1. RUNAWAY shop = ULP. An industrial plant moved by its owners from one location to another to escape union labor regulations or state laws.Strike Area the 1establishment, 2warehouses, 3depots, 4plants, 5offices, 6including the sites or premises used as runaway shops of the employer, 7as well as the immediate vicinity actually used by picketing strikers in moving to and fro before all points of entrance to and exit from said establishment2. ZAMBOANGA WOOD PRODUCTS, INC., petitioner, vs. THE NLRC, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR, DIONISIO ESTIOCA and THESTRIKERS, respondents.G.R. No. L-82088; October 13, 1989;

Facts: Dionisio Estioca, supervisor of the company and president of the union, NFL posted anannouncement on the bulletin board of the employees' coffee shop criticizing the Company for having earmarked the sum of P250,000 for the inter-department athletic tournament (which hecalled "a farce and baloony") to be held that year, instead of using the money to pay theemployees' claims for living allowance. He urged the employees to boycott the sports event.Subsequently he was terminated by the company for loss of trust and confidence in him.Thereafter, the union after filing a notice of strike with the Regional Director of the MOLE inZamboanga City stuck. Meanwhile the company asked the MOLE for arbitration. Estioca filed acomplaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC. The Minister of Labor certified the labor disputeto the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. In obedience to the Secretary's order, the strikers triedto return to work on August 19, 1982, but were rebuffed by the Company. Backtracking from itsearlier request for compulsory arbitration, the Company filed a motion for reconsideration of theMinister's order on the pretext that there was nothing more to arbitrate because the strikers had been dismissed. When its MR was denied, the Company brought the matter up to SC which ruledthat the company must respect the right of the eighty-one petitioners to resume their respective positions as of the time the strike was called. Pursuant thereto the NLRC on September 27, 1988,ordered the Company to readmit the striking employees including those who had been dismissed.The Company alleged that the positions of the dismissed strikers had been filled up.In the meantime, Estioca's complaint for illegal dismissal had also reached the SC.TheSC consolidated the cases and it required the NLRC to hold a formal hearing to determine thelegality of the strike and the dismissal of Estioca and other incidental questions. Complying withthat directive, the NLRC held hearings where evidence were presented by both sides. Later, NLRC reiterated its earlier decision.

Issue: Whether or not the company is guilty of unfair labor practice.

Held:Yes. Celso Abastillas and Lilio Navarro, Comptroller and Production Manager,respectively called the employees on separate occasions sometime in April 1982 and asked themto withdraw their membership from the union. The company also dismissed Dionisio Estioca,which is too harsh in view of Estioca's subsequent apology for his action in posting a bellicoseannouncement critical of the Company and based on false or erroneous information.Union busting, or interference with the formation of a union, constitutes an unfair labor practice (Art 248, subpar. 4, Labor Code), hence a valid ground for the declaration of a strike

REPUBLIC FLOUR MILLS WORKERS ASSOCIATION and PAFLU, petitioners,

vs.

THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANDRES REYES and AIA FEED MILLS, INC., respondents.

This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, filed by petitioners Republic Flour Mills Workers Association and PAFLU to set aside an order, dated June 10, 1963, issued by the Honorable Judge Andres Reyes of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. 7710 of said court, entitled AIA Feed Mills, Inc. vs. Republic Flour Mills Laborers Association and PAFLU, providing for a writ of preliminary injunction "ordering and commanding the defendants to desist from preventing the petitioner's employees from entering its premises."1

Before the lower court, herein respondent AIA Feed Mills, Inc. filed a petition for injunction alleging, among others, that on June 1, 1963 the members of the herein petitioner unions declared a strike against their employer, the Republic Flour Mills, Inc., and picket lines were formed around the premises of the company preventing the peaceful passing of other persons not connected with said employer; that herein respondent is a lessee occupying a parcel of land owned by the Republic Flour Mills, Inc., it being a completely different corporation from the Republic Flour Mills, Inc. with a different set of officers and employees, and there was no employer-employee relation between the striking employees and herein respondent; and that due to the picket lines formed by the striking unions the employees of herein respondent could not enter and leave its premises "thereby causing the same to stop its operation which constitute an invasion of its property rights and therefore causing irreparable and substantial damages."2

