Lecture on Poor Law

8/3/2019 Lecture on Poor Law

1/73

Two lectures on poor-laws: delivered before the University of Oxford in Hilary term, 1836.

Author(s): Lloyd, William ForsterSource: LSE Selected Pamphlets, (1836)Published by: LSE LibraryStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/60215173 .

Accessed: 10/10/2011 08:32

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Digitization of this work funded by the JISC Digitisation Programme.

LSE Library and are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access toLSE Selected

Pamphlets.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=lselibhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/60215173?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/60215173?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=lselib


2/73

BP IW-Wr

TWO LECTURES

ON

POOR-LAWS,

DELIVERED EFORETHEUNIVERSITY FOXFORD,INHILARYKRM,836.

BY THEREV. W. F. LLOYD, M.A., F.R.S.

studento* cuniSTijuhofj, 'noFrssortr potiticat.ecovomi.

LONDON:ROAKE AND VARTY, 31, STRAND ;AND J. H. PARKER,OXFORD.

1836.


3/73

LONDON.ROAhEND AK1Y,KIN1ERS,1, S1R4MJ


4/73


5/73

Also, by the sameAuthor,TWO LECTURES

ONTHECHECKS TO POPULATION,

DELIVEREDN1832.

A LECTURE

NOTION OF VALUE,ASDISTINGUISHABLE,OT NLYROMTILITY,UT LSOROMALUEINEXCHANGE,

DELIVEREDN1833.

FOUR LECTURES ON POOR LAWS,DELIVEREDN1834.


6/73

LECTURE I.

In the present and the following lecture, I propose to proceed with the subject of poor-laws,from the point where I left off, in the lectureswhich I published last year. Having thenexplained what I thought to be the proper fieldfor the operation of such laws, I now pass tothe subject of the application of the principlesthen explained to practice.

It will be remembered, that, among the causesof destitution, I particularly distinguished areal inadequacy of the national stock of subsistence from the various accidents, which mayoccasion an irregularity in its distribution. Imade this distinction, because it appeared to methat the effects of the former of these causesdid not admit of any direct remedy from theoperation of a poor-law. Still, as the sameintensity of destitution may proceed from either

I


7/73

O LECTURE I.of the two descriptions of causes, and as theeffect of one may be aggravated by the contemporaneous action of the other, it is easier todistinguish them in imagination, than to separate them with a view to practice. On thisaccount, in what is to follow, I shall choose amiddle course. I shall direct my attentionprincipally to the cases depending on the latter,without losing sight of the operation of the former description of causes.We assume the danger of perishing, whichmay arise from the failure of the income of thelabourer, in consequence either of want of employment or of infirmity of body, to be the evilwith which we have to deal. And, for this evil,the prima facie remedy obviously is to provideby law a fund, out of which, in all such cases,the income shall be continued, notwithstandingthe intermission or cessation of the service. Amaster commonly maintains his

domestic servantin sickness as in healthas well during thetransient intervals in which he does not, aswhen he really does, want his services ; andsome few masters, more kind than the rest,assign to those who have grown old in theirservice, and who have outlived their strength, apension in their old age. To a person reflectingon some of the circumstances which occasion anecessity for poor-laws, the extension of an analogous principle to the whole body of labourers


8/73

LECTUREI.will naturally occur. Let us begin, therefore,with supposing such a provision to be made.It is evident, that it would for the moment fullyremedy the existing evil. The next point is, toimagine the difficulties which would eventuallyarise from it, and the corrections, which wouldconsequently become necessary.The remedy, as I have proposed it, is to givea pension pro tempore to all who are out of employment. But then, since most persons, cceterisparibus, would prefer idleness to labour, and, inmany particular cases, it would not be easy toprove the want of employment to be voluntary,it is clear that such an offer would amount to aninvitation to universal idleness. The first andobvious correction, therefore, is, to exact fromthe able-bodied a competent amount of labour inreturn for the relief which is afforded to them.Thus the principle of our proposed poor-lawbecomes relief to the impotent and work for theable-bodied.It may here be objected that a poor-law wouldbe productive of no national good, for that, inrelieving some, we must injure others to theextent of the relief so given. It may be alleged, for example, that, by finding employment for able-bodied labourers, in Buckinghamshire, we diminish to the same extent the fieldof employment for other labourers in Lancashireor in Yorkshire, and that even the relief given

1


9/73

LECTURE I.to the aged and infirm constitutes a detractionpro tanto, from the funds which would otherwisebe destined to the maintenance of the remainingpopulation. The answer is, first, that the alleged consequence would not follow to its fullextent; and secondly, that, so far as it wouldfollow, and, supposing even

that it would followto the fullest extent that can be imagined, itwould not necessarily constitute a valid objectionto a fpoor-law : for that, notwithstanding such aconsequence, good reasons might exist, justifyingthe interposition of the law in order to secure apreference to particular persons. I adverted toboth of these points in the lectures which I published last yearnamely, to the first at the closeof the lectures, and to the second in pp. 87 and88. I will read the passage to which I have lastalluded.

It is to be observed, that the case before us isone of labourers, who, having been accustomed toobtain employment, are, from infirmity or someother cause, thrown out of employment. Ifthey are allowed to pass unrelieved, the failureof their demand, by its effect in depressing price,gives an advantage to all others, who retaintheir usual pecuniary resources. The commodities, which the labourers who are thrown out ofemployment would have purchased, are, bymeansof the depression of price, distributed betweenthe whole body of remaining purchasers. '' There


10/73

LECTUREI.is a difference, however, between positively causing an elevation, and merely preventing a depression in the price of provisions. The priceof labour, when at its natural level, expressesthe proportion between the supply of provisionsand the demand for them ; between the quantityto be consumed and the number of consumers.And, under such circumstances, pecuniary relief,given to some labourers in aid of their wages,depressing, by its effects in elevating price, thecondition of all others who are not receivingthe like assistance, unfairly benefits those particular labourers at the expense of the rest.This is the point which it was my object to explain in my first lecture. It is evident also, thatconversely, if we diminish the income of particular labourers, we shall produce an oppositeeffect upon price, and unfairly benefit all other,at the expense of those particular labourers. Weshall encourage them to marry ; and to bringinto the world families, whose subsistence, or apart of whose subsistence, will be derived fromthe privations of some other persons. But, thisis a benefit which those other labourers have noright to expect: and -they are equally far fromhaving a right to expect it, whether the primarycause be an artificial, or whether it be an accidental diminution of the incomes of the particular labourers in question. Now, assistance tothose whose incomes are failing, has the effect


11/73

10 LECTURE I.of sustaining rather than of elevating the priceof provisions. It does not depress the conditionof others, but prevents their obtaining an undueadvantage. Here, therefore, in respect of theseconsequences, we may fix the line of distinctionbetween the proper and improper application ofa poor-law."Besides the depressing effect on the price ofprovisions, which would arise from allowing particular labourers to pass unrelieved, there isalso another effect depending on the same causethe elevation of the pecuniary wages of theremaining labourers. The first effect proceedsfrom the failure of the demand of the labourers ;the second from the new course into which thedemand of the employers is diverted. By botheffects the condition of the remaining labourersis benefited. But what has been said withrespect to one, may be equally said with respectto both, that the remaining labourers have noright to expect a benefit of this kind. Manylabourers have recently been transferred fromBuckinghamshire, Bedfordshire, and many partsof the south, to Manchester, Bolton, and theother factory districts. We are told, that therate of wages has not been lowered by the coming of the new hands. We may view this migration, effected under the authority of thePoor-law Commissioners, as a mode of relief. Wemay conceive, that if relief bad been refused,


12/73

LECTUREI. iiwages would have risen in the factory districts,in consequence of the new demand of those, whohad been previously charged with the maintenance of the labourers who have migrated.We may conceive such rise to have been prevented by the transfer of the paupers. Supposing this to be the true state of the circumstances,it is clear that the old established hands canhave had no just cause for being dissatisfied onaccount of the arrival of the strangers. I haveput all these points hypothetically, because,though it is stated that the rate of wages has notbeen lowered by the coming of the new hands,but that, on the contrary, they have been regularly advancing for the last two or three years,and are higher now, or at least, were higherin June last, than has ever been known,* I donot cite the fact as evidence of its connectionwith the cause which I have assigned. I tracethat connexion in idea only. In the multitudeof causes which may affect the rate of wages inany particular place, the effects of such a one asI have mentioned cannot be distinguished. Stillthey must exist, as many other effects do exist,which, like the insects that people the air, eludeour grosser perceptions. 7We have settled that the right mode of relieving the able-bodied is by furnishing themwith employment. But, within the terms of this

* First reportof the Poor-lawCommissioners, . 355.f Malthus.


