Lacbayan vs. Samoy

G.R.No.165427.March21,2011.*

BETTYB.LACBAYAN,petitioner,vs. BAYANIS.SAMOY,JR.,respondent.

Ownership; CoOwnership; Partition; The determination as tothe existence of coownership is necessary in the resolution of anaction for partition.Ourdisquisition inMunicipality of Bian v.Garcia, 180 SCRA 576 (1989), is definitive. There, we explainedthat the determination as to the existence of coownership isnecessary in

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*THIRDDIVISION.

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678 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

Lacbayan vs. Samoy, Jr.

theresolutionofanactionforpartition.Thus:Thefirst phase of apartition and/or accounting suit is taken up with thedetermination of whether or not a coownership in factexists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legallyproscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all theparties interested in the property. This phase may end with adeclaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition eitherbecause a coownership does not exist, or partition is legallyprohibited.Itmayend,ontheotherhand,withanadjudgmentthata coownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in thepremises and an accounting of rents and profits received by thedefendant from the real estate in question is in order. x x x Thesecond phase commences when it appears that the parties areunable to agree upon the partition directed by the court. In thatevent[,] partition shall be done for the parties by the [c]ourtwiththeassistanceofnotmorethanthree(3)commissioners.Thissecondstagemaywellalsodealwiththerenditionoftheaccountingitselfanditsapprovalbythe[c]ourtafterthepartieshavebeenaccordedopportunitytobeheardthereon,andanawardfortherecoverybythepartyorpartiestheretoentitledoftheir justshareintherentsandprofitsoftherealestateinquestion.xxx(Emphasissupplied.)

Same; Land Titles; Words and Phrases; What cannot becollaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself;Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with thecertificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both areinterchangeably used.Would a resolution on the issue ofownershipsubjecttheTorrenstitleissuedoverthedisputedrealtiesto a collateral attack? Most definitely, it would not. There is no

dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterallyattacked, but that rule is not material to the case at bar. Whatcannotbecollaterallyattackedisthecertificateoftitleandnotthetitleitself.ThecertificatereferredtoisthatdocumentissuedbytheRegisterofDeedsknownastheTCT.Incontrast,thetitlereferredto by law means ownership which is, more often than not,represented by that document. Petitioner apparently confuses titlewith the certificate of title. Title as a concept of ownership shouldnot be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of suchownershipalthoughbothareinterchangeablyused.

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Same; Same; Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of theTorrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longerbe disputedthe certificate cannot always be considered asconclusive evidence of ownership.Placing a parcel of land underthe mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownershipthereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from acertificate of title, the latter only serving as the best proof ofownership over a piece of land. The certificate cannot always beconsidered as conclusive evidence of ownership. In fact, mereissuanceofthecertificateoftitleinthenameofanypersondoesnotforeclose the possibility that the real property may be under coownership with persons not named in the certificate, or that theregistrant may only be a trustee, or that other parties may haveacquired interest over the property subsequent to the issuance ofthe certificate of title. Needless to say, registration does not vestownershipoveraproperty,butmaybethebestevidencethereof.

CoOwnership; Partition; Evidence; Admissions; Requisites;Words and Phrases; An admission is any statement of fact made bya party against his interest or unfavorable to the conclusion forwhich he contends or is inconsistent with the facts alleged byhim.As to whether respondents assent to the initial partitionagreement serves as an admission against interest, in that therespondent is deemed to have admitted the existence of coownershipbetweenhimandpetitioner,weruleinthenegative.Anadmission is any statement of fact made by a party against hisinterestorunfavorabletotheconclusionforwhichhecontendsorisinconsistent with the facts alleged by him. Admission againstinterestisgovernedbySection26ofRule130oftheRulesofCourt,which provides: Sec. 26. Admissions of a party.The act,declarationoromissionofapartyastoarelevantfactmaybegivenin evidence against him. To be admissible, an admissionmust (a)involve matters of fact, and not of law; (b) be categorical anddefinite;(c)beknowinglyandvoluntarilymade;and(d)beadverseto the admitters interests, otherwise it would be selfserving andinadmissible.

