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7/27/2019 Learning in the Spanish Conquest: Changing Beliefs about Native Rationality in Yucatan during the Expeditions of
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Learning in the Spanish Conquest:
Changing Beliefs about Native Rationality in Yucatan during the Expeditions of Grijalva, Crdoba, and Corts
By Daniel Dufour
History 101
Stephanie Ballenger
Spring 2009
University of California, Berkeley
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Table of Contents
Introduction
Argument 4Definitions 4
Primary Sources 6
Methodology 8
Expedition under Hernndez de Crdoba
Introduction
10 Cape Catoche (Great Cairo)
10
Campeche (San Lazaro)
12
Champoton (The Coast of the Disastrous Battle)
16Florida
18Conclusion
20
Expedition under Juan de Grijalva
Introduction
21
Cozumel (Santa Cruz)
21
Campeche (San Lazaro)
27
Grijalva River (Tabasco River)
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34
San Juan
36
Champoton (The Coast of the Disastrous Battle)
38
Campeche (San Lazaro)
40
Conclusion
41
Expedition under Hernando Corts
Introduction
43Cozumel (Santa Cruz)
43Champoton (The Coast of the Disastrous Battle)
45
Grijalva River (Tabasco River)
46
San Juan
49
Conclusion
51
Conclusion
52
Works Cited
54
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Argument
In early March, 1517, a group of adventurous Spaniards led by Francisco Hernndez de
Crdoba discovered Yucatan. They held the belief that natives were irrational. In mid July,
1519, the Municipal Council of Vera Cruz, the hastily-made council established by Corts on his
way to Mexico, sent Emperor Charles V a letter updating him on the status of their conquest of
the new world. This letter reveals that Corts believed that natives could be rational and that
some in fact were. The difference in the beliefs of Corts and Crdoba was not accidental but
the result of the Spanish experience in Yucatan from March 1517 to July 1519. Both Corts and
Crdoba based their beliefs on their experiences with natives and also what they learned about
the experiences of other Spaniards. The purpose of this paper is to show how such a remarkable
transformation happened over the course of three successive expeditions led by Francisco
Hernndez de Crdoba, Juan de Grijalva, and Hernn Corts.1
Definitions
Several words in this paper have strict definitions that must be understood.
A rationalactormakes the best decision, knowing what she knows, through logic. A
rational decision is a decision made through logic and because only rational actors use logic,
only rational actors can make rationaldecisions. An irrationalactor does not use logic to make
decisions and therefore usually chooses unwisely.
Actors with a mostbasic rationality are rationalwith regards to making almost
instinctual decisions, such as whether to run from danger, but are irrational when it comes to
more complicated matters like war and diplomacy. Actors with sophisticated rationality are
1Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 14;
Hernn Corts, First Letter, Letters from Mexico, trans. Anthony Pagden (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1986), 3.
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rational in making all decisions, including those in war and diplomacy, and can develop and
execute strategies, such as tricking someone into an ambush.
Irrational inconsistency is the changing of decisions without any reason to do so, the
product of irrationality.
Rational-like is a decision that appears rational to an onlooker, considering the onlookers
specific set of beliefs about what are rational and irrational decisions. Rational actors almost
always make rational-like decisions. Irrational actors only make rational-likedecisions by
chance and therefore less frequently than rationalactors.
Irrational-like is a decision that appears irrationalto an onlooker. Rational actors never
make irrational-likedecisions unless a factor unknown to the onlooker affects the decision-
making process. Irrational actorsalwaysmakeirrational-like decisions unless by chance they
make a rational-likeone.
I have chosen to define rationality very simply because racionalidad, the Spanish
equivalent of rationality, as defined by 16 th century Spaniards is simply unworkable for several
reasons. First, the 16th century definition was contested because it entered the debate over race,
religion, and civilization. Second, this paper is more geared toward the idea of rationality and
less the word itself and does not want to get bogged down in modern debates on definition.
Third, this papers version of rationality is defined only by what the Spaniards agreed on during
the exploration of Yucatan. For example, the Spaniards agreed that it was irrational for the
natives to attack them considering their military superiority
Paradox adopts William Taylors definition, a seemingly contradictory set of beliefs that
upon further inspection are not contradictory, and reveal a set of related truths. 2
I have chosen not define the Spaniards in this paper for a number of reasons, but some
2 William Taylor, History 8A Class (UC Berkeley, Fall 2007).
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explanation of its usage is required. The primary source accounts of the expeditions frequently
use we, they, the Spaniards to describe a group of Spaniards specifying which Spaniards
are in the group. This usage obscures the differences of opinion among Spaniards, which we
only get rare glimpses of. Bound by the limit of the sources, this paper generally uses the
Spaniards to mean the majority. This paper looks at what the Spaniards as a group learned and
not as individuals. When the Spaniards decided to do something, the reader need not know
which Spaniards agreed with this decision, but only infer that it must have been a good number
of them because if not, then that decision would not have been made.
Primary Sources
This paper uses translations of five primary sources, Bernal Dazs Historia Verdadera
de la Conquista de la Nueva Espaa, Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedos Historia de las Indias, two
versions of Juan DazsItinerario de Grijalva, andPrimera Relacin.
ForHistoria Verdadera, this paper uses Alfred Maudslays 1908 translation titled The
True History of the Conquest of New Spain because it is the most complete scholarly translation
to date. Bernal Daz finished his work in 1568, decades after the conquest of Mexico, in
response to Francisco Lopez de GomarasHistoria General de las Indias written around 1550.
In old age Bernal Daz had fallen on hard times and had nothing left but the memory of his valor
and historical significance, which Gomara had questioned in his story. Daz wrote his own
version of the conquest story in order to illustrate the bravery, intelligence, and significance of
the Spanish conquerors of Mexico of which he was a part. True History has been consulted for
the analysis of the Crdoba and Corts expedition. It has not been consulted for the analysis of
the Grijalva Expedition, because there is significant doubt over whether that Bernal Daz ever
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went on the second expedition as he claims in True History. Bernal Dazs account of the second
expedition has been put to good use, though, in demonstrating what the Spaniards of the third
expedition thoughthappened during the second expedition.3
ForHistoria de las Indias,this paper usesHenry Wagners 1942 translation of the 1535
version, titledFernndez de Oviedos Accountin Wagners The Discovery of New Spain in 1518
by Juan de Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts. Oviedo was an accomplished royal
official who on coming to Cuba in 1523 set out to discover what had happened on the Grijalva
Expedition asking participants and those that had been in Cuba at the time of the expedition. It is
likely that the pilot of the expedition, Antn de Alaminos wrote the account, but Oviedo surely
sought corroboration on certain facts. As the title of Wagners book suggests, Oviedos Account
will only be used in the analysis of the Grijalva expedition.4
ForItinerario de Grijalva, this paper uses translations of two versions, a 1522 Italian
edition titledItinerario and a 1519 Latin edition titledProvinciae, both of which appear
translated in Henry Wagners The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan de Grijalva: A
Translation of the Original Texts.5 Juan Daz, the Grijalva Expeditions priest, wrote a now-lost
account in Spanish which was translated into these two versions. It is not clear why Juan Daz
wrote his account: possibly for fame, royal rewards, or to tarnish the reputation of Juan de
Grijalva who Daz portrays as reluctant to take any risks. Provinciae andItinerario are
3 Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), xxxviii
xli; For an argument for why Bernal Dazs participation in the second expedition is doubtful see Henry Wagner,Summary of the Accounts, The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the
Original Texts (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 18-21.4 Henry Wagner, Summary of the Accounts, The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A
Translation of the Original Texts (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 11-13.5 Wagner translated the Italian version and Dr. H. E. Robbins translated the Latin version. Wagner titled the Latin
editionProvinciae asan abridgment forProvinciae sive regions in India Occidentali noviter repertae in ultima
navigatione or in English,Provinces or districts recently discovered in the West-Indies.