13/73

12 LECTURE I.mode of relief, there is room for considerablevariety. The end proposed is, not only to prevent the offer of the law from operating as anencouragement to idleness, but also to preventits operating as a motive for preferring parochialto private employment. Not some labour only,but an adequate severity of labour, ought to bemade a condition of parochial relief. The trueprinciple with regard to this point is that which,in the Report of the Commissioners under thelate commission of Poor-law inquiry, is statedto have been adopted in the parish of Cook-ham, viz. :

As regards the able-bodied labourers whoapply for relief, giving them hard work at lowwages by the piece, and exacting more work ata lower price than is paid for any other labourin the parish. In short, to adopt the maxim ofMr. Whately, to let the labourer find that theparish is the hardest taskmaster, and the worstpaymaster he can find, and thus to induce himto make his application to the parish his last,and not his first resource.*

All this is very clear in theory. And, sincethe system operates only by the irksomeness ofthe conditions imposed upon the pauper, it isalso clear, that any other method, involving thesame intensity of irksomeness, though of a different nature, would be equally effectual. Ourpoor-laws have at all times required labour of the* Report,8 Edit. p. 229.


14/73

LECTUREI. 13able-bodied. But, within the last forty years,a practical difficulty has presented itself, whichdoes not appear to have been felt materially,during the preceding period the difficultyof rendering the conditions imposed on theindividuals relieved, sufficiently irksome to prevent the accumulation of labourers in the employment of the parish. Why this difficultyshould have appeared, in such force, only oflate years, is a question which does not appearto have attracted much attention. The absenceof motives of private interest, to stimulate theoverseers to vigilant superintendence, is an universal reason, which, being applicable to alltimes, is not sufficient to account for a phenomenon peculiar to a particular sera. Without, however, entering further into this question, I willonly remark, that the difficulty of finding agents,at any expense proportionate to the gain, tosuperintend the enforcement of labour, has suggested the substitution of the workhouse system. The potency of this new engine is manifested by its effect in dissipating in a few monthswhat had been accumulating for years, the classof parish labourers, which had grown up throughthe inefficiency of the former practice.

But, though it be true that the experience ofthe past year affords decisive proof of the efficiency of the new system, in converting generally the able-bodied paupers into independent


15/73

14 LECTURE I.

labourers, it is still a question, whether thepurchase of this benefit, by such means, doesnot involve an unnecessary expense of suffering.We may look upon the agency of the new poor-law in the light of an alteration, effecting agreat increase in the severity of the conditions,on which relief is to be obtained. Upon analyzing various articles which I have met with,written in its praise, I have been astonished atfinding that a great proportion of them havebeen grounded on no one fact in its favour, besides the reduction of the rates. Of course areduction in the rates must be a consequence ofan increased degree of strictness in affordingrelief. This increase, if applied proportionallyto all cases, amounts, in fact, to nothing elsebut a step towards the abolition of poor-laws.We may suppose a certain amount of increase,damming up the waters of misery to a higherlevel and a higher degree of pressure, to causea certain diminution in the quantity of the overflowing stream. A further increase will causea further diminution. Ultimately, we mayarrive at a point where there will be no overflowing, and where the use and abuse of a poor-law will together cease. The idea is, that thehigh pressure will cause the waters to bursttheir banks, and to open for themselves anotherand a better channel. This may sometimeshappen, but will it be always or generally thecase?


16/73

LECTUREI. 15A consent to enter the workhouse amounts in

substance to a consent to imprisonment. Amongthe orders and regulations to be observed inworkhouses,* I find an article, that any pauper may quit the house, taking his family withhim, upon giving the master three hours' noticeof his wish to do so ; and again, that no personshall be allowed to visit any pauper in the house,except by the permission, and in the presence of,the master, and in a room separate from theother inmates. But I have looked in vain forany regulation permitting occasional absence,whether to inquire for work or for any othercause. A person, who has once quitted, is notto be re-admitted, except by means of a newapplication to, and a new order from, the boardof guardians. It does not appear that even theboard of guardians has any direct authority forgiving leave of absence. Now the difficulty ofproviding a maintenance, which is experiencedby persons who have quitted prisons, is wellknown : and this difficulty is in a great measureindependent of the loss of character, which isthe consequence of crime. Many poor personsare irretrievably ruined even by a short imprisonment. Their affairs fall into disorder duringtheir absence. Their goods are, perhaps, seizedfor rent, their house is let to others, and, whenthey come out of prison, they find no home or* First Reportof Poor-lawCommissioners,p.98.


17/73

16 LECTURE I.

resting-place in the world. If a man be committed alone, his wife and family may, possibly,during his absence manage his affairs, and continue the occupation of his cottage. But, according to the principles of the workhouse system, a man, entering the house, must be accompanied by his wife and children. Having nobodyto take care of his furniture during his absence,he must previously dispose of it, and cease to bea householder. Upon entering the workhouse,he will have no prospect of an improvement inhis condition, whenever the time shall comewhen it shall be necessary for him to quit it.It is clear, therefore, that no person in middlelife, who entertains the hope of again rising inthe world, can consent to enter it, unless drivento it by the utmost extremity of present destitution. The motives likely to deter young menwithout the incumbrance of home or family, donot appear to be so strong; and old men, probably, when they clearly perceive their case tobe without hope, will deliberately wind up theiraffairs, in the prospect of entering the house astheir last place of refuge before the grave.In the evidence, collected by the Commissioners under the late Commission of Poor-lawInquiry, complaints

occur of thedifficulty of inducing persons, who had once become domiciledin the old workhouses, to quit them afterwards.

This is ascribed to the attraction of the good


18/73

LECTUREI. 17living, which was provided in some of thesehouses under the former system. But, thoughthis consideration must of course have had itsweight, it is probable that other causes concurred. The following extract from the evidencegiven by Mr. Charles Mott, before that Commission, is instructive. Mr. Mott was contractorfor the maintenance of the poor of Lambeth.

"If," says Mr. Mott, "you educate thechildren to a trade or manufacture, conductedby a parish, you give the contractor or workhouse-keeper, a motive to keep them on theparish, or not to put them out to independentoccupations." [I have nothing to do with themotives for keeping them in the workhouse. Ionly wish to direct attention to the consequencesof their remaining there.] " Being thus," Mr.Mott continues, " being thus kept in the workhouse, they contract various bad habits. If theyare kept till they become adults, the}'- are tooold to submit to the drudgery of apprenticeships,and can very seldom get employment, as theyare mostly unfitted for any. When I had theNewington contract. I found there two lads,upwards of seventeen years of age each. Theyhad both been found expert weavers for theworkhouse, and had been kept in by the formercontractor. The overseer proposed that theyshould be ejected. I pointed out the improbability of their being able to get into any employ-


19/73

18 LECTUREI.ment; for it was notorious that no manufacturerswould employ them, on account of their nothaving served a regular apprenticeship. Theoverseers, however, insisted on their being sentout of the house. One of them, named Porter,died in a month, not having obtained a day'semployment, after having lived in very greatmisery. The other, named Giles East, got littleor no employment, and, in less than threemonths, committed an offence, for which he wasexecuted. The parties, who had expelled himfrom the house, were called upon to prosecutehim for the offence. All these consequences Iconsider to be the results of the system, thoughthe incidents were more strikingly marked inthose cases than in others." *

These facts, though not sufficient of themselves to furnish a foundation for any generalinference, may yet serve to elucidate that viewof the question, which simple reflection willsuggest. Relief in a workhouse keeps a manalive, but is detrimental to his future prospects.The system, therefore, is incapable of being defended as a judicious mode of assisting an individual. Its merits must consist, not in itsinvitations but its terrors. In short, with respect to the class of persons to whom any otherform of relief is refused, it approximates sonearly to an abolition of poor-laws, that we* Extracts from the Information,&c, 183-5,p.317.


20/73

LECTUREI. 19shall be almost bound to approve or to condemnit, according as we decide the question, whetherpoor-laws, for the relief of the able-bodied, areor are not injurious. If it be true, as is alleged,that the able-bodied, on being refused all outdoor relief, do in fact find some regular channelof employment for themselves, we may safelyargue, that what they are found hj experienceto do through fear of the workhouse, they willalso do through fear of starvation. And, if suchbe the case, it follows, that, with respect tothem, a legal provision is unnecessary. Theemptiness of the workhouses is, however, noevidence of regularity of employment.

