Lang - On the Structure of Metaphyiscs Lambda

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The Structure and Subject of "Metaphysics "

Author(s): Helen S. LangReviewed work(s):Source: Phronesis, Vol. 38, No. 3 (1993), pp. 257-280Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182447 .Accessed: 27/11/2011 10:35

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The Structureand Subject of MetaphysicsAHELEN S. LANG

Introduction

Metaphysics A has long puzzled its readersnot only in the particularsof itsarguments, but in its very subject: what is Metaphysics A about? Indeed,perhapsA deals with several topics; we should not immediately assume thatit concerns only one. Ross claims that it is theology, a proof of a firstmover, god, culminating in a vision of divine life.' Along with this claim,he argues both that in relation to the rest of the Metaphysics, A "must beconsidered an entirely independent treatise" and that "Book A is rightlyregardedas the coping-stone of the Metaphysics."2 More recently, Grahamfollows Ross, asserting without argument that Metaphysics A is indeedtheology.3But Owens has arguedthat Metaphysics A is "a study of Entity [o',oaL],first in sensible Entity and then in immobile Entity".4 On this view, theol-ogy disappears, replaced by a science of first sensible and then separateEntity, which includes god.' His claims, like Ross', appear to rest on theparticular arguments of Metaphysics A. (Although we shall not take themup here, the same case can be made for claims about the chronology of theparticular arguments,the best known being Jaeger's claim that MetaphysicsA, 8 is a late insertion breaking the continuous argument that begins in 7and is completed in 9.)6 So Owens points to the sections of Metaphysics A' W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics:A Revised Text with Introductionand Com-mentaryvol. I, (Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1953), pp. xxix, cxxx-cliv.2 Ross, pp. xxix, cxxx.- D. Graham,Aristotle's Two Systems (Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press, 1987), p. 266.4 J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the AristotelianMetaphysics,3rd ed. (Toronto:Pontifical Instituteof Medieval Studies, 1978), p. 453.s Ibid. 453-54.6 WernerJaeger,Aristotle: Fundamentalsof the History of His Development rans. withthe author'scorrectionsand additionsby RichardRobinson.2nd ed. (Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1948) p. 346.Phronesis 1993. Vol.XXXVIII13AcceptedApril 1993)

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thatdeal with "sensible Entity" and "immobile Entity", while Ross pointsto argumentsabout god.

But in fact, these claims about the logos as a whole do not derive from itsparticularargumentsbut are prior to and determinativeof these arguments.For example, the claim that it is theology presupposes that the argumentsconcerning god in Chapters 6-8 somehow dominate the book while thoseconcerning sensible things, Chapters 1-5, preparefor, lead to, or are com-pleted by these arguments.The topic of Chapters9 and 10 must be under-stood as god, even though god is never mentioned in them. Likewise,Owens' claim that A concerns first sensible and then separate substancedivides the logos in half (with little sense of how, or if, the halves arerelated) and so, produces two quite independent arguments within A as awhole. In both these cases, the logical structureassumed (without specificevidence or argument) for the whole is reflected in the force and domainassigned to particularargumentswithin that whole.

I shall assume thatMetaphysics A should be examined as a unified pieceof reasoning. As I shall argue, Aristotle announces the subject of the logosimmediately and unambiguously: an investigation of substance. He thendivides it into two parts, sensible substance and unmoved substance, andexamines them in order. Within each part, as with the larger whole, themain topic is announced immediately and is then followed by its analysis.The main topic, substance, and its rubricationraise two furtherproblemsthat are not addressed until after the analysis of substance is complete. Buttheir solution is crucial to the investigation of substance and Aristotle'sreturn to them provides further evidence for the overall structureof Meta-physics A.

Indeed, these problems conclude the investigation of substance. The firstconcerns voig and the second how nature as a whole contains the good andthe best. The relation of these problems, especially vovs, to the investiga-tion of substance is problematic.Traditionally,the argumentabout vovf; (A,9) is understood as a returnto the account of god in A, 7 - an argumentthathas been interruptedby the separate(and out of place) argumentconcerninghow many gods there are (A, 8). I shall argue that A 8 continues, indeedcompletes, the analysis of god begun in 7; hence A, 8 is in the right place.A, 9 begins "there are some problems concerning mind"; hence it does notconsider specifically god's mind, but broader problems concerning voi;raised by but left unanalyzed in the argument in A, 7. The final problem,how nature contains the good and the best, completes the account of sub-stance by returning to a problem raised at the outset of the logos beforesubstance was rubricated nto sensible and separatesubstance. This view ofA makes better sense of it as a logical whole and makes better sense of its258


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particulararguments than do traditionalreadings.7Two brief points before turningto Metaphysics A. (1) Although the issue

itself lies beyond the bounds of this paper, the claim that Aristotle announc-es his topic immediately is supported by oft repeated speculations that thesewritings are, or are based on, teaching texts. Within an oral setting, an-nouncing the main topic first provides a mnemonic device for rememberingwhat follows.8 (2) The claim that Metaphysics A possesses substance as itsprimarytopic does not deny that argumentsabout god, and hence theology,appear in the logos. Such a denial would be absurd in the face of the text.But it does deny that the main purpose of the argument is to prove thenecessity and nature of god and divine life; rather, god appears within alarger investigation of substance. So, the investigation of substance andwhat such an investigation entails is at stake in the question of the structureand subject of Metaphysics A.

A. The Topic of Metaphysics AThe opening words of Metaphysics A announce: "The inquiry concernssubstance; for the principles and causes we seek are of substances." JrlHQiLT'g o0'utWg f OEwQ(a- TIWVaQ oboCdv Ca excRiXCTtCa 'TLUL1]TOv-TM] (Metaphysics A, 1, 1069al8). Without pause, Aristotle indicates theimportance of the subject. Philosophically, the investigation is importantbecause whether "the all" (To ru&v)s some sort of whole or a succession[of parts], substance must be first.9Even though contemporaries rank uni-versals as substance, the ancients bear witness, Aristotle claims, to theimportance of substance. Hence the most respected opinions confirm hisview of the importance of this investigation. And with his next words hegoes to work on his announced subject: "oCoIal be TQ Lg, . ." In short,the introduction is over, the investigation begins.Aristotle, master of efficiency, has done considerable work in just overten lines. He announces his subject and its importance: substance because7 Although a full developmentof the point clearly lies beyond the bounds of this paper,Dr Sharples has suggested thatthe concernsof Theophrastus'Metaphysicsmake bettersense with this interpretation f A than thatof others.I would like to takethis opportuni-ty to thank Dr Sharplesfor his thoughtfulandconstructivecriticismsof this paper.' For a full account of this thesis, cf. John P. Lynch,Aristotle's School: A Study of aGreekEducationalInstitution Berkeley, Los Angeles and London:University of Cali-forniaPress, 1972), pp. 75-86 and I. During, "Notes on the History of the Transmissionof Aristotle'sWritings"Aristotle and His Influence.Two Studies (New York and Lon-don:Garland,1987), pp. 37-70.9 Aristotle,MetaphysicsA, 1, 1069al9-20.

