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1
Law and Habits
Sylvie Delacroix1
UCL Laws
`[T]hehorriblethingaboutalllegalofficials,eventhebest,aboutalljudges,
magistrates,barristers,detectives,andpolicemen,isnotthattheyarewicked
(someofthemaregood),notthattheyarestupid(severalofthemarequite
intelligent),itissimplythattheyhavegotusedtoit.Strictlytheydonotsee
theprisonerinthedock;alltheyseeistheusualmanintheusualplace.They
donotseetheawfulcourtofjudgment;theyonlyseetheirownworkshop.’
(G.K.Chesterton,Ontremendoustrifles2)
Wehaveallbeenthere:tofailto`see’beyondroutineappearancesandhencegrasp
themoralsalienceofasituationiseasy.Itismadeeasierstillwhenthatsituationis
structuredaroundanormativeframeworkthatdefinestherolesofitsprotagonists.
Thatnormativeframeworkneednotbelegal.Itmaybeprofessional,conventionalor
otherwise.Yetbecauseofthepervasivereachandspecificnatureofitsinstitutional
structure,alegalframeworkmaywellbeuniquelyconducivetothe`roteblindness’
describedabove.
1TheworkleadingtothispaperwasfundedbytheLeverhulmeTrust.IamgratefulforthecommentsandinsightsofSimonBlackburn,ClareCarlisle,SeanCoyle,MaksDelMar,JakobHolterman,JonathanMontgomery,GeorgiosPavlakos,DanPriel,AndreaSangiovanni,PhilipSchofield,KevinToh,MichaelWilkinson,LorenzoZuccaand,lastbutnotleast,theeditorofthisJournal.2G.K.Chesterton,'TheTwelveMen',TremendousTrifles(TremendousTrifles,Sheed&Ward1955)
2
ThisperilisindirectlyrelatedtoaconcernwhichHartformulatesdifferentlywhenhe
referstothe`riskthatthecentrallyorganisedpowermaywellbeusedforthe
oppressionofnumberswithwhosesupportitcandispense,inawaythatthe simpler
regimeofprimaryrulescouldnot’.3Hart’sworryworkslikethis:oneofthedefining
featuresofestablishedlegalordersisthattheycanbesustainedonthebasisof
officialacceptancealone,thankstotheirinstitutionalstructure(thesis1).Becauseof
thisstructure,itmaywellbethecasethatanestablishedlegalsystem(asopposed
toasimplerregimeofprimaryrules)isparticularlyconducivetoasocietythatis
`deplorablysheeplike’-andwherethesheepmightallendup`inthe
slaughterhouse’4(thesis2).Thisarticlearguesthatthesis2iscorrectanddeserves
greaterattention.5Thisisinpartduetothefactthatitismuddledbyitsassociation
withthesis1,whichisunhelpfulatbest,andnotonlybecauseoftheminimalistway
inwhichHartdefinesacceptance.
`Anunreflectinginheritedortraditionalattitude,orthemerewishtodoasothers
do’6clearlyofferslittlesafeguardagainstthe`sheeplike’predicamentHartworries
about.Tomakesenseoftheriskinherentintheemergenceoflaw’scomplex
institutionalstructure,oneneedstoturnupstream,tothecomplexwebofsocial
processesthatshapeandenabletheattitudesencompassedunderHart’sconceptof
`acceptance’.Whileconsiderableworkhasalreadybeendevotedtodelineatingthe
waysinwhich`practices’(conventionalorotherwise7)maygiverisetolegalnorms,
3H.L.A.Hart,Theconceptoflaw(2ndedn,ClarendonPress1994)202.4Ibid.5BothJeremyWaldron,'AllWeLikeSheep'(1999)12CanJL&Jurisprudence169)andLeslieGreen,'PositivismandtheInseparabilityofLawandMorals'(2008)83NYULRev1035)havehelpedflagupthisimportantaspectofHart’stheory,buthavemostlyconsidereditinthewidercontextoflaw’sseparabilityfrommorality.Thisarticleseekstorefineourunderstandingofthefactorsthatcontributetothe`sheeplike’qualityofbehaviorthatisfacilitatedby(incontrasttothatwhichgenerates)legalinstitutions.6Hart,Theconceptoflaw.7AndreiMarmor,'Legalconventionalism'inJulesColeman(ed),Hart'sPostscript,essaysonthePostscripttotheConceptofLaw(Hart'sPostscript,essaysonthePostscripttotheConceptofLaw,OxfordUniversityPress2001)GeraldJ.Postema,'Coordinationandconventionatthefoundationsoflaw'(1982)11Journaloflegalstudies165GeraldJ.Postema,'Norms,reasonsandlaw'(1998)51Currentlegalproblems149MichaelEBratman,'Sharedcooperativeactivity'(1992)101Thephilosophicalreview327.
3
farlessattentionhassofarbeenpaidtothepatternsofrepeatedbehavior-habits-
thatfeedsuchpractices.Mostlegaltheoristswilltellyouthatthereisagoodreason
forsuchscantdevelopments,foreverybodyknowsthat`habitsarenotthe[…]sort
ofthingsthatcanimposeobligations’.8
Thefirstpartofthisarticleexposesthedualistmeta-ethicalpresuppositionsthatlurk
behindsuchanapparentlyunproblematicstatementanddelineatesthecontoursof
a(non-reductive)moralnaturalismthatgivesacentralplacetohabits.Bythrowing
lightonthefullspectrumofhabits(from`mere’ticsandautomatedbehaviourtothe
reflectivehabitsthatconstituteaparticularkindofpractice),thisarticleemphasizes
thequalitativedifferencebetweenthehabitsthatarecapableofgeneratingthe
practicesattheheartofalegalsystemandthehabitsthatthissystem’s`divisionof
normativelabour’isconduciveto.Hart’s`thesis2’iscorrectbecauseandtothe
extentthatlaw’sinstitutionalstructuredoesfacilitatethedevelopmentofrigid
habits,i.e.habitsthathavelosttheiradaptabilityandhencetheirabilitytogenerate
andsupportpractices(conventionalorotherwise).
Thesecondpartofthisarticlestartswiththeintellectualrootsofwhatcouldhave
beenHart’s(non-reductive)naturalistaccountoflegalnormativity,wherebythere
wouldbeno`gap’betweenhabitsassocialfactsontheonehandandsocialruleson
theother:agapwhichHartendeavourstobridgeviahisnotionofacceptance.
Section2.2unpacksthetwo-wayrelationshipbetweenhabitsandlawwhilesection
2.3drawsuponthelattertobolsterHart’sclaimthatlawisinherentlyconducivetoa
societythatis`deplorablysheeplike’(oncethisclaimisridofitsassociationwith
`officialacceptance’).
8`Fortunately,plansaretherightsortofthings’(ScottJ.Shapiro,'Law,Plans,andPracticalReason'(2002)8LegalTheory387438).
4
I.Thenatureofhabitanditsrelationshiptoethicalagency
Habitrequiresrepetition-whetheritberepeatedmovement,orposture,orframeof
thought.Inthepatternshapedbythisrepetition,atsomepointahabitisformed.To
trytoidentifyaprecisemomentintimewhenahabitisbornisdoomedtofailure,
fordiminishedawarenessofthepatternunderlyingitiskeytoitsemergence.9While
onecanintentionallyseektodevelopsomehabit,10thelatterisbornonlyoncethe
behavior,postureorframeofthoughtunderlyingithasbecomesointernalizedthat
ittakesefforttobringitbacktoconsciousawareness.Nowjustasthisnumbingof
one’spassivesensibilitytakesroot,habitconcomitantlybuoysupwhateveractivity
underliesit.WhenIgetusedtobicyclingbetweencarsinthemorningrushhour,I
notonlybecomelesstensewhendoingso;Ialsoacquiresomegenuinedexterity.
ItisthisdoubleeffectofhabitwhichHumereferstowhenheemphasizesthat
`customincreases[sic]allactivehabits,butdiminishespassive,accordingtothe
observationofalateeminentphilosopher[Butler]’.11Whentheyareconsidered
specificallyinthemoralsphere,theactiveandpassiveaspectsofhabitmakeita
double-edgedsword.Whilehabituationiscentraltotheprocessesbywhichwe
cometoacquireatastefor-andoureaseindiscerning-standardsofrightand
wrong,itisalsowhatcanstopusfromwakinguptothedemandsofsuchstandards,
lulledintoacomfortingbutdangeroussenseofroutine.
9Externalobservationnecessarilycomestoolate.10Habitscanbeacquiredinmanyways:intentionally(forinstancetofostertherealisationofaparticulargoal)orunintentionally(throughupbringingorsimplyrespondingtoparticularenvironmentalfeaturesthatshapeone’sbehaviour).11DavidHume,ATreatiseonHumanNature(OxfordUniversityPress1978)424.The`lateeminentphilosopher’HumeisreferringtoisBishopButler,whoemphasiseswhathecalls`thedoubleeffectofhabit’:`Fromthesetwoobservationstogether,thatpracticalhabitsareformedandstrengthenedbyrepeatedacts;andthatpassiveimpressions,bybeingrepeateduponus,growweaker;itmustfollow,thatactivehabitsmaybegraduallyformingandstrengthening,byacourseofactingonsuchandsuchmotivesandexcitements,whilstthesemotivesandexcitementsthemselvesare,byproportionatedegrees,growinglesssensible,i.e.arecontinuallylessandlesssensiblyfelt,evenastheactivehabitsstrengthen.Andexperienceconfirmsthis;foractiveprinciples,attheverytimethattheyarelesslivelyinperceptionthantheywere,arefoundtobe,somehow,wroughtmorethoroughlyintothetemperandcharacter,andbecomemoreeffectualininfluencingourpractice.’(J.Butler,Analogyofreligion,naturalandrevealed,totheconstitutionandcourseofnature(BellandDaldy1857)108).
5
`[E]thicsstrivestolegislateaworldinwhichthegoodisdonefluidly,asa
matterofhabituation,ifnotfact,evenasitisrecognizedthattheverything
ethicscanneverbeisanactingthatismerelyhabitormatteroffact.Evenas
ethicsseekstobecomefamiliar,itinsistsonrenderingtheworldunfamiliar.
Theemergenceofethicalobligationbothinsistsonregularityinone’s
conductandresiststhatregularity’.12
Becausehabits’compellingforcetypicallyeludesus13,theymaybeseenasamoral
menace,surreptitiouslycompromisingourautonomy.Hence,formany,`ethicscan
neverbeanactingthatismerelyhabit’(seetheabovequotation):inherseminal
workonhabit14,ClareCarlisletracesaphilosophicalthreadthatlinksKantto
KierkegaardandBergsonvialesswell-knownauthorssuchasMainedeBiran.For
Carlisle,itisdeBiran’sambivalencetowardshabitthatmakeshisaccount
particularlyinteresting.deBiranindeeddeemshabittobethe`generalcauseofour
progressontheonehand,ofourblindnessontheother’.15Becausehabitcaneclipse
reflectivethought,andbecausereflectivethoughtisdeemed(bythoseauthors
withintheKantianthread)toconditiontheexerciseofourfreedom,habitbelongs
firmlytothe`messy’,causal,spaceofdesires,inclinationsandthelike.
