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LeaYpiGovernmentDepartmentLondonSchoolofEconomicsandPoliticalSciencel.l.ypi@lse.ac.uk[1stDRAFT,pleasecheckwithmebeforeciting]WHATS WRONGWITHCOLONIALISM

I.There isnoquestionmarkat theendofmy title. Iaskyou togrant that something iswrongwithcolonialism.Thatinitselfisnomeagreconcession:thehistoryofliberalismis repletewithapologiesof colonialismasmuchas condemnationsof it.1 If you thinkthatcolonialismis,allthingsconsidered,justified,youareunlikelytofindattractivethearguments of this paper. But if you agree that something must be wrong withcolonialism, you might be keen to know more about what exactly the nature of thewrongis.Theanswerissurprisinglydifficulttoprovideforthosewhowanttoresistsomeversionofnationalism,beitofanethnicorofacivickind,beitdeclaredordisguised.Inthispaper Ishalldiscussnationalismverybriefly, ifatall.Whilstquitea fewscholarsstill find nationalism attractive, many more may be interested in a critique ofcolonialism which does not require commitment to nationalism (or to a concealedvariation of it). Here I try to offer an alternative critique, one that does not claim to 1FordiscussionsoftherelationshipbetweenliberalismandcolonialismseeDuncanIvison,PaulPatton,andWillSanders,PoliticalTheoryandtheRightsofIndigenousPeoples(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2000),DuncanIvison,PostcolonialLiberalism(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2002),PaulKeal,EuropeanConquestandtheRightsof IndigenousPeoples :TheMoralBackwardnessof InternationalSociety(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2003),DomenicoLosurdo,ControstoriaDelLiberalismo(Roma:Laterza,2005).

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refutenationalismconclusivelybutthatsuggestsawayforwardforthosewhoremainskepticofitscoreclaims.Thewayforward,Ipropose,istodisentanglethecritiqueofcolonialismfromthedefenseofterritorialrights.InthefirstpartofthepaperIexplainwhythisargumentisneeded, and what form it should take. In the second part I introduce a newunderstandingofcolonialism,onethatseescolonialismnotasaviolationofterritorialclaimsbutastheembodimentofanobjectionableformofpoliticalrelation.Thewrongof colonialism is revealed in the unilateral forcing of others to endorse a commonpolitical authority which fails to offer reciprocally equal terms of interaction tocolonizersandcolonized.Toshowthenatureofthiswrong,nojustificationofterritorialrightsisneeded.II.Disentanglingthecritiqueofcolonialismfromthedefenceofterritorialrightsisnotatallstraightforward.Wetendtothinkoftheclaimsofindigenousgroupsasterritoriallyrelatedinsomeimportantway,asclaimstoparticularland,particularresourcesandtheuseofgeographicalspacebelongingtoaparticulargroupofpeople.2Wetendtothinkofstruggles for colonial independence as struggles to restore selfdetermininghistoricalcommunities,withaunilateralrighttoexcludeothersfromdecisionsconcerningtheirfate. The power, Gandhi declared in his famous Quit India speech of 1947, willbelongtothepeopleofIndia,anditwillbeforthemtodecidetowhomitplacedintheentrusted.3Thelinkbetweenthecritiqueofcolonialismandthedefenceofterritorialrightsis also explicitly made in a number of important legal documents and international 2ForsomediscussionsofterritorialrightsthatrelatetothecritiqueofcolonialismseeLeaBrilmayer,'SecessionandSelfDetermination:ATerritorialInterpretation',YaleJournalof.InternationalLaw,16/1(Winter1991),177202,AllenBuchanan,'Boundaries:WhatLiberalismHastoSay',inAllenBuchananandMargaretMoore(eds.),States,Nations,andBorders:TheEthicsofMakingBoundaries(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2003),23161,DavidMiller,'TerritorialRights:ConceptandJustification',PoliticalStudies,(forthcoming),MargaretMoore,'TheTerritorialDimensionofSelfDetermination',inMargaretMoore(ed.),NationalSelfDeterminationandSecession(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1998),13457,A.J.Simmons,'HistoricalRightsandFairShares',LawandPhilosophy,14/2(May1995),14984.3QuitIndia,1947.InCollectedwritingsofGhandi.

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conventions. To take one prominent example, theUnitedNations Declaration on theGrantingof Independence toColonialCountriesandPeoplesof1960asserts that allpeopleshaveaninalienablerighttocompletefreedom,theexerciseoftheirsovereigntyandtheintegrityoftheirnationalterritory.4The defence of territorial rights might at first appear crucial also for ourunderstanding of rectificatory claims. Indigenous peoples arguments concerning theuseofparticularlandandresourcesseemtogaintheirstrengthfromanappealtotheinitialterritorialentitlementsoftheirancestors.Evenincaseswhereinterpretershavebeen prepared to concede that changes in future circumstances might imply thesupersession of past colonial wrongs, this original claim of colonized groups to theterritoryoccupiedbysettlershashardlyeverbeenchallenged.5If the argument of this paper is correct, the reason these claims strike us asplausible has little to do with their inherent validity and more with our moralassessment of the political circumstances under which they were progressivelydeveloped. The analysis of these circumstances reveals that thewrong of colonialismconsists in itsembodimentofamorallyobjectionable formofpolitical relation,not inthe allegedly wrongful occupation of others land.6 To understand its morallyobjectionablenature,onedoesnotneedaconclusivejustificationofgroupsterritorialclaims.7Whatisrequiredinsteadisanaccountofthecorrectwayofseekingtoexpandtheboundariesofpoliticalassociations,apointtowhichIshallreturn.III. 4Resolution1514(XV),seehttp://www.un.org/en/decolonization/history.shtml,accessed29thFebruary2012.5Seee.g.JeremyWaldron,'SupersedingHistoricInjustice',Ethics,103/1(Oct1992),428at4.6 This point is sympathetic to Catherine Lus remarks on colonialism as structural injustice althoughunlikeme,Luseemswillingtoconcedethathistoricalcolonialismwasalsowrongbecauseitviolatedtheterritorial rights of colonized people, see Catherine Lu, 'Colonialism as Structural Injustice: HistoricalResponsibility and Contemporary Redress', Journal of Political Philosophy, 19/3 (Sep 2011), 26181 at262.7 I talk about groups rather than nations or states to include inmy discussion of colonialism theterritorialclaimsofindigenouspeopleswhoIconsiderperfectlysymmetricaltotheseotheragents.ForadiscussionoftheimplicationsofthispointseeWillKymlicka,'MinorityRightsinPoliticalPhilosophyandInternational Law', in SamanthaBesson and JohnTasioulas (eds.),The Philosophy of International Law(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2010),37796.