Henry Wagner, Summary of the Accounts, The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A
Translation of the Original Texts (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 5-6.
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consulted for the Grijalva expedition.6
ForPrimera Relacin, this paper uses Anthony Pagdens 1986 translation titledFirst
Letterin PagdensLetters from Mexico. First Letterwas a letter sent by the town council of
Vera Cruz in July of 1519, ostensibly meant to update the crown on the progress being made in
the conquest. Corts had broken the expeditions contract and demonstrated disloyalty to the
Governor of Cuba, Diego Velsquez, and by implication the King by founding the city of Villa
Rica de la Vera Cruz. Corts heavily influenced the writing of this letter to the king if he did not
write it himself, in order to make himself look like both a skilled conqueror and a humble and
loyal servant of the crown. First Letteris consulted for the Corts expedition and for
understanding what the Spaniards of the Corts expedition thought happened during the Grijalva
expedition.7
Methodology
In order to create a complete and credible picture of changes in Spanish beliefs, we must look at
not only what the sources said they believed but also what they did. Passages in the sources that
describe Spanish behavior and beliefs can be misleading for a number of possible reasons. First,
the sources are intentionally dishonest about what the Spaniards believed and did. For example,
theFirst Letterfails to mention Corts blunders. Second, the Spaniards had developed a legal
tradition whereby a military conquest of natives was only just if the natives were treated like
rational actors and given the opportunity to surrender beforehand. Thus, Spaniards often spoke
as if natives were rational contrary to their beliefs in their irrationality. Third, in the words of a
popular psychology textbook, people tend to recall their past attitudes and beliefs as being
6 Henry Wagner, Summary of the Accounts, The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A
Translation of the Original Texts (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 5- 9.7Letters from Mexico, trans. Anthony Pagden (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), xi-lx.
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consistent with their current attitudes and beliefs, often revising their memories when they have a
change in attitude.8 Therefore, sources might be unintentionally dishonest about Spanish beliefs
or actions. For example, Bernal Daz participated in both the Crdoba and Corts expedition and
learned along the way just like any other Spaniard. However, he probably understated the extent
to which his beliefs changed because of this psychological tendency.
8 Michael Gazzaniga and Tod Heatherton,Psychological Science, ed. John Durbin, 2nd edition (New York: WW
Norton and Company, 2006), 285-286.
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Expedition under Francisco Hernndez de Crdoba
Introduction
On February 8, 1517, an expedition led by Francisco Hernndez de Crdoba left Cuba
and steered towards the setting sun and the Yucatan, although they did not know it at the time.
The expedition consisted of a little more than a hundred men and three ships. The adventurers
had staked what little wealth they had on the success of this expedition of discovery, having paid
for almost all the supplies themselves, with a little help from the Governor of Cuba, Diego
Velsquez.
9
Cape Catoche (Great Cairo)10
After three weeks and a brutal storm, the expedition spotted land and a large town, which
they named Great Cairo. Curiosity, as well as hunger and thirst, compelled the expedition to
anchor there and quickly discover what this land held. They did not have to wait long, as the
local natives spotted the Spaniards and approached in their canoes. The Spaniards, without a
translator, did their best to welcome the natives to their ships. Apparently they succeed as the
natives boarded the flagship, including one native whom the Spaniards thought to be the cacique.
On deck the Spaniards gave some green beads to the natives who were inspecting their ship, but
the natives did not reciprocate.11 Before the natives left, the cacique gestured that he would be
9 Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 11-14.10 Bernal Daz writes that it was given the name Cape Catoche. Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the
Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 18.11 Bernal Daz mentions no reciprocal gift-giving by the natives. This absence is nearly certain. First of all, Bernal
Daz, although old in age when he wrote about these events, probably remembered this encounter in great detail
because of its importance as being his first encounter with natives. Second, Bernal Daz had no apparent motive to
misrepresent the truth at this time. Third, the rest of this encounter will show that the cacique did not want to give a
gift to the Spanish and thus this absence fits in well with the rest of the story.
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back with transport to land.12 The following day the cacique returned with several canoes to the
ships. The Spaniards interpreted the caciques gestures as offering to bring them to his town and
feed them there.13 The cacique offered his canoes, but some Spaniards opted for their own boats
instead. All the Spaniards coordinated a simultaneous landing so that if there was an ambush
they could defend themselves in unison.14 The Spaniards were eager to visit the town but also
careful because they believed that the cacique was irrationally inconsistentand thus could
quickly and without reason change his mind and attack the Spaniards. The Spaniards believed
that the decision to welcome them was rational-like, but not necessarily rational.
Once on shore, the cacique gestured that he wanted to lead the Spaniards to his town.
Crdoba and his men came to a consensus to follow the cacique, but to also take all their
weapons. The cacique led the Spaniards into a hilly area with a lot of brush for hiding where
they were ambushed. The Spaniards fought back well, killing several natives and forcing a
retreat. All the Spaniards survived the attack, but many were wounded. The Spaniards then
happily reaped the spoils of war, plundering nearby temples of their low-quality gold. The
Spaniards left Cape Catoche to continue their discovery as soon as they had loaded their plunder
and cared for their wounded.15
The encounter near Great Cairo presents a paradox. One the one hand, the Spaniards
believed that a native ambush was possible and thus prepared for one by bring their arms. One
the other hand, the Spaniards were gullible and walked right into an ambush.16 The Spaniards
12 Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 14-15.13
We should reserve a little bit of skepticism about whether the cacique actually promised food because the Spanishwere without a doubt hungry, although not famished, after weeks of being at sea and it was probably that they infer
from any offer to bring them to a caciques town an implicit offer of food, too. Whether or not the cacique explicitlyor implicitly offered food is not the central concern of this analysis, however.14 Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 15-16.15 Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 16-17.16 There are two alternate factors to consider here, the superiority of Spanish arms and hunger, but both fail to fully
explain the Spaniards decision to follow the cacique.
First, the Spaniards could afford to be ambushed because of their superior military power. While it is
unclear that the Spaniards believed this prior to this battle, the resulting victory certainly supported this conclusion.