12JamesHatley,JaniceMcLaneandChristianDiehm(eds),Interrogatingethics:embodyingthegoodinMerleau-Ponty(DuquesneUniversityPress2006)3.13`[O]fallenemies,habitisperhapsthemostcunning,andaboveallitiscunningenoughnevertoletitselfbeseen,becausethepersonwhoseesthehabitissavedfromthehabit.’S.Kierkegaard,WorksofLove(PrincetonUniversityPress1995)36.14C.Carlisle,'Creaturesofhabit:theproblemandthepracticeofliberation'(2006)38ContinentalPhilosophyReview19,C.Carlisle,'BetweenFreedomandNecessity:FelixRavaissononHabitandtheMoralLife'(2010)53Inquiry123,C.Carlisle,Onhabit(Routledge2014).15PierreMaineDeBiran,Theinfluenceofhabitonthefacultyofthinking,vol3(Williams&Wilkins1929)49.CarlisleemphasisestheextenttowhichdeBiran’sambivalencetowardshabitisbornoutofthetensionsunderlyinghismetaphysics’dualistpresuppositions:`Biran’swholeaccountofhabitischaracterisedbytensionsandinconsistenciesthattestifytoakindofstrugglebetweenreasonandhabit:ontheonehand,thereistheinsistenceonadualisticpsychology,andontheotherhandtheacknowledgedfailureclearlytoseparateactivityandpassivity,perceptionandsensation,thevoluntaryandtheinvoluntary’(Carlisle,'BetweenFreedomandNecessity:FelixRavaissononHabitandtheMoralLife').
6
Now,themetaphoroftwospaceswhichtypicallyunderliesnegativeevaluationsof
habitisfarfromcasual.InKantitexplicitlystructureshisassertionofthepriorityof
freedom,`sothespaceofreasonsisthespaceinwhichourtranscendentalfreedom
operates,inspiteofthedeterministiccourseoftherestofourbeing[including
habits].’16Inlinewiththisdualistframework,theoriesofethicaldevelopment17are
traditionallystructuredaroundagradualdetachmentfromtheemotionaland
habitualrootsofethicalaction,celebratingreflectivereasoning–typicallyalong
Kantianlines-astheculminationofmatureagency.
Thisemphasisonthenecessitytogrowoutofthehabitualthroughcriticalreasoning
translatesakeyassumptionthatstructuresallnon-naturalistaccountsofethical
agency:thereisafundamentaldiscontinuitybetweenthenaturalandtheethical.
Whilenon-cognitivistsdrawfromthegapbetweenthosetwospacestheirskepticism
aboutthetruth-aptitudeofmoralstatements,Kantianaccountsofethicalagency
takethatgaptoconditiontheverypossibilityofassertingourethicalfreedom(and
concomitantresponsibility).Kantindeeddeemedhabit-understoodasmindless,
automaticrepetition,andthusfirmlybelongingtothespaceofcauses-tobeasign
ofhumanenslavement:
16SimonBlackburn,'Normativityalamode'(2001)5JournalofEthics:AnInternationalPhilosophicalReview139140.17Kohlberg’stheoryofethicaldevelopmentisthemostfamousinstantiationofthatKantianperspectiveindevelopmentalpsychology.Whenhedevelopedhistheoryofmoralstagesinthe1950s,thedominant,`socialization’viewclaimedthat`societyispriortotheindividual,bothchronologicallyandmorally.Itisthesourceofallvalues,whichareeventuallyreflectedintheindividual’(MelfordSpiro,'CultureandPersonality:TheNaturalHistoryofaFalseDichotomy'(1951)14Psychiatry19,p.20).Theessentiallypassiveroleattributedtotheindividual–seenasavaluereceptacle–bythissocializationviewworriedKohlberg.Asidefromthedangerofsocialstagnation,Kohlbergwasacutelyawareoftheperilinherentinover-emphasisingadequateadjustmenttosociallyconstitutedhabitsofevaluation.For`toidentifymoralitywithconformityistobeforcedtotakethepositionthataloyalNaziwasbehavingmorally’(LawrenceKohlberg,'Moralstagesandmoralization'inThomasLickona(ed),Moraldevelopmentandbehavior:Theory,research,andsocialissues(Moraldevelopmentandbehavior:Theory,research,andsocialissues,Holt,RinehartandWinston1976),p.3.).Kohlberg’sdefiningmoralmaturitybyreferencetotheindividual’scapacityto`differentiat[e]hisselffromtherulesandexpectationsofothersanddefin[e]hisvaluesintermsofself-chosenprinciples’(ibidem,p.33)isadirectattempttoaddressthisconcern,yetitcameataprice,assuchaKantianstandforcedKohlbergtobeliethespiritofapragmatisttraditionhewasclearlyattractedto.
7
‘Anaptitude(habitus)isafacilityinactingandasubjectiveperfectionof
choice.Butnoteverysuchfacilityisafreeaptitude(habituslibertatis);forifit
isahabit(assuetudo),thatis,auniformityinactionthathasbecomea
necessitythroughfrequentrepetition,itisnotonethatproceedsfrom
freedom,andthereforenotamoralaptitude.’18
ThisarticleproblematizesthenarrowKantianunderstandingofhabitasmindless
repetition(whichisstillwidelyinfluentialinlegaltheorytoday–seethequotation
fromShapirointheintroduction)tohighlightthewiderangeofwaysofhavinga
habit,andtheirsignificanceforourunderstandingoflegalnormativity(and,
concomitantly,forourunderstandingofthemoralrisksinherentinlaw’s
institutionalstructure–thisnormativeaspectisdiscussedin2.3).
Becausetheaccountofhabitthatemergesfromthisarticlestandsinthewayofany
non-naturalistefforttopreservethe`gap’between`(mere)nature’andethics,
section1.1.isdevotedtodelineating(inbroadterms19)thetypeofnaturalismthat
stemsfromthisanalysisofhabit.Ofthechallengessuchanaccountraisesin
committingtoanaturalistmethodology,noneismoreimportantthanthetaskof
explainingwhat,ifanything,enablesustostandbackfromandtochallengethe
habitual,whetheritbetoultimatelytriggermoral(andlegal)changeornot.Thiswill
bediscussedinsection1.2.
1.1. Growingwithin(ratherthanoutof)thehabitual:developinganon-reductivemoralnaturalism
18Kant,I.[1797](1996)TheMetaphysicsofMorals,trans.M.Gregor(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress),ms.6:407).19Forafullaccountofthehabit-centrednaturalismhintedatinthisarticle,seeS.Delacroix,HabitualEthics?(2018).
8
Thetypeofmoralnaturalism20defendedhere,whichgivesacentralplacetohabit,
rejectsbothnon-naturalismandanykindofnaturalismthatletsthecurrentresults
ofournaturalsciencesdefinewhatbelongstonatureandwhatdoesnot.Asforthe
former,onemayusefullydistinguishbetweentwobroadtypesofnon-naturalism.
While`subjectivists’highlighttheman-madenatureoftheethicalrealmtodismissit
aslackinginobjectivity(comparedtothenaturalrealm),`supernaturalist
rationalists’21insistthatatleastsomeethicalvaluesareindependentfrom-and
moreobjectivethan-naturalfacts.
Giventherangeofpossiblewaysofdefining-andarticulatingtherelationship
between-`nature’and`science’respectively,naturalismcancomeinmanyshapes
andcolours.Becauseofsomeversions’scientisticexcesses,`thetideofnaturalism
[which]hasbeenrisingsincetheseventeenthcentury’canbeperceivedasathreat:
`theregionsunderthreataresomeofthemostcentralinhumanlife.’22Toprotect
these`regions’–moralityisoneofthem-anincreasingnumberofcontemporary
philosophers(fromPricetoPutnamviaMcDowellandBlackburn)findthemselves
`onthesame[broadorliberal]sideofthebarricades’23,eveniftheirrespective
naturalismsdifferinsomeimportantways.Forthepurposesofthisarticle,itis
helpfultohighlightthreeconceptualhurdles-defining`thenatural’,`science’and
`internalismaboutreasons’,whichusefullydelineatethekindofnaturalismatstake
(andwhichahabit-centrednaturalismfacesmorefelicitouslythanothers).20Whateverelseitis,naturalisminvolvesatleastone`lowestcommondenominator’commitment.Itsrejectionofanydualistmetaphysicsinvolvesaclaimthat`thereisnounbridgeablespacebetweenwhathappensinthat[natural]orderandanyotherorderinheavenorearth,includingtheorderofourownminds’(Blackburn,'Normativityalamode').Onthisbasis,thechallengewhichanynaturalistaccountofmoralitymustaddressconsistsinunderstandinghowthedemandsandaspirationswecharacteristicallyassociatewithmoralitymaybeunderstoodasoutgrowthsofouranimal(ratherthannoumenal,orgod-likeetc.)nature:`theremustbenounmovedmover:nointerventionofthedivinespark,orgiftsfromunexplainedquarters’(ibid.).21IborrowthisotherwisecumbersometermfromMcDowellasithasthemeritofencompassingawiderangeofpositions,rangingfromPlatonismtointuitionism,vianaturallawtheories(JohnMcDowell,Mind,Value,andReality(HarvardUniversityPress1998)167).22HuwPrice,'NaturalismandthefateoftheM-Worlds'(1997)7ProceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety247.23PaulRedding,'TwodirectionsforanalyticKantianism'inMarioDeCaroandDavidMacarthur(eds),NaturalismandNormativity(NaturalismandNormativity,ColumbiaUniversityPress2010)271.
9
1.1.1. ‘TheNatural’
Therecannotbeanydiscontinuitybetweentheethicalandthenaturalinanaccount
ofethicalagencythatgivesacentralplacetohabit.Andthatisnotbecausethe
ethicalis`merely’naturalbutratherbecause,asHansFinknicelyputsit:`Natureis
nevermerenature.Thatwhichismorethanmereisnature,too’.24Habits(alongwith
thehistorical,theaesthetical,theman-made)areamongthosethingsthatare`more
thanmere’nature.Deweyhasanicewayofillustratingthesortofnaturalismthatis
atworkinanyaccountofethicalagencythatplaceshabitatitscore:
‘Mountainpeaksdonotfloatunsupported;theydonotevenjustrestupon
theearth.Theyaretheearthinoneofitsmanifestoperations.Itisthe
businessofthosewhoareconcernedwiththetheoryoftheearth,
geographersandgeologists,tomakethisfactevident,initsvarious
implications.Thetheoristwhowoulddealphilosophicallywithfinearthasa
liketasktoaccomplish’.25
Whetheritbeforfineartsorforethics,thetaskofthephilosopheristoexplainhow
bothfineartsandethicsaretheoutcomeofwhatwe-nature’sinhabitants-do;how
theyaremadepossiblebyhabits,bothreflectiveandunreflective,andpractices
disturbingthelatterandengenderingnewinstancesoffineartandethicalvalues,
whichinturnfosternewhabitsetc.Thissortofnaturalismentailsthat-toquote
Leiter,himselfreferringtothetypeofnaturalismendorsedbyMcDowell:
‘[T]hereisnospecialproblem(fromthestandpointofanaturalisticworld
view)abouttheepistemicorontologicalstatusofthefacts[includingethical
24HansFink,'ThreeSortsofNaturalism'(2006)14EuropeanJournalofPhilosophy202217.25J.Dewey,Artasexperience(CapricornBooks1958)3.