Waiver; Basic is the rule that rights may be waived, unless thewaiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, goodcustoms or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized bylaw.A careful perusal of the contents of the socalled PartitionAgreement indicates that the document involves matters which

necessitatepriorsettlementofquestionsoflaw,basicofwhichisa

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determination as to whether the parties have the right to freelydivideamongthemselvesthesubjectproperties.Moreover,tofollowpetitioners argument would be to allow respondent not only toadmitagainsthisowninterestbutthatofhis legalspouseaswell,who may also be lawfully entitled coownership over the saidproperties. Respondent is not allowed by law to waive whateversharehislawfulspousemayhaveonthedisputedproperties.Basicistherulethatrightsmaybewaived,unlessthewaiveriscontraryto law, public order, public policy, morals, good customs orprejudicialtoathirdpersonwitharightrecognizedbylaw.

Estoppel; A party does not have any right to insist on thecontents of an agreement she intentionally refused to sign.Petitionerherselfadmitted that shedidnotassent to thePartitionAgreementafterseeingtheneedtoamendthesametoincludeothermatters.Petitionerdoesnothaveanyrighttoinsistonthecontentsofanagreementsheintentionallyrefusedtosign.

BRION,J., Separate Opinion:

Family Code; CoOwnership; Coownership only arises whenthere is clear proof showing the acquisition of the property duringthe cohabitation of the parties, and the actual joint contribution ofthe parties to acquire the same.Anypropertyacquiredduringthecohabitation can only be considered common property if two (2)conditionsaremet: first, theremust be evidence showing that theproperties were acquired by the parties during their cohabitation;and second, there must be evidence that the properties wereacquired through the parties actual joint contribution of money,property,orindustry.Statedplainly,coownershiponlyariseswhenthere is clearproof showing theacquisitionof thepropertyduringthecohabitationoftheparties,andtheactual jointcontributionofthe parties to acquire the same. These two (2) conditions mustconcur.

Same; Same; Mere cohabitation under Article 148 of the FamilyCode, without proof of contribution, will not result in a coownershipproof of actual contribution must be established byclear evidence showing that the party either used his or her ownmoney or that he or she actually contributed his or her own moneyto purchase the property.On the contribution aspect of theseelements,merecohabitationunderArticle148of theFamilyCode,withoutproofof

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contribution, will not result in a coownership; proof of actualcontributionmustbeestablishedbyclearevidenceshowingthatthe

partyeitherusedhisorherownmoneyor thatheorsheactuallycontributed his or her own money to purchase the property.Jurisprudenceholdsthatthisfactmaybeprovenbyevidenceintheformofbankaccountstatementsandbanktransactionsaswellastestimonial evidence proving the financial capacity of the party topurchasethepropertyorcontributetothepurchaseofaproperty.

Same; Same; Unless there is a clear showing to the contrary,income from a business cannot automatically be considered aspersonal earnings, especially in this case where the income referredto is corporate income.Unless there is a clear showing to thecontrary, income from a business cannot automatically beconsidered as personal earnings, especially in this case where theincomethepetitionerreferredtoiscorporateincome.Thepetitionershould have presented evidence showing that the income shereferredtoactuallyaccruedtoherintheformofsalaries,bonuses,commissions and/or dividends from the manpower business.Otherwise, the rule regarding the corporations distinct legalpersonality from its officers, stockholders and members applies.Unless otherwise shown, the source of the earnings would be thecorporations,notthepetitioners.

Courts; Judgments; The phrase, without prejudice to anyclaim his legal wife may have filed or may file against him in thelast part of the dispositive portion of the Decision, is objectionablefor one, no issue exists in this case between the legitimate spousesregarding the nature of the properties they commonly orindividually hold, and, additionally, the phrase creates theimpression that the Court is giving legal advice to the wife of therespondent on what course of action to take against her husband.Thephrase,without prejudice to any claim his legal wife may havefiled or may file against him in the last part of the dispositiveportionoftheDecision, issimilarlyobjectionable.Forone,no issueexists in this case between the legitimate spouses regarding thenature of the properties they commonly or individually hold.Additionally, the phrase creates the impression that the Court isgivinglegaladvicetothewifeoftherespondentonwhatcourseofactiontotakeagainstherhusband.ThisstatementisbeyondwhatthisCourtshouldproperlystate in itsDecisiongiventhefactsandissuesposed,andisplainlyuncalledfor.

