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Layered ISRUSAF Investment for the Joint Team
Michael Isherwood
Colonel, USAF (Ret)
The Mitchell Institute for Airpower Studies is an independent, non‐profit research, studies, and analysis organization founded by the Air Force Association. The Institute seeks to carry on, in the modern day, General Mitchell’s tireless and dedicated effort to expand airpower thinking and increase public awareness of the need for this unique military instrument.
The Mitchell Institute
http://www.afa.org/mitchell/
Issue
• USAF Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) forces are challenged to– Provide accurate and timely strategic warning for developing events– Provide detailed tactical information to guide immediate operations
“Find, Fix, Target, Track, Engage and Assess”
• Layering of Airborne ISR forces maximizes the accuracy and timeliness of information– HUMINT, SIGINT, MTI, MASINT, CYBINT…no single discipline provides all
the data– Collectively…create a ‘mosaic of information’
• Airborne ISR forces are ideally suited to serve as effective and efficient provide
The definition of the Combat Air Force is more than just fighters and bombersCAF Master Plan 2010
Trends in USAF Airborne ISR‐ Post Vietnam to Iraq/Afghanistan
1975• Fixed targets and attack plan
• Focused/limited battlefield• Line of sight communications• Contested airspace • Primarily manned reconnaissance aircraft
• Limited time over target• Single sensor/”INT” per aircraft
4
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
4.6% 3.0% 4.3% 4.5% % of USAF Budget
2005 • Mobile targets and dynamic attack plan
• Dispersed/expanded battlefield • Satellite/Beyond line of Sight Communications• Permissive airspace
• Manned/Unmanned Reconnaissance Systems– Sensor miniaturization– Global Positioning System
• Persistent “Stare”
• Multiple sensor/”INTs” per aircraft
Active
Reserve
Guard
Num
ber of aircraft
Trends in USAF Airborne ISR‐ Post Vietnam to Iraq/Afghanistan
5
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
4.6% 3.0% 4.3% 4.5% % of USAF Budget
Active
Reserve
Guard
Num
ber of aircraft
2015 • Mobile targets and dynamic attack plan
• Dispersed/expanded battlefield • Satellite/Beyond line of Sight Communications• Non‐Permissive and Contested airspace
• Manned/Unmanned Reconnaissance Systems– Sensor miniaturization– Global Positioning System
• Persistent “Stare”
• Multiple sensor/”INTs” per aircraft• Data storage, retrieval and integration
1975• Fixed targets and attack plan
• Focused/limited battlefield• Line of sight communications• Contested airspace • Primarily manned reconnaissance aircraft
• Limited time over target• Single sensor/”INT” per aircraft
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
4,500
5,000
FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09
Adversaries “are reacting to our ability to hit anything‐anywhere. Consequently, finding the enemy has moved to the forefront of USAF operations.”
USAF ISR Strategy 2010
Trends in USAF Airborne ISR‐ 21st Century
USAF Airborne ISR Investment and Plans‐ Today and Future
2010
RC‐135COMINT/ELINT
E‐8MTI/SAR Imagery
U‐2/SYERSCOMINT/ELINT/EO/IR
U‐2/ASARSCOMINT/ELINT/SAR Imagery
RQ‐4/B10EO/IR/SAR Imagery
2020
7
Thea
ter
= 24/7 Orbit
Tact
ical
MC‐12COMINT/Day TV (FMV)/IR
MQ‐1Day TV(FMV)/IR
MQ‐9Day TV (FMV)/IR
RC‐135COMINT/ELINT
E‐8MTI/SAR Imagery
RQ‐4/B30COMINT/ELINT/EO/IR/SAR Imagery/MTI
RQ‐4/B40MTI/SAR Imagery
MC‐12COMINT/Day TV (FMV)/IR
MQ‐1Day TV(FMV)/IR
MQ‐9Day TV (FMV)/IR
COMINT
8
The Operational Environment‐ A wide range of scenarios: Irregular to Nation‐State Adversaries
Cyber threats span the spectrum of conflict
Concealment and Deception spans the spectrum of conflict
9
Layering ISR‐Maximizing Awareness of the Battlespace
Requirements Who What Where When Why
SIGINT X X X Now & XFuture
IMINT X X Now
MASINT X X Now
MTI X X Now
HUMINT X X X Now & XFuture
Layering ISR assets provides precise data:‐Where (geo‐location)‐When (timing)‐ Accuracy (speed, signal type, characterization, picture, etc)
Commander’s seek to understand…Who threatens them…with What …Where … When …Why