10
values]whoseexistencedependsontheseresponsivecapacities[naturally
developedbyhumanbeings]’.26
WhileIwholeheartedlyendorsetheperspectiveencapsulatedintheabove
renderingofMcDowell’snaturalism,Leiterthinksthelatterdoesnotqualifyas
`naturalism’,forit`rejectstheNaturalisticConceptionofobjectivity.’27Thisdismissal
isworthunpacking,andtodothatonemuststartwithwhatthat“specialproblem”
whichLeiterreferstointheabovequotemightconsistin.FarfromModern28,that
problemgoeshandinhandwithadrivetoconfinethenaturaltothatwhichisthe
resultofelementary,materialforces(asopposedtohumanforces).Sucha
restrictiveunderstandingofnatureinevitablythrowsintosharpfocustheontological
andepistemologicalprecariousnessoftheman-made.29
Nowonemayresisttheconclusionthatthisapparentprecariousnessisatall
problematicbasedonatleasttwodifferentstrategies.Thefirstoneconsistsin
arguingthatwhatdependsonhumanbeings’responsivecapacitiesisno-lessrealor
objectivethanthenatural,albeitinadifferentway.Quineanswillnecessarilybe
suspiciousofsuchalineofargument,atleastinsofarasitpresupposesontological
pluralism.30
Anotherwayofdebunkingthesupposed`specialproblem’abouttheepistemicand
ontologicalstatusoftheman-madeconsistsinpointingoutthatthelatter’s
precariousnessonlyspringsupincontrasttoapeculiarly-andsuspiciously-bare
Nature.NotonlyisitfarfromclearwhethersuchaNaturestrippedbareofthe
26BrianLeiter,Naturalizingjurisprudence:EssaysonAmericanlegalrealismandnaturalisminlegalphilosophy(OxfordUniversityPress2007)243.27ibid.28ItplaysacentralroleinPlato’sendeavourtocapturethetensioninherentinphysisinLawsBookX.29The“man-made”isbroadlyunderstood,andrangesfromtheethicaltotheartistic,viathereligious.30Priceusefullydefinesontologicalpluralism(inhisattemptatrescuingsomeofCarnap’sinsights)astheviewaccordingtowhich:“totheextentthatdifferentframeworks[atplayinlanguage]areindependent,anddoingdifferentjobs,theirexistentialquantifiersalsoseemtobedoingdifferentjobs—eachframeworkseemstobringwithititsownnotionofreality.”(HuwPrice,'Carnap,Quine,andtheFateofMetaphysics'(1997)5ElectronicJournalofAnalyticPhilosophy6).
11
humantouchisinfactavailabletous;quitewhywewouldwanttohankeraftera
conceptofnaturethatreducessodrasticallytheexplanatoryresourcesatour
disposalwarrantsanexplanation.Thelattergoeshandinhandwithone’s
conceptionofscience.
1.1.2. ‘Science’WhenLeiterremindsusthat,incontrasttooutdatedscientificmodels`usually
drawnfromsomeidealizedversionofphysics’,`scientificaccountsofsocial
phenomenahaveroom,inprinciple,forhermeneuticconcepts’31,hisnaturalism
seemsresolutelyun-`bald’.ThelattertermisMcDowell’s,and`baldnaturalism’has
beengivenvariousdefinitions,amongwhichtheviewaccordingtowhich`realityis
exhaustedbythenaturalworld,inthesenseoftheworldasthenaturalsciencesare
capableofrevealingittous’.32
YetLeiter’swayofengagingwiththeargumentslevelledbyMcDowellagainstbald
naturalismseemstopullhimbacktheotherway.Whenhenotesthat,asa
`Quinean’,it`alllooksverystrange[tohim]’whenMcDowellquestionsthe`reason
tosupposethatnaturalsciencehasafoundationalstatusinphilosophicalreflection
abouttruth—thattherecanbenofactsotherthanthosethatwouldfigureina
scientificunderstandingoftheworld’33,Leitercouldhavesimplygoneontopoint
outthatMcDowellseemstoassumetheoutdated,undulynarrowunderstandingof
naturalsciencesalludedtoabove.Leiter’sretortinginsteadthat`tosimplypushthe
scientificepistemologyasideopenstheontologicalfloodgatestoawholepre-
31Evenifit`doesnotshowthatthey[do]makeroomforthekindsofHermeneuticConceptstowhichconceptualjurisprudentsareattached’.Leiter,Naturalizingjurisprudence:EssaysonAmericanlegalrealismandnaturalisminlegalphilosophy.32JohnMcDowell,'Projectionandtruthinethics',Mind,valueandreality(Mind,valueandreality,HarvardUniversityPress1998).33Ibid.
12
Enlightenmentconceptionoftheworld’34mayleadthereadertoassumethatthere
isbutoneunderstandingofsciencecapableofsecuringthe`ontologicalfloodgates’.
Thelatterassumptionisworthdebunking,foritcontributestothegrowing
popularityofareductivematerialisttraditionwhoseinfluenceisincreasinglyfeltin
someneuroscientificstudiesofmoralagency.35Ifthemindisbutaby-productof
matter,36ifourmemories,beliefsandmoral,politicalandaestheticjudgmentsareall
aptlyunderstoodasphysicalstatescausedbynerveimpulsesinthebrain,thenmost
`socialscientific’accountsofthelatterwouldneedtobedismissedasontologically
queer.
Incontrast,theconceptionofsciencepresupposedbyahabit-centrednaturalism
notonlyincludesbutgivesacentralroleto`humanistic’contributions.37Amongthe
manychallengeswhichsuchaconceptionofsciencemayusefullytackle,the
followinginstigatedthepresentarticle:thechallengeofseekingtograspwhat
enablesustoperiodicallystandagainstcommonlyacceptedvaluestoinitiatechange
inthewaywethinkof(and,ultimately,implement)thestandardsgoverningourway
34Leiter,Naturalizingjurisprudence:EssaysonAmericanlegalrealismandnaturalisminlegalphilosophy.35SeeforinstanceGreene’sendeavourto`sendthesoulpackingforgood’,whichproceedsontheassumptionthatour`moralbusiness’canandshouldbeseenasabrainprocessandnothingmore:`Whatwe[socialneuroscientists]reallywant,Ithink,istoseethemind’sclockwork[…]totruly,deeplybelievethatwearemachines,wemustseetheclockworkinaction.We’veallheardthatthesoulisdead.Nowwewanttoseethebody[…]ifthesoulisnotinthemoraljudgmentbusiness,it’snotinanybusinessatall.And,thus,whatitwouldtaketosendthesoulpackingforgoodisapurelyphysicalaccountofhowthehumanminddoesitsmoralbusiness’.(JoshuaD.Greene,'Socialneuroscienceandthesoul'slaststand'inAlexanderB.Todorov,SusanT.FiskeandDeborahA.Prentice(eds),Socialneuroscience:towardunderstandingtheunderpinningsofthesocialmind(Socialneuroscience:towardunderstandingtheunderpinningsofthesocialmind,OxfordUniversityPress2011)264).Forsomevibrantcriticismofthereductivematerialismatplayintheabovequotation,seeRaymondTallis,ApingMankind:Neuromania,DarwinitisandtheMisrepresentationofHumanity(Acumen2011)359.36“Thereisonlyonesortofstuff,namelymatter–thephysicalstuffofphysics,chemistry,andphysiology–andthemindissomehownothingbutaphysicalphenomenon.Inshort,themindisthebrain”(DanielCDennett,Consciousnessexplained(PenguinUK1993)33).37Farfromthreateningthe`ontologicalfloodgates’,contributionsfromoursocialsciencesandhumanitiesaredeemedessentialtoilluminatingthatwhichdependsonhumanbeings’`responsivecapacities’,whetheritbeintentionality,actionormoraljudgments.Asthatwhichsystematicallyenablesalltheseresponsivecapacities,habitconstitutesanaptfocalpointfortheconceptofsciencethatunderliesthetypeofnaturalismdefendedhere.
13
oflivingtogether.Gainingabetterunderstandingofthemanywaysofhavingahabit
(andthemechanismsunderlyingbothhabitacquisitionandhabitmetamorphosis)is
crucialtotheabove,andbothempiricalinvestigationsandphilosophicalanalyses
cancontributetoit.Whiletheformerarestillfewandfarbetween38(thoughIam
hopingtoremedythis39),thelatterhavebenefitedfromrenewedinterestinrecent
years.
1.1.3. NaturalismandInternalismaboutreasons
Renewedphilosophicalinterestinhabitcouldbesaidtostematleastinpartfromits
playingacrucialroleinanyattempttoreconcilenaturalismononehandand
internalismaboutreasonsontheotherhand,twopositionsthataretraditionally
deemedincompatible.Indeeditisbecauseofthissupposedincompatibilitythat
manynaturalists(includingLeiter40)endupfallingbackuponasubjectivistposition,
wherebymoralpropositionsrefertotheattitudesofpeople,ratherthanobjective
factsindependentofhumanopinion.Thisexpressivismresolvesadifficultythatis
inherentinbaldversionsofnaturalism.Thelatter(mistakenly)assumethatthe
`ontologicalcleansing’demandedbynaturalism’srejectionofdualistmetaphysics
leavesthoseattemptingtoexplainhowmoraljudgmentsreliablymotivateuswith
onlybrute`inert’factsasexplanatoryresourcesattheirdisposal.
Thechallengefacedbysuchbaldversionsofnaturalismthenconsistsinexplaining
howsuchfacts–andthebeliefstheygiveriseto-reliablymotivateustoactincertain
38Experimentalstudieswillhavetoovercomethedifficultyinreplicatingahabitualsettinginitsfulldepthwhilelarge-scaleecologicalstudieswillstruggletoisolatetherelevantfactors.Onhabitacquisition,seePhillippaLallyandothers,'Howarehabitsformed:modellinghabitformationintherealworld'(2010)40EuropeanJournalofSocialPsychology998.39Anin-progressstudyreplicatesaroutineprofessionalsituationinahighlyimmersivevirtualenvironment.Thestudyaimstograsptheimpactofprofessionalhabituation(andexpertise)onethicalawareness(forthcomingin2017).40`Ofcourse,theNeoHumeannaturalisthasnotexplainedrealnormativity,asScanloncomplains,becauserealnormativitydoesnotexist:thatistheentireupshotofthenaturalistview.Therearenoreasonswhoseexistenceandcharacterisindependentofhumanattitudes;thereareonlyhumanattitudeswhichleadusto`talkthetalk’ofreasons.Andifrealnormativitydoesnotexist,ifonlyfeelingsofinclinationandaversion,compulsionandavoidance,actuallyexist,thenthatmeansthatallpurportedlynormativedisputesbottomoutnotinreasonsbutintheclashofwilloraffect.’BrianLeiter,'NormativityForNaturalists'(2015)25PhilosophicalIssues6474.
14
ways(formostofourfactualbeliefstypicallydonot).Farfromhavingonlyinertfacts
atitsdisposal,thenaturalismdefendedherereliesonhabittoexplainthereliable
connectionbetweenmoraljudgmentandmotivation.Thetermreliableindicatesa
`relaxed’41approachtodrawingaconnectionbetweenmoraljudgmentand
motivationthatreliesonthefactthat`mostofusarecreaturesoftherightsort’.The
latterexpressionisRailton’s,butunlikeRailtonIdonottakethepossibilityofan
absenceofsuchconnectioninpathologicalcases(suchasthechronicallydepressive
personRailtonrefersto)toinvalidateinternalismaboutreasons.
Railton’sargumentworkslikethis:Inorderto`permitplausibleconnectionstobe
drawnbetween,ontheonehand,whatisgoodorrightand,ontheother,what
characteristicallywouldmotivateindividualswhoarepreparedtosubmitthemselves
torelevantsortsofscrutiny’42,thenaturalistmayusefullycomparetwotypesof
practices:thepracticeofbelief-based,everydayconversationandmoralpractice.