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decided to follow a cacique whom they had just recently met into the unknown because they
must have thought it was very unlikely that natives would ambush them at that time. If they had
appreciated the risks greater, they would have returned to their ships or asked for a real
demonstration of friendship, such as a gift, before advancing. The Spaniards believed that the
cacique was irrational and thus incapable of developing and following through on a sophisticated
plan of persuasively lying about their intentions and then orchestrating an ambush.17 The
Spaniards believed that if an ambush were to happen it would be the result of the natives
irrationally changing their minds.18
Campeche (San Lzaro)
The Spaniards sailed on for a couple weeks before spotting another town, which they
named San Lzaro. The Spaniards were in much need of fresh water and landed to fill up their
casks, assuming that the town must have a local fresh water source. Bernal Daz wrote that the
Spaniards had not forgotten about Cape Catoche: In order that we could all of us land at the
same time, we agreed to approach the shore in the smallest of the vessels, and in the three boats,
The Spaniards cared whether they were ambushed, but their military capabilities afforded them the opportunity to
take risks that they would likely not have taken if they had been in a weaker position. However, this cannot be a
primary causal mechanism because military superiority did not actually force the Spaniards to take risks. [no, but
plunder could be a causal factor, given that the Spanish were technologically superior]Second, the Spaniards were often in need of supplies. Although Bernal Daz does not refer to the gravity of
this need at Cape Catoche, the Spaniards certainly desiredfree food if for no reason more than the fact that supplies
were limited and more supplies would allow the Spaniards to extend their expedition. This cannot fully explain the
Spaniards behavior however as hunger could support a wide range of actions, from automatically looting for food
to begging for food. This cannot explain by itself the particular set of decisions.
17 Inga Clendinnen suggests that the natives may not have intended to trickor ambush the Spaniards at all. The
natives may have thought that the Spaniards preparation of their arms was a tacit acceptance of a challenge tobattle. In any regard, as Clendinnen points out, the Spaniards were effectively ambushed.
Inga Clendinnen, Ambivalent Conquests: Maya and Spaniard in Yucatan, 1517-1520, 2nd edition (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 7-8.18 I am not saying that the Spaniards would not have prepared for an ambush if they had believed that the cacique
war rational. In reality, both a belief in native irrationality and rationality would have caused the Spaniards to
prepare for an ambush either by chance or plan, but as my focus is on explaining the effects of a belief in native
irrationality I do not discuss this in the body of the paper.
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with all our arms ready, so as not to be caught as we had been at Cape Catoche.19 The
Spaniards learned to be more prepared for an ambush, including while landing, because they had
learned from their experience at Cape Catoche that the natives were more dangerous and the
costs of an ambush higher than they had first thought.
The Spaniards landed as planned, discovered a fresh water pool used by the local natives
and filled all their casks without seeing anyone. On their way out, about fifty natives clad in
cotton mantles presumed to be caciques approached the Spaniards. The Spaniards gestured that
they only came for water and were on their way out. Much like the previous encounter at Cape
Catoche, the Spaniards interpreted the caciques gestures as offering to lead them to their town.
The Spaniards decided to follow the caciques because of their curiosity and the possibility of
food and riches (but not water as they had already filled up). The Spaniards prepared for an
ambush both mentally by keeping well on the alert and physically by maintaining good
formation.20 Although they could have left content with their full water-casks, the Spaniards
decided to follow the cacique while also preparing for an ambush because of three beliefs. This
decision can be explained by three beliefs as follows.
First, the Spaniards had learned from the ambush at Cape Catoche that they should
always be very prepared for an ambush, watchful and in tight formation, even when following a
cacique.21
19
Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 18.20 Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 18-19.
Quote from Page 19.21 InAmbivalent Conquests IngaClendinnen writes From that time forward [sometime at sea after Cape Catoche
and before Campeche] decisions as to where to make landfall were dictated not by calculations of security, but by
the coercive need for water. The reader would be wrong to generalize this statement to incorporate all the
Spaniards decisions, however, because as it happened at Campeche, the Spaniards had no need of water when they
decided to follow the caciques.
Inga Clendinnen, Ambivalent Conquests: Maya and Spaniard in Yucatan, 1517-1520, 2nd edition (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 9.
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Second, the Spaniards did not consider, much to their detriment, that watercouldbe a
decisive factor in triggering native animosity. Fresh water, not only a precious resource to the
thirsty, was also very rare in the nearly riverless Yucatan where sinkholes were the only fresh
water source. Foreigners taking of water from these natural wells usually meant war.22 The
Spaniards did not need to know this in order to wisely choose to leave as soon as meeting the
natives, but only had to consider that watercouldbe a cause of war.
Third, Cape Catoche had done nothing to change the Spaniards belief that it was
impossible for the natives to develop and follow though on a sophisticated plan to deceive the
Spaniards and then lead them into an ambush.
23
The caciques led some of the Spaniards into a temple. While they were inside, native
warriors assembled outside and encircled them. The Spaniards were then afraid that they had
been ambushed, but the natives did not attack. Instead, a native lit some incense outside the
temple and gestured that they would attack if the Spaniards were not gone when the incense
burned out.24 Bernal Daz writes that the Spaniards decided to leave and the reasons he offers are
illuminating:
When we perceived their menacing appearance and saw great squadrons of Indians bearing down on us we
remembered that we had not yet recovered from the wounds received at Cape Catoche, and had been
obliged to throw overboard the bodies of two soldiers who had died, and fear fell on us, so we determined
to retreat to the coast in good order.25
The Spaniards attention to formation, learned from their encounter at Cape Catoche,
22
Inga Clendinnen, Ambivalent Conquests: Maya and Spaniard in Yucatan, 1517-1520, 2nd
edition (New York:Cambridge University Press, 2003), 9, 17-28.23 Inga Clendinnen inAmbivalent Conquests submits that the Spaniards really had no choice because they believedthat a refusal would reveal their fear and lead to another brutal attack, like at Cape Catoche. (9) This interpretation
only takes into account half of the decision-making process. It ignores the risks of following the caciques, which the
Spaniards certainly evaluated, even if only subconsciously.
Inga Clendinnen, Ambivalent Conquests: Maya and Spaniard in Yucatan, 1517-1520, 2nd edition (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 9.24 Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 19-20.25 Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 20.
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strengthened their position and increased the cost to the natives of attacking them. This may
have convinced the natives here to see if they could get the Spaniards to leave some other way.
The Spaniards continued to believe that an ambush was unlikely until they were encircled and
completely vulnerable. At that point it no longer mattered if they predicted an ambush because
the Spaniards could do to little to remove themselves from that vulnerable situation.26
After the Spaniards had used the opportunity to leave, Bernal Daz writes that they feared
that the natives would change their minds and attack them: We had not dared to embark near
the town where we had landed, on account of the great press of Indians, for we felt sure they
would attack us as we tried to get in the boats.
27
The Spaniards believed that the natives could
change their minds and still attack the Spaniards. If the natives had wanted to attack they would
have done so when they had the advantage outside the temple. The natives had no rational
reason to change their minds as the Spaniards left. All that had changed was that the Spaniards
were leaving and were no longer encircled, but the Spaniards thought the natives were irrational
and irrationally inconsistent and thus kept fearing an attack as they left.28
26 Tzvetan Todorov writes that During the first contacts, the Spaniards are not at all concerned with the impression
their behavior makes on those they encounter: if they are threatened, they flee without hesitation, thereby showing
they are vulnerable. Without citing specific cases, it seems that Todorov means that the Spaniards did not care
about their general reputation within the land, something Todorov says Corts changes. This seems to contrast with
Inga Clendinnens argument that the Spaniards were very aware of not making themselves look vulnerable, which is
why they followed the cacique at Cape Catoche. There is a way to reconcile these two arguments with an
understanding about the Spaniards belief in native irrational inconsistency. The Spaniards feared that they could docertain things during encounters, which might cause the natives to attack, but generally speaking, the Spaniards did
not think that general reputation was not an element of the natives irrational decision-making process that only
responded to only tangible factors, if any at all.
