917 Facts: Julian Santiago, as Roman apostolic priest and the confessor of Eufrasia Siasat, a virgin, 16 years old, wilfully, unlawfully, and criminally seduced the said girl and succeeded in lying with her several times during the period covering the months of July to November 1914. Issue: Is the defendant liable for qualified seduction? Ruling: Yes, the defendant is liable for qualified seduction. The words "by means of deceit and promise of marriage: used in the complaint in question cannot have the effect of varying the qualification of the crime charged, inasmuch as in the complaint it was expressly stated that the carnal knowledge was had between Julian Santiago, roman apostolic priest, and the girl Eufrasia Siasat, a virgin 16 years old, and much less can those words have the effect of accusing the same Julian Santiago of the crime of simple seduction, that is, of two crimes punished with different penalties. Said words can be considered as a redundancy in the complaint, or in other words as mere surplusage, for the reason, as has been stated in speaking of the crime of qualified seduction, that the law does not require that there should be deceit on the part of the agent in order that he may be punished as guilty of the said crime. Mere surplusage will not vitiate an indictment which contains sufficient matter to charge a crime. An unnecessary averment may be considered surplusage and rejected, as may be a defective but immaterial averment, and a fact stated may be rejected as surplusage if it be merely in aggravation, so that it may be stricken out and yet leave the offense fully describes. . . . (Ruling Case Law, volume 14, par. 37, page 191 and the cases therein cited.) xxx xxx xxx

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Mere surplusage does not amount to duplicity, and where a count charges one offense, and defectively charges another, the latter charge may be rejected as surplusage. . . . (Ruling Case Law, volume 14, par. 40 page 196, and the cases therein cited.) It cannot therefore be held, that in the complaint in question two crimes are charged and that the phrase used in the said complaint, "by means of deceit and promise of marriage," which can be considered as superfluous because in the complaint Julian Santiago is accused of the crime of qualified seduction, has vitiated the complaint with a nullity, and that the lower court has committed an error in overruling the second ground of the demurrer interposed to the said complaint by the counsel for the defense. The acts proven at the trial constitute the crime of qualified seduction prescribed and punished by Article 443, par. 1 of the Penal Code. The guilt of the accused as the author of the said crime having been proven without the concurrence of any modifying circumstance, the penalty imposed upon said accused in its medium degree, such as has been imposed upon him by the trial court in the judgment appealed from, is property, although the accused should also be condemned to recognize and maintain the offspring which his illicit relations with the said girl would produce.

Stare decisis et non quieta movere Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled.

J.R.A. PHILIPPINES, INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

G.R. No. 177127 October 11, 2010 Facts: Petitioner, a PEZA Corporation, filed applications for tax credit/refund of unutilized input VAT on its zero-rated sales for the taxable quarters of 2000. The claim for credit/refund, however, remained unacted by the respondent. Hence, petitioner was constrained to file a petition before the CTA. The CTA eventually denied the petition for lack of the word “zero-rated” on the invoices/receipts. Issue: Whether or not the failure to print the word “zero-rated” on the invoices/receipts is fatal to a claim for credit/ refund of input VAT on zero-rated sales Ruling: Yes. The absence of the word “zero rated” on the invoices/receipts is fatal to a claim for credit/refund of input VAT. This has been squarely resolved in Panasonic Communications Imaging Corporation of the Philippines (formerly Matsushita Business Machine Corporation of the Philippines) v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (G.R. No. 178090, 612 SCRA 28, February 8, 2010). In that case, the claim for tax credit/refund was denied for non-compliance with Section 4.108-1 of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95, which requires the word “zero rated” to be printed on the invoices/receipts covering zero-rated sales. From the abovementioned decision, the Court ruled that the appearance of the word “zero-rated” on the face of invoices covering zero-rated sales prevents buyers from falsely claiming input VAT from their purchases when no VAT was actually paid. If, absent such word, a successful claim for input VAT is made, the government would be refunding money it did not collect. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Courts are bound by prior decisions. Thus, once a case has been decided one way, courts have no choice but to resolve subsequent cases involving the same issue in the same manner.