DrawinguponGrice’s43`complextheoryofhowthenormsthatgovern
conversationalexchanges-internalizedbyspeakersasmutuallyunderstood
intentionstobecooperativeincommunicating-makeitpossibleforwhatweliterally
saytooneanothertoconveyspokenandunspokeninformation’44,Railtonventures:
‘Mightsomethinglikethisbetrueinthecaseofmorallanguage?Canamoral
factualistarguethatthe`normativelyloaded’,dynamiccharacterofmoral
thoughtandpracticeisattributabletothejointoperationofan
encompassingframeworkofindividualandsharednorms,dispositions,and
41JamesLenman,'MoralNaturalism',TheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy(TheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy,2006).42PeterRailton,Facts,values,andnorms:Essaystowardamoralityofconsequence(CambridgeUniversityPress2003)33.43P.Grice,StudiesintheWaysofWords(HarvardUniversityPress1989).44PeterRailton,'Moralfactualism'(2006)Contemporarydebatesinmoraltheory201209.
15
intentions,ontheonehand,andtheparticularfactualcontentofmoral
statements,ontheother?’45
Inthe`jointoperation’describedbyRailton,habit46playsacentralrole,foritishabit
thatpresidesovertheprocessofinternalisationofthenormsthatconditionthe
possibilityofbothmoralpracticesandbelief-based,everydayconversations.Onsuch
anaccount,aphilosophicallyminded,self-proclaimed`amoralist’whodemandsthat
wegiveherareasontobemoraliseitherincoherent47orsuffersfromanimpaired
capacitytoengageemotionallywithhersurroundings.Thelikelihoodofagap
betweensinceremoraljudgmentandactualmotivationalengagementinthelatter,
pathologicalcase48doesnotdetractfromthefactthatmosthumanbeingsare
creaturesoftherightsort.Wedotakeaninterestinnaturalfactsaboutmoral
rightness,becausetheprocessofgrowingupinvolvesdevelopingasensibility`that
includesnotonlyordinarycognitiveandsensorycapacitiesbutalsoamotivating
attitude–acapacitytofindcertainthingssimply“tobedone”.Itwouldfollowthat
thosewhomastermoralconceptswill,whenmakingmoraljudgments,havea
tendencytoactandfeelaccordingly.’49
45`Thiswouldpermitthefactualisttolinkmoraljudgmentandmotivationwhileprovidingthemoststraightforwardexplanationofhowmoraljudgmentcouldbelogicallyandlinguisticallyintegralwith‘ordinaryfactual’judgment,possessingallthemarksoftruth.’ibid.46WhileRailtondoesnotdelvemuchintohabit,hecomesclosetoitinhisdescriptionof`ourcapacityforsuchnonpropositional,bodilycentered,groundedmentalmapsandexpectations’,thankstowhich`weareabletoconnecthumanpropositionalthoughttotheworldviadereanddesebeliefsandintentions.’(PeterRailton,'TheAffectiveDogandItsRationalTale:IntuitionandAttunement'(2014)124Ethics813838).47Onemayarguethatwithouthabitswewouldnotbeabletospeakof`ourselves’atall:`Isn’tthistheanswertothequestion‘whatarewe?’Wearehabits,nothingbuthabits–thehabitofsaying‘I’.Perhapsthereisnomorestrikinganswertotheproblemoftheself.’(GillesDeleuze,EmpiricismandSubjectivity:anessayonHume'stheoryofhumannature(ColumbiaUniversityPress1991)x).48RailtonproposestheexamplesofBrad,whosuffersfromdepression,andTheresa,whose`capacitiesforempathyandengagementonauniversalscalearequitelimited’(Railton,'Moralfactualism').49Ibid.Notethat,inthisquote,RailtonisreferringtoMcDowell’s`internalist’naturalism,whichRailtonisdistancinghimselffrom(unnecessarily,inmyopinion)becauseofthepossibilityofthepathologicalcasesmentionedabove.Theoptimistic,Neo-HumeanpositiondefendedherefindsanechoinMikhail’sworkonso-called`universalmoralgrammar’:`InitialevidenceforUMGcomesfrommultiplesources,includingpsychology,linguistics,anthropologyandcognitiveneuroscience.Althoughnoneofthisevidenceisunivocalorconclusive,collectivelyitprovidesatleastmodestsupportforthehypothesisthathumanspossessaninnatemoralfacultythatisanalogous,insomerespects,tothe
16
Now,theelementthatconditionsthesuccessofsuchan`internalistnaturalism’–i.e.
theprocessofgradualconstructionofone’sethicalsensibilitythroughhabituation
(or`Bildung’)-isalsothesourceofitskeychallenge.Foritisonethingtoaccountfor
thewayinwhichwemaybuildourethicalsensibility(andmoralcompetency)
throughupbringing,andanothertoexplainhow,giventhisdependencyonthe
socio-culturalworldweinhabit,wecanneverthelesspreserveanabilitytostand
againstcommonlyacceptednormsandchallengeroutineperceptions.Thischallenge
isunpackedinthenextsection.
1.2. Whatenablesustostandbackfromhabit?
ReferringtoAristotle’saccountofhowethicalcharacterisformed,McDowell
describestheprocess(whichhecalls`Bildung’)whereby`humanbeingsare
intelligiblyinitiatedintothisstretchofthespaceofreasonsbyethicalupbringing,
whichinstillstheappropriateshapeintotheirlives.Theresultinghabitsofthought
andactionaresecondnature’.50Clearly,the`habitsofthoughtandaction’McDowell
referstointheabovepassagemustbeofaverydifferentkindfromthosedeemed
byKanttobelongfirmlytothe`messy’,causal,spaceofdesires,inclinationsandthe
like?Orarethey?
ThesuccessofMcDowell’snon-reductivenaturalism,itspotentialtodevelopa
narrativethattakesusfromhumanbeingswithneedsanddesires(‘thesphereof
causes’)tointernalizedstandardsofrightandwronghingesuponakeyambiguity
inherentintheconceptofhabit.Seizinguponthisambiguity,BillPollardendeavours
toclarify`howthesameideaofhabitcanbothoccupythespaceofcausesand,at
languagefacultythathasbeenpostulatedbyChomskyandotherlinguists.’(J.Mikhail,'Universalmoralgrammar:theory,evidenceandthefuture'(2007)11TrendsCognSci143).50JohnMcDowell,Mindandworld:withanewintroductionbytheauthor(HarvardUniversityPress1996)84.
17
leastpotentially,beaconstituentofsecondnature’51bydistinguishingbetween`two
waysofhavingthesamehabit’(ratherthanbetweendifferentkindsofhabit52).
Unlikethe`waywhichisavailabletopre-rationalhumansandothernon-rational
animals’theway`availabletohumansoncetheyhaveacquiredthecapacitytoact
forreasons’involvesthecapacityto(hereIquoteMcDowell)`contemplate
alternatives;[and]stepbackfromthenaturalimpulseanddirectcriticalscrutinyat
it’.53Nowthisemphasisoncriticalscrutinyandsteppingbackfromnaturalimpulses
maysoundstrangelyreminiscentoftheKantianaccountsofmoraldevelopment
referredtoearlier.Thedifference-anditiscrucial-liesinwhatistakentoenablethis
capacitytostepback,i.e.whethertheemotional,instinctiveandhabitualaretaken
tocontributeatalltothisability.Thechallengeforanynaturalistaccountofmoral
developmentconsistsinexplaininghowonegrowswithin,ratherthan`out’ofthe
habitual.
Thischallengeismadeallthemorecompellingsinceanaturalistmethodology
forbidsanyreferencetosomeArchimedeanpoint(whetheritbePlatonicforms,
`natural’valuesora-prioriprinciples),referencetowhichcouldsomehowbetrusted
towakeustotheignobilityofsomeofoursocialpractices.Ifallwehavetotrigger
themovementofcriticalscrutiny(whichMcDowellreferstointheabovequote)are
oursociallyconditionedemotionsand`habitsofevaluation’,thentonevertheless
postulatethecapacitytocontemplatealternativestothehabitualascentraltoour
secondnaturesoundsoptimisticatbest.Whatwouldtriggersuchcontemplation?
Emotions?Notiftheyarethemselvesdulledbyhabit:
‘Ifhabitcausesfeelingstodecline,presumablytothepointofexpiration,
thenhowistheroleofemotionalresponse—whetherasacharactertrait;as
51BillPollard,'Naturalizingthespaceofreasons'(2005)13InternationalJournalofphilosophicalStudies6976.52As`[a]voidingtalkofkindsofhabitallowsustoseehowtheycanpersistthroughouttheBildungprocess’ibid.53McDowell,'Twosortsofnaturalism'.
18
thepleasureandpainaccompanyingvirtuousandviciousacts;orasa
motivationalfactorinaction—tobeaccommodated?’.54
AnAristotelianaccountofexcellenceinthemoralspherewouldstressthatsituation-
specificdiscernmentisallweneedtokeephabitsattheserviceofourethicallife.A
lothangsonwhethersuchdiscernmentisconceptualisedasresponsivenessto
`affordances’55or,whether,likeMcDowell,oneinsistsontyingadequate
unreflectiveactiontoresponsivenesstoreasons.56Whilebroadlyinagreementwith
McDowellinhisAristoteliananalysisoftheunreflectiveactionsconstitutiveofhabit,
Dreyfusnotes:
‘McDowellconcludesthat,[...t]hankstoourinculcationintoourculture,
webecomesensitivetoreasons,whichtheninfluenceour`habitsofthought
andaction’.Onecaneasilyacceptthatinlearningtobewisewelearnto
followgeneralreasonsasguidestoactingappropriately.Butitdoesnot
followthat,oncewehavegottenpastthelearningphase,thesereasonsin
theformofhabitsstillinfluenceourwiseactions’.57
ThisquotationindirectlyhintsatanormativechallengewhichneitherDreyfusnor
McDowellhaveexplicitlyengagedwith:formostofus(thephronimosexcepted),our
`habitsofthoughtandaction’willbeaptatgeneratingtheirown`self-sustaining
reasons’.Howdoesonebuildintoone’saccountofadequateunreflectiveactionthe
necessarycapacitytochallengesuch`self-sustainingreasons’andmaintainthe54Carlisle,'BetweenFreedomandNecessity:FelixRavaissononHabitandtheMoralLife'.55`Affordancesarepossibilitiesforactionofferedbytheenvironment`.ForfulldevelopmentsseeE.Rietveld,'SituatedNormativity:TheNormativeAspectofEmbodiedCognitioninUnreflectiveAction'(2008)117Mind973.56Rietveldrightlyemphasizesthat`unlikeresponsivenesstonormativesignificance,responsivenesstoreasonsisnotexperiencedbyusinunreflectiveaction.Thatmakes`responsivenesstoreasons’anabstract,theory-dependentandpotentiallymisleadingterm`.RietveldgoesontowonderwhetherMcDowells’insistenceontyingadequateunreflectiveactiontoresponsivenesstoreasonsstemsfromhis`fearthatwithoutaroleforconceptualitywewouldnotbeabletoplaceunreflectiveactioninthecategorycalledspaceofreasons,beingratherforcedtoseeitasdeterminedbydisenchantedcausalinteraction.’(ErikRietveld,'McDowellandDreyfusonUnreflectiveAction'(2010)53Inquiry183185).57HubertLDreyfus,Overcomingthemythofthemental:howphilosopherscanprofitfromthephenomenologyofeverydayexpertise(AmericanPhilosophicalAssociation2005)50.
19
`discernment’thatconditionsouravailabilitytotheethicaldemandsthatmay
emergefromnovelsituations?
