Laser Enrichment of Uranium: Power Promises and Proliferation Perils Dr. Charles D. Ferguson Philip D. Reed Senior Fellow for Science and Technology October

Laser Enrichment of Uranium: Power Promises and Proliferation Perils

Dr. Charles D. FergusonPhilip D. Reed Senior Fellow for Science and Technology

October 26, 2009

Laser Enrichment: Promises and PerilsCouncil on Foreign Relations

Be Forewarned Those who know the full details can’t reveal them

(nondisclosure agreements) Those who don’t know all of the details but who can assess

the proliferation risks can and should still talk and inform the public the best they can


Outline of Talk Brief tutorial on laser isotope separation (LIS) of uranium What is known about the SILEX method of enrichment being

developed in Wilmington, NC, by Global Laser Enrichment? What are the challenges in detecting and safeguarding LIS

facilities? What is the proliferation risk and what assessments are

needed?


Why enrich uranium? Natural uranium contains 0.72

percent U-235, 99.28 percent U-238, and 0.0054 U-234

U-235 is the fissile isotope useful for nuclear reactors and bombs.

Most commercial reactor fuels require low enriched uranium (LEU): usually 3-5% enriched in U-235

Nuclear bombs require highly enriched uranium (HEU): typically greater than 90% enriched but even approximately 80% enriched uranium can be useful for bombs


What is Laser Isotope Separation (LIS) ? Use of lasers to selectively excite U-235, the fissile isotope,

from the much more abundant isotope U-238 Promises to provide improved enrichment method as

compared to first generation gaseous diffusion and second generation gaseous centrifugation methods

Two types of LIS: AVLIS (Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation) Molecular Laser Isotope Separation (MLIS)


AVLIS


MLIS 16 micron wavelength infrared (IR) laser excites uranium-235

hexafluoride (UF6) gas

Another laser (either IR or UV) dissociates a fluorine atom to form uranium-235 pentafluoride (UF5), which precipitates out as a white powder

Similar techniques: MOLIS and CRISLA A single stage MLIS device will not produce high enough

concentration of LEU need to link multiple stages in a cascade


What countries have explored LIS? At least 20 countries are known to have investigated this

method. Includes: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Britain, China, France,

Germany, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Romania, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Stares, and Yugoslavia

During the past decade, LIS research uncovered in Iran and South Korea have raised proliferation concerns.


Separation of Isotopes by Laser Excitation (SILEX) Development work began in Australia in 1990s USEC began collaboration with Australian researchers in 1996. USEC acquired rights to SILEX in 2000. But due to unspecified technical and market concerns, USEC relinquished

the license in 2003. In 2006, Silex Corporation made an exclusive license with GE’s Nuclear

Energy Division. In 2007, GE’s Nuclear Energy Division forms an alliance with Hitachi

Corporation of Japan. (GEH Corporation) Later in 2007, Global Laser Enrichment (GLE) corporation is formed. In 2008, Cameco, a uranium mining, conversion, and fuel fabrication

company headquartered in Canada, buys 24% stake in GLE. This year, GLE is reportedly moving ahead with Test Loop operations.


How does SILEX work? Recall the cautionary note about those who know and those who

don’t know the full details Classified project Uses mixture of UF6 with a carrier gas (proprietary info) Mixture is cooled to separate resonance peaks of U-235 and U-238 16 μm laser selectively excites 235UF6

One or more infrared laser frequencies may be used. A Raman conversion cell is used to convert the 10.8 μm laser pulses

into 16 μm pulses. The actual separation efficiency is classified and so is the

repetition rate of the laser pulses as well as the pulse widths. High repetition rates (> 250 Hz) and narrow pulse widths

(< 100 ns) are most desirable to enrich enough uranium

-- John L. Lyman, “Enrichment Separative Capacity for SILEX,” Report for Los Alamos National Laboratory


What are the reported advantages of SILEX? “Low power consumption and capital costs. Relatively simple and practical separation modules. Modular technology providing versatility in deployment” Projected enrichment efficiency 2 to 20 as compared to 1.3 for

the centrifuge method.

--www.silex.com.au Would a successful SILEX enrichment plant spark a corporate

“arms race” among other nuclear companies? If successful, the real secret would be revealed—the fact that

the process can be done to a scale that can make large quantities of enriched uranium.


Why is LIS comparatively hard to detect and can

it be safeguarded? Small land area required as compared to diffusion and

centrifuge methods—perhaps only need a large warehouse “The current international system is able to safeguard a

declared LIS facility, but it is not able to timely detect the diversion of significant amounts of uranium to a LIS facility.”

--David Daniels, presentation to 1999 Science & World Affairs conference

Advanced technologies could “outflank” export controls in “nations with moderate-size economies during the first decades of the twenty-first century.” –Stanley Erickson, LANL report, October 2001.


Why SILEX may not pose a major proliferation concern Many elements of the SILEX system are technically

challenging. Hard to make well-collimated stream of gas Details of carrier gas closely held Very advanced laser system Most likely would need large team of technical experts as well

as significant financial resources


The Next A.Q. Khan Black Market? Dr. A. Q. Khan stole centrifuge designs

from URENCO in the early 1970s and used this information to develop uranium enrichment for Pakistan’s bomb program.

Many experts then thought that Pakistan was too backward technologically to master enrichment.

Let’s not be caught by surprise by laser enrichment

Need for thorough analysis of the proliferation risks of this technology Detailed assessments needed by NRC and DOE Need to involve IAEA in these assessments Will the increasing use of advanced lasers in

civilian non-nuclear applications leak over to nuclear proliferation?

Can corporations agree not to pursue this technology?

Documents

Laser Enrichment of Uranium: Power Promises and Proliferation Perils Dr. Charles D. Ferguson Philip D. Reed Senior Fellow for Science and Technology October