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Ubi jus, ibi remedium Where there is a right, there is a remedy.

LEONARDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G. R. No. 125329. September 10, 2003 Facts: Petitioner Ann Brigit Leonardo was born in Manila to common-law spouses Eddie Fernandez and Gloria Leonardo. In her Birth Certificate Leonardo was her surname. Wanting to change her surname to that of her father, they sent a letter to the Local Civil Registrar on August 1, 1994. The Local Civil Registrar denied their request citing FC 176 which states that petitioner, being illegitimate, should carry the surname of the mother. Issue: Whether or not Ann Brigit Leonardo could use her father‘s surname. Ruling: No. The Family Code has repealed NCC 366 which allows natural children to use the surname of the father if the child is recognized by BOTH parents. Now, in the Family Code, an illegitimate child should use the surname of the mother even if the father acknowledges him/her. Hence, Ann Brigit has NO right to use the surname of the father. Ubi jus, ibi remedium. When there is a right, there is a remedy. Conversely, if there is no right, there is no remedy as every remedial right is based on a substantive right.

Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus Where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish

GUEVARA vs. INOCENTES

G. R. No. L-25577, 16 SCRA 379, March 15, 1966 Facts: The petitioner, Onofre Guevara was extended an ad interim appointment as Undersecretary of Labor by the former Executive on November 18, 1965. Took his oath of office on November 25th same year. The incumbent Executive issued Memorandum Circular No. 8 dated January 23, 1966 declaring that all ad interim appointments made by the former Executive lapsed with the adjournment of the special session of Congress at about midnight of January 22, 1966. The respondent, Raoul Inocentes was extended an ad interim appointment for the same position by the incumbent Executive on January 23, 1966. Guevara filed before the court an instant petition for Quo Warranto seeking to be declared person legally entitled to the said Officer of the Undersecretary of Labor under Art. VII Sec. 10 (4) of the 1935 Constitution. which states that: “The president shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress”. Since there was no Commission on Appointments organized during the special session which commenced on January 17, 1966, the respondent contended that the petitioner’s ad interim appointment as well as other made under similar conditions must have lapsed when the Congress adjourned its last special session. But the petitioner stated that (1) the specific provision in the Constitution which states that: “until the next adjournment of Congress” means adjournment of a regular session of Congress and not by a special session and (2) only the Senate adjourned sine die at midnight of January 22, 1966 and the House of the Representative merely ‘suspended’ its session and to be

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resumed on January 24, 1966 at 10:00 AM. The petitioner therefore concludes that Congress has been in continuous session without interruption since January 17. Issue: 1. Whether or not, the petitioner’s contention regarding “the next adjournment of Congress specifically provides for regular session only. 2. Whether or not, the petitioner’s contention that Congress is still in continuous session? Ruling: 1. NO. The phrase “until the next adjournment of Congress” does not make any reference to specific session of Congress, whether regular or special. But a well-know Latin maxim is statutory construction stated that ‘when the law does not distinguish we should not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. It is safe to conclude that the authors of the 1935 Constitution used the word “adjournment” had in mind either regular or special and not simply the regular one as the petitioner contended. 2. NO. The mere fact that the Senate adjourned sine die at midnight of January 22, 1966, the House of the Representative is only a part of the Congress and not the Congress itself. So logically, the adjournment of one of its Houses is considered adjournment of the Congress as a whole. And the petitioner’s ad interim appointment must have been lapsed on January 22, 1966 upon adjournment of the Senate.

Utile per Inutile non vitiatur The useful is not vitiated by the non-useful.