Pollardemphasisestheimportanceoftheagent’s`capacitytooptout[ofhabit]for
reasons’but,justlikeMcDowell,doesnotdelveintoexactlywhatunderliesthis
capacity`toadoptstrategiestobreakhabits’58.Pollard’sfocusisondelineatingthat
subsetofhabitualactionswhichcanbedeemed`rational’:`[t]hatsubsetwillconsist
ofthosehabitualactionswhichcoherewiththeagent’sworldview’.59
‘Andthatinturnwillbeenoughtoruleoutnail-bitingandcigarettesmoking
whentheyareagainsttheagent’sbetterjudgement.Theseactionsarenot
justifiableintherightsense’.60
Butwillitbeenoughtoruleouthabitsgeneratedbyfrequentrepetitionof
abhorrentpractices(thatwereinitiallyperceivedassuch)?Whensocietalnormsare
pervertedenoughtocondonetheworstatrocities,anagent’sworldviewmightwell
bemalleableenoughtoaccommodate–insomecasesencourage-habitsthatone
couldnotpossiblydeemtobe`rational’.Thefollowingquoteisanexcerptfromthe
diaryofKretschmer,aGermanpharmacistwhojoinedtheNazipartyin193961and
servedinaSonderkommandothattookpartinmassexecutions:
‘AsIsaid,Iaminaverygloomymood.Imustpullmyselfoutofit.Thesight
ofthedead(includingwomenandchildren)isnotverycheering.Butweare
fightingthiswarforthesurvivalornon-survivalofourpeople.[…]Ifit
weren’tforthestupidthoughtsaboutwhatwearedoinginthiscountry,the
58BillPollard,'Habitualactions'inTimothyO'ConnorandConstantineSandis(eds),Acompaniontothephilophyofaction(Acompaniontothephilophyofaction,Blackwell2010)79.59`[T]hisworldviewwillconsistofherbeliefs,interests,projectsandpreferences,anyanyotheritemswhichdisclosehowtheworldisforher.’Pollard,'Naturalizingthespaceofreasons'.60Ibid.61KretschmerwasrejectedbytheSSfor`failuretosatisfyrequirementsduringacourseonideology’(Kleeetal.1991,296,quotedinHerlindePauer-StuderandJ.DavidVelleman,'DistortionsofNormativity'(2011)14Ethicaltheoryandmoralpractice329onp.348).
20
Einsatzherewouldbewonderful,sinceithasputmeinapositionwhereIcan
supportyouallverywell.Since,asIalreadywrotetoyou,Iconsiderthelast
Einsatztobejustifiedandindeedapproveoftheconsequencesithad,the
phrase:‘stupidthoughts’isnotstrictlyaccurate.Ratheritisaweaknessnot
tobeabletostandthesightofdeadpeople;thebestwayofovercomingitis
todoitmoreoften.Thenitbecomesahabit.’62
Tofindoneselfinasituationwhereonecandeliberatelychoosetomakeaparticular
typeofbehaviourhabitual(throughsystematicrepetition)isuncommon;particularly
so,onewouldhope,whenthebehaviourinquestionamountstomassmurder.63
Kretschmer’sdeliberaterepetitionstrategymayormaynotsucceedinengendering
a-murderous-habit.Thatsuccesswillinpartbedeterminedbytheintensityofthe
emotionsthataretobedulledbyrepetition.AssumingKretschmerdoescontractthe
desiredhabit,isheinprinciplecapableof`optingoutofitforreasons’?Absolutely.
Wouldthesereasonsbefoundinhis`worldview’,inthe`beliefs,interests,projects
andpreferences,andanyotheritemswhichdisclosehowtheworldisfor[him]?64
Notnecessarily.Infact,giventheextenttowhichthesuccessoftheNaziregime
relieduponadeepinternalisationofapervertedworldview,itisquiteunlikely.
Where,then,doesKretschmer-oranybodywhohascontractedanymorally
significanthabit-findthemomentumnecessarytostandbackandquestionit?`IfI
amnothingbutself,thereisnowayoftranscendingmyself;ifIamnothingbuthabit,
thereisnowayofliberationthroughmyownactions.’65Giventheongoingprocess
ofconditioningthatdynamicallyshapestheself,Carlislesuggests`aversionof
Nietzsche’sideaof`eternalrecurrence’asakindofethicaltest:doyouwillthis
62Ibid.63CarlislenotesthatRavaissongiveslittlethoughttothe`badhabits’towhichournaturalinclinationscanlead:`hewritesofgracebutnotofsin;ofdesireforthegoodbutnotofperversity’(Carlisle,'BetweenFreedomandNecessity:FelixRavaissononHabitandtheMoralLife').64Pollard,'Naturalizingthespaceofreasons'.65Carlisle2006,p.32.
21
actiontoberepeatedindefinitely?Doyouwillthisactiontobecomeahabit?Doyou
willtobecomethisself?’66
Thesecond-personformulationoftheaboveethicaltestsuggeststhatitisuptoa
thirdpersontoaskthosequestions,toconfrontuswiththehabitswehave
contractedandtheextenttowhichtheyareconducivetoourideaofself.Themore
thisideaisfixed,rigidifiedbysomeoverarchingreligious,ideologicalormoral
discourse,themoreoutofreachthewords-ormerepresence-ofothersbecome.67
Becausetheybypasstheneedtoarticulatewhatitisaboutusconstantlyevolving
humanbeingsthatcallsfordoingthingsinaparticularway,thedualist
presuppositionsunderlyingsuchdiscoursesaffordafixedframeworkthatdefines
theself’srelationshiptoothers.Thisfixedrelationshipinturnencouragesthe
rigidificationofthehabitsthatareconstitutiveofthatrelationship,includingthe
habitsofthoughtandactionthatunderliealegalsystem.Thatthelatterisenabled
by-andenables-ourhabitsisforgotten.Insteadofcomingtotermswiththe
contingency-andresponsibility-inherentinitsbeingasocialartifact,lawis
presentedasanecessity(naturalorotherwise),thusminimisingtheimpactof
criticismsandcallsforchange.
Hartexpressespreciselythisconcern(eventhoughhedoesnotframeitintermsof
habits–seenextsection)whenhehighlightsafundamentalpointofintersection
betweenBenthamandMarx,whoboth:
‘agreedontwofundamentalpointswhicharerelevanttomypresenttheme:
first,thattheirtasksassocialthinkersweretoclearmen'smindsastothe
66Carlisle,'Creaturesofhabit:theproblemandthepracticeofliberation'(myemphasis).67Itmaywellbethat,whenitcomestoawakeningusfromdeeplyentrenchedhabits,`mere’wordsarenomatchforthekindofencounterdescribedinradicaltermsbyLevinaswhenhereferstothe`faceoftheOther’summoningeachandeveryoneofus.Callingforhumilityandopennesstotheunforeseen,Levinas’ethicsisbuiltuponempatheticimagination,a`wisdomthatstilllearnsfromeverynewhumanface’.EmmanuelLevinas,Totalityandinfinity:anessayonexteriority(DuquesneUniversityPress1969).Whenitcomestoawakeningusfromhabits,suchencountersmaybemetaphorical.Itmaybefacilitatedbyapieceofart,orthereadingofagreatnovel.
22
truecharacterofhumansociety,and,secondly,thathumansocietyandits
legalstructurewhichhadworkedsomuchhumanmisery,hadbeen
protectedfromcriticismbymyths,mysteriesandillusions,notallofthem
intentionallygenerated,yetallofthemprofitabletointerestedparties.[…]
Forbothofthemsuchmysterywasmadepossiblebythefailureonthepart
ofordinarymentorealisethattheformsoflawandhumansocietywereat
bottommerelyhumanartefacts,notnaturalnecessitiesbutthingsactually
madebymen,andhencethingswhichcouldbeunmadeandremade.’68
WhenHartbemoansthefactthatanestablishedlegalsystemisparticularly
conducivetoasocietythatis`deplorablysheeplike’-andwherethesheepmightall
endup`intheslaughterhouse’69,heisreferringtoaconcernexpressedindifferent
termsfromthoseusedintheabovequote.Foritisnotsomuchtheprogressive
disregardfortheresponsibility(andpossibilities)entailedbythefactthatlawis
`unmadeandremade’byusthatHartemphasises,butratherthe
disenfranchisementmadepossiblebythefactthat,inanestablishedlegalsystem,
only`officials’needaccepttheRuleofRecognition.
II.Fromlegalinstitutionstothepoliticalmonotonyofrigidified
habits(andtheriskofasheeplikesociety)
Theaimoftheprevioussectionwastohighlighttheextenttowhichone’s
understandingofhabitreflectsone’smeta-ethicalunderstandingofagency.If
autonomyistakentorequiretranscendingone’scausalenvironment(soastoleave
a`safe’distancebetweenthatenvironmentandone’snormativechoices),then
habitsbelongfirmlytotheprovinceofsociology.Theymaybeofinteresttothe
68H.L.A.Hart,'BenthamandtheDemystificationoftheLaw'(1973)36ModLRev26.69Hart,Theconceptoflaw.
23
moralorpoliticalphilosopheronlytotheextentthattheyconstituteathreatto
personalautonomy.
Alternatively,onemaydismisstheconceptualrelevanceofhabitstoour
understandingoflawbecause,asShapiroputsitbluntly:`habitsarenotnormative
activities’.Given`thenormativenatureoflegalactivity’,assertinganyformof
conceptuallinkbetweenlawandhabitswouldfallfoulof`Hume’schallenge’,
supposedlyforbiddingany`derivationofanoughtfromanis’.70Asidefromthefact
thatitisfarfromclearwhetherHumeisrightlyunderstoodtoforbidsucha
`derivation’(Putnamconvincinglyarguesotherwise71),takingHume’sinterdictas
seriouslyasShapirodoesconsiderablyreducestheexplanatoryresourcesatone’s
disposalwhenitcomestograspingthenatureofthe`institutionalfacts’72thatshape
andenableourlegalsystem.
Ona(non-reductive)naturalistunderstandingofethicalagency,habitsnotonly
conditionbutenablenormativechoices.Therefore,theyraiseaconsiderable
challengeforthemoralorpoliticalphilosopher:giventhatslowlyacquiredhabitsof
evaluation-`allthewhirloforganismWittgensteincalls`formsoflife’73-areallwe
havegottotriggerthemovementofscrutinynecessarytoquestioningcommonly
acceptedpractices,howdoesonepreservethepossibilityofcivicresponsibility?
Hartopenlyacknowledgedthefosteringofsuchcivicresponsibilityasa`moraltask’
guidinghistheory.Significantlythough,hefeltunabletoreconcilethatconcernwith
a(non-reductive)naturalistmethodology.Hartstuckinsteadtoanagnosticmeta-70ScottJ.Shapiro,Legality(HarvardUniversityPress2011)2615(loc.).71`Thelogicalpositivistfact/valuedichotomywasdefendedonthebasisofanarrowlyscientisticpictureofwhata`fact’mightbe,justastheHumeanancestorofthatdistinctionwasdefendeduponthebasisofanarrowempiricistpsychologyofideas’andimpressions’.Therealizationthatsomuchofourdescriptivelanguageisalivingcounterexampletoboth(classicalempiricistandlogicalpositivist)picturesoftherealmof‘fact’oughttoshaketheconfidenceofanyonewhosupposesthatthereisanotionoffactthatcontrastsneatlyandabsolutelywiththenotionof`value’supposedlyinvokedintalkofthenatureofall`valuejudgments’(HilaryPutnam,Thecollapseofthefact/valuedichotomyandotheressays(HarvardUniversityPress2002)26).72Incontrast,seeJohnRSearle,Theconstructionofsocialreality(SimonandSchuster1995).73McDowell,'Non-cognitivismandrulefollowing'.
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ethicalposition(forwantofabettersolutiontohismeta-ethicaldilemma74)andonly
consideredhabitstobetteropposethemtorule-governedpractices.Thisneednot
havebeenso.
