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7/27/2019 Ladlad vs.doc
1/16
G.R. Nos. 172070-72 June 1, 2007
VICENTE P. LADLAD, NATHANAEL S. SANTIAGO, RANDALL B. ECHANIS, and REY
CLARO C. CASAMBRE,Petitioners,
vs.
SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, SENIOR STATE
PROSECUTOR JOSELITA C. MENDOZA, SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AILEEN
MARIE S. GUTIERREZ, STATE PROSECUTOR IRWIN A. MARAYA, and STATE
PROSECUTOR MERBA A. WAGA, in their capacity as members of the Department
of Justice panel of prosecutors investigating I.S. Nos. 2006-225, 2006-226 and
2006-234, JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL M. GONZALEZ, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO
C. LOMIBAO, in his capacity as Chief, Philippine National Police, P/CSUPT.
RODOLFO B. MENDOZA, JR., and P/SUPT. YOLANDA G. TANIGUE,Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO,J.:
The Case
These are consolidated petitions for the writs of prohibition and certiorari to
enjoin petitioners prosecution for Rebellion and to set aside the rulings of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (RTC
Makati) on the investigation and prosecution of petitioners cases.
The Facts
Petitioner in G.R. No. 175013, Crispin B. Beltran (Beltran), and petitioners in G.R.
Nos. 172074-76, Liza L. Maza (Maza), Joel G. Virador (Virador), Saturnino C.
Ocampo (Ocampo), Teodoro A. Casio (Casio), and Rafael V. Mariano
(Mariano),1are members of the House of Representatives representing various
party-list groups.2Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172070-72 are private individuals.
Petitioners all face charges for Rebellion under Article 134 in relation to Article
135 of the Revised Penal Code in two criminal cases pending with the RTC Makati.
G.R. No. 175013 (The Beltran Petition)
Following the issuance by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of Presidential
Proclamation No. 1017 on 24 February 2006 declaring a "State of National
Emergency," police officers3arrested Beltran on 25 February 2006, while he was
en route to Marilao, Bulacan, and detained him in Camp Crame, Quezon City.
Beltran was arrested without a warrant and the arresting officers did not informBeltran of the crime for which he was arrested. On that evening, Beltran was
subjected to an inquest at the Quezon City Hall of Justice for Inciting to Sedition
under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code based on a speech Beltran allegedly
gave during a rally in Quezon City on 24 February 2006, on the occasion of the
20th
anniversary of the EDSA Revolution. The inquest was based on the joint
affidavit of Beltrans arresting officers who claimed to have been present at the
rally. The inquest prosecutor4indicted Beltran and filed the corresponding
Information with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (MeTC).5
The authorities brought back Beltran to Camp Crame where, on 27 February 2006,
he was subjected to a second inquest, with 1st
Lt. Lawrence San Juan (San Juan),
this time for Rebellion. A panel of State prosecutors6from the DOJ conducted this
second inquest. The inquest was based on two letters, both dated 27 February
2006, of Yolanda Tanigue (Tanigue) and of Rodolfo Mendoza (Mendoza). Tanigue
is the Acting Executive Officer of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG), Philippine National Police (PNP), while Mendoza is the Acting DeputyDirector of the CIDG. The letters referred to the DOJ for appropriate action the
results of the CIDGs investigation implicating Beltran, the petitioners in G.R. Nos.
172074-76, San Juan, and several others as "leaders and promoters" of an alleged
foiled plot to overthrow the Arroyo government. The plot was supposed to be
carried out jointly by members of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)
and the Makabayang Kawal ng Pilipinas (MKP), which have formed a "tactical
alliance."
On 27 February 2006, the DOJ panel of prosecutors issued a Resolution finding
probable cause to indict Beltran and San Juan as "leaders/promoters" of
Rebellion. The panel then filed an Information with the RTC Makati. The
Information alleged that Beltran, San Juan, and other individuals "conspiring and
confederating with each other, x x x, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously form a tactical alliance between the CPP/NPA, renamed as Partidong
Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) and its armed regular members as Katipunan ng Anak
ng Bayan (KAB) with the Makabayang Kawal ng Pilipinas (MKP) and thereby rise
publicly and take up arms against the duly constituted government, x x x."7The
Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-452, was raffled to Branch 137
under Presiding Judge Jenny Lind R. Aldecoa-Delorino (Judge Delorino).
Beltran moved that Branch 137 make a judicial determination of probable cause
against him.8Before the motion could be resolved, Judge Delorino recused herself
from the case which was re-raffled to Branch 146 under Judge Encarnacion Jaja-
Moya (Judge Moya).
In its Order dated 31 May 2006, Branch 146 sustained the finding of probablecause against Beltran.
9Beltran sought reconsideration but Judge Moya also
inhibited herself from the case without resolving Beltrans motion. Judge Elmo M.
Alameda of Branch 150, to whom the case was re-raffled, issued an Order on 29
August 2006 denying Beltrans motion.
Hence, the petition in G.R. No. 175013 to set aside the Orders dated 31 May 2006
and 29 August 2006 and to enjoin Beltrans prosecution.
In his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General claims that Beltrans inquest
for Rebellion was valid and that the RTC Makati correctly found probable cause to
try Beltran for such felony.
G.R. Nos. 172070-72 and 172074-76 (The Maza and Ladlad Petitions)
Based on Tanigue and Mendozas letters, the DOJ sent subpoenas to petitionerson 6 March 2006 requiring them to appear at the DOJ Office on 13 March 2006 "to
get copies of the complaint and its attachment." Prior to their receipt of the
subpoenas, petitioners had quartered themselves inside the House of
Representatives building for fear of being subjected to warrantless arrest.
During the preliminary investigation on 13 March 2006, the counsel for the CIDG
presented a masked man, later identified as Jaime Fuentes (Fuentes), who claimed
to be an eyewitness against petitioners. Fuentes subscribed to his affidavit before
respondent prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco who then gave copies of the affidavit
to media members present during the proceedings. The panel of
prosecutors10
gave petitioners 10 days within which to file their counter-affidavits
Petitioners were furnished the complete copies of documents supporting the
CIDGs letters only on 17 March 2006.