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682 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATEDLacbayan vs. Samoy, Jr.

PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofadecisionoftheCourtofAppeals.

ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt. Margarita C. Feliciano forpetitioner. Culvera & Waytan Law Offices forrespondent. Cesar B. Jimenea, Jr. collaborating counsel for

respondent.

VILLARAMA,JR.,J.:Thissettlesthepetitionforreviewoncertiorari filedby

petitionerBettyB.LacbayanagainstrespondentBayaniS.Samoy,Jr.assailingtheSeptember14,2004Decision1oftheCourt ofAppeals (CA) inCAG.R.CVNo.67596.TheCA

had affirmed the February 10, 2000 Decision2 of theRegional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 224, of Quezon Citydeclaring respondent as the sole owner of the propertiesinvolved in this suit andawarding tohimP100,000.00asattorneysfees.

Thissuitstemmedfromthefollowingfacts. Petitioner and respondent met each other through a

commonfriendsometimein1978.Despiterespondentbeingalready married, their relationship developed untilpetitioner gave birth to respondents son on October 12,1979.3

During their illicit relationship, petitioner andrespondent, together with three more incorporators, wereable to establish a manpower services company.4 Fiveparcels of land were also acquired during the said periodandwereregisteredinpeti

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1Rollo, pp. 2842. Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca De GuiaSalvador, with Associate Justices Portia AlioHormachuelos andAuroraSantiagoLagman,concurring;

2CARollo,pp.3539.3Records,p.108.4Rollo,p.29.

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VOL.645,MARCH21,2011 683Lacbayan vs. Samoy, Jr.

tionerandrespondentsnames,ostensiblyashusbandandwife.Thelandsarebrieflydescribedasfollows:

1.A 255square meter real estate property located atMalvar St.,Quezon City covered by TCT No. 303224 and registered in thenameofBayaniS.Samoy,Jr.marriedtoBettyLacbayan.5

2.A 296square meter real estate property located at Main Ave.,Quezon City covered by TCT No. 23301 and registered in thenameofSpousesBayaniS.SamoyandBettyLacbayan.6

3.A300squaremeter real estateproperty locatedatMatatagSt.,QuezonCitycoveredbyTCTNo.RT38264andregisteredinthename of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. married to Betty LacbayanSamoy.7

4.A183.20squaremeter realestateproperty locatedatZobelSt.,Quezon City covered by TCT No. 335193 and registered in thenameofBayaniS.Samoy,Jr.marriedtoBettyL.Samoy.8

5.A400squaremeterrealestateproperty locatedatDonEnriqueHeights,QuezonCity covered byTCTNo. 90232 and registeredin the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. married to Betty L.Samoy.9

Initially, petitioner lived with her parents inMapagbigaySt.,V.Luna,QuezonCity.In1983,petitionerleftherparentsanddecidedtoresideinthepropertylocatedinMalvarSt.inProject4,QuezonCity.Later,sheandtheirsontransferredtoZobelSt.,alsoinProject4,andfinallytothe400squaremeterpropertyinDonEnriqueHeights.10

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5Records,pp.78,5152.6 Id.,atpp.910,5758.7 Id.,atpp.1112,5556.8 Id.,atpp.1314,5354.9Id.,atpp.1516,5960.10Rollo,p.31.

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Eventually,however,theirrelationshipturnedsourandtheydecidedtopartwayssometimein1991.In1998,bothpartiesagreed todivide the saidpropertiesand terminatetheir business partnership by executing a PartitionAgreement.11 Initially, respondent agreed to petitionersproposalthatthepropertiesinMalvarSt.andDonEnriqueHeightsbeassignedtothelatter,whiletheownershipoverthethreeotherpropertieswillgotorespondent.12However,whenpetitionerwantedadditionaldemandstobeincludedin the partition agreement, respondent refused.13 Feelingaggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for judicialpartition14ofthesaidpropertiesbeforetheRTCinQuezonCityonMay31,1999.

