LarsonMDR NARA FAA MorseMikeMFRs Notes 2003-09-15and2004 04 19

8/3/2019 LarsonMDR NARA FAA MorseMikeMFRs Notes 2003-09-15and2004 04 19

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N A T I O N A LA R C H I V E SNovem ber9 ,20 l l

KRISTENWILHELMCenteror LegislativerchivesEnclosures

N A T I O N A L A R C H I V E S n dR E C O R D SA D N 4 I I S T R A T I O N

7 O O F N N S Y L V A N I A V E N U E . WW A SH I N C T O N D C 2 O 4 O 8 , O O O i

w w w , a r c h i v e s . g t t t '

DearErik:Your e-mailof October 6 asking or a mandatory eclassif icationeview MDR) of withdrawn tems ro m th erecords f th e9/ll Commissionncluded hreewithdrawal otices or law enforcement ensitive/closedy statutewithdrawals. hosear eno t classif iedtems, o heyar eno tsubject o the MDR process.The first item, he memorandum or the record MFR) of an interviewwith Mike Morse datedSeptember 5, 2003

(l I pages)s onlineas partof th eMD R series. had he tem e-reviewed nd he original edactions er eupheld.This s the ink to the online mage:http://media.nara.gov/9-l/MFR/I-0148-91MFR-00742.pdf.The second tem is an April 19,2004, MFR with Mike Morse (5 pages).We reviewed his documentand releasedtin part.A copy s enclosed.

The third item is handwrittennotesof these wo interviewswith Morse (15 pages).The noteswerealso reviewedand eleasedn part.A copy s enclosed.If yo u chooseo appealhe redactions,he appealmustbe n writ ingand eceived y NARA within 35 calendar ay sof thedateof this etter. Both he etterand he envelopemustbe markedwith the words 9/ l I CommissionRecords ccessRestrictions ppeal." Th eappealmust nclude copyof your init ial equest nd our denialresponse. our appealmust nclude n explanation f why we should eleasehe records. lease en d he appeal o:

DepufyArchivistsof the United StatesNationalArchivesand RecordsAdministrationRoom 42008601AdelphiRd.CollegePark,MD 20740

I wil l notifyyou as soonas he outstandingocumentsi'omyour October 8 request reavailable.Sincerelv.

Mr. Erik Larson


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Event: Interviewwith Mike Morse,FAATypeof Event: InterviewDate: September5,2003Special ccessssues:NonePreparedy: LisaSullivanTeamNumber 7

NationalSecurityCoordination taffer

Location:FAA Headquarters, ashington, CParticipantsNon-Commission: ike Morse, AA National ecurity oordinationStaffer;andSusanCaron,FAA Officeof theChiefCounselParticipants Commission: ohnRaidt,Bill Johnstone,ndLisaSullivanBackground[U] Prior o coming o theFAA in 1986,Morsewas n theU.S.Ai r ForceOfficeofSpecialnvestigations.e dealtwith counterintell igencendcounterterrorismrom 1966to 1986. n 1986, e moved o theFAA wherehe assistedn the establishmentf anintellisence ivision or civil aviation ecurity.He namedRichardClarke,OliverNo(h,und-lasthreememberSoftheAdministrat ionwhowereinstrumentalinestaTTffirrrgTn''iiGTfrgenceivision or FAA becausef theirperceptionhatFAAnpeded elp n its overseasntelligence.nitially,FAA's connectiono the ntelli gencecbmmunitywasan onlinedatasystem, lashboard,osted y theNationalSecurityAgency. A securentelligenceacility(SCIF)wasbuilt atFAA Headquartersoaccommodatehe division.Between 986and1994,Morseserved sDeputyDirectorand henActingDirector f Civil AviationSecurityntelligence'[U] MorsewasmadeDeputyDirectorof AviationSecurityOperationsn 1994. Hehelda varietyof postswithin security perationsor FAA over henextTyears,ncludingdomestic perationsivisionmanager;tandardsndevaluation ivisionmanager ndspecial ctivities.He wasSpecial ssistanto theDirector f AviationSecurityOperationsrom 1999 hrough 001. At first, hiswasBruceButterworth, ut by 2001(incfuding911l), he DirectorwasLeeLongmire.[U ] As of theendof October 001,Morsewasmade esponsibleorsetting p an office(LitigationSupportStafQwithin FAA to coordinatendexpedite AA responsesoConglessionalndExecutivenquiries.He reportedhatFfu{ fielded20-30callsperdayfrom Hill staffers ndmembers like. TheAdministration anted nswers swell.

