LEGAL ETHICSErnesto L. Pineda(2009 Edition)

PRELIMINARIES

LEGAL ETHICS - is the branch of moral science which treats of the duties which an attorney owes to the court, to his clients, to his colleagues in the profession and to the public as embodied in the Constitution, Rules of Court, Code of Professional Responsibility, Canons of Professional Ethics, jurisprudence, moral law and special laws.

Significance of Legal Ethics

1.Guards against the abuses and ills of the profession such as dishonesty, deceit, immorality, negligence, slothness, lack of diligence, and the many forms of malpractice of the members of the bar.2,Raise the standard of the legal profession.3.Encourage and enhance the respect for the law.4.Assure an effective and efficient administration of justice.5.Assist in the keeping and maintenance of law and order in coordination with the other Departments of the Government.6.Provides the basis for the weeding out of the unfit and the misfit in the legal profession for the protection of the public.

Original Bases of Legal Ethics

1.Canons of Professional Ethics2.Supreme Court Decisions3.Statutes4.Constitution5.Treatises and Publications

Present Basis of Philippine Legal Ethics

The main basis of our legal ethics today is the Code of Professional Responsibility which was promulgated by the Supreme Court on June 21, 1988.

It is the embodiment into one Code of the various pertinent and subsisting rules, guidelines and standards on the rule of conduct of lawyers sourced from the Constitution, Rules of Court, Canons of Professional Ethics, statutes, special laws, treatises and decisions which must be observed by all members of the Bar in the exercise of their profession whether in or out of court as well as in their public and private lives.

Definitions of Terms Commonly Used in Legal Ethics

BAR - refers to the whole body of attorneys and counsellors; collectively, the members of the legal professsion

BENCH - denotes the whole body of judges

BAR ADMISSION - act by which one is licensed to practice before courts of a particular state or jurisdiction after satisfying certain requirements such as bar examinations, period of residency or admission on grounds of reciprocity after period of years as member of bar of another jurisdiction.

LAWYER - a person trained in the law and authorized to advise or represent oher in legal matters; a person licensed to practice law.

TRIAL LAWYER - a lawyer who personally handles cases in court, administrative agencies or boards which means engaging in actual trial work either for the prosecution or for the defense of cases of clients.

PRACTISING LAWYER - one engaged in the practice of law.

PRACTICE OF LAW - any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience.

CLIENT - one who engages the services of a lawyer for legal advice or for purposes of prosecuting or defending a suit in his behalf and usually for a fee.

ATTORNEY-AT-LAW - persons who are by license, officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are developed by law as a consequence.

ATTORNEY-IN-FACT - an agent whose authority is strictly limited by the instrument appointing him, though he may do things not mentioned in his appointment necessary to the performance of the duties specifically required of him by the power of attorney appointing him, such authority being necessarily implied.

COUNSEL DE OFICIO - a counsel, appointed or assigned by the court, from among such members of the bar, in good standing who, by reason of their experience and ability, may adequately defend the accused.

ATTORNEY AD HOC - a person named and appointed by the court to defend an absentee defendant in the suit in which the appointment is made.

ATTORNEY OF RECORD - one whose name must appear somewhere in permanent records or files of the case, or on pleadings or some instrument filed in the case, or on appearance docket.

OF COUNSEL - associate attorneys

LEAD COUNSEL - the counsel on either side of a case who is charged with the principal management and direction of party's case as distinguished from his juniors or subordinates.

HOUSE COUNSEL - lawyer who acts as attorney for business though carried as an employee of that business and not as an independent lawyer.

AMICUS CURIAE - experience and impartial attorneys who were invited by the court to appear to help in the disposition of issues submitted to it; acts merely as a consultant to guide the court in a doubtful question or issue pending before it.

BAR ASSOCIATION - an association of members of the legal profession like the Integrated Bar of the Philippines where membership is integrated or compulsory.

COMMISSION on BAR DISCIPLINE - the investigating arm of the Supreme Court on administrative matters involving disbarment cases against lawyers.