In her complaint, petitioner averred that she andrespondentstartedtolivetogetherashusbandandwifein1979withoutthebenefitofmarriageandworkedtogetheras business partners, acquiring real properties amountingtoP15,500,000.00.15Respondent,inhisAnswer,16however,deniedpetitioners claimof cohabitationand said that theproperties were acquired out of his own personal fundswithoutanycontributionfrompetitioner.17

Duringthetrial,petitioneradmittedthatalthoughtheyweretogetherforalmost24hoursadayin1983until1991,respondentwould still go home to hiswife usually in theweehoursofthemorning.18Petitionerlikewiseclaimedthatthey acquired the said real estate properties from theincome of the company which she and respondentestablished.19

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11Records,pp.6164.12Id.,atp.63.13Rollo,p.32.14Records,pp.26.15Id.,atp.2.16Id.,atpp.2628.17Id.,atp.26.18TSN,BettyB.Lacbayan,October20,1999,pp.5254.19Id.,atpp.5758.

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Respondent, meanwhile, testified that the propertieswerepurchasedfromhispersonalfunds,salaries,dividends,allowancesandcommissions.20He countered that the saidproperties were registered in his name together withpetitionertoexcludethesamefromthepropertyregimeofrespondentandhis legalwife, and toprevent thepossibledissipation of the said properties since his legal wife wasthen a heavy gambler.21 Respondent added that he alsopurchased the said properties as investment, with theintention to sell them later on for the purchase orconstructionofanewbuilding.22

OnFebruary10,2000,thetrialcourtrenderedadecisiondismissingthecomplaintforlackofmerit.23Inresolvingtheissue on ownership, theRTC decided to give considerableweight to petitioners own admission that the propertieswereacquirednotfromherownpersonalfundsbutfromtheincomeof themanpowerservicescompanyoverwhichsheownsameasly3.33%share.24

Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to the CAassertingthatsheisthepro indivisoownerofonehalfofthepropertiesindispute.Petitionerarguedthatthetrialcourtsdecision subjected the certificates of title over the saidproperties to collateral attack contrary to law andjurisprudence.Peti

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20TSN,BayaniSamoy,Jr.,December10,1999,pp.2223and27.21Id.,atpp.2831.22Id.,atpp.2932.23 The dispositive portion of the February 10, 2000 RTC Decision

reads:WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,thepresentcomplaintishereby

DISMISSED for lackofmerit and thedefendant isherebyadjudgedasthe sole owner of thepropertieswhich are the subjectmatters of thiscase.Furthermore,theplaintiffisherebydirectedtopaythedefendanttheamountofP100,000.00asandforattorneysfeesandtopaythecostofthissuit.

SOORDERED.(CARollo,p.39.)24CARollo,pp.3739.

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tioneralsocontendedthat it is improper to threshout theissueonownershipinanactionforpartition.25

Unimpressedwithpetitioners arguments, theappellatecourt denied the appeal, explaining in the followingmanner:

Appellants harping on the indefeasibility of the certificates oftitle covering the subject realties is, to say the least, misplaced.Rather than the validity of said certificates which was nowheredealtwithintheappealeddecision,therecordshowsthatwhatthe

trial court determined therein was the ownership of the subjectrealtiesitselfanissuecorrelativetoandanecessaryadjunctoftheclaimofcoownershipuponwhichappellantanchoredhercauseofaction for partition. It bears emphasizing,moreover, that the ruleontheindefeasibilityofaTorrenstitleappliesonlytooriginalandnot to subsequent registration as that availed of by the parties inrespect to the properties in litigation. To our mind, theinapplicability of said principle to the case at bench is evenmoreunderscored by the admitted falsity of the registration of theselfsamerealtiesinthepartiesnameashusbandandwife.

The same dearth ofmerit permeates appellants imputation ofreversibleerroragainstthetrialcourtforsupposedlyfailingtomaketheproperdelineationbetweenanactionforpartitionandanactioninvolvingownership.Typicallybroughtbyapersonclaimingtobecoownerofaspecifiedpropertyagainstadefendantordefendantswhom the plaintiff recognizes to be coowners, an action forpartition may be seen to present simultaneously two principalissues, i.e., first, the issue of whether the plaintiff is indeed a coowner of the property sought to be partitioned and, secondassumingthattheplaintiffsuccessfullyhurdlesthefirsttheissueof how the property is to be divided between plaintiff anddefendant(s). Otherwise stated, the court must initially settle theissue of ownership for the simple reason that it cannot properlyissue an order to divide the property without first making adeterminationastotheexistenceofcoownership.Untilandunlesstheissueofownershipisdefinitelyresolved,itwouldbeprematuretoeffectapartitionoftheproperties.Thisispreciselywhatthetrialcourt did when it discounted the merit in appellants claim of coownership.26

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25Id.,atp.23.26Rollo,pp.3537.