Petitioners moved for the inhibition of the members of the prosecution panel forlack of impartiality and independence, considering the political milieu under which
petitioners were investigated, the statements that the President and the Secretary
of Justice made to the media regarding petitioners case,11
and the manner in
which the prosecution panel conducted the preliminary investigation. The DOJ
panel of prosecutors denied petitioners motion on 22 March 2006. Petitioners
sought reconsideration and additionally prayed for the dismissal of the cases.
However, the panel of prosecutors denied petitioners motions on 4 Apr il 2006.
Petitioners now seek the nullification of the DOJ Orders of 22 March 2006 and 4
April 2006.
Acting on petitioners prayer for the issuance of an injunctive writ, the Court
issued a status quo order on 5 June 2006. Prior to this, however, the panel of
prosecutors, on 21 April 2006, issued a Resolution finding probable cause to
charge petitioners and 46 others with Rebellion. The prosecutors filed the
corresponding Information with Branch 57 of the RTC Makati, docketed asCriminal Case No. 06-944 (later consolidated with Criminal Case No. 06-452 in
Branch 146), charging petitioners and their co-accused as "principals,
masterminds, [or] heads" of a Rebellion.12
Consequently, the petitioners in G.R.
Nos. 172070-72 filed a supplemental petition to enjoin the prosecution of Cr imina
Case No. 06-944.
In his separate Comment to the Maza petition, the Solicitor General submits that
the preliminary investigation of petitioners was not tainted with irregularities. The
Solicitor General also claims that the filing of Criminal Case No. 06-944 has
mooted the Maza petition.
The Issues
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The petitions raise the following issues:
1. In G.R. No. 175013, (a) whether the inquest proceeding against Beltran for
Rebellion was valid and (b) whether there is probable cause to indict Beltran for
Rebellion; and
2. In G.R. Nos. 172070-72 and 172074-76, whether respondent prosecutors should
be enjoined from continuing with the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 06-944.13
The Ruling of the Court
We find the petitions meritorious. On the Beltran Petition
The Inquest Proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion is Void.
Inquest proceedings are proper only when the accused has been lawfully arrested
without warrant.14
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Cr iminal Procedure
provides the instances when such warrantless arrest may be effected, thus:
Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
x x x x
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall
be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
The joint affidavit of Beltrans arresting officers15
states that the officers arrested
Beltran, without a warrant,16
for Inciting to Sedition, and not for Rebellion. Thus,
the inquest prosecutor could only have conducted as he did conduct an
inquest for Inciting to Sedition and no other. Consequently, when another group
of prosecutors subjected Beltran to a second inquest proceeding for Rebellion,they overstepped their authority rendering the second inquest void. None of
Beltrans arresting officers saw Beltran commit, in their presence, the crime of
Rebellion. Nor did they have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that
Beltran had just committed Rebellion, sufficient to form probable cause to believe
that he had committed Rebellion. What these arresting officers alleged in their
affidavit is that they saw and heard Beltran make an allegedly seditious speech on
24 February 2006.17
Indeed, under DOJ Circular No. 61, dated 21 September 1993, the initial duty of
the inquest officer is to determine if the arrest of the detained person was made
"in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule
113."18
If the arrest was not properly effected, the inquest officer should proceed
under Section 9 of Circular No. 61 which provides:
Where Arrest Not Properly Effected. Should the Inquest Officer find that the
arrest was not made in accordance with the Rules, he shall:
a) recommend the release of the person arrested or detained;
b) note down the disposition on the referral document;
c) prepare a brief memorandum indicating the reasons for the action
taken; and
d) forward the same, together with the record of the case, to the City
or Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action.
Where the recommendation for the release of the detained person is approved by
the City or Provincial Prosecutor but the evidence on hand warrant the conduct of
a regular preliminary investigation, the order of release shall be served on the
officer having custody of said detainee and shall direct the said officer to serve
upon the detainee the subpoena or notice of preliminary investigation, together
with the copies of the charge sheet or complaint, affidavit or sworn statements of
the complainant and his witnesses and other supporting evidence. (Emphasis
supplied)
For the failure of Beltrans panel of inquest prosecutors to comply with Section 7,
Rule 112 in relation to Section 5, Rule 113 and DOJ Circular No. 61, we declare
Beltrans inquest void.19
Beltran would have been entitled to a preliminary
investigation had he not asked the trial court to make a judicial determination of
probable cause, which effectively took the place of such proceeding.
There is No Probable Cause to Indict
Beltran for Rebellion.
Probable cause is the "existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite
the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the
prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted."20
To accord respect to the discretion granted to the prosecutor and
for reasons of practicality, this Court, as a rule, does not interfere with the
prosecutors determination of probable cause for otherwise, courts would be
swamped with petitions to review the prosecutors findings in such
investigations.21
However, in the few exceptional cases where the prosecutor
abused his discretion by ignoring a clear insufficiency of evidence to support afinding of probable cause, thus denying the accused his right to substantive and
procedural due process, we have not hesitated to intervene and exercise our
review power under Rule 65 to overturn the prosecutors findings.22
This
exception holds true here.
Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed
[B]y rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of
removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the
Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or othe
armed forces or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or
partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.
The elements of the offense are:
1. That there be a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the
Government; and
2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either
(a) to remove from the allegiance to said Government or
its laws:
(1) the territory of the Philippines or any part
thereof; or
(2) any body of land, naval, or other armed
forces; or
(b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or
partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives.23
Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving
crowd action done in furtherance of a political end.24
The evidence before the panel of prosecutors who conducted the inquest of
Beltran for Rebellion consisted of the affidavits and other documents25
attached
to the CIDG letters. We have gone over these documents and find merit in
Beltrans contention that the same are insufficient to show probable cause to
indict him for Rebellion. The bulk of the documents consists of affidavits, some of
which were sworn before a notary public, executed by members of the military
and some civilians. Except for two affidavits, executed by a certain Ruel Escala
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(Escala), dated 20 Febuary 2006,26
and Raul Cachuela (Cachuela), dated 23
February 2006,27
none of the affidavits mentions Beltran.28
In his affidavit, Escala
recounted that in the afternoon of 20 February 2006, he saw Beltran, Ocampo,
Casio, Maza, Mariano, Virador, and other individuals on board a vehicle which
entered a chicken farm in Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas and that after the
passengers alighted, they were met by another individual who looked like San
Juan. For his part, Cachuela stated that he was a former member of the CPP and
that (1) he attended the CPPs "10th
Plenum" in 1992 where he saw Beltran; (2) he
took part in criminal activities; and (3) the arms he and the other CPP members
used were purchased partly from contributions by Congressional members, like
Beltran, who represent party-list groups affiliated with the CPP.