IBP BOARD of GOVERNORS - one who reviews the recommendations made by the Commission on Bar Discipline.

ADVOCATE - a lawyer who pleads on behalf of someone else; one who is learned in the law and duly admitted to practice law.

BARRISTER - a person entitled to practice law as an advocate or counsel in superior courts.

SOLICITOR - a government lawyer attached with the Office of the Solicitor General.

TITULO DE ABOGADO - means not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law.

INTEGRATION OF THE BAR - the official unification of the entire lawyer population; an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members--they are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar.

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES - the national organization of lawyers created on January 16, 1973 under Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court and constituted on May 4, 1973 into a body corporate by PD No. 181.

IBP is the investigating arm of the Supreme Court in the investigation of disbarment cases. Under Rule 139-B, the IBP is given the power to entertain cases of disbarment filed before it, or cases filed before the Supreme Court and referred to it for investigation, report and recommendation. It does not, however, have the power to suspend or disbar. Its recommendations are subjec to appeal to the Supreme Court which alone has the prerogative to disbar.

General Objectives of the IBP

1.To elevate the standards of the legal profession2.To improve the administration of justice3.To enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively4.To assist in the administration of justice5.To foster and maintain on the part of its members high deals of integrity, learning, professional competence, public service and conduct6.To safeguard the professional interests of its members7.To cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood8.To provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform, pleading, practice and procedure9.To encourage and foster legal education10.To promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and adjective law and make reports and recommendations thereon.

MEMBERSHIP - A lawyer does not automatically become a member of the IBP, he has the discretion to choose the IBP Chapter he wants to join. Membership in the National IBP is mandatory. It is not violative of a lawyer's freedom to associate.

PAYMENT OF DUES - without paying IBP dues, a lawyer cannot engage in the practice of law, no matter how limited is his practice. The exemption from payment of income tax granted to senior citizens by RA 7432 does not include payment of membership or association dues of the IBP. Similarly, as regards dues, they are not entitled to 20% discount.

RETIREMENT - there is no such thing as retirement in the IBP as understood in labor law. A lawyer may terminate his membership after filing the required verified notice of termination with the Secretary of IBP.

NATURE OF THE IBP - The IBP shall be strictly non-political, and every activity tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized accordingly.

PROHIBITION - No lawyewr holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election or appointment to any position in the IBP or any Chapter thereof. A delegate, governor, officer or employee of any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his position as of the moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any elective public office or accepts appointment to any judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof.

SALARY/COMPENSATION - except as may be specifically authorized or allowed by the Supreme Court, no Delegate or Governor and no national or local officer or committee member shall receive any compensation, allowance or emolument from the funds of the IBP for any service rendered therein or be entitled to reimbursement for any expense incurred in the discharge of his functions.

POWERS AND FUNCTIONS - Under Rule 139-B, the IBP is given the power to entertain cases of disbarment filed before it, or cases filed before the Supreme Court and referred to it for investigation, report, and recommendation. It does not, however, have the power to suspend or disbar. Its recommendations are subject to appeal to the Supreme Court which alone has the prerogative to disbar.

COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE (CBD) - is the investigating arm of the Supreme Court on administrative matters involving disbarment cases against lawyers.

IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS - one who reviews the recommendations made by the CBD. If the resolution of the latter is one of suspension or disbarment, it is automatically elevated to the Supreme Court for final disposition.

.ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW

POWER TO ADMIT - The power to admitBAR MATTER NO. 712, MARCH 19, 1997IN RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE LAWYER'S OATHJUSTICE PADILLA ( En Banc)

FACTS:

Petitioner passed the bar examinations in 1993, however, the SC deferred his oath taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide. The conviction of the petitioner arose from the death of a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991. The petitioner, together with his seven other co-accused, pleaded guilty on re-arraignment to the said crime, and on February 1993 the trial court rendered judgment sentencing the accused an imprisonment from two years four months and one day to four years. On June 1993, the accused applied for a probation to which the court thereby granted.