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however "the all" is constituted, ubstancemust be first. But herein ies aquestion."Theall" remainsunknown is it somesort of whole [4); bXovTnTo Tav]or a succession T ' fj;pEt] of parts?No indication f Aristot-le's answerappearshere, perhapsbecause n eithercase substancemust befirst and the importance f this investigation estson the priorityof sub-stance.Hence an answer o thisquestion s not requiredn order o proceedwith the investigation.But the meaningof "first" and hence our under-standingof substance s prior o all else cannotbe completewithoutknow-ing the constructionf "the all"; at the same time,the constructionf "theall" cannotbe knownwithoutknowingsubstance,which is first. In thissense, an investigation f substance nd the natureof "the all" areinsepa-rableand bothare announced n the opening inesof A.Aristotledemarcates is topicand affirms ts importancewhen he notesits priority or the ancients.Criticalof his contemporaries they (probablyPlato or his followers) rank universalsas substance , his link with theancientsemphasizes he superiority f his own view. Thisreference o theancientsserves almostas a punctuationmark: t declares he importancefthe subjectwith the force of a tradition with which Aristotleexplicitlyconnectshimself) thatestablishes heworthiness f anexamination f sub-stance.So concludes he announcementf the topicat hand.The firstmo-ment of the logos is complete.B. The Rubric of the AnalysisTurning o substance,Aristotle mmediately ubdivides t into threekinds,two sensible and one unmoved.'0This divisionpresents he rubricwithinwhich substancewill be treated.As such, it presentsnot the primaryopicof the logos, buta firststepin the argument.However,although he topicproperly peakingof MetaphysicsA is establishedas obia( priorto thisdivision,the immediacy f this division impliesboth thatthere s nooioGCtapart romor in addition o sensibleand unmovedsubstanceandthataninvestigation f substancemustset out fromthese three"kinds",i.e. frombeingsratherhansomegenericcategoryapart romor prior o these kindsandthebeingsthatthey present.But this divisionof substance nto threekindsraisesa secondquestionand Aristotleturnsto it directly.Sensible substancesare the subjectofphysics because hey involve motion,whileunmoved ubstancebelongstoa different heoria, f this substancehasno commonprinciplewiththetwo

10 Aristotle,MetaphysicsA, 1, 1069a30-33.

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sensible substances." Is there such a common principle? Again, Aristotlegives no indication of his view - either of what this first principle might beor even if there is one. Rather, the examination of the immediate topic athand, sensible substance ('H 6' acdCOriTio0io(ta tcaT3XpkT),begins with-out pause.12

The methodological question concerning sensible and unmoved sub-stances - whether they belong to the same theoria - rests upon a meta-physical question - whether they possess a common principle. And in thisquestion we see what is at stake in defining the largerstructureof the logos.If Metaphysics A considers first sensible and then unmoved substance, adivision between these different kinds of substance is presupposed at theoutset and the need for a common principle is muted - the three kinds seemgrouped loosely together and so the examination of them is sequential, firstsensible and then unmoved. But if, as I am arguing, the subject of theinquiry is substance, a topic recognized even by the ancients, then thedivision of substances into kinds is the first step in implementing the in-quiry into substance. Consequently, these three kinds must possess a com-mon principle sufficient to include them within a single investigation, i.e.the investigation of substance announced in the opening lines.The problem posed here by A appears as an explicit topic in other booksof the Metaphysics. So Metaphysics E mentions mathematics, physics andtheology as separate sciences bearing on different objects and specifies "thefirst science" as that which concerns immovable and separate things.'3Fur-thermore,Aristotle continues, if there is a science of immovable substance,this science will investigate being qua being and the things that belong to itquabeing[xai iTci oIOV VTOgj OVTcUOTln]Ev' OE awpOcCL,calT tOTLXcLiTlt fAdovra fi 6v. (MetaphysicsE, 1, 1026a31-2; cf. also K, 7,1064a28-bl3)]. The mention of being qua being and its possible identifica-tion with theology, cannot but in its turn recall us to Metaphysics F."4 IsMetaphysics A the science of immovable substance, theology, mentioned inMetaphysics E and so, by implication, the science of being qua being de-scribed in Metaphysics F? Aristotle himself never addresses this question,but his readers find it irresistible. And the topic and rubrication of Meta-physics A provide food for speculation. A investigates both sensible andimmovable substance as well as answering an important question about the" Aristotle,MetaphysicsA, 1, 1069a36-1069b2.12 We may note here that the chapterdivision does not altogethercoincide with thedivision of the argument.Chapter2 begins some five lines into the argument oncerningsensible substance.3 Aristotle,MetaphysicsE 1, 1026al5-20.'4 Aristotle,MetaphysicsF 1, 1003a21.

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constructionof "the all". Hence, insofar as the "theology" mentioned in Eseems restricted to an investigation of separate and immovable things,Metaphysics A cannot be this theology. It certainly contains theology, but itis not just theology. Metaphysics A presents an investigation of substance,first sensible and then immovable.But what of the science of being qua being in Metaphysics f? Settingaside the problematic relation between E and F, we can ask how the topicand rubricationof A relate to the account of the science of being qua beingin Metaphysics r. There Aristotle argues that being falls immediately intokinds and therefore the sciences follow these kinds [ibrd&Q%t &e EOiV;Ey'vr {xov no fv [xcd t6 Ev]J 6L xai at EOTiiJTaL dxoXovUO1ouoLtotitoLg (Metaphysics r 2, 1004a5-6)]. Thus he accounts for the so-calledspecial sciences, i.e. each takes up some "part" of being (MetaphysicsF 1,1003a24-25). But there is another science, the science of being qua beingthat investigates being as such (Metaphysics r 1, 1003a21). He declaresunambiguously that all beings are related - and so insofar as they arerelated presumably fall under one science - because there is one centralpoint, a tQo Ev, for all (Metaphysics r 2, 1003a31-b18). Whatever thisrelation entails, it reappears, as we shall see, at the end of Metaphysics A.'5Here we may note that the methodological point of F, i.e. there is a scienceof being qua being even though all beings fall immediately into kinds,reflects the procedure of A which declares an investigation of obmoWt,mme-diately divides it into kinds and concludes by referringall things together astQo; tv.In Metaphysics A, I the question of a common principle among sub-stances returns us to "the all". If it is some sort of whole, then there mustbe a common principle among the three kinds of substance because sub-stance is "first" in its constitution;but if "the all" is a succession of parts,then either there is no common principle or only a very weak one. As withthe question of "the all" and of how substance is first, an immediateanswer to the question of whether there is a principle common to all sub-stance may be unnecessary because the argumentcan (and should) proceedwithout it. However, if the theoria of Metaphysics A concerns otoC(a, theunity of this logos and the coherence of its analysis rests squarely on theanswer to this question. Consequently, the integrity of Metaphysics A re-quires that it be addressed at some point within the logos. And, as we shallsee, it is addressed when Aristotle concludes this book with the claim thatall things in the world are indeed related "7rQboEv".'6'5 Aristotle,MetaphysicsA 10, 1075a18.16 Aristotle,MetaphysicsA 10, 1075a18-20.262


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Here the second moment of the logos is complete. Aristotle has sub-divided the topic announced in the introductionand so presented the rubricof the upcoming analysis. Oboia is divided into three kinds, two sensibleand one unmoved. They are now considered in order.

C. Sensible SubstanceThe examination of sensible substances now begins, and like the logos as awhole, begins immediately with the topic at hand. "Sensible substance ischangeable," Aristotle begins, and his analysis establishes first that thecauses and principles of sensible substance are three, namely form, matter,and privation and, second, that neither matter nor form comes to be, butonly their combination. With these terms he analyses sensible substance aschangeable and in so doing establishes and spells out the claim with whichthe argumentbegins.