The allegations in these affidavits are far from the proof needed to indict Beltran
for taking part in an armed public uprising against the government. What these
documents prove, at best, is that Beltran was in Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas on
20 February 2006 and that 14 years earlier, he was present during the 1992 CPP
Plenum. None of the affidavits stated that Beltran committed specific acts of
promoting, maintaining, or heading a rebellion as found in the DOJ Resolution of
27 February 2006. None of the affidavits alleged that Beltran is a leader of a
rebellion. Beltrans alleged presence during the 1992 CPP Plenum does not
automatically make him a leader of a rebellion.
In fact, Cachuelas affidavit stated that Beltran attended the 1992 CPP Plenum as
"Chairman, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU)." Assuming that Beltran is a member of the
CPP, which Beltran does not acknowledge, mere membership in the CPP does not
constitute rebellion.29
As for the alleged funding ofthe CPPs military equipment
from Beltrans congressional funds, Cachuelas affidavit merely contained a
general conclusion without any specific act showing such funding. Cachuela
merely alleged that "ang mga ibang mga pondo namin ay galing sa mga party l istna naihalal sa Kongreso tulad ng BAYAN MUNA pimumunuan nila SATUR
OCAMPO at CRISPIN BELTRAN, x x x."30
Such a general conclusion does not
establish probable cause.
In his Comment to Beltrans petition, the Solicitor General points to Fuentes
affidavit, dated 25 February 2006,31
as basis for the finding of probable cause
against Beltran as Fuentes provided details in his statement regarding meetings
Beltran and the other petitioners attended in 2005 and 2006 in which plans to
overthrow violently the Arroyo government were allegedly discussed, among
others.
The claim is untenable. Fuentes affidavit was not part of the attachments the
CIDG referred to the DOJ on 27 February 2006. Thus, the panel of inquest
prosecutors did not have Fuentes affidavit in their possession when they
conducted the Rebellion inquest against Beltran on that day. Indeed, although this
affidavit is dated 25 February 2006, the CIDG first presented it only during the
preliminary investigation of the other petitioners on 13 March 2006 during which
Fuentes subscribed to his statement before respondent prosecutor Velasco.
Respondent prosecutors later tried to remedy this fatal defect by motu proprio
submitting to Branch 137 of the RTC Makati Fuentes affidavit as part of their
Comment to Beltrans motion for judicial determination of probable cause. Such
belated submission, a tacit admission of the dearth of evidence against Beltran
during the inquest, does not improve the prosecutions case. Assuming them to be
true, what the allegations in Fuentes affidavit make out is a case for Conspiracy to
Commit Rebellion, punishable under Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code, not
Rebellion under Article 134. Attendance in meetings to discuss, among others,
plans to bring down a government is a mere preparatory step to commit the acts
constituting Rebellion under Article 134. Even the prosecution acknowledged this,
since the felony charged in the Information against Beltran and San Juan in
Criminal Case No. 06-452 is Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion and not Rebellion.
The Information merely alleged that Beltran, San Juan, and others conspired to
form a "tactical alliance" to commit Rebellion. Thus, the RTC Makati erred when it
nevertheless found probable cause to try Beltran for Rebellion based on the
evidence before it.
The minutes32
of the 20 February 2006 alleged meeting in Batangas between
members of MKP and CPP, including Beltran, also do not detract from our
finding.1a\^/phi1.netNowhere in the minutes was Beltran implicated. While the
minutes state that a certain "Cris" attended the alleged meeting, there is no other
evidence on record indicating that "Cris" is Beltran. San Juan, from whom the
"flash drive" containing the so-called minutes was allegedly taken, denies knowing
Beltran.
To repeat, none of the affidavits alleges that Beltran is promoting, maintaining, or
heading a Rebellion. The Information in Criminal Case No. 06-452 itself does not
make such allegation. Thus, even assuming that the Information validly charges
Beltran for taking part in a Rebellion, he is entitled to bail as a matter of right since
there is no allegation in the Information that he is a leader or promoter of the
Rebellion.33
However, the Information in fact merely charges Beltran for
"conspiring and confederating" with others in forming a "tactical alliance" to
commit rebellion. As worded, the Information does not charge Beltran with
Rebellion but with Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion, a bailable offense.34
On the Ladlad and Maza Petitions
The Preliminary Investigation was Tainted
With Irregularities.
As in the determination of probable cause, this Court is similarly loath to enjoin
the prosecution of offenses, a practice rooted on public interest as the speedy
closure of criminal investigations fosters public safety.35
However, such relief in
equity may be granted if, among others, the same is necessary (a) to prevent the
use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner36
or (b) to
afford adequate protection to constitutional rights.37
The case of the petitioners in
G.R. Nos. 172070-72 and 172074-76 falls under these exceptions.
The procedure for preliminary investigation of offenses punishable by at least four
years, two months and one day is outlined in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus:
Procedure.The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following
manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall
be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to establish
probable cause. They shall be in such number of copies as there are
respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file. The affidavits shal
be subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government
official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or
unavailability, before a notary public, each of whom must certify that
he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they
voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.
(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the
investigating officer shall either dismiss it if he finds no ground to
continue with the investigation, or issue a subpoena to the responden
attaching to it a copy of the complaint and its supporting affidavits and
documents.