Moreover, it is not only with respect to thediscipline of the workhouse that the new systemis more severe than the old one. One relievingofficer in an extensive district is not easily accessible by an individual in a time of need.His place of residence may be distant, and theapplicant, even when he does airive there, maybe told that the person, whom he is seeking, ismany miles off. The officer may be himself astranger, and may only have been brought intothe district in consequence of his pecuniary engagement. Even if he happen to be a native orsettled inhabitant of the place, it is not likelythat, in so extensive a field, he will have muchpersonal knowledge of the habits, wants, orcharacters of the generality of those on whosec2


21/73

20 LECTUREI.claims he will have to decide. He will be incapable of judging quickly of the merits of anyapplication. What cannot be effected withoutthe trouble of a previous inquiry, will be avoidedif possible. The natural consequence is, that hewill give dilatory instead of determinate answers,and nominal instead of effectual relief. By thesubstitution of one such officer, in the place ofthirty or forty churchwardens and overseers, whowere, for the most part, the neighbours of those,whom, in the discharge of their respective duties, they were called upon to relieve, the difficulty of applying for relief, and of obtaining asufficient hearing when the application is made,has been very much increased. An appeal alsoto the board of guardians against the decision oftheir own servant, is less likely to be receivedwith favour than an appeal to magistrates againsttfe decision of the overseer. An opinion wasexpressed, in the Report of the- Commissionersof Inquiry, that, under the operation of the newprinciple, the assurance that no one need perishfrom want would be rendered more completethan formerly. The sort of idea, on which thatopinion was founded, seems to have been, that,the workhouse being a self-acting test, its doorsmight be conceived to be opened wide, to theend that all, who should deem themselves to bedestitute, might freely enter. But now it ispractically more difficult to obtain an order for


22/73

LECTUREI. 21admission into the workhouse, than it formerlywas to obtain pecuniary assistance. The journey,which must be performed, on a certain day, andat a certain hour, to fetch the bread which isgiven instead of money, may be placed to thesame account, of an increase in the severity ofthe terms, on which relief is afforded. In whatever point of view we consider the change, wemust come to the same conclusion of its being astep pro tanto towards the abolition of poor-laws.

At the beginning of the lecture, I referred totherw,ork which the law directed to be providedfor the able-bodied, merely with respect to itsbeing a useful test for checking improper applications for relief. At this point, however, itmay be proper to make a nearer approach toaccuracy, by observing, that it is not useful inthat respect alone, nor was such an end the soleor primary object of the law. The famous statute of the 43rd of Elizabeth, consisted of littlemore than a re-enactment of the statute of the39th of Elizabeth, by which two different laws,passed in two different years, and for the sakerespectively of two objects, differing in someessential respects, though not without some common principle of connexion, had been consolidated into one. The first of these two statutes,viz. the Act of the 14th of Elizabeth, c. 5, wasintended as its title expresses, " for the punish-


23/73

22 LLCTURE I.ment of vagabonds, and for the relief of thepoor and impotent." It directed that diligentsearch and inquiry should be made of all poor,aged, impotent, and decayed persons born withinthe several divisions of the justices, and of necessity compelled to live by the charity of thepeople, and that, their names being registered,an assessment should be made for their relief,by collectors and overseers to be appointed forthe purpose. But, with respect to persons,whole and mighty of body, and able to labour,not having land or master, nor using any lawfulmerchandize, craft, or mystery whereby theymight get their living, it directed only that theyshould be adjudged rogues, vagabonds, andsturdy beggars, and should suffer accordingly.To the same punishment able-bodied labourers,loitering and refusing to take work, when tendered to them with reasonable wages, were alsosubjected. But not a word appears in the actabout the relief of the able-bodied. Therefore,we may conclude, that the subsequent act, theact of the 18th of Elizabeth, c. 3, which provided work for the able-bodied, was not intended, like the present workhouse system, asa check on the applications for relief. It waspassed for the purpose of increasing the wealthof the country, by bringing the whole of thepopulation, which was before, in a great measure, maintained in idleness, into constant env


24/73

LECTUREI. 23ployment. This purpose is indicated by itstitle, " An Act for setting the poor on work,and for the avoiding of idleness."The parish officers were directed to provide acompetent store and stock of wool, hemp, flax,iron, or other stuff for setting the poor to work ;and, by the form in which the clauses are drawn,it would seem to have been intended, that theapplications to have the work done, should proceed originally in the direction from the parishofficers to the poor, rather than that the parishofficers should appoint the labour to the poor,as an answer to an application for relief. Thelanguage of the 43rd of Elizabeth points also tothe same construction. By that statute, whichstill remains unrepealed, though its operationhas been, in a great measure, suspended by thelate act, it was enacted that the overseers shouldtake order for setting to work the children of allsuch as they should think not able to maintainthem; and for setting to work all persons, marriedor unmarried, having no means to maintainthemselves, and using no ordinary or daily tradeof life ; and for raising a competent stock of flax,hemp, wool, thread, iron, and other stuff forsetting the poor to work. So far the act pursued,and improved upon, the former act of the 18thof Elizabeth. In the same clause, it was furtherenacted, that they should also take order forraising competent sums of money for and towards


25/73

24 LECTURE I.the necessary relief of the lame, impotent, old,iblind, and other such among them, being poorand not able to work. The latter part, providing relief for the impotent, was borrowed fromthe act of the 14th of the same reign. Thus weha,ve, in the poor-law of Elizabeth, which stillcontinues to be the foundation of our poor-laws,two parts, of which each has a different object.Of the part which corresponds with the act ofthe 14th of Elizabeth, the object is relief to theimpotent. Of the part which corresponds withthe act passed four years afterwards, the objectis the excitement of industry. The wages to begiven in return for the industry were only acollateral result. The original act did not direct,that the persons set to work by the parish officersshould be relieved according to their necessities,but only that they should be paid '' according tothe desert of the workiarj szsh wlw

The proposition, that the change of systemhas converted generally the able-bodied paupersinto independent labourers, requires attentiveexamination. Its different parts admit of different degrees of certainty. It involves, in thefirst place, the position, that those, who werebefore dependent on the parish, have ceased tobe paupers; in the second place, that they havefound the means of procuring a maintenanceindependently of public assistance ; and thirdly,the looseness of the language in which it is ex-


26/73

LECTURE I. 25pressed, though not necessarily involving, mayyet seem calculated to convey, and may convey,the impression, that they have obtained constantemployment, and constant wages, at the handsof private employers. I say that these threedifferent points admit of different degrees ofcertainty. The first point, the point that theyhave ceased to be paupers, is capable of beingeasily and accurately verified. On looking intothe Report of the Poor-law Commissioners, Ido not find any statement as to this point soprecise as I could have expected. They tell usgenerally, that " so far as the change has proceeded in those districts which have workhouses, the reduction of the out-door relief hasbeen accompanied, not by an increase, but by adecided diminution of the number of the indoor paupers."'tv.-ijt.follows from this, that ifany of those, who were before out-door paupers,and whose relief has been discontinued, haveaccepted the offer of the workhouse, a greaternumber of its former inmates have quitted it,in consequence either of the increased severityof the discipline, or from some other cause. Alittle further on in the Report, the Commissioners, by way of example, enter into a particulardetail.

"In the Faringdon Union," they tellus, " alLout-door relief was discontinued, andrelief in the workhouse was offered to two hun-4fiw W * page 46-


27/73

26 LECTUREI.dred and forty able-bodied labourers. Of these,not more than about twenty entered the workhouse, and not one-half remained there morethan a few days, the diet in the workhousebeing at the same time high as compared withthe diet of large classes of independent labourers."* In another part, we are told, that" in none of the new unions, where the workhouse system has been applied, have any considerable number of married couples, who wereout-door paupers, accepted relief within theworkhouse, and that the instances of the reception of married couples, even temporarily, intothe workhouse, where the separation of thesexes is enforced, are extremely rare."7 Forthe absence of greater precision, the explanation,which is given, in reference to a subject connected with this point, will probably account." The complete statement," they say, " of thepecuniary results fairly ascribable to the newlaw, or to our proceedings under its authority,could scarcely be made within the time in whichit is desirable to present our report."J Atthe time of the date of the report, (8th of August,1835,) only a few unions had been formed,and those only a few months before. All,however, that I wish to impress is, that the assertion that the able-bodied paupers, who werebefore dependent on their parishes, have been* Page 46. T Page 32. %Page 43.