When the analysis of sensible substance as changeable is complete, onemight expect this section of the logos to conclude. But before concluding,Aristotle raises a broaderquestion: in what way are the causes and princi-ples of different things different and in what way are they the same? Inorder to answer this question, he characterizes substances generally - andthis characterization s telling: "Since some things can be apartwhile otherscannot, the former are substances. And because of this the same thing is acause of all things because without substances, affections and motions willnot be." ['EJTFA ' TI Ta [LEVXwQ^Toa C b' oibXWQLCTcL,OfCxLaL(dIva.xcc &Q TO^ITO TUaVTWVtLTLLacTa , 6TUL WV ObUCILWVVE10Ob)X ECOTLa3Td01 xl at xLvrw;Lg. (Metaphysics A, 5, 1070b36-1071a2)]. In this sense,he concludes, the principles of things are the same by analogy, for example,form is always actuality and matter potency.17 This is not to say that thesethings, i.e. form and matter, are universally, (for example some one form"man" causing all men, as Plato would have it) because an individual is asource of individuals.'8 Rather, within individuals actuality and potencyalways operate analogously and in this sense are the same.

Although the immediate topic of this part of A is sensible substance thisquestion and its answer return to the two problems raised but left unresolv-ed at the outset of the logos. (1) Is there something common to all sub-stances? Yes. They can all be apart.Furthermore, n all substances actualityand potency are the same by analogy. (2) In what sense is "the all" one?Analysis of sensible substance shows that because substances can be apart," Aristotle,Metaphysics A 5, 1071a4-5.18 Aristotle,MetaphysicsA 5, 1071a 19-20.

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affectionsand motionsdependuponthem.Consequently,verything s oneinsofaras everythingdependsuponsubstance nd n thissense, substance sfirst.As we noted, becausethese issues are entailedboth by the announcedsubject,substance,andby the rubrication f the argumentnto an analysisof first sensibleandthenunmoved ubstance, hey must be addressed f thelargeranalysis s to be coherent.The completionof theaccountof sensiblesubstanceas changeablepresentsthe first set of substantive onclusionswithin the logos. Andthese conclusionsreturn he account mmediately othe broader ssuesconcemingsubstance nd the nature f "theall". As weshall see, these issues will be addressed gain n termsof theresultsof theanalysisof unmoved ubstance ndfinallyas a conclusion o the logos as awhole.In short, he conclusionsof "local" argumentswithinMetaphysicsA are consistentlyreturned o the topic raised at the outsetof the logos:substance.And this factsupportshe claim thatas a unifiedpieceof reason-ing MetaphysicsA concerns ubstance.Now, at the end of MetaphysicsA, 5 the argument boutsensible sub-stance(alongwith the implications f thisanalysis or the inquiry oncern-ing substance) oncludesunambiguously: hatandhowmany he&QXCctfsensiblethingsare,how the same and howdifferent,hasbeenstated.'9Thethirdsection of the logos, the analysisof sensible substance s changeableas well as the implicationsof this analysisfor substanceas first and theconstruct f "the all", is complete.D. Unmoved SubstanceAristotle urns mmediatelyo the remainingkind of substance stablishedby his division of substance nto threekinds.Again,he beginsby assertingthe topic of the upcominganalysis:since there are threeo&o(uiL,wo ofthem natural ndone unmoved,concerning he unmovedwe mustsay thatthere must be some eternalunmoved ubstance. 'Eti 6' iGoavTQEg o0b6-JLCL,biio IE'V at qAJOLXaiCia 6 i etXL'V1TO5, 7tEQL TlUTlg XEXTE0V 6TL

dEvayx1J EwVQL dtL6Lov tVa otActv &xLCVT]TOV.Metaphysics A, 6,1071b3-5)].And he now establishes his claim by showingfirst that suchsubstancemustbe and thenwhat ts naturemust be.An analysisof motion, i.e. actualization lways occurring n sensiblesubstance, evealsboth hat heremustbe an unmovedmoverandthe natureof this substance. ts substancemustbe actualitybecause t causeseternal

'9 Aristotle,MetaphysicsA 5, 1071b-2.

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motion in sensible substance while something else (the first heaven) causesdifferences; these two together cause eternal variety.20Why, then, seekother causes?2'Here we see that the orderof the argumentsin A is not arbitrary.Becausethe principle of sensible substanceas changeable and the analogical unity ofpotency and act is established first, motion in sensible things may be treatedas an effect of unmoved substance. Given that such a cause must be, Aris-totle identifies the nature of this cause: pure actuality that causes as anobject of thought and desire. "Since then, there is some mover being itselfunmoved, being actuality, this mover is in no way able to be other than itis" [?tEAL&eUOTLTLXLVO1V ctnTo &XLiVfTOV6v, tVEQYELa 6v, TOUTO bVxtV&TXETaL dk(Xw EYX6LV0168%t6. (Metaphysics A, 7, 1072b7-8)]. There-fore, it is necessary and, insofar as it is necessary, it is good and in thissense a first principle [t &viyxr;g &iQCIWOT'Vv acd vyxV xck;,xcaLob-Twg Q (Metaphysics A, 7, 1072b10-1 1)].As with the logos as a whole and the analysis of sensible substance, theopening assertion establishes the immediate topic of analysis: that theremust be a first mover and what its naturemust be. Following the account ofsensible substance as changeable, this account rests on the dependence ofmotion in sensible things upon a prior cause. Given Aristotle's definition ofmotion, this dependence shows both that there must be a first mover andthat this mover must be pure actuality acting as an object of thought ordesire. And the analysis continues with just these points. "And on such aprinciple depend the heavens and nature" [Ix TOUWtfl diQa &Q)xn;IQT1qVL6 obQavog xac f cpiVoi. (Metaphysics A, 7, 1072b13-14)]. Thatis, because unmoved substance causes motion, both kinds of movable sub-stances depend upon it. This point echoes the conclusion of the analysis ofsensible substance: without substance, affections and motions will not beand in this sense they depend upon substance.

In short, substance must be first and all things must share a commonprinciple, unmoved substance. This conclusion appearshere as an immedi-ate implication of the analysis of unmoved substance. It articulates theopening claim that there must be such a substance and leads to the closelyrelated question: what is the natureof unmoved substance?

This substance is life at its best, actuality fully actualized, thought whichthinks itself [1 &e vO6i]ot f XcL0'acbTTV TOr xaO' ATO &dQioToU, xaXl[aULctLX TO' [uaktWLa. (Metaphysics A, 7, 1072bl8)]. An account of thisthought now follows and at its conclusion it is identified as god. Each20 Aristotle,MetaphysicsA 6, 1072al5-17.21 Aristotle,MetaphysicsA 6, 1072bI0- 1.

