Lecture Four Power in International Politics

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    Power in International Politics

    State Power/Power PoliticsBalance of Power

    International Systems

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    Key Concepts

    Anarchy and self-help.

    The security dilemma.

    Security dilemma within a society of states.Power Politics: whereas power is unequally distributed,each state must provide its own security, and whereasone states security is anothers threat, states

    continually vie for power to be secure.PP includes diplomacy, alliance, BoP, War, Peace,even IL and IO. Primacy is Power.

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    Types of State Power

    The form of PP changes, but the nature of staterelations remains the same.

    Great Powers have five features. (Roman, Napoleonic,British empires, USA/USSR post 1945).

    Middle Powers: GPs value its resources, strategicposition and military value added. (Regional MPs:

    France, Indonesia).Small Powers: do not affect BoP (Netherlands), aremost insecure, can be flashpoints (Israel).

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    Nature of GP Power Politics

    Status Quo vs. Revolutionary GPs.

    Tools: national power, alliances, diplomacy. (Classical

    vs. Cold War: Structural Realism {K. Waltz})

    GPs may seek concert for world domination.

    GP may seek universal empire.

    Former GPs may be submerged in power structure ofsupplanter: Holland-England, A-H Empire-Germany,

    UK-US, ?USA-China?

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    End of Part I

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    Balance of Power: various meanings

    Historical/descriptive assessment of power.

    BoP not as conscious state policy but as a function of

    systems equilibrium.Grotian (Liberal) Balance: enlightened self-interestmakes near equilibrium a founding principle of thesociety of states (eg: Concert of Europe), used to limit

    conflict, grant compensation, and avert hegemony,eventually overcome war.

    Machiavellian Balance: BoP is inevitable. States onlyhave permanent interests: maintaining the scales in

    their favour. BoP is inherently unstable.

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    Realist Rules for BoP

    Always increase capabilities, but choose

    diplomacy over war. (Morton Kaplan)

    War rather than a loss in capabilities.

    Oppose preponderance by one GP.

    Avoid uncertainty of eliminating other GPs

    (Versailles, Gulf 1991) or allowing a new order

    not based on Power Politics.

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    Preponderance rather than Balance

    Preponderance of Power school of thought. (balances

    are unstable, benevolent hegemony is better {Cold

    War}, war is likely when hegemon declines orchallenger closes the gap).

    Hegemonic stability theory: hegemon underwrites rules

    of trade and diplomacy which creates stability

    Declining hegemons/stability causes war or systems

    change

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    Types of Structure

    Unipolar (tether pole). National or bloc power: RomanEmpire.

    Multipolar (merry-go-round). National power andalliances. (1648-1814 Europe), South Asia today.

    Bipolar (see-saw). National power and alliance blocs.Triple Alliance {Ge, It, A-H, 1882) and Triple Entente

    {Eng-Fr-Rus. 1907}, and Cold War.Each has its own type of dominant security problem:challenger/assimilation; shifting alliances;escalation/zero-sum conflict

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    Conflict Potential and Risk

    calculationDeutsch and Singer definition of stability (no dominant,

    all GPs remain, no large-scale war)

    Multipolar: potentially many conflicts, but alsocountervailing alliances and BoP holder.

    Bipolar: potential zero-sum and high risk of escalation,

    but more political control.(offset by ideology and MAD)

    Structure of IS is also contextual: rules of war and

    diplomacy change.

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    Todays International System

    Boundaries: global strong points

    Units: democracies vs. the rest

    Interaction: eco, pol, mil, cult.

    Structure: unipolar and multipolar mixed.

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    Complicating Factors

    Non-state actors and intrastate wars.

    Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Weapons of

    Mass Destruction (WMD).Trade blocs vs. WTO

    USA is not a traditional empire. It is a mixture of: primusinter pares, benevolent hegemon, globocop, and

    traditional GP.Triumph of Liberalism and instant communicationchallenges legitimacy of national interest and possibilityof limited war.

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    Conclusion

    Does the end of territorial aggrandizement mean theend of GP Power Politics?

    Does the presence of Nuclear Weapons mean the endof GP Power Politics?

    Does Globalization?

    Can regional or global organization (NATO/UN)

    prevent/overcome GP politics?Each GP has its own power and normative context.

    Todays Power Politics: The Role of one Hyper Power.

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    Future System Watch

    Will a multipolar MAD be as stable as the Cold War

    MAD?

    Will missile defence replace deterrence?

    Will WMD replace Nuclear Weapons?

    Will rigid trade blocs emerge from globalization?

    Will the state system weaken from quasi states andglobal economics?

    Will civilization/religion clashes replace inter-state war?