Lebanese Republic Judicial Councilwebtest.stl-tsl.org/x/file/TheRegistry/Library/BackgroundDocuments/... · Lebanese Republic Judicial Council Case file No.: 4/1994 Judgement No.:

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STL Official Translation

Lebanese Republic

Judicial Council Case file No.: 4/1994

Judgement No.: 5/1995

Date: 24 June 1995

Judgement

in the case of the homicide of Engineer Dany Chamoun,

his wife Ingrid Ilya Abdenour and their two sons, Tarek

and Julian __________________

Plaintiffs: 1. The National Liberal Party: their counsel Emile Assaf Nejm,

Antoine Toubia, Georges Chamoun, Abdallah Basbous, Jihad

Akl and Assaf al-Hashem

2. Mr. Ilya Abdenour and his wife Elsie: their counsel Assaf al-

Hasem

3. Ms. Tracy Dany Chamoun: her counsel Joseph Mikhael

4. The minor Tamara Jean Daniel Chamoun through her legal

guardians: their counsel Rishad Salameh

5. The Public Prosecutor‟s Office

Defendants:

Present

1. Samir Farid Geagea: his counsel Issam Karam, Edmond Rizk,

Edmond Naim, Moussa Bornus, As„ad Abi Raed, Valeran

Doussan Joust, Emile Rahme, Tony Mardini and others

2. Camille Hana Karam: his counsel Hana Geagea

3. Rafik Ghaleb Saadeh

Fugitives

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1. Ghassan Antoine Touma

2. Antonios Elias Elias, also known as Antonios Elias Obeid

and Tony Obeid

3. Jean Youssef Chahine, known as Asad

4. Atef Paulus al-Haber

5. Georges As„ad Feghali

6. Elie Jirjis Akiki

7. Jean Ghattas Samia

8. Naja Anis Kaddoum

9. Elias Georges Awad

10. Farid Salim Saadeh

On behalf of the Lebanese people

The Judicial Council, chaired by the First President of the Court of Cassation,

Philippe Khairallah, Court of Cassation Presidents Hikmat Harmouch, Georges Kassouf

and Hussein Zein, and Court of Cassation Judge Hassan Kawwas.

Following scrutiny and deliberation,

Having considered Decree No. 668 of 30 October 1990, which referred to the

Judicial Council the case concerning the attack on the internal security of the state that

occurred on 21 October 1990, resulting in the assassination of Engineer Dany Chamoun,

his wife Ingrid Ilya Abdenour and their two sons, Tarek and Julian, and entailing other

related consequences, and concerning all persons who were involved therein as

participants, inciters, accomplices or in any other capacity;

And having also considered the indictment decision issued by Investigating Judge

Mounir Hanine on 16 June 1994, the bill of indictment dated 20 June 1994 and the other

documents pertaining to the case:

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Chapter I

Referral and procedures

On the basis of the investigation undertaken pursuant to the indictment issued by

the Public Prosecutor‟s Office at the Court of Cassation on 19 November 1990 and its

subsequent indictment issued on 20 April 1994, Investigating Judge Mounir Hanine

issued a decision on 16 June 1994 in which he charged each of the following defendants:

1. Samir Farid Geagea, mother‟s name Marie, born in Bsharre in 1952,

Lebanese, apprehended on 24 April 1994 and still in custody;

2. Camille Hana Karam, Lebanese, mother‟s name Saydeh, born in Bazaoun in

1963, apprehended on 23 April 1994 and still in custody;

3. Rafik Ghaleb Saadeh, Lebanese, mother‟s name Josephine, born in Aamchit

in 1961, apprehended on 23 April 1994 and still in custody;

4. Ghassan Antoine Touma, mother‟s name Alice, born in Sboul in 1957,

Lebanese;

5. Antonios Elias Elias, Lebanese, known as Antonios Elias Obeid and Tony

Obeid, mother‟s name Marie, born in Miryat in 1960;

6. Jean Youssef Chahine, Lebanese, known as Asad, mother‟s name Marie,

born in Kfar Aabeida in 1962;

7. Atef Paulus al-Haber, Lebanese, mother‟s name Laure, born in Bsirrine in

1964;

8. Georges As„ad Feghali, Lebanese, mother‟s name Therese, born in Bdadoun

in 1964;

9. Elie Jirjis Akiki, Lebanese, mother‟s name Diba, 31 years old, born in

Hrajel (known as Al-Arnous);

10. Jean Ghattas Samia, Lebanese, mother‟s name Sarah, born in Aaqoura in

1968;

11. Naja Anis Kaddoum, Lebanese, mother‟s name Hana, both in El-Kfour in

1965;

12. Elias Georges Awad, Lebanese, known as Giuliano, mother‟s name Nadia,

born in Sin el-Fil in 1968;

13. Farid Salim Saadeh, Lebanese, mother‟s name Bahia, born in Deir el-Ahmar

in 1967;

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The last ten defendants were charged in their absence on 26 April 1994, except

for Elie Jirjis Akiki, who was charged on 30 Mary 1994; they are still fugitives from

justice;

They were charged with having participated, within and outside the Governorate

of Mount Lebanon on 21 October 1990, a date not subject to statutory limitation, in an

attack on the internal security of the state by wilfully and intentionally murdering

Engineer Dany Camille Chamoun, his wife Ingrid Ilya Abdenour and their two sons,

Tarek and Julian;

These offences are defined in and punishable under article 6 of the Law of

11 January 1958 and under article 945, paragraph 1, of the Criminal Code.

The Investigating Judge decided to assume that the defendants had arranged to

transport and use military weapons without a permit, which constitutes a misdemeanour

pursuant to article 72 of the Weapons and Ammunition Act, as amended.

He further decided to refer all the defendants to the Judicial Council to face trial

for the offences with which they were charged or of which they were suspected, to issue

an arrest warrant for all the accused and to hold them liable for the costs.

On 20 June 1994 the Public Prosecutor‟s Office at the Court of Cassation charged

the accused with the offences specified in the indictment decision.

The accused Ghassan Touma, Antonios Elias Elias, Jean Chahine, Atef al-Haber,

Georges Feghali, Elie Akiki, Jean Samia, Naja Kaddoum, Elias Awad and Farid Saadeh

failed to appear before this Council notwithstanding the notice given in accordance with

the rules, the adoption of decisions setting a time limit for their appearance, their

notification thereof and the expiry of the legal time limits, in accordance with the rules

laid down in articles 335, 336 and 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, whereupon the

Council decided to regard them as fugitives from justice and to try them in absentia.

Following the public trial in the presence of the accused Samir Geagea, Camille

Karam and Rafik Saadeh, and in the absence of the other accused;

Having read the records of the preliminary and preparatory investigations, and

having discussed them together with the other documents pertaining to the case;

Having questioned the defendants who were present and having listened to the

witnesses‟ testimony;

Having heard the plaintiffs;

Having heard the arguments of the Public Prosecutor‟s Office and the pleadings

of counsel for the defence;

Having heard the statements of the defendants who were present during the final

stages of the proceedings;

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And having taken cognizance of the written pleadings that were filed:

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Chapter II

Applications, pleadings and defence

I. Objections filed

Counsel for the defence challenged the prosecution and trial and presented the

following objections:

1. The Decree referring the case to the Judicial Council was issued by a

de facto Government since the lawful Government was that of General Aoun. The

Chamber of Deputies from which the Al-Hoss Government had been formed and which

had issued the Decree in question had been dissolved. The Council could reaffirm its

non-existence, thereby rendering its invalidation unnecessary.

2. The Judicial Council has absolutely no jurisdiction to try the present case.

3. The preliminary questioning pursuant to article 285 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure as well as the subsequent measures taken must be declared null and

void because the questioning took place before the defendants had arrived at the Judicial

Council detention centre and because the defendant Rafik Saadeh was questioned without

his counsel, Attorney Louis Helou, being present, although the latter was named as

counsel in the file.

4. Failure to apply article 268 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to

Attorney Louis Helou‟s client;

5. The invalidity of the decision by the Minister of Defence to incarcerate the

defendants in the Ministry of Defence, so that it was incumbent on the Council to order

that the defendants be held in ordinary prisons;

6. The obligation to halt the proceedings pending a decision by the state

Consultative Council on the defence challenge to Minister of Defence decision 742 of

30 June 1994 on account of the incommodious conditions in the place of detention and on

the ground that counsel for the defendants must be able to communicate with their clients

and prepare their defence under comfortable conditions.

7. The obligation to remove the plaintiffs from the trial on the ground that

the Council is a special court, so that a personal lawsuit cannot be brought before it under

public law. The Council rebutted the above-mentioned objections and the arguments

raised by the following rulings:

– Decision No. 5 of 3 December 1994;

– Decision No. 6 of 3 December 1994;

– Decision No. 3 of 28 January 1995.

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8. Attorney Naim argues that the National Liberal Party has no standing to

appear in these proceedings because it suffered no material or moral damages.

9. Mr. Geagea‟s action, should he be convicted of the charge against him,

falls within the category of war crimes, so that he does not incur responsibility.

10. It follows that his action is fully covered by the general amnesty

proclaimed in Law No. 84/1991.

11. Attorney Abi Raed argues that the previous interrogations of Mr. Geagea

should be declared null and void because they occurred in the Ministry of Defence,

because the Intelligence Department does not form part of the judicial police force,

because the record of the preliminary investigations was drawn up without a clerk being

present, because the investigations in question breached article 99 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, and because the request for legal assistance drawn up by Judge

Farihah was illegal since he was not an investigating judge in the case of the

assassination of Dany Chamoun. The records of his investigations and the records of the

preliminary investigations should therefore be excluded from the proceedings.

12. Attorney Hana Geagea argues that the investigatory measures taken were

unlawful and that their unlawfulness influenced the outcome of the investigation and the

confession of his client, Camille Karam.

II. The merits

1. The Public Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation demanded in his oral

arguments and his written pleadings that the defendants should be found guilty of the

offences set out in the bill of indictment and sentenced to death. The Council should

show them no mercy or compassion, since they had shown no compassion for those they

had slain and had shown no mercy to children and women.

2. Counsel for the defence argued as follows:

(a) These proceedings were instituted under extremely odd circumstances.

Some investigations were conducted by the Mount Lebanon investigating judge during

the weeks that followed the incident. Investigating Judge Hanine then took a number of

measures and suspended the investigation in July 1991. Why was the investigation

suspended on that date, given that the investigators had all available means at their

disposal to complete their investigations and reach a clear outcome?

The investigation was reopened three years later. Why was nothing done during

those years and why was the evidence left to be destroyed?

The file was reopened under very suspicious circumstances, giving the impression

of a fabrication.

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The bomb attack on the Church in Zouk allowed the parties concerned to combine

it with the Chamoun case against the members of the Lebanese Forces, to disband their

party and to arrest their leader in order to eliminate them from the political stage, because

it was Mr. Samir Geagea‟s political positions, directed against the authorities, that led to

his indictment and detention. It should be noted that separate case files relating to persons

other than Mr. Geagea had been opened and closed, and that open case files had been

dismissed by known parties whom nobody had arrested or prosecuted.

(b) Legal rules were not respected in the investigations conducted in this case:

It was the persons who conducted Samir Geagea to the Ministry of Defence on

21 April 1994 who interrogated him, while the summons was drawn up on behalf of the

Investigating Judge. Moreover, he was not questioned about the Church case but about

the Chamoun et alia case. The Intelligence Department had no status or authority, since it

is not a judicial police force and it had not received a request for judicial assistance in

conducting the interrogation.

Judge Farihah investigated the Chamoun case although he was officially

appointed to investigate the case of the Zouk Church bombing and his authority was

limited to that case. Mr. Samir Geagea had been questioned by the Intelligence

Department before and after his interrogation by the Investigating Judge. Moreover, the

defendants had been arrested without an arrest warrant and Judge Farihah had questioned

them as witnesses before they were questioned by Judge Hanine as defendants.

The bill of indictment was flawed by serious omissions and inconsistencies

because the judicial investigation had ignored established material facts, such as the time

of commission of the crime, and the type and number of cars that had come to the

building in which the late Dany and his family lived. There were also inconsistencies in

the testimony of those questioned during the investigation regarding the number of

perpetrators of the assassination, the weapons used, the number of injuries sustained by

the victims, and the person who opened the door of the late Dany‟s home.

The judicial investigation failed to examined and investigate many important

matters such as:

The driver of the non-local white Range Rover that was hovering around the

building of the late Dany prior to his murder.

The statement by the witness Hind Mughamis, who heard people knocking at the

window of her home on the ground floor of the Chahine Centre at about 3 a.m. One of

them inquired about Dany‟s home and the place where his guard was stationed.

The approach adopted by the Investigating Judge in his investigations was

unsound: he had failed to question Mr. Abdullah Azzam Alaa until 1994, although he

should have questioned this witness, who accompanied the late Dany, immediately after

the crime. He had also failed to question the person known as Fadi Abu Jawdeh who,

according to the witness Elias Maroun, had been instructed to booby-trap a car with a

view to killing the late Dany. Moreover, he had not attempted to ascertain why the

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Ministry of Defence had issued an order on 20 October 1990 requiring members of Dany

Chamoun‟s protection detail to come to the Ministry. Did the Lebanese Forces know

about the Ministry‟s order and decide to proceed with the assassination? Or did someone

else know about the order before the Forces and was that person responsible for the

assassination?

(c) Major omissions occurred in connection with the failure to broaden the

inquiry and also in the context of the acquittal evidence relating to the content of the

statements by the following witnesses:

Maroun Helou, Rachid al-Khazen, Youssef Ghalayini, Georges Sarkis, Chief

Warrant Officer Habib Salim, the two bodyguards Naji and Karam, Jeannette Boutros

and Nabih Nakhleh; the investigation failed to clarify some of the facts contained in their

statements;

Moreover, it did not occur to the Investigating Judge to question the French

Consul in order to ascertain what he knew about the night Dany spent at his place, during

which he had mentioned names and facts that could have shed light on the investigation;

he also failed to question Karam Karam and Nader Saker; and Abdou Saman claimed in

his statement that he had made preparations with a foreign party for the assassination of

Dany Chamoun.

(d) The Investigating Judge was not impartial in the findings set forth in the

indictment decision:

By selecting passages from some statements and interpreting them in a manner

that supported his aim and by disregarding the core content of the statement;

The statements in question were those made by Sheikh Rachid al-Khazen,

Mr. Gibran Tueni, Mr. Karim Pakradouni, Mr. Karim Abou Chahine and Mr. Fadi Saab.

Furthermore, the Investigating Judge questioned the witness Assam Zamar, Atef al-

Haber‟s uncle, who was present with his sister, Atef‟s mother, who wanted the

investigator to take her statement; however, he took a statement from Zamar but not from

Atef‟s mother. Moreover, he did not record Issa Chahine‟s statement about the chaotic

circumstances on the day when they broke into the headquarters of the security forces and

thefts had occurred.

He distorted some of the basic points that would have shed light on the

investigation. With regard to the vehicles and persons speaking a non-Lebanese dialect

who were roaming around in the vicinity of Chamoun‟s home, the Investigating Judge

concluded from these facts that it was the Lebanese Forces who had dispatched them to

conduct surveillance around Dany Chamoun‟s home. The same applies to the question of

the defendants‟ travel and the financial assistance paid to them, as well as to the content

of the meeting with Mr. Elias Hobeika.

(e) Some flaws also occurred between the publication of the indictment

decision and the beginning of the pleadings. The Church case file was produced before

the Chamoun file, which in the final analysis contradicts the Church file.

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The legal guarantee of client privacy was not respected.

The place of detention should have been under the supervision of the Judicial

Council. The trial proceedings are integrated and take place in a single context. If one

constituent element or link is flawed, the legality of the entire proceedings is vitiated.

Mr. Geagea was encircled in the courtroom. That constitutes a breach of the rights

of treatment of the accused before the criminal court, violating human rights and

adversely affecting the rights of the defence.

The treatment of witnesses outside the context of the courtroom has an impact on

the proceedings.

The external atmosphere had an oppressive and overbearing influence on the

proceedings. Most of the witnesses who appeared before the Council were scared; some

asked to be examined by a doctor and some requested protection.

(f) During the discussion of the evidence, counsel for the defence adduced the

following arguments:

The Investigating Judge relied to a large extent on the statements of the accused

Camille Karam, regardless of their truth or falsity, because his confession related to

himself, and his statements against the other accused in the same case are not legally

admissible as an avowal of their guilt but constitute testimony. Statements by one

accused against another invariably involve an element of doubt and suspicion and are

unreliable.

Camille Karam is the only link with the Lebanese Forces. Under no circumstances

can the Council rely on Camille Karam‟s statements. If the criminal court judge ruled on

the basis of his personal conviction, that conviction should have been based on

established and well-grounded facts leaving no room for doubt.

Camille Karam states that at 3 a.m. he met his companions and they split into

three groups, each with its own vehicle. There was a grey Mercedes 280, a sea-blue

BMW and another BMW. He had no idea what their assignment was and he did not know

where they were heading. He stayed close to the furthest car, while two others remained

close to the other two cars. He returned to the barracks during the night and went to bed.

It would have been impossible for Camille Karam to take part in the assassination

of Dany Chamoun, or else he may be lying or he may have participated in a completely

different operation, since it has been established that Dany Chamoun was killed between

6.30 and 7 a.m., i.e. after daylight.

The witness Kharyati said that he saw two BMW cars passing at 5 a.m. and their

number, colour and model were fully consistent with the descriptions of many other

witnesses.

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None of the witnesses who saw the killers in the basement of the building and in

the stairwell said that they were openly carrying weapons such as submachine guns and

transmitters.

The testimony of Khalil Salameh refuted all the conclusions that the prosecution

drew from the statements of Camille Karam.

That witness, at the sitting of 7 April 1995, stated that he had gone out on his

balcony with his family and that the armed elements remaining in one of the cars

indicated to them that they should go back inside, displaying the weapons they were

carrying through the windows of the car. Camille Karam contradicted those statements.

A link has to be established between the weapons issued by the Intervention

Barracks arms depot and those used to perpetrate the crime. The defendant Camille

Karam states that the group charged with its execution was composed of eight members,

while Saadeh states that he issued six weapons, five handguns and a submachine gun, all

of which were fitted with silencers. The link between the weapons issued and the group‟s

assignment is illogical and Camille Karam states that the Ingram submachine gun he was

carrying was not fitted with a silencer.

(g) The testimony of the defendant Rafik Saadeh shows that he was not

involved in the affair and that the Lebanese Forces were not involved either. He stated

that he issued weapons without knowing what they would be used for. When they were

returned, he did not need to clean them because they were clean and oiled and had not

been used.

(h) The charge relies on testimony from witnesses who relate what they heard

others saying. These accounts amount to hearsay and cannot be treated as evidence. It is

inadmissible to rely on weak and shaky evidence, and the witnesses in question are

particularly unreliable.

Fadi Saab gave evidence against himself regarding the party with whom and on

whose behalf he works, when he mentioned that the discussion came to a halt between

himself and Samir Geagea when he visited the latter in Ghadras, and that Geagea

summed up the matter with the comment: “We weren‟t the ones who killed Dany, don‟t

you know that?” The witness got the impression that Geagea thought he was in the pay of

the Intelligence Department.

Walid Geagea is a suspect because of his very strong links with one of Samir

Geagea‟s arch enemies and he is also known to have deceived the Lebanese Forces on

behalf of his political adversary, i.e. Mr. Hobeika.

Hana Atik is mentioned in the American report regarding human rights violations

and his statement is unreliable. Molham Haddad‟s statement is also unreliable. They are

both members of the Forces who volunteered to give testimony with an unquestionable

aim in this case: the armed members of the Forces were being transferred from one

leadership to another, so that they could be under a person‟s orders and still take part in

his assassination.

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Is it reasonable for a person who took part in an operation described as secret and

organized to inform the first person he meets and with whom he has no close connection?

Walid Geagea‟s account was motivated by spitefulness and revenge because he

was imprisoned and beaten by the Forces.

He openly admitted that only the Shock Corps has the capability and equipment to

execute operations and that the task of the Intervention Company is to escort arrested and

wanted persons and to provide protection for senior members of the Forces, not to carry

out operations. He also confirmed that he went up to be interviewed at the Ministry of

Defence after receiving a telephone call from the office of Minister Elias Hobeika.

Tony Moussa retracted most of his statements before the Council.

Robert Abi Saab did not testify until 1994, when he was detained at the Ministry

of Defence. His testimony cannot be linked to the murder of Dany Chamoun. Moreover,

some witnesses lied quite shamelessly. For instance, Nayef Abu Otmeh told an incredible

story and even went so far as to tell the so-called Dekwaneh story, claiming that Dany

informed him about it some time around March 1990, whereas the facts relating to the

incident occurred in July 1990.