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moment n thedevelopment f thisaccount s definedby thetopicat hand,unmoved ubstance.Aristotle irstshowsthat t mustbe - it is required ymotion n sensiblesubstance andwhat ts naturemustbe.Theforceof theanalysis s to establisha fullcharacterizationf unmoved ubstance.There-fore, characteristics uch as "life at its best" and "thought thinkingthought"appearas predicatesrevealedby an analysis of unmovedsub-stance,god. Forexample,thought hinking hought s activewhen it pos-sesses its objectand so possessionrather hanreceptivity eems to be thedivineelementof thought MetaphysicsA, 7, 1072b22-23).And theanaly-sis retums mmediatelyo godbecausegod is theproper ubjecthere: f godis always well, as we are sometimes, we must marvel .. . (Metaphysics A,7, 1072b24-25).Finally,Aristotle oncludes,"Therefore,we saythatgodisliving,eternal,best, so that ife andduration,ontinuous ndeternalbelongto god;for this is god" [a(Ev b6i T'OVOEOVEvai lJov &t6lOV 6QLoTOV,(oTe 4wi1 xati ctbWv uVcxiTg xai dtLbLogtaQXt& T( OF UoUTO yaQ60O6; (Metaphysics A, 7, 1072b28-30; cf. N. Ethics X, 8, 1178b21-23)].After this characterization, ristotlecriticizesPythagoras nd Speusip-pus:theirviews are inferiorbecause hey think hat"the mostbeautiful ndbestare not in the firstprinciple" TO6 cLXXLOTOVait tQLOTOV[d tV &QX11EtvaL (Metaphysics A, 7, 1072b31)]. He then summarizes his arguments.This summary eturnsus to the claim with which theanalysisof unmovedsubstancebegan."It is clearfrom what has been said that there mustbesome substance ternalandunmovedandseparaterom sensiblethings.. .And it is clear 'why' unmoved substance must be in this way." [6TL [ItVOVV {OTLV O1bOLa TLg etLbLo XaQXLCVTog Xai XEXWQLCFE1 TlOVatcoOrT6Ov,qxLvEQOv x T6)V dQ?SVOV ...T.C. uTa pEV OWV6iXCa 6LOTTOUTOV9XEl T'OVTQO3Erov.MetaphysicsA, 7, 1073a3-5; 1073a13)I.22But a question remains about unmoved substance, god, and Aristotleraises it now: is it one or many and if many, how many (Metaphysics A, 8,1073al4-15)? We need not consider the chronology of Aristotle's writingsin order to consider the proper topic of this argument: 1-lTEQov bE [ILLVOETEoVT'iV ToLaUTrivboiav f 3TXE?oUg,acfJToCtg,b86 [dl kavOdvELv. . . "Such substance", .e. unmoved, s his topicand insofaras this argu-ment concernsunmoved ubstance t continues he analysisdeveloped husfar.23Aristotleconcludes thatthe primary bO t' iV ELVaLdoes not have22 We may note that in Ross' translation his sentence appearsas the opening sentenceof A 8, even thoughin his Greek edition (cf. note 29) it is the closing sentence of A, 7.Jaegeralso makes it the closing line of A 7 in the OCT.23 Speakingof A, 8, Owens concludes that "the necessary connection of the passagewith the immediatelyprecedingargument eems very apparent",TheDoctrine of Being,p. 448.266


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matter but is fulfillment; therefore the first mover, being unmoved, must beone in both definition and number [Ev dQa xatLkoyw xati dQL0[aC o3TQCOYrOVLVOUV LV1ITOV 6v (Metaphysics A, 8, 1074a36-38)].With this conclusion, Aristotle tums to the ancients and their treatmentofthis problem. In a suddenly expansive style, he explains that the most an-cient of our elders have handed down in the form of a myth the view thatthere are gods and that the divine surrounds the whole of nature (Meta-physics A, 8, 1074b-4). If, Aristotle argues, we separate their view fromlater (inferior) additions, we can see that it is inspired and so has beenpreserved. And the ancient truth here becomes clear in the light of thisaccount of substance (Metaphysics A, 8 1074b4-14). And, of course, itthereby attests to Aristotle's own (superior)position.What is the function of this fourteen line encomium to the ancient past?Obviously it adds furtherweight to Aristotle's view, especially in contrastto his opponents. But it does more: like the earlier reference to the ancients,it provides a punctuation mark indicating the completion of a major seg-ment of the logos. ThroughoutMetaphysics A, Aristotle frequently refers tovarious philosophers, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Plato, but never in this ex-pansive style. And these lines refer neither to a Presocratic nor a contempo-rary;they cast back to the most ancient and noble opinion - one that bothaccords with and can be interpretedby Aristotle's position.Aristotle underscores the virtues of his position by turningto the light ofeternal truthknown first (however intuitively) by the ancients. And in doingso, he implies that the argument concerning unmoved substance is com-plete. Indeed we know both that there must be such substance, and what itsnature must be (pure actuality, thinking about thinking, life at its best,activity) and that it must be one in both number and definition. The topicannounced at the beginning of this section of Metaphysics A, i.e. unmovedsubstance, has been analyzed. This section of the logos is now complete.In the rubrication of his analysis, Aristotle divides substance into threekinds, two sensible and one unmoved. Since all three kinds have beenexamined, it would seem that the analysis of substance is now complete.The excursion into noble ancient opinion appears as a punctuationnot onlyof the analysis of unmoved substance but also of the analysis of substanceas such. It is complete.

E. Metaphysics A, 9: Mind or God?But the logos is not complete. Two chapters, Metaphysics A 9 and 10,remain. Here we reach the most problematic part of the logos, especially 9.How we construe the overall topic of the logos is crucial not only for the

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particulars of these arguments, but even for defining their topics. We canconsider A, 9 and its topic first. There are two views of this argument.(1) If we think that the unmoved mover, god, is the topic of MeiaphysicsA, two consequences follow for these particulararguments.First, the argu-ment concerning mind and its object is out of place - it picks up anddevelops the account of A, 7, where god is characterized as thought think-ing itself.24Or alternately,A, 8, the discussion of whether the first mover isone or many, is out of place; indeed, on this view A 8 is largely eliminatedfrom any meaningful role in the logos - and as there is no other "obvious"place for it, it can be dismissed altogether as early and immature.Second, the subject of the argument is at stake here. For if the proper

subject of the argumentis god, thought thinking thought, then the introduc-tion of mind and its relation to its object in effect furthers the analysis ofdivine being, namely god's mind and the relation of divine mind to itsobject. Because god stands as the subject of this argument and divinethought is thought at its best, this account of mind provides a model forwhat thinking is at its best and hence for what all thinking should be.25When we turn to the analysis itself, we shall encounter a startlingexampleof the interpretiveforce of this view.(2) If, however, with the conclusion that there must be separate sub-

stance, a first mover unmoved and one, the argumentabout unmoved sub-stance, god, is complete, and with it the analysis of first sensible and thenunmoved substance - a completion "marked" by the reference to the an-cients - then this argument concems a different (albeit related) topic. In-deed, we saw that in the analysis of unmoved substance, "thinking aboutthinking" appearsas a predicatebut is not analyzed apartfrom its immedi-ate implications for god. Indeed, it cannot be analyzed because the argu-ment presents a characterizationof god. In effect, the strict definition of theanalysis of unmoved substance - it is solely about god - leaves Aristotlewith unfinished business. On the one hand, god has been described as"thought thinkingthought" and so the topic of mind in relation to its objecthas been raised and its immediate implications for god developed; on theother hand, furtherproblems involved in mind could not be pursuedearlierbecause that argumentconcerns unmoved substance (god) and such pursuitwould change the subject. But with the analysis of unmoved substance (andsubstance) complete, Aristotle can consider, as a subject, a topic, vovs,raised by that analysis. In so doing, he will complete the unfinished busi-24 W. Jaeger, p. 346.2S Ibid. Owens seems to assume this view, moving from A 7 to 9 without comment. Cf.Doctrine of Being, p. 444, n. 33.268


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ness raised by, but not formally a part of, the analysis of unmoved sub-stance. And he turns to this subject immediately afterpraising the ancients.

On this view, different conclusions follow. Because voig presents a topicraised but left unexamined by the analysis of unmoved substance, it is in theright place - properly presented within the logos, but postponed until afterthe account of unmoved substance, is complete. Co-relatively A, 8 is also inthe right place because it continues and completes the account of unmovedsubstance by asking if it is one or many.

Furthermore, f the analysis of unmoved substance is complete at the endof A, 8, then A, 9 cannot, strictly speaking, develop furtherthe account ofdivine being and cannot present an account of god's mind as a model for allthinking. Rather, divine mind raises some general problems concerningmind. By considering mind and the relations obtaining between mind andits object, the special case of divine mind can also be considered. In short,divine mind on this view is not a model for all thinking, but a special caseof thinking.