28/73

LECTUREI. 2fdispauperized, is one which, from its nature, isso easily capable of being proved or disproved,that, on this account, we cannot doubt the truthof the fact, of which we are informed, as wellby common report as by the statement of theCommissioners, that, on the cessation of out-doorrelief, the offer of the workhouse has been generally declined.The certainty of this first fact, does not, ofitself, necessarily establish the second position,that those who have ceased to be paupers, havefound the means of procuring a maintenance independently of public assistance. The possibility that some of them may have passed out ofthe world ought not to be too readily excludedfrom our calculation. I believe, that in ourgreat towns, what happened not unfrequentlybefore, has happened more especially since thelate act, namely, that many miserable beingshave perished through want. The cases of extreme distress, which have come accidentallybefore the London police magistrates, too clearlyindicate this fact; and it is not improbable thatsome such cases have happened in the country,though the evidence of them has not appeared.With the exception of some few such cases, thesecond position of course follows as an inferencefrom the first, since, if those who have been refused relief, had not found means of maintaining themselves, they could not be now alive.


29/73

$8 LECTUREI.As to the third position, it is clear, that, unless wholly dependent on the charity of friends,the paupers, whose out-door relief has been

stopped, have been converted into independentlabourers. Here again, however, there is aplace for pausing. The half-employed Irish areindependent labourers. Persons of the labouring class, not receiving parochial relief, are independent labourers by virtue merely of thatcircumstance. It does not follow that they arein constant employment. On this subject, however, the Commissioners give us the followinginformation.

"We have directed," they say, " our mostanxious attention to the general effects producedby the change upon the condition of the able-bodied paupers, whose allowances in aid ofwages have been discontinued. Careful inquiries have been made as to the subsequent condition of those who had refused to accept reliefin a workhouse." Then, after stating the casewhich I have already noticed, of the two hundred and forty labourers in the FaringdonUnion, of whom only about twenty entered theworkhouse at all, and of the twenty, not halfremained in it above a few days ; they add, thatMr. Gulson, the assistant commissioner, " found,at the time of his inquiry, that the whole ofthese labourers had got into independent employment," and that, " on inquiry of some of


30/73

LECTUREI. 29the farmers, who had previously represented tohim that they had then no means of employingadditional labourers, he received for answer,that the additional employment was given inconsequence of the improved character of thelabourer."*

The fact here stated, that the whole of thelabourers, whose allowances were discontinuedin the Faringdon Union, had obtained independent employment, may probably be true.But it is not a fact so readily to be received, orso easily capable of verification, as the fact oftheir having refused the offer of in-door relief.It would be a tedious task to trace accuratelythe various means by which two hundred andforty individuals, dispersed probably in manydirections, have obtained their living within anygiven period, even though that period might beshort. Besides, it is only stated that they hadobtained independent, not that they had obtained constant, employment; and the twothings, as I have already observed, are verydifferent."-The reason" also, which is given, is not satis

factory. The improved character of particularlabourers, unless it produces a depression in theprice of labour, can furnish no reason why morelabourers should be employpd. Its only propereffect is to elevate its possessors in the scale of* Page 46.


31/73

30 LECTUREI.competition. It raises them to an equal footing with all other labourers of equally good character. But the number, who can be profitably employed at the same price of labour bythe farmer, remains a given number ; and ifsome, who were before out of employment, do,in consequence of the improvement of theircharacters, obtain employment, we ought, intheory, to infer, that they must displace anequal number of other labourers, and that thus,though there may be a change of persons, theproportion between the numbers in and out ofemployment will remain as before. ''''"'"There is a difference between the price andthe wages of labour. The price of labour is theprice paid for a given amount of toil. By thewages of labour, the sum earned within a giventime is signified. The price of labour mayfall while the wages of labour are raised, thedeficiency of price being made up, within theweek, by dint of increased exertion. If it betrue, as is alleged, that, without reference toany contemporary change arising from circumstances independent of the new law, whichought not to be taken into the account, morelabour is employed in agriculture, we ought toinfer that the price of labour has fallenthatthe condition of those labourers, whose characters were good, and who were before obtainingindependent employment and independent


32/73

LECTUREI. Mwages, has been depressed in consequence ofthe change, and that they must now work harderthan before, in order to obtain the same wages.It may be said that those, who before wereidle paupers, do now confessedly work harder,and that, thus, without any change with respectto those who have always worked hard, theaverage price of labour may be allowed to havefallen. But this will not do. The persons inactual employment, every and each of them,ought to do more work for the same pay. Theprice of labour remaining the same, and theprice of produce also remaining the same, nochange of poor-laws, though it may lead to asubstitution of persons, can supply any motive ofinterest to the farmer for increasing the numberof the labourers in his employment.Neither is it enough to say, that the farmerhas more capital at liberty in consequence ofthe reduction of his poor-rates. A person ofsuperior intelligence, surveying at any giventime the existing state of agriculture, might,probably, point out times and places, when andwhere more capital might be profitably employed. Again, individuals in particular instances, may be prevented by want of capitalfrom cultivating their lands to the full extentat which they can well perceive that their expenditure would be repaid with profit. But,still we have no right to assume, that the farmers

-w


33/73

32 LECTUREI.in general, taken on an average, and clue allowance being made for the existing defects of theirintelligence and for the existing uncertainty oftheir tenures, did not, before the change in thepoor-laws, employ all the capital which could beprofitably employed upon their land. Notwithstanding the prevalent complaints of the depression of agriculture and of the burthen of thepoor-rates, whenever a farm has been vacant,there have always, as far as my observations haveextended, been numerous applicants to engageit. Whenever any delay has occurred, it hasbeen caused by the higgling about terms.Yet, when the terms have been settled, thesame persons, who have thus outbid their competitors, have been apt to complain of the lowprice of corn, and of the pressure of parochial taxation Of course, if it had beenpreviously understood that they would be relieved from the whole or a part of that pressure,the biddings of others and consequently theirown would have advanced to a higher point.Thus, what is saved in poor-rates, is to be considered, not as an addition to the farmer's capital,but as a portion of rent, which will ultimatelypass over to the landlord.The amount of labour, displaced from theparish pay, ought, according to all just theory,to be absorbed, not by agriculture, but by domestic service, manufactures, and commerce.


34/73

LECTURE I. .33While the state of the law charges the farmerwith the maintenance of a number of idlehands, the charge ought to be considered asconstituting a deduction from rent. And when,by a change in the law, these hands are allturned loose, they ought to be expected to findtheir way into that kind of employment, whichis naturally maintained through the expenditureof the incomes of landed proprietors.I have dwelt upon the allegation that theable-bodied paupers have been converted generally into independent labourers, not because, asa whole, I doubt its truth, but because it is ahimportant proposition, and it is desirable towatch closely every avenue by which error mightenter. With respect to the general merits ofthe system of refusing relief to the able-bodied,the points which require particular attention are,first, the amount of the floating want of employment, occurring in winter and in other particularseasons when work is slack ; and secondly, theextent and intensity of the occasional privationsof those, who find a difficulty in obtaining employment. On the results of sufficient experiencewith respect to these chances, the ultimate decision of the question as to the necessity of alegal provision for the relief of the able-bodied,will materially depend. The cases of distressarising from the failure or depression of particular branches of trade, are to be excepted from


35/73

34 LECTURE I.these remarks. It appears to me, that the newsystem is indebted, in a great measure, for itspresent apparently easy success, to the high proportion which now subsists, between the wagesof labour generally and the price of the necessaries of living. On account of this high proportion, there is at present a great elasticity inthe wages of labour. Between different menthere are often original differences, both in theirmental powers and in their bodily strength.Even where there is no original difference,casual circumstances will create a difference,and a difference once begun is apt to be widenedin the progress of time. Hence, different individuals, though brought up to the same description of labour, must be valuable, in differentdegrees, in the estimation of their employers.While the common wages of labour continuehigh, in proportion to the price of necessaries,the wages even of the least valuable may fall according to the ratio of their value, and may yetbe sufficient for their necessary, though, perhaps,scanty maintenance. So long as this state ofthings shall continue, it may be found, at alltimes, comparatively easy to obtain or to recoveremployment. But, whenever circumstancesshall change, and the average amount of thewages of common labour shall descend and approach more closely to the level of the price ofthe necessaries of living, then the labouring class