The testimony of Samir Abou Chahine is totally vacuous and obliterated by

Nadim al-Hanoun‟s statement.

The statements of witnesses such as Abdallah Azzam, Antoine Wazen, Georges

Sarkis, Assam Zamar, Abdou Saman, Simoun Kharyati and Khalil Wakim are entirely

devoid of credibility.

Antoine Wazen testifies that Albash Maroun told Dany about the Dekwaneh

incident, and Albash Maroun swears by God that he did not tell Dany Chamoun lest he

should report it.

Khalil Wakim‟s statement was refuted by Elie Erez before the Council.

The witnesses affiliated to the Lebanese Forces were questioned by the

Investigating Judge initially as witnesses and subsequently as defendants in disregard of

the relevant legal rules; as a result, a decision was issued prohibiting their prosecution

despite all they had done in return for the evidence given in their statement. They were

turned into witnesses after the decision not to prosecute them because they testified under

oath, the target being Samir Geagea.

If it was true that Dany Chamoun was targeted by threats from the Lebanese

Forces, why did he say nothing about it, or why was it not revealed at least to his friend,

Member of Parliament Sheikh Rachid Khazen, who came to take him and his family to

Kesrouan? Samir Geagea welcomed that fact when he was informed about it by Sheikh

Khazen.

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The witness Gibran Tueni could not have recognized the photo of Atef al-Haber

four years after the incident.

The person known as Mansourati who was accompanying him certainly knew

Atef al-Haber, since Mansourati was a member of the Lebanese Forces and of the

Security Department for more than ten years. But when he admitted the officer who went

to see Gibran Tueni, he failed to recognize him.

Youssef Ghalayini was interviewed on 2 May 1994 at 1.30 p.m.

The Investigating Judge began his questioning of Ghalayini on the same afternoon

and if the two records are compared, they prove to be identical, word for word.

– The Motorola equipment

This is not Forces equipment. Not more than seven pieces of Motorola equipment

were seized from the General Directorate of the Internal Security Forces, which is of no

use either for communication or for concealment. It is uncertain whether the Lebanese

Forces took the equipment from the Directorate Barracks, since many witnesses stated

that there was chaos when the Lebanese Forces broke into the barracks and that many

civilian groups also entered and stole most of the contents.

The witness Milad Helou says that he took note of everything that could have

been taken from the barracks of the Internal Security Forces. He had been given lists and

none of them referred to Motorola equipment. It follows that the fundamental point has

not been established.

The inquiry into the Motorola affair when it was discovered occurred under

suspicious circumstances.

Officer Aasy lied concerning the time and plan for the handover of the equipment

to the official investigators. Then the responsible officer in the forensic criminal police

force never reported the existence of the Motorola equipment and took no fingerprints.

There was no investigation into the Motorola affair for more than three years.

It was also established in the investigations, particularly through the statement by

witness Elie al-Hajj, that the Lebanese Forces returned and handed over the equipment to

the Lebanese authorities. The Public Prosecution Service was unable to establish that the

seized equipment was not handed over and whether the equipment was placed

deliberately to bring down the Lebanese Forces.

– The physical impossibility of leaving the area in which the Lebanese Forces

were stationed and reaching Baabda.

It has been established that the crossings still existed between the region

controlled by the Lebanese Forces and the regions held by General Aoun, and heavily

armed members of the Lebanese army were unable to travel in ordinary cars.

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Pursuant to orders given by the army leadership, no soldier in the Forces area

could cross over into another area. The Lebanese Forces had handed over their crossings

and checkpoints to the Lebanese Army.

All but four witnesses agreed on the presence of roadblocks, Syrian forces and

armed party elements, and on the climate of panic that prevailed at the time in the area.

The whole front was planted with mines and containers.

It can be affirmed with absolute certainty that it was impossible for any soldier to

leave the Forces area.

Someone from outside the territory is also inhibited by a psychological barrier

from committing a crime there.

– The perpetrators are locals

The late Dany, after joining General Aoun‟s front, was fighting on two fronts: the

Lebanese Forces front and the other front, which was allied with the Syrians. Both parties

thus had an interest in eliminating him, but those with the stronger capabilities on the

ground were destined to succeed.

The beneficiaries of the crime were those who wished to send a message to the

Eastern Region and to lay the Lebanese Forces and Samir Geagea open to suspicion.

– It was essential to allow those responsible for security in the Forces to

leave because of the natural hostility that existed between them and the people.

Those sent away were both security people and non-security people who went

abroad to seek a livelihood when they lost hope of finding employment in Lebanon.

– With regard to the accused Samir Geagea

Lack of criminal motive in the case of Mr. Samir Geagea:

Samir Geagea has a right to vie and compete with anyone he wishes and to

consider himself pre-eminent. Antagonistic relations developed over time among the

Maronites, and Samir Geagea is not to be blamed if he engaged in the contest for

primacy. It may not be inferred from this that he was determined to eliminate Dany

Chamoun. For instance, he wanted to become the head of the Lebanese Phalange Party

and when he failed to do so, he did not murder Georges Saadeh but returned to the Forces

Party to work politically for its organizational enhancement. He complied with the rules

and set legality above all other considerations.

It is not true that Samir Geagea planned to eliminate Chamoun because he

regarded him as a political obstacle on the Lebanese stage, especially within the Christian

component of the population. It was he who revitalized the Lebanese Front after the Deir

Aoukar bomb.

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The leadership of the Front was never assigned to the Liberal Party but to

President Camille Chamoun, because the principle was to entrust its leadership to the

former President of the Republic.

Following the retirement of President Chamoun and in view of the struggle within

the Phalange Party at the time between the Forces component and the traditional faction,

Samir Geagea had to bolster the Forces component by supporting Dr. Saadeh‟s leadership

of the Lebanese Front. He did not object to the fact that the Liberal Party continued to be

represented by Dany Chamoun.

As the National Liberal Party did not participate in the 1986 uprising, Karim

Pakradouni took over the deputy leadership of the Lebanese Forces because of his

involvement in the uprising.

The scale of Phalange representation in the Forces meant that the Liberal Party

could not be provided with funds equivalent to those allocated to the Phalange.

Moreover, the economization policy led to a reduction in the budget of all organizations.

Samir Geagea did not object when Dany declared himself a candidate for the

office of President of the Republic and he had no intention of opposing Dany‟s

candidacy. However, the Lebanese Forces had a clear-cut position regarding entitlement

to the presidency, namely that it should be accorded to a consensus candidate and that the

Lebanese Front should not field a candidate.

It may be noted as clear evidence that Dany Chamoun was not targeted by this

position that Geagea proposed that Dany Chamoun should lead the transitional

government after the end of Amine Gemayel‟s term of office, although Geagea

considered himself far more important than Dany Chamoun.

Samir Geagea‟s relationship with the Liberal Party was the best relationship

between a leader of the Forces and that Party. It paved the way for the unification of the

Liberal Party under the leadership of Dany Chamoun and the Party recovered proper

representation within the Forces.

The general political climate on the eve of 13 October 1990 did not permit the

Forces to give any thought to Dany Chamoun or his ilk, because greater worries prevailed

during that period on account of the entry of foreigners into what was formerly General

Aoun‟s area and of parties and organizations that had previously been hostile to the

Forces, the occupation of houses belonging to the Phalange, the physical liquidation of

supporters of the Forces and the violation of the agreements signed with them.

The broad Chamounist faction was represented at the time by Michel Sassine and

the Aounist faction was solely in the hands of General Aoun.

With regard to Dany‟s recent relationship with the authorities and their allies,

especially after the visit of Mr. Elias Hobeika, extreme hostility between the two men did

not bar them from forming an alliance.

- 16 -


The witness Maroun Helou stated that Samir Geagea said nothing against Dany

during the events. The witness Tawfik al-Hindi stated that Samir Geagea and Dany

Chamoun were on the best of terms. The witness Georges Antoine stated that Samir

Geagea had never reproached him for his relationship with Dany Chamoun.

The witness was very close to Dany and went hunting with him regularly. He was

a personal friend of Samir Geagea and never felt at any time that he was annoyed on

account of Dany.

Member of Parliament Al-Khazen rang Samir Geagea to tell him that there was a

strong possibility that Dany Chamoun would move to Kesrouan after 13 October 1990.

Samir Geagea replied that that was no problem. On the contrary, if Geagea planned to

take Dany Chamoun‟s life, he simply had to wait for the latter to seek refuge in

Kesrouan.

The murder of children proves that Samir Geagea has no connection with the

crime, for if Dany was a political obstacle, his family was not an obstacle, and the murder

of children indicates that the perpetrators were real criminals.

– With regard to the link between the Dekwaneh attempted assassination

and the Dany Chamoun operation:

The statements by the witnesses Maroun Khoury and Ghalayini are extremely

dubious.

Samir Geagea confirmed that an attempted assassination had been carried out, but

against the army officer Khamis.

The operation was invented by General Aoun‟s intelligence unit in order to rule

out the possibility of a meeting and prospective agreement between Dany Chamoun and

the Forces. It was well known that Dany Chamoun was in touch at the time with the

Lebanese Forces and was seriously thinking of taking up a different position from that of

General Aoun.

There was no link between the alleged attempted assassination in Dekwaneh and

the assassination of Dany Chamoun because the two operations occurred under different

political, military, security and popular circumstances. The operation of 30 October 1990

produced a completely different political, military and security set-up from that which

existed during the previous stage.

– With regard to the link between the Lebanese Forces and their leader

Samir Geagea

The case file contains no testimony or document that directly establishes the

responsibility of Samir Geagea.

- 17 -


If we assume, for the sake of argument, that some members of the Forces

participated in the assassination, we cannot conclude therefrom that Geagea participated

in the operation.

History is full of foreign infiltrations of security institutions.

In a case decided by the Lebanese Judicial Council, that of the assassination of

Mohammed Aboud, it was ascertained that the killer was driven spontaneously to commit

his crime in the service of his leaders from the Al-Ali family.

Assassinations throughout history have been attributable to the impetuous zeal of

many leaders and parties.

All leaders have fallen victim to affairs that were actually carried out by their

subordinates behind their backs.

In the present case, the witness Abi Tayeh says that during the war of elimination

one of the shock commandoes stole money from a lorry that was transporting funds from

a bank. The operation was carried out without the knowledge of Samir Geagea, who

returned the money as soon as he found out about the incident. He actually handed over

the thieves to the authorities.

The witness Roger Dib stated that the Lebanese Forces had been infiltrated by

suspicious persons.

The claim that Samir Geagea exercised absolute authority in the Forces is belied

by the evidence of the witnesses Georges Antoine, Raja al-Rasy and Pierre Daher, who

stated clearly that they enjoyed independence in the areas in which they worked, that they

never heard Dr. Geagea speak ill of Dany Chamoun, and that they were prepared to leave

the Forces and sever relations with them if they suspected that Samir Geagea or the

Forces were behind the assassination.

Even Robert Abi Saab stated that he had never felt that Geagea and the Forces

had the inclination or intention to eliminate Dany.

One cannot rely on the allegation that Samir Geagea once made some vague

statement to Ghassan Touma, and the expression reported by the witness Robert Abi

Saab, even if it is true, referred to Mr. Elias Hobeika and not to Dany Chamoun, as Samir

Geagea made clear when he was asked about it.

Furthermore, the reactions of the Forces‟ rivals and even their enemies were

similar to the reactions of the Forces. General Aoun stated more than once that Samir

Geagea had no connection with the murder of Dany Chamoun.

The person with the closest link to this case, Ms. Tracy Chamoun, said in her

book and in statements to the French magazine Paris Match that she knows her father‟s

killer, referring to a different party from the Lebanese Forces and its leader Samir

Geagea. Moreover, she paid a visit to the latter in 1993.

- 18 -


Dory Chamoun does not accuse Samir Geagea of killing his brother Dany.

One important fact is that the defendant Samir Geagea refused to leave the

country after the explosion in Our Lady of Deliverance Church in Zouk and before the

investigation into that crime, which led to the reopening of the investigation into the

murder of Dany Chamoun, although he had been urged to do so and despite advice from

the highest authorities.

– The law

Counsel for the defence, Attorney Edmond Naim, refers again to the statement he

had made in his oral pleading before the Council that the crime being dealt with in the

present proceedings is fully covered by General Amnesty Law No. 84 of 1991 because

it is incumbent on the Judicial Council to exercise its authority in interpreting the law to

ensure that the text is construed in a manner consistent with the logic of equality.

Attorney Naim demanded, in particular, that his client, Mr. Geagea, should be

acquitted of all the charges laid against him, arguing that article 3 of the aforementioned

Amnesty Law does not cover facts that are beyond the original jurisdiction of the Judicial

Council, as specified in article 363 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and that therefore

all the facts invoked in the indictment decision in support of the referral of Mr. Geagea to

the Judicial Council are covered by the amnesty. He reserved Mr. Geagea‟s right to claim

damages from the appropriate authority. He argued that the war between the Lebanese

factions between 1975 and 1991 was subject to the law and customs of war, that the law

of war permits the killing of one‟s enemy, that a politician who participates in political

fronts is regarded as a de facto enemy, and that the customs of war require that criminal

law should not be applicable to any acts that fall within the context of the waging of war.

The assassination of Dany Chamoun, his wife and his two children is not covered

by the terms of article 6 of the Law of 11 January 1958, which is defined in article 314 of

the Criminal Code. The present case is restricted by the referral decree and the indictment

decision, and it is not permissible for the Public Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation to

bring charges that are unrelated to the text of the indictment.

It follows that no account should be taken of the inference drawn in the

indictment decision from the statement of Robert Abi Saab.

– It is impermissible to adopt the theory of indirect complicity.

– It is impermissible to regard Mr. Geagea as a perpetrator or an inciter since

there is no material or non-material evidence of such involvement in the crime.

Moreover, it is impermissible to question Mr. Geagea as a criminal accomplice to

the offence with which he is charged in the absence of the conditions of criminal

complicity.

– Mr. Geagea, pleading on his own behalf, focused on a number of points

raised by his counsel in their pleadings and presented additional details as follows:

- 19 -


His detention was political and he had been detained under the harshest conditions

because he did not join in the national accord process. He referred to the assassination of

Sheikh Bachir Gemayel and the person accused of his murder, Chartouni, who was still a

free man in spite of his repeated statements to the effect that he had planted the

explosives that had led to the death of Sheikh Bachir. The political decision to detain him

was clearly intended to bring down the Lebanese Forces, and the timing of his release

from prison would be political.

He stated that the political atmosphere prevailing prior to the preparation of the

case file, at a senior governmental level, identified the perpetrator before he was tried.

Two days before his arrest, a television programme had shown pictures of Dany

following his murder and the presenter had commented, attacking the Lebanese Forces

while the images were being shown to the viewers, although the investigation had not yet

begun. She then proceeded to broadcast ordinary news. After 7 or 8 minutes, the

presenter suddenly said: “We have received many requests to retransmit the pictures of

the crime”, and they did so. The attitude in the press was more or less the same.

Everyone understood from this atmosphere what was required.

The witnesses told strange stories, all politically motivated, and nobody could

claim that a single word in the file was true.

Mr. Geagea referred to the basis of the case, repeating his counsel‟s comments on

the joint finances of the Forces and Dany Chamoun‟s candidacy for the presidency of the

Republic, stating that he was not in favour of the candidacy because it was impossible for

anyone from the Lebanese Front to succeed under the existing circumstances.

He also referred to his relationship with Dany Chamoun and his father, President

Camille Chamoun, and the friendly meetings that used to take place between them, and to

his attempts to move Ingrid, Dany‟s wife, away from Ashrafiyeh. He drew attention to

the statement by the witness Raymonda Nassif, Dany‟s secretary, who said that when

members of the Forces came to the Chamoun residence, the late Ingrid opened the door

and her first words were: “Does Samir know about this?”

Turning to the assassination, he challenged the authenticity of the witnesses‟

testimony, asserting that Dany Chamoun‟s guards had disappeared between Friday

afternoon and Saturday night, that they had not left because of an order issued by the

Ministry of Defence and that the Forces could not have known what happened.

Ghassan Touma did not go to Al-Sana building. The Forces did not take the

Motorola radio set to the crime scene but it was the radio that took the Forces there.

The Forces did not use such a radio because they had many more advanced

transmitters and the Motorola radio set could be intercepted. The conclusion that the

Forces took the radio was unsound and untrue. There might have been members of the

Forces who took radios and weapons for their own use, but that did not mean that the

Forces as an institution had taken them.

- 20 -


A month after the assassination of Dany Chamoun, Greater Beirut came into

being, so why had they not released the radio set at that time, when they could have

achieved what they wished?

The statement by Camille Karam could not possibly be true. He was not accusing

him of lying because he knew nothing about his circumstances.

If one examined the details, one found that his statement was untrue for three

reasons:

1. Was it possible to take a person of the stature of Camille Karam to the scene

of the crime without giving him any instructions?

2. Was it reasonable to entrust the commission of a crime of the scale of Dany

Chamoun‟s murder to the Protection and Intervention Division and not to the Shock

Squad, given that the members of the Stock Squad had attended a special training course

in America?

3. It was physically impossible for three cars to cross over from Ashrafiyeh to

other areas because the authorities were only allowing members of the army to use the

crossings. Geagea noted that many members of the Forces had travelled abroad because

of the security vacuum, the assassination of a number of senior members of the Forces

and successive waves of arrests.

The fugitive defendants had not shown up because they were afraid that they

would suffer the same fate as the others.

With regard to the charge that he had killed Chamoun because he saw him as a

political obstacle and a rival for the leadership, he said that those were not the motives for

the crime that occurred, and even if they were, he would not have killed his wife and

children.

Dany Chamoun had never constituted a political obstacle to him, or at least he

might have constituted an obstacle in 1988 or 1989 but not after 13 October when Dany

Chamoun was finished.

The people who constituted an obstacle were Dr. Georges Saadeh, Sheikh Amine

Gemayel and General Michel Aoun, and there was nothing in the case file to indicate that

any one of them had been the victim of an attempted assassination.

The theory of a single leader was applicable only in a state of war and in the

context of rivalry for influence in a military area, and Dany had not competed with him

militarily.

Geagea asked in his pleading: “When Dany Chamoun died, did Geagea become

the sole leader?” In response to the question by the Public Prosecutor of the Court of

Cassation as to why he had justified himself vis-à-vis Tracy Chamoun, he said: “When I

met her, I told her that the Forces had not killed Dany. The Public Prosecutor pointed out

- 21 -


that nobody was accusing the Forces at the time, but I said that this was my response

because Dory was inquiring through Malek about the Motorola and occasionally repeated

accusations directed at the Forces.”

It was simply a remark and a gesture.

In the final analysis, the case file had been drawn up in its present form in order to

crucify him.

Geagea concluded by demanding that he and his companions from the Forces

should be declared innocent of the charges laid against them.

– He further demanded that the other defendants, Karam and Saadeh, should be

declared innocent.

- 22 -


Chapter III

Decision on unresolved defence arguments

I. The status of the National Liberal Party as a plaintiff

Whereas it is indisputable that the National Liberal Party is an association with

legal personality under the law and that the victim was the leader of the Party, providing

it with cohesion and motivation by virtue of his status as the political heir to the late

President Camille Chamoun, the founder of the Party, a fact that is well known in

political circles and among the public at large;

It was also noted in the press on the day after the crime that “The assassination

calls in question the fate and future of the National Liberal Party”:

“As is well known, the Party has inherited its record and continuity from the late

President Camille Chamoun, and Dany was the sole legitimate heir to the Chamounist

political heritage.”

(Article by Georges Yassine in the newspaper Al-Diyar, an exhibit from the

submissions of Attorney Abi Raed)

As the Party suffered moral damages from the murder of its leader Dany, it has

the status and interest of a civil plaintiff in the public-law case against the defendants.

The argument challenging the Party‟s status and interest is therefore dismissed.

II. The amnesty

Whereas Mr. Geagea submits, in the oral and written pleadings of his counsel

Attorney Naim, that the homicide of Dany Chamoun and members of his family is

covered by the amnesty declared in the Law of 26 August 1991;

And that the exception provided for in article 3, paragraph 2, of the Law is not

applicable to it, notwithstanding its referral to the Judicial Council;

He argues that the crimes referred to the Judicial Council to which the exception

is applicable are only those which originally fall within the jurisdiction of the Judicial

Council, i.e. those set forth in article 363 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to which

articles 270 et seq. of article 336 [sic] of the Criminal Code are applicable.

The above-mentioned articles are not applicable to the homicide of Dany

Chamoun.

He demands that the exception be construed along these lines and on the basis of

the principle that the defending party should be taken into account in any interpretation.