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Therewere7-8congrossionalearingsn a3-4weekperiod. His rolehelped o decreasethe mpactof theresponserocess nregularFAA operations smuchaspossible.Asthenameof Morse'snew officesuggests,heFAA saw hepotential or major itigationas aresultof glll. Morseandhis staffactedasacentral epositoryor all essential ndrelevant ecordselatedo theattacks. ssue apers, ecords,ncludingall of theemailtraffic,weresaved.All of thesematerials avebeensent o TSA. Morsehasmostrecentiymoved nto the ead ole on theNationalSecurityCoordinationStaffwithin theFAA. i{" *ur instrumentaln theset-upanddesignof thisoffice. The staff s madeupof himselfand wo intelligence fficers.NationalSecurityCoordinationStaff s theentrypoint for all outsideequestso theFAA fromthe ntelligence ommunityonprojects,data,andpeople hatmight beneededo conduct landestinerojectsathomeandabroad.[U] On the splitbetween AA andTSA,Morse ndicatedhathewas directly nvolveditt itt" developmentf theMemorandum f Understandingf February28,2003whichprovided or transferof functionsandpersonnelo TSA. Morse urtherstatedhathe wasthe,'keeper"of theMOU for FAA. In order o maintaina singlesourceor aviationintelligence,Annex5 of theMou, TSA agreedo provideFAA with intelligenceinformation.With respecto security,FAA is still responsibleor securityof its ownfacilities including heAir TrafficControlSystem) nd or providingFAA supportorclandestineovernment perationsespeciallymilitary and ntelligence).FAA Regulation[CS]MorsedepictedheFAA before9/11asstrictlyaregulatoryagency.n thatcapacity,heoiganization ften"got its nosebloodied" n attemptingo exert nfluenceover he ndustrystakeholders,nd o domore han he systemwouldsustain.CivilAviationSecurityofficialswantedo domore,but in the absencef publicorCongressionalupport,he securitysystem id "asgooda ob as t could." Thiswas hegreatest eakness f the system, ccordingo Morse.An example e used o describethispoint wasanattemptby theFAA to institutebackground hecks or thosewho weregrr,,"tt nescortedccesso secure reasn airportsn the ate-1980s.FAA proposalsieceivedsevere ushbackrom Congressnd he ndustrystakeholders. hemostunpopular nessuchas hiswouldoften esult n legislation appropriationsiders) hatwouldrestrictFAA abilityto enforce uchunpopular roposals.MorsesaidKarl ShrumfromFAA policywouldrememberhespecificdetailsof the backgroundnvestigationissue.[CS]Whenasked ow t was hat heFAA arrivedat theconclusiono proposebackground hecksor all employees ith unescortedccesso the airports,Morsesaidthat he movementoilowed hecrashof flightTWA 800andcameat a timewhen"thedomestichreatevelhad significantlyncreased."n addition o TWA 800,he referredto the World TradeCenterattackand heBojinkaplot as ncidentshatcombinedofinallyproduceCongressionaloncernhatenabledhe FAA to try to raise he securitybaseline.Morse ndicated hatsomesignificantmprovements eremadeat his time.

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[CS]Morse eferredo the"tombstonementality''of the system sawhole. TheinOustry takeholderselievedhe ustificationsheFAA provided or tightersecuritymeasures erenot valid. Airlineswantedo seemorespecificndications f threats.MorseclaimedheFAA did a lot to communicatehe hreat o the ndustry.Factorshatinhibited his communication ere heclassified atureof the ntelligenceeporting;honeed or the ntelligence ommunityo concealhe ntelligencemethods ndsources; ndthedifficulty of sanitizinghe ntelligenceor the ndustry n ameaningfulway. Inaddition,hebelievedhat heairlinesecurity irectorswerenot highlyplacedwithin the.o*p*irr, andweremainlyretired aw enforcementfficialswith limitedexperiencewitlt-terrorism ndwith limitedaccesso currentntelligence.MorsecitedLarryWansleyatAmericanasan exception,whowaswell-connected ithin his company'TSSUSanitizinghe ntelligenceor the ndustrystakeholdersas doneby theACI andthe ntelligence rovider. Morsestressedhat hiswas a difficult process.[CS]Overall,Morse eportedhat t wasslowanddifficult to get hesecuritybaselineiuiria. TheBaselineWorkingGroupmet or thefirst timeon the dayTWA 800exploded, ndsomeof its effortswero elativelyquicklydivertednto thework of thesubsequent oreCommission.[CS]SecurityDirectiveswereeffectiveo acertainextent,but theywereonly enacted nu t.-pot*y basis.Stakeholdersaw he ssuance f directives s he federalauthoritiesinterfering,rather hanadvising,on airlineandairportoperations.nevitably, his strainedtherelationship.From he stakeholders'erspective,hegovemmentwouldbetterservethe ndustryby providing elevantnformationather han ooselyqualifiedSecurityDirectiveshat he ndustrymustgrudginglyadhereo, lest hey ncurpenalties.[CS]Morsecharacterizedheregulatory rocess saweaknessn the aviationsecuritysystem.He wenton to say hat inancially,heairlineswere n "dire straits."Thisc-ontributedo theirresistanceo securityegulationsmposed y theFAA. Lr addition otherulemaking rocess,Morse dentifieddeficienciesn the numberof inspectors nd helack of a streamlined nforcement echanismssources f theFAA's regulatoryweaknesses. ithout he enforcementuthorityt neededo ensure ecuritydirectiveswere ollowed, herewas ittle theFAA coulddoto significantlymprovecivil aviationsecurity, espite ood ntelligenceheFAA was eceiving hat t was mprudent ot to doso.[CS]Morse elt that inesandotherenforcement echanisms erenot an effective oolin producing etterperformance.The airlinesandairportssawpenalties s a

"costofdoingbusiness," ndMorsequotedoneairlinesecuritydirectorascornmentinghat,"Weplanfor these iolations ike badweather."Frequenteductionsn the ines rustratedhesecuritynspectors,owering heirmorale.