36/73

LECTUREI. 35will begin to divide permanently into the employed and the unemployed. An individual,once out of employment, will not easily resumehis position. Long continued want of practice,will render him unfit, in the estimation of theemployers of labour, to be again received intoemployment. They will prefer giving highwages to those who, through good living andconstant practice, remain strong and fit for work,to employing the remainder at wages sufficientlyhigh for maintaining them in health and inworking condition. Thus, some labourers willengross the whole field of employment, whichthey will transmit to, and which will be retainedby, their children, until these again are displacedby fortune. The rest, if they survive at all,will drag on a miserable existence, according tothe fashion of Irish wretchedness. Mr. M'Adamis in the habit of placing large stones and blocksacross the more beaten parts of the roads, ,tGoblige the passengers to pass over and begin theuse of the rougher parts. We may conceive,with respect to the condition of the poor, that,whenever the scarcity of food shall be muchincreased, the interposition of the law will become necessary, like Mr. M'Adam's stones andblocks, to secure the more equable use of thefield of labour.

d2


37/73

36"bibod-s1

LECTURE II.aii> i

"^There has been at all times a difference betweenthe country and the towns, with respect to thedegree of want, which has been accepted by theparish officers as furnishing a valid claim toparochial assistance. Relief has been muchmore sparingly administered in the towns, thanin the country. This has been especially thecase with respect to the able-bodied. I believe,that, in the great towns, relief to the able-bodiedwas, at no time, dispensed with a much moreliberal hand than it now is, both in town andcountry, under the new poor-law. If we suppose it to have been dispensed, in all other respects,in the towns as in the country, with an equaldegree of judgment, it will follow, that, whilepoor-laws will probably have produced less goodin the towns, they will also have produced lessevil. Accordingly, we find, that the mostpressing of the evils arising from the late administration of the poor-laws having been


38/73

LECTUREII. 37those connected with the relief of the able-bodied,the complaints of their bad effects have proceeded principally from the country districts.It has never been pretended, that, in the towns,parochial assistance to the able-bodied has proceeded to the extent of producing any sensibleeffect on the wages of common labour, or on theindustry of the labourers. I mention this distinction, because the idea has occurred to me,that if we could form a correct estimate of thedegree of misery commonly prevalent amongthe inferior population of the towns, we mightview it, subject to certain allowances, as a fairsample of that which might be expected to prevail generally in the absence of poor-laws.It would be a much more easy task to showthe intensity, than it would be to show the extentof this misery. We might show the intensityby producing particular instances of extremesuffering. The extent, that is, the number ofsuch cases, and of the other cases receding byvarious gradations from the utmost extremity ofwant, could hardly be ascertained, with muchapproach to accuracy, even by the most carefulinquiry, supported by all the assistance of publicauthority. Many circumstances, however, pointto the conclusion that it is not inconsiderable.

Though I have not collected any particularswith a view to such an inquiry, yet, to furnish ageneral idea, I will lay before you such as I can


39/73

38 LECTURE II.recollect, and to which I am able readily torefer.

In Mr. Henderson's report on vagrancy, contained in Appendix E,* to the report of theCommissioners under the late commission ofPoor-law inquiry, I find the following :" At Liverpool," says Mr. Henderson, " theoverseers, anxious to discourage vagrancy, havenot opened any lodging-house; but an institution called ' The night Asylum for the houselesspoor,' established by the exertions of an individual, and supported by voluntary contributions,ought perhaps to be noticed. This asylumconsists of a double house, in which the sexesare completely separated. No one, who behavesin an orderly manner, is refused admittance, orrequired to quit it, except during two hours inthe day-time. Each inmate is supplied with arug or blanket; the bedsteads consist of threetiers of sloping wooden shelves fixed in thewall; and the inmates usually sleep on theboards in their day-clothes, with the rug wrapped round them. No food is provided, excepta few potatoes on Sunday. It is urged by thefounder of the asylum, that such scanty accommodations offer no temptations to any but thosewho are in extreme destitution, whom it ischarity to receive. Great attention is paid tocleanliness and ventilation, and, if I may judge* Last page.


40/73

LECTURE II. 39

from a few visits, and general report, the establishment is managed with order and propriety.It will be seen from the subjoined table, thatthe inmates remain on an average betweenfive and six nights, and that the number ofpersons admitted, in the course of the year,commencing the 25th of December 1830, was6,122. Sailors, who were under peculiar difficultiesin obtaining employ, during the first four monthsincluded in this statement, constitute a largeproportion of the whole number accommodated."Of course it would be of no use for me to offerhere to read a tabular statement. But I willmention a few particulars. On inspection of thetable, the number of sailors appears to haveamounted to rather more than two-fifths of thewhole. It appears also, that the number, not ofsailors only, but also of mechanics and labourers,who were admitted into the asylum, was muchgreater in the four first months of the year thanafterwards. In the three first months, theaverage number of berths for sailors in eachmonth, each night being computed separately inthe number of the berths, amounted nearly to2,000. The number for mechanics and labourersin the same time exceeded 2,100 a month. InApril, there was a great falling off, the numberof berths for sailors in that month having-amounted only to 945, and for mechanics andlabourers to 1,311. In the subsequent months


41/73

40 LECTURE II.

the number was still less. On referring to thepopulation abstract, I find that the number ofpersons accommodated in this asylum in the courseof the year, amounted to about one twenty-seventh part of the entire population of Liverpool. It was justly urged by the founder of theinstitution, thatsuch scanty accommodation couldoffer no temptation to any but those who werein extreme destitution. Since, then, a twenty-seventh part of the population accepted in factthe offer of this asylum, and that, principally, inthe coldest month of the year, we may wellimagine that, if admission into the workhouses,in which the accommodations are so much superior, were really free, a much greater numberwould enter them. We may, therefore, fromthis-fact form some conjecture respecting theoccasional destitution of a large part of thepopulation of Liverpool. ,3soqm


42/73

LECTURE. II. 41

these applications, though I have not been successful in my endeavours to refer to them for thepurposes of this lecture. The number of pawnbrokers' shops, the cases, which frequently happen, of persons being burnt to death by sleepingin the brick-fields, upon the bricks, to whichthey resort for the sake of the warmth, contribute,with many others, to indicate the existence of alarge amount of floating destitution.

Everybody of course would desire that thismisery should, if possible, be relieved. But theobjection to all attempts to relieve it, is, thatlegislation for the poor aggravates the evil, whichit is intended to cure, and which grows accordingas it is relieved.

The question raised by this objection, is,whether this effect be the necessary and inseparable consequence of a legal provision for thepoor. I propose, therefore, now to review someof the evil consequences of the late administration of the poor-laws, with the view of ascertaining the precise point of connexion of those consequences with the undertaking of the law.

First, as to what has been called the allowance system. Money was given to the agricultural labourers, while working for private individuals, for the purpose of enabling them tomaintain their familiesan end, to which thewages of their labour alone, were, as was alleged,inadequate. One evil consequence of this mode


43/73

42 LECTURE II.of relief was that it depressed the market rate ofwages, and, by reason of this depression, imposed on other labourers a necessity, whichwould not otherwise have visited them, of applying in like manner for similar relief.It produced this effect upon agricultural wagesby retaining in agriculture labourers who wouldotherwise have quitted it. If the supply ofagricultural labour had remained the same,wages would have remained the same. But theoperation of the law, by its effect in increasingthe supply, lowered the rate of wages. Supposing, two shillings a week to have been given toevery agricultural labourer without distinction,the practice would have been productive of noeffect tending either to improve or injure thecondition of the labourers. The benefit of therelief would have been merely illusory. Thewages of all would have been depressed to theextent of two shillings, and the relief affordedwould have been exactly neutralized by the depression. But, a selection having been made,and the relief having been given only to thosewho would otherwise have been obliged to quitthe employment, the wages of all were affected,while all did not receive compensation in theform of relief. Thus, with respect to this point,the accusation is verified, that the operation ofpoor-laws aggravated the evil it was intendedto cure.


44/73

LECTURE II. 43For the solution of the question whether thisconsequence be essential to all systems of allow

ances, we may remark, that, at each step of theproceeding, the person to whom relief is givenis exempted from the necessity of changing hisemployment. His competition lowers the rateof wages, and thereby transfers that necessity toa second person. I suppose the means of thesecond person, in proportion to his necessities,to exceed, in some slight degree, those which arepossessed by the first independently of theparochial assistance. Supposing no relief to begiven to the second person, the degree in whichwages will be depressed will depend merely onthis excess. He will quit the employment, andall further effect upon wages will cease. If,however, there be no excess, no permanent effecton wages will be produced. By pursuing thistrain of reasoning, we shall arrive at the conclusion, that it is only on the circumstance of theundertaking of the law being unlimited, thatthe mischief depends. A limited undertakingwould have the effect of securing a maintenanceto particular persons, but would not vary thesupply, nor consequently the wages, of agricultural labour. For example, allowances to allpersons above thirty years old, would not beneutralized by a depression of the market-rate ofwages. The only effect would be, to imposeexclusively on persons under the age of thirty,the necessity of changing their employment.