Tzvetan Todorov, The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other, trans. Richard Howard (Norman,
OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), 99.
27 Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 20.28 A counter-argument supporting the Spaniards continual fear of an attack is that they believed that the nativeswere testing the Spaniards fear and by implication their strength with the burning reeds and that the Spaniards
believed that, upon the natives seeing them retreat, the natives would attack. This argument has a whole though. If
the natives were to attack they would have attacked immediately when the Spaniards were still surrounded and not
have waited till the Spaniards reached the beach. It is the Spaniards belief in native irrational inconsistency that
underlies their fear of an attack even as they are leaving. The counter-argument has similarities to Inga
Clendinnens argument about why the Spaniards followed the caciques in the first place described in Footnote Error:
Reference source not found.
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The Spaniards believed that native irrationality prohibited the natives from tricking them
into an ambush as much as it meant that natives could change their minds quickly and without
reason. Native behavior certainly appearedrandom and unpredictable to the Spaniards who
were ignorant of the importance of certain factors, like water, in the natives decision-making
process. The Spaniards took this one step further, taking the appearance of irrationality as
reality. In other words, the Spaniards believed that the world was as they saw it. In an attempt
to understand confusing native behavior, they simplified it. In reality, Spaniards had already
simplified native behavior before the Grijalva expedition, but because this history is outside the
scope of this paper, the reader only needs to know that it had happened. This simplification had
helped the Spaniards to prepare for the ambush at Cape Catoche and possibly prevented one at
Campeche, but it also made it more difficult for the Spaniards to recognize their own mistakes.
Champoton (Coast of the Disastrous Battle)
From Campeche the expedition sailed for a couple weeks and experienced the same
storms, hunger and thirst as before, but found fresh water sources often enough without native
interference. After these couple weeks, the Spaniards arrived near a river and an unknown town
(Champoton) and followed their now standard procedure of preparing for battle, coordinating
their landing, posting guards, and filling up on water.29 Their experience at Champoton would
not be the standard, however, as their current set of beliefs and procedures would fail them.
While the Spaniards were filling up their water-casks, some natives approached in
silence, which the Spaniards interpreted as a sign of peace. Little was effectively communicated
except for the natives question whether the Spaniards came from the east, which the Spaniards
promptly confirmed. After some time, the natives ended the conversation and left peacefully.
29 Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 20-21.
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However, the Spaniards were skeptical of the local natives intentions because natives had begun
to assemble around the Spaniards camp. The Spaniards posted watchmen in case of a nighttime
attack. 30 The Spaniards had learned from their experiences at Cape Catoche and Campeche that
an ambush was very costly, so took turns standing guard.
That night, the Spaniards were encircled by hundreds of native warriors. Luckily for the
Spaniards, their watchmen prove their worth and alerted the rest of the men. The encirclement
had surprised the Spaniards however (much as it had at Campeche) and meant that they could no
longer avoid a difficult battle if the natives wanted to attack. There was some diversity in the
camp about what to do next; attack preemptively, escape immediately, or hold for the night. The
Spaniards decided to hold in their camp for the night and act during the day. The rising sun
revealed that the Spaniards were completely surrounded and hopelessly outnumbered. Unlike at
Campeche, the natives exploited their advantage and attacked the Spaniards. The Spaniards
could not possibly win, so they desperately fought to their boats and sailed away. The Spaniards
suffered gravely. The water-casks and about half of their expedition, a little over fifty men, had
been left behind; fittingly, the survivors dubbed this place the Coast of the Disastrous Battle.
The prospects for a successful discovery at that point were dim, considering the shortage of men
and supplies, so they decided to return to Cuba.31
Standard Spanish combat preparation, so successful in preventing a disaster at Cape
Catoche and possibly at Campeche, was not enough at Champoton. The Spaniards made two
crucial mistakes: taking on water after being approached by natives and sleeping on the shore.
Compelled by their thirst, the Spaniards needed to get fresh water, but they did not need to
continue in that endeavor after they had been caught doing so and certainly did not have to camp
30 Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 22-23.31 Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 23-26.
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out on land. They could have loaded what water they had attained, slept on their ships, and
returned the following day. The Spaniards chose not to because they did not realize that they
had angered the natives.32 The specific failure to consider that water could be a cause of war was
a result of the interaction of the Spaniards beliefs and the circumstances they found themselves
in, specifically at Campeche. The Spaniards had not recognized the connection between their
taking of water and the natives decision to threaten the Spaniards, because their belief in native
irrationality dismissed looking for a logical connection in the first place.
Florida
On their way back to Cuba, the Spaniards made their last important stop at Florida to
refill their water-casks. The Pilot Alaminos recognized this place and warned that the last
Spaniards to visit here were attacked. But there was no choice, as even Captain Crdoba, was
dying of thirst. The twenty most able Spaniards, those least affected by the damages of war
and sea, landed on shore to fill up what containers they still had with water from the mouth of a
nearby river. They generally followed standard procedure of preparing for an ambush, except for
the fact that they only placed two watchmen. They were so overcome with joy at having
discovered fresh water that they spent too much time filling up: so overjoyed were we that what
with satiating our thirst, and washing our clothes with which to bind our wounds, we must have
stayed there an hour.33 The Spaniards low numbers and exuberance at having discovered water
32 InAmbivalent Conquests, Inga Clendinnen writes They had landed soon after midday, but by the time the casks
had been filled and the parley with the warriors was over the sudden dusk of those latitudes had fallen. IngaClendinnen seems to imply, whether she meant to or not, that the Spaniards really did not have an option to return to
their ships during the day, similar to her argument about the Spaniards following of the cacique at Cape Catoche.
The Spaniards had only reached the point where a daytime withdrawal to their ships was no longer possible, because
they decided to continue filling up on water and communicating with the natives, rather than leave.
Inga Clendinnen, Ambivalent Conquests: Maya and Spaniard in Yucatan, 1517-1520, 2nd edition (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 11.33 Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 28.
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seems had greatly mitigated their preparation for an ambush.
While the Spaniards were filling up, Berrio, one of the watchmen, went off alone to cut
down a tree. While he was chopping, natives ambushed and killed him and then proceeded after
the other watchman. The other watchman ran from the natives to the Spaniards and warned them
with practically no time to prepare. The Spaniards defeated the native warriors, killing twenty,
but several Spaniards were wounded. After loading all the water onboard, the Spaniards left
Florida for Cuba.34 Berrios behavior is a clear demonstration of how the Spaniards beliefs
affected their actions. After being warned by Alaminos that there were potentially hostile
natives in this land, Berrio did something which probably antagonized the local natives. We do
not know what factors caused the natives to attack. Was it Berrios attempt to cut down a tree,
the other Spaniards taking of fresh water, or the Spaniards trespassing, something else entirely,
or a mix of these? The point is that Berrio did not knoweither. If he had recognized any of
these actions as possible factors in natives decisions to attack, he would not have moved to an
extremely vulnerable position to cut down a tree. His actions reveal that he believed that he
could notpossiblycause an attack.