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Intelligence[CS]MorseconsideredheFAA intelligence ivision o be a strenglh f the systemnihut ts functionwas o actasanadvocateor the aviation ommunity'sntelligenceeedswithin the ntelligence ommunity,The ntelligenceeporting id not,however,enditself o long-term trategic lanning or thesystem.Where he ntelligence ivisionwaseffectivewas n disseminatingmmediatehreatsn real-timeo the ightparties.Hereportedhat heACI hada direct ine o theFAA Administrator. ction aken nresponseo threat eports ada short urn-aroundime. ACI hada"fair amount"ofautonomy ith respecto the ssuancef SecurityDirectives nd nformationCirculars.tCSl In the ate1980s nd heearly1990s,post-Pan m 103crash),Morsesaid heFAAAdministrator nd he Secretary f Transportationere hungry"for intelligence nthreatso civil aviation,Whatmade hingsdifficult for thegovernment as hat he FAAhadmerelya regulatoryolewithin thesystem.Given hecumbersomeulemakingprocess,ecurity irectives nd o a essEr xtentnformationCirculars ecamehosenmethods f tightening ecuritymeasuresnd ncreasinghreatawarenesso theairlines,airpofls,andall othersignificant arties.As thesenstrumentsparticularly ecurityDirectives) ecamemorecommon,heybecameess popular"with industry, nd his nturn ted o a slowingdownof theprocess f issuing hem. In this imeperiod late1980s-early990s),Morse ndicatedhatgovemmenteadershipometimesecamefrustrated ith the aviation ecurity rocess ecausef the ack of threat pecificity ndtheaccompanyrngifficultyof "selling"the emedieso industry,o Congress nd o thepublic.fsql fne Inter-agencyntelligence ommittee nTerrorismIICT) wassponsoredytheNationalSecurityCouncil.TheFAA Intelligence ivisionhada seaton theCommittee.The Committee iscusseduidelinesor the ntelligence ommunity sawhole. It definedermsandpriorities, unctioned sa nexus oint or thedifferentagencies,nd ostered nalyst-to-analystxchanges.t alsodid periodic hreatassessments.\;SQIIFAA intelligencehoughthe ntelligenceommunity eededo be more esponsiveto th'e viationndustry's eed or intelligencen thedomestichreatevel. As a result,the DCI's (Director or Centralntelligence)taffprovided reporton threatestimateswhich heFAA used o establish videncehat hebaselineudget eededo be raisedorsecurity.This contributedo theoveralleffort o raise hebaselineor theFAA.Civil AviationSecurityLayersjSSfl On the opicof checkpoint creening, orsedwelton thehuman actor nseparablefrom his ayerof thesecurity ystem t theairport.With screenerurnover shigh as400percentn some laces,herewasno room or ob-performancemprovement,Morseindicated hat one factor contributing omentalityof the checkpoint upervisors.

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COMMISSIONENSITIVEA programmustbe devisedo achieve

fSSIfWhenaskedwhathe houghthemission f civil aviation ecuritywasbeforegllll1l, Morse aid t was to keep ombs ff of planes... eforePanAm 103, ll wecould alkaboutwashijackings."AfterPanAm 103,FAA Securitywasconcemedmostabout hepossibility f a sophisticatedxplosive evicegettingon acommerciallight'He candidlyadmittedhatscreeningt hecheckpoint id notdo a goodenoughob topreventt, observinghat"screeningis inherentlyough." Thedeployment f EDSmachinesmarked heFAA's besteffort o addressheproblem hat t sawas hebiggest,mostprobablehreato the ndustry.[CS]Neither heFAA nor the ndustrywaspreparedor the ypeof at tack hecountryfaced n glll/Ol. Noneof thesecuritymeasuresn place ouldhavepreventedt.[CS]Morsesaid hatbefore9/ll/Ol, it wasnotFAA's role o activelyprovideprotectionlor th" aviation ndustry.Exceptions, herea direct ederal ecurity olewas n place,included uttingK-9 teamsat airports,maintaininghesmallFederal ir Marshalprogram, ndconductingesearchnddevelopment'[CS]Compliance ith FAA regulationsndproceduresaswhatFAA was ooking orlromthe airports.Essentially,his swhat heSpecial ssessmenteams overtly estedfor atairports.ttCommonStrategY"[CS] Morsewasaskedo discusshe CommonStrategy,"hedoctrine nd rainingmatirialsdevelopedy theFAA, in consultation ith theFBI andATA, andprovided othe ndustry n howto dealwith hijackings.The strategy, hichhe ndicatedwas easilymisunderstood,"asmanyyears ld,datingback o around1980,andwasalso hesubject f anFAA,/FBIMOU whichhad astbeenupdatedn 1997. Morsesaid hepointof t-he trategy, hichwas ncorporatednto he raining ideoshown o pilotsand lightcrewsduring raining,was o "optimizeactionsaken y a crew o resolve ijackingspeacefully." t wasgearedowarda systematicelay hrough ppeasementf theirijackers,Appeasementasemployedo preventhehijackersromdoinganythingrash.Morsesaid hatover ime,historyhadshown hat he ongera hijacking ersisted,themore ikely t was o haveapeacefulesolution.One easonor this mightbe that hehostagesad ime o develop elationships ith thehijackers.[CS]TheCommonStrategy peratedn theassumptionhathijackersssue emands,mostoften or asylum r therelease f prisonersrom ail. Morseadmittedhescenariowhichplayed uton 9/ll/01was not magined hendesigninghestrategy;hey houghtthat suicidewasn't hegame lan"of hijackers.[CS]Prior o the1996AtlantaOlympics,heFAA tried o updatehe CommonStrategy" ideoused y the airlinesor frainingts flightcrewsbecausef changesn