45/73

44 LECTUREII.A second evil consequence of the late modeof administering the poor-laws, was the entireremoval or great diminution of all those incentives to industry which depend on the principleof free labour. We have seen that the effect of

the allowance system was the depression ofwages. This depression created a necessity forthe extension of relief. Ultimately, when wageshad fallen below the amount necessary for thesupport of an ordinary family, most of themarried men were dependent upon the parish.Their allowances and wages together were determined, not by their industry, but by theirnecessities. If, by voluntarily increasing theirindustry, they had earned higher wages, theirallowance would have been diminished by anequal amount. They would have benefited, notthemselves, but the parish. Consequently, in allcases, in which idleness did not admit of distinctproof, they were naturally idle. Agriculturalwork being little susceptible of measurement,this effect appeared principally in the agricultural parts. In manufactures, we are told, itwas not found that parish assistance necessarilydestroyed the efficiency of the labourer. Wherethat assistance made only a part of his income,and the remainder was derived from piece-work,his employer insisted, and sometimes successfully, that he should not earn that remainder butby the greatest exertion.* In agriculture as* Reportof Commissioners f Inquiry,8 edit.p. 74.


46/73

LECTURE II. 45well as manufactures, wherever the allowancesystem went beyond a certain extent, the motivesfor exertion, which belong to the principle offree-labour, were taken away ; those whichbelong to the principle of slavery remained.But the last-mentioned motives were moreefficient in manufactures, on account of thegreater accuracy of measurement, of whichmanufacturing operations are capable. " j'*>uThis effect of the system depended on thecircumstance of the allowances having beenmade to vary, in respect of addition and subtraction, inversely as the earnings of the labourer. His allowance and wages togetherconstituted a fixed sum-total, which dependedon his necessities, and which he could not increase by an increase of his industry. Had theallowances been determined upon another principle, so as to have varied directly as the industry of the labourers, or at least, so as not tohave been diminished according to its increase,the effect would not have followed.

A third evil consequence of the late administration of the poor-laws, was the discouragement of the prudential virtues. I will illustratethis consequence by a case Avhich was put to mesome years ago by a labouring man. He mentioned two young men, who had worked together at the same work during the whole summer, and had earned precisely the same wages.


47/73

46 LECTURE II.The one had disposed of his money in the purchase of a watch and some good clothes, and,perhaps, had saved a little ; the other had spenthis money in drinking, or had otherwise squandered it in perishable articles, as fast as he hadreceived it. On the approach of winter, bothapplied to the overseer for work. The one whohad nothing was set to work for the parish as amatter of course : the answer given to the otherwas that he had a watch, which he might sellto support himself. He found it necessary tosell the watch, and, when the produce had beenexpended, he applied again to the overseer." No," said the overseer, " I have seen you atchurch with a coat which is worth some money.Go and sell that." I do not remember whetherI heard that the coat was sold ; but only, that,in the result, this man passed the winter without obtaining any work either from the parishor otherwise, while the other, during the wholetime, was receiving regularly his parish pay,without murmur or opposition. The remedysuggested by my informant was, that want ofemployment ought to give to all, without dis:tinction of their means of maintaining themselves, an equal title to ask for work at thehands of the overseer. Without now discussingthe objections, which might be made on othergrounds, to such a principle, I will observe,that it would remedy the evil which this ex-


48/73

LECTUREII. 47ample is calculated to illustrate. While'ilwould place the saving and the squandering onequal terms in all other respects, it would reserve to the saving the full benefit of his prudence. Here the evil proceeded from the circumstance of destitution having been made anessential ingredient of the title to relief. Hadrelief been given according to the cause of destitution, the evil would have been avoided. Bythe cause of destitution, I mean the want ofworkthat cause which was independent of theactions and control of the individuals themselves.

A fourth bad effect consisted in the refusal tothose who had any property, not only of parishwork, but even of private employment. Thefarmers, in choosing their labourers, gave thepreference to those, with whose maintenance,when unemployed, they were legally chargeable.Many examples of such conduct are mentionedin the Report of the Commissioners of Inquiry." In the hundred of Buckingham, in whichI act as a magistrate," says Sir Harry Verney,in a communication to the Commissioners," many instances occur in which labourers areunable to obtain employment, because they haveproperty of their own. For instance, in theparish of Steeple Claydon, John Lines, formerlya soldier, a very good workman, is refused employment, because he receives a pension. The


49/73

48 LECTURE II.farmers say they cannot afford to employ thosefor whom they are not bound by law to provide.In order to prevent John Lines from being outof work, I am frequently obliged to give himemployment." *Out of many other examples which are mentioned, I will add the following. It is containedin a statement made by a solicitor at Royston,who was himself personally acquainted with thedetails of the case." An individual, who had risen from poverty,and accumulated considerable personal property,bequeathed legacies to a number of labourers,his relations. Circumstances delayed for several months the collecting the testator's estate.The overseer's deputy of one parish, in whichsome of the legatees were labourers, urged tothe agent of the executors the payment, on theground that it would benefit the parishioners,as, when the legacies were paid, they would notfind employment for the legatees, because theywould have property of their own. It was thenstated that some of them, who lived in a different parish, had been refused employment,because they were entitled to property."7The witnesses, besides citing particular instances, state in general terms the results oftheir own observations. The following answerof Mr. Wetherell, the rector of Byfield, North-* Reportof Commissioners,page 78. f Page 80.


50/73


51/73

50 LECTUREII.of the possession of property would have beenentirely removed. No person above the age ofthirty would have been, on that account, refusedemployment; for, by the hypothesis, whetherthe labourer were possessed of property or otherwise, the legal liability would have been thesame. No person under the age of thirty,in the possession of property, would havebeen refused employment on that account;for, by the hypothesis, with respect to them,the reason would have been wanting, on account of which, under the legal liabilitieswhich actually existed, the destitute werein fact preferred. The persons above the ageof thirty would have been, in some degree,protected against the competition of the rest;but individuals in the same degree of fitness,belonging to each of these two classes respectively, would have had, in their competitionwith each other, an equal chance of obtainingemployment.Jtj0i,.r- .LThe circumstance of the relief of the poorhaving been a parochial instead of a nationalcharge, was also essential to the existence ofthis evil. It was proposed, by many persons, tothe Commissioners of Inquiry, that the relief ofthe poor should have been changed from a parochial to a national charge a change ofwhich, for reasons into which it is not nownecessary to enter, the Commissioners disap-


52/73

LECTUREII. A5\proved, at the same time acknowledging, that,amongst its various effects, it would have beenproductive of some great and immediate advantages. " There would be no longer," theyobserved, " a motive' for preferring in employment the men with large families to those withsmall, the married to the unmarried, the destitute to those who have saved, and careless andimprovident to the industrious and enterprising."* Within the small circle of a countryparish, an individual farmer, in the managementof his own affairs, is influenced by the consideration of the effect which his conduct will produce upon the immediate interests of the wholebody of the rate-payers with whom he is connected, and it is on this account only, that, inchoosing his labourers, he gives the preferenceto those who would otherwise be chargeable tothe parish. Were the relief of the poor madea national charge, this feeling of regard for thepublic would be altogether dissipated.A fifth evil consequence of the late administration of the poor-laws was the disturbance ofthe natural distribution of the labouring population into their different kinds of emp^ment.The individuals composing the labouring classwould, in the absence of poor-laws, have beenproportioned to all their different businesses according to the wants and tastes of those, who,* Page 179. E 2


53/73

52 LECTURE II.by reason of their power of purchasing, wouldhave had the whole labour of the country attheir command. A rise in the price of anyparticular commodity, occurring independentlyof any variation in the price of the raw material,would have indicated the pleasure of the purchasers that labour should be diverted fromother employments to the production of thatparticular commodity. The rise of price wouldhave been followed by an increase of wages inthat branch of industry. Labourers would havebeen attracted by the increase of wages fromother employments. In a similar manner, upona diminution in the demand for any particularproduct, labourers would have been warned bythe fall of wages to leave that kind of employment. Thus the regularity of the proportionbetween the supply and the demand for labourin different employments would, by this process,have been restored as often as any change ofcircumstances should have occasioned a variation. But the poor-laws prevented this gradualmotion. Having been carried into executionprincipally with respect to the agricultural families; they caused an accumulation of populationin the country parishes. Hence arose the depression of wages, the extension of the allowancesystem, and the other evils which I have beenexplaining. All the five evil consequences arein fact very intimately connected with each