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Disentanglingthecritiqueofcolonialismfromthedefenceofterritorialrightsisactuallyrathertricky.Thetermitselfsuggestsaninherentlinkbetweenthesettlementclaimsofparticulargroupsofpeopleandthemodalitiesofuseofspecificareasofgeographicalspace. In its first Latin use theword colonising derived from colon,whichmeansfarmer, tiller orplanter. It referred to theRomanpractice of settling in a hostile ornewly conqueredcountryby citizenswho retained their rightsoforiginal citizenship,whilstworkingonlandbestowedtothembytheoccupyingauthorities.8This relationship between settlers and the appropriation of land remainedcentralin16thand17thcenturyaccountsofoccupationoftheNewWorld.Herethetermcolonies was deployed to refer to the territory used by settlers who created newcommunitiesforthemselvesandtheirdescendantswhilstremainingdependentonthemother country in all political and economicmatters.9 In themore recent normativeliterature, the issueofwhothe landbelongsto,andwhatcriteriaonemight invoke injustifying legitimate territorialoccupationhasbeenconsideredcrucial inemphasizingthewrongofcolonialismandinadjudicatingtherectificatoryclaimsofsettlersvisvisthoseofnativepopulations.10Ifwebracketnationalism,weare leftwith two families of theories connectingthewrongofcolonialismto territorialrights:acquisitionaccounts inspiredbyLockestheory of property rights and legitimate state theories. Let us start by examining thefirst. Proponents of the view are typically divided between those who endorse anindividualistversionandthosewhoendorseacollectivistversionoftheargument.Ontheindividualistversion,territorialrightsarederivativeofindividualrightstopropertyinaparticularterritory;onthecollectivistversiontheyareanalogoustothem.11Butthedifference between them is relatively marginal for our purposes. In both cases,territorialrightsareestablishedasaresultofagents(betheyindividualorcollective)freedomtostakeaclaimonpreviouslyunownedresources(includingland)andonthewayinwhichtheuseoftheseresourcespromotestheendsoftheseagents.Forsome, 8SeeOxfordEnglishDictionnary,http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/36547.9Ibid.10Seeforexample{Meisels,2005#2054@7895;Nine,forthcoming#4365@ch.7;Simmons,1995#4366;Miller,forthcoming#2061;Kolers,2009#4288;Stilz,2011#4193}11FordevelopmentsoftheindividualistversionseeHillelSteiner,'TerritorialJustice',inSimonCaney,D.George, andPeter Jones (eds.),NationalRights, InternationalObligations (BoulderCO:WestviewPress,1996), 13948., JohnA. Simmons, 'On theTerritorialRights of States',Philosophical Issues, /11 (2001),30026., forcollectivist interpretationsseeCaraNine, 'ALockeanTheoryofTerritory',PoliticalStudies,56/1(2008),14865.

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territorial rightsareestablishedasa resultofagentsmakingefficientuseof the land.Forothers,theyareestablishedasaresultofdeservingthefruitsoftheeffortsinvestedto improve it. For others still, they are established as a result of the incorporationofneededexternalresourcesintolegitimatepurposesandactivities.12Thetroublewiththese justificationsofterritorialrights isthattheyallseemtofailinrulingoutcolonialism.Onthecontrary,theytendtolegitimizeit,andhavedonesointhepast.Consider,forexample,howtherelationshipbetweenlandoccupationandsettlement was characterized in several early modern attempts to justify colonialpractices. In Grotius and Lockes theories of property, the land used by indigenouspopulationswasconsideredavailableforoccupationbyWesternsettlersonthebasisofargumentsonacquisitionmuchliketheoneswehavejustcited.Initialavailabilityoftheearth to everyone, together with the role of cultivation, improvement of otherwisewasted resources, and desert for the fruit of ones efforts, were crucial to thejustification of colonial enterprises. Since native inhabitants of newly discoveredterritoriesdidnotmakeefficientuseof the land,didnot investeffortsoncontinuouspatchesoftheearth,andfailedtocreateanagriculturalsystemaddingmaterialvaluetorawnaturalresources,partsoftheterritoriesinwhichtheylivedcouldlegitimatelybeconsideredavailableforappropriationbyanyone.Oncenewlyarrivedsettlersinvestedefforts inpreviouslyuncultivatedareas, theirparticularwayof interactingwithwastelandwassufficienttoturnrelevantchunksoftheterritoryunderuseintothepropertyof those living in it. As Grotius puts it: ifwithin a territory of a people there is anydesertedandunproductive soil ... it is a rightof foreigners to takepossessionof suchground for the reason that uncultivated land ought not to be considered occupied.13Locke, forwhomthe livingconditionsof indigenousgroups in theAmericasofferedaclear image of how the state of naturewould have historically looked like,14made asimilarpointbutreplacedthecriterionofusewithamuchstrongerconstraint:labour.Forhim,externalobjectshadtobeappropriatedbefore theycouldbeofanyuse,andtheonlymeansbywhichlandcouldbeappropriatedwastocultivateit. 12Forareviewoftheseargumentsseeunpublishedmanuscript..13 Hugo Grotius,The Rights ofWar and Peace, Including the Law of Nature and of Nations, trans. A. C.Campbell(NewYork:M.WalterDunne,[1625]1901)atII.2.XVII.14In the beginning, Locke writes, all the world was America. See John Locke, Two Treatises onGovernment, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [1690] 1988) at II,49. For anexcellent discussion of Lockes relationship to English colonialism see Barbara Arneil, John Locke andAmerica:TheDefenceofEnglishColonialism(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1996).

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Ofcourse,itispossibletoobjecttotheseearlieraccountsthattheirjustificationofterritorialrightsplacestoomuchemphasisonlabour,efficientuseofresources,andcultivation,thereforeneglectingculturallyspecificwaysofinteractingwithlandontheside of indigenous populations.15 This point however misses the target. The reasontheseearlymodernauthorsdeniedterritorialrightstoindigenouspeoplecouldhardlybe ascribed to their ignoranceof alternativewaysof life or to a cultural bias in theirapplicationofacquisitiontheories.TheFirstSetofFundamentalConstitutionsforSouthCarolinathatLockehelpedtodraftemphasizesthattheIndiansidolatry,ignoranceormistakesgivesusnorighttoexpelorusethemill.16And,LockecertainlyagreedthatthelabourtheoryofacquisitionappliedtonativepopulationsoftheAmericas,TheLawofreasonheclaimed,makestheDeer,thatIndianswhohathkilledit.17Theissuewasnot that the productive activity of American Indians did not generate claims toacquisition. It was rather that indigenous productive activity did not extend toresources(like land)whichwasevidentlynotusedonaterritoriallycontinuousbasis.The chiefmatter of Property, Locke declared, is not the fruits of the Earth, nor theBeaststhatsubsistonit,buttheEarthitself.18IftheEarthcarriednosignsofservingtheendsofthosewhooccupiedit,itcouldbeplausiblyinferredthattheyhadnoneedtoaccess it on an exclusive and permanent basis. If they had no need for exclusive andpermanentaccess,thenitwasplausibletoarguethatothersinneedwereatlibertytostakeaclaimonit.AsGrotiusbeforeLockehadalsoputit,naturalneedsaresatisfiedwith only a few things,whichmay be easily hadwithout great labour or cost. As forwhatGodhasgrantedusinaddition,wearecommandednottothrowitintothesea(assome Philosophers foolishly asserted), nor to leave it unproductive [inutile], nor towasteit,buttouseittomeettheneeds[inopiam]ofothermen,eitherbygivingitaway,orbylendingittothosewhoask;asisappropriateforthosewhobelievethemselvestobenotowners[dominos]ofthesethings,butrepresentativesorstewards[procuratoresacdispensatores]ofGodtheFather.19 15 See for example the argument in Buchanan, 'Boundaries: What Liberalism Has to Say', at 23744,Moore, 'The Territorial Dimension of SelfDetermination', at 14750. and an attempt to address it inTamarMeisels,TerritorialRights(Dordrecht:Springer,2005)at97112.16CitedinA.R.Pagden,LordsofAlltheWorlds:IdeologiesofEmpireinSpain,BritainandFranceC.1500C.1850(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1995)at86.17Locke,TwoTreatisesonGovernmentatII.30.18Ibid.,atII.32.19[Grotius,Deveritatereligionischristianae]