PEOPLE vs. MARTIN

G.R. No. L-33487; May 31, 1971 Facts: Respondents were charged with violating Sec. 46 of C.A. No. 613 or the Philippine Immigration Act by the Court of First Instance of La Union, specifically in the act of bringing in and landing. The Court dismissed the charges on the ground of it being a continuous offense with Criminal Case 6258-M filed in Bulacan against other Respondents who were concealing and harboring the same Chinese Immigrants who were brought in therefore they had no jurisdiction. Issue: Whether or not the the act of bringing in and landing constitute a continuous offense with concealing and harboring. Ruling: No. They are two separate offenses. C.A. No. 613 clearly provides that the four acts are in fact four separate acts. Each act possesses its own distinctive, different, and disparate meaning. The word OR in C.A. No. 613 cannot be given a non-disjunctive meaning signifying the separation of one act from the other. The words in the information suggesting conspiracy are considered a mere surplusage. A well-know Latin maxim is statutory construction stated that “The useful is not vitiated by the non-useful.” “Utile per inutile non vitiatur”.

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Ut res magis valeat quam pereat The construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute –its very word

PEOPLE vs. MANTALABA

G.R. No. 186227 Facts: The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City received a report from an informer that a certain Allen Mantalaba, was selling shabu at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City. Thus, a buy-bust team was organized. Around 7 o'clock in the evening the team, armed with the marked money, proceeded to Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City for the buy-bust operation. The two poseur-buyers approached Allen who was said to be in the act of selling shabu. PO1 Pajo saw the poseur-buyers and appellant talking to each other. Afterwards, the appellant handed a sachet of shabu to one of the poseur-buyers and the latter gave the marked money to the appellant. The poseur-buyers went back to the police officers and told them that the transaction has been completed. Police officers Pajo and Simon rushed to the place and handcuffed the appellant as he was leaving the place. The police officers, still in the area of operation and in the presence of barangay officials, searched the appellant and found a big sachet of shabu. PO1 Simon also pointed to the barangay officials the marked money, two pieces of P100 bill, thrown by the appellant on the ground. The RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of R.A. 9165. The appellant pleaded not guilty and states the lone argument that the lower court gravely erred in convicting him of the crime charged despite failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Issue: Whether or not the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of R.A. 9165. Ruling: Yes. This Court stresses that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law, for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors. It is often utilized by law enforcers for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their nefarious activities. Further, What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs in a buy-bust operation is proof of the concurrence of all the elements of the offense, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. From the above testimony of the prosecution witness, it was well established that the elements have been satisfactorily met. The seller and the poseur-buyer were properly identified. The subject dangerous drug, as well as the marked money used, were also satisfactorily presented. The testimony was also clear as to the manner in which the buy-bust operation was conducted. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Such interpretation is to be adopted so that the law may continue to have efficacy rather than fail. A perfect judicial solution cannot be forged from an imperfect law, which impasse should now be the concern of and is accordingly addressed to Congress.

Verba Accipienda sunt secundum subjectam materiam A word is to be understood in the context in which it is used

R (ON THE APPLICATION OF ST (ERITREA)) (FC) vs. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT Facts: The appellant is of Eritrean nationality. But she has never lived in Eritrea. She was born on 2 July 1981 and was formerly resident in Ethiopia. She came to the United Kingdom on 3 July 1998. Immediately on her arrival in this country she claimed protection as a refugee. Her reason was that she feared persecution in both Eritrea and Ethiopia. Her claim was registered, and she was granted temporary admission into the United Kingdom under paragraph 21 of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971.

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The appellant’s status has not changed since the date of her arrival more than 13 ½ years ago. Her temporary admission has been extended from time to time, and she remains liable to detention. The latest notification of temporary admission was issued to her on 17 October 2011. She was told that she must reside at the address given on the notification form and she was to report to an immigration official on 22 December 2011 and then on the fourth Thursday every two months. She was also told that she was not allowed to work or engage in any business unless she had been explicitly granted permission to do so. Issue: Whether the appellant is entitled to the protection of article 32 of the Convention, which precludes the contracting states from expelling a refugee who is “lawfully in their territory” save on grounds of national security or public order. Ruling: For these reasons, I am not persuaded that there are sound grounds for departing from my provisional view that the word “lawfully” in article 32(1) must be taken to refer to what is to be treated as lawful according to the domestic laws of the contracting state. I think, in agreement with the Court of Appeal and with Lord Dyson, that this is what the framers of the Convention intended by the use of this word in this context. I would dismiss the appeal. Mr Drabble did not seek to rely on Lord Brown’s observations in Szoma v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2006] 1 AC 564, para 24, that in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Bugdacay [1987] AC 514 Lord Bridge has decided the case of In re Musisi rightly but for the wrong reasons, and that the term ‘refugee’ in art icle 32(1) of the Refugee Convention must be taken to mean someone who has been determined to have satisfied the article 1 definition of that term. I think that he was right not to do so. The ancient maxim verba accipienda sunt secundum subjectam materiam (words are to be understood according to the subject-matter with which they deal) provides the best guide to the meaning that should be given to what Lord Brown said in this paragraph.

Verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservire Words ought to be more subservient to the intent and not the intent to the words.

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINE REPRESENTATIVE BY LCP NATIONAL PRESIDENT JERRY P. TRENAS, ET AL.

GR. No. 176951 GR. No. 177499 GR. No. 178056 Facts: These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Trenas, assailing the constitutionality of the sixteen laws, each converting the municipality covered thereby into a component city and seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the subject laws. The supreme court en banc, by a majority vote, struck down the subject 16 Cityhood Laws for violating Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and the equal protection clause. On 31 March 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, again by a majority vote, denied the respondents’ first motion for reconsideration. On 28 April 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a split vote, denied the respondents’ second motion for reconsideration. Issue: Whether the subject 16 Cityhood Laws is a violation of the Constitution. Ruling: Yes! It’s final. The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional. “We should not ever lose sight of the fact that the 16 cities covered by the Cityhood Laws not only had conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, but have also complied with the requirements of the [Local Government Code] LGC prescribed prior to its amendment by RA No.

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9009. Congress undeniably gave these cities all the considerations that justice and fair play demanded. Hence, this Court should do no less by stamping its imprimatur to the clear and unmistakable legislative intent and by duly recognizing the certain collective wisdom of Congress,” the SC said. The Court stressed that Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of RA 9009, which imposes a higher income requirement of PhP100 million for the creation of cities. “The Court reiterated that while RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, the Congress was well aware of the pendency of conversion bills of several municipalities, including those covered by the Cityhood Laws. It pointed out that RA 9009 took effect on June 30, 2001, when the 12th Congress was incipient. By reason of the clear legislative intent to exempt the municipalities covered by the conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 entitled Joint Resolution to Exempt Certain Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001 from the coverage of Republic Act No. 9009. However, the Senate failed to act on the said Joint Resolution. Even so, the House readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 during the 12th Congress, and forwarded the same for approval to the Senate, which again failed to prove it. Eventually, the conversion bills of respondents were individually filed in the Lower House and fellesters.blogspot.com were all unanimously and favorably voted upon. When forwarded to the Senate, the bills were also unanimously approved. The acts of both Chambers of Congress show that the exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the express articulations of the clear legislative intent to exempt the respondents, without exception, from the coverage of RA No. 9009. Thereby, RA 9009, and, by necessity, the LCG, were amended, not by repeal but by way of the express exemptions being embodied in the exemption clauses. The Court held that the imposition of the income requirement of P100 million from local sources under RA 9009 was arbitrary. “While the Constitution mandates that the creation of local government units must comply with the criteria laid down in the LGC, it cannot be justified to insist that the Constitution must have to yield to every amendment to the LGC despite such amendment imminently producing effects contrary to the original thrusts of the LGC to promote autonomy, decentralization, countryside development, and the concomitant national growth.” In fact, any interpretation that runs counter with the legislative intent is unacceptable and invalid. Verba intentioni, non e contra debent inservire. Words ought to be more subservient to the intent than intent to the words.

Verba legis Plain-meaning rule.