- 23 -


Whereas article 3, paragraph 2, of the Amnesty Law states clearly that the

exception pertains to “crimes referred to the Judicial Council prior to the date of entry

into force of this law”;

Whereas there is no call for interpretation in view of the clarity of the text;

Whereas, in accordance with article 363 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the

case is referred to the Judicial Council by a decree of the Council of Ministers;

Whereas Decree No. 668 of 30 October 1990 referred to the Council the case

concerning the attack on the internal security of the state which occurred on 21 October

1990, resulting in the assassination of Engineer Dany Chamoun and his family and

entailing other related consequences, and concerning all persons who were involved

therein as participants, instigators, accomplices or in any other capacity;

Whereas the homicide of Dany Chamoun, his wife and his two children Tarek and

Julian is a crime referred to the Judicial Council pursuant to the provisions of article 3,

paragraph 2, of the Amnesty Law;

It constitutes an exception to the Amnesty Law;

And it is not covered by the amnesty, so that the contrary argument is dismissed.

Whereas it may further be noted that article 8 of the said Amnesty Law stipulates

that:

“Contrary to any other legal provision, all crimes of assassination or attempted

assassination of religious figures and political leaders committed prior to 28 March 1991

inclusive shall be referred by law, from the date of their commission, to the Judicial

Council.”

Whereas this article extended the basic legal scope of the Judicial Council‟s

jurisdiction laid down in article 363 of the Code of Criminal Procedure so that it covers

the crimes referred to in article 8;

Furthermore, whereas the Amnesty Law is a lex specialis concerning an internal

matter and not a public law or an international treaty relating to the specific matter in

question, which might give rise to an issue of precedence;

Whereas it is for the Council to apply the Law and not to discuss it or pay

attention to any criticism directed against it;

Whereas the basic crimes to be examined by the Council in this case constitute an

exception to the amnesty, the defence argument is devoid of merit.

- 24 -


III. The argument that the preliminary investigations were null and

void

Given that the Council, as an ordinary criminal court, is not a hierarchical

authority that hears appeals against a decision by the investigator and the investigatory

measures that led to the decision, it is not for the Council to monitor the propriety of the

measures in order to declare them null and void.

Even if it is assumed that the preliminary investigations were flawed, the

Investigating Judge dealing with the case reviewed all the investigations, thereby

remedying any defects in the previous investigations.

Moreover, the indictment decision taken on the basis of the investigations, which

is conclusive, nullifies such flaws, should any exist.

Furthermore:

Whereas verification is free in criminal cases and all available means may be used

for the purpose, and the Council has discretion to examine all elements of the case

provided that they are subjected to its absolute powers of assessment and provided that it

relies on what it deems to be relevant and what appears to be acceptable and convincing;

This Council has adopted such a procedure in previous decisions, including in the

recent past:

The decision of 12 April 1994: case of the homicide of the Antonios brothers in

Baabda;

The decision of 19 October 1994: case of the homicide of Naeb Omran Maaytah.

It may further be noted with regard to the facts:

In the light of Attorney Abi Raed‟s claim in his submission that the security

agencies investigated the case “without receiving a request for assistance”;

And as stated in the record instituting the investigation:

Investigating Judge Mounir Hanine issued a request for assistance on 23 January

1991 to the Director-General of the General Security Directorate, the Director-General of

the Internal Security Forces and the Army Intelligence Department, requesting inquiries

and investigations regarding the perpetrators of and accomplices to this crime and a

complete list of their identities and requesting that they should be handed over under

escort.

On 21 April 1994 a request for assistance was issued to the Army leadership,

Intelligence Department, whereby it was requested to conduct all investigations and

inquiries relating to the case of the assassination of Dany Chamoun and his wife and

- 25 -


children in order to obtain complete information concerning the identity and place of

residence of all persons named (Atef al-Haber and his companions) and of all persons

identified by the investigation as accomplices, participants or perpetrators, and, once they

were traced, to bring them in for questioning in connection with the above-mentioned

case and to communicate the outcome.

Furthermore, article 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires all official

authorities or officers who obtain knowledge in the performance of their duties of any

offence or misdemeanour to report the circumstances of the case to the public prosecutor

… and to communicate to the public prosecutor all information, records and documents

pertaining to the crime.

If the officers of the security agencies that received the request and subsequently

Investigator Farihah came across material during their search for the perpetrators of the

Zouk Church crime that was of interest to the investigation into the homicide of Dany

Chamoun, and this was recorded in the reports, all of which were referred to the

investigator, this did not vitiate the case and the subsequent measures taken were in

accordance with the rules.

- 26 -


Chapter IV

The facts of the case

On 15 January 1986 the defendant Mr. Samir Geagea carried out a military

operation in which he achieved victory over Minister Elie Hobeika, head of the Executive

Committee of the Lebanese Forces at the time. The latter was compelled to leave what

was known as the Eastern Region and seek refuge in Zahle with some of his supporters.

Mr. Geagea then took over the leadership of the Lebanese Forces without contest,

implemented a radical military reorganization programme and placed all components of

the Forces under the authority of persons who had a special and close relationship with

the leader, serving him devotedly and faithfully carrying out his orders.

The defendant Ghassan Touma headed the Security Department with his assistant,

the other defendant Tony Obeid. The two men had been companions of Mr. Geagea for

many years and had endured hardship and adversity with him since his time as leader of

the Forces‟ northern front in Deir al-Qattara.

After the 15 January 1986 operation, the Lebanese Front, composed of leaders of

political parties and movements, expanded. The late Dany Chamoun, the defendant Samir

Geagea, Gibran Tueni and others joined the Front.

Early on, a form of alliance existed between the late Dany and Mr. Geagea, since

they had a single political position. However, subsequent developments led to a

divergence of views between Dany and the Forces on many questions relating to politics,

the administration of the Eastern Region and the treatment of the Liberal Party, which

had been led by the late Dany since 1985.

Relations between them began to deteriorate. When the office of leader of the

Lebanese Front fell vacant after the death of the late President Camille Chamoun, the late

Dany felt that custom dictated that he should lead the Front, since the Lebanese Forces

were led by a Phalangist. But Mr. Geagea supported the candidacy of the Phalangist

Georges Saadeh, preventing the late Dany from becoming the leader of the Front. This

gave rise to a certain amount of touchiness between the two men, but that did not prevent

Mr. Geagea from nominating the late Dany in 1988 to head the transitional government

after the end of Sheikh Amine Gemayel‟s term of office.

The crisis between Geagea and Chamoun escalated in 1989 when clashes broke

out between the Army and the armed members of the Forces. The late Dany Chamoun

sided with the Army and this had a major impact on Mr. Geagea‟s state of mind, since he

felt that it was the duty of all leaders in the Eastern Region to coordinate with him at all

times and to stand by him, or at least to remain neutral, especially since the military,

social, financial and political status of the Lebanese Forces had been considerably

enhanced under his leadership.

A state of aversion and loathing prevailed between Dany Chamoun and Samir

Geagea during the war between the Lebanese Forces and the Army that began on

- 27 -


31 January 1990. As a result, when the clashes began, the Lebanese Forces occupied the

headquarters of the National Liberal Party in the Al-Sana building in Ashrafiyeh and a

team led by Khalil Wakim, the head of the East Beirut Security Division, raided the home

of Dany and former President Camille Chamoun, confiscating some of the property and

arresting some of the guards.

The Lebanese Forces also targeted those who were allied to and supported

General Aoun. A group of them occupied the premises of Al-Nahar newspaper in the

Akkawi district and it remained occupied for two years. A team also took over the

Guardian of the Cedars centres, arresting their leader Etienne Saqr and detaining him for

a month. Dany was prevented from returning to Ashrafiyeh after the clashes began and

had to live in his brother Dory‟s apartment on the fifth floor of one of the Chahine Centre

buildings in Baabda, where he was joined by his wife Ingrid and their two children after

about two weeks.

The antagonism between the late Dany and Mr. Geagea increased as the battles

between the Army and the Lebanese Forces escalated. In statements by the late Dany

against Samir Geagea published in the newspapers, he described him as harbouring

feelings of hatred against some people and as aspiring to become the governor of the

Eastern Region. Dany remained in the Lebanese Front after it was renamed the New

Lebanese Front and became its leader.

The Front adopted a number of decisions expressing full support for General

Aoun and condemning the conduct of the Forces, accusing them of carrying out the Nahr

al-Mott and Boustat al-Mathaf massacre and of deviating from their principles. It

instructed the members of the Liberal Party, the Guardians of the Cedars and Al-Tanzeem

to withdraw from the Lebanese Forces, and decided to dissolve the Forces and to transfer

their military equipment and materiel to the Lebanese Army.

Mr. Geagea knew that a large number of Lebanese, especially Christians, were

influenced by the views of the National Liberal Party, especially those of the leader of the

Party, the late Dany Chamoun, who grew up in the home of an old and venerated political

family, inheriting great popularity from his father, the late Camille Chamoun, in addition

to his personal record.

Mr. Geagea perceived the late Dany as a major obstacle to his ambitions to be the

sole Christian decision-maker and hence to control the Eastern Region. He therefore

decided to eliminate him, especially since he knew and all the evidence indicated that

General Aoun‟s day was coming to an end.

In July 1990 Mr. Geagea ordered his security departments to prepare an operation

to assassinate Dany Chamoun. Forces member Georges Khirat got in touch with Youssef

Ghalayini who lived in Bouar, counting on the latter‟s need for money, and asked him

whether he wanted to carry out the operation for a considerable sum of money. He put

him in contact with security officer Rafik al-Fahl who asked him to cooperate with the

Forces Security Department for the purpose.

- 28 -


Youssef Ghalayini pretended to accept after telling Maroun Khoury about the

matter. He informed an intelligence officer in the Lebanese Army and the latter asked

Ghalayini to proceed and come to an agreement with the leaders of the Forces Security

Department. So Youssef Ghalayini met with Rafik al-Fahl and Tony al-Amm, who

informed Ghalayini subsequently that he was Tony Obeid, head of the Protection and

Intervention Division of the Security Department. They accompanied him on 25 July

1990 to the security building in Karantina, where Tony Obeid explained to him what was

required, namely to assassinate Dany Chamoun and his companions. He specified a

location in the Dekwaneh district, Mar Roukoz, where Dany Chamoun used to hunt and

shoot. He was given a Renault car with a power of attorney in his name to use in driving

round and reconnoitring an appropriate site for the job. Ghalayini kept Maroun Khoury

informed and the latter passed on the information to the officer in the Intelligence

Department, who ordered him to proceed and keep in touch. Ghalayini then returned to

the security centre in Karantina, where Tony Obeid and his assistants prepared for him 20

kilograms of explosives with the requisite wiring and detonators, and gave him a 7 mm

military handgun fitted with a silencer. They concealed the explosives and accessories in

a Mercedes 280 which they handed over to him after showing him how to place the

explosives in the specified location. They instructed him to withdraw the battery used to

trigger the explosion if Dany Chamoun failed to show up. They also told him that his

assignment would be completed as soon as he placed the battery and explosives at the

site, and that someone else would trigger the explosion. They promised him a monetary

reward and informed him that the assassination would take placed on 5 August 1990. But

Ghalayini delivered the car to the Intelligence Department and an Army expert blew up a

quantity of the explosives after removing them from the car to a safe place. When

Ghalayini failed to return to the Security Department building, members of the

Department captured his wife Fabiola by way of revenge, keeping her in custody for

three and a half months, while he and his children escaped to Egypt with the assistance of

the army and returned after a month and a half.

After the failure of the 5 August 1990 bombing operation, the Forces Security

Department began to gather information about the late Dany. It asked the Security

Department officer responsible for reconnaissance in Beirut, Khalil Nicolas Wakim, for

information about the Coordination Bureau group, who supported General Aoun and one

of whose members was the late Dany Chamoun. Khalil Wakim entrusted Elie Iwaz with

the task and the latter provided him with details of the Chahine Centre, where the late

Dany Chamoun was living, about the buildings of which it was composed, the wall

surrounding it and the street leading to it. Khalil Wakim sent this information to the

Forces Intelligence Division after drawing a map showing the residence of the late Dany

and how it could be reached.

Then, acting on the orders of Tony Obeid, the head of the Protection and

Intervention Division, he called up the following members of the Division: Atef al-Haber,

Elie Akiki, Jean Samia, Naja Kaddoum, Georges Feghali, Farid Saadeh, Elie Akiki [sic],

Kamil Karam and others. These members were trained in Al-Houd al-Khamis port in

Beirut in using handguns and Ingram and Scorpion submachine guns fitted with silencers.

The defendant Rafik Saadeh, who had been appointed storage secretary by Tony Obeid,

- 29 -


was responsible for transporting the weapons and ammunition from the Karantina

warehouse to Al-Houd al-Khamis.

On 13 October 1990 Lebanese and Syrian armies entered the area of influence of

General Aoun and overthrew him, ending the war between the Lebanese Forces and the

Army. Moreover, parties and organizations whose political positions were opposed to

those of the National Liberal Party entered the region. The late Dany tried to show

flexibility in the new circumstances and met with Mr. Elie Hobeika, the leader of the

Waed Party, who was allied with the party that opposed General Aoun. He stated that he

wished to cooperate with all parties and he made contact with all the leaders.

Mr. Samir Geagea noticed that there had been a shuffling of roles and that the

political stage was now open to all. It seems, however, that the situation on the ground in

the two Metn districts was worrying him because Syrian National Party forces had

entered the districts as well as the followers of Mr. Hobeika, and he feared that the same

thing would happen in Ashrafiyeh.

Furthermore, Mr. Dany Chamoun was pursuing a new policy based on burying

the past and on openness and building bridges with the General Staff of the new

authorities. He began to forge closer relations with Mr. Elie Hobeika so that it was easier

for the latter‟s group to spread out among Chamoun‟s supporters. Moreover, the policy of

openness to the legally established General Staff and its institutions secured official

support for the areas that were loyal to General Aoun and Dany Chamoun.

All these new developments made it extremely urgent for Geagea to address them

if they were not in his interest.

He had to take steps, before it was too late, to deal with new and different

circumstances, imposing himself (i.e. Geagea) on the new political environment and

preventing his marginalization should that idea occur to anybody.

At the evaluation meeting convened by Mr. Geagea in Ghadras after the

13 October 1990 operation, the entry of the Syrian Nationalists and Elie Hobeika‟s

followers into the two Metn districts was discussed in the presence of Mr. Ghassan

Touma, the head of the Security Department, and the other department heads, including

Robert Abi Saab, the head of the Foreign Intelligence Department. The question of the

Assassination of Dany Chamoun was not discussed at the meeting, but it was not absent

from the mind of Mr. Geagea, who alluded to it after the meeting, without mentioning it

openly, in a private conversation with Ghassan Touma that was overheard by Mr. Abi

Saab, whom Mr. Geagea had asked to stay behind in order to give him a fax message to

send abroad.

The assassination plan was carried out by members of the Protection and

Intervention Division, who wore Army uniforms. The defendant Jean Youssef Chahine

was instructed to supply uniforms from among those looted by the Lebanese Forces when

they had occupied the Army barracks in Sarba. Jean Chahine went to Kesrouan and

- 30 -


dispatched a carton of military uniforms after telling Rafik Saadeh to be ready to pick up

the carton, which was to be transported by ship.

When the carton arrived, the operations room called to inform him of its arrival

and he went to pick it up and place it in the warehouse.

Three days before the murder of Dany, Tony Obeid, Jean Chahine and Atef al-

Haber picked up the carton containing the military uniforms and transported it to the

office of Georges Feghali opposite the warehouse in Karantina.

On the evening of Saturday 20 October 1990, the defendant Tony Obeid called

Rafik Saadeh and asked him to provide Atef al-Haber with Ingram submachine guns and

five handguns when he arrived at around 7 p.m.

At dawn on 21 October 1990, a meeting was held in the office of the defendant

Georges Feghali in the Protection and Intervention Division building, which was attended

by the other defendants, Atef al-Haber, Camille Karam, Elie Akiki, Jean Chahine, Naja

Kaddoum, Elias Awad, also known as Giuliano, and Farid Saadeh. Feghali told the

defendants that they must now execute the task for which they had been trained, i.e. to

assassinate Dany Chamoun in accordance with the plan, and that they must wear army

uniforms during the operation. He then distributed the military uniforms and the

weapons.

They left Karantina for Baabda in three cars led by Atef al-Haber, who was

wearing the insignia of a first lieutenant and was carrying a Motorola two-way radio – a

trade mark used by the official forces – as evidence of the official military status he

claimed for himself and his companions. The radio had been among the equipment looted

by the Lebanese Forces when they occupied the building of the General Directorate of the

Internal Security Forces on 4 February 1990 at the beginning of their war with General

Aoun. It had previously been in the possession of Security Forces First Lieutenant As„ad

Nahra.

When the group arrived at the specified location, Atef al-Haber parked the car 20

metres from the Chahine Centre buildings and the other cars parked behind him. Then

Atef al-Haber drove on and parked his car in front of the building in which Dany

Chamoun‟s home is located and the group got out of their cars.

At the entrance to the building Atef al-Haber met the concierge, witness Nabih

Aref Nakhleh. He placed his hand on his neck and ordered him to go upstairs with him,

after inquiring whether Dany Chamoun was at home. The concierge answered: “I haven‟t

seen him for three days.” Atef al-Haber was accompanied upstairs by Naja Kaddoum and

Elie Awad, who were carrying Ingram submachine guns and handguns fitted with

silencers hidden beneath their uniforms. Jean Samia and Georges Feghali took up a

protective position at the entrance to the building, while Camille Karam, Farid Saadeh

and Elie Akiki remained in the vicinity of the cars.

When Atef al-Haber and his companions reached Dany Chamoun‟s home, which

is an apartment on the fifth floor of the building, they told the concierge Nabih Nakhleh

- 31 -


to knock on the door. He did so and the door was opened by the maid, Jeannette Dakkash,

who first asked who was there. The concierge replied: “Open the door, Jeannette, it‟s

Abou Georges.” It was then around 6.30 a.m.

When Jeannette opened the door, where she had been joined by the two boys

Tarek and Julian, Atef al-Haber and Elie Awad entered and Naja Kaddoum remained

outside the door, telling the concierge to go back downstairs. The concierge went back to

his room at the entrance to the building.

On entering the apartment, Atef al-Haber asked for the late Dany. At that moment

the latter entered the living room and asked him what he wanted. He replied: “I just want

to have a word with you.” When Dany turned round to sit down with him in the small

living room, he suspected what was going on and pushed him away. They began to fight

and fell onto the couch. Elie Awad had told the witness Jeannette and the Sri Lankan

maid to go into the bathroom and he had pushed the two boys in another direction.

But the fight between Chamoun and Al-Haber and Kaddoum, the arrival of Ingrid,

Dany‟s wife, and the screaming of the children made it necessary to speed up the

operation. So Naja Kaddoum went inside to assist his two companions and the three of

them opened fire on Dany and his wife and also fired at the two boys, Tarek and Julian.

They then left the apartment and went back to their cars, returning to the security building

in Karantina, where they took off their military uniforms and returned them together with

the weapons to Atef al-Haber and Georges Feghali.

Atef al-Haber had forgotten his Motorola radio, which had fallen on the couch in

the small living-room while he was fighting with Dany. The radio was picked up by

Army First Lieutenant Hossein Aasy, who travelled to the site of the incident

immediately after its occurrence. He handed it over to the responsible officers in the

Internal Security Forces.

At about 5 a.m. on the same morning, 21 October 1990, Ghassan Touma and

Tony Obeid went to the “Al-Sana” building in Ashrafiyeh, where the operations room of

the Lebanese Forces Security Department was located. They did not leave the building

until 7.30 a.m., returning to the security centre in Karantina after being informed of the

success of the assassination operation that they had ordered.

The late Dany was shot fourteen times with 9 mm bullets; his wife Ingrid was

shot ten times with 7 mm bullets; Tarek was shot three times and Julian four times with 9

mm bullets. However, Julian did not die immediately but was taken to hospital, where he

passed away.

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Chapter V

The evidence

Whereas the acts attributed to the defendants and set forth in the chapter

concerning the facts have been established:

1. In respect of the defendants belonging to the Security Department of the

Lebanese Forces;

2. In respect of Mr. Samir Geagea;

On the basis of the following evidence:

I. Evidence concerning the defendants Ghassan Touma, Tony Obeid,

Atef al-Haber, Georges Feghali, Elie Akiki, Jean Samia, Naja

Kaddoum, Elias Awad, Farid Saadeh and Camille Karam

The fact that a group from the Protection and Intervention Division of the

Security Department of the Lebanese Forces composed of the defendants listed above

went up to the Chahine Centre in Baabda, where the late Dany Chamoun lived with his

family, and committed the crime described in the chapter concerning the facts on the

basis of instructions from their two direct supervisors, Ghassan Touma and Tony Obeid,

who had previously planned the operation, has been established as follows:

1. Statements by those directly involved in the incident - Camille Karam

and Rafik Saadeh

(a) Camille Karam

The defendant Camille Karam stated to Investigating Judge Mounir Hanine on

22 April 1994 that he is a member of the Protection and Intervention Company and that

he took part in the war of elimination on the Galerie Khabbaz front.