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COMMISSIONSENSITTVEaircraftandcommunications hichhad enderedheold versionobsolete.Over heyears,someof thecarriers, uchasContinental ndAmerican,had developedheirownupdatedrainingmaterialso supplementhe antiquated AA video. The raining tselfhad alwaysbeen he responsibility f theairlines.Morsewould sit in on trainingsessionsfromtime to time. Morse ndicated hat he rainingmaterials eveloped y AmericanAirlines"mocked"the CommonShategy, pparentlyn an effort to usehumor o get hepointacross.Commission taff hasnot viewed he AmericanAirlines trainingmaterials.ffil As partof its efforts o updatehe CommonStrategy, AA gave he raining ilm tothe FBI to review(1996-1997) ecausehecontentof the videowasbased n aMemorandum f Understandingetweenhe FAA andFBI ondelegation fresponsibilitiesn the eventof adomestic ijacking. The Bureau eported ack hat t had"lost track"of theCommonShategyprinciples.Morsesaid hat he FBI hadnotbeenkeeping rackon incidentsof hijackingsabroad r the changesn technologyhatcouldbe usedn or would be relevant n a hijacksituation.\q Uotre reported hat at that ime, heFAA and heFBl "renegotiated"theMemorandum f UnderstandinghathadestablishedheCommonStrategy.The FBIcamebackandsaid hat he substantiveontent f the videowasnot, n fact, rrelevant;twasprettygood.However, t agreedhe apecoulduseupdating or the benefitof theviewers.The deaof suicidehijackers everenteredheir discussions. ookingback,Morse ealizes ow that n theirdiscussions,ey factorsweren't considereduchas hecommunicationsmprovements ver heyears airphones, ell phones,ACARSmessages,tc). It goeswithoutsayinghat on 9llll0l, these ommunicationoolswereinstrumentalo our understanding f what happenedhat day.[CS]Around1999,someof the airlines, articularlyUS Air's SecwityDirectorLauraGimlet,werealsoconcernedhat he FAA trainingmaterialswere substantivelyrrelevantandusedobsolete quipment.Sincemanyof the airlines, ncludingUS Air, wereon thevergeof bankruptcy,an effort was madeon thepartof the airlines andFAA to worktogethero financea new video.ISSIIIn late 1999or early2000, he opicof updating he rainingmaterials or theCommonStrategywasraisedat ameetingatATA Morseattendedwith theairlinesecuritydirectors.TheFAA neededhe air carrierso invest n theproject.Morsereported,It did notgowell;" no onewantedo help. For nstance, o airlinewantedoloan aplane o theproject or filming,and herewas ittle enthusiasmrom ATA. Inspiteof thisreaction,FAA proceeded ith plans o update heStrategy, rimarily throughplanningon useof currentplaneoutfittedwith currentcommunicationsevices(includingACARSandcellphones). n responseo aquestion,Morse ndicatedhatatthis time(2000andearly2001)he was"not so sure" hebasicdoctrinewas still sound.lSSn In 2000and2001,Morseheld a numberof meetings n updating heCommonStrategywith groups uchasmilitary counterterrorismorcesand U.S.governmentspecialists" nhow to "absolvean aircraft" n theeventof hijacking;severalwith FBI;the StateDepartment;ndwith representativesrom the airlinecariers. He indicatedhat

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theirexisted "disconnect"betweenhemilitaryand heFBI on tacticsn theeventof ahijacking, ut hehijackingmodelwas he same i'e' non-suicide).TSSIdlnMay 2001,a meetingwasheld n Quanticoo bringall interestedartiesogetherio OGcusspdutingheCommonStrategy. t includedhreeairlinecaptains ith securityclearances,TC representatives,therFAA representatives,utnotNORAD. Thesuicide ijackingmodelwasnot formallydiscussed,ut discussionsid takeplaceon theimperative f keeping ijacked lanes n theground, nd heydid seeko developtechniquesor thecrew o disable ircrafto achievehisgoal.[CS]Morse eportedhatATA continuedo "dragits feet"on revising he rainingmaterials.(CS) n thesummer f 2001 the oint project o updateheCommonStrategy asunderway nd heybeganilming thenew raining ideo.A highjackexercise asconductedn collaboration ith theMiamiFBI Field Office,Miami DadeCountyPoliceDepartment,he SWATteam,andVarig Airlines,utilizinga767. Theunderlyingdoitrinewasstill underdevelopmentt his ime,andwasnot finalized efore9/Ill0l.Thevideoandall of thematerials avebeenumedover o TSA.SuicideHijacking

Whenasked owheassessedhepossibility f a suicide ijackmission,Morse aidthat n thebackof hismind,hewasaware f thepossibility f the event based nincidentsn the 1970s nd 1980s), uthestressedhathe never awanyspecificintelligence n a suicide ijackingplot. Morseadmittedhathe feared ijacking ouldbecome popularacticwith terrorists gain.When hey ookedat he Air Francehijacking, uthorities uspectedndattack.Otherpossibleerrorist acticommerciallight, arehard o prevent.industry.