Thenextsection(2.1)highlightsHart’sintellectualaffinitiesforwhatcouldhave
beena(non-reductive)naturalistaccountoflegalnormativity,wherebytherewould
beno`gap’betweenhabitsassocialfactsontheonehandandsocialrulesonthe
other:agapwhichHartendeavourstobridgeviahisnotionofacceptance.Section
2.2outlinesthetwo-wayrelationshipbetweenlawandhabits,withaparticular
focusonthedifferenttypesofhabitslawmayfoster.Section2.3thenproceedsto
showhowsuchanaturalistnarrativebolstersHart’sclaimthatlawisinherently
conducivetoasocietythatis`deplorablysheeplike’(oncethisclaimisridofits
associationwith`officialacceptance’).
2.1.Hart’sintellectualaffinitiesfora(non-reductive)naturalistaccountoflegalnormativity.
Farfromassumingthathabitsarenotworthyofphilosophicalinquiry,Hartnotesina
bookreviewpublishedin1952:
`Whatmakesbehaviorintelligent(orstupid)isitsrelationtotheagent's
needsorpurpose.[…]ForthepurposeofhisanalysisMr.Holloway[…]
exhibitstheintelligentresponsenotasasharpbreakfromhabitbutasa
developmentandrefinementofit.Fewphilosophers,Ithink,couldfailto
benefitfromthisexaminationoftheintelligentversusstupiddichotomyand
oftheconnectionbetweenhumanintelligence,toooftenportrayedin
absoluteandsplendidisolation,andhabitequipment.’75
74Ihaveoutlinedindetailthisdilemma,andHart’sagnosticwayoutinSylvieDelacroix,'Meta-ethicalagnosticisminlegaltheory:mappingawayout'(2010)1Jurisprudence225.75H.L.A.Hart,'SignsandWords'(1952)2ThePhilosophicalQuarterly5959.
25
TheConceptofLaw’sscantdevelopmentsonhabit(anditsrelationshiptolaw’s
normativeforce)mayhaveproceededinpartfromdidacticconcerns:toadmitthat
habitscanbehadwithsomedegreeofreflexivitymighthavemuddledtheotherwise
ratherneatdistinctionbetweenruleandhabit.Itmayalsohavehadalottodowith
Hart’seffortstodispelAustin’s`habitofobedience’frameworkand`freethe
conceptofarulefromconfusionwiththeconceptsofacommandorahabit’.76
Beyond(andbehind)thesefactors,IbelieveHartmayhavebeeninthegripofa
meta-ethicaldilemmathatjustdidnotallowforanaturalistaccountofnormativity–
despitehisotherwiseclearinclinationsinthatdirection.
Anon-reductivenaturalistaccountoflegalnormativityneedstogofromhuman
beingswithneeds,desiresand-mostimportantly-habitstoafully-fledgednormative
framework(oneexpressedin`oughts’,`musts’and`shoulds’)withoutany
`interventionofthedivinespark,orgiftsfromunexplainedquarters’.77Hartwas
almostthere78-hadheallowedhimselftodelvefurtherintotherelationship
betweenthepracticesthatareconstitutiveofsocialnormsandthehabitsthatoften
underliethem.Therewereatleasttwofamiliarintellectualpathsavailabletohim.
2.1.1TheWittgensteiniantakeon`custom’GivenhisexplicitrelianceonWittgenstein’sPhilosophicalInvestigations,Hartcould
havechosentoexpanduponthelatter’sreferenceto`custom’asawayofexplaining
howthecausalprocessesconstitutiveofhabitgettoacquirethesignificancetheydo
whentheyevolveintorule-followingpractices:
`ThencanwhateverIdobebroughtintoaccordwiththerule?’---Letmeask
this:whathastheexpressionofarule–sayasign-post–gottodowithmyactions?
76HerbertLionelAdolphusHart,'AnalyticalJurisprudenceinMid-TwentiethCentury:AReplytoProfessorBodenheimer'(1956)105UPaLRev953958.77Blackburn,'Normativityalamode'.78Hart’saccountoflegalnormativityisdevelopedatlengthinSylvieDelacroix,'Hart'sandKelsen'sconceptionsofnormativitycontrasted'(2004)17RatioIuris501.
26
Whatsortofconnectionistherehere?Well,perhapsthisone:Ihavebeentrained
toreacttothissigninaparticularway,andnowIdosoreact.
Butthisisonlytogiveacausalconnexion,onlytoexplainhowithascome
aboutthatwenowgobythesign-post;notwhatthisgoing-by-the-signreally
consistsin.Onthecontrary,Ihavefurtherindicatedthatapersongoesbyasignpost
onlyinsofarasthereexistsaregularuseofsign-posts,acustom.’79
Wittgenstein’sfocusistoshowthatrule-following’s`bedrock’is`simplywhatwe
do’:`IfIhaveexhaustedthejustificationsIhavereachedbedrock,andmyspadeis
turned.ThenIaminclinedtosay:`ThisissimplywhatIdo’’.80Thisupstreamfocus,
goingfromrule-followingpracticesbacktopatternsofbehaviour,meansthat
Wittgensteinisnotparticularlypreoccupiedwiththefactorsthatenablechangesin
rule-followingpractices.Yetthatisarguablythemosttrickyaspectofnaturalist
accountsofrule-following(seesection1.2.2).Foroneneedstoarticulatethedegree
ofreflexivityneededforsuchchanges,withoutbetrayingthekeynaturalistinsight:
thatanysuchreflexivityisnecessarilyembeddedin,andconditionedby,the
`bedrock’ofcausalconnectionsthatareconstitutiveof`custom’.
2.1.2TheWeberiannarrativeAlternatively,HartcouldhavedevelopedanarrativealongWeberianlines(evenifhe
deniedit,weknowthatHartcarefullyreadWeber’sEconomyandSociety81).Thekey
challengewouldthenconsistinarticulatinganarrativethatbuildsuponWeber’s
typologyofsocialrelationships.Suchanarrativewouldsetforthacontinuumfrom
formsofsocialrelationshipbasedon`usage’(Brauch)and`custom’(Sitte)82,viawhat
79LudwigWittgenstein,PhilosophicalInvestigations(Blackwell1958)para.198.80Ibid.81InherbiographyofH.L.AHart,NicolaLaceyhighlightsHart’sapparent(butunacknowledged)indebtednesstoWeber’ssociology.NicolaLacey,Thenightmareandthenobledream:AlifeofHLAHart(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress2004).82Auniformityinsocialactionisausage`insofarastheprobabilityofitsexistencewithinagroupisbasedonnothingbutactualpractice’(MaxWeber,Economyandsociety,anoultineofinterpretive
27
Webercalls`conventions’,allthewaytoalegalorder,asaconventionbackedbya
groupofpeopledeemedtohavetheduty(andlegitimacy)toapplysanctionsagainst
thosewhotransgressthelaw.Adistinctivefeatureofthelatterconsistsinthefact
that`thesubjectiveattitudesoftheparticipatingindividualsaredirectedtowards
thebeliefinalegitimateorder’.83WithstrikingsimilaritiestoHart’sinternalpointof
view,Weberillustratestheattitudeshementionswiththefollowingexample:
`[W]henacivilservantappearsinhisofficedailyatafixedtime,hedoesnot
actonlyonthebasisofcustomorself-interestwhichhecoulddisregardifhe
wantedto;asarule,hisactionisalsodeterminedbythevalidityofanorder
(viz.,thecivilservicerules),whichhefulfillspartlybecausedisobedience
wouldbedisadvantageoustohimbutalsobecauseitsviolationwouldbe
abhorrenttohissenseofduty(ofcourse,invaryingdegrees)’84
Farfromaone-wayevolutionarystorythatwouldidentifyformsofsocialorder
basedonusageorcustomas`primitive’,suchanarrativewouldremaintrueto
Weber’sinsightsonlyifitmanagedtoarticulatethedynamicrelationshipbetween
eachformofsocialorder.85Inparticular,Giddenshighlightsthefactthatalegal
ordernotonlybuildsuponusageandcustom,butalsofacilitatestheemergenceof
newformsofusageandcustom:
`Thereisnoclearempiricallinebetweenusageandcustom,andwhatWeber
calls`convention’.Conformityisnot,inthiscase,amatterofthevoluntary
dispositionoftheindividual.[…]Theempiricalrelationshipbetweencustom,
conventionandlawisanintimateone.Eventheholdofsheerusagemaybe
verystrong.Thosewhoframelawstocoverconductwhichwasformerly
sociology(UniversityofCaliforniaPress1978)vol.1).Acustomisausagewhichhasbeenestablishedforalongtime.83AnthonyGiddens,Capitalismandmodernsocialtheory:AnanalysisofthewritingsofMarx,DurkheimandMaxWeber(CambridgeUniversityPress1971)154.84Weber,Economyandsociety,anoultineofinterpretivesociology.85Inmostempiricalcases,elementsfromeachformofsocialorderwillnotonlyco-existbut`dynamically’facilitate(orhinder)theirrespectivedevelopment.
28
merely`usual’frequentlydiscoverthatverylittleadditionalconformitytothe
prescriptioninquestionisattained.However,usageandcustomdoinmost
casesprovidetheoriginofruleswhichbecomelaws.Thereversealsooccurs,
althoughlessfrequently:theintroductionofanewlawmayeventuateinnew
modesofhabitualconduct.’86
Thenextsection(2.2)outlinesthetwo-wayrelationshipbetweenlawandhabits,
withaparticularfocusonthe`reverse’movementdescribedabove.
2.2.Frompatternsofbehaviourtolegalnorms,via(reflective)habitsand/orpractices–andback.
Thediagrambelowoutlinesacontinuumthatstretchesfromcollectivepatternsof
behaviourallthewaytolegalnorms,viahabitsand/orpractices.Practices(whether
theycanbecharacterisedas`reflectivehabits’ornot)stemfromcollectivepatterns
ofbehaviour,andtheypresupposeareflectiveawarenessoftheneedsorpurposes
servedbythosepatternsofbehaviour,withaconcomitantabilitytochangethose
patternsinlightofthoseneedsorpurposes.Thosepracticesthatarenotreflective
habitsdistinguishthemselvesfromthelatterbytheirgenesis,whichpresupposes
somedeliberativeagency87allthewaythrough.Mostlegalphilosopherswhohave
soughttocapturethewayinwhichthefoundationsoflawaresocialpracticeshave
beeninfluencedeitherbyBratman’s`sharedcooperativeactivity’modelorbyLewis’
`coordinationconvention’model.88Thesemodelshaveincommonthefactthatthey
86Giddens,Capitalismandmodernsocialtheory:AnanalysisofthewritingsofMarx,DurkheimandMaxWeber.87`Weexercisedeliberativeagencywhenwedeliberateorreflectonwhatweoughttodo,attemptingtoevaluateourreasonsforactioninthelightofourvalues,convictions,andbeliefsabouttheworld.Thiskindofagencyhasrightlyimpressedphilosophers—largely,wesuspect,becausedeliberativeagencyseemstobeuniquelyhuman—butinfactonlyasmallproportionofouractionsinvolvemuchinthewayofdeliberationorreflection.’(N.LevyandT.Bayne,'Doingwithoutdeliberation:automatism,automaticity,andmoralaccountability'(2004)16IntRevPsychiatry209).88Bratman,'Sharedcooperativeactivity';DavidK.Lewis,Convention:aphilosophicalstudy(HarvardUniversityPress1963).