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To see the force of these arguments, consider the case of indigenous huntergatherer populations. If these groupswereplaced onedayhere, another day there, athirddaysomewhereelse,itmeantthattheydidnotactuallyneedtouseacontinuousareaofgeographicalspace;landsimplydidnotrelatetotheirculturallyspecificendsina way that was relevant to ground property claims. Earlier defenders of colonialismwere well aware of this point. Emmerich de Vattel for example granted that theoccupantsof fertile landmightoncehavebeen justified inhuntingandkeeping flocksinsteadofengaginginagriculture.Butnowpopulationswithasimilarstyleoflifeusedmore land than they needed.20 They therefore had no reason to complain if othernations,moreindustriousandcloselyconfinedcometotakepossessionofpartofthoselands.21 The establishment of colonies in North Americawas, he argued, extremelylawful. The people of those extensive tracts rather ranged through than inhabitedthem.22 This argument remains valid even if one accepts that indigenous people areentitled to parts of the land they currently occupy in virtue of its promoting somesufficiently importantendof theirs, andeven if it is conceded that they relate to it inwaysthatareculturallydifferentfromours.IV.The arguments made in these passages are also perfectly compatible with anotherreading of acquisition theories of territorial rights, emphasizing the relevance of theproviso principle to leave enough and as good for other needy newcomers. Theproviso, as is well known, places original appropriators under an obligation todownsize their holdings should changes in circumstances create new needs foroutsiders to access land and resources previously available to native inhabitants.23 20ForadiscussionofVattelspositionseeKeal,EuropeanConquestandtheRightsofIndigenousPeoples:TheMoralBackwardnessofInternationalSociety.21EmerDeVattel,TheLawofNations:OrPrinciplesoftheLawofNatureAppliedtotheConductofNationsandSovereigns,edsBelaKapossyandRichardWhatmore(Indianapolis:LibertyFund,2008)at68.22Ibid.23ManyoftheobservationsA.J.Simmonsmakesinhisdiscussionondownsizingarecompatiblewiththese remarks. Simmons gives the example of original islanderswhose holdings can be challenged byneedynewcomersclaimingafairshareoftheislands landandnaturalresources.Original islanders,heargues,may choosewhich portions of their holdings to distribute, keeping for example the parts theyhaveinvestedmostlabourinorinwhichtheyfeelmostattached.Butiftheyresistdownsizingandrefuseto choose which portions to surrender, the newcomers may seize their shares without the original

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Vattel,aswehaveseen,didnotdisputethefactthatoccupiersofterritoriesintheNewWorldmight be entitled to the land they inhabited. The pointwas that their right tooccupytheselandsshouldnotbecoupledwitharighttopermanentlyexcludeothersinneed. Many of Vattels predecessors (including Vitoria and Pufendorf) also concededthatindigenouspeoplemightwellbeconsideredinrightfulpossessionoftheirland.Yetthey denied that this implied a permanent right to exclude needy settlers. Since theEarthhadinitiallybeenavailableforusebyeveryone,indigenouspeoplehadadutytoreceivecolonialists,totreatthemhospitably,togiveawaypartoftheirholdingsandtoenterintocommercialandpoliticalrelationswiththem.24TheSpaniards,Vitoriaargued,may import the commodities which they lack, and export the gold silver and otherthingswhich they have in abundance.25 Local princes, he continued, are obliged bynaturallawtolovetheSpaniards,andthereforecannotprohibitthemwithoutduecausefromfurtheringtheirowninterests.26One could of course resist these claims by arguing that the way tribalpopulations engagedwith land implied a particular connection to their territory, onewhichwasessentialtothesepopulationssenseofidentityandwhichrequiredexclusiveandpermanentaccesstoitsresources.Butasimilarargumentwouldtakeusclosertonationalistaccounts,andwouldnotbeavailabletoacriticofcolonialismwhoisatthesametimetryingtoavoidcommitmenttonationalism.Ifweputnationalismtooneside,itseemsthatthereisnoplausiblereasontoinsistthattheprovisoprincipleshouldnotapplytoindigenouspopulations,evenassumingthattheywereinitiallyentitledtovasttracts of territory. From an acquisition perspective, no identitybased conception of owners' consent although they should compensate them for any labour invested and seize those partsthatarelesscentraltotheoriginalownerspursuits.SeeSimmons, 'HistoricalRightsandFairShares',at165.24Seefordiscussionsontherighttotreat foreignershospitablyGeorgCavallar,TheRightsofStrangers.Theoriesof InternationalHospitality, theGlobalCommunityandPolitical JusticesinceVitoria. (Aldershot:Ashgate,2002),AnthonyPagden, 'Stoicism,Cosmopolitanism,andtheLegacyofEuropeanImperialism',Constellations,7/1(2000),322.25SeeFranciscoDeVitoria, 'On theAmerican Indians', inAnthonyPagdenand JeremyLawrance(eds.),PoliticalWritings(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1991),23192at279.26 Ibid. See for a discussion of this argument in the context of the Spanish conquest Anthony Pagden,'DispossessingtheBarbarian:TheLanguageofSpanishThomismandtheDebateoverthePropertyRightsof the American Indians', in Anthony Pagden (ed.), The Languages of Political Theory in EarlyModernEurope(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1987),7998.SimilarargumentstoVitoriaweremadebyPufendorf,Wolffand,withsomequalificationsthatwewillconsidershortly,Kant.ForagoodoverviewoftherighttohospitalityinthethoughtoftheseauthorsseeCavallar,TheRightsofStrangers.TheoriesofInternationalHospitality,theGlobalCommunityandPoliticalJusticesinceVitoria.

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territorycanlimittherightsofotherstoafairshareoftheEarthsnaturalresources.27Asoneauthorputsit,NativeAmericanbeliefsthattheyshouldnotyieldtonewcomersexclusive control over portions of their territories would be viewed as a kind ofnonculpablemoralignorance,anignorancethatperhapsexcusestheiractsofresistancetosettlementoftheirterritories,butthatinnowaylimitstherightsoffairaccess(andselfdefense)ofnewcomers.28If the wrong of colonialism is linked to the justification of territorial rights,colonialpracticesappearverydifficulttocriticizequacolonialpractices.Deprivedofaconclusive justification for the right to permanently exclude outsiders, the claims ofcolonizedpeopletounilaterallycontrollandandresourcesrestonveryweakgrounds.Thisisnottosaythatwecannotcondemnsuchpracticesforwhattheyhavehistoricallyproduced:massmurder,ethniccleansing,theexploitationoflabourandresources,theenslavement of huge parts of the Earths population. But this critiquewould take uscloser to the idea that the wrong of colonialism consists in its embodying anobjectionableformofpoliticalrelation,not inthewrongfuloccupationofothers land.For inthiscaseweareconcedingthatattemptingtoenter intopoliticalrelationswithpeople inhabiting other areas of the earth is not in itself objectionable. And we areendorsing the idea that native inhabitants of these areas cannot refuse entrance tooutsiders. Colonialism is therefore not condemned on the basis of territorialentitlement. It is rathercriticizedbecause itmarksadeparture froman idealofwhatcountasjusttermsofpoliticalassociation,apointtowhichIshallreturn.V. Itmightbe tempting to think that there is a straightforwardconnectionbetween thisideaof just termsofpolitical associationand thedefenseofexisting territorial rights.The form takenby the argumentwould in that casebe functional.Anagentmightbeconsideredentitledtoparticularterritorialrightsjustinsofarasthatagentiscapableofperforming certain desired political functions within a defined geographical area: 27See foranexcellentdiscussionof thedistributionofresources fromanacquisitionbasedperspectiveHillelSteiner, 'TerritorialJusticeandGlobalRedistribution', inGillianBrockandHarryBrighouse(eds.),ThePoliticalPhilosophyofCosmopolitanism(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2005),2838.28Simmons,'HistoricalRightsandFairShares',(at181.

