G.R. No. L-21465March 31, 1966INDUSTRIAL-COMMERCIAL-AGRICULTURAL WORKERS' ORGANIZATION (ICAWO), petitioner-appellant, vs.COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE PILAR and/or ANTONIO BELZARENA as Manager, CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE PILAR ALLIED WORKERS ASSOCIATION (CAPAWA), respondents-appellees.FACTS: ICAWO is an independent organization of workers who who works with the CentralAzucarera De Pilar (Azucarera) some of them have been working with the latter since thepre-war years. On the other hand CAPAWA is another workers association which isconsidered to be a company union of the Azucarera with which the latter has a collectivebargaining agreement, prioritizing members of CAPAWA when hiring unskilled workers.The ICAWO staged a strike against the Azucarera asking for a fair treatment between theworkers belonging to the two labor unions. The matter was settled through an amicablesettlement with the Azucarera promising not to discriminate the members of the ICAWOwhether a striker or not. During the opening of the milling season in 1956, 101 seasonalemployees who are members of the ICAWO was denied re-admission to work by theAzucarera on the ground that the latter is precluded by its collective bargainingagreement with CAPAWA containing a closed-shop clause. The ICAWO fled an unfairlabor practice charge against the Azucarera before the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR)who subsequently ordered the reinstatement of the said workers. However, on themotion for reconsideration, The CIR reversed its previous order relying on the contentionof the Azucarera that the members of the ICAWO could not be re-admitted withoutviolating their collective bargaining agreement with CAPAWA, stating that the membersof the latter must be preferred when hiring new workers. Hence, this appeal.ISSUE: Is the employment of seasonal workers severed when they are allowed to seekother employment during the of-season when they dont work for the company hence,considering them as new workers when the operation of the company resumes?RULING:No, their employment is merely suspended temporarily and the workers aredeemed on-leave without pay. Even if they were allowed to seek employment during thetemporary lay-of, their employment subsist and they are not terminated from workwhen the season ends, hence, they are not to be considered as new employee when theoperation of the company resumes at the start of the milling season. Seeking otheremployment during of-season is natural because the laborers are not being paidtherefore they must fnd means to support their familys living. The seasonal stoppage ofwork does not, therefore, negate the reasonable expectation of the laborers to besubsequently allowed to resume work unless there be justifable reasons for actingotherwise. In view thereof, the Court hereby sets aside the resolution of the CIR anddirects the latter to reinstate the 101 seasonal workers to their former positions in theAzucarera. Motion for reconsideration is denied, and case is remanded to the CIR for thedetermination of backwages, if any. G.R. No. L-30592 February 25, 1982PHILIPPINE FISHING BOAT OFFICERS AND ENGINEERS UNION, SAMAHAN NG MANGDARAGAT SA FILIPINAS, FRANCISCO VISAYAS AND AMBROCIO BERGADO, petitioners, vs.COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, SAN DIEGO FISHERY ENTERPRISES, INC., BARTOLOMEA. SAN DIEGO AND ANATOLIO LLIDO, respondents.FACTS:Francisco Visaya (Visaya) and Ambrosio Bergado (Bergado) were president and treasurer,respectively, of Philippine Fishing Boat Ofcers and Engineers Union (Ofcers Union) composedof ofcers and engineers while Samahan ng Mangdaragat sa Filipinas (Samahan) is anotherregistered union composed of crew members. Both unions are in the employ of San DiegoFishery Enterprises (Company) where Bartolome A. San Diego (San Diego) is a stockholder andAnatolio Llido is an employee. Petitioners are seasonal employees of the company who seize towork with the latter when the latters boats are on dry dock and they seek other employmentduring such time. The petitioners fled before the CIR a complaint for unfair labor practices bythe respondents when the latter failed to act on the demand letters, sent by the petitioners,within the reglamentary period provided by Sec. 14 of R.A. 875 and for the illegal termination ofthe individual petitioners because of the union activities and their refusal to resign from thepetitioner unions when asked by San Diego to resign and join the union being established by thelatter. The CIR dismissed the case of the petitioners giving merit to the contention of therespondents that the unions were not legitimate representative groups entitled to a collectivebargaining agreement with the company and that Visaya and Bergado were not employees of thecompany at the time of their dismissal hence were not illegally terminated from work.ISSUE:Is employment is severed when the workers stop to work for the company and seek otheremployment when the operation of the company temporarily seizes during lean season or whencompany machineries and equipment are under maintenance?RULING:No, the contention of the respondents that at the moment the crew members disembark,they are no longer considered employees of the company, is not correct. Likewise, the ruling ofthe CIR