– That after General Aoun‟s takeover the Intervention Company withdrew to

Karantina;

– That the group was led by Atef al-Haber and Georges Feghali and joined by

Elie Akiki, Jean Samia, Naja Kaddoum, Elie Awad, Farid Saadeh, Fadi Saab and Francis

Akiki, and that his (Karam‟s) task was to undertake reconnaissance in the Metn regions;

– That, based on orders from Atef al-Haber and Georges Feghali, information

was gathered in the region of Broumana, Beit Meri and Bikfaya about roadblocks in

those areas and about places that he been destroyed, and a summary of the information

was provided to Atef al-Haber and Georges Feghali;

- 33 -


– That those two officers trained them to use 7 mm handguns in Al-Houd al-

Khamis;

– That Atef Al-Haber and Georges Feghali informed them after they had

completed their practice that they were to remain in the barracks;

– That very early on that day, at about 3 a.m., when he was guarding the

entrance to the barracks, the telephone near the control post rang and Georges Feghali

asked him to attend a meeting in his office in the barracks before daybreak. The meeting

was attended by Feghali, Al-Haber, Samia, Akiki, Saadeh, Kaddoum and Elie Awad.

Georges Feghali and Atef al-Haber informed them that they had a mission to

accomplish and that they had to wear Lebanese Army uniforms. They were given the

uniforms from a carton and put them on in the office. Al-Haber and Feghali also issued

them with Ingram 9 mm submachine guns and they each had a handgun except for Atef

al-Haber, Naja Kaddoum and Elie Awad, and the submachine guns were fitted with

silencers.

– It was then a little after 3 a.m., the dawn was about to break and it was not yet

light.

– The members split up: Atef al-Haber drove a secondhand grey Mercedes 280

with Farid Saadeh or Elie Akiki seated next to him.

He (Karam) travelled in a dark blue BMW 528 driven by Elie Awad (Giuliano)

with Naja Kaddoum seated next to him and Karam and Jean Samia in the back. A third

car, a BMW, was driven by Georges Feghali with Elie Akiki or Farid Saadeh seated next

to him.

It was Georges Feghali and Atef al-Haber who had supervised this distribution of

the members.

Al-Haber was also wearing a military uniform and had placed the insignia of an

Army first lieutenant on his shoulder.

– They drove to a region that he had never visited before. He learned, of course,

afterwards that it was Baabda.

– Atef al-Haber, who headed the convoy, parked his car 20 metres from one of

the buildings and the other cars also parked. Then Al-Haber drove his car forward and

parked it in front of the entrance to one of the buildings and got out.

– He recalls that when they left the Intervention barracks Al-Haber was carrying

a Motorola radio of the type used by officers of the Internal Security Forces. The others

then got out of their cars.

– Karam, Saadeh and Akiki remained in the vicinity of the cars and Georges

Feghali and Jean Samia stood at the entrance to the building. Al-Haber, Kaddoum and

- 34 -


Awad (Giuliano) entered the building. Al-Haber was carrying the Motorola radio and all

three of them were carrying Ingram submachine guns fitted with silencers.

– Karam continued: “After a short while, not more than a few minutes, Al-

Haber, Kaddoum and Awad came out, got into the cars, forming the same groups as on

arrival, and we returned to the location from which we had set out, i.e. the Intervention

barracks, where we changed from our military uniforms into sports clothing and retired to

our separate rooms to sleep. I shared a room with Elie Awad.”

– They handed over the submachine guns to Georges Feghali and Atef al-Haber

and kept their handguns.

– Elie Awad told him (Karam) the following day that the mission they had

accomplished had resulted in the assassination of Dany Chamoun and members of his

family, and he (Karam) heard the news on the radio.

– Elie Awad told him (Karam) that he had entered the apartment with Atef al-

Haber and Naja Kaddoum, and that they had carried out the assassination. He also told

him that Atef al-Haber had inadvertently left behind the Motorola radio that he was

carrying.

– Elie Awad told him (Karam) that the three of them had opened fire.

– He did not ask who had given the orders for the mission, but such orders were

issued by the Security Department headed by Ghassan Touma. Atef al-Haber and

Georges Feghali received their orders from Tony Obeid, who in turn received his orders

from Ghassan Touma.

– He insists that he did not hear any gunfire; there may have been screams, but

they did not pay much heed to them because they headed off at full speed.

– He informed Tony Moussa, his cousin, that a group of them had carried out

the assassination of Dany Chamoun. That was a week or just over a week later at his

sister‟s wedding, because they were close friends.

– It was customary to use silencers for assassinations.

On 6 May 1994 Investigating Judge Hanine summoned Camille Karam again and

questioned him once more in the presence of his counsel, Attorney Hana Geagea, and he

repeated the content of his first statement in his replies to the questions put to him.

It should be noted that the content of his two statements to Judge Hanine was

basically identical to his two previous statements during the preliminary investigation and

to Judge Farihah.

Before the Council, Karam repeated what he had stated during the previous

stages:

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– He was originally a member of the Intervention Company in Karantina;

– He took part in the fighting between the Forces and the Army at Galerie

Khabbaz;

– He returned with his companions to the Intervention Company in Karantina

after the fall of General Aoun;

– A group was formed, its members being Atef al-Haber, Naja Kaddoum,

Georges Feghali, Jean Samia, Fadi Saab, Elie Akiki, Farid Saadeh, Elie Awad and

himself (i.e. Karam);

– He would accompany the members of this group on reconnaissance trips to

the Metn region to gather information about roadblocks set up by the Syrian army and the

Lebanese army and about places that had been destroyed. They would pass on the

information they gathered to Atef al-Haber and Georges Feghali.

– He underwent training in the use of 7 mm handguns equipped with silencers

in Al-Houd al-Khamis with the same persons.

– With regard to the murder of Dany Chamoun:

– He had the job of guarding the barracks door.

– At about 6 a.m. he received a telephone call from Georges Feghali. He went to

his office where he found the men listed above except for Fadi Saab and Francis Akiki.

– Georges Feghali informed them of the mission that they were to accomplish

and told them to wear army uniforms for the purpose.

– The men were split up and assigned to three cars: a Mercedes 280 driven by

Atef al-Haber, with either Elie Akiki or Farid Saadeh next to him, a dark blue BMW 528

driven by Elie Awad with Naja Kaddoum next to him and himself (Karam) and Jean

Samir in the back seat, and a BMW 528 driven by Georges Feghali with another person,

“either Farid Saadeh or Elie Akiki”.

– They reached a built-up area and Al-Haber was the first to park, followed by

the other cars, at a distance of about twenty metres.

– Al-Haber, Kaddoum and Awad entered the building.

– Georges Feghali and Jean Samia remained at the entrance.

– He (Karam), Farid Saadeh and Elie Akiki remained in the vicinity of the cars,

in accordance with the role that had been assigned to them before they set out, which was

one of protection.

- 36 -


– After ten minutes they all came down, got into the cars and headed to the

barracks.

– On arrival they handed over their weapons and uniforms and went to their

bedrooms.

(b) Rafik Saadeh

Rafik Saadeh stated that the head of the Protection and Intervention Division of

the Security Department, the defendant Tony Obeid, instructed him about two weeks

before the fall of General Aoun to take over the Division‟s arms warehouse, in which a

number of submachine guns and handguns fitted with silencers were stored. He told him

at one point to transport some of the weapons and ammunition to Al-Houd al-Khamis,

where Tony Obeid, Atef al-Haber, Elie Akiki, Jean Samia, Naja Kaddoum, Elie Awad,

Georges Feghali and others practised firing the weapons, both with and without the

silencers. They came to him from time to time to obtain weapons and then returned them

after firing practice. Rafik Saadeh stated that during the period between the fall of

General Aoun and the murder of Dany Chamoun he was visited by the defendant Jean

Chahine, who told him that he was going to Kesrouan and would send him a large carton

by steamboat.

On the following day the Operations Room phoned him and asked him to go to

the port to pick up the carton, so he picked it up and placed it in storage. It contained

military uniforms. Prior to the murder of Dany Chamoun, he was visited by Tony Obeid

and Atef al-Haber, who were accompanied by someone he thinks was Jean Chahine, and

they took the carton to the building opposite the warehouse. On the night of the murder of

Dany Chamoun, Tony Obeid phoned him and asked him to provide Atef al-Haber with an

Ingram submachine gun and five 7 mm handguns fitted with silencers, and he did so.

The following morning, Atef al-Haber returned the weapons. Rafik Saadeh

mentioned that he had heard that day the news of the murder of Dany Chamoun and his

family, and that he had not asked Atef al-Haber what he had done with the weapons he

had taken in the evening and returned in the morning. He added that he had not noticed

whether the weapons had been used, that they were oiled and that he thought it possible

that they had not been used.

Rafik Saadeh provided the details set out above in three statements, the first on

22 April 1994, the second on 24 May 1994 before Investigating Judge Mounir Hanine,

and the third and last statement before this Council.

– The Council considers that the criticism directed by the defence against the

testimony of Camille Karam was aimed at secondary facts contained in his statements,

which were entirely inconsistent with the data stemming from the investigation, such as

Camille Karam‟s statement that he went on a security assignment with his companions

and returned before daybreak, whereas the crime was committed between 6.30 and

7 a.m., and his statement that the group of assailants travelled in three cars, one a

Mercedes and two BMWs, whereas the witnesses say that they saw two BMWs carrying

- 37 -


the attackers entering and leaving the Chahine Centre courtyard. According to the

statement by the witness Khalil Salameh who lives in the same building as Chamoun and

his family, he went out onto the balcony of his home and the armed men outside the

building signalled to him with their weapons that he should return inside, while Camille

Karam denies this fact.

The Council considers that the criticism directed by the defence against Camille

Karam‟s testimony does not invalidate the well-established basic facts that he reported,

inasmuch as the criticism is aimed at secondary facts contained in his statements that

were inconsistent with the basic facts, from which he did not deviate in any of his

statements.

His statement in response to a question that he went on a security assignment and

returned before daybreak is inconsistent with what he said in the rest of his testimony:

that he was called up at around 3 a.m., that he met the other members of the group and

that they left at dawn. That was consistent with the other evidence in the file and with the

fact that the crime occurred at about 6.30 a.m.

His statement that the group travelled in three cars, a fact on which he insisted in

all his testimony, whereas the witnesses at the site of the incident stated that the criminals

arrived in two cars does not affect the fact that the group travelled to Baabda and

committed the crime. It should be noted that, given the location of the roads in the

vicinity of the Chahine Centre and in front of the Chamoun building, cars arriving in the

area would not all be within the field of vision of the witnesses who testified about the

cars they saw in the area at the time of the incident.

Furthermore, the testimony was given more than three years after the incident and

memories of secondary facts depend to a large extent on the reliability of the memory and

attention of the persons asked to testify.

It should be noted that Camille Karam, when answering questions before the

Council, had the status of a defendant and that his answers must have been influenced by

that status, especially since he had relied on his insistence that he was unaware when he

went to Baabda that that was his destination and unaware that he was on a mission to

assassinate Dany Chamoun.

If follows that the argument raised by the defence in an attempt to invalidate

Camille Karam‟s testimony that it was a Forces group that travelled to Baabda and

assassinated Dany Chamoun and members of his family does not undermine this

evidence, since the main facts concerning which he testified from the preliminary

investigations until his questioning before the Council remain consistent and logically

interrelated, despite the fact that they confirm his involvement in the case, and cannot be

disregarded.

These facts are:

– That he executed a security assignment in Baabda in the company of specific

persons after training and preparations;

- 38 -


– At dawn on the day of the incident;

– That army uniforms and weapons fitted with silencers were used;

– That Atef al-Haber impersonated a first lieutenant;

– And that he carried a Motorola;

– That different roles were assigned to the members of the group;

– That the outcome of the mission was the assassination of Dany Chamoun and

his family.

These facts were confirmed, in substance, by the evidence amassed during the

investigation.

The Council will not dwell on the remark by the defence and Mr. Geagea himself

to the effect that Camille Karam was not qualified to accomplish a mission such as the

assassination of Dany Chamoun and that only the Shock Squad was qualified to

discharge such difficult assignments, since there is no evidence of the lack of competence

of the members of the group who were sent to Baabda to carry out their instructions,

which were not of a military or combat-related nature.

It should be noted that Camille Karam and his companions were members of the

Protection and Intervention Company and had engaged in combat on the battlefronts (for

instance on the Galerie Khabbaz front). They had been trained to use weapons in

Al-Houd al-Khamis in preparation for that particular mission.

– Moreover, with regard to the defence criticism of some of the content of Rafik

Saadeh‟s testimony, the Council considers that one cannot rely on the defendant Rafik

Saadeh‟s memory, three years after the incident, of the number of weapons distributed to

the group involved in the mission, whether or not the weapons distributed and returned

the same day had been used, and whether oil remained on some of the returned weapons.

It is uncertain whether the use of a weapon to fire a number of shots eliminates all traces

of oil on the weapon.

2. Information leaked by some of the perpetrators of and participants in

the crime to other members of the Lebanese Forces

(a) Fadi Saab

Fadi Saab, a member of the Intervention Company, stated that:

– On instructions from Tony Obeid, he was trained in Al-Houd al-Khamis in

using 7 mm handguns, 9 mm Ingram submachine guns and other submachine guns fitted

with silencers. The firing practice took place in the presence of Tony Obeid and with the

participation of Naja Kaddoum, Atef al-Haber and Georges Feghali, officers in the

Forces, and of Elie Akiki, Camille Karam, Elie Awad and Jean Samia. He, i.e. Fadi Saab,

- 39 -


had heard on the news, a few days after the fall of General Aoun at about 8 a.m., the

report of the assassination of Dany Chamoun, his wife and his two children. And he saw

Jean Samia and Naja Kaddoum “lounging on their beds in their underclothes”. He asked

them about the news and they replied at once: “We killed him or we wiped him out.”

Jean Samia told him after the arms training that there was a long list of persons

“that needs to be worked on through reconnaissance or by killing, who knows”.

He said that Gibran Tueni was on the assassination list;

That a group travelled to the latter‟s home for that purpose;

That the group included Atef al-Haber and Elie Awad.

A few days after the murder of Dany Chamoun, Fadi Saab read in a newspaper

that a fight had broken out between the deceased and the perpetrators. He asked Naja

Kaddoum about it and Naja told him that a fight had in fact occurred between Atef al-

Haber and Dany Chamoun and that Atef had opened fire on Dany and hit him in the

stomach.

Fadi Saab added that before the assassination of Dany Chamoun he had seen

Lebanese Army uniforms in a large carton in the office used by Tony Obeid for meetings

with members of the Protection Company.

(b) Walid Joseph Geagea, Molham Haddad and Hana Atik

– Walid Joseph Geagea stated before the Council that:

He trained members of the Intervention Company in November 1990 and one

member called Naja Kaddoum, a member of the detachment accompanying Tony Obeid

and of the Intervention Company, informed him during a break in the training that he,

Atef al-Haber and Giuliano were in the group that had assassinated Dany Chamoun.

Walid said to him at the time: “You‟d better not talk about the matter or you might harm

both yourself and others.”

Two days later, another member called Karam Karam informed him that Atef al-

Haber, Naja Kaddoum and Giuliano had knocked on the door of Dany Chamoun‟s home.

They were wearing Lebanese Army uniforms and when they got inside his home, Dany

Chamoun had fought with Atef al-Haber and both Atef and Giuliano had opened fire and

killed Dany, his wife and his two children. Atef had dropped a Motorola radio in Dany

Chamoun‟s apartment and they had forgotten to take it away.

Karam Karam did not tell him where he had obtained that information. According

to Walid Geagea, he informed Molham Haddad of what he had heard and they both

informed Hana Atik, who was surprised and asked Walid: “Are you sure of what you‟re

telling him?” Walid told them because they were his bosses. He also stated that he

continued fighting with the Forces under Samir Geagea and remained in their pay until

the end of December 1993.

- 40 -


Molham Elias Haddad stated before Investigating Judge Mounir Hanine on

21 April 1994 that Walid Geagea had said to him, literally: “Listen mate, it was the

Security Group that committed the crime of assassinating Dany Chamoun and his

family.” The Security Escort Group whom he was training told him about it and Walid

Geagea informed him that Atef al-Haber had fought with Dany Chamoun before he died

together with his wife and children.

Hana Youssef Atik confirmed in his statement before Investigating Judge

Mounir Hanine on 21 April 1994 and before this Council that he was friendly with Walid

Geagea who visited him frequently and that the latter said to him in 1992, word for word:

“Do you know, teacher, that it was the Touma group who carried out the operation to

assassinate Dany Chamoun, and that they sent Atef al-Haber out of Lebanon immediately

after the incident?”

Walid mentioned that he had heard this from the Touma group.

Hana Atik replied: “Walid, that‟s a dangerous thing to say, and if you‟re not sure

of it, you shouldn‟t say it.” And Walid replied: “As you wish, teacher.”

Hana Atik added that he was responsible for the men in the Lebanese Forces in

1992 and took part with Walid Geagea in the war of elimination against General Aoun.

(c) Robert Abi Saab

The witness Robert Abi Saab stated before the Council that he had received

reports, in connection with his work in the Intelligence Department of the Lebanese

Forces, to the effect that the Lebanese Forces had carried out the operation to assassinate

Dany Chamoun and that a Motorola wireless receiver had been left behind at the scene of

the incident. However, that information had not been confirmed.

Ghassan Touma was the head of the Security Department and Tony Obeid was

the head of the Protection and Intervention Division at the time of the assassination of

Dany Chamoun.

(d) Tony Moussa

Tony Moussa stated before Investigating Judge Mounir Hanine on 22 April 1994

and testified on oath before this Council that, in summary, Karam Karam had informed

him when the two of them discussed the incident that the persons who had taken part in

the assassination of Dany Chamoun were Atef al-Haber, Georges Feghali, Naja

Kaddoum, Elie Awad and Farid Saadeh, and that he had gone to the Intervention

Company on the day of the murder of Dany Chamoun and had seen Elie Awad standing

with Camille Karam. He had asked them in surprise why they were up so early and had

noticed that they showed signs of having been up all night.

Tony Moussa stated in his testimony to the Judicial Council that he met his cousin

Camille Karam at his sister‟s wedding in 1991.

- 41 -


Camille informed him during a conversation that it was the Forces who had killed

Dany Chamoun and when Tony Moussa asked him to explain, Camille Karam replied:

“We‟re the ones who killed Dany Chamoun.”

When Tony Moussa appeared again before this Council, he stated that Camille

Karam had merely said to him, literally: “Maybe it was the Forces who killed Chamoun.”

Tony Moussa added that he was scared when he made his statement to the

Investigating Judge although no pressure had been brought to bear on him.

(e) Maroun Maurice Ghanem

Maroun Maurice Ghanem testified to the Investigating Judge in the case

concerning the Zouk Church bombing and later before the Investigating Judge in this

case, Mr. Mounir Hanine, that in February 1992 he had accompanied Samir Geagea to

America as a First Lieutenant in the Lebanese Forces and personal escort to Samir

Geagea. About two weeks after their return, Molham Saman, the other leader of Samir

Geagea‟s convoy and escort, who slept in the same room as Maroun Ghanem, said during

a conversation with him, when mention was made of the Forces Second Lieutenant Atef

al-Haber, that Atef al-Haber was a big useless corpse because when he knocked on the

door of Dany Chamoun‟s home and the latter opened the door and said “I know you:

aren‟t you an army officer?” Al-Haber took fright, froze and lost his nerve, so that the

comrades who were with him accomplished the mission.

– No official authority was aware of the foregoing information, which leaked

from some of the perpetrators of the crime and was discussed among some members of

the Forces, and it only became known during the investigations into the explosion in Our

Lady of Deliverance Church in Zouk. The statements pertaining thereto cannot be

characterized as fabricated statements.

The defence challenge to the authenticity of these statements has no serious or

factual foundation, since the information was circulated between persons who were

bound to each other by close and friendly relations and solid companionship. It should be

noted that the persons concerned were long-time members of the Lebanese Forces under

the leadership of Samir Geagea and had served him faithfully in 1990, carrying out the

security assignments entrusted to them by Geagea or security bosses such as Ghassan

Touma or others, until after the murder of Dany Chamoun. Most of them fought on

behalf of the Forces in the war against General Aoun and their testimony is not open to

doubt.