The herein petitioners, Republic Flour Mills Workers Association and PAFLU, as respondent in the court below, filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the injunction prayed for by herein respondent is a "labor injunction" and because the petition for injunction failed to allege the jurisdictional requisites provided for in Section 9 (b) of Republic Act 875 it is fatally defective and, therefore, should be dismissed.

The respondent Judge, after hearing, found that the herein respondent AIA Feed Mills, Inc. is a distinct and separate entity from the Republic Flour Mills, Inc., that it has a distinct personnel of its own, that it was engaged in a different business, and that herein petitioner unions' picketing had no connection whatsoever with herein respondent. Based on said findings, the respondent Judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction which is now being questioned in the proceedings before this Court.

In the petition for certiorari before this Court, petitioners contend that the respondent AIA Feed Mills, Inc. is a subsidiary corporation of Republic Flour Mills, Inc., that it is located at the very site and compound of the latter, the entrance to, and the walls of, the compound being common to both entities; that the operations of the former and of the latter were intermingled and complementary, including an interchange of employees; thus the picketing of one necessarily is extended to both; that the petition filed before the lower court was fatally defective because it failed to allege the strict jurisdictional requirements of Section 9(b) of Republic Act 875; that the respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining and granting the petition of the respondent AIA Feed Mills, Inc. in spite of the failure of said respondent to comply with the strict procedure outlined in Section 9(b) of Republic Act 875, and in granting the injunction before the hearing of the main issue; that as a result of the issuance of the injunction in question even the picketing against the Republic Flour Mills is for practical purposes enjoined.

In its answer to the petition for certiorari, respondent AIA Feed Mills, Inc. alleges that it is a business entity distinct and separate from the Republic Flour Mills, Inc., that there is no employer-employee relation between it and the striking members of the petitioner labor unions and no labor dispute exist between it and the striking and picketing employees; that the picketing was not a peaceful one because the picketing members of petitioners unions were employing violence against the employees of herein respondent; and that the respondent Judge had jurisdiction to issue the writ of preliminary injunction in question because the injunction sought is one that is provided for in Rule 60 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court) and not the one provided for in Section 9, paragraph (b), of Republic Act 875.

This Court did not issue the preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition for certiorari. This case was submitted by the parties without oral argument and without memorandum.

After a careful study of the pleadings in the present case, We find that the grounds relied upon in the petition for certiorari have no merit.

The main question to be resolved in the present proceedings is whether or not the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal had jurisdiction to issue the writ of preliminary injunction in question, or whether or not it had acted with abuse of discretion in issuing said injunction.

We agree with the findings of the lower court that respondent AIA Feed Mills, Inc. is a distinct and separate entity from, the Republic Flour Mills, Inc., with distinct personality of its own from the latter corporation, including the business in which it is engaged, and the picketing by the petitioner unions has no connection whatsoever with respondent AIA Feed Mills, Inc. We find that there is no labor dispute between the petitioners and respondent AIA Feed Mills, Inc., and neither is there an employer-employee relation between them. We declare, therefore, that the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the respondent Judge is not a labor injunction that is provided for in Section 9, paragraph (d) of Republic Act 875. The court may issue an injunction, whether temporary or permanent, as provided in said section of Republic Act 875, only in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute. As we have stated, we find that no labor dispute existed between the petitioner unions and the respondent AIA Feed Mills, Inc. The preliminary injunction issued by the respondent Judge was, therefore, one that was within its jurisdiction to issue pursuant to the provisions of Rule 60 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court.) In the case of Associated Watchmen and Security Union (PTOW), et al. vs. United States Lines, et al., 101 Phil. 896, 901, this Court made the following pronouncement:

. . . If a labor dispute exists then the provisions of the Magna Charta of Labor (R.A. No. 875) should be strictly followed, as ruled by Us in various decisions (PAFLU, et al. vs. Tan, et al., L-9115, prom. August 31, 1956; PAFLU, et al. vs. Barot, et al., L-9281, prom. Sept. 28, 1956); and on the other hand, if no labor dispute exists then the court may issue an ordinary injunction in accordance with the Rules of Court.