are a vl

[SSq Vorse ndicatedhathe ntendedo raise ome oncernsbout hepossibility albeitunlikety)of thesuicidshijackingactic n theCommonStrategy pdate.KnivesffilThe FAA and ndustry'sreatment ndattitudeowards nivesandknife detectionhasnotchangedignificantlyince efore /ll/0I. The4-inch tandard asse t n partbecausenivesof shorterengthwere egal n all of theU,S. exceptNew York statewhich hada 3 inch hreshold) ndwere husnot regulated. urthermore,heycouldnothaveprohibited nything mallerhana 4-inchbladeeven f theywanted o becausehemachines renotsophisticatednougho detecthem. Finally, heir hinkingat he imewas hat,giving heexperience ith hijackermotives nd actics p till that ime,short-bladed niveswerenot seen samenacing, rediblemeans f controlling assengersrflight crews.A question f, "wheredo you put yourenergies?"ad o beconsidered

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whendecidingwhatwenton theprohibitedtems ist. Bombs ouldeasilybe disguisedas aptops ndballpointpens ouldbe used s ust as ethalaweapon sa smallblade,whether rohibited r not.ffi[The CheckpointOperations uide COG)wasdevelopedy ATA andRAA,approuedy FAA, and hensoldby ATA andRAA back o theirmembers.FAA wantedto nsure hat heCOGdidn't fall below heminimumstandardsalled or in theAirCarrierStandard ecurityProgramACCSP),Morse emembershatATA wasnarticnlarlv ocused n orohibitinsor restrictinetemswhich ooked menacing.'

actions, iven ts oleat he lme wasnotFAA could do with respect o knives,according o Morse.The Dayof September l' 2001[CS]Morsewashome ickon themorning f 9/ l l/01. At 8:30a.m., iswife called ndtoldhim about he irstplane hatcrashednto heWorld TradeCenter,He immediatelystartedn to FAA headquarters.t tookhim approximatelynehour o get here y car'Along heway,heheard l of the umorsand alsealarmshementionedhe supposedcarbombat heStateDepartment hichwaswidely reportedhatday). By l0:00 a'm.,hewasat headquartersndwent o theCommand enter, herehe stayedor thenext24hours.TheCommandCenterwas un by LeeLongmire hatday. Initially,PeterFalconemayhavebeen n charge f theCenterwhenMorsearrived.Morsespenthebetter artof thedayactingasa"dispatcher"of sorts or theprimarynet'[CS]Longmire,Falcone, ndMorse otatedn andout of positions n thedais, acing h. . -.staffmembers nswering alls. A "SCIF" adjacento theCommandCenterwaswhere JJ hltsecure ideoand eleconferenceommunicationsSVTC) ookplace hatday,berween nrrr{a^nationaleadership,AA, and hemilitary. FranLozito,a FAA representativeo oneofthe air carriers,manned honesrom heCommand enterhatday;asdid JanetRiffe,whowason (among thercalls) heprimaryand actical ets hatday. Riffewas hePrimarySecuritynspectoror American t he ime'[CS]Theprimarycommunicationsetwasunclassifiedndwasusedby air carriers ndair trafficcontrollersnvolved n the ncident.The actical etwasused or discussionsof deptoying ssets.ntelligence asanother ommunicationsrovider n thesensehatit linkedpeoplehroughhe ntemet.

[CS]Becausehecrisis nfolded ndendedelativelyuickly,heCommand enter's

functionquicklychangedo consequenceanagement. heywereworriedaboutdeploying esources.Questionsheyneeded nsweredertainedo whatkind of cargothe lightshadon board,whether r notany aw enforcementeoplewereon board,hephysical ay-outof theplanes,heamount f gas n the anks'

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COMMISSIONSENSITIVE[CS]Before /ll, it was heCommand enter'sob in a crisis o directheactivities flaw enforcementn responseo a hijack. It wasorganizedhatwaybecause AAprovided heexpertiseo determine hatcouldandcouldnot feasibly edone o thwartahijackingunderway. Law enforcementoesnot have uchexpertise. Morse epoftedthat he FBI wasnot necessarilyleased y this arrangement.)heAssociateAdministratororCivil AviationSecurityACS-1)was esponsibleor coordinatingFAA's responseo a hijacking.On 9/11/01,he eadFAA staffwereLee Longmire,whoserved sDirector,andMorse,who served s nformationManager.[CS]Information athered n9/l I at theCommandCenterwascompiled or theAdministrator,Most of the nformationwaskept ogethern what s nowroom312A atFAA headquarters. ennyAndersoned theeffort to sort hrough he nformationon thefour separateijacks ncludingall of themiscellaneouseports includingmany redherrings," sMorsecalled hem). t was n thisroom hat he"butcherpaper"washungon thewalls o keep rackof information s t came n, Morsedidnot think hepaperstill exists,f it did,he hought ewouldknowaboutt,ICSJMorse ecalledhatLeeLongmire uestionedanetRiffe (sometime etween0 andl2) on her nitial reportof a gunbeing iredon oneof thehijackedAmerican lights,based n reporting rom American.Morse nformedCommission taff hatRiffewastalking o all of theair carriershatday,not ust American.Morse ecalled hatRiffe,atthe ime, ndicatedo Longmirehat, l think I got" the nformation n thegun, ndicatingsomeuncertainty n herpart. In subsequentiscussion, mericanAirlinesdenied heywere hesource f the nformation,[CS]Morse aid, lt is almostmpossibleo overstatehechaos f thatday." He addedthatJanetRiffe mayhavebeen n oneof themost stressfulroles hatday." No onehadeveranticipatedhenumber f attacks t hesame ime.(CS)Morsewas not surewg[pg5lJgllqj4formation from the butcherpaper hethoughtt mighthu',r" ""41-lthat day or theAdministraior;s riefingbook. The reportof thegufiGilillFltEiFfor several ours, ut wassubsequentlydestroyed hen t was. eterminedo havebeenerroneous. dministratorGarveyinformedMorse hal shenever aw hebriefingbook eporton gunusage.Morsespeculatedhat son'ieone ithin FAA "pulledit offthe harddriveand eaked t to themedia."(CS)Morse ndicatedhat heystarteclettingmore nformation uring hatdayon theweaponshich may havebeenused n thehijackingsfrommediaandotheraccounts)and it..wasclearwe hadshort-bladedeaponsnvolved,"(CS)TheGAO Officeof Specialnvestigationsid an nvestigationn thegun ssue.!4orse ecalledhat he FAA had eceived written esponserom hemconcludinghatagunon boardFlight I I washighlyunlikely,given he nformationheir nvestigatorswereable o uncover.