The Council notes that it is not surprising that a person is unable to stifle an

important secret and reveals it to somebody close to him.

- 42 -


3. The fact that Ghassan Touma and Tony Obeid drove to the “Al-Sana”

building in Ashrafiyeh

The following is a summary of Tony Milad Moussa‟s testimony to Investigating

Judge Mounir Hanine on 22 April 1994:

He was previously a member of the Security Department of the Lebanese Forces,

serving as a driver in the convoy of the Department‟s chief, Ghassan Touma. About a

week after 13 October 1990, he was asked to perform guard duty at Ghassan Touma‟s

office in Karantina from 1 a.m. to 3 a.m. and at 3.15 a.m. Tony Haddad, Ghassan

Touma‟s secretary, asked him to come to Ghassan Touma‟s office with another member

and to prepare Touma‟s car. He was joined by Tony Faddoul and carried out the order. At

around 5 a.m. Ghassan Touma left the building with Tony Obeid and another person

called Amine, who was Tony Obeid‟s escort. Ghassan Touma got into his car and drove

it himself with Tony Faddoul seated next to him and Tony Moussa in the back seat, and

Tony Obeid got into his car with his escort and the two cars drove to the Al-Sana

building in Ashrafiyeh, where there is an Operations Room belonging to the Forces

Security Department.

Tony Obeid, Ghassan Touma, Tony Faddoul and Amine went into the building

and Tony Moussa stayed in the car.

At about 7.30 a.m. Ghassan Touma, Tony Obeid and Tony Faddoul came down

and they all returned to the Security Centre in Karantina. When Tony Moussa went to his

bedroom, he saw Amine, Tony Obeid‟s escort, with a radio and the latter told him that he

had heard on the news that Dany Chamoun had been assassinated. He then went to the

Intervention Company and saw Elie Awad and Camille Karam there. They showed signs

of having been up all night because they had red eyes and pale faces.

Tony Moussa gave the same testimony on oath before the Council but said that he

could no longer remember the times and dates.

– The Council finds that Tony Moussa‟s statement is admissible since the

investigators were unaware of the facts he related and he was under no pressure to

mention them if they were untrue, and that the statement by the witness Tony Faddoul is

unreliable. The latter testified that on the night of the murder of Dany Chamoun he was in

Jbeil, that he had not gone to the Al-Sana building in Ashrafiyeh and that he did not know

the building. The Council finds that his denial was motivated by a desire to evade

responsibility for giving evidence that might harm his former bosses.

The Council finds that Tony Moussa‟s statement constitutes evidence of a

meeting between Ghassan Touma and Tony Obeid in the Al-Sana building in Ashrafiyeh,

where there is an Operations Room belonging to the Lebanese Forces Security

Department, at exactly the same time as the Atef al-Haber group went to assassinate

Dany Chamoun. The sole purpose was to ascertain whether the assassination that they

had planned and ordered had been carried out, in accordance with the decision taken by

the leader of the “Forces”, the defendant Samir Geagea, as will be shown hereafter.

- 43 -


The Council‟s conviction is supported by the fact that it was no coincidence that

Atef al-Haber and his companions carried out the assassination and left the “Chahine

Centre” building in Baabda between 6.30 a.m. and 7 a.m. and returned to Karantina, and

that Ghassan Touma and Tony Obeid left the “Al-Sana” building in Ashrafiyeh at 7.30

a.m. and returned to Karantina.

4. The material evidence constituted by the Motorola wireless receiver

It has been established by the preliminary investigations conducted by Public

Prosecutor Tarbiyeh Rahmeh and the officers of the Baabda control post, as reflected in

record No. 302/464 of 21 October 1990, the investigations conducted by the first

investigating judge in Mount Lebanon and those conducted subsequently by Investigating

Judge Mounir Hanine, especially the statement by witness Ilya Abdenour, the late

Ingrid‟s father, the maid Jeannette Dakkash and Dany‟s chief bodyguard Georges Sarkis,

that the perpetrators left a Motorola wireless receiver at the scene of the crime. Ilya

Abdenour, the first person to enter Dany Chamoun‟s apartment after the assassination,

saw it and so did Red Cross representative Ahmed Khoury before the arrival of Army

First Lieutenant Hossein Aasy or any other officer. A media correspondent took a

photograph of the site, with the radio on the couch, in the presence of members of the

Red Cross.

When First Lieutenant Aasy picked up the radio, he handed it over to

Gendarmerie Captain Abdou Najim, the Assistant Commander of the Baabda

Commissariat, in return for a signed receipt from the Commander, Major Robert Jabbour.

It emerged subsequently from the investigations and the official records that the radio

seized at the scene of the crime was of the type used by the Internal Security Forces and

that it was issued to First Lieutenant As„ad Nahra in the Internal Security Forces, who

recognized the set from its number, the slightly bent voice key and a scratch on the upper

corner.

Lieutenant Nahra confirmed in his preliminary testimony on 7 November 1990

and in his subsequent testimony, most recently before this Council, that after armed

members of the Lebanese Forces broke into the headquarters of the leadership of the

Internal Security Forces on 4 February 1990, he had placed the aforementioned radio

with his official handgun in a cupboard in the criminal evidence storeroom. Captain Abd

al-Saater had also placed his radio there and they had locked the cupboard and the

storeroom.

They discovered that the armed members of the Forces had set up a barrier at the

main entrance to the General Directorate building, the purpose of which was to inspect

everyone who left the building. As they feared that they might seize the two radios and

handguns from them when they left, they placed them in the storeroom. On 7 March

1990, they returned to the headquarters and went to the criminal evidence office. They

found that the cupboard had been broken open and that its entire contents had been

stolen, including the two radios.

- 44 -


Captain Roland Abd al-Saater gave similar testimony, adding that he prepared a

report on the incident and submitted it through the hierarchy to the Director-General. The

two witnesses repeated their testimony before the Council.

The witness Issa Sarkis Chahine from the Forces Security Department testified

to the Investigating Judge that after the Lebanese Forces broke into the Internal Security

Forces Directorate, Dr. Jbeili, an assistant to the head of the Security Department

Ghassan Touma, asked him and others to go to the General Directorate of the Internal

Security Forces and gather equipment that could be used in their field of specialization.

The witness Georges Qessas, who is also a member of the Security Department,

stated that after the occupation of the General Directorate of the Internal Security Forces

he sent some of his staff to deal with the situation there, acting on a request from Dr.

Jbeili, Ghassan Touma‟s assistant.

The witness Issam Saman al-Khoury, a First Lieutenant in the Forces at the

time, testified that it was the Security Department, according to his information, that

broke into the above-mentioned Directorate because the break-in assignment had been

entrusted to it. He stated that the break-in and exit had been organized and that nobody

apart from the members of the Security Department had been involved.

The witness Georges Fourides, a Phalangist political officer in the Ashrafiyeh

area, stated that he had been informed that it was the Security Department that was

responsible for the break-in at the headquarters of the General Directorate of the Internal

Security Forces.

The witness Khalil Wakim, a former member of the Security Department

responsible for reconnaissance in Beirut, testified that the Internal Security barracks had

been occupied by groups from the Intervention Company led by Tony Obeid, that the

contents of the barracks had been seized and that the military police in the Forces had

arrested members of the Forces for seizing some articles, which were returned.

It may be concluded from the testimony of Issa Chahine before this Council that

there was chaos in the headquarters of the cooperative where the foodstuffs were stored.

Elie Mansour al-Hajj testified before the Council that he was responsible for

signal-corps weapons in the General Staff Department of the Lebanese Forces.

During the war he received wireless equipment taken from the building of the

leadership of the Internal Security Forces, including not more than ten Motorola sets

similar to the wireless that was seized and other equipment bearing the same trademark.

All the equipment was sent from the Fourth Division to the signal-corps building in Zouk

Mosbeh and it was not used until instructions were given to hand it over to the Lebanese

Army. It was handed over three weeks before the fall of General Aoun on 13 October

1990 to the Forces‟ Beirut operations centre in Karantina.

It has been established from the testimony of these witnesses that it was the

Forces Security Department that broke into the headquarters of the Directorate of the

- 45 -


Internal Security Forces, that it set up a barrier at the entrance in order to control the

situation, and that each member of the Security Department took whatever equipment

could be used in his field of specialization, acting on orders from Dr. Joseph Jbeili, the

security officer.

The Motorola wireless handset equipment and the fixed equipment were seized by

the Forces. A certain amount of chaos occurred in the cooperative centre at the

headquarters, and it was on account of the chaos that the foodstuffs were seized there.

It appears from the statement by the Army Chief Warrant Officer Michel

Najim, who was questioned by this Council, that communications handsets were not

handed over by the Lebanese Forces. The equipment that was handed over was all fixed

equipment.

The witness Raed Ali al-Hajj, who was responsible for signal-corps weapons,

testified that he inspected the equipment that was handed over and that it did not include

any communications handsets. Moreover, the defence failed to establish that the seized

equipment was handed over to the Lebanese Army.

The Council sees no ground to admit the defence argument that the radio was

deliberately left at the scene of the crime to bring down the Lebanese Forces because, in

order to admit such an argument, it would have to be proved that some person who did

not belong to the Forces had seized the radio from the building of the General Directorate

of the Internal Security Forces, although it has been ascertained that it was members of

the Forces who seized the fixed and hand-held communications equipment. It would have

to have occurred to the party who was attempting to bring down the Forces that a

gendarmerie officer would recognize the radio, and confirm that he had received it and

stored it in a cupboard in the criminal evidence office when he left the headquarters

barracks on 4 February 1999 after it was taken over by the Lebanese Forces. There is no

evidence that this could have occurred.

As a result, since it has been ascertained that the radio was still in the hands of the

Lebanese Forces until the time of commission of the crime, it follows that it was

members of the Forces who carried the radio to the site of the crime and this constitutes

evidence of the fact that they committed the crime.

Furthermore, the defence arguments regarding the radio are contradictory. It is

claimed, on the one hand, that the radio was not stored with the Forces but seized by

some of its members and, on the other, that the radio was returned with the other

equipment to the authorities. Moreover, it is sometimes claimed that they had radios on

the battlefront.

Two conclusions may be drawn from the foregoing: first, that the radio was in the

possession of the Forces and was still in their possession when the crime was committed;

and second, that the defence has been unable to prove the contrary.

- 46 -


Mr. Geagea‟s argument that a murderer does not leave evidence at the scene of

the crime fails because the radio was not left there deliberately but fell down during the

fight.

It may be added to the foregoing that Camille Karam confirmed that Atef al-

Haber carried a Motorola radio to the site of the crime and that, according to the

witnesses, he let it drop during the fight and inadvertently left it there.

The Council does not consider that the failure to record a description of the

Motorola and to specify the exact time and place of its delivery to the gendarmerie by

First Lieutenant Aasy has any relevance to the investigations and the conclusions based

thereon.

5. Evidence based on the planning and preparation of the assassination

of Dany Chamoun in Dekwaneh by members of the Security

Department of the Lebanese Forces

The witness Maroun Naim Khoury testified before this Council that one day in

1990 Youssef Ghalayini came to his place and told him that the Lebanese Forces had

asked him to place explosives in a shooting field, a place frequented by Dany Chamoun

and his group, including soldiers and civilians. They had been given a Renault car for

reconnaissance purposes and all the witness had to do was to inform Lebanese Army

intelligence. He took Ghalayini to meet Lieutenant Colonel Antoine Karim, left him there

and went about his business. Several days later Ghalayini came to see him and said: “I

have brought the car with the explosives.” The witness Maroun Khoury phoned Major

Karim in army intelligence and he turned up with a squad and a military expert. They

took the car to the old Beit Meri road and deactivated the explosives. The target was

Dany Chamoun.

Youssef Ghalayini testified that in July 1990 he had received a visit from a friend

called Georges Khirat of the Lebanese Forces in his home in Bouar. He asked him to

carry out an assassination in return for a large sum of money, since he had noticed that

Ghalayini was unemployed. Youssef asked for time to think it over since he feared the

consequences. He got in touch with Maroun Khoury, who advised him to pretend to agree

so that he could find out what they wanted him to do.

Two days later Georges Khirat came to his place and took him to see Rafik al-

Fahl, a Forces security officer in the Bouar region, who put him in touch with Tony al-

Amm. The latter took him to Karantina and gave him a Renault car for reconnaissance of

the area in Dekwaneh where Dany Chamoun went for shooting practice.

Ghalayini got in touch with his friend Maroun Khoury and informed him about

the matter. He in turn informed army intelligence and put Ghalayini in touch with them.

They instructed him to proceed with the operation.

Ghalayini returned to Karantina and Tony al-Amm – who later proved to be Tony

Obeid – and his assistants showed him how to use explosives and trained him for the

- 47 -


operation. They then gave him a Mercedes and indicated where the explosives had been

placed – behind the dashboard – and issued him with a 7 mm handgun fitted with a

silencer and a sight, and promised him a financial reward when he accomplished the

mission. On receiving the car he went to see Maroun Khoury, who accompanied him to

the intelligence branch, where he handed over the car and explosives to an army squad in

the Mar Roukoz area.

Youssef Ghalayini confirmed that the target was Dany Chamoun and added that

the army gave him a sum of money afterwards so that he could make the necessary

arrangements. He discovered afterwards that the Forces had arrested his wife Fabiola, but

the army managed to bring his children to him and they travelled together to Egypt.

The witness Georges Khirat confirmed that it was he who informed Rafik al-

Fahl about Ghalayini and that the latter allowed Rafik al-Fahl to take charge of his case.

The witness Lieutenant Antoine Karim confirmed the authenticity of the facts

reported by Maroun Khoury and Youssef Ghalayini, adding that he had blown up the

bomb placed in the Mercedes in the Louaizé region. The facts were also confirmed by

General Joseph Ghosn and Captain Nazih Akiki, the officers in charge of the Mount

Lebanon intelligence office at the time.

Captain Georges Nawar testified that he investigated the case and questioned

Youssef Ghalayini in writing. He submitted a report on the outcome of the investigation

to the leadership of the Mount Lebanon branch. At the time he was an officer in the

intelligence branch office in Mount Lebanon.

He added that Youssef Ghalayini was promised a sum of between twenty and

twenty-five thousand United States dollars by the Lebanese Forces if he managed to

assassinate Dany Chamoun, and a sum of ten thousand dollars if he managed to kill one

of the officers such as Capital Khamis, and that Maroun Khoury was cooperating with the

intelligence office.

Youssef Ghalayini‟s wife, the witness Fabiola Boayni, testified that the Lebanese

Forces captured her and began to question her about her husband‟s relationship with

Dany Chamoun. The person who ordered her arrest was Rafik al-Fahl and she learned

about the operation entrusted by the latter to her husband when she was released – three

months and twenty days after being arrested on account of her husband‟s failure to

accomplish the mission entrusted to him.

The defendant Mr. Samir Geagea declared before the Council, when asked

about this story, that when he heard about it he had asked his security departments and

they had answered that the car had been used in one of the operations targeting military

personnel, officers and others, and not Dany Chamoun, and that army officers had

publicized the operation as one targeting Dany Chamoun.

The witness Antoine Wazen in the Mar Roukoz district of Dekwaneh confirmed

that Dany Chamoun used to come to him for shooting practice and that Maroun Khoury

told him to close the club because the Lebanese Forces were going to send a car bomb

- 48 -


and blow it up in the club. He acted on the advice and did not receive anyone afterwards

in his club.

It has been ascertained from what was construed as an avowal by the defendant

Mr. Samir Geagea and from the statements of the witnesses listed above that the Security

Department of the Lebanese Forces made preparations for the assassination, primarily, of

Dany Chamoun and, secondarily, of the officers accompanying him and others. The

assassination was not executed because the person entrusted with the operation handed

over the explosives intended for the assassination to Lebanese Army intelligence.

6. Evidence based on the operation to gather information about Dany

Chamoun prior to his death

Khalil Nicolas Wakim testified to Investigating Judge Mounir Hanine that, since

he was the officer responsible for security and reconnaissance in Beirut, he was asked by

Nadim al-Ashkar, also known as Jean Najim, the head of the Mobilization and

Recruitment Section of the Forces Security Department, to gather information about

Dany Chamoun, Boussi al-Ashkar, Gibran Tueni and others from General Aoun‟s

Coordination Bureau, and to forward the information to the main centre. The requested

information concerned the location of the home of the person concerned, his work, where

he spent his time, the members of his family, the number of his car and a map of his

home.

With regard to Dany Chamoun, who was living in Baabda, hence in an area that

Wakim was unable to frequent, he instructed Elie Erez who lived in Hadeth and knew

where Dany Chamoun lived to pinpoint the location of Dany‟s home. Elie Erez was

absent for a time and then returned and informed him of the location. Wakim drew a

small map of the house‟s location and gave it to Nadim al-Ashkar about a month or just

under a month before Dany‟s death.

Elie Erez confirmed before Investigating Judge Mounir Hanine that Khalil

Wakim had asked him to gather information about the residence of Dany Chamoun, since

before General Aoun invaded the area he was living in Antonieh. He provided the

requested information and Khalil Wakim drew a map of the location based on the

information he provided. Khalil Wakim repeated the content of his statement before the

Council but Elie Erez denied that he had provided Khalil Wakim with information

concerning the location and residence of Dany Chamoun. He said that he provided him

with information concerning incidents that occurred in the vicinity and that the local

people knew him.

Elie Erez‟s retraction of his statement before the Investigating Judge is unreliable

because there is no convincing ground to justify his disavowal.

- 49 -


7. Evidence based on the suspicious visit by Atef al-Haber and other

members to the witness Mr. Gibran Tueni

Mr. Gibran Tueni testified before Investigating Judge Mounir Hanine that Atef al-

Haber had come to his home in Beit Meri in the uniform of a lieutenant of the Lebanese

Army on the pretext that he was seeking reassurance of his safety. He placed his hands on

his jacket and did not shake hands. He stayed for two minutes and then left. The

lieutenant claimed that he was First Lieutenant Tony Eid from the fifty-first regiment.

When he made inquiries with a security officer attached to the first brigade in charge of

the Metn sector and the leader of the fifth brigade at the time, they stated that they had

not sent any officer to his home. Thirty-six hours after Atef al-Haber‟s visit, Dany

Chamoun was murdered. Mr. Tueni easily picked out the photograph of Atef al-Haber

from several photographs he was shown as the man who had impersonated an army first

lieutenant and had come to his office.

Mr. Tueni‟s escort, the witness André Michel Mourad, who was questioned by

Investigating Judge Hanine, pointed immediately to the portrait of Atef al-Haber when

the Investigating Judge showed him several portraits for identification purposes, stating

that he was the person claiming to be First Lieutenant Eid.

This statement was backed up by the testimony of witness Fadi Saab, who stated

that Gibran Tueni was on the list of persons to be assassinated.

Mr. Gibran Tueni stated that when Atef al-Haber turned up at his home, there

were two persons outside, one of them from the fifth brigade, and two persons inside the

house. The persons concerned were responsible for his protection and they were

suspicious about the real purpose of the visit.

After the assassination the two ministers Marwan Hamadeh and Michel Murr took

the view that his life was in danger and the army sent members of a protection unit to his

home. One week later he left Lebanon for France.

The witness Mr. Gibran Tueni repeated his testimony before the Council, adding

that his escort Dany Mansourati did not recognize Atef al-Haber and that there was no

evidence that he had known him before.

It may be concluded from the testimony of Mr. Gibran Tueni, the content of

which was confirmed by his guard Sergeant Tony Kaddissi, that he was also targeted by

the Forces Security Department on account of his hostile attitude to the Forces and that

Atef al-Haber and his companions had been unable to attack him because of the presence

of the guards.

8. Evidence based on the medical reports drawn up by the forensic

physician, Dr. Salim Nejm, and the related radiological images and on the

statement on oath by their compiler before the Investigating Judge;

- 50 -


9. Evidence based on the criminal evidence report and the related

photographs and on the record of the inspection of the home of the

deceased;

10. Evidence based on the forensic report concerning the analysis of 25

spent cartridges, seven bullets and four pieces of shrapnel found during the

inspection of the scene of the crime by the gendarmerie officers, as well as

a cartridge clip for a 7 mm handgun containing undischarged cartridges;

It may be concluded from the report that 19 spent cartridges and four bullets came

from a 9 mm gun, that five empty cartridges and three bullets came from a 7.65 mm gun

and that one empty cartridge and a bullet shell came from a 9 mm Parabellum.