The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence
submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished
and to copy them at his expense. If the evidence is voluminous, the
complainant may be required to specify those which he intends to
present against the respondent, and these shall be made available for
examination or copying by the respondent at his expense.
Objects as evidence need not be furnished a party but shall be made
available for examination, copying, or photographing at the expense o
the requesting party.
(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the
complaint and supporting affidavits and documents, the respondent
shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other
supporting documents relied upon for his defense. The counter-
affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to and certified as provided in
paragraph (a) of this section, with copies thereof furnished by him to
the complainant. The respondent shall not be allowed to file a motion
to dismiss in lieu of a counter-affidavit.
(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does
not submit counter-affidavits within the ten (10) day period, the
investigating officer shall resolve the complaint based on the evidence
presented by the complainant.
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(e) The investigating officer may set a hearing if there are facts and
issues to be clarified from a party or a witness. The parties can be
present at the hearing but without the right to examine or cross-
examine. They may, however, submit to the investigating officer
questions which may be asked to the party or witness concerned.
The hearing shall be held within ten (10) days from submission of the
counter-affidavits and other documents or from the expiration of the
period for their submission. It shall be terminated within five (5) days.
(f) Within ten (10) days after the investigation, the investigating officer
shall determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold therespondent for trial. (Emphasis supplied)
Instead of following this procedure scrupulously, as what this Court had mandated
in an earlier ruling, "so that the constitutional right to liberty of a potential
accused can be protected from any material damage,"38
respondent prosecutors
nonchalantly disregarded it. Respondent prosecutors failed to comply with Section
3(a) of Rule 112 which provides that the complaint (which, with its attachment,
must be of such number as there are respondents) be accompanied by the
affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, subscribed and sworn to before
any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their
absence or unavailability, before a notary public. Respondent prosecutors treated
the unsubscribed letters of Tanigue and Mendoza of the CIDG, PNP as
complaints39
and accepted the affidavits attached to the letters even though some
of them were notarized by a notary public without any showing that a prosecutor
or qualified government official was unavailable as required by Section 3(a) of
Rule 112.
Further, Section 3(b) of Rule 112 mandates that the prosecutor, after receiving the
complaint, must determine if there are grounds to continue with the investigation.
If there is none, he shall dismiss the case, otherwise he shall "issue a subpoena to
the respondents." Here, after receiving the CIDG letters, respondent prosecutors
peremptorily issued subpoenas to petitioners requiring them to appear at the DOJ
office on 13 March 2006 "to secure copies of the complaints and its attachments."
During the investigation, respondent prosecutors allowed the CIDG to present a
masked Fuentes who subscribed to an affidavit before respondent prosecutor
Velasco. Velasco proceeded to distribute copies of Fuentes affidavit not to
petitioners or their counsels but to members of the media who covered the
proceedings. Respondent prosecutors then required petitioners to submit their
counter-affidavits in 10 days. It was only four days later, on 17 March 2006, that
petitioners received the complete copy of the attachments to the CIDG
letters.1a\^/phi1.net
These uncontroverted facts belie respondent prosecutors statement in the Order
of 22 March 2006 that the preliminary investigation "was done in accordance with
the Revised Rules o[f] Cr iminal Procedure."40
Indeed, by peremptorily issuing the
subpoenas to petitioners, tolerating the complainants antics during the
investigation, and distributing copies of a witness affidavit to members of the
media knowing that petitioners have not had the opportunity to examine the
charges against them, respondent prosecutors not only trivialized the
investigation but also lent credence to petitioners claim that the entire
proceeding was a sham.
A preliminary investigation is the crucial sieve in the criminal justice system which
spells for an individual the difference between months if not years of agonizing
trial and possibly jail term, on the one hand, and peace of mind and liberty, on the
other hand. Thus, we have characterized the right to a preliminary investigation as
not "a mere formal or technical right" but a "substantive" one, forming part of due
process in criminal justice.41
This especially holds true here where the offensecharged is punishable by reclusion perpetua and may be non-bailable for those
accused as principals.
Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General, respondent prosecutors filing
of the Information against petitioners on 21 April 2006 with Branch 57 of the RTC
Makati does not moot the petitions in G.R. Nos. 172070-72 and 172074-76. Our
power to enjoin prosecutions cannot be frustrated by the simple filing of the
Information with the trial court.1a\^/phi1.net
On Respondent Prosecutors Lack of Impartiality
We find merit in petitioners doubt on respondent prosecutors impartiality.
Respondent Secretary of Justice, who exercises supervision and control over the
panel of prosecutors, stated in an interview on 13 March 2006, the day of the
preliminary investigation, that, "We [the DOJ] will just declare probable cause,
then its up to the *C+ourt to decide x x x."42
Petitioners raised this issue in their
petition,43
but respondents never disputed the veracity of this statement. This
clearly shows pre-judgment, a determination to file the Information even in the
absence of probable cause.
A Final Word
The obvious involvement of political considerations in the actuations of
respondent Secretary of Justice and respondent prosecutors brings to mind an
observation we made in another equally politically charged case. We reiteratewhat we stated then, if only to emphasize the importance of maintaining the
integrity of criminal prosecutions in general and preliminary investigations in
particular, thus:
[W]e cannot emphasize too strongly that prosecutors should not allow, and
should avoid, giving the impression that their noble office is being used or
prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends, or other purposes alien to,
or subversive of, the basic and fundamental objective of observing the interest of
justice evenhandedly, without fear or favor to any and all litigants alike, whether
rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless or mighty. Only by strict adherence to the
established procedure may be publics perception of the impartiality of the
prosecutor be enhanced.44
1a\^/phi1.net
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions. In G.R. No. 175013, we SET ASIDE the
Order dated 31 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 146 and
the Order dated 29 August 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch150. In G.R. Nos. 172070-72 and 172074-76, we SET ASIDE the Orders dated 22
March 2006 and 4 April 2006 issued by respondent prosecutors. We ORDER the
Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 150 to DISMISS Criminal Case Nos. 06-
452 and 06-944.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 164007 August 10, 2006
LT. (SG) EUGENE GONZALES, LT. (SG) ANDY TORRATO, LT. (SG) ANTONIO
TRILLANES IV, CPT. GARY ALEJANO, LT. (SG) JAMES LAYUG, CPT. GERARDO
GAMBALA, CPT. NICANOR FAELDON, LT. (SG) MANUEL CABOCHAN, ENS.