ISSUE:

WON a bar passer who was previously convicted of a crime and thereafter pardoned may be allowed to take the lawyer's oath and practice legal profession.

RULING:

The SC granted the petition and allowed the petitioner to take the lawyer's oath, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and to practice the legal profession.

HELD:

In allowing the petitioner to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.

The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerious and uncalculating.

The lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at all times weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.A.C. NO. L-1117 MARCH 20, 1944THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS VS.ESTANISLAO R. BAYOTJUSTICE OZAETA (En Banc)

FACTS:

The respondent who is an attorney-at-law is charged with malpractice for having published in the Sunday Tribune an advertisement which publishes legal assistance and arrangement of marriages, as well as free legal consultations for the poor.

During trial, the respondent admitted having caused such advertisement and prayed for the indulgence and mercy of the Court, promising not to repeat such professional misconduct in the future and to abide himself to the strict ethical rules of the law profession.

ISSUE:

WON publishing of advertisements for legal service or legal aid is allowed in the legal profession.

RULING:

The SC ruled to reprimand Atty. Estanislao Bayot.

HELD:

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public.

G.R. NO. L-27654 FEBRUARY 18, 1970IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDING FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN IN L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO VS. VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAYJUSTICE CASTRO ( En Banc)

FACTS:

Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen filed a Petition to Surrender Lawyers Certificate of Title on September 25, 1967 in protest against what he therein asserts is a great injustice committed against his client by the Highest Tribunal, where the said Court refused to take cognizance the appeal by certiorari of the civil case entitled Virginia Yaptinchay vs. Antonio Calero, where Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. In the said civil case, the trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, Virginia Yaptinchay, and on appeal, the Court of Appeals likewise dismissed the same. Thus, the instant petition where Atty. Almacen indicted the Supreme Court as a tribunal peopled by mean who are calloused to their pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.

ISSUE:

WON the Supreme Court has the discretion to suspend or disbar a member of the bar who commits gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyers oath and gross transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics.

RULING:

Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen was suspended from the practice of law until further orders.

HELD:

The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacens petition, answer and oral argumentation speaks for itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more important of all, bring this Court and its members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture presents no redeeming feature, and completely negates any pretence of passionate commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyers oath and gross transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefore is unavoidable.

Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited upon Atty. Almacen for the transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these may range from mere suspension to total removal or disbarment. The discretion to assess under the circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be controlled by the imperative need that the purity and independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously maintained.

That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be overemphasized. However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an advocate and that in every effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added glow of respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us no way of determining how long that suspension should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree that the same should be indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter but also because, even without the comforting support of precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a person from the practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the compass of that authority. The merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for himself how long or how short that suspension shall last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law.

GR. NO. L-28899 MAY 30, 1974ALFREDO C. TAJAN VS. HON. VICENTE N, CUSI, JR.JUSTICE ANTONIO (Second Division)

FACTS:

Atty. Alfredo C. Tajan, the petitioner in this case, filed an action for prohibition against respondent Judge Vicente Cusi, Jr., on the ground that the latter has no authority to hear and determine proceedings for disbarment or suspension of attorneys because jurisdiction thereon is vested exclusively and originally in the Supreme Court and not in courts of first instance. Petitioner also contends that assuming arguendo that courts of first instance have such authority, the procedure outlined in Rule 139 of the Revised Rules of Court should govern the filing and investigation of the complaint.

The case rooted from Misc. Case No. 2968, where petitioner, being the counsel for the party to the said case, was required by respondent Judge to explain within 72 hours why he should not be removed or suspended from the practice of law for preparing, or causing to be prepared, a petition in court containing factual averments which he knew were false. Petitioner, in answer thereto, denied the material averments of respondent Judge, however, the latter was not satisfied with the formers answer, thus resulted in the filing of Adm. Case against Atty. Tajan.

ISSUE:

WON trial courts may hear and determine proceedings for disbarment or suspension of members of the bar.