CYBINT X X X Now & XFuture
Theater Level ISR Capability‐ Synergies between Surveillance and Reconnaissance
10
• In an uncertain environment, layering theater‐ and tactical‐level ISR forces allows maximum opportunity to find(detect) then fix (target/track) hostile forces
• Find – Wide Area Surveillance (WAS)– Sustained monitoring (persistence) is vital as no single source will detect all warnings/activities
– Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Ground Movement Target Intelligence (GMTI) are primary WAS capabilities– WAS Aircraft
o Joint STARS (Ground MTI)o Rivet Joint (SIGINT)o U‐2 (SIGINT)o Global Hawk B30/40 (SIGINT/MTI)
• Fix – Precise Reconnaissance (Recon)– Provides precise data for targeting– Fleeting nature of targets demands persistence
– Recon Aircraft – WAS aircraft plus:o Predatoro Reapero MC‐12 Project Liberty
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1 x MQ‐1 2 x MQ‐1 3 x MQ‐1 4 x MQ‐1
WAS technology makes electro‐optical/infra‐red capabilities relevant
Wide Area Surveillance (E-8/Global Hawk) and Precise Recon (Predator) combined
Precise Recon (Predator) alone
% o
f tar
gets
foun
d/tr
acke
d
40 nm x 40 nm area
Building a Mosaic of Information‐ HUMINT
• Human Intelligence – oldest form of Intelligence– Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy – Cold War Spy
– Interrogations
– Human Terrain Teams
– Ground Patrol reports and interaction
• Understand the society and culture– Power Brokers
– Motivations
• Airborne Sensor…Full Motion Video?
• Advantages
• Limitations
“Useful intelligence is most often obtained through personal contact with the population. This puts a disproportionate level of importance on HUMINT”
US Army Major with Iraq experience
Building a Mosaic of Information‐ HUMINT
Building a Mosaic of Information‐ SIGINT
• Signals Intelligence– Communications Intercepts
– Electronic Intercepts
– Wide Area and Spot Reconnaissance
• Wide Area– RC‐135
– U‐2 with RAS‐1
– Global Hawk with ASIP
– MC‐12
• Tactical reconnaissance
• Advantages
• Limitations
Building a Mosaic of Information‐ HUMINT + SIGINT
Building a Mosaic of Information‐Moving Target Indicator
• Moving Target Indictor (or Intelligence)– Radial Acceleration of an object
• Airborne MTI– E‐3 AWACS
– E‐2
• Ground MTI– E‐8
– Global Hawk Block 40
– MQ‐9
• Advantages
• Limitations
Building a Mosaic of Information‐Moving Target Indicator
Building a Mosaic of Information‐ Imagery
• Visual Imagery (EO)
• Infrared Imagery (IR)
• Full Motion Video (FMV)
• Radar Imagery
• Advantages
• Limitations
Building a Mosaic of Information‐ HUMINT + SIGINT + MTI + Imagery
Building a Mosaic of Information‐MASINT
• Measurement and Signature Intelligence – Technically derived intelligence that detects, locates, tracks,
identifies and describes the specific signatures of fixed and dynamic target sources
– Includes radar, laser, optical, IR, acoustic and often samplings of the electro‐magnetic and atmospheric mediums to identify and characterize objects and targets
• Typical sensors– Multi‐Spectral Imaging
– Hyper‐Spectral Imaging
• Advantages
• Limitations
Building a Mosaic of Information‐ HUMINT + SIGINT + MTI + Imagery + MASINT
Building a Mosaic of Information‐ CYBINT
• Cyber Intelligence– Traditionally viewed as ground based,
computer attack
– A form of Electronic Attack
• Potential airborne sensors– Advanced Electronically Scanned Arrays
– EC‐130 Compass Call
• Advantages
• Limitations
Building a Mosaic of Information‐ HUMINT + SIGINT + MTI + Imagery + MASINT + CYBINT
Who What Where When Why Assets
WAS Recon WAS Recon WAS Recon WAS Recon WAS Recon
SIGINT Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes RC‐135, U‐2, MC‐12, Global Hawk
MTI Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes E‐8, GH, MQ‐1/9
IMINT Yes Yes Yes U‐2, Global Hawk, MC‐12, MQ‐1/9
MASINT Yes Yes Yes Multiple
CYBINT Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Multiple
HUMINT Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Multiple
Layering ISR‐Maximizing Awareness of the Battlespace
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