The beliefs of the Spaniards as a whole, and Berrio, in particular remained unchanged
from Champoton to Florida. Specifically, the Spaniards continued to believe that the natives
acted without reason and that they could to do nothing to prevent an ambush except stay vigilant.
From the encounter at Champoton, the Spaniards could not but learn that the cost of
failure was higher than they previously thought. The Spaniards were saved to the extent they
were by what little they did learn, which was to post watchmen. All that was clear to the
Spaniards was that their belief in the dangerous irrationality of natives saved them and therefore
sought no reason to change this. Punishment, in the form of ambushes, for the Spaniards
34 Bernal Daz del Castillo, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain (London: Bedford Press, 1908), 29-30.
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mistaken belief in native irrationality did not cause the Spaniards to change their beliefs if they
did not understand what their mistake was.
Conclusion
The Crdoba Expedition, or what was left of it, made it back to Cuba. The Spaniards still
held to their initial erroneous belief that natives made irrational decisions. This belief affected
what lessons the Spaniards did learn, specifically those about their strategies. Their new found
regard for native warriors coupled with their belief in native irrationality resulted in them
learning to be more prepared for ambushes, tighten their formation and clean their weapons, and
to be prepared all the time, including when they disembark, embark, and follow a cacique.
The Spaniards failed to consider that coming close to a town, taking fresh water, or
cutting down trees couldcause war. They also failed to learn that natives had the capacity to
trick them into an ambush. This learning was not the result of unintelligence but rather a result
of the interaction between their beliefs and what actually happened. The Spaniards also quite
naturally generalized and made assumptions about natives. In a dangerous situation and in the
absence of specific information about natives, the Spaniards predicted that all the natives they
encountered in the future would be as irrational the ones they had encountered in the past. The
Spaniards seemed to have over-generalized and this hampered their ability to discern connections
between their own and natives behavior. Information about specific natives encountered was
accessible to the next expedition and thus the next expedition would not have to generalize as
much.
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Expedition under Juan de Grijalva
Introduction
On February 1518, shortly after Crdobas return, another expedition left Cuba for the
Yucatan under the command of Juan de Grijalva. The expedition left with 4 ships, about 200
men, one interpreter.35 Besides having twice as many men, an additional ship, and an interpreter,
the second expedition had two more advantages over the first. First, they had an undeveloped
idea that natives could be rational to a small degree. Second, they had the experiences of a
previous expedition off of which to base their beliefs and decisions.
Cozumel (Santa Cruz)
On May 3, 1518 the expedition discovered the island of Cozumel, which they named Santa
Cruz, and anchored there. It is unclear exactly how much communication the Spaniards had with
the natives during the following couple days. At the least the Spaniards only saw some native
canoes and at the most they and the natives met and exchanged pleasantries and gifts with the
natives promising that their cacique would visit the Spaniards soon.36 Although all three sources
disagree about what happened from this point up through the Spaniards ritual taking possession
of Cozumel, the Spaniards belief that the natives of Cozumel lacked a sophisticated rationality
appears in all of them.
InFernndez de Oviedos Accountthe cacique came in a canoe to the Spaniards ships
35Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva:A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 89-90.36 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva:
A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 89-91; Juan Daz,
Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts,
trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 58; Juan Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of New
Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val
Trefz Press, 1942), 69.
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while Grijalva was exploring the coastline in the smaller boats. The Spaniards onboard
entertained the cacique until Grijalva returned. After Grijalva and the cacique exchanged gifts,
the cacique promised to guide the Spaniards to his town that day. The cacique returned to his
town and never went to meet the Spaniards again, implying that he had taken back his promise.
The Spaniards, on their own, tried and failed to find a way to his town through the swamp that
bordered it. The following day, the Spaniards again requested and received permission to visit
the town from some natives in a canoe that was passing by. The Spaniards landed soon
thereafter.37 The Spaniards wanted a welcome, but did not require one, to visit the caciques
town. The Spaniards requested a welcome a second time because, as much as the cacique did
not stick to his promise, they believed that the natives would not stick to the caciques new
decision, a manifestation of irrational inconsistency.
Itinerario agrees with Oviedos Accountabout the meeting with the cacique, but does not
mention the caciques failure to follow through on his offer or the Spaniards second request for
a welcome. Itinerario says that, following the meeting with the cacique, the Spaniards landed
battle-ready because they expected native hostility in spite of the welcome they had received.38
In the story ofItinerario, the Spaniards clearly believed that the caciques welcome did not
guarantee a peaceful landing, because the cacique could be irrationally inconsistent and thus he
could change his mind with reason and attack.
Provinciae mentions no meeting with the cacique or requests to visit his town, but simply
that the Spaniards landed.39Provinciae andItinerario were based on the same account by Juan
Daz, so that the lack in theProvinciae is the result of a translator or editor who felt that the
37 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva:
A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 91-93.38 Juan Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the
Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 69-70.39 Juan Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the
Original Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 58.
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initial welcome was not important enough to include in this version. The belief in the natives
irrationality meant that a welcome was peripheral to a story that was more about deeds than
words, especially the words of the natives which could never be trusted.
A Spanish belief that the natives of Cozumel were irrationally inconsistent runs through
all three sources. Like the Spaniards at Cape Catoche during the first expedition, these Spaniards
believed that the rational-like decision to welcome the Spaniards was not necessarily rational.40
Upon land, the Spaniards performed an act of possession at a nearby temple without any
native resistance. A native priest, under whose care the temple apparently rested, approached the
Spaniards and gave them pipes, which the Spaniards interpreted as a sign of peace. The
Spaniards then celebrated mass in the temple. After that, Grijalva ordered that only he was to
have direct communication and trade with the natives: this order did not go over well with the
rest of the Spaniards.41 Grijalva did not believe that the natives would necessarily make the
rational-like decision to run away from marauding Spaniards; rather, he believed that they could
posses the most basic rationality to makethat decision.
After these new rules were introduced, Grijalva and the natives began an exchange. The
natives gave some food to the Spaniards, but the Spaniards had their eyes set on something else.
Grijalva told the natives that they only wanted gold. At this point,Itinerario andProvinciae
drop off the description of this exchange, but Oviedo carries it on. Oviedo said that the natives
40 A counter-argument could be made that, as Oviedo tells it, the Spaniards asked the natives for permission to land
simply for show, so that they had a legal reason to land. I argue that although the Spaniards may have desired a
welcome, as it gave more legality to their actions, this was not the only reason. The Spaniards had already asked
once and once would have been enough to satisfy a legal requirement. The fact that the Spaniards asked permissionto land at least twice reveals a desire to have more than just a superficial welcome.41 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva:
A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 93-95; Juan Daz,
Itinerario, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans.
Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 70-71; Juan Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New
Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val
Trefz Press, 1942), 58. All three sources mention these new rules, but only Oviedo explicitly names these rules. I
have also adopted the timeline of the giving of new rules from the Provinciae and the Itinerario because Oviedo is
ambiguous and unclear on this matter.