29
requireboth`commitmenttoconceptualandepistemicagreement’89and`strong
practicalcommitment’.MatthewSmithhighlightsthesignificanceofsuch
assumptionsandraisesimportantdoubtsabouttheextenttowhichsuch
`hypercommital’modelsareaptatconceptualisingthebulkofsocialpracticesatthe
rootoflaw’sinstitutionalstructure.
Whatmatters,forourpurposes,istodebunkthedominant(andintellectualist)
assumptionthatthesocialpracticesgivingrisetolawmustpresupposesome
deliberativeagencyallthewaythrough(orroute`3’inthediagrambelow).Notonly
arethesetypesofsocialpracticesunlikelytoaccountforthevastmajorityofthose
socialprocessesthatgiverisetolaw;suchexclusivefocusonthisnarrowtypeof
socialpracticeshasalsohinderedourchancesofconstructingarichunderstanding
oflegalnormativity.Foronlybybuilding(reflective)habitsintothecontinuumthat
leadsfrompatternsofbehaviourtolegalnormscanweaccountfortheroleplayed
bylaw’sinstitutionalstructureinfosteringthereturnmovementsdescribedin`7’
and`8’below(aswellasthenormativeimplicationsflowingfrom`9’).Before
unpackingtheseinthenextsection,definingeachofthevectorsinthediagram
belowprovidesanopportunityforaneatsummaryofourdiscussionsofar:
89`[W]hatisrequiredforsharedintentionandsharedactionisnotonlythatthereisconceptualagreementwithrespecttoconceptsdeployedwithrespecttotheactivitytobesharedbutthattheagentshavemoreorlesscorrectbeliefsabouteachother’ssubplansandintentions’(MatthewNoahSmith,'TheLawasaSocialPracticeAreSharedActivitiesattheFoundationsofLaw?'(2006)12LegalTheory265282).WhileIfindSmith’sargumentsinrelationtoBratman’stheoryofsharedcooperativeactivitiesconvincing,IamlesssurethathisargumentsapplyequallywelltoLewis’analysisofconventions.
30
`1’:Therepetitionofaparticularpatternofbehaviourleadstoitsbecoming
automaticonthepartofthoseinwhomahabithastakenhold.Suchautomaticityis
concomitantwithareductionintheawarenessofbehavinginthatparticularway.90
`2’:Areflectivehabitrequiressomecriticaldistanciationfromtheinternalised
patternofbehaviour,whichisevaluatedinthelightoftheneedsorpurposesofthe
agent(s).
`3’:Apracticecanemergeoutofasharedcommitmentorendeavourtodo
somethingtogether,withouthavingtoinvolveanydegreeofautomaticagency.91
90`Theparadigmofsuchbehaviouristheover-learnedaction.Oneisusually(fully)consciouswhenperforminganover-learnedaction,butoneisnotconsciousoftheover-learnedactionitself.’(LevyandBayne,'Doingwithoutdeliberation:automatism,automaticity,andmoralaccountability').91LevyandBaynehelpfullydistinguishbetweenautomaticagency(`Automaticagencyinvolvesanabsence—oratleastareduction—oftheexperienceofdoing`)andautomatisticagency,withinwhichtheydistinguishbetweenglobalautomatismsandlocalautomatisms:`Globalautomatismsinvolveaglobaldisruptionofconsciousness;theyoccurinthecontextofsomnambulism[etc.]Individualsin
31
Thiswayofconceptualisingthegenesisofsocialpractices-whichneednotmakeany
referencetohabit-hasdominatedlegaltheorysofar,inpartthankstothe
considerableinfluenceofbothBratman’sandLewis’theories.
`4’:Withrepetition,apracticemaycometobeinternalisedinawaythatgivesriseto
thetypeofautomaticagencycharacteristicofhabit,yetwithoutthegoal-oriented
adaptabilityandcriticaldistanciationassociatedwithreflectivehabits.
`5’:Thevaluesassociatedwithsomepracticeleadtopeer-pressuretoconformand
widespreadsocialcondemnationofanydeviationfromthatpractice,thusmarking
theemergenceofasocialrule.
`6’:Aninstitutionalstructureisbuilttosupportthecontinuousadaptation,
implementationandadjudicationofsuchsocialrules.
`7’:Somelegalnormsorinstitutionsgiverisetonovelpractices,someofwhichmay
disruptacommunity’shabitsofthought(orbehaviour).
`8’:Otherlegalnormsorinstitutionspromptwidespreaddisengagementfromsocial
/communityissuesthatwouldotherwisehavetriggeredreflectivepracticeswithin
thatcommunity.
`9’:Insomecases,thoseinchargeofcontinuouslyadaptingandgeneratinglegal
normsinaparticulardomainaresoalienated92fromtheinstitutiontheyserve(and
thevaluesthatinstitutionpromotes)thattheyareabletocontributetothe
modificationoftheapplicablelegalregimeinthatdomainwithoutanydeliberative
engagementontheirpart.
thesestatesperformfairlycomplexactionsina‘robotic’manner.Theirenvironmentalawarenessislimited[…]Whatwecall‘localautomatisms’,bycontrast,involveonlyadisruptionofconsciousnessandcontroloveraparticularkindofaction.Apersonwithalocalautomatismisfullyconscious,buttheyexperiencenosenseofagencyoveraparticularcomplexandapparentlyvoluntaryaction.’(ibid.).92Smith,'TheLawasaSocialPracticeAreSharedActivitiesattheFoundationsofLaw?'.
32
Thenextsection(2.3)unpacksthe`moralrisk’inherentinthedevelopmentoflaw’s
institutionalstructurenotablybyreferringtothe`returnmovement’
encapsulatedin`8’(incontrastto`7’),andthetypeofalienationthatmayresult
fromit.
2.3.Laws’inherentmoralriskandthetypesofhabitslawmayfoster
`Withoutlaw,socialorderrequiresconsiderablebuy-infromthegeneral
population:Thepeopleareregulatedbynormsthataremoreorless
accepted.[…]Withtheemergenceoflaw,however,peoplearealso
regulatedbynormsthatmeetofficials'criteriaofvalidityandareenforcedby
specializedagencies.Thisdivisionoflaborcanalienatepeoplefromthemost
importantrulesthatgoverntheirlives-rulesthatthreatentobecome
remote,technical,andarcane.Thatisonemorereasonwhytheruleoflawis
notanunqualifiedhumangood:Itisinthenatureoflawtoposesuchrisks,
andtheruleoflawcannoteliminatethem.’93
BuildinguponHart’sownanalysisofthe`risks’concomitantwiththeemergenceof
institutionalizedrules94,LeslieGreenproceedstoarguethatthemoralimportof
suchrisks(inherentintheverynatureoflaw)disprovesHart’sseparabilitythesis.95
Perhapsbecauseofhisfocusonthelatter,Greendoesnotdwellonhowexactly
peopleget`alienated[…]fromthemostimportantrulesthatgoverntheirlives’,save
forreferringtoHart’sown(unfortunate)phrasingintermsofacceptance:`where93Green,'PositivismandtheInseparabilityofLawandMorals'.94`Thestepfromthesimpleformofsociety[…]intothelegalworld[…]bringsitssolidgainsatacertaincost.Thegainsarethoseofadaptabilitytochange,certaintyandefficiency,andtheseareimmense;thecostistheriskthatthecentrallyorganisedpowermaywellbeusedfortheoppressionofnumberswithwhosesupportitcandispense,inawaythatthesimplerregimeofprimaryrulescouldnot’(Hart,Theconceptoflaw).95Asit`marksaconnectionbetweenlawandmoralityofareversekind’(Green,'PositivismandtheInseparabilityofLawandMorals').
33
thereisaunionofprimaryandsecondaryrules[…]theacceptanceoftherulesas
commonstandardsforthegroupmaybesplitofffromtherelativelypassivematter
oftheordinaryindividualacquiescingintherulesbyobeyingthemforhispart
alone’96(inapre-legalsociety,bycontrast,acceptanceoftheruleshastobe
widespread).
Wilkinsonvoicesdoubtsasto`whetherwidespreadacceptancecanbesaidto
precludetheviceofalienation,ifacceptanceisgivennofurtherspecification’.97
GiventheminimalistwayinwhichHartdefinesit(acceptancemaybebasedon`an
unreflectinginheritedortraditionalattitude,orthemerewishtodoasothersdo’98),
acceptanceiscertainlynosafeguardagainstthe`sheeplike’predicamentHart
worriesabout.Tomakesenseofthetypeofengagementthatmaymakea
`slaughterhouse’endinglesslikely,onemustlookattheoppositeofsuch
engagement,andunpacktheexactnatureofthealienationthatisclaimedtobean
endemicriskconcomitantwiththeemergenceoflaw’sinstitutionalstructure.
Amongthe`fivevariantsofalienation’describedbyMelvinSeeman,`powerlessness’
encapsulatesoneaspectofthealienationweareconcernedwith:initsMarxian
origins,alienationreferredtotheextenttowhich`theprerogativeandmeansof
decisionareexpropriated[fromtheworker]bytherulingentrepreneurs’.99
ExtendedbeyondtheindustrialspherebyWeber,thistypeofalienationaptly
capturesthewayinwhichthetransitionfromacustomaryordertoafully-fledged
legalstructuremaybesaidtotakeawayfrommost`theprerogativeandmeans’of
shapingalegallandscapethatisnotdeemedtobe`theirs’anymore.Thisaspectof
alienationtiesinwithwhatHartbemoanedas`thefailureonthepartofordinary
mentorealisethattheformsoflawandhumansocietywereatbottommerely
96Hart,Theconceptoflaw.97MichaelA.Wilkinson,'IsLawMorallyRisky?Alienation,AcceptanceandHart’sConceptofLaw'(2010)30OxfordJournalofLegalStudies441451.98Hart,Theconceptoflaw.99MelvinSeeman,'Onthemeaningofalienation'(1959)Americansociologicalreview783784.
34
humanartefacts,notnaturalnecessitiesbutthingsactuallymadebymen,andhence
thingswhichcouldbeunmadeandremade.100
Yettodaythatfailuretocometotermswithourrole(andresponsibility)asauthors
ofthoseverypracticesthatcanultimatelygiverisetolawstemsatleastinpartfrom
anothervariantofalienation.Itisonethatisconnected-butnotreducibleto-what
Seemandescribesas`meaninglessness’:
`Thissecondtypeofalienation,then,referstotheindividual'ssenseof
understandingtheeventsinwhichheisengaged.Wemayspeakofhigh
alienation,inthemeaninglessnessusage,whentheindividualisunclearasto
whatheoughttobelieve-whentheindividual'sminimalstandardsforclarity
indecision-makingarenotmet.’101
Asasocietyevolvesfromatight-knit,smallcommunity,thenumberandcomplexity
oftheissuestobeaddressedtocontinuallyseek(better)waysoflivingtogetheris
daunting–andthe`minimalstandardsforclarityindecision-making’mentioned
abovearearguablyrarelymet.Legalinstitutionsaredesignedtotacklesuch
complexity.Freeingtheindividualfromthetaskofbalancingacomplexsetof
reasons,lawistomediatebetweenitssubjectsandthereasonsthatapplyto
them.102The`secondaryrules’thatcomewithlegalinstitutionsestablishhowlegal
changemayoccur.Relinquishingresponsibilityforthisfundamentalaspectof
`normativelabour’comesataprice,foritisalltootemptingtorelaxandenjoythe
benefitsofinstitutionalauthority(ratherthanactivelypartakeinthe`normative
labour’facilitatedbysuchinstitutions).