11. Evidence based on the investigations as a whole.

Rebuttal of the defence arguments, comments and criticism regarding the

evidence pertaining to the defendants belonging to the Forces Security Department

(a) The question of the crossings and the inability of the Protection and

Intervention group to leave Ashrafiyeh

According to the statements of both Lieutenant Colonel Elias Saliba and

Lieutenant Colonel Nader Farjallah, members of the army led by General Lahoud

controlled three crossings leading to the Eastern Region with effect from 13 October

1990: Al-Fayyat crossing (Corniche al-Nahr), the Nebaa crossing (Es-Salomi) and the

Nahr al-Mott crossing (Al-Almaze). There was also a fourth crossing in the port towards

the Western Region without any army roadblock. The army was only responsible for the

three above-mentioned crossing points and was not responsible for the remainder. When

it took over the crossings from the Lebanese Forces, the Forces pledged that their

members would not use the crossings held by the army, because they had open posts on

the demarcation lines and internal roads and their own crossings.

This accounts for the fact that the Forces were still fully in control of the

Ashrafiyeh region after 13 October 1999. They had their own crossings connecting them

to the demarcation lines. Their members were able to leave and enter Ashrafiyeh via the

demarcation lines and there was nothing to prevent them from doing so. If the Forces set

up protective barriers, they could get rid of them or open gaps in them whenever they

wished.

The Council is therefore not convinced that it was impossible for the group of

members of the Protection and Intervention Company entrusted with the mission in

Baabda to leave the Ashrafiyeh area.

As to the question of access to the region opposite the area of influence of

General Aoun, this region fell militarily on 13 October 1990 and those defending it

against the Forces were called upon to take their orders from the new leadership, i.e. that

of General Lahoud, which was not hostile to the Forces. While some members hesitated

and did not join them immediately, remaining at their positions, according to the

- 51 -


witness‟s testimony concerning those at Nahr al-Mott, this does not mean that all posts

were still controlled by persons formerly under the orders of General Aoun or that they

were still tightly shut or under close surveillance.

The Council does not consider that it was impossible for the Protection and

Intervention group to find a corridor leading across the demarcation lines that were

located opposite the Ashrafiyeh region before the toppling of General Aoun and the entry

of the army of the Government resulting from the Taif Agreement and the Syrian army

into the region that had been under the control of General Aoun.

(b) The question of the roadblocks and access to Baabda

Captain Hossein Aasy testified before the Council that on the day when Dany

Chamoun was murdered, he was commanding a company of the Lebanese Army and was

based with his troops at the telephone exchange in Baabda Square. The official security

forces did not have roadblocks throughout the Baabda area and there were no roadblocks

controlled by unofficial armed elements on the roads in the area. It was therefore possible

for anybody to travel around in the Baabda area. This officer‟s testimony is reliable since

he was the top military officer in the region. Louis Karam testified that he lives in Hadeth

and visited Dany Chamoun in his home in Baabda after 13 October 1990. While there

were roadblocks manned by the official security forces, they were not fixed and when he

went to visit Dany Chamoun there were no barriers on the roads except for the roadblock

at Baabda Rond Point. He saw no armed men on the roads.

The witness As„ad Shofteri testified that security measures were not immediately

taken in the region in which the Lebanese and Syrian armies deployed. They were not

taken during the first week or ten days and the subsequent situation was confused.

Former Minister Roger Dib testified that it was a hazy transitional period and

quite chaotic.

The following is an excerpt from an article in Al-Diyar newspaper of 22 October

1990, a photocopy of which is included in Attorney Abi Raed‟s submissions:

“We hereby say to you all that although you have entered and deployed in the

region militarily and politically, you have left it without proper security.

“We hereby say to the Government and to the army leadership: General Aoun‟s

security units fled and have not been replaced. Why have you left the people at the mercy

of the wolves? … Where is the General Security Directorate, where is the Army

Intelligence Department and where are the nighttime army and combat patrols in the

region? And where are the security authorities who should replace those who fled from

their posts?”

The newspaper Al-Nahar of 22 October 1990 contained the following report on

the discussions at the summit held between the Syrian and Lebanese leaders:

- 52 -


“On the question of Greater Beirut, sources stated that the Lebanese and Syrian

armies agreed to speed up action to control security in the two Metn districts, with the

Lebanese Army taking over all security installations in the region. No unofficial armed

element belonging to any group will be allowed to operate there. Such elements will be

free to engage only in political activity.”

It may be concluded from the foregoing that at the time of the assassination of

Dany Chamoun the official authorities had not yet raised fixed security barriers on the

roads in order to control security in the region, a move that would have prevented the

Intervention Company group from reaching Baabda.

As additional evidence of this fact it may be mentioned that Atef al-Haber and his

companions were able to reach the home of Gibran Tueni shortly before the murder of

Chamoun, bearing arms and wearing Lebanese Army uniforms.

It should be noted that the Forces had sent out their members to undertake

reconnaissance in the region, particularly regarding roadblocks, according to the

testimony of Camille Karam, so that they had a clear idea of where the barriers were

located.

While the witness Brigadier General Nasr saw Syrian army roadblocks on the

Damascus road (Chevrolet, Sayyad traffic circle, Ministry of Defence crossroads), these

barriers were designed to protect the army‟s positions at those points. The same was true

of the position of the sixth brigade of the Lebanese Army at the Baabda traffic circle.

These roadblocks were not part of a security plan and no such plan had been devised.

(c) The question of Dany Chamoun‟s bodyguards

Some of the guards were from the army and others from the gendarmerie. They

were in General Aoun‟s region and under his orders when he was Prime Minister. They

were also serving as guards for Chamoun, who supported General Aoun. When General

Aoun was toppled, his followers were also defeated and were in fear of their lives. It was

reported that a number of his military officers took off their uniforms and concealed them

as well as their equipment, or else they threw them into the fields. It was only natural

under such circumstances that the military bodyguards would try to hide or move away,

depending on how frightened they were.

The question of the withdrawal of the guards is related to the general order issued

to all soldiers to join their units so that the new leadership could gather and exert control

over all members, giving the opportunity to those who had been under the orders of

General Aoun and in the areas under his influence to proclaim their allegiance to the new

leadership. The witness As„ad Shofteri testified, and his testimony was repeated by

Attorney Moussa Bornus, counsel for Mr. Samir Geagea, in his submission that:

“Minister Hobeika was surprised at the failure to take security measures in the vicinity of

Dany‟s home and told us that the army leadership had withdrawn the squad that was at

his disposal because it had no assignment from the lawful army.”

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It was therefore clear that after 13 October 1990 there was no longer any de jure

or de facto guard, in the strict sense of the term, protecting Dany‟s home, and Dany was

trying to obtain bodyguards from the new leadership.

Reference may be made to a statement by Dany Chamoun during an interview

with an LBC journalist, which was reported in the L’Orient-Le Jour newspaper on

23 October 1990. He said that Syrian and Lebanese soldiers had come to his home to

disarm his guards, so that he was now unable to travel to the Western Region to talk with

the Government (Abi Raed submission). The entire defence argument based on the

bodyguards thus fails.

(d) The question of the statements by Tracy Chamoun and others

Trace Chamoun‟s statements after her father‟s murder are not based on any

evidence and may be described as conjecture. They have no probative value nor have any

similar statements made by others.

(e) The question of the criticism directed against the Investigating Judge

in this case

This criticism concerned marginal issues and secondary facts which had no

influence on the investigation.

Doubts regarding the impartiality of the Investigating Judge are dismissed

inasmuch as they have no real factual basis.

(f) The question of whether pressure was exerted during the investigation

This claim has not been proved and is dismissed. The Council took pains to repeat

the questioning of all persons who were interviewed during the preliminary investigations

and by the Investigating Judge. It went even further and questioned anybody who seemed

to be able to assist in uncovering the truth. They were all permitted to testify freely and

the Council does not consider that those who testified before it presented fanciful and

untrue facts because they were under some kind of pressure.

II. Evidence concerning Mr. Geagea

Whereas the connection of the defendant Mr. Samir Geagea with the crime as the

person who took the decision and ordered its execution has been established from the

following:

1. The testimony of witnesses and the content of the defendant‟s own

statements

Mr. Karim Pakradouni, who was the deputy leader of the Lebanese Forces in

1989, stated that the Lebanese Forces were a military organization within which all

power and decision-making authority was vested in the leader of the Forces, Mr. Samir

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Geagea, and that the leader directed all constituents of the Forces through persons

appointed directly by him. At the time of the assassination of Dany Chamoun, Ghassan

Touma was the head of the Security Department, which was responsible for all matters

within Lebanon, and Tony Obeid ran the Protection and Intervention Division within the

Security Department.

The relationship between Ghassan Touma and Tony Obeid, on the one hand, and

Samir Geagea, on the other, was one of absolute allegiance based on a longstanding

struggle dating back to Deir al-Qattara.

The mandate of the Protection and Intervention Division of the Security

Department was to carry out the orders of the leader of the Forces.

He also stated before the Council that after President Amine Gemayel left office

the Forces took over the Metn region, which is President Gemayel‟s area of influence.

Some time afterwards Samir Geagea asked the witness Pakradouni to seek out President

Gemayel and tell him to leave Lebanon until the situation calmed down. So the witness

called President Gemayel‟s wife, Joyce, and said to her, literally: “Samir Geagea wants

you to leave, and my advice is that you should leave.”

Some time later President Gemayel left the country because he feared Samir

Geagea, who regarded President Gemayel as a political obstacle.

It was Samir Geagea‟s ambition to take over the Phalange Party.

The witness Pakradouni added that he was unable to recall any important incident

that was not in accordance with the leader‟s orders.

The witness Fouad Malek, who was Chief of Staff of the Lebanese Forces,

confirmed before Investigating Judge Mounir Hanine and before this Council that

something like the plan to assassinate Dany Chamoun and the actual assassination could

not be carried out without the knowledge and consent of Samir Geagea, given the way in

which Samir Geagea controlled the various constituents of the Forces, particularly the

Security Department, and his direct relationship with them.

He further stated that Samir Geagea had a particularly close relationship with

Ghassan Touma and Tony Obeid and that nothing could happen without his knowing

about it and ordering it. This was confirmed by the members of the Forces who were

questioned in this case.

The witness Fouad Malek further testified that when he visited the home of the

late President Chamoun to present his condolences some time after the incident, he met

Dory and offered his condolences. Dory told him that a Motorola radio had been found in

Dany‟s home which had been stolen from the headquarters of the Directorate of the

Internal Security Forces when the Lebanese Forces had stormed it. He did not accuse the

Forces of being behind the crime, but asked for assistance since he was anxious to find

out who had stolen the radio and left it deliberately at the scene of the crime so that the

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Forces would be charged with it. He wondered why they wanted to fuel a dispute

between him and the Forces.

The witness Malek put the question to Samir Geagea, and he replied that Dory

Chamoun was a “dimwit” and asked him to tell Dory that the Forces had lost plenty of

equipment on the fronts. Would someone who wanted to commit a murder leave evidence

at the scene of the crime? Everyone knew that it was Hobeika‟s group that had killed

Dany. Malek stated that Samir Geagea had sent away some Forces security officers who

knew of things that needed to be kept hidden and that he had provided them with the

funds they needed to leave the country, while persons who were unaware of security

aspects or other matters that might prove harmful stayed in Lebanon.

For his part, former Minister Robert Dib, who was formerly Secretary for

Internal Affairs in the Lebanese Forces, stated before the Council that Ghassan Touma

worked extremely closely with Samir Geagea and that they had a special and

longstanding relationship. The witness had no knowledge of any transgressions on the

scale of the assassination of Dany Chamoun occurring within the Forces. The situation

had escalated between Dany Chamoun and Samir Geagea during the war of elimination.

Engineer Maroun Helou, a member of the Lebanese Front and a

communications officer between the National Liberal Party and the Forces, testified

before the Council that Samir Geagea had plans to build an institution in which all

political forces would interact and that he aspired to head the institution. By virtue of his

responsibilities, he considered that all leaderships that followed the same political line

should remain constantly in touch and coordinate with him.

Geagea was trying to find a voice within the National Liberal Party that would

sponsor or support him, and he attempted to infiltrate the Party because he felt that a

large proportion of the Lebanese were influenced by the opinion of the Liberal Party.

The witness Robert Abi Saad, who headed the Foreign Intelligence Department

in the Lebanese Forces after Pierre Rizk (Akram), also testified that the real direct

decision-maker in the Lebanese Forces was Samir Geagea, that the Security Department

was directly under the orders of the leader of the Forces, that Ghassan Touma was the

head of the Security Department and Tony Obeid head of the Intervention Division, and

that Ghassan Touma had executive responsibility.

The witness Abi Saad added that, after the toppling of General Aoun on

13 October 1990 and before the assassination of Dany Chamoun, a meeting of heads of

departments of the Lebanese Forces had been held in Ghadras, the headquarters of Samir

Geagea, under the latter‟s chairmanship and in the presence of Georges Kassis, the

Phalangist leader in the Metn region, to discuss the consequences of the return of the

Syrian Nationalist Party to Metn. After they had all left except for Ghassan Touma,

Geagea asked the witness to remain behind so that he could give him a fax to send

abroad. Then Samir Geagea said to Ghassan Touma: “Have you done the job I asked

you to do?” And Ghassan replied: “We sent the lads out to do the rounds and I‟ll let

you know as soon as they return.” Samir Geagea then said: “Tell them to be quick

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because I don‟t want another Suleiman Frangieh coming to the region.” After that

Ghassan left the centre and some days later Dany Chamoun was assassinated.

The witness added that: “When the assassination took place, I made the

connection with what I had heard and assumed that we were the perpetrators.”

The defendant Samir Geagea stated to the Council that Jean Chahine worked

with Ghassan Touma and that Tony Obeid was responsible for Geagea‟s personal

protection before he joined the Intervention Company. It was, in principle, illogical for

Ghassan Touma to assassinate Dany Chamoun without referring the matter to the leader

of the Lebanese Forces. Members of the Security Department did not commit acts on

such a scale and he doubted that Ghassan Touma would become involved without his

knowledge in something on the scale of the murder of Dany Chamoun. The leader

determined general policy and it was inconceivable that members of the Security

Department would murder Dany Chamoun.

Many people, within the Forces and outside, inquired about the walkie-talkie

story and many were accused of Chamoun‟s murder, including the Lebanese Forces. That

was why he had tried to tell Tracy Chamoun something about the incident when she

visited him. And Tracy had replied: “You don‟t have to explain anything.” Geagea said

that he was sure that the radio had been placed there deliberately so that the Lebanese

Forces would be accused, because the Motorola had been taken from the Internal Security

Forces barracks. Samir Geagea added that a car had been sent out by the Forces to kill

one of General Aoun‟s officers whose name he did not know, but it was not true that the

car was sent to assassinate Dany Chamoun. He was referring to the Dekwaneh incident.

It may be concluded from the foregoing, from the remainder of the case file and

from the known facts that:

The Lebanese Forces are basically a military organization without legal

personality and without any link between its members or between the members and the

organization apart from the person of the leader. He alone has absolute authority and

those beneath him in the Forces hierarchy take their orders regarding security, military

and political affairs only from him. He is also in charge of the “Forces‟” finances, which

are held through persons with fictitious names (individuals and companies) from whom

he receives blank credit.

– The leader of the Forces, Mr. Geagea, placed the defendant Ghassan Touma,

who serves him with absolute devotion, in charge of his Security Department. Next in

line is Tony Obeid, who is no less devoted to the leader than Touma and was responsible

for the protection of Samir Geagea.

– The group from the Security Department headed by two officers from the

Department (Atef al-Haber and Georges Feghali) and composed of six other members

could not have travelled to Baabda and killed Dany Chamoun on the orders of Ghassan

Touma and Tony Obeid unless the leader, Samir Geagea, had taken the decision and

- 57 -


issued a direct order in his own direct interest, since his Security Department served as

his operational tool.

This fact supports the following findings:

First: The lack of a personal interest on the part of the perpetrators

It is beyond dispute that Ghassan Touma and Tony Obeid as well as Atef al-Haber

had no personal interest in killing Dany Chamoun. In doing so, they were serving the

interests of the leader and obeying his orders in order to ensure that their performance

was deemed to be satisfactory and that they would therefore retain their positions and

advantages within the “Forces” institution.

Second: The motive of the leader, Mr. Samir Geagea, and the benefit he

would reap from the elimination of Dany Chamoun

The motive is apparent from the deep-seated hostility between Geagea and

Chamoun, which led to mutual anathema:

Chamoun and his “New Lebanese Front” decided to disband the Forces.

Geagea barred Chamoun from engaging in politics on pain of being treated as a

criminal.

To gauge how matters stood, one merely has to read Geagea‟s statement to the

magazine Al-Maseera, which served as his mouthpiece (issue No. 260 of 22 October

1990), in an interview he gave on 15 October 1991, a few days before Chamoun‟s

murder. The publication of this statement was reaffirmed during the trial. It reads:

“… President Chamoun led the National Liberal Party … and suddenly President

Chamoun‟s son was „thrust‟ on the Party (a similar phenomenon occurred in the Phalange

Party). Alas, look at the damage done by leaders‟ sons to their country … In recent times

Dany has sold himself to the devil …”.

When asked what view he would take of those who sold themselves to the devil,

Dany Chamoun and Gibran Tueni, he replied:

“… If they want to give one hundred per cent support to Michel Aoun, let them

do so, that‟s better … But they must certainly not get involved again in politics. Their

involvement is a crime, it is certainly – most certainly – a crime.”

When asked by the magazine about their introduction to public life in the

Lebanese Forces and their political education, he replied:

“… The Lebanese Forces are a resistance movement … Dany Chamoun was there

amongst us, tormenting us, bothering us and destroying us, but we didn‟t publicize his

negative qualities … I was the one who carried Dany and Gibran on my back. Aoun came

and tempted them. They were small-minded people and went off with him to increase

- 58 -


their profits as though politics is a matter of profits and trading. You cannot do anything

about these phenomena. If you give birth to a son who doesn‟t live up to your

expectations, do you kill him?”

The attempted assassination of Gibran Tueni occurred just a few days after this

statement was made and Dany was assassinated on 21 October 1990.

For his part, Dany Chamoun, as leader of the New Lebanese Front which he

established and led, with Gibran Tueni as his Secretary-General, took decisions within

the Front that are of some relevance.

The Front took a number of decisions reflecting full support for General Aoun

and condemning the behaviour of the Forces, accusing them of committing the massacre

of Nahr al-Mott and Boustat al-Mathaf and of deviating from their principles. It

instructed the members of the Liberal Party, the Guardians of the Cedars and Al-Tanzeem

to withdraw from the Lebanese Forces, and decided to disband the Forces and to transfer

their military equipment and materiel to the Lebanese Army (testimony of Gibran Tueni

before the Council).

The matter was not confined to confrontation and mutual political recrimination.

The roots of the dispute went much deeper and affected Mr. Geagea‟s most cherished

beliefs and aspirations.

Mr. Geagea, who had assumed power over the “Lebanese Forces” in January

1986, sought to consolidate his leadership, exerting control over the members through a

hierarchical organization and obtaining secure funding sources by imposing exorbitant

taxes of various kinds. As he had the men, the weapons and the funds, it was he who

exercised control, using various slogans, in particular that of resistance and the security

of the Christian community above all else.

He took steps to ensure that nobody would dispute his leadership of the Christian

community and that no Christian leader would take any decision or position without first

consulting him and obtaining his prior consent (as may be gathered from the tenor of his

statements during the trial).

To that end, he sought to obtain control over the Phalange Party as a first step

towards becoming the leader of the Party.

But Dany Chamoun was a rebel and in 1988, when President Gemayel‟s term of

office came to an end, he actually announced his candidacy for the office of President of

the Republic without consulting Mr. Geagea, a fact that angered the latter. Tension

gradually escalated between the two men, reaching a point where Dany Chamoun did not

dare to return home to Ashrafiyeh when the “war of elimination” began on 31 January

1990. Had he done so, he might, at best, have suffered the same fate as Mr. Etienne Saqr,

who was placed under arrest by the Forces for a time and then allowed to leave. Gibran

Tueni also remained outside Ashrafiyeh. And then the events occurred at the offices of

his newspaper, in Chamoun‟s home and at the offices of the National Liberal Party.

- 59 -


Things remained bearable for Geagea so long as he possessed financial and

military power and was able to use them to maintain control by enticement and

intimidation over the Christian community.

But circumstances changed after the Taif Agreement and its provision for the

disbandment of the militias. Mr. Geagea wrote in his own hand during the investigation

into the case:

“One week after the operation of 13 October 1990, Engineer Dany Chamoun and

his family were assassinated, which was a transitional stage between two political eras.