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crucially, securing justice for all those who relate to each other in demanding thatagentsprotection.Thisispreciselywhatlegitimacybasedaccountsofterritorialrightstypically try toargue.The territorial rightsofstatesarehereconsideredderivativeoftherightsof citizens (or residents) tobemembersof legitimatepoliticalassociations.States, in other words, exercise jurisdictional authority on behalf of the people.However, unlike nationalist theories, peoples (understood as collectively sharingcertainhistoricalpractices)donotexistbeforestatesbutarepoliticallyconstitutedbythem.Andunlikemostacquisitionbasedtheories,thejustificationofarighttopropertyisnotalwaysessentialtothejustificationoftheauthorityofthestate.Thecontinuityofitsboundariesisguaranteedbyrightofitspeopletoformapoliticalassociationandbythe states ability to impose a legitimate political system upon a continuous patch ofland. Legitimacybasedtheoriesrenderthejustificationofterritorialrightsconditionaluponthesatisfactionofanumberofinternalandexternalconditions.Theseareratherfamiliar sowe can afford tomention very quickly someof themost salient ones: theability to guarantee the rule of law, to protect basic human rights and to providesufficientopportunitiesforcitizensdemocraticparticipation.29Thepuzzleforthecriticofcolonialismisthatifthisishowterritorialrightsarejustified,oneparticularkindofcolonialism,colonialismwithacivilizingmission,couldhardlyberuledout.Historically,theemancipationofallegedlybackwardnationswiththesupportofmore progressive ones has been one of the main arguments offered in support ofcolonial practices. Barbarians, Vitoria claimed with regard to the American Indians,though not totally mad could be considered so close to being mad, that they areunsuitedtosettinguporadministeringacommonwealthbothlegitimateandorderedinhuman and civil terms. It is therefore not implausible to claim that for their ownbenefit the princes of Spain might take over their administration, and set up newofficersandgovernorsontheirbehalf,orevengivethemnewmasters,so longasthiscouldbeprovedtobeintheirinterest.30 29 Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and SelfDetermination:Moral Foundations for International Law(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2004),ThomasChristiano,'ADemocraticTheoryofTerritoryandSomePuzzlesAboutGlobalDemocracy',JournalofSocialPhilosophy,37/1(2006),81107,AnnaStilz,'Nations,States, andTerritory',Ethics, 121/3 (2011), 572601, ChristopherHeathWellman, 'Political LegitimacyandTerritorialRights',(unpublishedmanuscript,2012).30Vitoria,'OntheAmericanIndians',at290.

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Vitoria presented these arguments in 1538, a mere fortysix years afterColumbushadfirstsetsailtoAmerica.Butneitherthepassageoftimenortheincreasedawareness of the consequences of European colonial rule seem to have made muchdifference to the argument. If anything, Vitoria's claims appear more qualified thanthose of the otherwise progressive John Stuart Mill more than three centuries after.WhileVitoriawaswillingtoadmitthethesisofthementalincapacityofthebarbariansmerely for the sake of argument, Mill had no doubt that barbarians could not bereliedupontoobserveanyrules.Theirminds,hewrote,arenotcapableofsogreatan effort nor is their will sufficiently under the influence of distant motives.31Therefore,Mill concluded, nationswhicharestillbarbaroushavenotgotbeyond theperiodduringwhichitislikelytobefortheirbenefitthattheyshouldbeconqueredandheldinsubjectionbyforeigners.32Ifterritorialrightsarecontingentuponaparticularwayofdeliveringjustice,thatofthelegitimatestate,itseemsthatagentswhoseemtofailinthattaskcouldplausiblybe colonized. Of course, contemporary proponents of legitimacybased accounts arewell aware of these challenges. This is exactly why their defence of the requisitecapacitiesanagentmustdisplaytolegitimatelyexerciseterritorialauthorityiscoupledwith a nonusurpation condition.33 But this condition is rather puzzling.Usurpationdoes not count as usurpation unless an independent criterion has been offered toexplainwhythosewhocurrentlyoccupyaterritoryarealsoentitledtodoso.Eitherthisindependentcriterionisgroundeditselfontherequirementsofalegitimatestateoritisnot.Ifitis,wearebacktothedefenceofcolonialismwithacivilizingmission.Ifitisnotwe can only support the nonusurpation condition with arguments external to thelegitimacybasedaccount.VI. 31JohnStuartMill, 'AFewWordsonNonIntervention', inJohnM.Robson(ed.),CollectedWorksofJohnStuart Mill. Essays on Equality Law and Education (XXI; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, [1859]1984)at118..32Ibid.33 See for example Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and SelfDetermination: Moral Foundations forInternationalLawat26678,Stilz,'Nations,States,andTerritory',(at590601.

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Onemightargueatthispointthatitispossibletofurtherelaboratethenonusurpationcondition in a way that admits the incorporation of prepolitical criteria but avoidscommittingtonationalistclaims.Onewayofdoingthisistorefertooccupancyrights,theclaimsofthosewhoinhabitaparticulargeographicalareathroughnofaultoftheirown to continue doing so.34 Permanent occupation of a particular place, so theargument goes, is central to individuals structuring of their expectations and to thereliablepursuitoftheirlifeprojects.Peoplearebornincertaingeographicalspacesandthesespacesareofcentralimportancetothepracticeswithwhichtheyareengagedona daily basis. To remove them from such places would be to severely disrupt theirability tocontinue investing in theactivities thatmatter to them,andtoprevent theircontinuousfunctioningasautonomousmoralagents.35Theoccupancy criterion seems todoa relatively good jobat clarifyingwhat itmeans for legitimate states to respect thenonusurpationcondition.Butnotice thatasimilarjustificationofrightstooccupancyisuseorientedandselfreferential.Itreferstothefreedomofthosewholiveinaparticularplacetocontinuedoingso,foraslongastheplacecontinuestobeimportantfortheirlifeprojects,andifnootherreasonsspeakagainstthatclaim.Thisargumenthoweverseemstoprovetoomuchinonerespectandtoolittleinanother.Onesetofargumentsgroundsrightstooccupancy,andanothersetof arguments grounds rights to jurisdiction. But it is possible to recognize rights tooccupancywithoutacknowledgingrightstojurisdiction,andviceversa,itispossibletoacknowledge rights to jurisdiction without acknowledging rights of occupancy. Thelegitimatestate argument explains the right to jurisdiction with reference to how apolitical association should deliver justice for its members. It explains the right tooccupancywithreferencetohowresidenceinaparticularplacestructuresindividualslifeprojects.Whatremainsunclearhoweveriswhytheagentthatcollectivelyexercisesoccupancy rights and that which delivers justice in a political association should beconsidered the same.Why couldnt occupancy rights be exercised by one agent, andjurisdictional rights by another? And why couldnt the same occupied territory besubjecttotwoormorejurisdictions? 34 The most sophisticated argument in favour of this criterion is given by Stilz, 'Nations, States, andTerritory', (at5827., seealsoAnnaStilz, 'OccupancyRightsand theWrongofRemoval', (unpublishedmanuscript,2012).35 See Stilz, 'Occupancy Rights and the Wrong of Removal'. and Wellman, 'Political Legitimacy andTerritorialRights'.

