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Lamfalussy Lectures Conference On the effectiveness of non-standard monetary policy measures in Slovenia Boštjan Jazbec Banka Slovenije Budapest, 2 February 2015

Lamfalussy Lectures Conference On the effectiveness of non-standard monetary policy measures in Slovenia Boštjan Jazbec Banka Slovenije Budapest, 2 February

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Lamfalussy Lectures Conference

On the effectiveness of non-standard monetary policy measures in Slovenia

Boštjan Jazbec

Banka Slovenije

Budapest, 2 February 2015

2

Summary

• The decoupling of real and financial cycles is symptomatic of a balance-sheet recession, which impairs the effectiveness of monetary policy. Credit continues to decline, while the economy is back on a growth path. The economic recovery is "domestic credit-less", but not "funding-less".

• Main impediments to more effective non-standard monetary policy measures rest with risk-averse domestic banking system as well as with the undeveloped market for alternative instruments that would support these measures.

• In small open economies, and especially in a country with boom-bust legacy, spill-overs of non-standard monetary policy measures complement and could even dominate their direct effects.

• Monetary policy could be effective in providing liquidity, but is not able to repair the impaired transmission channels without assistance of other policies.

3

The decoupling of real and financial cycles in Slovenia is related to balance-sheet recession and to unsustainable model of debt-financed economic growth during the pre-crisis period.

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

2004

Q1

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2014

Q3

Perc

ent d

evia

tion

from

tren

d

Cyclical comp. of foreign funding of resident banks

Cyclical comp. of real GDP

Cyclical comp. of firm credit

4

The contraction of loans to private sector in Slovenia persists. Hence, the economic recovery is a "domestic credit-less", but not a "funding-less" one.

Source: Bank of Slovenia.

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014-35-30-25-20-15-10

-505

1015202530354045

Loans to non-banking sector

Loans to corporates (non-financial corporations and OFIs)

Loans to non-banking sector, excluding transfer to BAMC

Loans to corporates (non-financial corporations and OFIs), excluding transfer to BAMC

Crisis begins

VLTRO

OMT

BAMC

TLTRO

y-o-y growth; %

5

Monetary policy was effective in filling the liquidity / funding gap of banking sector after shut down of wholesale markets via FRFA, and later on VLTROs and TLTROs.

0%

200%

400%

600%

800%

1000%

1200%

1400%

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 20150%

200%

400%

600%

800%

1000%

1200%

1400%

SI excess liquidityEuro area excess liquidity

VLTRO

OMT

TLTROBAMC

Crisis begins

EUR million

1st VLTRO 2nd VLTRO Total VLTRO

VLTRO as share of MFI tota l

assets 1st TLTRO 2nd TLTROTotal TLTRO

Share of initial

a l lowance

Slovenia 1.466,00 2.233,00 3.699,00 7,1% 75,50 630,88 706,38 71,0%

Eurosystem 489.190,75 529.530,81 1.018.721,56 3,0% 82.601,57 129.840,13 212.441,70 53,0%

Source: ECB, Bank of Slovenia. Bank of Slovenia calculations.

6

Excess liquidity had no effect on bank lending rates in Slovenia – not even for prime borrowers.

0

1

2

3

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6

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Perc

ent (

MRO

), Pe

rcen

tage

poi

nts

ECB MRO rate Spread over MRO - "prime" borrowers (A) Spread over MRO - "subprime" borrowers (C)

Crisis begins VLTROTLTROOMT

BAMC

interest rates on new loans

Source: ECB, Bank of Slovenia. Bank of Slovenia calculations

7

Why has there been no impact on lending interest rates in Slovenia?

-15%

-10%

-5%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

9000

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Non-performing claims, EUR million (left)

Non-performing ratio in %

Transfers to BAMC

Source: Bank of Slovenia.

• High level of NPLs

• High leverage of a part of the corporate sector

8

In Slovenia, banks have been deleveraging since the beginning of the crisis, notwithstanding the non-standard monetary policy measures.

161,5

142,9 145,3134,8 129,8

107,9

88,4

50

100

150

200

250

300

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Banking system

Large domestic banks

Small domestic banks

Banks under majority foreign ownership

Source: Bank of Slovenia.

Loan to deposit ratio

9

Banks in Slovenia have been left with a high level of NPLs. They have not transferred the excess liquidity to the real sector of the economy and at the same time they deleveraged.

• Such a situation required decisive policy action which included a balance sheet-repair.

• This was done in the second half of 2013 by a comprehensive review of the banking sector, recapitalisation of major banks and the transfer of NPLs to BAMC.

• So why are banks not lending even then?– Strengthened risk management practices in banks– Stronger supervisory oversight– The realities of the private sector

• Some parts of the corporate sector are still suffering from debt overhang• Corporate sector is still deleveraging• Better clients are able to tap alternative sources of financing, mainly abroad -

both by borrowing loans and by issuing bonds

10

Slovenian banks keep their credit standards tightened.

-9

-6

-3

0

3

6

9

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014-9

-6

-3

0

3

6

9

Level of credit standards - SILevel of demand for financing - SILevel of demand - EALevel of credit standards - EA

Source: Bank of Slovenia

BLS: Demand and supply of loans: NFC

cumulated net percentage change over the last three months

Crisis begins

VLTRO

OMT

BAMC

TLTRO

11

In Slovenia, there is an increased recourse of private (viable, mostly export oriented corporate) sector to funding from abroad.

The share of foreign held securities in total liabilites of corporate sector reached 1.6% in 2014, compared to 0.6% in 2008.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

2004

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Perc

ent

Share of loans to NFC from abroad

Share of short-term loans from abroad in all short-term loans

Share of long-term loans from abroad in all long-term loans

12

Why additional non-standard monetary policy measures may not be effective in Slovenia?

• ABS and covered bond programmes face obstacles in Slovenia

• ABS/covered bonds do not exist owing to small amounts of underlying assets, first mover disadvantage, to smaller extent also due to remaining legal uncertainty and tax issues.

• Diversification of risks by means of securitisation is weaker, because the pool of underlying assets that can be securitised is small.

• Banks which are losing their best clients magnify these problems as they may not have sufficient volume of eligible loans.

• QE – the effect of bond purchases may be limited in Slovenia

• It does not ensure that banks will pass the - yet additional provision of - liquidity into the private sector. Although yield curves are flatter, these effects are not expected to be transmitted to loan pricing conditions.

• It does not guarantee that banks will be willing to sell bonds at all – given that they are risk-averse and faced with very low-yield (or negative-yield) alternative assets.

• It is expected that the main effect will be an indirect one via spill-overs from other countries, where the above issues are less relevant

13

Summary

• The decoupling of real and financial cycles is symptomatic of a balance-sheet recession, which impairs the effectiveness of monetary policy. Credit continues to decline, while the economy is back on a growth path. The economic recovery is "domestic credit-less", but not "funding-less".

• Main impediments to more effective non-standard monetary policy measures rest with risk-averse domestic banking system as well as with the undeveloped market for alternative instruments that would support these measures.

• In small open economies, and especially in a country with boom-bust legacy, spill-overs of non-standard monetary policy measures complement and could even dominate their direct effects.

• Monetary policy could be effective in providing liquidity, but is not able to repair the impaired transmission channels without assistance of other policies.

Lamfalussy Lectures Conference

On the effectiveness of non-standard monetary policy measures in Slovenia

Boštjan Jazbec

Banka Slovenije

Budapest, 2 February 2015