RULING:

The SC ruled to deny the instant petition.

HELD:

The power to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the legal profession stems from the inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the practice of law and the admission of persons to engage in that practice. It is a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice. An attorney-at-law is an officer of the court in the administration of justice and as such he is continually accountable to the Court for the manner in which he exercises the privilege which has been granted to him. His admission to the practice of law is upon the implied condition that his continued enjoyment of the right conferred, is dependent upon his remaining a fit and safe person to exercise it. When it appears by acts of misconduct, that he has become unfit to continue with the trust reposed upon him, his right to continue the enjoyment of that trust and for the enjoyment of the professional privilege accorded to him may and ought to be forfeited. The law accords to the Court of Appeals and the Court of First Instance the power to investigate and suspend members of the bar.

AC NO. 838 JANUARY 21, 1974IN RE: ATTY. FELIZARDO M. DE GUZMANJUSTICE MUNOZ PALMA (First Division)

FACTS:

The case stemmed from a Petition for Relief from Judgment, Orders and other Proceedings in the Inferior Court with a Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed by one Lagrimas Lapatha against Vicente Floro and herein petitioner Atty. Felizardo M. De Guzman. In her petition, Lapatha alleged that during the hearing on the complaint for ejectment that was filed by Vicente Floro against her, she was deprived of her day in court and that Atty. De Guzman agreed to a postponement of the hearing and even accepted partial payment so the case would not proceed, but behind her back wrote the words "confessed judgment" over her signature on the court's expediente, thus prevailed upon the City Court to render judgment in favor of his client Vicente Floro. The trial court consequently rendered judgment in favor of Lagrimas Lapatha on the ground of machinations unworthy of an attorney, which resulted to this administrative case against Atty. Felizardo De Guzman.

ISSUE:

WON there is sufficient ground to disbar the petitioner on the ground of machinations unworthy of an attorney.

RULING:

The SC dismissed and exonerated of the charge Atty. Felizardo De Guzman.

HELD:

The Court held: "It is quite elementary that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. To be made the basis suspension or disbarment of a lawyer, the charge against him must be established by convincing proof. The record must disclose as free from doubt a case which compels exercise by this Court of its disciplinary powers. The dubious character of the act done as well as of the motivation thereof must be clearly demonstrated.

An attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges preferred against him until the contrary is proved, and as an officer of the court, that he has performed his duty in accordance with his oath. Thus, the serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against a respondent attorney.

AC NO. 1037 DECEMBER 14, 1998VICTORIANO P. RESURRECCION VS. ATTY. CIRIACO C. SAYSONPER CURIAM

FACTS:

Respondent Atty. Ciriaco Sayson was charged with acts constituting malpractice, deceit and gross misconduct in his office and a violation of his duties and oath as a lawyer by herein petitioner Victoriano Resurreccion. The complaint arose from a homicide through reckless imprudence case where Resurreccion was the defendant and Atty. Sayson was the counsel for the offended party, Amando Basto, Sr. Resurreccion alleged that pursuant to the amicable settlement that was previously reached by the parties, he gave P2,500 to Atty. Sayson who, however, never gave the money to Basto. Thus, he was compelled to give another P2,500 to Basto for the settlement of the case. He then demanded the return of the money from Atty. Sayson but to no avail. Hence, this complaint for disbarment.

ISSUE:

WON respondent should be disbarred for converting and appropriating for his own personal benefit the amount which was supposed to be delivered to his cilent.

RULING:

Respondent Atty. Ciriaco Sayson is hereby disbarred.

HELD:

Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealing with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.

GR. NO. L-23959 NOVEMBER 29, 1971PHIL. ASSOC. OF FREE LABOR UNIONS, ET AL. VS.BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR CO.JUSTICE REYES (En Banc)

FACTS:

The petition stemmed from a case before the Court of Industrial Relations, where the said Court rendered a Decision ordering the reinstatement with backwages of herein petitioners Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenazas. Subsequently, upon motions, the Court issued an Order awarding 25% of the backwages as compensation for attorneys fees and professional services rendered by Attys. Cipriano Cid and Associates, Atty. Atanacio Pacis and private respondent herein Quintin Muning, a non-lawyer. Petitioners contend that the award of 10% to Quintin Muning is sought to be voided on the ground that he is not a lawyer.