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COMMISSIONSENSITIVE(CS)Havingbroughtdown heflights,Morseconcededhat here s no way to knowforsure f otheraircraftwere nvolved n theplot thatday. Morsespeculatedhat hemostseniorevelpeoplen thesecure ideo eleconferencen the SCIFwould havediscussedproceduresor theplaneso follow once hey anded. Morsehimselfcouldnot saywhatsteps adbeen akenby law enforcementr securityat that stage. aneGarvey,MonteBelger,andLynne Osmuswouldhavebeennvolved n any suchdiscussions,longwithATC officialsandotherseniorDOT officials.(CS)Morsesaid hat someonen theCommandCenter ad spokenwith ATA aboutwhattheycouldor should ell theirmembers.Morse'sexperiencen thepasthadbeen hatATA washelpful n disseminatingnformationn emergencies,nd hat heywouldwillingly takeon such esponsibilities.After-Action Report(CS)No comprehensivefter-ActionReportwas evercompleted y the FAA. Everyonewasworkingdayandnight onemergency easures. hepotential or otherattackswasreal. Months ater(March/April),an attemptwasmade o complete report,but thecreation f TSA wasunderwayand t was ncreasingly ifficult to getall of theprinciplesin oneplace o discusswhathappenedndgeneratelessons-learned."Morse eportedthatLarry Bruno,thesecurity egulatorymanager,was nitially taskedwith writing thegllll}L After Actionreport.He found t impossible ecauseeoplecouldnot make imeto cooperate.Willie Gripper han askedMorsewith the assignment,twhichpointMorse ndicatedhat o accomplishhemissionwould require hat higher evel officialsmade t apriority.(CS)h separatereas f interest,ntense tudieswerecompleted.And operationally,theseed to a greatdealof change sa resultof 9l|1l01. An example f this s theDEN(DomesticEventsNetwork),whichwas ormed hat dayandhas emained perational24-hours dayeversince.(CS) n Morse'sopinion, apid congressionalctionquelledhe FAA's internalenthusiasmor identifying essons-leamed.fter a drasticorganizationalverhaul,lessons-learnedy anout-moded ureaucracyuicklybecamerrelevant.Aviation SecurityToday(CS)Today,FAA's security esponsibilitys limitedto its own assets ndpersonnel. tstill ownsandoperateshe nationalair space,which n Morse'swords, remainsvital topublicsafety."Airpo$ towers,TRACONs,andcircuitsarealso mportantassetshatareunder heprotectionof FAA. ln thisregard,FAA hasa role n supporting ationalsecurityactivities includingmilitary, aw enforcement,nd ntelligence). n addition,airtraffic controllers avean added ecurity omponento their obs since9/1ll0l inimplementing ertainTSA functions, uchas estrictinghe useof nationalairspace.

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COMMISSIONSENSITIVEtrSD Morse eels hatOsamaBin Laden'snetworkof terrorists aveapreoccupationwith aviation.TheU.S.government eedso be familiarandwell trainedon theworkingsof theaviationsystemn order o protect t; theserainingoperationseed o goon outsideof thepublicview.(CS)Morse eels hat t is better he countryhas akensecurityesponsibilitiesway romthe air carriers ecauseheywereall unwillingto absorbheoverheadn sucha highlycompetitivemarketand heywereneververygoodat doingsecurity."Theywerehappyto contractout screeningo the owestbidder" anddidn't like all the dataentry imeandcostof working heCAPPSsystem.Furthermore,ong-term onsiderationseemedonot havemuch mpacton theairlines'behaviorwith respecto security.(CS)Morsedoesnot see heevidencehat he newlyfederalized viationsecurity ystemis being estedandexaminedwith the same igorthat t wasbefore9/lI/Ol. He saidcritically,"TSA is beingexpectedo inspect tself;" mplying hatoneagency arurot eexpectedo performbothfunctions erywell. In theold system,estingof thesecuritymeasures asdoneby multipleparties:he airlines hemselves,heprivatesecuritycompaniesnvolved,andFAA assessments.irlinesstill haveobligationo check hesecurityof theplane'scabinbeforeandafter akeoff,but for themostpart, heyhavebeen elievedof security esponsibilities.(CS)Morsedescribedheold system shavingbeen'Junked"n thechangeovero thecurrentsystem.He worries hat he newstructure asminimalknowledge f aviationandlittle expertisen regulatory ffairs. His initial impressions thatTSA is doinga worsejob in regulation nd nspection nd in many espects,ecuritys now worse." Hebelieveshat TSA's expeditedulemaking uthoritys a good hing,but that heagencyneeds bettermanagementocus o fix problemswith inspection, nforcementndcompliance.(CS)Morse ecommendedhat a sfiongand ndependentestingmechanism eestablishedor theaviationsecuritysystem.He saidTSA hashired alented ndhardworking eoplewith law enforcementackgroundsndno aviationor regulatoryexpertise.Theregulatoryunctionof FAA did not survive he ransfero TSA. Keypeoplehave eft appointmentsinceTSA's inception.Morsebelieveshis s due o thetendencyo underestimatehecomplexityof the skill-setneededn leadershipoles orregulationof aviation n thiscountry.He warned, Whenall youhave s a hammer,everythingooks ike anail." Morseconcludedhat awenforcements nota"curs-all"for the system f transportationecurityn this country.