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Hence, this petition premised on the followingarguments:

I.Ownershipcannotbepasseduponinapartitioncase.II.Thepartitionagreementdulysignedbyrespondentcontainsan

admissionagainstrespondentsinterestastotheexistenceofcoownershipbetweentheparties.

III.An action for partition cannot be defeated by the mereexpedience of repudiating coownership based on selfservingclaimsofexclusiveownershipofthepropertiesindispute.

IV.ATorrenstitle isthebestevidenceofownershipwhichcannotbe outweighed by respondents selfserving assertion to thecontrary.

V.The properties involvedwere acquired by both parties throughtheiractualjointcontributionofmoney,property,orindustry.27

Noticeably,thelastargumentisessentiallyaquestionoffact,whichwe feel has been squarely threshed out in the

decisionsofboththetrialandappellatecourts.Wedeemitwisenot todisturb the findingsof the lower courtson thesaidmatterabsentanyshowingthattheinstantcasefallsunder theexceptions to thegeneral rule thatquestionsoffact are beyond the ambit of the Courts jurisdiction inpetitions under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of CivilProcedure,asamended.Theissuesmaybesummarizedintoonlythree:

I.Whether an action for partition precludes a settlement on theissueofownership;

II.Whether the Torrens title over the disputed properties wascollaterallyattackedintheactionforpartition;and

III.Whetherrespondentisestoppedfromrepudiatingcoownershipoverthesubjectrealties.

Wefindthepetitionbereftofmerit.

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27Id.,atpp.1718,2122.

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Ourdisquisition inMunicipality of Bian v. Garcia28 isdefinitive.There,weexplainedthatthedeterminationastotheexistenceofcoownershipisnecessary intheresolutionofanactionforpartition.Thus:

Thefirst phase of a partition and/oraccountingsuit is takenup with the determination of whether or not a coownershipin fact exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwiselegallyproscribed)andmaybemadebyvoluntaryagreementofallthe parties interested in theproperty.This phasemay endwith adeclaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition eitherbecause a coownership does not exist, or partition is legallyprohibited.Itmayend,ontheotherhand,withanadjudgmentthata coownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in thepremises and an accounting of rents and profits received by thedefendantfromtherealestateinquestionisinorder.xxx

The secondphase commenceswhen it appears that thepartiesare unable to agree upon the partition directed by the court. Inthat event[,] partition shall be done for the parties by the [c]ourtwiththeassistanceofnotmorethanthree (3)commissioners.Thissecondstagemaywellalsodealwiththerenditionoftheaccountingitself and its approval by the [c]ourt after the parties have beenaccorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for therecoverybythepartyorpartiestheretoentitledof their justsharein the rents and profits of the real estate in question. x x x29(Emphasissupplied.)

While it istruethatthecomplaint involvedhereisoneforpartition,thesameispremisedontheexistenceornonexistence of coownership between the parties. Petitionerinsistssheisacoownerpro indivisoofthefiverealestatepropertiesbasedon the transfercertificatesof title (TCTs)

covering the subject properties. Respondent maintainsotherwise.Indubitably,therefore,untilandunlessthisissueofcoownershipisdefinitelyandfinallyresolved,itwouldbepre

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28G.R.No.69260,December22,1989,180SCRA576.29Id.,atpp.584585.

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mature to effect a partition of the disputed properties.30More importantly, the complaint will not even lie if theclaimant,orpetitionerinthiscase,doesnotevenhaveanyrightfulinterestoverthesubjectproperties.31

WouldaresolutionontheissueofownershipsubjecttheTorrenstitleissuedoverthedisputedrealtiestoacollateralattack?Mostdefinitely,itwouldnot.