ARMAND PONTEJOS, LT. (JG) ARTURO PASCUA, and 1LT. JONNEL
SANGGALANG, Petitioners,
vs.
GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, in his capacity as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and B. GEN. MARIANO M. SARMIENTO, JR., in his capacity as the
Judge Advocate General of the Judge Advocate Generals Office
(JAGO), Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the Petition for Prohibition (with prayer for a temporary
restraining order) filed by the above-named members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), herein petitioners, against the AFP Chief of Staff and the Judge
Advocate General, respondents.
The facts are:
On July 26, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo received intelligence reports
that some members of the AFP, with high-powered weapons, had abandoned
their designated places of assignment. Their aim was to destabilize the
government. The President then directed the AFP and the Philippine National
Police (PNP) to track and arrest them.
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On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00 a.m., more than 300 heavily armed junior officers
and enlisted men of the AFPmostly from the elite units of the Armys Scout
Rangers and the Navys Special Warfare Group entered the premises of the
Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments on Ayala Avenue, Makati City. They
disarmed the security guards and planted explosive devices around the building.
Led by Navy Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes IV, the troops sported red armbands
emblazoned with the emblem of the"Magdalo"faction of the Katipunan.1The
troops then, through broadcast media, announced their grievances against the
administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, such as the graft and
corruption in the military, the illegal sale of arms and ammunition to the
"enemies" of the State, and the bombings in Davao City intended to acquire more
military assistance from the US government. They declared their withdrawal of
support from their Commander-in-Chief and demanded that she resign as
President of the Republic. They also called for the resignation of her cabinet
members and the top brass of the AFP and PNP.
About noontime of the same day, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427
declaring a state of rebellion, followed by General Order No. 4 directing the AFP
and PNP to take all necessary measures to suppress the rebellion then taking
place in Makati City. She then called the soldiers to surrender their weapons at
five oclock in the afternoon of that same day.
In order to avoid a bloody confrontation, the government sent negotiators to
dialogue with the soldiers. The aim was to persuade them to peacefully return to
the fold of the law. After several hours of negotiation, the government panel
succeeded in convincing them to lay down their arms and defuse the explosives
placed around the premises of the Oakwood Apartments. Eventually, theyreturned to their barracks.
A total of 321 soldiers, including petitioners herein, surrendered to the
authorities.
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigated the incident and
recommended that the military personnel involved be charged with coup
detatdefined and penalized under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. On July 31, 2003, the Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of
Justice (DOJ) recommended the filing of the corresponding Information against
them.
Meanwhile, on August 2, 2003, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War,
respondent General Narciso Abaya, then AFP Chief of Staff, ordered the arrest and
detention of the soldiers involved in the Oakwood incident and d irected the AFP
to conduct its own separate investigation.
On August 5, 2003, the DOJ filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City
an Information for coup detat2against those soldiers, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 03-2784 and eventually raffled off to Branch 61, presided by Judge Romeo F.
Barza.3Subsequently, this case was consolidated with Criminal Case No. 03-2678,
involving the other accused, pending before Branch 148 of the RTC, Makati City,
presided by Judge Oscar B. Pimentel.
On August 13, 2003, the RTC directed the DOJ to conduct a reinvestigation of
Criminal Case No. 03-2784.
On the same date, respondent Chief of Staff issued Letter Order No. 625 creating a
Pre-Trial Investigation Panel tasked to determine the propriety of filing with the
military tribunal charges for violations of the Articles of War under
Commonwealth Act No. 408,4as amended, against the same military personnel.
Specifically, the charges are: (a) violation of Article 63 for disrespect toward the
President, the Secretary of National Defense, etc., (b) violation of Article 64 for
disrespect toward a superior officer, (c) violation of Article 67 for mutiny or
sedition, (d) violation of Article 96 for conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman, and (e) violation of Article 97 for conduct prejudicial to good order
and military discipline.
Of the original 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, only 243 (including
petitioners herein) filed with the RTC, Branch 148 an Omnibus Motion praying that
the said trial court assume jurisdiction over all the charges filed with the military
tribunal. They invoked Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7055.5
On September 15, 2003, petitioners filed with the Judge Advocate Generals Office
(JAGO) a motion praying for the suspension of its proceedings until after the RTC
shall have resolved their motion to assume jurisdiction.
On October 29, 2003, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Initial Report
to the AFP Chief of Staff recommending that the military personnel involved in the
Oakwood incident be charged before a general court martial with violations of
Articles 63, 64, 67, 96, and 97 of the Articles of War.
Meanwhile, on November 11, 2003, the DOJ, after conducting a reinvestigation,
found probable cause against only 31 (petitioners included) of the 321 accused in
Criminal Case No. 03-2784. Accordingly, the prosecution filed with the RTC anAmended Information.
6
In an Order dated November 14, 2003, the RTC admitted the Amended
Information and dropped the charge ofcoup detatagainst the 290 accused.
Subsequently, or on December 12, 2003, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel
submitted its Final Pre-Trial Investigation Report7to the JAGO, recommending
that, following the "doctrine of absorption," those charged with coup detatbefore
the RTCshould not be charged before the military tribunal for violation of the
Articles of War.
For its part, the RTC, on February 11, 2004, issued an Order8stating that "all
charges before the court martial against the accusedare hereby declared not
service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime
ofcoup detat." The trial court then proceeded to hear petitioners applicationsfor bail.
In the meantime, Colonel Julius A. Magno, in his capacity as officer-in-charge of
the JAGO, reviewed the findings of the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel. He
recommended that 29 of the officers involved in the Oakwood incident, including
petitioners, be prosecuted before a general court martial for violation of Article 96
(conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War.