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brought some low-quality gold, saying that that was all they had.42 The absence inItinerario and
Provinciae of a description of the actual trading reveals that Juan Daz did not consider that
establishing a friendly diplomatic relationship through trade was important because Juan Daz
believed that the natives were irrationally inconsistentand their friendship could never be
trusted.
All three sources agree that the Spaniards then went to the caciques town, presumably
with a native guide as they had tried and failed to reach it previously. The sources of Juan Daz
and Oviedos Accountdiffer in what they tell happened in the town and what caused the
Spaniards to leave, but the Spaniards belief in the natives lack of sophisticated rationality
appears in all three.
Oviedo says that in town Grijalva held two hopes, to trade for significant quantities of
gold and to visit the cacique. Both turned out unfulfilled. Apparently unconvinced that the
natives did not have high-quality gold, Grijalva asked to trade again and got the same results.
Grijalva asked to see the cacique, but was told by his interpreter that the cacique had decided to
go on a trading mission elsewhere rather than meet the Spaniards. Disappointed Grijalva and the
Spaniards left.43 Grijalva believed that the natives may have lied about how much gold they had
the first time and could change their mind and give up their gold to trade if he only asked again
because they were irrationally inconsistent. Furthermore, the caciques failure to follow through
on his promise surely reinforced Grijalvas belief that the natives were irrational inconsistency.
Ironically, because he believed in irrational inconsistency, he asked to see the cacique a second
42 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva:A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 94; Juan Daz,
Itinerario, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans.
Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 71; Juan Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain
in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz
Press, 1942), 59.43 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva:
A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 94-95.
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time, much like he had asked twice for a welcome. The caciques inconsistency meant that he
could irrationally change his mind and make the rational-like choice to meet the Spaniards.44
Provinciae andItinerario do not mention Grijalvas request for trade, but add an episode
about the Spaniards going to dinner. The natives of the town led Grijalva and about ten other
Spaniards, presumably consisting of the Spaniards captains, into a building for dinner. While
they were eating or soon there after, the towns inhabitants surprised the Spaniards by leaving the
town and hiding from them.45 The Provinciae says it most eloquently:
Then after a dinner had been prepared, being courteously invited by them, we were led into a stone building but
suddenly changing their mind, they departed, leaving their huts, so that we saw not one of them after the third
hour.46
With no natives around to talk and trade with, the Spaniards soon left. The Spaniards being led
into a stone building is eerily reminiscent of Cordoba being led into an ambush at Cape Catoche
and a possible ambush at Campeche. Fortunately for the Spaniards this quick change resulted in
the natives hiding, rather than ambushing the Spaniards. The natives inconsistency of trading
then fleeing must have appeared irrational to the Spaniards.
47
By this point in their time at
Cozumel, the Spaniards must have believed that the natives lacked a sophisticated rationality and
44 A counter-argument could be made that Grijalva was in a tactically more threatening position as they were in thetown and that the natives might give up more gold if they have any because of increased fear of the Spaniards
reprisal if they dont. I do not find this argument as persuasive as the one outlined in the paper, because there is no
evidence that Grijalva recognized the change in his tactical position and the affect this could have on the natives. At
the least, Grijalvas behavior does not challenge the argument that he believed that the natives were irrational. The
argument for the Spaniards belief in native irrationality can stand without this episode, however, so this behavior
should not be a focal point of too much controversy.45 Juan Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the
Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 71; Juan Daz, Provinciae, in TheDiscovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins
(Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 59.46 Juan Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the
Original Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 59.47 It could be argued that the Spaniards walked into this ambush spot because they did not consider it an ambush
spot. This leads us back to the fact that the Spaniards could not perceive of it as an ambush spot, although clearly it
was, because of certain beliefs.
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thus could not orchestrate an ambush.48
While the stories of Oviedo and Juan Daz differ, the Spaniards beliefs in these stories
do not. Both stories describe Spanish behavior that demonstrate a belief that the natives lacked a
sophisticated rationality and were irrationally inconsistent.
While Grijalva landed at Cozumel believing that the natives of Cozumel couldposses a
sophisticated rationality, by the time he left he had given up all hope that they did. Their
encounter got off to a bad start with the cacique failure to meet the Spaniards when they landed
and guide them to his town. This one decision by the cacique to go back on a promise or what
the Spaniards had thought was a promise doomed the rest of the interaction. All actions by
natives would be interpreted under the belief that they did not have a sophisticated rationality.
Even if the cacique had decided later to meet the Spaniards, this would have been too late and
would have appeared as a result of his irrational inconsistencyand not rationality.
Based on what sources we have, it is a little uncertain if Grijalva believed that these
natives possessed a most basic rationality to run away from danger. What is certain is that he
believed that they couldpossess it, which in itself is a significant departure from the beliefs of
Crdoba.
Grijalva believed what he did because of what he had learned from the Crdoba
48 One could argue that hunger and thirst could explain Spaniards decisions to make risky decisions. Factors such
as hunger and thirst, however, can not explain Spaniards decision to go to dinner this time, like they may have been
able to account for some riskySpanish behavior during the Crdoba expedition. The Spanish had left Cuba about 2
weeks ago and the three sources record not troubles with storms or leaky water casks that were in found in the
Crdoba expedition. Furthermore, if Oviedos account is to believed, Grijalva offered the cacique some of theirfood during their meeting although the cacique declined that offer. This is hardly a smart decision if they are
running low on food! A counter-argument could be that the Spanish offered some of their food in the hopes thatthey would be supported by the cacique in greater quantities. I find this answer unpersuasive though because the
Spanish had many alternative things to offer other than food and specifically brought some things other than food to
be traded.
Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De
Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942),
92.
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expedition, although it had only ended months if not weeks before he left. Grijalva must have
been surprised to learn about the alarming frequency of ambushes during the Crdoba
Expedition. One or two ambushes taken separately could easily be attributed to bad luck, an
irrational decision by the natives to attack at coincidentally the same moment when the Spaniards
were most vulnerable, but all three ambushes taken as a whole with the almost-ambush at Cape
Catoche could not be explained as random chance. Grijalva must have wondered if some of the
natives encountered by Crdoba had a most basic rationality if not a sophisticated rationality. He
did not believe that all the natives he encountered would necessarily be rational, but that some
could be and he should always be on the look out for those that were.
49
Campeche (San Lazaro)
On May 7, the Spaniards sailed away from Cozumel. For more than two weeks, they
were unable to find fresh water and were forced to drink wine for hydration. It is in this
condition that they arrived at Campeche on May 25.50
The encounter at Campeche would be the first encounter in which the natives had had
previous contact with Spaniards, those of the Crdoba Expedition. The Spaniards believed,
somewhat incorrectly, that the cacique Lazaro of Campeche and Francisco Fernndez de
Crdoba had been friends. As the hour was late at the time of their arrival, the Spaniards held
off landing till the next day. During the night, the Spaniards witnessed from their ships the
natives banging drums and yelling and believed that the natives had seen their ships and were
preparing for battle. Grijalva decided to secretly land combat-ready Spaniards before the dawn
49 Crdoba may have thought it possible that natives had a basic form of rationality, but he certainly thought it less
probable than Grijalva did because Crdoba enacted no policies to demonstrate it, unlike Grijalva.50 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva:
A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 99; Timeline is
from Henry Wagner, Itinerary of Grijalva according to Oviedo, The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De
Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 47.