54/73

LECTUREII. 53other. The four preceding ones all flow froma local superabundance of population in proportion to the demand for labour. Viewing, however, this local congestion as a distinct evil initself, namely, as the consequence of a legalobligation imposed on particular persons possessing a power of commanding and maintaininglabour, to dispose of a portion of this power inmaintaining a certain amount of labour in idleness, or in a kind of labour which they wouldnot of themselves have preferred, when, if left tothemselves, they would have maintained an equalnumber of persons in profitable employment^viewing, I say, this local congestion in thislight, we may observe, that the evil would havebeen avoided, if the liability to find maintenance and employment for the destitute hadnot been indefinitely extended. If the law hadundertaken to find in employment those onlywho were above thirty years of age, then, thepressure of necessity, operating on all who wereunder that age, and compelling them to surmount the barriers which obstructed their passage from the less into the more profitableemployment, would have produced an equablediffusion of the supply of labour in proportion tothe demand for the different kinds of service.As to some other evil effects which the poor-laws have been accused of producing, I cannothelp looking at the accusation, though it is not


55/73

54 LEC'IUHEII.without some foundation, yet as being in themain the result of rash generalization from theexperience of some extreme cases. I allude tothe dreadful degradation of character which hasbeen said to have been all but universal amongthe receivers of relief. I can neither perceivemuch cause for such degradation as the consequence of relief, nor does my own observationconfirm the statement of the fact. That amongthe receivers of relief, many bad charactersshould be found, it is reasonable to expect.Idle, drunken, and dissolute habits will bringpersons to want, and want will bring themupon the parish. But to consider parish reliefas the cause of such habits is to transposethe order of cause and effect. Many of thearguments which have been brought forwardunder this head of accusation are, in fact, looseand unsatisfactory in an extreme degree. Take,for example, the following, which I extract fromthe Report of the Commissioners of Inquiry." The effect of allowance," says Mr. Stuart," is to weaken, if not to destroy, all the ties ofaffection between the parent and child. Whenever a lad comes to earn wages, or to receiveparish relief on his own account, (and this wemust recollect is at the age of fourteen,) although he may continue to lodge with hisparents, he does not throw his money into acommon purse and board with them, but buys


56/73

LECTURE II. 55his loaf and piece of bacon, which he devoursalone. The most disgraceful quarrels arise frommutual accusations of theft, and, as the childknows that he has been nurtured at the expenseof the parish, he has no filial attachment to hisparents."I believe the argument, which is here used,to be a perfectly just one. But it hardly touchesthe operation of the poor-laws. The independence of children on their parents is a very greatevil. But it is an evil which belongs to thegeneral circumstances of the labouring classes,and has very little, indeed scarcely any, connexion with the receipt of parochial relief.Let us try one more example" Those whose minds," say Messrs. Wrottes-ley and Cameron, " have been moulded by theoperation of the poor-laws, appear not to havethe slightest scruple in asking to be paid for theperformance of those domestic duties which themost brutal savages are in general willing torender gratuitously to their own kindred. Whyshould I tend my sick and aged parents, whenthe parish is bound to do it or if I do perform the service, why should I excuse the parishwhich is bound to pay for it?""

At Princes-Risborough we turned over theminute-book of the select vestry, and found thefollowing entries :" Samuel Simmons' wife applied to be allowed something for looking after her mother,


57/73

56 LECTURE II.who is confined to her bed ; the mother nowreceives three-and-sixpence weekly. To be allowed an additional sixpence for a few weeks."" David Walker's wife applied to be allowedsomething for looking after her father and mother (old Stevens and his wife) now ill, whoreceive six shillings weekly. To be allowed oneshilling weekly." Maiy Lacy applies for something for waiting on her mother, now ill. Left to the governor." Elizabeth Prime applies to have somethingallowed her for her sister looking after her father, now ill. Left to the governor."*An old woman in Buckinghamshire, aboutfive miles from Princes-Risborough, was mentioning to me that, having been very ill, she hadbeen obliged to have her grandaughter to waiton her and do her work, and that she had hiredher at eighteen pence a week, for three weeks.With reference to these very cases which Ihave just read, I observed to her, that her grandaughter might as well have waited on herwithout any payment. The reply was, that shecould not live, if she was not paid ; for that shehad to pay two shillings a week for her board,and could not earn much at her pillow whileemployed in waiting upon her. A similar explanation might probably have been given ofthe other casesand it might have been found,* Pages 06 and 97.


58/73

LECTUREII. 57that, if the applicants had had it in their powerto give their attendance gratuitously, they wouldnot have applied for assistance. The evil, such'as it was, arose from the construction of society,not from the poor-laws.

Upon a review of the five evil consequences,which I have noticed, it will be perceived, thatnot one of them would take place under a system of poor-laws, such as I have suggested,which should be limited to a part only of thepopulation, but, with respect to that part, shouldbe so far extended as to apply to all who are inwant of work. The benefits of the new poor*,law are, according to my view of it, of a negative character. They are the benefits whichnaturally attach to a measure of abolition. Ittakes away the good together with the evil, and,as the subtraction of an evil is a good, it is protanto beneficial. The evil having been verygreat, the benefit, arising from its removal, isgreat accordingly. But it appears to me that adiscriminating system, which should give assistance liberally to age, but should diminish possibly into the workhouse system, or even tonothing with respect to youth, would retain andimprove upon the good, while it would avoidthe evil, tendencies of our late poor-laws.In the absence of poor-laws, the industriousderive a relative advantage from their industry,the honest from their good character, the saving


59/73

58 LECTURE II.from their frugality, and the clever from theirsuperior skill. The new poor-law, approachingas it does to the abolition of poor-laws, is attended by all these benefits. But those whopraise it, and, looking only to such consequences,regard it as perfect, commit the error of treatingthat as absolute, which in its essence is relativeonly. Where there is a difference of characters,the man of good will be preferred to the man ofbad character. But if the inferior charactersshould be all improved, and raised to the levelof those which are at present the best, it wouldnot be correct to infer that all would be elevated tothat degree above indigence at which, so long asthereis adifference between the characters of men,those who have the best characters must necessarily stand. It would not be correct even to inferthat they would be raised in any, the smallest degree, above the lowest point. The like may be saidof the effects of superior industry, frugality, andenterprise. To persons who have no fixed rightof property in the earth, all these virtues giveonly relative advantages. One man becomingmore honest, more industrious, more frugal, andmore enterprising, depresses others at the sametime that he elevates himself. Even supposingthat no other points remained to be added to theaccount, the question might reasonably be raisedwhether the effects of extreme competition instimulating frugality and industry, by incessantly


60/73

LECTUREII. 59restoring the same pressure of necessity, mightnot eventually transgress the limits of theirutility.

But, besides that in the absence of poor-laws,the most industrious, the most honest, the mostfrugal, and the most clever, would possess a relative advantage, we have also to consider thatthe strong would have the like advantage overthe -weak, and consequently the young over theaged, and the healthy over the diseased. Variousaccidents also, and the caprices of purchasersand employers, might displace from their employments even the most honest and the possessors of all the other advantages which have beendescribed. Something is necessary to give agreater degree of certainty to the prospects of alabouring man. An objection has been made topoor-laws that they encroach upon the rights ofproperty. It would be more to the purpose, toobject and to prove that they ought not to encroach upon them. It follows from the principles, which I explained last year, that a qualifiedright of property in the earth, such as thatwhich can be effected by poor-laws, ought to beextended to as many of the families which inhabit it, as can be maintained in comfort out ofits produce/1 9d cIt might at first sight appear reasonable toargue, that if poor-laws undertaking to provideonly for the destitute, occasion at present a