Every effort was made in the Lebanese Forces to prepare for the stage that would follow

13 October, particularly in terms of its relationship with the lawful authorities, and to

build a political bloc with some weight in the new equation. One of the parties with

whom we were conducting an indirect dialogue was Engineer Dany Chamoun.” The

political bloc that Mr. Geagea wished to build would have to be under his leadership and

those involved would have to pursue a policy based on his theories. In particular, the

Christian leaders were either those who entertained good relations with Geagea at the

time (the Phalange Party and its leader);

Or those who had been toppled militarily and lost their freedom to engage in

politics and who were facing either prosecution or exile (General Aoun);

Or those who had left voluntarily years ago (Brigadier General Edde);

Or those who had been compelled to leave (President Amine Gemayel), on the

orders of Geagea himself and for fear of being assaulted (testimony of Mr. Pakradouni

and record of the Public Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation, Joseph Farihah, dated

11 October 1988).

As for Dany Chamoun, who had “sold himself to the devil and who was tiresome,

destructive and worthless”, according to Mr. Geagea‟s description, he had to be

eliminated as a matter of urgency under the new circumstances:

The war had ended;

The era of peace had begun;

The militias would be disarmed;

What was done prior to the disarmament could not be done afterwards;

That is to say, after the state had succeeded in asserting its authority on the

ground;

When that situation was reached, those bearing arms would all lose their

advantages.

And then Dany Chamoun would have a position in the Christian leadership:

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Because he was the only legitimate heir to the Chamounist political heritage of his

father, the late President Camille Chamoun;

He had been the leader of the National Liberal Party since the death of his father,

and a large proportion of the Lebanese were influenced by the Party‟s views;

And he was the leader of the New Lebanese Front, which was likely to attract

opponents of the Forces and its leader and hence the masses who had congregated around

General Aoun, fleeing from the Forces, their power and their conduct.

Furthermore,

Dany Chamoun and his companions in the Lebanese Front opened up to

adversaries of Samir Geagea and the Forces (the Social Nationalist Party, the Waed Party

(Hobeika) and the Progressive Socialist Party).

He also established links with the lawful authorities stemming from the Taif

Agreement.

He was destined to lead a broad Christian faction in which the new lawful

authorities would find the honest interlocutor and support that they needed.

Mr. Geagea would thus be marginalized and prevented from realizing his

ambitions.

This reveals the motives for the crime.

It also explains what Mr. Geagea meant when he said, as testified by the witness

Robert Abi Saab, “I don‟t want another Suleiman Frangieh in the region”, a

description applicable to Dany Chamoun and nobody else.

– Because both Dany Chamoun and President Frangieh were heirs to a

traditional political dynasty;

Whereas Samir Geagea was an ordinary citizen from a humble family. He and his

followers planned to get rid of the traditional political class and political feudalism.

As Dany Chamoun was on his way to becoming a prominent Christian

interlocutor;

Mr. Geagea‟s hopes of becoming the main Christian leader and the prime

Christian interlocutor vis-à-vis all domestic and foreign powers and authorities were

dashed.

These ambitions were reflected in his refusal to join the governments that were

formed after the Taif Agreement, basically because he would not agree to be just one

figure in the political equation, according to his statements during the legal proceedings.

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All of this motivated him to eliminate Dany Chamoun “speedily”, as he said to

Ghassan Touma, before the lawful authorities caught their breath, before the final

disarmament and before the enactment of the expected amnesty law, which he hoped

would obliterate all crimes committed prior to its enactment.

As is well known, political observers and analysts at the time were not unaware of

the foregoing facts and reasoning, based on the evidence in the file and the legal

proceedings. One of them, Mr. Georges Yassine of the newspaper Al-Diyar (a photocopy

of which is included in Attorney Abi Raed‟s submissions), wrote the following under the

title “Chamoun, the lawful authorities and the second assassination”:

“… The assassination of Dany Chamoun has put an end to the New Lebanese

Front, which was established during the war of elimination to support General Michel

Aoun and to build a political front composed of his supporters that would be the political

extension of his discourse. While the Front survived the departure of Aoun, it will be

hard for it to survive the death of Dany…

“The assassination also calls in question the fate and future of the National

Liberal Party. As is well known, the Party has inherited its record and continuity from

the late President Camille Chamoun, and Dany was the sole legitimate heir to the

Chamounist political heritage.

“The assassination spells the end of the political road for the Chamoun family

because the elder brother, Mr. Dory Chamoun, has decided for some time to stay away

from politics and the political morass…

“The main symbol of support for Aoun has been hit. After the latter sought

refuge in the French Embassy and after his military and political defeat, Dany was

physically eliminated in order to prevent his policy from enduring through him or

through the New Front.”

It may be concluded in the light of the foregoing that Mr. Samir Geagea was the

sole beneficiary of the assassination of Dany Chamoun, and this supports the conviction

that he was an accomplice to the assassination.

Third: This conviction is further supported by Mr. Geagea‟s own statements

to Ghassan Touma as reported by Robert Abi Saab.

The second Suleiman Frangieh to be eliminated was not Hobeika, as claimed by

Geagea, for the reasons set out above;

And also because Hobeika was not living in the region of the two Metns but in the

Western Region and he was secure there, especially from Mr. Geagea‟s attempted

assassinations, according to the testimony of witness Abdou Saman before the Council:

“Before Elie Hobeika left, the late Dany asked Elie Hobeika „Why don‟t we see you

around?‟ and Hobeika replied: „I don‟t come here often because we are afraid that our

brother Ghassan [he means Ghassan Touma] will hit us with a booby-trapped car, and his

arms are very long.‟”

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And because Ghassan Touma said to Geagea – who asked him after the Ghadras

meeting “Have you done the job I asked you to do?” – “We sent the lads out to do the

rounds and I‟ll let you know as soon as they return.”

The lads who were “doing the rounds” were the Intervention Company group,

including Fadi Saab and Camille Karam, and they had been instructed to conduct

reconnaissance in the two Metns region.

Camille Karam said … “A group headed by Atef al-Haber and George Feghali

was set up and they asked us to conduct reconnaissance in the regions. I remember that I

was ordered to carry out a reconnaissance mission with my companion Francis Akiki in

the Broumana, Beit Meri and Bikfaya region. We travelled without weapons and gathered

information about Lebanese army and Syrian army roadblocks and about places that had

been destroyed, and we provided the information to Atef al-Haber and Georges Feghali.”

Commenting on the reconnaissance missions, Fadi Saab said: “I remember one

day, when I was in Tony Obeid‟s office, hearing Francis Akiki or Georges Eid from Tony

Obeid‟s Department reporting that Massoud al-Ashkar had a large protection detail … On

two occasions, acting on orders from Tony Obeid, I obtained the addresses of persons in

the district between Mkalles and Hayek in Sin el-Fil. I was accompanied by Naja

Kaddoum. On another occasion in the Nakkash district I was accompanied by Digoul

Roukz.

The lads were therefore the above-mentioned and their companies.

The “rounds” were the reconnaissance trips on which they were sent.

The region was the two Metns and Elie Hobeika was not there.

The comparison between the region‟s political leader and Suleiman Frangieh is

accurate with respect to Dany Chamoun because he, like Suleiman Frangieh, was

influential in the northern region. Dany Chamoun had inherited Camille Chamoun‟s

influence in the Mount Lebanon region and in both cases the leadership was of a

traditional character. It would not occur to anyone, however, to compare Elias Hobeika to

Suleiman Frangieh in that context.

Lastly, the person who died two days after the incident was none other than Dany

Chamoun.

Geagea‟s words constitute evidence that it was he who ordered the murder of

Dany Chamoun.

Fourth: The conviction of Geagea‟s complicity in the murder of Chamoun is

supported by Geagea‟s method of eliminating his political opponents

The defendant‟s record of this type of conduct helps to shed light on his intentions

and on the method he employed in similar cases.

- 63 -


It was therefore useful to review past acts attributable to Mr. Geagea which

resembled the murder of Dany Chamoun.

(1) In October 1988 Mr. Geagea sent a message by word of mouth via

Mr. Pakradouni to President Amine Gemayel to the effect that he should keep out of

politics and leave the country at once.

President Gemayel called the then Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation,

Joseph Farihah, and informed him about the matter, asking him to place it on record. He

did so on 11 October 1988 and stated in the record:

“His Excellency the former President officially informed us of the following:

On the sixth day of this month, he heard from his Secretary that Mr. Karim

Pakradouni wished to meet him at his home and he refused.

He then heard that Mr. Pakradouni had telephoned his wife Joyce and asked her

for an urgent meeting concerning a very important matter. She agreed and met him at the

headquarters of the benevolent organization that she runs in Sin el-Fil.

Mr. Pakradouni informed her officially that Dr. Geagea had decided that President

Gemayel must leave Lebanese territory within two or there days. Otherwise he and his

family would be wiped out. He added that he, i.e. Mr. Pakradouni, had been instructed to

inform her of the matter because President Gemayel had refused to receive him so that he

could inform him.

The former President informed us that His Excellency the Prime Minister,

General Aoun, and His Holiness Patriarch Sfeir were aware of the matter and that he had

decided not to comply with the demand and to remain in Lebanon. He had decided to

report the matter to us officially, without asking for any measures to be taken, and to keep

the matter secret.”

However, President Gemayel subsequently relented and left the country, since he

had apparently been convinced of the seriousness of the message and the determination

of its sender, and he feared Samir Geagea. “Samir is scary”, as the witness Pakradouni

stated before the Council.

(2) Mr. Geagea admitted that he had ordered Ghassan Touma to pursue Elias

Hobeika in Zahle and to eliminate him.

Ghassan Touma got one of the priests to blow up the headquarters of the Greek

Catholic archdiocese in Zahle in order to kill Elias Hobeika during a meeting with the

Archbishop of Zahle, André Haddad, and others. But the attempted assassination failed

because the explosion occurred before those attending the meeting entered the area

designated for the meeting.

(3) Mr. Geagea ordered his men to blow up Elias Hobeika‟s car in Ashrafiyeh.

They did so and killed Mr. Hobeika‟s driver who was in the car.

- 64 -


All these facts illustrate Geagea‟s method of eliminating his political opponents.

Hence his plea that he does not regard political rivalry as a justification for murder is

untrue.

2. Evidence based on the attempted assassination of Dany Chamoun in

Dekwaneh

This attempted assassination confirms that Geagea had decided to eliminate Dany

Chamoun and lends credibility to the charge of murder laid against Mr. Geagea

subsequently;

Especially since the motives that prompted Mr. Geagea in summer 1990 to seek to

eliminate Chamoun had not receded but escalated, as shown above.

3. Evidence based on the fact that senior officers remained behind and

were then sent away with the necessary funds

The officers are Ghassan Touma, Tony Obeid, Jean Chahine and others.

Mr. Geagea was personally involved in arranging for their departure and it was he who

ordered that the funds should be transferred to them. Large sums were paid to Ghassan

Touma, and Geagea and his wife met him in Cyprus in summer 1993 and spent some

time in his company.

This treatment of the above-mentioned security officers was definitely not due to

their failure to serve Samir Geagea faithfully. Moreover, they did not leave without an

order from him and against his will.

The Council does not accept the defence argument that Samir Geagea welcomed

the move by Chamoun and his family to Fakra when he was informed of it by Sheikh

Rachid al-Khazen. It was easy for him to assassinate Chamoun when he came to

Kesrouan, because Sheikh al-Khazen confirmed in his statement to Investigating Judge

Hanine on 2 January 1991 that he had been unable to get in touch with Samir Geagea to

tell him that Dany‟s family wanted to come to Kesrouan. This is the statement that can be

relied upon because it is closest to the event. It may be noted that Samir Geagea himself

stated to the Council that he had no recollection of a call from Sheikh al-Khazen in that

connection. It should further be noted that the murder of Dany Chamoun in Kesrouan

would necessarily be carried out by the Forces, since Geagea did not wish to be openly

involved himself in this way.

4. Evidence based on the fact that Samir Geagea made no inquiries and

took no measures to shed light on the “Motorola” radio issue and the

accusations against the Forces

Mr. Geagea merely noted in one of his statements: “Let‟s wait for the

investigation, which we‟ll take very seriously. In my view, nothing will remain hidden in

the long run.”

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He made no inquiries despite the accusations that were being made against the

Forces. It would have been in his own interest and in that of the Forces to undertake such

an investigation in order to dispel doubts about them and about him, if they were really

not involved in the crime.

This is particularly true when one considers that clear and urgent questions were

being raised regarding Geagea and Ghassan Touma in this connection.

– Reference may be made to the previous testimony of Mr. Fouad Malek

concerning the questions raised by Mr. Dory Chamoun about the Motorola, who

requested a response from Geagea. Malek does not seem to have been convinced by

Geagea‟s response, since he did not communicate it to Dory Chamoun. It would not have

been difficult for him to do so, especially when they were both in the French capital and

met there for lunch.

– Moreover, Dory Chamoun put the same questions to Ghassan Touma through

the witness Charles Rostom, who, after consulting Mr. Touma on several occasions,

never obtained an answer and concluded that the latter was indifferent.

– The witness Robert Abi Saab testified before this Council (record No. 533)

that: “We obtained through our work in the Intelligence Department reports to the effect

that the Forces had carried out the operation and that a Motorola radio had been left

behind at the scene of the incident. We obtained the information through our intelligence

work.”

– The witness Fadi Saab stated the following before Investigating Judge Hanine

on 26 April 1994: “When I heard that Simoun Kharyati had been arrested in connection

with the Zouk explosion, I was afraid that Simoun might know about the murder of Dany

Chamoun and that Samir Geagea might be unaware of the fact that he knew. So I

discussed the matter with Samir Geagea, saying to him: „I‟m afraid that Simoun is aware

of the killing of Dany Chamoun and that he might implicate the Forces and implicate the

men.‟ And he replied: „We weren‟t the ones who killed Dany Chamoun, don‟t you know

that?‟”

The fact that Mr. Geagea made no inquiries about any of the questions raised after

the crime, especially about the Motorola, the Forces‟ connection with it through the

storming of the headquarters of the General Directorate of the Internal Security Forces

where it was located, and the transfer of the radio, according to Geagea‟s claim, to

someone outside the Forces so that it could be used as evidence against them and so

forth: all of this constitutes evidence of the involvement of the Forces and Mr. Geagea in

the crime.

Furthermore, Mr. Geagea‟s claim of possible infiltration of the Security

Department, allegedly by Hobeika or a person currently protecting Ghassan Touma –

according to the submission by Attorney Bornus – is a weak and unfounded claim. If

Geagea had really suspected infiltration, he would have conducted an inquiry. The fact

that there was no inquiry demonstrates the lack of seriousness of the claim. Moreover,

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Mr. Geagea‟s solid relationship with the group in his Security Department remained

untroubled: Ghassan Touma, Tony Obeid and even Atef al-Haber and his companions.

Suffice it to recall, as already noted, that the Department‟s senior officers remained in

their positions after the crime and that Geagea arranged to send them abroad to places

where they would be beyond the reach of Lebanese justice. Mention may also be made of

the friendly meeting between Mr. Geagea and his wife and Mr. Touma during a holiday

trip by the couple to Cyprus in late summer 1993.

With regard to the possibility of a spontaneous act of zeal, with members killing

Chamoun for their leader‟s benefit without his knowledge and without an order from him,

there is no evidence for this and it lacks credibility:

Because of the number of participants in the criminal conspiracy, the scale of the

preparations and training required for its execution, the precautions taken, the number of

persons (eight) who travelled to Baabda, an area outside the sphere of influence of the

Forces;

And, in particular, because the whole enterprise took place within a Department

that was organized on a hierarchical basis and headed by the leader of the Forces;

And also because Mr. Geagea himself stated that the leader of this Department,

directly subject to his control, could not have undertaken a mission such as the murder of

Dany Chamoun without the knowledge of the leader, i.e. Mr. Geagea.

The inadmissibility and lack of credibility of the idea of a spontaneous act of zeal

by the members is supported by the fact that Mr. Geagea undertook no inquiry and took

no measures in response to the accusations made against him and against the “Forces” –

as already demonstrated above – and by his ongoing relationship with the perpetrators of

the crime, the arrangements he made for their departure and the funds he provided to their

leaders.

Summary of the foregoing

(1) The Council is fully convinced, in the light of the facts and evidence gathered

and of the logical analysis thereof, that the crime was committed in accordance with the

facts established in the text of this judgement.

It is plain to the Council that all the arguments and questions raised by the

defence in this connection have failed to cast doubt on this conviction, which is based on

the ample and abundant evidence adduced. There is no need for further analysis or

investigations. Any such application, including the application for appointment of a

psychiatrist, is hereby dismissed.

(2) It is not true that the defence was prejudiced during the trial in a manner that

would render the outcome of the proceedings unsound.

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(3) The Council is required by the separation of powers to respect the limits of its

jurisdiction, and the last two authorities must refrain from discussing the decisions taken

by each one of them within its area of jurisdiction.

(4) The principle of equality between people cannot be invoked to prevent the

Council from trying a defendant referred to it, and from ruling against him if he is

convicted, on the ground that there are crimes whose perpetrators have not been

identified or other criminals who are still at large or whose prosecution has been delayed.

It follows that all such arguments are devoid of merit.

(5) As the facts have been established, it remains for the Council to consider the

legal provisions applicable thereto in order the impose the appropriate penalty on those

who are convicted.

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Chapter VI

The applicable law

I. Application of the law and customs of war

Whereas Mr. Geagea argues through the oral and written submissions of his

counsel, Attorney Naim, that the crime is not punishable under the law and customs of

war;

If we assume that the situation in Lebanon during the period prior to the murder

of Dany Chamoun can be described as a situation of war or civil war and that the norms

of international law pertaining to war and the customs of war are applicable thereto, all

related questions are unclear and call for closer scrutiny of Lebanese events and recent

developments.

Attorney Naim himself presents an article by a foreign legal authority, Eugene

Lucas [?], according to which the law of war is governed by two principles:

– The principle of necessity,

which justifies all violent acts designed to achieve the aims of the war provided that they

take humanitarian considerations into account;

– The principle of humanity,

according to which, since war occurs between states, acts of war should not extend to

non-combatants.

Whereas, based on these two principles, a prisoner shall not be killed, and a

person who has been rendered unable to fight or resist shall not be put to death;

And whereas, as noted in this case:

(a) The Lebanese Forces, under the leadership of the defendant, Mr. Geagea,

waged war with the Lebanese Army under General Aoun, who had held the office of

Prime Minister since April 1988.

(b) This war ended on 13 October 1990, i.e. eight days before the murder of Dany

Chamoun, with the defeat of General Aoun and the regular forces that were under his

orders, and the integration of these troops into the forces under the leadership of the new

lawful regime stemming from the Taif Agreement, to which the “Lebanese Forces”

proclaimed their loyalty, largely with a view to bringing down General Aoun.

(c) The late Dany Chamoun – who had stood by General Aoun politically in his

struggle with the “Lebanese Forces” – was one of thousands of Lebanese non-combatants

who supported General Aoun as the representative of the state against outlaws, militias

and those who imposed their authority on the ground by force of arms.

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He had no militia fighting the “Forces” and no military status or combatant role.

(d) Dany Chamoun and all those who sided with General Aoun and fought for

him belonged to the faction that suffered political defeat following the military defeat of

General Aoun.

He and the others sought protection, like any other losing faction, from a

confrontation which was characterized by violence and was decided by military means.

The rapid victory, which occurred within a matter of hours, gave rise to rumours

of the settlement of scores on a massive scale during the takeover.

Chamoun himself, as is clear from the evidence in the case file, sought protection

from the faction that had taken over politically and militarily. Thus, he appealed to the

President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the President of the Chamber of Deputies,

the head of the army and a member of the new political alliance, Mr. Elie Hobeika, for

protection by the lawful forces.

Whereas it was in these circumstances that Dany Chamoun, his wife and his two

sons were assassinated;

Whereas these murders, under the circumstances prevailing at the time, were not

required by the war of the “Forces” who are charged with this crime, since the persons

they targeted presented no military danger to them, especially since they benefited from

the outcome of the armed struggle which they had entered on the pretext of frustrating an

attempt to eliminate them;

Whereas there were thus no war-related circumstances of necessity that might

have warranted the killing of Dany Chamoun, his wife and his two children;

It follows that the murder of all those persons was an ordinary heinous crime,

contrary to all humanitarian principles, whether the purpose was to take revenge on a

person who had sided with the enemy, to eliminate a political rival in an area in which the

perpetrator aspired to uncontested leadership, or any other personal aim.

The argument pertaining to the norms and customs of war invoked to remove this

crime from the scope of the internal Criminal Code is baseless and must be dismissed.