On June 17, 2004, Colonel Magnos recommendation was approved by the AFP
top brass. The AFP Judge Advocate General then directed petitioners to submit
their answer to the charge. Instead of complying, they filed with this Court the
instant Petition for Prohibition praying that respondents be ordered to desist from
charging them with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War in relation to the
Oakwood incident.9
Petitioners maintain that since the RTC has made a determination in its Order of
February 11, 2004 that the offense for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming
an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War is not service-connected, but is
absorbed in the crime ofcoup detat, the military tribunal cannot compel them to
submit to its jurisdiction.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, counters that R.A. No. 7055
specifies which offenses covered by the Articles of War areservice-connected.
These are violations of Articles 54 to 70, 72 to 92, and 95 to 97. The law provides
that violations of these Articles are properly cognizable by the court martial. As
the charge against petitioners is violation of Article 96 which, under R.A. No. 7055
is a service-connected offense, then it falls under the jurisdiction of the court
martial.
Subsequently, petitioners filed with this Court a Supplemental Petition raising the
additional issue that the offense charged before the General Court Martial hasprescribed. Petitioners alleged therein that during the pendency of their original
petition, respondents proceeded with the Pre-Trial Investigation for purposes of
charging them with violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman) of the Articles of War; that the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel then
referred the case to the General Court Martial; that "almost two years since the
Oakwood incident on July 27, 2003, only petitioner Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes was
arraigned, and this was done under questionable circumstances;"10
that in the
hearing of July 26, 2005, herein petitioners moved for the dismissal of the case on
the ground that they were not arraigned within the prescribed period of two (2)
years from the date of the commission of the alleged offense, in violation of
Article 38 of the Articles of War;11
that "the offense charged prescribed on July
25, 2005;"12
that the General Court Martial ruled, however, that "the prescriptive
period shall end only at 12:00 midnight of July 26, 2005;"13
that "(a)s midnight of
July 26, 2005 was approaching and it was becoming apparent that the accused
could not be arraigned, the prosecution suddenly changed its position and
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asserted that 23 of the accused have already been arraigned;"14
and that
petitioners moved for a reconsideration but it was denied by the general court
martial in its Order dated September 14, 2005.15
In his Comment, the Solicitor General prays that the Supplemental Petition be
denied for lack of merit. He alleges that "contrary to petitioners pretensions, all
the accused were duly arraigned on July 13 and 18, 2005."16
The "(r)ecords show
that in the hearing on July 13, 2005, all the 29 accused were present" and, "(o)n
that day, Military Prosecutor Captain Karen Ong Jags read the Charges and
Specifications from the Charge Sheet in open court (pp. 64, TSN, July 13, 2005)."17
The sole question for our resolution is whether the petitioners are entitled to thewrit of prohibition.
There is no dispute that petitioners, being officers of the AFP, are subject to
military law. Pursuant to Article 1 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended,
otherwise known as the Articles of War, the term "officer" is "construed to refer
to a commissioned officer." Article 2 provides:
Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. The following persons are subject to
these articles and shall be understood as included in the term "any person subject
to military law" or "persons subject to military law," whenever used in these
articles:
(a) All officersand soldiers in the active service of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or of the Philippine Constabulary, all members of the reserve force,
from the dates of their call to active duty and while on such active duty; alltrainees undergoing military instructions; and all other persons lawfully called,
drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or for training in the said service, from the
dates they are required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the same.
Upon the other hand, Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055 reads:
SEC. 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other persons subject
to military law, including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical
Units, who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code,
other special penal laws, or local government ordinances, regardless of whether
or not civilians are co-accused, victims, or offended parties, which may be natural
or juridical persons, shall be tried by the proper civil court, except when the
offense, as determined before arraignment by the civil court, is service-connected,
in which case, the offense shall be tried by court-martial, Provided, That the
President of the Philippines may, in the interest of justice, order or direct at any
time before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the propercivil courts.
As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be limited to
those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of
Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended.
In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial may take
into consideration the penalty prescribed therefor in the Revised Penal Code,
other special laws, or local government ordinances.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055, quoted above, is clear and unambiguous. First, it lays
down the general rule that members of the AFP and other persons subject to
military law, including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units,
who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code (like coup
detat), other special penal laws, or local ordinances shall be tried by the propercivil court. Next, it provides the exception to the general rule, i.e., where the civil
court, before arraignment, has determined the offense to be service-connected,
then the offending soldier shall be tried by a court martial. Lastly, the law states
an exception to the exception, i.e., where the President of the Philippines, in the
interest of justice, directs before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be
tried by the proper civil court.
The second paragraph of the same provision further identifies the "service-
connected crimes or offenses" as "limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70,
Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97" of the Articles of War. Violations of these
specified Articles are triable by court martial. This delineates the jurisdiction
between the civil courts and the court martial over crimes or offenses committed
by military personnel.
Such delineation of jurisdiction by R.A. No. 7055 is necessary to preserve the
peculiar nature of military justice system over military personnel charged with
service-connected offenses. The military justice system is disciplinary in nature,
aimed at achieving the highest form of discipline in order to ensure the highest
degree of military efficiency.18
Military law is established not merely to enforce
discipline in times of war, but also to preserve the tranquility and security of the
State in time of peace; for there is nothing more dangerous to the public peace
and safety than a licentious and undisciplined military body.19
The administration
of military justice has been universally practiced. Since time immemorial, all the
armies in almost all countries of the world look upon the power of military law
and its administration as the most effective means of enforcing discipline. For this
reason, the court martial has become invariably an indispensable part of any
organized armed forces, it being the most potent agency in enforcing disciplineboth in peace and in war.