There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of titlecannot be collaterally attacked,32 but that rule is notmaterial to the case at bar. What cannot be collaterallyattacked is the certificate of title andnot the title itself.33The certificate referred to is that document issued by theRegisterofDeedsknownastheTCT.Incontrast,thetitlereferred to by lawmeans ownership which is, more oftenthan not, represented by that document.34 Petitionerapparentlyconfusestitlewiththecertificateoftitle.Titleasa concept of ownership should not be confused with thecertificate of title as evidence of such ownership althoughbothareinterchangeablyused.35

Moreover, placingaparcel of landunder themantle oftheTorrens systemdoesnotmean that ownership thereofcan no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from acertificateoftitle,thelatteronlyservingasthebestproofofownership

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30SeeFabrica v. Court of Appeals,No.L47360,December15,1986,146SCRA250,255256.

31Catapusan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109262, November 21,1996,264SCRA534,538.

32Section 48 of PresidentialDecreeNo. 1529, otherwise known asthePropertyRegistrationDecree,statesinfull:

SEC.48.Certificate not subject to collateral attack.Acertificateoftitle shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered,modified,orcancelledexcept inadirectproceeding in accordancewithlaw.

33Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals,G.R.No.115402,July15,1998,292SCRA544,547.

34Id.35Id.,atp.548.

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over a piece of land. The certificate cannot always beconsidered as conclusive evidence of ownership.36 In fact,mere issuanceof thecertificateof title inthenameofanyperson does not foreclose the possibility that the realproperty may be under coownership with persons notnamedinthecertificate,orthattheregistrantmayonlybeatrustee,orthatotherpartiesmayhaveacquiredinterestover the property subsequent to the issuance of thecertificate of title.37 Needless to say, registration does notvest ownership over a property, but may be the bestevidencethereof.

Finally,astowhetherrespondentsassentto the initialpartition agreement serves as an admission againstinterest,inthattherespondentisdeemedtohaveadmittedthe existence of coownershipbetweenhimandpetitioner,weruleinthenegative.

Anadmission isanystatementof factmadebyapartyagainst his interest or unfavorable to the conclusion forwhichhecontendsor is inconsistentwiththefactsallegedbyhim.38AdmissionagainstinterestisgovernedbySection26ofRule130oftheRulesofCourt,whichprovides:

Sec.26.Admissions of a party.The act, declaration oromissionofapartyas toarelevant factmaybegiven inevidenceagainsthim.

Tobeadmissible,anadmissionmust(a)involvemattersoffact,andnotoflaw;(b)becategoricalanddefinite;(c)beknowinglyandvoluntarilymade;and(d)beadversetotheadmitters interests,otherwise itwouldbeselfservingandinadmissible.39

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36Id.,atpp.547548.37Id.,atp.548.38Regalado,REMEDIALLAWCOMPENDIUM,Vol.II.,2004edition,p.715,

citing31C.J.S.1022.39Id.

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AcarefulperusalofthecontentsofthesocalledPartitionAgreement indicates that the document involves matterswhichnecessitatepriorsettlementofquestionsoflaw,basicofwhichisadeterminationastowhetherthepartieshavethe right to freely divide among themselves the subjectproperties.Moreover,tofollowpetitionersargumentwouldbe to allow respondent not only to admit against his owninterestbutthatofhislegalspouseaswell,whomayalsobelawfully entitled coownership over the said properties.

Respondentisnotallowedbylawtowaivewhateversharehis lawful spouse may have on the disputed properties.Basic is the rule that rights may be waived, unless thewaiveriscontrarytolaw,publicorder,publicpolicy,morals,good customs orprejudicial to a thirdpersonwitha rightrecognizedbylaw.40

Curiously, petitioner herself admitted that she did notassenttothePartitionAgreementafterseeingtheneedtoamend the same to include othermatters. Petitioner doesnothaveanyrighttoinsistonthecontentsofanagreementsheintentionallyrefusedtosign.

As to the award of damages to respondent, we do notsubscribetothetrialcourtsviewthatrespondentisentitledto attorneys fees. Unlike the trial court, we do notcommiseratewithrespondentspredicament.ThetrialcourtruledthatrespondentwasforcedtolitigateandengagedtheservicesofhiscounseltodefendhisinterestastoentitlehimanawardofP100,000.00asattorneysfees.Butwenotethatinthefirstplace,itwasrespondenthimselfwhoimpressedupon petitioner that she has a right over the involvedproperties. Secondly, respondents act of representinghimselfandpetitionerashusbandandwifewasadeliberateattempt toskirt the lawandescapehis legalobligation tohis lawful wife. Respondent, therefore, has no one buthimselftoblametheconsequencesofhisdeceitfulactwhichresultedinthefilingofthecomplaintagainsthim.