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broke, so that the Spaniards were not vulnerable while landing.51 The Spaniards believed that
Lazaro had been a friend, but they still were very cautious and prepared for combat anyway
because they believed that Lazaro likely lacked a sophisticated rationality and could irrationally
decide to break his friendship with Spaniards.
The Spaniards landing went without incident, but as the sun rose the Spaniards
discovered native warriors had gathered to meet them. Both the Spaniards and natives decided to
put off battle for the moment and communicate through Julin, the Spaniards interpreter who
was probably from Campeche. The Spaniards told some natives who stepped forward as
representatives that they only came to peacefully trade for water, and may have also included
wood and food.52 The word choice in the Provinciae for the description of Grijalvas orders to
Julian highlights the issue of rationality:
Since, however, the number of the inhabitants was large, and in order that there might be no motive to
attack, the captain ordered them to be advised through an interpreter that we had not come there with
hostile intent or for any harm but to obtain water, wood, and article of food and after receiving this we
would withdraw straightaway.53
Grijalva communicated to the natives as if they were rational in order to test their rationality. If
the natives chose the rational-like decision to let the Spaniards supply themselves, then Grijalva
51 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva:A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 99; Juan Daz,
Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts,
trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 60; Juan Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of New
Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val
Trefz Press, 1942), 72-73. The Provinciae goes as far as saying that Crdoba and cacique Lzaro agreed to a treaty,
the terms of which are not stated.52 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva:
A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 100-101; JuanDaz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original
Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 61; Juan Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of
New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA:
Val Trefz Press, 1942), 73. Both the Provinciae and Itinerario include wood in the Spanish request. The Provinciae
also includes food.53 Juan Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the
Original Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 61.
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would be more persuaded of their rationality while also leaving room for the exception that they
were irrational and this was by chance. But if they reject the Spaniards, then they were certainly
irrational.54
The sources are more ambiguous about the native response. Oviedos Accountsays that
the natives answered first that the Spanish must turn back immediately then changed their minds
and allowed the Spanish to get only water. TheProvinciae says that the natives consistently told
the Spanish to go away. Both theProvinciae andItinerario tell that the Spaniards believed that
the natives rejection of their requests was the fault of the translator Julin and not the natives
lack of rationality. The Provinciae specifically adds that Julin told the natives that the
Spaniards were their enemy and would attack them.55 The central question here is did Grijalva
and the Spaniards actually believe that the tense relations were solely because of Julin? Before
answering we must first understand what an answer to this question might mean. First of all, we
have no reason to believe that the Spaniards had learned that competition over resources of
water, wood, and food, could rationally cause war, especially considering that they tell the
natives directly their desire to take resources. Therefore, the Spaniards were left with two
possible answers for the question, why did the natives, seemingly irrationally, demand that the
Spaniards leave? One is that the natives were irrational. The other is that Julin is spreading
false information about the Spaniards. With no credible incentive for the sources to misrepresent
the truth, it is almost certain that the Spaniards chose the second answer. The Spaniards believed
54 A possible factor in deciding to address the natives as rational is that Grijalva may have been trying to lend
himself the veneer of legality and defend himself from later charges of aggression, much like his reading of theRequirement would do.55 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva:
A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 101; Juan Daz,
Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts,
trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 61; Juan Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of New
Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val
Trefz Press, 1942), 73.
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that the natives couldposses a sophisticated rationality, but Julins lies made it impossible for
the Spaniards to distinguish between a solely irrational-like decision and an irrational decision.56
Although the Spaniards thought Julin was treacherous, they still used him, indicating that they
did not have another option for translator and that they believed that the natives probably would
have made the wrong decision even if Julin had not lied. While the Spaniards believe that the
natives of Campeche couldhave a sophisticated rationality, they considered it unlikely.
Instead of immediately getting water, the Spaniards celebrated mass. After this, the
Spaniards advanced in formation to a well that they believed was used during the previous
expedition and began to fill up their casks. The natives repeated their demand that the Spaniards
leave immediately and brought their warriors into clear view of the Spaniards. Grijalva insisted,
through Julin, that they would stay until the following day to fill up on water.57
Relations between the Spaniards and natives took an upturn when Grijalva asked to trade
and meet Lazaro. The natives responded ambiguously, as it appears in the three sources, that
Lazaro would visit the Spaniards and also that the Spaniards must leave immediately after filling
up. But native behavior changed significantly, as they began to trade their food and gold for the
Spaniards green beads, probably after the Spaniards insistence on trade. The Spaniards stopped
the exchange soon after it had begun, however, because the natives gilded objects were of little
56 It is as if the native rolled a dice, albeit in their heads, and if it landed on one they made the rational-like decision,
but Julin prevented the natives from ever rolling this dice.57
Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva:A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 101-102; Juan
Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the OriginalTexts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 61; Juan Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of
New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA:
Val Trefz Press, 1942) 73. Although Grijalvas behavior here might at first look seem unresponsive, we cannot
determine this because the incentive to keep filling up on water were too high. The Spaniards were desperate for
water prior to this encounter and this well did not yield much water. The Spaniards must have been scared of what
would lie ahead of them if they did not fill up on water when they had the chance. Therefore, the Spaniards
insistence on staying does not necessarily reveal a belief in native irrationality.
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worth. Lazaro never came.58 The cost of trading for the Spaniards was extremely low. The
green beads they had were very inexpensive for the Spaniards, but highly valued by the natives.
The Spaniards ended this exchange as soon as they realized that they were not making a very big
profit. The Spaniards did not even consider that this exchange could help develop friendly
relations between the Spaniards and natives. If they had, they would have at least continued
trading a little longer to see if the natives would become friends and change their minds. The
Spaniards believed that peace could notbe bought from these natives. The natives were just as
likely to act irrationally and change their minds whether or not the Spaniards gave them green
beads. From the time that they blamed Julin to the time they ended the exchange, the Spaniards
had lost all hope that the natives of Campeche had a sophisticated rationality. This change was
the result of the natives demonstration of their irrational inconsistency. The natives decision to
trade actually showed that they were irrational because if they were rational they would either
traded in the first place or never trade at all. The Spaniards believed that the natives response to
their presence was inconsistent because of their irrationality. Like at Cozumel, the caciques
failure to appear after it had been promised he would appear, demonstrated to the Spaniards the
natives irrational inconsistency. The Spaniards failed to blame Julin anymore because the
examples of native irrationality were too numerous to be all Julins fault.
Later that day, the situation took a turn for the worse. The natives insisted again that the
Spaniards leave immediately and then escalated the situation by rallying their warriors in front of
the Spaniards. Oviedos Accountalone adds that the natives then tried to unsuccessfully defeat
58 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva:
A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 102-104; Juan
Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original
Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942) 61; Juan Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of
New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA:
Val Trefz Press, 1942), 73. Only Oviedo explicitly states that the Spaniards cut off the trade, but the Provinciae and
Itinerario suggest it in their telling of the Spaniards belief in the low-quality of the natives goods.