20
Here, petitioners are charged for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an
officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War before the court martial, thus:
All persons subject to military law, did on or about 27 July 2003 at Oakwood Hote
Makati City, Metro Manila, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously violate their
solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution, the law and the duly-
constituted authorities and abused their constitutional duty to protect the
people and the State by, among others, attempting to oust the incumbent duly-
elected and legitimate President by force and violence, seriously disturbing the
peace and tranquility of the people and the nation they are sworn to
protect, thereby causing dishonor and disrespect to the military profession,
conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, in violation of AW 96 of the
Articles of War.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring ours)
Article 96 of the Articles of War21
provides:
ART. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman. Any officer, member o
the Nurse Corps, cadet, flying cadet, or probationary second lieutenant, who is
convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be dismissed
from the service. (Underscoring ours)
We hold that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is
service-connected. This is expressly provided in Section 1 (second paragraph) of
R.A. No. 7055. It bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners concerns
the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution
and the duly-constituted authorities.Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and
disrespect to the military profession. In short, the charge has a bearing on
their professionalconduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of
the "service-connected" nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the
samedismissal from the serviceimposable only by the military court.Such
penalty is purely disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse the
military profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military
discipline.
Obviously, there is no merit in petitioners argument that they can no longer be
charged before the court martial for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War
because the same has been declared by the RTC in its Order of February 11, 2004
as "not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged
crime ofcoup detat," hence, triable by said court (RTC). The RTC, in making such
declaration, practically amended the law which expressly vests in the court martia
the jurisdiction over "service-connected crimes or offenses." What the law has
conferred the court should not take away. It is only the Constitution or the law
that bestows jurisdiction on the court, tribunal, body or officer over the subject
matter or nature of an action which can do so.22
And it is only through a
constitutional amendment or legislative enactment that such act can be done. The
first and fundamental duty of the courts is merely to apply the law "as they find it,
not as they like it to be."23
Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes
grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is,
therefore, void.
In Navales v. Abaya.,24
this Court, through Mr. Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., held:
We agree with the respondents that the sweeping declaration made by the RTC
(Branch 148) in the dispositive portion of its Order dated February 11, 2004 that
all charges before the court-martial against the accused were not service-
connected, but absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of coup detat, cannot b
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given effect. x x x, such declaration was made without or in excess of jurisdiction;
hence, a nullity.
The second paragraph of the above provision (referring to Section 1 of R.A. No.
7055) explicitly specifies what are considered "service-connected crimes or
offenses" under Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, also known as the
Articles of War, to wit:
Articles 54 to 70:
Art. 54. Fraudulent Enlistment.
Art. 55. Officer Making Unlawful Enlistment.
Art. 56. False Muster.Art. 57. False Returns.
Art. 58. Certain Acts to Constitute Desertion.
Art. 59. Desertion.
Art. 60. Advising or Aiding Another to Desert.
Art. 61. Entertaining a Deserter.
Art. 62. Absence Without Leave.
Art. 63. Disrespect Toward the President, Vice-President,
Congress of the Philippines, or Secretary of National
Defense.
Art. 64. Disrespect Toward Superior Officer.
Art. 65. Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer.
Art. 66. Insubordinate Conduct Toward Non-Commissioned Officer.
Art. 67. Mutiny or Sedition.
Art. 68. Failure to Suppress Mutiny or Sedition.
Art. 69. Quarrels; Frays; Disorders.
Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement.
Articles 72 to 92:Art. 72. Refusal to Receive and Keep Prisoners.
Art. 73. Report of Pr isoners Received.
Art. 74. Releasing Prisoner Without Authority.
Art. 75. Delivery of Offenders to Civil Author ities.
Art. 76. Misbehavior Before the Enemy.
Art. 77. Subordinates Compelling Commander to Surrender.
Art. 78. Improper Use of Countersign.
Art. 79. Forcing a Safeguard.
Art. 80. Captured Property to be Secured for Public Service.
Art. 81. Dealing in Captured or Abandoned Property.
Art. 82. Relieving, Corresponding With, or Aiding the Enemy.
Art. 83. Spies.
Art. 84. Military Property.Willful or Negligent Loss, Damage
or wrongful Disposition.
Art. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property
Issued to Soldiers.
Art. 86. Drunk on Duty.
Art. 87. Misbehavior of Sentinel.
Art. 88. Personal Interest in Sale of Provisions.
Art. 88-A. Unlawful Influencing Action of Court.
Art. 89. Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions.
Art. 90. Good Order to be Maintained and Wrongs Redressed.
Art. 91. Provoking Speeches or Gestures.
Art. 92. Dueling.
Articles 95 to 97:
Art. 95. Frauds Against the Government.
Art. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.
Art. 97. General Article.
Further, Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 7055 vests on the military courts the jurisdiction
over the foregoing offenses. x x x.
It is clear from the foregoing that Rep. Act No. 7055 did not divest the military
courts of jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of Articles 54 to 70, Articles
72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of the Articles of War as these are considered"service-connected crimes or offenses." In fact, it mandates that these shall be
tried by the court-martial.
Moreover, the observation made by Mr. Justice Antonio T. Carpio during the
deliberation of this case is worth quoting, thus:
The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by holding that the
charge of Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman is absorbed and in
furtherance to the alleged crime of coup detat. Firstly, the doctrine of
absorption of crimes is peculiar to criminal law and generally applies to crimes
punished by the same statute,25
unlike here where different statutes are involved.
Secondly, the doctrine applies only if the trial court has jur isdiction over both
offenses. Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over
service-connected offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles of War. Thus, the
doctrine of absorption of crimes is not applicable to this case.
Military law is sui generis (Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 [1975]), applicable only
to military personnel because the military constitutes an armed organization
requiring a system of discipline separate from that of civilians (see Orloff v.
Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 [1953]). Military personnel carry high-powered arms and
other lethal weapons not allowed to civilians. History, experience, and the nature
of a military organization dictate that military personnel must be subjected to a
separate disciplinary system not applicable to unarmed civilians or unarmed
government personnel.
A civilian government employee reassigned to another place by his superior may
question his reassignment by asking a temporary restraining order or injunction
from a civil court. However, a soldier cannot go to a civil court and ask for a
restraining or injunction if his military commander reassigns him to another area
of military operations. If this is allowed, military discipline will collapse.
x x x
This Court has recognized that courts-martial are instrumentalities of the
Executive to enable the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to effectively
command, control, and discipline the armed forces (see Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75
Phil. 875 *1946+, citing Winthrops Military Law and Precedents, 2nd edition, p.