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40Art.6,CIVILCODE.

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WHEREFORE,thepetitionisDENIED.TheSeptember14,2004DecisionoftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.CVNo.67596 is AFFIRMED withMODIFICATION. RespondentBayaniS.Samoy,Jr. isherebydeclared the soleownerofthedisputedproperties,withoutprejudicetoanyclaimhislegal wife may have filed or may file against him. Theaward of P100,000.00 as attorneys fees in respondentsfavorisDELETED.

Nocosts.SOORDERED.

CarpioMorales (Chairperson), Bersamin and Sereno,JJ., concur.

Brion, J.,SeeSeparateOpinion.

SEPARATEOPINION

BRION,J.:

Thiscasestemmedfromacomplaintforjudicialpartitionofseveralpropertiesbasedonthepetitionersassertionofcoownership.Asinothercivilcases,theburdenofproofrestsontheparty(thepetitionerinthiscase)who,asdetermined

by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts theaffirmativeintheissuepresented.1

Subject to my observations below, I find that thepetitioner failed to discharge by clear preponderantevidence her coownership of the subject properties towarrant their judicial partition.Iconfinemyselftothisconclusion, however, as the issue before us is solely onwhether a judicial partition should be made. Specificallyandasarticulatedinmyobservationsbelow,Icannot jointheponenciasotherrulings.

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1 Saguid v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003, 403SCRA678.

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Article 148 of the Family Code which applies to thepropertyrelationshipinacohabitationsituation,isclearonthe conditions it imposes.The first sentenceof thisarticlestates:

In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article,only the properties acquired by both of the parties through theiractual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall beowned by them in common in proportion to their respectivecontributions.[underscoringsupplied]

Thus,anypropertyacquiredduringthecohabitationcanonlybeconsideredcommonpropertyiftwo(2)conditionsaremet: first, there must be evidence showing that theproperties were acquired by the parties during theircohabitation;andsecond, theremustbe evidence that theproperties were acquired through the parties actual jointcontributionofmoney,property,orindustry.Statedplainly,coownershiponlyariseswhenthereisclearproofshowingthe acquisition of the property during the cohabitation oftheparties,andtheactualjointcontributionofthepartiestoacquirethesame.Thesetwo(2)conditionsmustconcur.

On the contribution aspect of these elements, merecohabitationunderArticle148oftheFamilyCode,withoutproofofcontribution,willnotresultinacoownership;proofofactualcontributionmustbeestablishedbyclearevidenceshowingthatthepartyeitherusedhisorherownmoneyorthatheorsheactuallycontributedhisorherownmoneytopurchase theproperty.2 Jurisprudenceholds that this factmay be proven by evidence in the form of bank accountstatements and bank transactions as well as testimonialevidence proving the financial capacity of the party topurchase the property or contribute to the purchase of aproperty.3

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2Villanueva v. Court of Appeals,G.R.No.143286,April14,2004,427

SCRA439.3Atienza v. De Castro, G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006, 508

SCRA593.

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In this case, the presumption of coownership over thesubject properties between the petitioner and therespondentdidnotarise.Whilethefirstconditionwasdulyprovenbyevidence,thesecondconditionwasnot.

The records sufficiently establish the first conditionshowingtheacquisitionofthesubjectpropertiesfrom1978to1991orduringthecohabitationofthepetitionerandtherespondent. The second condition is not similarlyestablished since no evidence was adduced showing thepetitioners actual contributions in the acquisition of thesubjectproperties.

Since thepetitionassertsanaffirmativeallegation (i.e.,her coownership of the subject properties to which shebases her action for judicial partition) she carries theburden of substantiating her claim. She failed in thisregard. The records show that she did not present anyevidence showing that the funds oraportionof the fundsusedtopurchasethesubjectpropertiescamefromherownearnings. On the contrary, the petitioner presentedcontradictory evidence when she admitted that the fundsused topurchase the subjectpropertiesdidnot come fromher own earnings but from the income of the manpowerbusiness which she managed. The Regional Trial Courtfound that she only owned 3.33% of share in thiscorporation.