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Thedistinctionbetweenoccupancyandjurisdictionhasbeenhistoricallycrucialto the justification of colonial enterprises. Grotius, one of the earliest defenders ofoccupancy rights, insisted that since such rights are only weak claims, typicallyassociatedtotheuseofparticularresources,theyshouldbeunderstoodaspermissionsand not commands that were to be perpetually enforced.36 Indeed, no one couldpossibly agree to the exclusive appropriation of territorial resources by rights ofoccupancy, if accessing them undermined their availability to other people. Theproblemwiththeoccupancyargumentasformulatedinlegitimatestatetheoriesisthatit allows territorial rights topromote theendsof residentsat theexpenseofdenyingthem toothers inequalneed.Butashistorical examplesof colonialismshow, settlersneededterritoryandnaturalresourcesasmuchasoriginalinhabitants.Theycamefromsocietieswhocontinuedtoexperiencefamineanddemographiccollapse,triggeredbyashortageoflandandundersupplyofnaturalresources.InthecaseofEngland,assomeauthors have argued, it is not at all implausible to argue that it was the growth ofcoloniesthatallowedittoeliminatethefamineof1623,thelastfaminethecountrywasevertoexperience.37Giventheseconditions,perpetualenforcementofoccupancyrightscouldnotbeunilaterallyimposed.Theclaimstopermanentoccupation,Grotiusargued,do not have the force of a general compact binding upon different independentnations. Instead, they could be considered, as one branch of the civil law of manynations,whichanystatehasarighttocontinue,orrepealaccordingtoitsownpleasureordiscretion.38Thisdistinctionbetweenoccupancyandjurisdictionimpliedthatitwasplausibleto concede that tribal populations had rights to jurisdiction (regardless of how theytreated their members), and that such rights to jurisdiction should be respected bysettlers.39However,whenitcametooccupancytitles,theiracknowledgementdependedon their use, and their use was determined by needs. Some territorial resources(conspicuousamongthem:water)werebydefinitionimpossibletobeexclusivelyandpermanentlyoccupiedwithoutharmingtherestofhumanity.Ariver,Grotiusargued,is 36Grotius,TheRightsofWarandPeace,IncludingtheLawofNatureandofNationsatII.3.III.37RichardTuck,TheRightsofWarandPeace:PoliticalThoughtandtheInternationalOrderfromGrotiustoKant(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1999)at233.38Grotius,TheRightsofWarandPeace,IncludingtheLawofNatureandofNationsatII.3.III.39SeethediscussiononthisinTuck,TheRightsofWarandPeace:PoliticalThoughtandtheInternationalOrderfromGrotiustoKantat233.

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assuchthepropertyofthatpeople,orofthesovereignofthatpeople,throughwhoseterritories it flows.Hemay formquays,andbuttressesuponthatriver,andtohimalltheproduceofitbelongs.Butthesameriver,asarunningwater,stillremainscommontoalltodrawordrinkit.40Commonavailabilityforuseofnaturalresourcesimpliedarighttoaccesstheseresources on the side of all those who needed it. It followed from this that a freepassage throughcountries, rivers,oroveranypartof the sea,whichbelongs to someparticular people, ought to be allowed to those, who require it for the necessaryoccasionsof life.This,Grotiusargued, included thequestof settlements, afterbeingdrivenfromtheirowncountry,ortotradewitharemotenation.Itfollowedalsothatafreepassageshouldbeguaranteednotonlytopersonsbutalsotomerchandise.Anditfollowedfurtherthatthosegoingwithmerchandiseoronlypassingthroughacountry,oughttobeallowedtoresidethereforatime,iftherecoveryofhealth,oranyotherjustcauseshouldrendersuchresidencenecessary.Andevenpermanentresidenceoughtnot to be refused to foreigners,who, driven from their own country, seek aplace torefuge.41 Historically,theseclaimshaveplayedacrucialroleinthejustificationofcolonialpractices in the early stages of European expansion to the New World. Theestablishmentofcharteredcommercialcompaniescouldnothaveoccurredwithouttheadvocacyof the right topassageand trade,bothdefendedon thebasisof auniversalclaim to use resources (likewater and air) considered to be commonly available. Totakeoneinfluentialexample,theBritishEastIndiaCompany,throughwhichtheBritishCrownexercisedindirectcontroloverIndiauntilthemid19thcentury,wasatfirstonlyanassociationofjustoveronehundredBritishmerchants,createdafterpetitioningforpermission to sail the IndianOcean, allegedly open to all.42 Far from threatening thejurisdictional powers of local authorities, it operated for over two hundred years inconcert with Indian authorities, taking advantage of their agreement to theestablishmentoftradingposts,commercialprivileges,andtrademonopoliesinordertounderminetheirDutchandSpanishcompetitors.Asimilarargumentcouldbemadefor 40Grotius,TheRightsofWarandPeace,IncludingtheLawofNatureandofNationsatII.2.XIII.41Ibid.42 See Kenneth R. Andrews,Trade, Plunder and Settlement :Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of theBritishEmpire,14801630(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1984)at256.

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theDutch East India company, in support ofwhich Grotiuss claims are often said tohave been made.43 Regardless of some important differences in the way thesecompanies operated and enjoyed political support from home authorities, one pointcould be said to have been shared by all. Whether the territorial claims of nativepopulations were justified or not, and whether they were justified on grounds ofpropertyormereoccupation,seemstohavemadeverylittledifferencetothedefenceofcolonialexpansion.This, as I have suggested, is not a contingent problem, relating to the lack ofphilosophicalsophisticationinthethoughtofauthorswhosewritingswerefundamentalin the justification of European colonialism. Nor is it a problem that can be easilycircumscribed by simply formulating a more careful defence of territorial claims, atleastnotifthedefencecontinuestoinvokeselfreferentialcriteria(ofattachmenttotheterritory, productive interaction with it or mere occupation) to justify the right topermanentlyexcludeoutsidersandtolimittheiraccesstonaturalresources.Toreallyunderstand the wrong of colonialism we can afford to be neutral on the status ofterritorial rights,whether they can be justified, and how, if at all.Wherewe need tofocus our attention instead is on the kinds of political relations colonial practicesexemplify.ThatistheissuetowhichInowturn.VII.Wecanbeginour reflectionson thewrongof colonialismasanobjectionable formofpolitical relationbyrevisitingKantscritiqueof thecommercialpracticesofEuropeanstates.Likemostofhispredecessors,Kantendorsedtheideathateveryoneonthefaceof the earth might be entitled to use natural resources commonly available. He alsoendorsedthesuggestion,familiarsincethewritingsofVitoria,thatthisincludedarighttovisitotherareasoftheworldandtoestablishpoliticalrelationswiththepopulationof these areas.44 It is wellknown that Kant defined this right to communicate with 43Tuck,TheRightsofWarandPeace:PoliticalThoughtandtheInternationalOrderfromGrotiustoKantat78108.44ForVitoriaandotherstherighttoestablishcontactincludedtherighttotrade.Kantontheotherhanddistinguishes between trade and interaction and whilst the latter is what grounds the possibility ofcommunicating with inhabitants of other areas of the world, the former is conditional upon theestablishmentofarightfulframeworkofpoliticalinteraction.Onthisdistinctionbetweencommerceand