On both views, A, 9 furthers the development of the analysis of god;consequently, on both views it belongs to the larger account of MetaphysicsA. But on the first view it does so by developing a new step and furtherconclusions for the argumentbegun in A, 7; that is, the subject of A 9 isdivine mind, i.e. god. On the second view, A 9 resolves a problem involvedin and raised by what has already been established in A 7 - god is athinking on thinking;but it reaches this resolution by presenting an analysisof voi,; - now taken as a topic in its own right - that includes divine mindas a special case.

Here we can see quite clearly how decisions about the topic of Meta-physics A as a whole effect decisions about the topic and status of particulararguments within that whole. How can we decide what the argument ofMetaphysics A 9 is about? We have already seen some evidence: (1) thecoherence and efficiency of the argument concerning unmoved substancefrom its announcement in A 6 to its conclusion in A 8 that the first movermust be one in both definition and number and (2) the larger structurebeginning with the claim that the investigation concems substance, the im-mediate division of substance into its kinds, the completion of the analysisof each kind and the encomium to the ancients as a closing "punctuationmark" to the argument as it has proceeded thus far.To this we may add as furtherevidence the opening sentence of A 9. Thefirst words after the excursion to the ancients announce the topic at hand:Ta 6E JEP T'OVvo'v 4EL TnVog aToQL'Ctg- oXEl [V yaQ ,vLL TOVQaLVoEvWvOE6OTaov. .. "There are some problems concerning mind -for it seems to be the most divine of things observed" (Metaphysics A, 9,

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1074b15-16).Aristotledoes notsay thattherearesomeproblems oncern-ing unmovedsubstance,or god; rather,he says thereare some problemsconcerningmind.And he is entitledto be takenat his word.Therefore,voug now constituteshe topicof analysis.But if vovs;is nowthe topic,we facea new problem:what s therelationof this topic,vovsg, o substanceandwhy shoulda discussionof vovs;beincluded within an investigationof substance hathas been dividedintosensibleand unmoved?As I shall now argue,the analysisof mindand itsrelation o its objectappearshereas a topicbecauseit has been raisedbythe characterizationf god and involvesdifficulties hatremainunresolvedwithin that analysis.Consequently,A, 9 takesup a predicate stablishedwithin he analysisof the unmoved ubstanceA, 6-8), considerst inandofitself,andnarrows heanalysisof thinking o the specialcaseof immaterialeternal hinking.Herein ies thesensein whichMetaphysicsA, 9 belongsto the investiga-tion of substanceeven thoughit does not develop a further tep in theanalysisof unmovedsubstance an analysis hathas been completed.A 9takesupa problem aisedby the characterizationf god as theactualityofthought,namelythe relationbetweenmind and its object.This problemcould not be consideredearlier(A 7 and 8) because the topic there isunmoved ubstance nd as its topicunmoved ubstance trictlydefinesthatanalysis.With its close, Aristotlecan takeup a problemraised by it andconsiderthis problem n itself. Finally,the solutionto the problemof therelationof mindto its object s applied o eternal hinkingas a specialcase.Letus brieflyconsiderMetaphysicsA 9.Severalquestionsarenowraisedconcerningwhatmindthinksaboutand,althoughneitherunmoved ubstancenorgodarementioned,hesequestionsclearlyseem to bearuponthe specialcase of thinkingat its best. In thissense,theyreview andamplify he accountof minddeveloped o character-ize god. Does it thinkaboutnothing?If so, where is the dignityin suchthought, for it resembles someone who is asleep (MetaphysicsA, 9,1074b17-18)?Whatdoes it think about?For if it thinksaboutsomethingelse, then it dependson thatobjectfor its activityandso cannotbe the best(MetaphysicsA, 9, 1074bl8-20)?Does it matterwhatit thinksaboutor iftheobjectof its thought hanges MetaphysicsA, 9, 1074b21-24)?Answer-ing thesequestions,Aristotleconcludes"therefore,t thinks tself, if it isthe most excellent thing,and this thinking s a thinkingaboutthinking"[t5bTOv ia vo'i, EticEQoi toTrtXCUTov,xaiL QTLVv6joatsvoijoEW;vO6qMg (MetaphysicsA, 9, 1074b33-35)].We seem here to be exactly where we were in A, 7. So why is thisargumentnot a return o MetaphysicsA, 7 and its argument oncerning270


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god? A, 7 is partof an analysisof unmovedsubstance an argument hatbegins in 6 and ends in 8 - and as such it reachesconclusionsaboutun-movedsubstance.MetaphysicsA, 9, as Aristotleannouncesat theoutset, saboutmind,i.e. the problemsof the relationof mind to its object.Hence,neitherunmoved substancenor god are mentioned n 9. Insofar as bothunmovedsubstanceand mind at its best turnsout to be a thinkingaboutthinking he arguments learlygo togetherand the argumentaboutmindbelongs withinMetaphysicsA, i.e. an investigationof substance.Never-theless,thetopicsbeing analyzed n A, 7 andA, 9 are different:whatcomesout in the analysisof unmoved ubstanceas a necessarypredicate,hinkingaboutthinking,now forms a topic of analysisin its own right,mind inrelationto its object.And the conclusionsreachedby an analysisof theproblems oncerningminddo not developfurther he argument boutgod;rather,hey resolveproblemsnvolved n a predicate f unmoved ubstance.HenceA, 9 possesses a different opic,mind,than does A, 7, which con-cerns unmovedsubstance,but bothare includedwithinan investigation fsubstancebecause mind, the subjectof A, 9, is a predicateof god, thesubjectof A, 7.Theproblems oncerningmindand itsrelation o its objectareserious npartbecausethey involve notjust thinkingabout hinking,but all formsofthinking.In the next sentenceAristotle's anguageshows how broadlyhecasts these problems.The differentkinds of thinkinginvolved here areemphasizedby therepetition f the conjunction"and"- a rhetorical evicecalled polysyndeton hat lengthens and slows the pace of the sentence:"But, it seems, knowledgeand sensationand opinionand thoughtare al-ways of anotherand of themselves only indirectly" [tcqxivTcaL ' &d('L?iXOV ftJTLCT'[tTIcii f CifoOfloCL Cai t866a xL h &6LVOWa,tfig 6'tv tctQE`Qy (MetaphysicsA, 9, 1074b35-36)].Generally, o thinkand tobe thoughtare notthe same; n virtueof which does "goodness"belong tomind [Ett F d ko 10 vosiv xaL TO voELoOcu, xacTct m6TTEQov (naTy To E?tftcnQx?L; 06? yCpQ'tct0rr T6OELVaiLVOiJOEL XCiiVOU[LTVp. (MetaphysicsA, 9, 1074b36-38)]?n somecases, e.g. theproductiveciences, theknowl-edge is the object [ij ?r' tVLwV f t 1JTLCTijn] TO 7rQy&Lca, TIL[tEV TJVJTOLTITLIXViVEUR5Yr ftoCWLa caiToT i~valvaL ... (Metaphysics A, 9,1074b38-1075a2)]. But in the case of the theoretical sciences, the act ofthinking is the object of thought; in short, thinking and the object of thoughtdo not differ when matteris absent and, therefore, such thinking is one withthe object of thought [tni 6E TOV OwQTITLXOwV6 kXdo0gT0oaQ&yic xciitfVOTJOLg;?iX TE'QOUOrV 6VtO; TOlUVOOiU[tEVOUai toi5 VoU, 6ota [i1iXknV9y(c1, T6oCdTo go-TctL,cii f v6rToTLqOVOO'U[Vp [iAa.(MetaphysicsA, 9, 1075a2-5)].