Whereas it remains to consider the articles of the Code applicable to the crime:

II. The Criminal Code and the articles applicable to the crime

Whereas the defendants are being prosecuted under article 6 of the Law of

11 January 1958, article 549, paragraph 1, of the Criminal Code and article 72 of the

Weapons and Ammunition Act;

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1. Article 6 of the Law of 11 January 1958

Whereas this article stipulates that any terrorist act shall be punishable by a life

sentence of hard labour and shall be punishable by a death sentence if it leads to the death

of a person …

“Terrorists acts are all acts which are aimed at creating panic, which are

perpetrated by means of explosives, incendiary materials, poisonous or combustible

products, or contagious or microbial substances, and which are designed to bring about a

public emergency.”

While it may be true that the crime that is being prosecuted was intended and

succeeded in creating panic, it was not perpetrated by any of the means referred to in the

article, and the means used (handguns and submachine guns), the place in which they

were used, a private and closed apartment, and the persons targeted were not designed to

bring about a public emergency;

It follows that the crime does not come under article 6 of the Law of 11 January

1958.

2. Article 549 of the Criminal Code

A. The homicide of Dany Chamoun

(a) Concerning the defendants Atef al-Haber, Elie Awad and Naja

Kaddoum

Whereas it has been established from the investigations that the defendants Atef

al-Haber, Elie Awad and Naja Kaddoum jointly fired numerous gunshots at the late Dany

Chamoun, using military weapons fitted with silencers, and hit him in the stomach, the

chest and other parts of his body with 14 bullets, thereby causing his death, which

demonstrates their intention to commit homicide;

Whereas the perpetration of this crime was preceded by planning, preparation,

calm consideration and premeditation, and determination to proceed with its execution

after weighing the consequences;

Whereas the act thus undertaken constitutes the crime of intentional and

premeditated homicide defined by and punishable under article 549, paragraph 1, of the

Criminal Code.

(b) Concerning the defendants Samir Geagea, Ghassan Touma and Tony

Obeid

Whereas it has been established that the defendant Samir Geagea decided and was

determined to assassinate his political opponent Dany Chamoun, using the Security

Department of the Lebanese Forces under his leadership, which carried out his orders,

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and that he instructed the head of the Department, the defendant Ghassan Touma, to

make arrangements for the assassination. The latter told his assistant, the defendant Tony

Obeid, to carry out the mission and Tony Obeid ordered his subordinates in the

Protection and Intervention Division to perpetrate the crime. The decision and orders to

eliminate Dany Chamoun were preceded by planning, preparations and determination to

proceed with what had been decided.

Whereas article 218 of the Criminal Code concerning incitement does not specify

the means whereby this crime is committed, giving the judges absolute discretion in this

regard;

Whereas the Council finds that the defendants Samir Geagea, Ghassan Touma and

Tony Obeid took steps to create a determination among their subordinates and pressed

them to commit the crime, or to participate in its commission, by issuing orders to them

which, given their power over them, amounted to incitement, so that their act constitutes

the crime defined in and punishable under article 549, paragraph 1, in conjunction with

paragraphs 217 and 218 of the Criminal Code;

Whereas it is untrue that their act corresponds in any way to complicity in the

crime, inasmuch as the Lebanese legislature enacted a special provision applicable to

such acts, designating them as incitement, which is a separate crime from complicity, and

devoted a special section of the Criminal Code to this crime, namely Section II of

Chapter II in Part 1 of Book IV (articles 217 and 218), while Section I deals with

complicity. The elements of the two crimes are different. In this case, the defendants

Samir Geagea, Ghassan Touma and Tony Obeid cannot legally be characterized as

perpetrators.

(c) Concerning the defendants Georges Feghali, Elie Akiki, Jean Samia,

Farid Saadeh and Camille Karam together with Tony Obeid

Whereas the Lebanese legislature defined perpetrators and co-perpetrators in

article 212 of the Criminal Code, stipulating that the perpetrator of a crime is the actor

who brings into existence the elements constituting the crime or who is directly involved

in its commission. It follows from this definition that the perpetrator is anyone who

commits material acts that contribute towards creating the material element of the crime

where criminal intent exists, and also anyone who takes positive action which does not

contribute to the creation of its basic material element but leads directly to the

commission of the crime by laying the basis for its execution;

Whereas the role intentionally played by the defendants listed above consisted

solely in mounting surveillance outside the building in which the crime was committed in

order to assist the perpetrators if necessary, in accordance with the previously prepared

plan, they cannot be considered to have participated actively and directly in the

commission of the crime. Instead their act constitutes complicity in the form of assistance

for acts which they facilitated and hence constitutes the crime defined in and punishable

under article 549 , paragraph 1, in conjunction with article 219, paragraph 4, and article

220 of the Criminal Code;

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Whereas the defendant Tony Obeid was the head of the group that carried out

the assassination and also incited the commission of the crime through planning and

preparations, providing the perpetrators with information concerning the movements of

the victim and his place of residence, and with appropriate weapons, i.e. submachine

guns and handguns fitted with silencers, and supervised their training in the use of the

weapons. Moreover, he obtained Lebanese army uniforms for them to conceal their

involvement in the acts that paved the way for and facilitated the crime, from which it

may be concluded that without his assistance the crime would not have been committed.

His act in this regard constitutes the crime defined in and punishable under article 549,

paragraph 1, in conjunction with paragraph 219, paragraph 4, and article 220,

paragraph 1, of the Criminal Code;

Whereas the defendant Camille Karam claims that he participated in the

mission without being aware of its nature;

Whereas it has been established by the investigation, particularly from the

testimony of Camille Karam himself, who testified before the Council, that the defendant

and his companions in the Protection and Intervention Company were trained prior to the

assassination of Dany Chamoun to fire submachine guns and handguns fitted with

silencers, and that he was fully aware that weapons of this kind were used for

assassinations. Moreover, when he and his companions got into the cars, he knew that

their task was to provide protection (trial record Nos. 100-103) and that at least three of

them were carrying weapons fitted with silencers. Furthermore, those who remained in

the vicinity of the cars to provide protection (Karam was one of them) replied to a

question from the witness Georges Sarkis that they had come to protect Dany Chamoun.

When he asked who had sent them, they rebuked him and he ran away. This reveals that

they were aware that the mission they were carrying out involved Dany Chamoun and

that it was a criminal assignment. This is also demonstrated by their behaviour towards

the witness Khalil Salameh, when he appeared on his balcony and they indicated to him

with their weapons that he should go back inside (see the testimony of Georges Sarkis

and Khalil Salameh);

All these facts – together with the fact that the members of the group were

wearing Lebanese Army uniforms as a disguise and that they departed at dawn –

demonstrate conclusively that the defendant Camille Karam was fully aware of the

mission entrusted to the group, including him, that left the Karantina building, and that he

wanted to participate in the accomplishment of the mission. Hence he possessed the

criminal intent and his testimony in this regard is dismissed.

(d) Concerning the defendant Jean Chahine

Whereas the defendant Jean Chahine merely provided the military uniforms to the

participants in the crime, knowing that the uniforms were to serve as a disguise and

would thereby facilitate the commission of the crime, his act constitutes, for the reasons

that have been set out above, indirect complicity in the crime through the provision of

assistance for the acts that were being prepared. It thus constitutes the crime defined in

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and punishable under article 549, paragraph 1, in conjunction with article 219, paragraph

4, and article 220 of the Criminal Code.

(e) Concerning the defendant Rafik Ghaleb Saadeh

Whereas the defendant states that he was unaware of the crime that was being

prepared, and that when he handed over the weapons, he was simply doing his job as the

officer in charge of the weapons warehouse;

Whereas it has been ascertained in the investigation that the defendant Rafik

Saadeh, a few weeks prior to the commission of the crime, had been appointed by his

boss Tony Obeid to serve as the officer in charge of the weapons warehouse, whose sole

task consisted in obtaining weapons, handing them out and looking after them;

On orders from Tony Obeid, he handed over the weapons that were used to

commit the crime. He also obtained and handed out the military uniforms that were

subsequently worn by the criminals.

If it is assumed that the defendant Rafik Saadeh knew that the military uniforms

and the weapons he had distributed could be used to commit a crime, this knowledge is

not in itself sufficient, and the Council does not believe that the defendant wished to

become involved, by handing out the weapons and uniforms, in the crime of murdering

Dany Chamoun, because the matter in no way concerned him. His only concern was to

perform the duties assigned to him as officer in charge of the warehouse.

Whereas article 188 of the Criminal Code stipulates that criminal intent is the will

to commit a crime defined by law;

Whereas there was no element of criminal intent – intended complicity in the

crime – in the acts of Rafik Saadeh, it follows that he must be declared innocent of the

charges laid against him.

B. The crime of homicide of Ingrid Abdenour, Dany Chamoun‟s wife, and of her

two children, Tarek and Julian

(a) Whereas the defendants Atef al-Haber, Elie Awad and Naja Kaddoum

participated in the homicide of Ingrid Abdenour, Dany Chamoun‟s wife, and of her two

children, Tarek and Julian, when they were assassinating Dany Chamoun, with a view to

facilitating the assassination and ensuring their escape;

Whereas this act constitutes the crime defined in and punishable under article 549,

paragraph 2, of the Criminal Code, which deals with the commission of homicide in

preparation for a crime or misdemeanour, to facilitate the escape of inciters to such a

crime or its perpetrators or accomplices, or to prevent them from being punished;

(b) Whereas, in the case of the defendants Samir Geagea, Ghassan Touma,

Tony Obeid, Jean Chahine, Georges Feghali, Elie Akiki, Jean Samia, Farid Saadeh

and Camille Karam:

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The investigation did not bring to light any evidence that the above defendants

incited the perpetrators or wished to participate as accomplices in the crime of homicide

of Dany Chamoun‟s wife and his children Tarek and Julian.

The question arises whether indirect intent – a concept which the Lebanese

legislature has adopted and defined as being equivalent in terms of its legal outcome to

direct intent – exists in the case of these defendants.

Whereas article 189 of the Criminal Code stipulates that a crime shall be deemed

to be intended, even where it exceeded the criminal intent pertaining to the act or

omission intended by the perpetrator, if its occurrence was expected and the risk was

accepted;

Whereas the evidence stemming from the circumstances of the present case

cannot convince the Council that it occurred to the inciters or accomplices to the

assassination of Dany Chamoun that the perpetrators Atef al-Haber, Elie Awad and Naja

Kaddoum would also murder Dany Chamoun‟s wife and children, and that they accepted

the possibility of this outcome;

Whereas it is necessary in the light of the foregoing to declare the above-

mentioned defendants innocent of the charges laid against them.

C. The carrying of weapons

Whereas the carrying of military weapons without a permit by the defendants

Antonios Elias Elias, also known as Tony Obeid, Atef al-Haber, Georges Feghali, Elie

Akiki, Jean Samia, Naja Kaddoum, Elias Awad, Farid Saadeh, Rafik Saadeh and Camille

Karam constitutes a misdemeanour under article 72 of the Weapons and Ammunition

Act, as amended, and this offence is not covered by Amnesty Law No. 84 of 28 March

1991 because its perpetrators failed to hand over their weapons within a month of the

date of enforcement of the law, as provided for in article 2, paragraph 5.

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Chapter VII

The political nature of the crime

Whereas the crime of the homicide of Dany Chamoun is a complex crime

inasmuch as it involved a direct assault on an individual right but with a political motive;

Whereas crimes that are complex or associated with political crimes are still

deemed to constitute political crimes, they nonetheless lose that character by virtue of the

provisions of article 197 of the Criminal Code if they are extremely serious crimes such

as murder;

Whereas this element of seriousness is therefore present in the crime of the

homicide of Dany Chamoun, and its political nature is thus nullified.

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Chapter VIII

Recognition of extenuating circumstances

Whereas the Council considers that the circumstances of the case justify granting

the defendants the discretionary extenuating circumstances provided for in article 253 of

the Criminal Code.

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Chapter IX

The claims of the civil plaintiffs

Whereas counsel for the National Liberal Party requested that the Party be

awarded symbolic damages of one Lebanese pound;

Counsel for Ms. Tracy Chamoun requested that she be awarded damages of

10 million United States dollars.

Counsel for the minor Tamara Jean, Dany Chamoun‟s daughter, represented by

her legal guardians, requested that she be awarded personal compensation of 10 million

dollars or the equivalent in Lebanese currency.

Council for the plaintiffs Ilya Abdenour and his wife Elsie requested that they be

awarded the sum of 1 million dollars.

Whereas the Council decides that the following compensation should be awarded

to the civil plaintiffs:

(1) To the minor Tamara Jean for the injury caused to her by the murder of her

father Dany Chamoun, a sum of 200 million Lebanese pounds payable by all the

defendants with the exception of Rafik Saadeh, and for the injury caused to her by the

murder of her mother Ingrid Abdenour and her two brothers Tarek and Julian, the sum of

100 million Lebanese pounds payable jointly by the defendants Atef al-Haber, Elie Awad

and Naja Kaddoum;

(2) To Ms. Tracy Chamoun the sum of 50 million Lebanese pounds in respect of

the murder of her father, payable jointly by all the defendants with the exception of Rafik

Saadeh, and a similar sum in respect of the murder of her brothers Tarek and Julian,

payable jointly by the defendants Atef al-Haber, Naja Kaddoum and Elie Awad;

(3) To Mr. Ilya Abdenour and his wife, in respect of the murder of their

daughter Ingrid and their grandsons Tarek and Julian, the sum of 100 million Lebanese

pounds to be divided equally between them, payable jointly by the defendants Atef al-

Haber, Elie Awad and Naja Kaddoum.

Whereas in the light of the foregoing, the remaining applications, arguments and

observations which have no bearing on the content of this judgement are hereby

dismissed.

For these reasons

The Judicial Council unanimously decides,

On the basis of its decisions No. 5 of 3 December 1994, No. 6 of 3 December

1994 and No. 3 of 28 January 1995:

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I. To dismiss the arguments that the preliminary and subsequent

investigations should be invalidated, that the National Liberal Party should be held to

lack standing as a plaintiff, and that the crime is covered by the general amnesty;

II. To declare that none of the defendants is guilty of the offence with which

they are charged under article 6 of the Act of 11 January 1958 in conjunction with article

314 of the Criminal Code;

III. To declare the defendant Rafik Saadeh innocent of the charge of

complicity in the crime of homicide of Dany Chamoun, his wife and his children Tarek

and Julian;

IV. To declare the defendants Samir Geagea, Ghassan Touma, Antonios Elias

Elias, also known as Antonios Elias Obeid and Tony Obeid, Jean Chahine, Georges

Feghali, Elie Akiki, Jean Samia, Farid Saadeh and Camille Karam innocent of the charge

of complicity in the crime of homicide of Ingrid Abdenour, Dany Chamoun‟s wife, and

of their children Tarek and Julian;

V. To convict the defendants Atef Paulus al-Haber, Naja Anis Kaddoum and

Elias Georges Awad, also known as Giuliano, of complicity in the intentional and

premeditated homicide of the late Dany Chamoun, a crime defined in and punishable

under article 549, paragraph 1, of the Criminal Code, and to impose the death penalty on

all three of them, commuted, pursuant to article 253 of the Criminal Code, to a life

sentence of hard labour in each case;

To convict them also of the crime defined in and punishable under article 549,

paragraph 2, of the Criminal Code for complicity in the homicide of Ingrid Ilya

Abdenour, Dany Chamoun‟s wife, and their children Tarek and Julian, thereby

facilitating the homicide of Dany Chamoun and ensuring their escape, and to impose the

death penalty on all three of them, commuted, pursuant to article 253 of the Criminal

Code, to a life sentence of hard labour in each case;

VI. To convict the defendants Samir Geagea, Ghassan Antoine Touma and

Antonios Elias Elias, also known as Antonios Elias Obeid and Tony Obeid, of the crime

defined in and punishable under article 549, paragraph 1, in conjunction with articles 217

and 218 of the Criminal Code, and to impose the death penalty on all three of them,

commuted, pursuant to article 253 of the Criminal Code, to a life sentence of hard labour

in each case, for incitement to the murder of the late Dany Chamoun;

VII. To convict the defendant Antonios Elias Elias, also known as Antonios

Elias Obeid, of the crime defined in and punishable under article 549, paragraph 1, in

conjunction with article 219, paragraph 4, and article 220, paragraph 1, of the Criminal

Code, and to impose the death penalty on him, commuted, pursuant to article 253 of the

Criminal Code, to a life sentence of hard labour, for the necessary assistance he provided

to the perpetrators of and accomplices to the crime of the homicide of Dany Chamoun;

VIII. To convict the defendants Jean Youssef Chahine, Georges As„ad Feghali,

Elie, Jirjis Akiki, Jean Ghattas Samia, Farid Salim Saadeh and Camille Hana Karam of

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the crime defined in and punishable under article 549, paragraph 1, in conjunction with

article 219, paragraph 4, and article 220, paragraph 3, of the Criminal Code for

complicity in the crime of the homicide of the late Dany Chamoun, and to sentence them

to 15 years‟ hard labour, commuted, pursuant to article 253 of the Criminal Code, to

10 years;

IX. To convict Antonios Elias Elias, also known as Tony Obeid, Atef Paulus

al-Haber, Georges As„ad Feghali, Elie Jirjis Akiki, Jean Ghattas Samia, Naja Anis

Kaddoum, Elias Georges Awad, also known as Giuliano, Farid Salim Saadeh, Rafik

Ghaleb Saadeh and Camille Hara Karam of the misdemeanour punishable under article

72 of the Weapons and Ammunition Act, as amended, and to sentence all of them to a

term of imprisonment of one year. In the case of Rafik Saadeh, the time spent in pre-trial

detention shall be taken into account;

X. To combine the penalties imposed, it being understood that only the

criminal penalty shall be enforced since it is the more severe, pursuant to article 205 of

the Criminal Code, and that in the case of Camille Hana Karam the time spent in pre-trial

detention shall be taken into account;

XI. To deprive the fugitive defendants Ghassan Antoine Touma, Antonios

Elias Elias, also known as Antonios Elias Obeid and Tony Obeid, Jean Youssef Chahine,

Atef Paulus al-Haber, Georges As„ad Feghali, Elie Jirjis Akiki, Jean Ghattas Samia, Naja

Anis Kaddoum, Elias Georges Awad, also known as Giuliano, and Farid Salim Saadeh of

their civil rights, to confiscate their financial assets and property, which shall be

administered through the Government, and to issue a warrant for their arrest;

XII. To order all those convicted of the misdemeanour punishable under

article 72 of the Weapons and Ammunitions Act to hand in a submachine gun and

military handgun on pain of being fined double their price, i.e. a sum of 700,000

Lebanese pounds, or, alternatively, of serving a prison sentence of one day for every

5,000 Lebanese pounds that remain unpaid;

XIII. To order the convicted persons Samir Farid Geagea, Ghassan Antoine

Touma, Antonios Elias Elias, also known as Antonios Elias Obeid and Tony Obeid, Jean

Chahine, Atef al-Haber, Georges Feghali, Elie Akiki, Jean Samia, Naja Kaddoum, Elias

Awad, Farid Saadeh and Camille Karam to pay jointly to the minor Tamara Jean, the

daughter of the late Dany Chamoun, the sum of 200 million Lebanese pounds, and to

Ms. Tracy Dany Chamoun the sum of 50 million Lebanese pounds in personal damages

in respect of the murder of their father Dany Chamoun, and one Lebanese pound in

damages to the National Liberal Party;

XIV. To order the convicted persons Elias Awad, Naja Kaddoum and Atef al-

Haber to pay jointly to the above-mentioned minor, Tamara Jean, the sum of 100 million

Lebanese pounds in respect of the murder of her father and of her brothers Tarek and

Julian and to Ms. Tracy Chamoun the sum of 50 million Lebanese pounds in respect of

the murder of her brothers Tarek and Julian;

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XV. To require the convicted persons Elias Awad, Naja Kaddoum and Atef al-

Haber to pay jointly the sum of 100 million Lebanese pounds to the plaintiffs Ilya

Abdenour and his wife, in equal shares, in respect of the murder of their daughter, the

above-mentioned Ingrid, and their grandsons Tarek and Julian;

XVI. To confiscate the criminal materials that were seized;

XVII. To reject all other demands that are unrelated to this judgement;

XVIII. To order the defendants to share the court costs.

Judgement rendered in the presence of Samir Farid Geagea, Camille Hana Karam

and Rafik Saadeh and in the absence of the other defendants.

[Signed by the members of the Council]

Judge Kawwas, Judge Zein, Judge Kassouf, Judge Harmouch and President Kheirallah

[Signed by the Court Clerk]

Court Clerk Al-Hajj

This Judgement was delivered on the twenty-fourth day of June 1995.

[Signed] [Signed]

The President The Court Clerk