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the Spaniards, but we cannot be certain that this happened because such an attack is not
mentioned inItinerario andProvinciae. Regardless, Oviedos description of the Spaniards
attitudinal response to the natives rally and attack is highly informative: The captains and
soldiers said that it was not proper that they should suffer such knavery and insolence from that
bestial people.59 The word choice of knavery, insolence, and bestialsuggest that the
Spaniards believed that the natives could only possess the most basic rationality because of their
animal-like nature.
Tensions remained high during the night as the natives kept watch on the Spaniards while
the Spaniards did the same to them. The next day, the natives repeated their request that the
Spaniards leave and the Spaniards repeated their response that they would leave once they were
completely filled up on water. Much like during the Crdoba expedition, a native began burning
some incense in view of the Spaniards, threatening an attack if the Spaniards were not gone
when it burnt out. The Spaniards said that they would not leave immediately but soon. Some
natives gave the Spaniards some turkeys. When the incense burned out, the natives followed
through on their threat, attacking the Spaniards. The Spaniards held from counter-attacking at
first so that Grijalva could have it taken down in writing that he was defending himself because
those barbarous people were about to attack him without cause. The Spaniards then fought
back and eventually the natives fled after wounding forty Spaniards and killing one. Having
beaten back the natives, the Spaniards continued to fill up on water as they remained vigilant and
prepared for another attack. They actually fired a cannon at some native warriors who were
trying to sneak up on the Spaniards, which scared them away.60
59 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva:
A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 104; Juan Daz,
Itinerario, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans.
Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 74.60 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva:
A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 104-106; Juan
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Grijalva decision to disregard the native threat is likely a result of his beliefs formed after
a days interaction with the natives of Campeche. He had already formed the belief that the
natives of Campeche lacked a sophisticated irrationality and succumbed to irrational
inconsistency. Grijalva believed that the natives would probably not follow through on their
threat because they were prone to changing their mind often. At which point, they would return
to their irrational vacillation of responses.
The Spaniards vigilantly posted guards throughout this encounter even after beating
back native attacks because they believed that the natives lack a sophisticated rationality and
could irrationally attack anytime. This belief turned out to be fortunate for the Spaniards because
the natives made what the Spaniards thought was the irrational decision to maintain hostilities.
The Spaniards thought a decision to attack was irrational and to surrender was rational although
it was probably quite the opposite.
All three sources agree that the natives then sued for peace and brought gifts of food and
gold for the Spaniards, but only Oviedo describes in detail what follows till the Spaniards
departure. Oviedo says that Grijalva sent a few messengers to the cacique to see what they
wanted. The cacique promised to come, as the messengers relayed, and bring much gold and
food to the Spaniards. The cacique failed to appear and so the Spaniards left as soon as they
finished getting water, in battle-ready formation.61 Much like the Spaniards of the Crdoba
expedition, the Spaniards of the Grijalva expedition feared being attacked as they left Campeche.
Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts,trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 74; Juan Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New
Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: ValTrefz Press, 1942), 61. The quote is from page 106 of Oviedo.61 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva:
A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 106-108. Juan
Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original
Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 62; Juan Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of
New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA:
Val Trefz Press, 1942), 74. Quote is from page 107.
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Although they had thoroughly defeated the natives, the Spaniards feared an attack as they left
because they believed that the natives lacked were irrationally inconsistent and could suddenly
decide to attack without cause.
Tabasco River (Grijalva River)
From Campeche, the Spaniards explored the coastline for a couple weeks, finding a good
supply of fresh water and fish on the coastline, before reaching a large river they named Grijalva
River. The rivers strong current prevented the Spaniards from sailing very far upstream, if at
all, but it also meant that fresh water, pushed by the river, could be found out at sea. It is likely
that the Spaniards were greeted by natives firing arrows at their ships from onshore whom they
scared off with cannon fire.62 In spite of this clear indication that they were not welcome, the
Spaniards refused to leave.63 The natives had demonstrated their lack of sophisticated rationality
by attacking the Spaniards, but the Spaniards still believed that peace for a short time was
possible. They would not have stayed if they believed that they would be caught in perpetual
war. The Spaniards believed that if the natives did not change their minds by chance and make
the rational-like decision to seek peace, they could use their military strength to scare the natives
into peace, appealing to the most basic rationality. The Spaniards thought that a peace was sure
not to last forever, but just long enough for the Spaniards to acquire water, food, gold, or
whatever other resources they wanted.64
62
The Provinciae and Itinerario, but not Oviedo, mention this hostile greeting.63 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva:
A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 110; Juan Daz,Itinerario, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans.
Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942) 75; Juan Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain
in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz
Press, 1942) 62; Henry Wagner, Itinerary of Grijalva according to Oviedo, The Discovery of New Spain in 1518
by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 47.64 Because the Spaniards were well supplied with water and food at this point, it is clear that a decision to stay was
not the result of a need to acquire supplies from the natives or their land.
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The situation looked grim as the native warriors returned to their positions along the
shore the next day, but through the use of a few captured natives as translators the Spaniards and
natives agreed to trade, instead of war. The Spaniards were right to believe that the natives
would change their minds although they thought incorrectly about the reasons. The exchange
was profitable for the Spaniards and lasted a couple days.65 Oviedos Accountand Juan Dazs
two sources tell different stories about the Spaniards departure from the River Grijalva.
Oviedo simply says that the Spaniards left once they realized beyond a doubt that the
rivers current would not allow them to explore upstream.66
Itinerario andProvinciae say that the local cacique offered a very large ransom of a
mans weight in gold for a native that the Spaniards had captured along the coast a few days
earlier and now used as translator and source of information. Grijalva decided to leave that land,
much to the dismay of the other Spaniards, before the cacique returned to the ships with the
promised ransom.67 If Juan Dazs story is to be believed, then Grijalva must have decided to
leave because he did not believe that the cacique would return with a large ransom if he returned
at all. It is hard to believe the value of this native as a translator and informant outweighed this
enormous offer of gold. Grijalva did not trust the cacique at his word and thus left, possibly
forsaking an opportunity at much wealth, because he believed that the natives at River Grijalva
did not posses the sophisticated rationality to have kept the gold hidden from him throughout
65 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva:
A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 110-111; Juan
Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the OriginalTexts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 63; Juan Daz, Itinerario, in The Discovery of
New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA:Val Trefz Press, 1942) 75-76.66 Gonzalo Fernndez de Oviedo, Oviedos Account, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva:
A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 112.67 Juan Daz, Provinciae, in The Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the
Original Texts, trans. H. E. Robbins (Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 63; Juan Daz, Itinerario, in The
Discovery of New Spain in 1518 by Juan De Grijalva: A Translation of the Original Texts, trans. Henry Wagner
(Pasadena, CA: Val Trefz Press, 1942), 76.
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their extensive trade prior to the ransom offer.
San Juan
For about three weeks the Spaniards explored the coastline and participated in a few
minor encounters, before happening upon a relatively wealthy group of natives. On June 19,
while exploring an island off the mainland, the Spaniards saw some natives on the mainland
beckoning to the Spaniards with their white banners. Grijalva decided to send Montejo to
investigate. The natives had a very friendly manner and gave the Spaniards some mantles while
promising to bring gold in the future. The following