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This analysis is not about god in any obvious sense. It concerns what isannounced at the outset of A 9: an aporia concerning mind, namely theproblem of its relation to its object. And as such it is cast quite generally.Indeed, although a full examination lies beyond the scope of this paper, theanalysis of mind in A, 9 most obviously compares with the analysis of vov'gin De Anima F. Thinking here includes perception and opinion - fonns ofthinking that cannot possibly apply to immaterialdivine mind.26Only with-in a general account of thinking, do we arrive at science, both productiveand theoretical. Although science is a more specialized form of thinkingthan the very broad formnsncluding perception and opinion, nevertheless itis a human activity and as such proves that we have not yet arrived at thenarrowest case of thinking, uniquely divine activity; thus, the brief charac-terization of science is narrowerthan the class of all thinking but still doesnot apply exclusively to god.

These sciences bring us to the special case of thinking in which there isno matter (or in which thinking may exclude matter as such). Since un-moved substance, god, is a thinking on thinking that also cannot involvematter,we reach here the kind of thinking appearingwithin and requiredbythe earlier account of unmoved substance. And one sentence concludes theargument:when there is no matter, thought and the object of thought willnot be different, in this case thinking will be one with its object [ob)x

TErQOi OV'V 6VTog TOVi VOOU[EVOU xal 1J v, boct [t'U Iv PXEL,TornlTo 90Tiza, xal f V6Oriot TO VOOtU[EVp [RCC.(MetaphysicsA, 9,1075a3-5)]27Although unmoved substance or god is not mentioned, this case certainlyseems to returnus to this substance - or the subset within all thinking ofwhich this substance is a member- and the account of god as a thinkingonthinking. If we are to account for Metaphysics A as an investigation ofsubstance, then we must be able to explain both why there is no mention ofunmoved substance, god, and why we seem to be back to it. God is notmentioned because, properly speaking, the subjectof this argumentis mind,voV5. We seem clearly back to god because god is thought thinking26 Cf. De Anima F, 3, 427b7-26 whereperception a'LcGOr(cJLs comparedand contrast-ed with opinion [b66Ej, knowledge [I LQPlIj, thought [&6voLC] and imagination[qQavTaoJa].27 It seems impossiblenot to comparethis line to the accountof mind at De Anima F 4,430a2-6: "And mind itself is among things that are thought. For in the case of thingsthat are withoutmatter, he thinkingand the thing thoughtare the same. Fortheoreticalknowledge and the thing thusly known are the same." xCf rnrlr6;g& voI]T6q t0TLV6&MEQPi voiTd. tni tFEv YQ T7V &VFV VXilg T0 OT6 o?TL To VOOVV XaLiToVOOWEVOV 1 (AQ 2tOT?UTf OEW?T1TLXfXacl TOiT0 g tOTELCT1TOV1 CUTW60tLV.

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thought:the predicateappearingin the analysis of unmoved substance, god,is identical with the special case of mind to which this argumentnarrows.Hence, this argument both concerns a different topic (vovs; rather thanobki(ct)and completes business left unfinished within the analysis of obiMLta.By considering problems involved in vovs, Aristotle can complete the argu-ment concerning substance. For this reason, the argument of A 9 is bothproperlypostponed until after the account of unmoved substance in 6-8 andincluded within A, which as a whole concerns substance.

A further tnoQica bout the object of thought [in these cases] remains,and Aristotle with his next words turns to it: is it composite? (MT bliFL-rrETaC 6CROQAtc, &t 0iVV0ETOV TO VOO'uvov (MetaphysicsA, 9,1075a5-6).28Because it is without matter, such an object of thoughtmust beindivisible - "just as human vovs; (or the vov5gof composite things) is insome time" (Metaphysics A, 9, 1075a7-8). Thus too is "the thought havingitself [as its object] for all time" [oDiTwg6' EXELbTi1 CtiT'c ij vOTCtg ToV&TnaVTa atLWva;](Metaphysics A, 9, 1075alO). Here the argumentclearlyconcludes (as does the chapter);the next line begins a different topic (andopens A, 10).

Again this &tJoQLa Is the object of thought [when there is no matter]composite? - does not seem to be exclusively about unmoved substance,god. First, the principle cited in supportof the solution, absence of mattermakes a thing indivisible, applies to all cases in which there is no matter.Secondly, the concluding sentence reflects both on human mind and itsobject of thought as well as eternal thought having itself as its object.Indeed, these two look very much alike - eternity being the only differencecited. Aristotle does not call this eternal thought substance, or god; rather,he extends the point about thinking and the object of thought to the case inwhich the activity is thinking and the object of thought to the case in whichthe activity is eternal. Structurally,this argument too seems to be a generalaccount of thinking when there is no matterpresent narrowing to a specialcase, i.e. when such thinking is eternal. That is, the propersubject is think-ing and the special case to which the account narrows is unmoved substanceand this special case reveals why this topic (yoV) appears in MetaphysicsA.

In short, Metaphysics A 9 does not possess unmoved substance as itstopic and is not a returnto the account of god in Metaphysics A, 7. Rather,the topic here is exactly that announced at the beginning of Metaphysics A,28 'ET!be regularly ntroducesnew moments in the argument.Cf. Physics A, 1, 208a34,b8, 209aI8, 23. 'ETi also introduces lists of arguments by itself, cf. Physics A, 8,215al4, 19, 22, 24.

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9: problems concerning vovs. Problems concerning mind follow the com-pleted argument about unmoved substance because they have been raisedby that account but could not be treated within it (without changing thetopic). And the analysis of these problems narrows to the special case ofeternal immaterial thinking. Indeed, they appear after the account of sub-stance is complete precisely because, although they do not concern sub-stance per se, they are occasioned by thatanalysis and are intimately linkedto its conclusions.

Before turning to Metaphysics A, 10, I would like to consider a strikingexample of what is at stake in these decisions about the subject of theargument and ultimately Metaphysics A as a piece of reasoning. Ross ar-gues that A, 9 continues the argument of 7: "Aristotle now turns to theconsideration of 6 voV5;, .e. of the supreme intellect, which has in ch. 7been shown to be implied as the cause of the movement of the heavens."29The identification of 6 voV5 with "the supreme intellect" is absolute forRoss. So when Aristotle begins "Tat be rQiL TOV VOUV 9XtELTLVQ dL-toQeit" Ross translates (the Oxford translation) "The nature of divinethought involves certain problems" (Metaphysics A, 9, 1074b15). Indeed,

because he identifies vovsg with god so absolutely, Ross finds the nextwords ("for it seems to be the most divine of observable things")"strange" because divine reason is presumably not found among observ-able things; perhaps, he suggests, the phrase "observable things" couldalso apply to things examined by reason."

Again, when Aristotle concludes that in the absence of matter, thoughtand the object of thought are one, the text reads: oiix TlEQOUo1&v6VTo;TOvU VOO1EVOU XaL TOU Wov, boa IAf iIXkIV 9yEL, To a?Tho 9OTC, xaC 9VO6loiL Ti VOOu[tFiVW [da. But Ross translates: Since, then, thoughtandthe object of thought are not different in the case of things that have notmatter, the divine thought and its object will be the same, i.e. the thinkingwill be one with the object of its thought." But the word "divine" does notappearhere.