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MEMORAI\IDUMFORTIIE RECORDEvent: ederal viationAdministrationFAA)HeadquartersTypeof event:nterviewwithMichaelMorseDate:April19,2004SpecialAccessssues:NonePreparedy: GeoffreYBrownTeamNumber:8Location:FAA Headquartersuilding,Washington, 'C'ParticipantsNon-Commission: rookAvery,ChiefConsulOffice,FAAparticipants commission:Team8: JohnAzzarello,MilesKara,GeoffreyBrownN"t.' P1"*" refer o therecordednterview or furtherdetails.

Background:MichaelMorsespentwentyyeaxsn theAir Forceworking n counter-espionageandcounter-intelligenc.. r b.g*with theFAA eighteen earsago,andsupportedheformationof the ntelligence ivision.HebecameheActingDirectorof AviationIntelligence, nd hirteenyearsagobeganworking or AviationSecurityOperations'On September1,Z00l(gll1) hewasSpecial ssistanto AviationSecwityOperations.Onthemomingof 9ll1 hewassickwith Bronchitis,but cameo theFAAHeadquartersuildinFnd reportedo the enth loor at approximately 0AM.

Crisiscenterpositions n 9/11:On 9/11 hereexisteda scripted tructureor operations t theFAA Air CrisisCenter ACC). Themostseniorpersonnel erepositionedo frequently rief theAdministratoi,and herewasa NetDirectorwho managedhe ACC.From heCrisisCenterwouldbe a PrimaryNet Controllerandbehind heman ndividualwith theresponsibilityo keep ra& of thecommunicationsngoing.Therewas alsoa Tactical

Nei Controlleranda "recorder"positionbehindhem.TherewasalsoanAirlinesCoordinator. hesewere all themainpositions. heotherpositionsadjusted ependenton thesituation.Therbwas aplace or technical upport, ublic affairs,amilitary liaison,flight standards,tc.Thosepositionsweredependentntheongoingevent.Theprimaryan[ tacticalnet approach ad evolved romhijacks n thepastafter t was ealizedhatextemalentitiesneed o be n the nformationaloop for anappropriateesponse.Morse ook responsibility t theACC'

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Morsenoted hat o speakwith anair traffic stafferon 9/11 heACC mighthavecontacted AA HemdonCommandCenter. eeLongmireandPeteFalconewereboth attheACC and heWOC;LongmireasMorse'ssuperior. alconewasLongmire'soperationalcounterPrt.Falcone suallywouldrun theTacticalNet'Morsewasunder he mpressionhat herewasonly onenet functional or at eastonehour;and ecalledacontroversy nwhetheror not therecallwasaprimarynet or atacticalnet.

Agency ie-ins:Morsenoted hat henetswerenotmadewith 9/11 n mind.Morseexplainedhattherewasanexpectation ince hereare"tie-ins" to military counter-terroristorces hatmonitor heneti in aneventsuchasahijacking.Further,herewasestablished

guidelineandchainof commandhroughwhich theFAA canrequest or operationalJupportby themilitary.TheFBI wasoneof theagenciesied-into he acticalnetaswell.rtrereweiealsodata-iinkcommunicationsetweenCivil AviationIntelligenceACI)staffand hegovemmentntelligence gencies.Morsebelievesherewere en o twelvepersonneln theCrisisCenteron 9/11.Morsebelieves ongmirewas here or themajorityof theday.Morse old Commission taff hathehadvery ittle interaction nthe SVT.MorseexplainedhatMonteBelgerwasmore ikely briefedby JeffGriffith in a

separateonferenceoomfromtheACC.From heFAA protocolsahijackcoordinators neededo officially requestassistancerom themilitary;but theNMCCwouldstill be apriority since hrough heNMCC thereare inksto othermilitary monitors.Morsecommentedhat herewasa scripted lan for singlencidents, uthe doesnotbelieveanythingwasaddressedor simultaneousvents. urther,Morsecommentedthatevenwitlr-justonehijacking herecanbechaosat the CrisisCenter.Morsebelievesthatafter the first flight hit theWorld TraderCenter, heFAA began heprocess t uses oaddress singleaircraftcrash.And thisprocess ad o be adjusted smultipleevents

occurred.MorseexplainbdhatbothAir Trafficand hemilitary shouldbe on aFAAPrimaryNet in anair eventof thescaleof 9/11.Themaynotbe anactiveon the net,buttheyshouldbemonitoring.Morsewas nvolved n theFAA responseo theLufthansa ijacking n 1993aswell asaNorthwestAirlinesFlight88hijack romDetroit o Amsterdam. ccording o