Moreover, the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the respondent Judge did not in any way curtail the right of petitioner unions to picket, because the writ simply and clearly ordered and commanded the petitioner unions "to desist from preventing petitioner's (herein respondent AIA Feed Mills, Inc.) employees from entering its premises." The writ did not prevent petitioner unions from picketing against their employer, the Republic Flour Mills, Inc. The record shows that the respondent Judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction after a hearing. The respondent Judge, therefore, had not acted in a manner that was in violation of the law or with grave abuse of discretion when he issued the writ of preliminary injunction in question.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in the present case is denied, with costs against the petitioners.

Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J. and Reyes, J.B.L., J., took no part.

3. innocent bystander- While peaceful picketing is entitled to protection as an exercise of free speech, we believe the courts are not without power to confine or localize the sphere of communication or the demonstration to the parties to the labor dispute, including those with related interest, and to insulate establishments or persons with no industrial connection or having interest totally foreign to the context of the dispute. Thus the right may be regulated at the instance of third parties or innocent bystanders if it appears that the inevitable result of its exercise is to create an impression that a labor dispute with which they have no connection or interest exists between them and the picketing union or constitute an invasion of their rightsLAPANDAY WORKERS UNION, et. al vs. NLRC G.R. Nos. 95494-97 September 7, 1995 PUNO, J.

FACTS:

On August 1, 1988, private respondents contracted Philippine Eagle Protectors and Security Agency, Inc., to provide security services for their business premises located in Lapanday, Bandug, Callawa, Davao City, and Guising, Davao Del Sur. Their contract also called for the protection of the lives and limbs of private respondents' officers, employees and guests within company premises. The Union branded the security guards posted within the company premises as private respondents' "goons" and "special forces." It also accused the guards of intimidating and harassing their members. Private respondents conducted seminars on Human Development and Industrial Relations (HDIR), however the Union claimed that the module on the Philippine political spectrum lumped the ANGLO (Alliance of Nationalist and Genuine Labor Organization), with other outlawed labor organizations such as the National Democratic Front or other leftist groups. These issues between the company and the union were discussed during a labor-management meeting, however issues were not resolve. The union filed on August 25, 1988, a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). It accused the company of unfair labor practices consisting of coercion of employees, intimidation of union members and union-busting.

On October 3, 1988, a strike vote was conducted among the members of the Union and those in favor of the strike won overwhelming support from the workers. The result of the strike vote was then submitted to the NCMB on October 10, 1988. Two days later, or on October 12, 1988, the Union struck.

Private respondents filed separate charges against the Union and its members for illegal strike, unfair labor practice and damages, with prayer for injunction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the strike staged by the union is illegal.

HELD:

Yes. It was ruled that strike conducted by the union is plainly illegal for non compliance of the seven (7) day waiting period provided for by paragraph (f), Ar ticle 263 of the Labor Code, A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in meetings or referenda called for that purpose. A decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a majority of the board of directors of the corporation or association or of the partners in a partnership, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose. The decision shall be valid for the duration of the dispute based on substantially the same grounds considered when the strike or lockout vote was taken. The Ministry may, at its own initiative or upon the request of any affected party, supervise the conduct of secret balloting. In every case, the union or the employer shall furnish the Ministry the results of the voting at least seven (7) days before the intended strike or lockout subject to the cooling-off period herein provided.