Finally, when Aristotle asks if the object of thought is composite, Rosstranslates eTT 6I XELJtEnaL 3To(La, EctC5V0OETV 10 voov[tevov" as "Afurtherquestion is left - whether the object of the divine thought is compos-ite". Again, there is no reference to the divine here. Indeed, as we have justseen, the duTopiaand its solution could hardly be cast more generally.How can we account for this extraordinarytranslation? Ross introduces29 W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics:A Revised Text with Introductionand Com-mentaryvol II, (Oxford, ClarendonPress, 1953), p. 397.30 Cf. his comment on MetaphysicsA, 9, 1074bl6, p. 397.274


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words(indeeda subject)not found n Aristotlebecausehe identifies6 vovsso radicallywith "supremeintellect." And he makes this identificationbecausehe presupposeshatMetaphysicsA 9 continues he argument f A7. ButAristotledoesnotintroduce odor divinethoughthereandtheGreekcannoton anyaccountbe translated s Ross proposes.Ross, like Jaeger, andmorerecentlyGraham) ssumes hatMetaphysicsA is theology.3'Becauseas theologythe logos possessesgod as its subject,particularrgumentsmust be interpreted elative o this subject.Andwhenthe particulars o not fit the largerwhole, as Ross definesit, they mustbechanged.And thesechanges nclude(1) rearranginghe orderof the argu-mentsby largelyeliminatingA 8 from thetreatise, 2) expanding he trans-lationso that he text discusseswhat s required f it, i.e. divine mindratherthanmind,and(3) interpreting waydifficultiesthatremain,e.g. how di-vine mindcan be foundamongobservablehings.Virtuallyno aspectof thelogos is untouched.Prima acie such a view can only be suspect.Finally,the origin of the difficulties that generatesuch changes lies in a misfitbetween the presupposed topic of Metaphysics A - the logos is theologyculminatingn the accountof god in chapter7 - and the logos itself,whichannouncesan investigation f obo(tC.Theoppositeresultsobtain rom dentifyinghe subjectof thelogos as aninvestigationof substance. 1) The argumentsare in the rightorder, i.e.MetaphysicsA, 8 continuesand completes the analysisof unmovedsub-stance, 2) the textreadsas it stands, .e. without ntroducing divine", and(3) the arguments orm a consistentpattern, generalproblemof thinkingnarrowedo the requisite pecial case. I shallsuggest in conclusion hatonthis construal he logos is remarkablyoherentand well-ordered.F. How The WorldContains The Good And The BestMetaphysicsA, 10 raises a finalproblem:"Let us consideralso in whichway the natureof the whole containsthe good and the best, whetherassomething eparate,namely tself in virtueof itselforas the order.Or [is it]bothways, as does anarmy?" 'E7aLdXETTnEOVE' xai 7totEQw;XF-L i TOi?Xov (ptUCoLTO &vycO6vxC T6 dQLOTOV, TO6TEQOVEcxwQt[EVOV Tt XCtfTo xct0' act6, i 'iv TdIev. I &totK wg 4DoJ?Qrg tTia; (Meta-physics A, 10, 1075a 1-13)].The good, Aristotleconcludeshere,is foundboth in the orderand in thegeneral,althoughmore n the latterbecause heorderdependson the generalbut not the converse.All things,e.g. fishes,3' W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics: A Revised Text with Introductionand Com-mentaryvol I, (Oxford,ClarendonPress, 1953), pp. cxxx-cliv.

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fowls and plants,are somehoworderedogether,all thingsarenQoQgv.Thisfifteen line argument ompletesAristotle'sanalysis.Theremainderof thechapter, xceptthelast line,consistsexclusivelyof criticismsof otherviews. Hence, these fifteen lines raise and solve the final problemof thelogos:in some sense all thingsareordered ogether.In one sense,this problemparallelshatof mind: heproblem f the goodand the best has been raisedby thecharacterizationf unmoved ubstancebut, as a topic in its own right,it lies outsidethe direct examinationofsubstance.Thus it too presentsunfinishedbusiness, the completionofwhichis closely tied to the accountof god in MetaphysicsA, 7. But in amore mportantense, thisproblemalone formsa suitable onclusion o theinvestigation f substance:t returns s to the nature f "the all", - an issueraisedbeforesubstancewas subdividedntosensibleand unmoved andtothe relatedquestionof whether he threekindsof substance avea commonprinciple.Howeverone interpretshe metaphor f the generaland the army (fol-lowedby another oncerninghehouseholder nd thehousehold),he mainpoint is clear: all things are ordered ogether,connected, rQogtv. Thenatureof the wholeis notjust a successionof parts; t mustbe unified n astronger ense.

But there s no mentionhereeitherof substance r of god.The reader ndthe readeralone must connect this accountto the precedinganalysis: hegeneralis presumably he unmovedmover, god, while the other thingsmentioned, ishes, fowls and plants,are sensible substances.And on thebasis of this identification n interpretationollows directly.Although hethreekinds of substanceare not derived rom someone, andso cannotbeknownby an examinationof it, nonetheless n the one to which they allrelate,all thingspossessa firstprinciple. n this sense,"the all" is one andthere s a commonprinciple or all substances.These fifteenlines providea conclusion o the wholeof MetaphysicsAby returningus to the problemsand subjectof the openinglines of thelogos. Theanalysis hatfollowsuponthe divisionof oOocLtntoits kinds sformallycompleteat A 8. Problems oncerningmindthat are raisedby theanalysisof unmovedsubstance,namelythe relationof mind to its objectand the natureof thatobjectaresolvedin A 9. Themetaphor f thegeneraland the army(andthe householder nd thehousehold) hows thegood andthe best as related o "the all". Again,a predicate ppearingn theanalysisof unmovedsubstanceappearsas a topic in its own right.This identityfounds the conclusionthat this argument ompletesthe accountof sub-stance and presents he relationbetweenunmovedand sensiblesubstanceand thewhole as orderedo a commonprinciple.Hence thisargument oth

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reflects on the highestcharacteristic f god and providesa fitting conclu-sionto theconstructive nalysisof the logos as a whole.Again,therelatedargument f MetaphysicsF 2 seems irresistible.ThereAristotlearguesthatwhenthingsare related pQo6;v they fall underonescience. Such a science deals with what is primary,becauseotherthingsdependuponthese and even derivetheirnamesthence.32 If therefore ub-stance s this,then thephilosophermustgrasp he principlesand thecausesof substances"[1 oiv TOI,T'?(oTiLV oboCC, TGv otaLO'v 6Wv&OL T-ag

&QXagxaclTaS cdTiag9xELv OV qtlkOOoPOV(MetaphysicsF, 2, 1003bl7-19)]. And in MetaphysicsA we seem to do thatby grasping he "primaryinstance",namelythegeneral,and, so, if we identify hegeneralwithgod,god.Here we face the questionof the topic of MetaphysicsA in its mostextreme form:if it is primarilyaboutgod, then why not understandt astheology?Theology(a wordapparently oinedby Plato)means hestudyofgod.33Aristotleuses the relatedword 0?oEk0YoX only twice and in bothcases considers hreekindsof theoreticalcience, physics,mathematics,ndtheology.34 ndthesetextsagree: f natural ubstance s theonly substance,then physics will be the first science; but if thereis an immovablesub-stance,then the science of this will be first.35But MetaphysicsA is not,strictlyspeaking, he scienceof immovable ubstance. t announcesan in-vestigation of substance and, as we have seen, includes both sensible andimmovable substance.