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othersascosmopolitanright,ultimatelyculminatingintheobligationtojoinaworldfederation of free states which would help overcome the limits of their unilateralinteraction.Itisalsowellknownthatheconsideredcosmopolitanrightsoimportantandsystematicallyintegratedwithdomesticandinternationalrightthatifanyofthemwere undermined the framework of all the others is unavoidably undermined andmustfinallycollapse.45Whathasbeenrelativelyunderexploredandonlysuperficiallydefended is how a similar understanding of cosmopolitan right paves the way for acritiqueofcolonialismthatcanbeprovidedindependentlyofthedefenceofterritorialclaims,toacritiqueofcolonialismfromacosmopolitanperspective.46Letmeelaborate. In his defense of the right to visit and to seek political association withinhabitantsofdifferentgeographicalareas,Kantemphasizedthatwhensuchattemptsweremade,itwasreasonabletoexpectthoseonthereceivingendtobehavehospitablytowards theirvisitorsand torefrain fromtreating themwithhostility.Therewere, inotherwords, certain norms of decent treatment and reciprocitywhich had to governanyattempttoseekpoliticalassociationwithdistantothers.Inthelightofsuchnorms,Kantcriticized the instancesofpiracyandenslavementofstrandedvisitors thatweretypicalof the inhabitantsof theBarbarycoast, andhealsocondemned theattacksonnomadic tribes practiced by inhabitants of the deserts, for example the Beduins. Butevenmoreinterestingisthatwhenhecomparedtheseformsof inhospitablebehaviorwiththeinhospitablebehaviorofcivilized,especiallycommercial,statesinourpartofthe world, he observed that the injustice they show in visiting foreign lands andpeoples (which with them is tantamount to conquering them) goes to horrifyinglengths.47When the socalledcivilized statesvisited remoteareasof theearth,whenAmerica,Africa,andAsiawerediscovered,themerchantcompaniesthroughwhichthey interactionseealsoSankarMuthu,EnlightenmentagainstEmpire(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2003)at186200.andPeterNiesen,'HospitalityandColonialism',PoliticsandEthicsReview,3/1(2007),90108.45SeeforadiscussionoftheinterdependenceofthesethreeelementsinKantstheoryofright,seealsoLeaYpi, 'APermissiveTheoryofTerritorialRights',TheEuropeanJournalofPhilosophy, (forthcoming).and Katrin Flikschuh, 'Kant's Sovereignty Dilemma: A Contemporary Analysis', Journal of PoliticalPhilosophy,18/4(2010),46993.46Therearehoweverafewgoodaccountsoftherelationshipbetweencosmopolitanismandcolonialismfromahistoricalperspective, see forexample,Muthu,EnlightenmentagainstEmpire,Pagden, 'Stoicism,Cosmopolitanism,andtheLegacyofEuropeanImperialism',(andthechaptersincludedin47 Immanuel Kant, 'Toward Perpetual Peace', in Mary Gregor (ed.), Practical Philosophy (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,[1795]1996),31152at359,29.

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operated treated the inhabitants of these areas as nothing. In the East Indies, Kantobserved,theybroughtinforeignsoldiersunderthepretextofmerelyproposingtosetuptradingposts,butendedupwithoppressionof the inhabitants, incitementof thevariousIndianstatestowidespreadwars, famine,rebellions,treachery,andthewholelitany of troubles that oppress the human race.48 In the Sugar Islands, those tradingcompaniesservedonlythepurposeoftrainingsailorsforwarshipsanddeployingthemEuropeforselfish,profitseeking,purposes.InChinaandJapan,whichhadgivensuchguestsatry,theirclaimsasvisitorswerewiselyrestrictedtorightsofpassageratherthanentry,preventingthosetowhomtheyhadextendedcommercial favours(e.g. theDutch)fromcommunitywithnativepopulations.49It is important to insist thatwhatmade these restrictions justified (and oftennecessary)wasnotaconclusiverightofhostcountriestoexcludeoutsidersfromtheirterritory.Anyone,Kantargued,hadtherighttooffertointeractwithotherswithoutthisofferresultingintheotherbeingauthorizedtobehavetowarditasanenemybecauseithasmadethisattempt.50Whatdistortedthegroundsonwhichtheseofferscouldbeadvancedwasthemodeaccordingtowhichtheytookplace.Inotherwords,whatmadethecolonialismpracticedbyEuropeanstatesparticularlyabhorrentwasitsviolationofstandards of reciprocity in interaction, and the departure from a particular ideal ofeconomic,socialandpoliticalassociation,aviolationwhichwasallthemoredespicablewhen exercised by powers thatmakemuch ado of their piety and,while they drinkwrongfulnesslikewater,wanttobeknownastheelectinorthodoxy.51 Itisalsoimportanttoemphasizethatthiscritiqueofcolonialismasadeparturefrom a certain ideal of political association is not limited to the condemnation ofviolence.Thecritiqueextendstopeaceful,butdeceptive,offersofexchange,aswhenforexample native inhabitants of particular territories were persuaded by fraudulentmeans to signcontractswithcolonizers selling the territory inwhich they lived.Kantgives as an example attempts to conquer or settle in areas used by shepherding andhunting populations who depended on such areas for their survival. Again, withoutdenying the possibility of settling in these areas, he argues that similar attempts to 48Ibid.49Ibid.50Ibid.51Ibid.

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settle may not take place by force but only by contract. But it is a specific kind ofcontract,onethatdoesnottakeadvantageofthe ignoranceofthose inhabitantswithrespect to ceding their lands.52 So the crucial point here is not the fact that nativeinhabitantsoftheseareaswereentitledtounilaterallycontrolthemovementofpeopleor to permanently exclude outsiders from the resources to be found in them. Whatmattersisthattheseattemptstosettleandinteractwiththenativeinhabitantsoftheseterritories must be made compatibly with an ideal of political association that givesequalweighttotheclaimsofall those involved intheexchange,not just theclaimsofnewcomersnorjusttheclaimsofnativeresidents.But how should we understand further the conditions under which a similarrighttoassociatewithotherscanbestbeguaranteed?WhenexaminingKantsthought,twointerpretationscometomind,onethatfocusesonrelationsbetweengoods(betheygoods necessary for subsistence or social goods) and one that focuses on relationsbetweenpeople.53Thefirstmodeofcommunicationgroundswhatwemayplainlyrefertoas commercial exchange (eithermaterialor cultural), the secondgrounds relationsbetweenpeople.Inbothcases,reciprocityininteractioncanonlybeprovidedthroughtheestablishmentofpoliticalinstitutionsthatallowpeopletoassociatewitheachotherasequals,guaranteeingthattheirvoicewillbeheardandthattheirclaimswillbefairlyreflected indecisionsbywhich theyareaffected.Whether it is rulesof tradeor rulesregulating themovement of people (including their right to settle) a decent basis ofinteractionisonethatensuresthateverybodysclaimswillequallybeheard.Thisidealof equal consideration of each others claims and of reciprocity in communication iswhatoughttoberespectedeverytimetwopreviouslyunconnectedpoliticalgroupsaretryingtoconstructabasisforfuturecooperation.Todepartfromthatidealistobuildthefoundationsofanobjectionablemodelofpoliticalassociation. 52 ImmanuelKant, 'TheMetaphysics ofMorals', inMaryGregor (ed.),Practical Philosophy (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,[1797]1996),353604at353,490.53ForexamplesofthefirstuseofthetermseeintheDoctrineofRight,sichzumVerkehranzubieten,andinPerpetualPeace,einenVerkehrzuversuchen.ForrelationsbetweenpeopleseeinPerpetualPeace,sichzurGesellschaftanzubieten,or,intheDoctrineofRight,dieGemeinschaft[zu]versuchen.IamindebtedtoPeterNiesensexcellentNiesen, 'HospitalityandColonialism', (forreferences to thesedifferentusesoftheterm.