49). In short, courts-martial form part of the disciplinary system that ensures the
Presidents control, and thus civilian supremacy, over the military. At the apex of
this disciplinary system is the President who exercises review powers over
decisions of courts-martial (citing Article 50 of the Articles of War; quotedprovisions omitted).
x x x
While the Court had intervened before in courts-martial or similar proceedings, it
did so sparingly and only to release a military personnel illegally detained (Ognir v
Director of Prisons, 80 Phil. 401 [1948] or to correct objectionable procedures
(Yamashita v. Styer, 75 Phil. 563 [1945]). The Court has never suppressed court-
martial proceedings on the ground that the offense charged is absorbed and in
furtherance of another criminal charge pending with the civil courts. The Court
may now do so only if the offense charged is not one of the service-connected
offenses specified in Section 1 of RA 7055. Such is not the situation in the present
case.
With respect to the issue of prescription raised by petitioners in theirSupplemental Petition, suffice it to say that we cannot entertain the same. The
contending parties are at loggerheads as to (a) who among the petitioners were
actually arraigned, and (b) the dates of their arraignment. These are matters
involving questions of fact, not within our power of review, as we are not a trier o
facts. In a petition for prohibition, such as the one at bar, only legal issues
affecting the jurisdiction of the tribunal, board or officer involved may be resolved
on the basis of the undisputed facts.26
Clearly, the instant petition for prohibition must fail. The office of prohibition is to
prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of authority and is directed against
proceedings that are done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion, there being no appeal or other p lain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.27
Stated differently, prohibition is the remedy to
prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards, or persons from usurping or
exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have not been vested by law.28
In fine, this Court holds that herein respondents have the authority in convening a
court martial and in charging petitioners with violation of Article 96 of the Articles
of War.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. WALPAN LADJAALAM yMIHAJIL alia
WARPAN,appellant.
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D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN,J.:
Republic Act No. 8294 penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms,
provided that the person arrested committed no other crime. Furthermore, if
the person is held liable for murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms is
an aggravating circumstance, but not a separate offense. Hence, where an
accused was convicted of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide for
firing an unlicensed M-14 rifle at several policemen who were about to serve a
search warrant, he cannot be held guilty of the separate offense of illegal
possession of firearms. Neither can such unlawful act be considered to have
aggravated the direct assault.
The Case
Walpan Ladjaalam yMihajil, also known as Warpan, appeals before us
the September 17, 1998 Decision[1]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga
City (Branch 16), which found him guilty of three out of the four charges lodged
against him.
Filed against appellant were four Informations,[2]
all signed by Assistant
Regional State Prosecutor Ricardo G. Cabaron and dated September 25, 1997. The
first Information[3]
was for maintaining a den for the use of regulated drugs. It
reads as follows:
That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Walpan
Ladjaalam being then the owner of a residential house located at Rio Hondo,[4]thisCity, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting x x x his
co-accused wife Nur-in Ladjaalam and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajaraini, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, maintain said house as a den, where
regulated drug *was+ used in any form.[5]
The second Information[6]
charged appellant with illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition. We quote it below:
That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting with one
another, without any justifiable reason or purpose other than to use it in the
commission of crime, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have
in their possession and under their custody and control, the following weapons, to
wit: one (1) M14 rifle with SN 1555225 with magazines and seven (7) rounds of
live ammunition; two (2) magazines with twenty (20) and twenty[-one] (21)rounds of live [ammunition]; one (1) homemade caliber .38 revolver with five (5)
live ammunition; one (1) M-79 (single) rifle with pouch and with five (5) empty
shell[s]; one (1) home made caliber .38 with SN-311092 with five live ammunition
and one empty shell of [a] cal. 38 x x x Smith and Wesson; two (2) .38 Caliber
paltik revolver with Serial Number 311092 and one defaced M79 grenade
launcher paltik, without first having obtained the necessary license and or permit
therefor from authorities concerned, in flagrant violation of the aforementioned
law.[7]
The third Information,[8]
for multiple attempted murder with direct assault,
was worded thus:
That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being
then armed with M-14 Armalite Rifles, M-16 Armalite Rifles and other assorted
firearms and explosives, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding
and assisting x x x one another and with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously try and attempt to kill SPO1 WILLIAM B. JONES, JR., PO3
ENRIQUE C. RIVERA[,] SPO1 AMADO A. MIRASOL, JR., and SPO1 RICARDO J.
LACASTESANTOS, in the following manner, to wit: by then and there firing their M-
14 x x x Armalite Rifles, M-16 Armalite Rifles and other assorted firearms and
explosives, aimed and directed at the fatal parts of the bodies of the above-named
police officers, well known to the accused as members of the Philippine National
Police, Zamboanga City Police Office, and as such, agents of a person in authority,
who at the time of the attack were engaged in the performance of their duties,
that is, on the occasion when said officers were about to serve the Search Warrant
legally issued by the Regional Trial Court, this City, to the person of the accused
thus commencing the commission of crime of multiple murder directly by overt
acts, and if the accused did not accomplish their unlawful purpose, that is, to kill
the above-named Police Officers, it was not by reason of their own voluntary
desistance but rather because of the fact that all the above-named police officers
were able to seek cover during the firing and were not hit by the bullets and
explosives fired by the accused and also by the fact said police officers were able
to wrestle with two (2) of the accused namely: Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil a.k.a.
Warpan and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajairani, who were subdued and subsequently
placed under arrest; whereas accused PO2 Nurhakim T. Hadjula was able to make
good his escape and has remained at-large.[9]
In the fourth Information, appellant was charged with illegal possession o
drugs.[10]
On December 21, 1997, the cases against Nur-in Ladjaalam and Ahmad
Sailabbi yHajaraini were dismissed upon motion of the Office of the City
Prosecutor, which had conducted a reinvestigation of the cases as ordered by thelower court. The accused were consequently released from jail.
The arraignment of appellant on all four (4) charges took place on January
6, 1998, during which he entered a plea of not guilty.[11]
After pretrial, the assaile
Decision was rendered, the disposi