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Morse, heflight squawkedhehijackingcode,andwasnot communicating ell with thepilot. Therewas anACARSmessagehatwas"flippant",and t fueledmany ears romih. "o-p*y. U.S. ighterswere aunchedo escortheflight. It was aprotractedincident.Morsenoted hatundernormal esponserotocols heACC shouldhavehad a AirTraffic representativen theroom,and hattheoperationalesponserom HerndonCommandCenterwould have edthe nformation o theAir Traffic representative.hisscenariowouldbevery different hanwhatoccurred n 9/11,when herewasanAirTraffic telecom onvened y DavidCannoleseparaterom thenets hatwerealreadyestablished.peteFalconewasmost ikely, accordingo Morse, hemoderator f theACC nets.Morsecommentedhathe believesherewasonlyonenet ongoing the"tacticalnet".The acticalnetwasmeant o dispatch viationsecurityassets.Morse s of theopinionthat herewas"confusionin thenets"on 9/l l.Morsecommentedo Commission taff hatnormally t is expectedhat air trafficbeon thePrimaryNet, andsince herewasase,parateet of air traffic rnputs n anotherroom,the nformationmaynot havebeen ranslatedrom oneroominto another'Morse ecallsJeffGriffith beingactiveand n the SVTroom.He doesnot knowDougDavis,and hushasno knowledge f him.Morseexplainedhat heTrafficSituationalDisplay TSD)was at"oneof thepositionsn thefarback".He doesnot knowwho mayor may nothavebeenpresent.Heiemembersas heaircraftstartedo landhe saw henumberson theTSD of aircraftlower,but doesnot know f someoneontinuallymonitoredand/or eferencedt.Mike Weckert,of CrisisManagement,as n charge f connectivityor the CrisisCenter.The SecurityDirective oomat GSAwasused or certainoperations ndwas onthe hird floor.Morse ecalled rurulers"whobroughtnformation rom this operationsroomto the enth loor.

Post-9/11 ssessment:Morseexplainedhat heFAA "setup a shop" o answer uestionsrom CapitolHill. Theystarted ompilinga databasef the nformational apershatwerebeingprinting n order o reproduce nddisseminatehe nformation.Morse ecalls hat hehe didnot knowthatNORADhad developedimelineinformationuntil timelineissuesbetweenheFAAA'{ORADwere apparent t theCommissionMay 2003Hearing.



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MorsecommentedhatTerryKraus,DougTiegeandLeoBoymir all worked orhim, andproducedhemajorityof thebriefingbookusedby JaneGarveyn herCongressionalestimonyn theFallof 2001.Morsebelieveshis eam ookedat manyissueshatwereperlinent o thebriefingbook,andcompiledhemajorityof itscontext.Morsealsocommentedhathe s familiarwith thebriefing hatwascompiled yColonelAllan Scott or theCommissionMay2003hearing.Morsedidnot specificallyremember etails egarding ORAD's 8:43AM ime or notificationo themilitaryof thehijackingof UAL 175,nor the nformation resentedy NORAD that9:16AMwas henotification imefor UAL 93. Morsehasnot seen n explicitnotification f thehijackingof UAL 93 from heFAA to themilitary.Morsecommentedhat herewerespeculativeiscussionsegarding uestions fwhen hemilitarywasmonitoring ontinuing ommunications,ndwhen heycouldlogicallybebelieved shavingbeennvolvedn the communications,ecommentedhattherewasdifficulty showing videncehat herehadbeena directnotification f eventsthrough phoneo phone all,andofficialnotification,Whereasherbwasenoughinformationeadingo theability o arguehat hemilitarywas ooped utnotactiveononeof thenets.Further,Morsecommentedhat f a TacticalNetwasproperly abeledheNMCC wouldnot be on it. But normally heAir Trafficpersonnel f theFAA wouldnotbe on t in the uture.He commentedhatsome f thepersonnel ayhaveassumedherewereparties resent ndmonitoring he elecoms,At thepointat which heprimarynetneededo be activatedt should avebeen waypast hepoint"atwhich herewasnotification f theeventsrom heWOC dutyofficers.This nitial notificationwouldhaveonly been nformationhat herewasanongoing ijack AA 1 ). It would notbeunusualor the ntelligence atch o receive n nitialnotification.When ookingat documents, orsestatedhat hePrimaryNet mayhavebeen

establishedater hana half hourafter heTacticalNet. Since heonlynet hatmayhavebeen unningwas heTacticalNet, herewasconfusion s o individualsooking or thePrimaryNet.mav nave

lnteltigenctcommunicationsith a Departmentf DefenceDoD)element, urther,Morsebelieveshat heremayhavebeenmilitary nvolvementn theCannoleselecom.He alsobelievesherewassomemilitarypresence/representationhroughCol Atkins nCannoleselecom.He cited he nformation assedromBostonCenter ZBW) toNortheast ir Defense ector NEADS)asanother otification oint,

Morsewouldhaveexpected rocedurallyor the NationalMili.triryCommandCenterOIMCC) o bepresent n a PrimaryNet elecom hortlyafter'itsnitialnotificationhrough heWOC that herewasahijackingevent; heNMCC would hencontinuallyeceivehroughhisconduitheproper otificationdf each ijackingasknownbv FAA air traffrc.

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Morsecommentedhatasof 9ll1 he had'heverheardof an Air ThreatConference a11."he ntelligence peratorsor theFAA were specificallyaviationintelligence pecialists,ndwouldnothavehadknowledge nNORAD operations.



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Documents

LarsonMDR NARA FAA MorseMikeMFRs Notes 2003-09-15and2004 04 19