ISSUE:

WON a non-lawyer may recover attorneys fees for legal services rendered.

RULING:

The SC ruled to set aside the assailed orders insofar as the awarded 10% of the backwages as attorneys fees for respondent Quintin Muning.

HELD:

Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in Amalgamated Laborers Association, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., L-23467, 27 March 1968, that an agreement providing for the division of attorneys fees whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and cannot be justified. An award by a court of attorneys fees is no less immoral in the absence of a contract, as in the present case.

GR NO. L-151127 MAY 30, 1961EMETERIO CUI VS. ARELLANO UNIVERSITYJUSTICE CONCEPCION (En Banc)

FACTS:

Plaintiff herein studied law in defendant's law college from first year up to and including the first semester of his fourth year. Plaintiff left the defendant's law college and transferred to Abad Santos University College of Law for the last semester of his fourth year. Plaintiff, during all the time he was studying law in defendant university was awarded scholarship grants, for scholastic merit, so that his tuition fees were returned to him after the ends of semester and when his scholarship grants were awarded to him. The whole amount of tuition fees paid by plaintiff to defendant and refunded to him by the latter amounted to P1,033.87. The plaintiff was made to sign a contract covenant and agreement stating that he is waiving his right to transfer to another school without having refunded to the defendant university the equivalent of his scholarship grant.

After graduating in law from Abad Santos University, plaintiff applied for the bar examination and in so doing, he needed the transcripts of his records from defendant university. However, the defendant university refused until after he had paid back the P1,033,87 which defendant refunded to him. Thus, plaintiff was constrained to pay the said amount.

ISSUE:

WON the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant whereby the former waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his scholarships in cash, is valid or not.

RULING:

The SC ruled in favor of the petitioner and sentenced the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P1,033.87.

HELD:

Scholarships are awarded in recognition of merit not to keep outstanding students in school to bolster its prestige. In the understanding of that university scholarships award is a business scheme designed to increase the business potential of an education institution. Thus conceived it is not only inconsistent with sound policy but also good morals. But what is morals? Manresa has this definition. It is good customs, those generally accepted principles of morality which have received some kind of social and practical confirmation. The practice of awarding scholarships to attract students and keep them in school is not good customs nor has it received some kind of social and practical confirmation except in some private institutions as in Arellano University. x x x In this institutions scholarships are granted not to attract and to keep brilliant students in school for their propaganda mine but to reward merit or help gifted students in whom society has an established interest or a first lien.

AC NO. 1608 AUGUST 14, 1981MAGDALENA T. ARCIGA VS. SEGUNDINO D. MANIWANGJUSTICE AQUINO (Second Division)

FACTS:

Magdalena Arciga filed a complaint for the disbarment of respondent Segundino D. Maniwang on the ground of grossly immoral conduct because he refused to fulfill his promise of marriage to her. Their illicit relationship resulted in the birth of their child, Michael Dino Maniwang. Consequently, it appears that their marriage could not take place because respondent was already married to one Erlinda Ang.

ISSUE:

WON respondent is guilty of grossly immoral conduct that would warrant his disbarment.

RULING:

The SC found that respondent's refusal to marry the complainant was not so corrupt nor unprincipled to warrant disbarment, hence, the complaint is hereby dismissed.

HELD:

An applicant for admission to the bar should have good moral character. He is required to produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court.

If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued possession of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have a good moral character. A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.

It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is grossly immoral conduct or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-faced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.