SIGINT MTI FMV
0
2000
4000
SIGINT
Thou
sand
sof
nm
2
0
50
100
150
MTI
Thou
sand
sof
nm
2
0
500
1000
1500
2000
FMV hours
USAF Investment in Airborne ISR*‐ 2010 to 2020
Num
ber of Orbits
20102020
*As of 2011
Building a Mosaic of Information‐ Pulling it all together
Date Time Data GEO-LOCATION Source Item1/8/2010 5:18 PM Haqqani l ieutenant tells XX in Village X to start getting ready 33 16 20N/70 13 39E MC‐12 11/8/2010 7:57 AM Vil lage Y farmer complains of foreign fighters taking l ivestock 33 18 02N/69 53 18E MC‐12 21/9/2010 1:50 AM UNK requests status report 33 19 50N /69 55 41E U‐2 31/9/2010 4:14 PM UNK reports watching coalition forces from ridge 33 21 44N/70 06 24E MC‐12 41/9/2010 10:27 PM PP tel ls DD to make the meeting tonight 33 22 17N/70 05 18E MC‐12 51/9/2010 10:26 PM UNK tel l ZZZ to be ready next 3 days 33 23 17N/69 50 45E U‐2 61/9/2010 4:57 PM Vil lager B calls to say he's glad Taliban have not been around 33 04 47N/70 20 09E MC‐12 71/9/2010 8:36 AM Haqqani operative tells GG to report on weapon status by tonight 33 18 41N/70 04 06E U‐2 81/9/2010 11:45 AM UNK warns GG about coalition forces in area 33 21 29N/70 09 54E U‐2 91/10/2010 2:17 AM TT wants to know whe WW has seen tonight 33 21 08N /69 37 18E U‐2 101/10/2010 2:17 PM UNK reports 4 coaltion force vehicles moving on road 33 19 23N/69 48 42E MC‐12 111/10/2010 9:09 AM UNK tel ls HH to be ready for the party tonight 33 17 32N/69 56 09E U‐2 121/10/2010 12:16 pm FF, villager leader, tel ls unk that Taliban left two dozen night letters 33 14 27N/69 55 09E U‐2 131/10/2010 5:15 pm UNK reports explosives in short supply 33 14 39N/69 17 17E U‐2 141/11/2010 12:32 AM UNK tel ls XX to be ready in 2 hours 33 16 16N /69 59 18E MC‐12 151/11/2010 2:16 AM XX reports ready 33 23 07N/69 56 15E MC‐12 16
SIGINT
Date Time Data GEO-LOCATION Source Item
1/8/2010 2:15 AM GMTI monitors multiple roads , suspect activities 33 21 29N/69 56 17E P‐3 11/8/2010 2:50 AM DMTI monitors fields north of base, track suspects 33 22 01N/69 57 16E P‐3 21/9/2010 7:25 AM Ambush area/vicinity monitored/blue forces tracked 33 17 55N/70 06 28E E‐8 31/9/2010 9:25 AM Suspect compound monitored 33 18 22N/70 05 48E E‐8 41/9/2010 10:01 AM Monitored road activity during convoy transit 33 21 15N/69 58 15E E‐8 51/9/2010 11:50 AM Monitored suspect compound and vicinity 33 26 58N/ 69 58 16E E‐8 61/10/2010 4:50 AM GMTI monitors road network for vehicles 33 19 45N/70 58 55E E‐8 71/10/2010 11:06 AM DMTI detects a dozen tracks 33 13 50N/70 04 10E P‐3 81/10/2010 10:55 PM DMTI detects 6 individuals near border 33 26 25N/70 14 56E E‐8 91/11/2010 2:33 AM DMTI detects 40 tracks moving south 33 23 07N/69 56 15E E‐8 10
MTI
How does the Warfighter merge this information into the coherent picture?
• Targets hidden by natural or man‐made obscurants– Trees / foliage, camouflage nets, thin skinned buildings– Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD), and Counter Drug targets• Research indicates multiple sensor types are needed• Candidate technologies include
– Foliage penetration radar (FOPEN)– Hyperspectral Imaging– Laser Imaging (LIDAR)– Improved Full‐Motion Video (FMV)
• Must be able to store, retrieve and fuse data inside the enemy’s decision or movement cycle
• Survivability
Challenges for Airborne ISR‐ Sensors and Aircraft
Challenges for Airborne ISR‐ Turning Data into coherency
AF/A‐2“We’re going to find ourselves in the not too distant future swimming in sensors and drowning in data.”
Commander, 3rd Fleet“The volume and diversity of reporting produced by the US Intelligence Community has expanded to the point where even most experienced analysts are no longer able to easily discriminate actionable intelligence from an enormous volume of background information.”
• Layering of Intelligence data vital to ‘create a picture’
• All disciplines of intelligence are valued…– HUMINT can offer unique insights
• Air Component’s ISR force provides– Persistence
– Penetration into hostile areas
– Reduced risk to the Joint Team
Summary
Commanders make decision based on 100% of the available information……even if it’s only 50% of all information