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VIII.One might wonder at this point whether endorsing this particular ideal of politicalassociationimpliesthatifacertainagent(beitastate,atribeoranyotherinstitutionclaimingauthorityonbehalfofaminoritygroup)deniesequalvoicetotheclaimsofitsmembersitisplausibletoincorporateitintoanotheronewhichrespectsthereciprocitycriteria of political association. If a group is ruled paternalistically, should another,allegedlylesspaternalisticstateannextheterritoryinwhichthegroupresidesandofferitsmembersequalandreciprocalrepresentation?It ishardtoseewhythisshouldbethe case. Ifmembers of a group are denied representationwithin the group, it is notclearthattheyshouldbeunilaterallyforcedintoanotherassociation,onewhosetermsare also initially imposed on them. Two wrongs dont make a right. Conquest andannexationarewrongbecausetheyareunilateralformsofpoliticalassociation,failingto establish reciprocal termsofpolitical interaction.Theunilateralityof these actionsremainsthesameregardlessofwhethertheagentoneistryingtoassociatewithisfreefrominternalconstraintorgovernedinapaternalisticway. To see this argument consider a domestic analogy. Suppose your ideal ofmarriageisoneinwhichyouareallowedtochooseyourlifepartner,andinwhichyouhaveanequalsayonhowyouought to live together.Supposeyou findyourself inanunhappy marriage your parents have arranged for you. Your partner drinks, hardlylistens to you, and rules the householdwith an iron fist. Your parents at some pointrealise theywerewrong to forceyou into thispartnershipand claim tohave foundawayoutforyou,onewhichrequiresterminatingthepresentmarriage(withsomecostinvolved, however little) and forcing you into another one. The second candidate ismore rich, more handsome, more sophisticated, and on the whole has a betterreputation. Is the fact that thesecondmarriageoffers seeminglybetterprospectsanylesswrongthanthefirst?Ibelieveitisnot.Andthereasonitisnot,isthatinbothcasesyouarenotallowedasayinwhomyououghttomarry,andtheconditionsaccordingtowhichlifetogethershouldgo.

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IX.At this point we can afford to illustrate the implications of our framework forunderstandingthewrongofcolonialismindependentlyofterritorialclaims.Colonialism,weargued,isanobjectionableformofpoliticalassociation,objectionableongroundsofitsfailuretoreflectanidealofequaltreatmentandreciprocitywhichshouldunderpinevery attempt to expand the boundaries of political cooperation. Human beings arebrought by the contingent conditions of their life to constantly seek interactionwithothers, including sharing land and resources with others situated in distantgeographical areas. Itwould be hard to deny the plausibility of their attempts. But itwould bewrong to inflict those attemptswhilst refusing to hear the claims of thoseaffected by them. And it would be perverse to interpret those claims in a way thatsystematically disadvantages those with whom association is sought. Disentanglingcolonialism from territorial rights implies accepting that there isnopressure tokeeptheterritoriesofpoliticalcommunitiesisolatedfromeachother,thattheremaywellbeacosmopolitanpulltoexistingpoliticalinstitutions.Butitalsoimpliesthatthemodeofpoliticalassociationshouldgivevoice to theclaimsofall concerned, that themodeofexpandingtheboundariesofpoliticalassociationshouldbeonethatreflectsnormsofequalityandreciprocity.Ifcolonizedpeopleareforcedtojoinacollectiveauthoritytherules ofwhich are establishedwithout their say, they are beingwronged. If they areoffereda saybut facedwithcollectivedecisionswhichsystematicallymanipulate thatsay to generate outcomes that persistently disadvantage them, they are beingoppressed.Inbothcasesthecritiqueofcolonialismcanbegeneratedregardlessofthedefenceofterritorialclaims.This attempt to disentangle the critique of colonialism from the defense ofterritorial rights has several implications. One concerns the past. To the extent thatdescendants of colonized groups make a claim to rectification for past wrongdoing,appropriaterectificatorymeasuresmayormaynotberelatedtothereturnoflandandto the use of natural resources available to their ancestors. This is particularlyimportant in the case of conflicts over the use of the land and resources involvingindigenous people and descendants of colonizing groups in places like New Zealand,

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Australia and North America.54 If we understand colonial injustice not as wrongfultaking of territory but as the establishment of an objectionable form of politicalassociationwedonotneedtoinsistthatsacredlandorparticularresourcesshouldbereturnedtothesegroups.Butarguingthatnoterritorialrightshavebeenviolateddoesnotimplythatnoinjusticehaseverbeendone,evenlessdoesitimplythatinjusticehasbeensuperseded.55Thepathdependencyofcolonialinstitutionsmightwellimplythatdescendants of colonized groups continue to be disenfranchised (either formally orsubstantially) from the countries inwhich they reside. If that is the case they remainvulnerable to colonial injustice simplybeing renewed, regardlessofwhatwe thinkoftheirterritorialclaims.Rectificatorymeasuresconcerninglandandresourcesshouldinthiscasebeconsideredonly if theyhelp thesegroupsovercomethat formofpoliticaldomination.Anotherimplicationofmycritiqueofcolonialismhastodowithhowweshouldthink about decolonization. On the account of colonialism proposed here, colonialwrongs are not necessarily remedied when territory is returned to members of theformer colony. Instead they are remedied when the terms of political interactionbetweenformercolonizersandcolonizedareclosertotheidealofpoliticalassociationIhavejustsketched.Agroupcanbeformallyindependent,andenjoyterritorialrightsbutmayfactuallystilldependonthepreviouscolonialmasteronalmostalleconomicandpoliticalmatters:Franafriqueisacaseinpoint.56Viceversa,agroupcanstillsharethesamepoliticalassociationwithaformercolonialmasterbutitsmembersarenowfullyenfranchised:considerthecaseofScotlandandEngland.OnthecritiqueofcolonialismIhavepresentedherejusticehasnotbeenrestoredintheformercase.Andnoinjusticeisbeingcommittedinthelatter. 54SeeforexampletheclaimsofindigenouspeopleinNewZealand,AustraliaandNorthAmerica.55Waldron for examplewhogrants that indigenouspeoplewere initially entitled to the territory fromwhichtheyweredispossessed,Waldron,'SupersedingHistoricInjustice',(at1820..HethendefendsthesupersessionofhistoricinjusticewithregardtoAboriginallandclaimsonthebasisoftheneedtomakespaceforthecompetingterritorialclaimsofothergroups.Butifthatargumentworksitcanalsobeusedtodenythatindigenousgroupswereeverentitledtoexcludeoutsidersfromaccesstotheirland,implyingthatinjusticeissupersedednotbecausecircumstanceschangebutbecauseitwasneverthere.56FranafriquewasatermcoinedbythePresidentofPresidentFlixHouphoutBoignyofCted'Ivoireto refer positively to the relation between France and its former colonies but has since been usednegatively to highlight the neocolonial nature of Frances relations to a number of FrenchspeakingAfrican countries. See for one recent critique, Samul Foutoyet, Nicolas Sarkozy ou la Franafriquedcomplexe,Tribord,2009.

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Arelatedimplicationconcernsthepresent.Thecritiqueofcolonialismadvancedin this paper introduces to a new way of thinking about ongoing political relationsbetween states. Even if their current practices of interaction no longer affect groupsterritorial claims, when equality and reciprocity in communication and exchange isviolatedtheremaystillbegroundsforcriticizingthesepracticesaspracticesofaneocolonial nature.57 Whether these practices characterize one country, like the UnitedStates,oragroupofcountriesactinginconcert,liketheEuropeanUnion,whethertheyextend only to commercial relations or also include a social, political and culturaldimension,weneedtoassessthemasreflectingspecificmodelsofpoliticalassociation.Totheextentthatthesemodelsestablishpoliticalrelationswhichdenydistantothersequalvoiceintheprocessofpoliticalcommunicationandcommercialexchange,totheextent that they seek to secure strategic advantages for their companies andmarketsregardless of the impact of such practices on the populations that they affect, thedifference from institutions like the British and the Dutch East India companies andfromthecolonialpowersthatsponsoredthemisonlyofdegreeratherthankind.A third implication concerns the future.The critiqueof colonialismpursued inthis paper implies being agnostic on the territorial rights of current states (whethertheywere formerlycolonizersorcolonized).Thatmeans thatstates rights toexcludeoutsidersandunilaterallycontrolnaturalresources(totheextentthattheseclaimsareassociatedtoterritorialrights)couldalsobechallenged.Thatchallengeremainsevenifwedontthinkthattheclaimtoterritorialjurisdictionrelatestotherighttocontrolthemovementofpeopleandthedistributionofresourcesinaparticularlystraightforwardway.58Althoughexploringtheissueinfurtherdetailexceedsthescopeofthispaper,itsrelevance should be clear when we turn to debates on migration, the legitimacy ofbordercontrolandglobaldistributivejustice.59 57 Part of this critique is familiar in the recent literature in international lawor international relations(see e.g. S. JamesAnaya, IndigenousPeoples in International Law (NewYork,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2000)Keal,EuropeanConquestand theRightsof IndigenousPeoples :TheMoralBackwardnessofInternational Society. but,with fewexceptions (e.g.CharlesR.Beitz,The IdeaofHumanRights (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2009) at ch.8. and Katrin Flikschuh, 'On the Cogency of Human Rights',Jurisprudence,2/1(2011),1736.)relativelyneglectedbynormativetheorists.58 Although some authors emphasize that defending territorial rights implies all these three elements,othersareinclinedtodisaggregatethefirstfromtheothertwo.Forfurtherdiscussionofhowthesethreecomponentsofterritorialrightsshouldrelatetoeachother,seLeaYpi,Apermissivetheoryofterritorialrights.59Foradiscussionof territorialrights inconnectiontomigrationseealsoArashAbizadeh, 'DemocraticTheory and Border Coercion: No Right to Unilaterally Control Your Own Borders',Political Theory, 36