A.C. NO. 3405 JUNE 29, 1998JULIETA B. NARAG VS. ATTY. DOMINADOR M. NARAGPER CURIAM

FACTS:

Petitioner filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against her husband, herein respondent, for allegedly violating Canons 1 and 6, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Ethics for Lawyers. The petitioner alleged in her complaint that her husband is having an illicit relationship with one Gina Espita and abandoned her and their family. However, the petitioner later moved for the dismissal of the complaint contending that she only fabricated the allegations thereto to humiliate and spite her husband. In a Decision dated October 8, 1991, the IBP Board of Governors dismissed the said complaint.

The case took an unexpected turn when a month later after the decision was rendered, petitioner together with her seven children as co-signatories, appealed again for the disbarment of respondent. Investigation proceeded, and after a careful scrutiny of the records of the proceedings and the evidence presented by the parties, respondent was subjected to disciplinary action as a member of the legal profession.

ISSUE:

WON a lawyer may be disbarred for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

RULING:

Respondent Dominador M. Narag is disbarred and his name is ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

HELD:

Good moral character is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred.

Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Furthermore, such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.

We explained in Barrientos vs. Daaro that, as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards.

In the present case, the complainant was able to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession. As held in Maligsa vs. Cabanting, a lawyer may be disbarred for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

A.C. NO. 396 JULY 31, 1964IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE DISBARMENT OF ATTY. EDUARDO M. TUASON, EMILIO C. STA. MARIA, PetitionerJUSTICE PAREDES (En Banc)

FACTS:

Petitioner Emilio Sta. Maria filed the instant petition for the disbarment of Atty. Eduardo M. Tuason on the ground that the latter allegedly deprived him of his lawful share in the judgment of a collection case involving a promissory note amounting to PHp50,000.00. In the said case, petitioner, together with his two partners, Fausto Chincuanco and Andress Guanzon, were represented by the respondent lawyer. After trial on the merits, the court ruled in favor of the said petitioners and they were able to recover sufficient amount of money for the satisfaction of judgment. However, petitioner claims that respondent lawyer personally withdrew from the Sheriff the amount of Php22,930.64 and applied Php10,000.00 for his attorneys fees, P1,648.00 for the supposed expenses of litigation and the balance of Php11,282.64 to plaintiff Chincuanco, his uncle, without his prior knowledge and consent. Respondent admitted having received the amount in question and disbursed the same in the manner stated by the petitioner, but he denied that he obtained and disbursed the amounts without the latters knowledge and consent.

ISSUE:

WON the respondent was guilty of malpractice and gross misconduct in withholding the amount in question.

RULING:

The Court recommended that instead of a more severe penalty which he would otherwise deserve, the respondent was reprimanded for professional indiscretion, with the warning that a more severe penalty be imposed for a repetition of same or similar acts.

HELD:

After an overall consideration of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case, we find that the findings and conclusions of the Solicitor General are supported by the evidence of record. The fact that the respondent has placed his private and personal interest over and above that of his clients constitutes a breach of a lawyers oath, to say the least. Call it professional indiscretion or any other name, but the cold fact remains that the act, as found by the Solicitor General, is not conducive to a healthy growth of the legal profession. The respondent is hereby admonished that a repetition of similar acts will merit more drastic action.

A.M. NO. MTJ-92-687 DECEMBER 8, 2008ENGR. EDGARDO GARCIA VS. JUDGE MELJON DELA PENAPER CURIAM (En Banc)

FACTS:

In its Resolution dated February 9, 1994, the Court dismissed respondent Judge Meljohn de la Pena from the service for partiality, abuse of authority and grave abuse of discretion with forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to reinstatement or reappointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

Respondent now presents for the consideration of the Court a Plea for Judicial Clemency and Compassion, alleging that his dismissal from the service made him and his family suffer the insult and ridicule of his peers and the general public for many years; that his dismissal made him realize that the most valuable things in life honor, honesty, dignity, service to the public and respect for fellowmen can be obtained only through a simple and honorable life and honest service to fellowmen. That consistent with his realization, he devoted himself to his church by serving as a member of the Knights of Columbus and as a member of the Parish Pastoral Council of Sto. Rosario Parish of Naval, Biliran. Furthermore, respondent states that his reformation and redemption from his unenviable fate did not escape the attention of the very person who filed the administrative case against him, Engr. Edgardo Garcia, who executed an Affidavit of No Objection in his favor.