REPUBLIC v. LACAP

G.R. No. 158253; March 2, 2007 Facts: •Case is a petition for certoriari, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed,with modifications, ruling by the RTC granting the complaint for Specific Performance anddamages filed by Lacap against RP •Dist. Eng. Of Pampanga issued an invitation to bid dated Jan 27, 1992 where Lacap and twoother contractors were pre-qualified •Being the lowest bidder, Lacap won the bid for concreting of a certain baranggay, andthereafter undertook the works and purchased materials and labor in connection with •On Oct 29, 1992, Office of the Dist. Eng conducted final investigation of end product and fountit 100% completed according to specs. Lacap thereafter sought the payment of the DPWH •DPWH withheld payment on the grounds that the CoA disapproved final release of funds dueto Lacap’s license as contractor having expired •Dist. Eng sought the opinion of DPWH legal. Legal then responded to Dist. Eng that theContractors License Law (RA 4566) does not provide that a contract entered into by acontractor after expiry of license is void and that there is no law that expressly prohibits or declares void such a contract •DPWH Legal Dept, through Dir III Cesar Mejia, issued First Indorsement on July 20 1994recommending that payment be made to Lacap. Despite such recommendation, no paymentwas issued

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•On July 3, 1995, respondent filed the complaint for Specific Performance and Damagesagainst petitioner before the RTC.14 •On September 14, 1995, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed aMotion to Dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of actionand that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the nature of the action since respondent did notappeal to the COA the decision of the District Auditor to disapprove the claim. •Following the submission of respondent’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, the RTC issued an Order dated March 11, 1996 denying the Motion to Dismiss. The OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 but it was likewise denied by the RTC in its Order dated May 23, 1996. •On August 5, 1996, the OSG filed its Answer invoking the defenses of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of non-suability of the State •Following trial, the RTC rendered on February 19, 1997 a decision ordering DPWH to pay Lacap for the contract of the project, 12% interest from demand until fully paid, and the costs of the suit •CA affirmed the decision but lowered interest to 6% Issue: Whether or not a contractor with an expired license is entitled to be paid for completed projects Ruling: A contractor with an expired license is entitled payment for completed projects, but does not exonerate him from corresponding fines thereof. Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566 explicitly provides:“ SEC. 35. Penalties. Any contractor who, for a price, commission, fee or wage, submits or attempts to submit a bid to construct, or contracts to or undertakes to construct, or assumes charge in a supervisory capacity of a construction work within the purview of this Act, without first securing a license to engage in the business of contracting in this country; or who shall present or file the license certificate of another, give false evidence of any kind to the Board, or any member thereof in obtaining a certificate or license, impersonate another, or use an expired or revoked certificate or license, shall be deemed guilty of misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than five hundred pesos but not more than five thousand pesos. The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation. The wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are clear. It does not declare, expressly or impliedly, as void contracts entered into by a contractor whose license had already expired. Nonetheless, such contractor is liable for payment of the fine prescribed therein. Thus, respondent should be paid for the projects he completed. Such payment, however, is without prejudice to the payment of the fine prescribed under the law.

Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt The laws aid the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.

ALONSO vs. CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC.,

G.R. No. 130876; December 5, 2003 Facts: The Supreme Court rendered a decision declaring that neither Tomas N. Alonso nor his son Francisco M. Alonso or the latter’s heirs are the lawful owners of the lot in dispute. Neither has the respondent Cebu Country Club, Inc. been able to establish a clear title over the contested estate. The reconstitution of a title is simply the re-issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of title in its original form and condition. It does not determine or resolve the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. A reconstituted title, like the original certificate of title, by itself does not vest ownership of the land or estate covered thereby.