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Finally,asimilaraccountofcolonialismputspressureontheideathatthereisanintrinsic link between colonialism and territorial selfdetermination or between pastcolonialinjusticeandtherighttosecession.Butitdoessowhilstacceptingthatthereisno significant difference between former colonized groups and oppressed domesticminorities.60 Not every instance of colonial wrongdoing triggers a claim to eitherterritorial selfdetermination or to secession; nor do remedial principles relateexclusivelytothepoliticalcapacityofcolonizedpeopletoformtheirownstate.Thisisnottosaythatwemustnecessarilyrulethemout.Muchdependsonthepossibilityofrestoringequaltermsofpoliticalcooperationbetweencolonizersandcolonizedandonthebackgroundconditionsunderpinningsuchattemptsatreconstruction.Historically,thepervasivenessandbrutalityofcolonialoppressionhasmeantthatvictimsofcolonialrule perceived breaking all political relations with their former masters as the onlyplausiblewayforward.Butindifferentpoliticalcircumstances,thatchoicemaynotbetheonlyone.X.Thewrongofcolonialismhasoftenbeenexaminedinrelationshiptothejustificationofterritorial rights.Mymain purpose in these pages has been to disentangle these twoissues.Colonialism, Ihaveargued,remainsawrongwhetherornotthecolonizersareentitled to the particular piece of land they have historically occupied. Thewrong ofcolonialism consists in its embodiment of a morally objectionable form of politicalrelation, not in the allegedlywrongful occupation of others land. To understand thewrongofcolonialismweshouldnotfocusonthemodalitiesofsettlementanduseofaparticular area of geographical space but on the terms of political interactionestablishedbetweencolonizersandcolonized.Themorallyobjectionablenatureofthis (2008),3765,S.Fine,'FreedomofAssociationIsNottheAnswer',Ethics,120/2(Jan2010),33856.andfor the issue of natural resources Margaret Moore, 'Natural Resources, Territorial Right and GlobalDistributiveJustice',PoliticalTheory,(forthcoming).andArmstrong(unpulishedpaperonresources).60Manyauthorshavecomplainedaboutthewayinwhichinternationallawdistinguishesbetweenformercolonizedstatesandnationalminoritiesinthediscussiononselfdetermination,suggestingthatwhateverreasonsonehastograntselfdeterminationtotheformeralsoapplytothelatter,seeKymlicka,'MinorityRightsinPoliticalPhilosophyandInternationalLaw'.Iagreewiththecomplaintbuttaketheconsistencyrequirementinadifferentdirection,onewhichdoesnotnecessarilytieremedyingcolonialinjusticewithselfdetermination.

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interaction is immediately revealed even if a conclusive justification of groupsterritorialclaimscannotbefound. My critique of colonialism was designed to appeal to those who tend to beskepticalofnationalismbutstillthinkcolonialismiswrong.Ihadverylittletoofferbywayof adirect assessmentofnationalism.But itmaybeworth concludingby simplymentioning that I am aware that not all readers will agree with the critique ofcolonialism Ioutlineandwith the conclusions Ipropose. If that remains the case,myhope is that these thoughts will still have played a useful heuristic role. Those whocontinuetodisagreemightcometorealizethat,forthem,colonialismisnotwrongafterall.Or, if theystill thinkcolonialismiswrongbut find ithardtosharemyreasons forexplainingthatwrong,itmightbebecausenationalists,afterall,haveapoint.

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Cmtsfromconference occupancyrightsandlegitimaterightsofproperty KantiancasesharesacrucialassumptionabstractindividualismEqualpoliticalparticipationisafurtherconditionoflegitimacyDemocratic condition does rule out colonialism with civilizing mission until civiling mission iscompletedParticularspacegroundsrights tooccupancyonhow justice isdelivered theywillalwayscoincide inpracticeWENEEDSOMEAUTHORITYNOTTHISPARTICULARAUTHORITYNeedbasedargumentsandsettlersneededterritorycanbechallengedHistoricallyitisnotthebasisforclaims,settlersclaimsweremoreexpensiveandextensiveNeedbasedargumentdoesnotsucceedOccupancyrightswemightcircumscribeconditionsofhospitality,trulyabjectandnotterriblyorganizedinvadersFuturepoliticalarrangementsandbordersthisweakensclaimstoArgumentisalsoindividualistdidnotarrivebutaspartofconcretepoliticalprojectsthathasbeenpartofClosesother responses,blocks conceptionsofproperty, justice that are incompatiblewith rightsbasedindividualism,butcosmopolitanismmayseemcompletelysinistergivenhowitispoliticallyusedSARAHFINE supersessionofpastinjustice,canwedetachthemfromterritorialclaims?e.g.Palestiniancaseas longasyouhave the rightpolitical institutions in Jordan, there isaterritorialworry

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KantandterritorialrightsareStilzandcowrongtotakethatfromKant,whatswrongwithisnotjusttheterritorialrightsbutalsothepoliticalassociation EngagewithpeopleintherightkindofwaybutitisstillEurocentricwayofthinkingandthatleavestheproblemoflettingcolonialisminthebackdoor,peoplecancomeinKIERAN whatisthespecialwrongofcolonialism,isthereaspecialwrongandwhatisit? Descriptivevs.evaluativeproblemSUSAN norighttoexclude(unilaterally)andwhatarethelimitsofthat intensionwiththerighttoselfgovernmentandnoninformae JOHNWhat is colonialism and there are lots of characteristic, is there one answer to the question ofwhatswrongwithcolonialism,therearesomanyphenomenaIamnotsayingitisonlyanswer,whatitisNOT. GRAHAMWecouldbeworriedaboutbordersiftheyareleavingvulnerablepeopleinabadconditionAbsenceofrighttoexcludeexploitedtoleadtounequalinteractionofcorporationsYoucanhaveculturalpracticeswithoutessentialism possiblybeingmorethingswrongwithcolonialism,itwouldbecompatibletosaythattheremightbeaterritorialwrong,notonethatcanbecorrectlydialogue, forciblyexpellingthatisnotexplainedbytheforceitisused... postcolonialrulebutalotbetterthanthepeoplethatareyettocome.Belgiumcolonialismwasabadthingeven if itwasa lesserevil thanwhat followed.Sowhatdoyoudowithhumanitarianintervention.