The dismissal of respondent judge stemmed from a complaint for grave oral defamation filed by his brother, Dr. Melencio de la Pena, against Ignacia Garcia, wife of petitioner Engr. Eduardo Garcia. Engr. Garcia claimed among others that respondent judge took cognizance of the criminal case without the requisite certification from the Lupon Tagapayapa and that he should inhibited himself from acting on the case because private complainant Dr. de la Pena is his brother.

ISSUES:

1. WON the Court should lift the ban on reemployment against the respondent Judge.

2. WON the Court can order the payment of all his financial benefits.RULING:

1. NO. The lifting of the prohibition on reemployment of respondent judge in the government service will serve no practical value or useful purpose, considering that he is already more than 73 years old and beyond the age of government employment.

2. YES. In several cases, the Supreme Court, out of humanitarian considerations, allowed dismissed judges to enjoy all vacation and sick leave benefits that they earned during his government service. The Court finds that the same leniency may be accorded Judge de la Pena. Thus, in the interest of justice, he may be allowed to claim the leave credits that he earned during his employment in the government service.

A.C. NO. 4148 JULY 30, 1998REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR VS.ATTY. LAURO L. TAPUCARPER CURIAM (En Banc)

FACTS:

In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant Remedios Tapucar sought the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Lauro Tapucar, on the ground of continuing grossly immoral conduct for cohabiting with another woman, a certain Elena Pena, under scandalous circumstances.

Prior to this complaint, respondent, then newly appointed as CFI judge, was already administratively charged four times for conduct unbecoming an officer of the court where he meted the penalty of 6 months suspension without pay. Despite this penalty, respondent still continued to cohabit with Elena, giving rise to another charge of immorality and other administrative cases, such as conduct unbecoming an officer of the court, and grossly immoral conduct. These cases were consolidated and after investigation, the Court ordered his dismissal and separation from the service. But his dismissal as a judge did not impel respondent to mend his ways. He continued living with Elena and they begot two children, thereafter completely abandoned his legitimate family.

ISSUE:

WON continued cohabitation with a woman other than your wife constitutes grossly immoral conduct as ground for disbarment of the respondent.

RULING:

The respondent is hereby disbarred and his name was stricken out from the Roll of Attorneys.

HELD:

Well settled is the rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain ones good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. There is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is more imperative than that of law.

As this Court often reminds members of the Bar, they must live up to the standards and norms expected of the legal profession, by upholding the ideals and tenets embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility always. Lawyers must maintain a high standards of legal proficiency, as well as morality including honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. For they are at all times subject to the scrutinizing eye of the public opinion and community approbation. Needless to state, those whose conduct both public and private fails this scrutiny would have to be disciplines and, after appropriate proceedings, penalized accordingly.

In the present case, the record shows that despite previous sanctions imposed upon by this Court, respondent continued his illicit liaison with a woman other than lawfully-wedded wife. The report of the Commissioner assigned to investigate thoroughly the complaint found respondent far from contrite; on the contrary, he exhibited a cavalier attitude, even arrogance; in the face of charges against him. The IBP Board of Governors, tasked to determine whether he still merited the privileges extended to a member of the legal profession, resolved the matter against him. For indeed, evidence of grossly immoral conduct abounds against him and could not be explained away. Keeping a mistress, entering into another marriage while a prior one still subsists, as well as abandoning and/or mistreating complainant and their children, show his disregard of family obligations, morality and decency, the law and the lawyers oath. Such gross misbehavior over a long period of time clearly shows a serious flaw in respondents character, his moral indifference to scandal in the community, and his outright defiance of established norms. All these could not but put the legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the administration of justice in peril, hence the need for strict but appropriate disciplinary action.