Unless there isaclearshowingto thecontrary, incomefrom a business cannot automatically be considered aspersonalearnings,especiallyinthiscasewheretheincomethepetitionerreferredtoiscorporateincome.Thepetitionershould have presented evidence showing that the incomeshe referred to actually accrued to her in the form ofsalaries, bonuses, commissions and/or dividends from themanpower business. Otherwise, the rule regarding thecorporations distinct legal personality from its officers,stockholders and members applies.4 Unless otherwiseshown, the source of the earnings would be thecorporations,notthepetitioners.

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4 AMA Computer CollegeEast Rizal v. Ignacio, G.R. No. 178520,June23,2009,590SCRA633.

695


Iadditionallyobservethatexceptforone,allthesubjectpropertiesnametherespondentastheexclusiveregisteredowner.Althoughthemereissuanceofacertificateoftitleinthe name of any person does not foreclose the possibilitythat the realproperties covered therebymaybeunder coownership with the petitioner and viceversa, the factremains that the subject properties are registered in therespondents name. The rebuttable presumption is thatthesepropertiesbelongtotherespondentorto the conjugalpartnership of the respondent,inlinewithArticle116oftheFamilyCodeandArticle160oftheCivilCode.5

Insum,thepetitionerscasefor judicialpartitionofthesubjectpropertieshasnolegalbasisintheabsenceofaclearevidence of coownership proven under the circumstances.Consequently, we must deny the petition for lack ofmerit without.

As final observations, I disagree with the Majoritysconclusiondeclaringtherespondentasthesoleownerofallthepropertiessought tobepartitioned.Recordsshowthatthepetitionerisaregisteredcoownerofoneofthefive(5)propertiescitedinthiscase,i.e.,therealestateunderTCTNo. 23301 registered in the name of Spouses Bayani S.Samoy andBettyLacbayan.By the tenor of its decision,the Majority effectively (and unnecessarily) introduced acloudoverthepetitionersinterestsinthiscommonlyownedproperty. I note, too, that the complaint underlying thispetition is an action for partition; the adjudication of thiscaseshouldnecessarilybelimitedtoresolvingtheproprietyof the partition sought. Notably, the Majority itselfrecognizes that registration in ones name is withoutprejudicetoanactionseekingtoestablishcoownership.

Inlightoftheundisputedjointownershipofthepropertycommonlyregisteredunderthepartiesnames,thisDecisionshouldbewithout prejudicetoanactionforpartitionto

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5Atienza v. De Castro, supranote3,atp.603.

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divideupthispropertyaremedywecannotnowprovideinthe absence of any factual basis on how the partiescontributed in acquiring this property. Alternatively, theactualpartitionofthiscommonlyownedpropertyshouldberemanded to the trial court for determination of howpartitionshouldbemade.

Thephrase,without prejudice to any claim his legal wifemay have filed or may file against himinthelastpartofthedispositiveportionoftheDecision,issimilarlyobjectionable.Forone,noissueexistsinthiscasebetweenthelegitimatespouses regarding the nature of the properties theycommonly or individually hold. Additionally, the phrasecreatestheimpressionthattheCourtisgivinglegaladvicetothewifeoftherespondentonwhatcourseofactiontotake

against her husband. This statement is beyondwhat thisCourt shouldproperlystate in itsDecisiongiven the factsandissuesposed,andisplainlyuncalledfor.

Subjecttotheseobservations,IconcurwiththeopinionoftheMajority.

Petition denied, judgment affirmed with modification.

Notes.Where paymentwas given to a person on themistakenbeliefthatitwasacoowner,thensuchpersonhasan obligation to return the same. (Valley Land Resources,Inc. vs. Valley Golf Club, Inc.,369SCRA17[2001])

Itisafundamentalprincipleinlandregistrationthatacertificateoftitleservesasevidenceofanindefeasibleandincontrovertibletitletothepropertyinfavorofthepersonwhosenameappearstherein.(Vda. de Retuerto vs. Barz,372SCRA712[2001])

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Lacbayan vs. Samoy