61/73

60 LECTURE II.certain expense, they would, if the undertakingshould be so extended as to include many morethan the destitute, become intolerably expensive.This consequence would not necessarily follow.We have seen the effect of a local liability, ininducing the farmers, when choosing their labourers, to give the preference to those withwhose maintenance they were legally chargeable. This principle, which, while theywere chargeable, only and always, with therelief of the destitute, was productive of theworst of evils, might, as it seems to me,be diverted into a new channel, in which, instead of evil, it would be productive of almostunqualified good. Were the law to provide thatevery person discharging a labourer should beexclusively obliged to maintain him while outof employment, the incentives to industry wouldbe very much impaired. The sluggishness belonging to a system of slavery would prevail.The clause of the new Corporation Act, by whichthe towns are charged with a liberal provisionfor such of the town-clerks as shall be dismissedfrom their offices by the new councils, is opento this objection. It furnishes, however, to thecouncils, an obvious motive for retaining theformer town-clerks in their service, and so faranswers the purposes of a poor-law. But a liability, imposed on a body of men collectively,to maintain individuals taken as individuals,


62/73

LECTUREII. &1while' it would provide for the individuals asfully as the separate liability, is free from theobjection of materially weakening the incentivesto industry. Each master would have the powerof discharging, without much or any certainloss to himself, a man personally offensive ordisagreeable to him, or otherwise guilty of misconduct. The loss would not be great, because,supposing the man to be thrown upon the parish,the charge of maintaining him would be dividedbetween all the rate-payers. It would not becertain, because, in all probability, anotherwould give him private employment. Manyreasons for refusing employment, which wouldbe all-powerful with one master, would have noforce in the estimation of another. Irritatedfeelings on both sides might make it desirablefor the master, that he should not again takethe same servant, and for the servant, that heshould not return to the same master. Butthese feelings would be lost in the change ofpersons; and, as we suppose of course thatparish work would be less eligible than privateemployment, we may conclude that the servantwould be unwilling, by displeasing his new employer, to subject himself to the inconvenienceof a second change. For these reasons, it seemsprobable, that a legal liability to find employ-ment for all persons above a certain age, wouldnot have the effect of increasing the burthens of


63/73

62 LECTUREII.parishes, but only of preventing the contingencyof persons of that age being unable to obtainprivate employment.In country parishes, the farmers, by whomthe burthen of the poor-rates was principallyborne, stood generally towards the able-bodiedwhom they were liable to relieve, in the relation of the employers of a particular kind oflabour, to the workmen educated to that samekind of labour. They were the agriculturalmasters required to find employment for theagricultural workmen. This relation is essential to the easy working of the principle whichI have just been advocating. It does not, however, appear that it would be impossible, or evenvery difficult, to classify and to divide into sections the whole productive population, above acertain age, with sufficient accuracy for such apurpose. A general liability, independent ofparticular classification, might at the same timebe extended over the whole, and with regard to

businesses, for which little or no capital is required, the classification would be less necessary. ' alTt w

Hitherto, I have principally had in view thecase of the able-bodied, and the time obliges meto be brief in treating of the case of the impotent.Similar reasons for extending relief beyond destitution apply also to this second case. It isimpossible to confine legal relief to the destitute


64/73

LECTUREII. 63only, without impairing, to an improper extent,the motives for individual saving and for private charity. That the limitation, to cases ofdestitution only, of the legal obligation to relieve, has a necessary tendency to check privatecharity, is a truth which seems to have beenperceived and noticed at all times since the firstinstitution of poor-laws. " If," said JudgeHale, writing above a hundred and fifty yearsago, " if they give more than their proportionin their respective parishes, that they say isbut giving to the rich ; for the poor are not seton work thereby, nor have the more given them,but only their rich neighbours pay the less."" The adoption of this plan," said Mr. Drum-mond, the founder of this professorship, in aspeech to the magistrates of Surrey[I amnot able to state what his plan was, because Iam quoting only from a short memorandumwhich I took in the British Museum, and havenot been able to recur to the pamphlet here.]" The adoption of this plan will also unlockonce more the sluices of private charity, whichthe present system tends to close entirely ; forthere is no object now to be gained in assistinga poor man, because it is not he who is therebyrelieved, but the parish rates ; it is not he whois rendered more comfortable, for the momenthis increased comfort is perceived, his allowance from the parish is diminished." The same


65/73

64 LECTURE II.considerations which thus operate to diminishprivate charity towards other individuals, mustalso operate to diminish frugality, which may becalled the charity of an individual towards himself. The more he saves, the less will he receivefrom the parish.I have alluded to a distinction between aproper and an improper diminution of the motives to charity and saving. I call that a proper diminution, which would arise from a diminution of the necessity for these virtues. I callthat an improper diminution, which would be effected by taking away the benefits of an individualact. Any poor-law whatever, so far as it is effectual towards its end, must diminish the necessity for charity and saving, and therefore, cceterisparibus, ought to be expected to diminish the extent of their practical developement. This, withincertain limits, I should call a proper consequence.But, a judicious poor-law, while it could not,consistently with its proper end, do otherwise ineffect than diminish the necessity for these virtues,would steer clear of the tendency to discouragethem, which must attend the confiscation of theirintended benefits to the public use.

The abolition of poor-laws, and, in proportion,the approach to abolition, would at once operateto increase the necessity for the virtues of privatecharity and frugality, and to remove the previousdiscouragements which obstructed their exercise.


66/73

LECTURE II. '65It is important carefully to distinguish betweenthese two consequences : because, while both ofthem contribute jointly^ to the production of oneeffect, namely, the extension of the active exercise of these virtues, this ulterior effect, which,taken by itself, seems to be altogether good,requires to be separated into its two parts, eachof which should be viewed with a reference to itscause. With respect to the former part, namely,the part which depends on the extension of thenecessity for charity and frugality, the questionmay arise whether it would form an adequate substitute for the system it would supersede. This isthe important question. Of coui'se, on the abolition of a poor-law, private charity would be extended. Of course, sons would do more for theirparents. Of course, many individuals would domore for themselves. Were we to lose the useof gunpowder, we should return to that of spearsand arrows. Were we deprived of the metals, weshould recur to fish-bones and wood hardened inthe fire. The ancient maxim '

N?77noe,oe irarspa Krelvag, 7rato*aeKaraXuTru,indicates a state of society in which childrenwere charged with the duty of avenging thedeath of their murdered parents. Were thelaws for the protection of life abolished, publicopinion and the necessity of the case would,probably, again impose this duty upon children.


67/73

66 LECTUREII.But would the interests of society be benefitedby the change With respect to that extensionof private charity, which would be the result ofthe abrogation of a legal provision for the poor,a similar question must be solved, before wecan decide that the change, including both thecause, namely, the increased necessity, and itsconsequence, the extension of private charity,would be a real good. As to the other part ofthe effectthe part which depends on the removal of injudicious obstructions, that, of course,would be a good without alloy.The objection, on the ground of expense, tothe proposal of an allowance to all the impotent,does not admit of so easy an answer as the similarobjection to the proposal of finding employmentfor all the able-bodied. But I solve the objection by qualifying the proposal itself, which Iput at first universally, merely for the sake ofsimplifying the conception of the principle. Itis not necessary that the allowance should beextended to all the impotent. It would be sufficient if it were confined to a circle includingthe destitute and such as should be situated onthe borders, and within a certain distance of theborders, of destitution.

With the same view of simplifying the conception of the principle, in speaking of a legalprovision for the poor, which should be freefrom the objections applicable to our late poor-


68/73

LECTUREII. 67laws, I have supposed it to be precisely limitedto persons above a certain fixed age. The absolute cessation, however, of the legal provision atany particular age, forms no essential part of thesupposition. All that is essential is, that indescending from age to youth, the liberality ofrelief, and of the conditions on which it is to beobtained, should be diminished.

I introduced originally, the supposition of alegal provision limited to the older part of thepopulation, but with respect to that part asliberal as possible, for the purpose of showing,that, under such a system, the principal evilsattendant on our late poor-laws, would have noplace. I -will now add some further considerations, which occur to me, with regard to itsprobable effects. For the sake of brevity, I shallstill speak of it, as limited to persons above theage of thirty years.I think that a difference should be made withrespect to persons below a certain age, for manyreasons. On account of the principle of population, it might, perhaps, be impossible to fulfilthe promise of maintaining every family. Butit would certainly be possible to maintain, andto maintain in comfort, all persons above theage of thirty years. As to their families, I donot propose to promise them a sufficient maintenance. I only propose to secure to the headsof the families their usual or nearly their usual


69/73

68 LECTUREII.incomenamely, that income, which, by reference to the proportion which ought naturally tosubsist between the wages of different employments, might be calculated to be due to personsof their class.

That income would, in general, be adequateto the purpose of

Documents

Lecture on Poor Law