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It declared that the subject lot legally belongs to the Government of the Philippines. Wherefore, the petition for review was denied. Petitioners and respondent filed separate motions for reconsideration, each assailing a different aspect of the decision. Issue: Petitioners, in their MR vigorously argue that: The majority decision unduly deprives petitioners of their property without due process of law and “in a manner shocking to good conscience”; in invalidating the sale to the late Tomas Alonso, the ponencia unfairly deviated from established doctrine, using as basis factual findings either unsupported by the evidence or contradicted by the appellate court’s findings of fact; the core issues of fraud and want of jurisdiction afflicting the reconstitution of respondent Cebu Country Club’s title were not squarely and frontally met, to the prejudice and damage of the petitioners; and the dissenting opinion deserves a second hard look as it presents a more balanced, sober, factually accurate, and juridically precise approach to the critical issues of this case, including prescription and laches.Respondents, in their MR staunchly assails the decision insofar as it declared that that the subject land legally belongs to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. Moreover: The Torrens Certificate of Title of respondent, covering subject lot cannot be collaterally attacked and nullified in this case at bar. Ruling: IN VIEW THEREOF, we DENY with finality the separate motions for reconsideration of the petitioners and respondent. Tomas Alonso had caused the reconstitution of his title on a Lot which is adjacent to the disputed property, and yet petitioners failed to show that Tomas Alonso exerted the same effort to reconstitute his alleged title to the subject property. As successors-in-interest, petitioners merely stepped into the shoes of Tomas Alonso. They cannot claim a right greater than that of their predecessor. Moreover, it cannot be over-accentuated that Tomas Alonso, petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest, never asserted any claim of ownership over the disputed property during his lifetime. When he was alive, Tomas Alonso did not exert any effort to have the title of the disputed property reconstituted in his name or seek recovery thereof from the respondent which was in possession since 1931 On the part of respondent, it failed to shed light on how its predecessor in interest, United Services Country Club, Inc., acquired its title. Surprisingly, there is not even one evidence to show when and how its predecessor in interest, United Services Country Club, Inc., acquired the property from anybody. Respondent relies solely on its reconstituted title which, by itself, does not determine or resolve the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. The reconstitution of a title is simply the re-issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of title in its original form and condition. It does not determine or resolve the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. A reconstituted title, like the original certificate of title, by itself does not vest ownership of the land or estate covered thereby. Furthermore, the declaration in the Court’s judgment that the subject property belongs to the Government is not an offshoot of a collateral attack on respondent’s title. The validity of the reconstitution of title to the land in question was directly in dispute, and the proceedings before the trial court was in the nature of a direct attack on the legality of respondent’s title. Neither may the rewards of prescription be successfully invoked by respondent, as it is an iron-clad dictum that prescription can never lie against the Government. Since respondent failed to present the paper trail of the property’s conversion to private property, the lengthy possession and occupation of the disputed land by respondent cannot be counted in its favor, as the subject property being a friar land, remained part of the patrimonial property of the Government. Possession of patrimonial property of the Government, whether spanning decades or centuries, cannot ipso facto ripen into ownership. Their claims can hardly evoke judicial compassion. Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt. "If eternal vigilance is the price of safety, one cannot sleep on one’s right for more than a tenth of a century and expect it to be preserved in its pristine purity"

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Verba legis non est recedendum From the words of the statute there should be no departure.

VICTORIA vs. COMELEC AND JESUS JAMES CALISIN

G.R. 109005;January 10, 1994 Facts: Due to the suspension of Governor Romeo Salalima of the Province of Albay, Vice-Governor Danilo Azana automatically assumed the powers and functions of the governor, leaving vacant his post as vice-governor. Under the law, Azana’s position as vice-governor should be occupied by the highest ranking Sangguniang member, a post being contested by petitioner and private respondent. In answer to private respondent’s petition for his declaration as senior Sanggunian member for the Province of Albay, the COMELEC issued a resolution dated January 22, 1993, certifying him as first in the order of ranking, garnering 21.78% out of the total registered voters while petitioner herein as second ranking member with 21.19%. The COMELEC based its certification on the number of votes obtained by the Sanggunian members in relation to the number of registered voters in the district. However the petitioner claims that the ranking of the Sanggunian members should not only be based on the number of votes obtained in relation to the total number of registered voters, but also on the number of voters in the district who actually voted therein. Issue: The issue at bar is the ranking of the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Albay for purposes of succession. Ruling: The Local Government provides: For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each district in the immediately preceding local election. The law is clear. In such a case, the Court has no recourse but to merely apply the law. The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words. Petitioner’s contention is therefore untenable considering the clear mandate of the law, which leaves no room for other interpretation but it must very well be addressed to the legislative branch and not to this Court which has no power to change the law. Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statue is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given it literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived from the maxim, index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude the court from construing it differently. The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisely, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure No grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in issuing the Resolution dated January 22, 1999 was committed. The petition is DISMISSED.