100Hart,'BenthamandtheDemystificationoftheLaw'.101Seeman,'Onthemeaningofalienation'.102`Theadvantageofnormallyproceedingthroughthemediationofrulesisenormous.Itenablesapersontoconsiderandformanopiniononthegeneralaspectsofrecurrentsituationsinadvanceoftheiroccurrence.Itenablesapersontoachieveresultswhichcanbeachievedonlythroughanadvancecommitmenttoawholeseriesofactions,ratherthanbycasetocaseexamination’.JosephRaz,Themoralityoffreedom(ClarendonPress1986)58.
35
Razvividlycapturesthosebenefitsinhis`serviceconceptionofauthority’:whenlaw
succeedsinitsclaimtoauthority,itissupposedtogiveusreasonsforactionthat
replacethesetofdependentreasons,andthussimplifyourpracticalreasoning.Toa
largeextenttheefficiencyofalegalsystemdependsonthis`de-mobilisation’of
practicalreasoning-anditsconcomitantfosteringofhabituatedbehavior.Butof
coursethereisanothersidetoRaz’stheory.Law’sclaimtoauthorityistosucceed
onlyifitislegitimate.Sowearenotmeanttorelaxfortoolong.Wearesupposedto
keepcheckingthatlawstillhasa`sufficientlyhighnormaljustificationscore’103,i.e.
thatitdoesbetterenableustocomplywiththedemandsof`rightreason’.104Inso
doing,thehopeisthatwemay,touseWilkinson’sphrase,`reclaimlaw’s
authority’.105
Theworryisthat,inpractice,fewerandfewerofuswillbother;thatmoreandmore
ofuswillsurrendertothecomfortofdemobilisedpracticalreasoning.Iftrustingin
legalinstitutionstohavefiguredouttherightcourseofactioninparticular
circumstanceswasinitiallyachoice(thatmaybebornoutofnecessity),thattrust
canbecomesohabitualastoforgetitself–andthepossibilityofanalternative.This
aspectofalienation-`meaninglessness’-isconnectedtothe`powerlessness’aspect
discussedearlier:
“[I]nsomeimportantdegree,theviewthatonelivesinanintelligibleworld
maybeaprerequisitetoexpectanciesforcontrol;andtheunintelligibilityof
103EmranMian,'Thecuriouscaseofexclusionaryreasons'(2002)15CanadianJournalofLawandJurisprudence99107.104`Insuchcasesconformitywiththeunderlyingreasonsissecuredbycomplyingwiththerule,orratherabetterdegreeofconformitythancanotherwisebeachievedissoobtained.Thiscanjustifycomplyingwiththeruleevenwhenitrequiresactionwhichtheunderlyingreasonsdonot.Suchcompliancemaystillbethebeststrategytomaximiseconformitywiththeunderlyingreasons’.JosephRaz,PracticalReasonandNorms(rev.ed,withpostscriptedn,PrincetonUniversityPress1990)194.105`ContrarytoRaz’simageoflawasanofficialauthority,inthemoderndemocraticorderweareallimplicit‘mouthpieces’ofthelaw,aninsistenceonwhichmightbegintoinculcateasenseoflegalandsocialresponsibilityandperhapsinmoreradicalguise,asocialpurpose,toreclaimlaw’sauthority.’(Wilkinson,'IsLawMorallyRisky?Alienation,AcceptanceandHart’sConceptofLaw').
36
complexaffairsispresumablyconducivetothedevelopmentofhigh
expectanciesforexternalcontrol(thatis,highpowerlessness)’106
Inourcontext,estrangementfromthepoliticalandsocialpracticesthatempower
eachandeveryoneofustoshapeourlegallandscapemaybesaidtostematleastin
partfromresignationinthefaceofthatlandscape’ssheercomplexity.This
resignationinturnallowsforone’sretrenchmenttohabitualframesofthought,
uncriticallyadoptingwhateverlegalframeworkisapplicable,asdescribedinvector
`8’inthediagramdiscussedin2.2.
Atthisstagethedistinctionbetweendifferentwaysofhavingahabitdevelopedin
section1.2.becomesparticularlyrelevant.Foritmaywellbethatwhatis
distinctivelyalienatingaboutalegalregimeisnotsomuchthepossibilityofnon-
acceptance,butratherthewayinwhichalegalsystemisconducivetothe
developmentofrigid,unreflectivehabits.Unlikethegoal-oriented(henceadaptable)
habitsthatgiverisetolegalpractice,therigidhabitswhicharefacilitatedbythe
emergenceofalegalsystemareformedonthebackofthelegalsystem’s
institutionalizedadaptationtochange.
Inapre-legalworld,bycontrast,peopleareregulatedbynormsthat`haveno
particularoriginintheenactmentofanindividualoraninstitution’107:theyfindtheir
origininapatternofcollectivebehaviorthatacquiresparticularsignificanceinlight
ofthepurposeithascometobeassociatedwith.Whileitishabitualinnature,that
patternofbehaviorcannotgiverisetothekindofpracticeconstitutiveofalegal
systemunlessitiscapableofadaptingtochangingaspirations.Intheabsenceofa
`secondaryrule’establishinghowlegalchangeoccurs,suchchangecanonlyhappen
organically.Peopledon’t`accept’butrather`liveby’thenormstheyneedtofostera
betterwayoflivingtogether.Thataspirationinturngeneratesapracticewhose
perceivedsocialvaluemaycallforthispractice’sinstitutionalisation.106Seeman,'Onthemeaningofalienation'.107Marmor,'Legalconventionalism',194.
37
Thetroubleisthatlegalinstitutions–becauseofthedivisionofnormativelabour
theyenable-encourageashifttowardswidespreadpassivity,orwhatonemaydeem
a`leisurely’attitude108towardsournorm-making(andnorm-sustaining)practices.de
TocquevilleanticipatesthisshiftinhisprescientanalysisofAmerica’snascent
democracy:
`Thus,therulingpower,havingtakeneachcitizenonebyoneintoits
powerfulgraspandhavingmoldedhimtoitsownliking,spreadsitsarms
overthewholeofsociety,coveringthesurfaceofsociallifewithanetworkof
petty,complicated,detailed,anduniformrules[…]Itdoesnotbreakmen’s
willsbutitdoessoften,bend,andcontrolthem;rarelydoesitforcemento
actbutitconstantlyopposeswhatactionstheyperform;itdoesnotdestroy
thestartofanythingbutitstandsinitsway;itdoesnottyrannizebutit
inhibits,represses,drains,snuffsout,dullssomucheffortthatfinallyit
reduceseachnationtonothingmorethanaflockoftimidandhardworking
animalswiththegovernmentasshepherd’.109
LeslieGreenhasawonderfullynaturalistwayofsummingthingsup:`Abitlike
unstableisotopes,politicalinstitutionshavestandardpatternsofdecaythatare
explainedbythenatureofthethingthatisdecaying’.110Hart’sinsight(inlinewithde
Tocqueville’s)wastohighlighttheextenttowhichlegalinstitutionsareinherently
conducivetowhathecalled`sheeplike’behavior.Hadhedelvedfurtherintothe
mutuallyenablingrelationshipbetweenlawandhabit,hemighthavebeenableto
substantiatethisinsightinawayinwhichhisreferencetothepossibilityofnon-
108`It[theimmenseandprotectivepowerthatstandsabovemen]providestheirsecurity,anticipatesandguaranteestheirneeds,suppliestheirpleasures,directstheirprincipalconcerns,managestheirindustry,regulatestheirestates,dividestheirinheritances.Whycanitnotremovefromthementirelythebotherofthinkingandthetroublesoflife?Thus,itreducesdailythevalueandfrequencyoftheexerciseoffreechoice;itrestrictstheactivityoffreewillwithinanarrowerrangeandgraduallyremovesautonomyitselffromeachcitizen.’AlexisdeTocqueville,DemocracyinAmerica(Penguin2003)805.109Ibid.110Green,'PositivismandtheInseparabilityofLawandMorals'.
38
acceptancecouldnot.Despitehisaffinitiesforanon-reductive,naturalistaccountof
legalnormativity,Hart’sinsistenceonanalyzingthe`stepintothelegalworld’by
reference,instead,toanoverlycognitivenotionof`acceptance’betraystheappeal
ofanentrencheddualistandintellectualisedconceptionofagency.111
III.Conclusion
EversinceHart’sswiftcritiqueofAustin(introducingthe`internalpointofview’to
distinguishrulesfrommerehabits),legaltheoryhasmostlyproceededonthe
assumptionthatanyaccountofthenormativityoflawmustbedeliberativeallthe
waythrough:tolethabitsimpingeuponsuchanaccountwouldfallfoulof`Hume’s
law’andsabotagethelot.Thisassumptionreflectsadualismwhoseholdon
contemporarylegaltheoryisconcomitantwithaone-sidedviewofhabit:inits
negative(ratherthanenabling)aspect,habitisindeedwhatcanstandinthewayof
ourlivinguptoourresponsibilityasnormativeanimals.Thisresponsibilitystems
fromthecharacteristicallyhumancapacitytooccupythe`spaceofreasons’,whichin
turnenablesustoseehowtheworldcanbemadebetter,tomakenormativeclaims
thatwillguideourmoralorpoliticalagenda.Forthoseinthralltothismetaphorof
twospaces,itistheverypossibilityofournormativefreedom-noless-thathangson
thosetwospacesbeingkeptdistinct.
Onanon-reductivenaturalistunderstandingofethicalagency,accountingforour
normativefreedomisnolessimportant.Onlythechallengeconcomitantwithsuch
anexplanationisgreater.Foronecannotcountonany`gap’betweenspacesto
explainwhatenablesustostepbackandconfrontcommonlyacceptedpracticesto
declarethemwanting.Tounderstandwhatconditionsthepossibilityofsuch
reflexivescrutiny,attentionmustbepaidtowhattypicallyhampersit:habit.
111Foracandid,contemporary,formulationofsuchadualistframeworkappliedtoHart’sinternalpointofview,see:VeronicaRodriguez-Blanco,'PeterWinchandHLAHart:TwoConceptsoftheInternalPointofView'(2007)20CanadianJournalofLaw&Jurisprudence45313.
39
That’sallverywell,somelegaltheoristsmightsay,butwhat’sinitfor
jurisprudence’sendeavortograspthenatureoflaw?Doesn’ttherealmoflawstart
preciselywherehabitends?Thisarticle’sanswertosuchskepticismistwofold.
Conceptuallyspeaking,atheoryoflawthatdismissestheimportanceofhabitsends
upwithapoorerconceptofethicalagencyandaconcomitantlytruncatedaccountof
legalnormativity.
Fromanormativeperspective,anaccountofthetwo-wayrelationshipbetweenlaw
andhabitiscrucialtograspingthedangerinherentinlaw’sparticularinstitutional
structure.Because(andtotheextentthat)suchastructureinstitutionalizes
mechanismsforchangeandsuccessfullysimplifiesourpracticalreasoninginrelation
tokeysocietalconcerns,wemayinadvertentlyfindourselvesenjoyingever-longer
normativeholidays.Whatifourabilitytoadoptareflectivestancetowardsour
habitsiscompromisedbythelackof`normativeexercise’inducedbysuchholidays?
Thecontinuumthatgoesfromcollectivepatternsofbehaviourallthewaytolegal
normsviahabitsandpractices-andback-wouldbecompromised.Thelegal
structurewouldmostlyfostersheeplike,unreflectivehabits.Notonlyaresuchhabits
incapableofgeneratingthetypeofpracticesgivingriseto(novel)legalstructures.
Suchunreflectivehabitsarealsoalltooeasilyexploitedbyunscrupulousshepherds
bentona`slaughterhouse’ending,touseHart’smetaphor.
40