At the opening of A, 1, the primacy of substance immediately raises theproblem of "the all". And however one interprets its details, the intent ofdescribing things in Metaphysics A 10 as JTQo; v is to establish a scienceof many different (and different kinds of) things, sensible as well as immov-able.Herewe see what s at stake n determininghesubjectof MetaphysicsA: theology gives us god and a science of separatesubstance, but a rQpO;vrelation gives us both the one and the world, "the all", as ordered to it. Andthe problem that opens Metaphysics A 1, the problem addressed by themetaphorsof the general and his army, the householder and the household,is a problem that concerns both the primacy of substance and the structure32 Aristotle, MetaphysicsF, 2, 1003b16-17.'" Cf. Plato,Republic II, 379a5.`4 Aristotle, MetaphysicsE 1, 1026a19and K 7, 1064b2; cf. also Physics B 2, 193b25-194al 1 for a parallelaccount of mathematicsand physics but no mentionof theology.We may note thatalthoughAristotle refers to "the theologians" [ot Oox6yot] twice inMetaphysics A (6, 1071b27 and 10, 1075b26) no otherform of this word occurs in A.The wordOcokoy(aoccursonly once in Aristotleaccording o Bonitz,Meteorologica B,1, 353a35.35 Aristotle,MetaphysicsE 1, 1026a28-31; MetaphysicsK 7, 1064b9-13.

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of "the all". Indeed,as an investigation f substance hatbegins and endswith this problem,MetaphysicsA appears o be not the science of separatesubstance, heology, but the science indicated n MetaphysicsF 2, the sci-ence of being qua being.In the remainder f MetaphysicsA, 10 Aristotlecriticizes alternative,inferiorviews, especiallythose of Plato andthe Platonists. nsofaras theseviews differ from his own, they lead (Aristotle ells us) to impossibilities(68vvaTa) and paradoxes dToAa).36 And pathologiesof these problemsfurther upportAristotle'ssuperiorposition.In its last line, the logos ends grandlywith a quotationnot from thePresocratics rPlato,butfromthe mostancientand reveredauthor,Homer.Homer, expressingan eternal truth,confirins Aristotle's own position:"The rule of many is not good; one ruler let there be" ["oibx&ya0ovnroXtixoL(avL*tg xoiQavoS 90TOr." (MetaphysicsA, 10, 1076a4)]. AsAristotle efers o the ancientsat the end of his introduction ndat the closeof the analysisof the threekinds of substance, o too - and in this casewithout furtherado - an ancient returnsus to and completes Aristotle'sview of substanceas first and providinga commonprinciple or the all.ConclusionThe overall ogical structure f the logos maybe brieflysummarized.Aris-totle announceshis subjectirst, oboCra,nd confirms ts importance andhis view in making t important by reference o theancients.Thepriorityof substance eaves open the questionof the structure f the all; howeverthe all is structured, ubstancemustbe first and the analysisof substancecan proceed.With this subjectin place, AristotlesubdividesobiCrantothreekinds,two sensibleand one unmoved.Again,a questionarisesbut isleft unanswered: o these threekinds sharea commonprinciple ndso fallundera single investigation? heanswer o thisquestionwill determinehecoherenceof the logos, since it is an investigation f substance.The examination f firstsensiblesubstances ndthenunmoved ubstancefollowsdirectly.Within heanalysisof sensiblesubstanceA 2-5) Aristotlealso announceshis subjectfirstandconcludesby returningo the generalproblemof substance.An examination f unmovedsubstance A 6-8) be-gins with an announcement f its subjectandends with an extendedex-cursionto most ancientopinion.As in the introduction, ncientopinion,confirmingAristotle'sview, closes theargument.

36. Aristotle,MetaphysicsA, 10, 1075a25-27.278


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Analysis of two topics raised within but different from the analysis ofunmoved substance concludes the logos. The first concerns mind and itsrelation to its object. This analysis takes up as its subject a predicate (think-ing about thinking) that appears in the analysis of unmoved substance.Several conclusions follow about the relation of mind to the object ofthought and the nature of that object. These conclusions apply both totheoretical science and to eternal immaterial thinking that has itself as itsobject. Neither substance nor god is explicitly mentioned in this analysis.

Finally, in A, 10 Aristotle considers how the nature of the whole containsthe good and the best. Since unmoved substance has been characterizedas"life at its best", this topic seems to returnus to substance as first and theconstitution of "the all". The metaphors of the general and the army, thehouseholder and the household, address the ambiguity raised in the openingline of the logos. Again, unmoved substance, or god, is not mentioned inthis chapter; so when Aristotle concludes that the good is found both (andmore) in the general, because he does not depend upon anything else, and inthe order of the parts that depend upon him, the reader must provide theconnection to unmoved substance and ultimately the problem of the all withwhich the logos begins. With the primacy of the general (and the house-holder) it would seem that all things do relate to a one, to some commonprinciple. Herein lies not only the coherence of the world but also thecoherence of the logos as an investigation of substance. Having thus com-pleted his own account, Aristotle criticizes opposing views and the logos,like its most importantparts,closes with a quotationfrom an ancient, in thiscase the most noble of all - Homer.

This proposed structureraises two questions thatmust be answered if thisanalysis is to be persuasive. (1) What, finally, is Metaphysics A about? (2)How can we understand the order and unity of the logos, especially if itincludes two arguments (A 9 and 10) that do not even mention substanceand (on my account) concern different topics?(1) What is Metaphysics A about? Although it contains a discussion, i.e.A 7, in which unmoved substance is identified as god, it is about substance(ouo(a) properly speaking. Metaphysics A is an investigation of substanceas first, however "the all" is constituted. While it is true that substancecannot be examined except as three kinds of substance (two sensible andone unmoved), nevertheless the subdivision of substance into these kindscomes after the identification of the subject of the theoria. Hence, thisdivision and its resulting kinds constitutes not the subject of the logos butthe first step in its analysis. Finally, the conclusions about substance (first assensible and then as unmoved) are consistently referred back to the problemof substance as first and its relation to "the all".

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(2) How can we understandhe orderand unity of the logos as a fullydevelopedformalargument?The investigation f substanceunifies the lo-gos. It is announced n the opening line and subdivided nto two parts,which are takenupin order.Eachpartannounces ts "local topic", i.e. firstsensible and then unmoved substance,analyses this topic, and refers itsconclusionsbackto thebroadest roblems ssociatedwith substance.Meta-physics A, 8 furtherdevelopsthe argument tartedn A 6 and continued n7; at theendof 8 andonly at theendof 8 do we findtheconclusionof theargument bout unmovedsubstanceand the conclusionof the analysisofsubstance.Within the analysis of unmoved substance, two predicates appear,"thinkingabout hinking"and"life at its best". However,eachof these isalso a topic in its own right; "thinkingabout thinking" raises problemsconcerninghe relationbetweenvovsgand its objectwhile "life at its best"raisesthe issue of the independence f whatis best and the relationof thebest to the all. These topics and the problemsentailedby them presentunfinishedbusiness,unresolvedambiguities, or the investigation f sub-stance.Hencetheyareraisedandanalyzed n theirownrightas soonas theaccountof substances complete.Althoughneitherunmoved ubstancenorgod appearsn eitherof these arguments,hefact thatpredicates stablishedin the analysisof unmovedsubstanceappearhereas subjectsattests o therole of these argumentsn the logos. They functionsolely withinandas acompletionof the investigation nnouncedn theopening ine: the investi-gationof substance.Herein ies the order, he unity,indeedthe remarkablefficiencyof thislogos. It is dominatedhe topicannouncedn theopening ine. Evenwhenthe examinationof substance eads to topics thatmustbe treated n theirown right, heanalysisof thesetopicsis radically estricted y therequire-ments of an examination f substance. ndeed, or thisreasonMetaphysicsA maybe offeredas a perfectexampleof an investigation f substance.Trinity College, Hartford, Connec icut

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