which states that since the record indicated that individual petitioners were not onboard any of the company's fshing vessels at the time of their dismissal, there existed noemployer-employee relationship between the parties and therefore respondents could not be heldliable for unfair labor practices, is equally erroneous. It is settled that tenure of employment isnot considered as the test of employment. All that is required is hiring. For it not the continuityof employment that renders the employer responsible, but whether the work of the laborer ispart of the regular business or occupation of the employer. In the case at bar, the employer-employee relationship is merely suspended during the time the vessels are dry docked orundergoing repairs or being loaded with the necessary provisions for the next fshing trip. Allthese activities form part of the regular operation of the company's fshing business. Hence, theindividual petitioners are employees of the company and the fact that on the date of theindividuals petitioners dismissal, they were not on board any of the company's fshing vesselsdoes not exonerate respondents from the charge of unjust dismissal. In view of the foregoingthereof, the decision of the CIR is set aside and the respondent company is ordered to pay theindividual petitioners their entitled backwages.G.R. No. L-64313January 17, 1985NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.BENJAMIN JUCO AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.FACTS:Benjamin Juco (Juco) was a project engineer of the National Housing Corporation(NHC). Juco was dismissed from work by NHC for having been implicated on a crime oftheft and malversation of public funds involving the iron scraps owned by thecorporation and appropriating the proceeds to his own benefts. Juco fled a complaintfor illegal dismissal against NHC with the Department of Labor. The Labor Arbiter,however, dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, the NLRC set aside thedecision of the Labor Arbiter and remanding it back to the latter for the settlement of theillegal dismissal case. Its contention was that the case of Fernandez vs. Cedro whichruled that NHC is a government owned and controlled corporation does not preclude itfrom taking a contrary stand if by doing so the ends of justice could be better served.Hence, this appeal.ISSUE:Can the Labor Code be applied to the illegal dismissal of employees of government owned and controlled corporations such as the National Housing Corporation? RULIUNG:No, the Code does not apply to employees of government owned and controlledcorporation like the National Housing Corporation. What governs them are laws andregulations governing civil service. Section 1, Article XII-B of the Constitution providesthat the Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentalityof the Government, including every government-owned or controlled corporation, andas ruled on previous cases NHC is deemed a government owned and controlledcorporation. The Art. 227 of the Labor Code itself provides that the terms andconditions of employment of all government employees, including employees ofgovernment-owned and controlled corporations shall be governed by the Civil ServiceLaw, rules and regulations. Clearly, The NHC comes under the jurisdiction of the CivilService Commission, not the Ministry of Labor and Employment nor its subordinate.Wherefore, the petition of NHC is granted, the decision of the NLRC is set aside and thedecision of the Labor Arbiter dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction is reinstated.G.R. No. L-69870 November 29, 1988NATIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION (NASECO) AND ARTURO L. PEREZ, petitioners, vs.THE HONORABLE THIRD DIVISION, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MINISTRY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, MANILA AND EUGENIA C. CREDO, respondents.G.R. No. 70295 November 29, 1988EUGENIA C. CREDO, petitioner, vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, NATIONAL SERVICES CORPORATION AND ARTURO L. PEREZ, respondents.FACTS: Eugenia Credo was an employee of the National Service Corporation (NASECO). She wascharged with an administrative case for non-compliance with a company memo issued by hersuperior and for her disrespect to the latter in the presence of other co-workers. NASECOsCommittee on Personnel Afairs recommended her termination from work with forfeiture ofbenefts and was later given a notice of termination. Hence Credo fled a complaint for illegaldismissal. The Labor Arbiter dismissed Credos complaint and directed NASECO to pay herseparation pay. Both appealed to the NLRC to which rendered a decision ordering NASECO toreinstate Credo and pay her back wages but not granting Credos claim for attorneys fee, moraland exemplary damages. Hence, this appeal. NASECO contends that, as a governmentcorporation by virtue of its being a subsidiary of the National Investment and DevelopmentCorporation , a subsidiary wholly owned by the Philippine National Bank, which in turn is agovernment owned corporation), the terms and conditions of employment of its employees aregoverned by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.ISSUE: Does the Labor Code Apply to an illegal dismissal case between a government ownedand/or controlled corporation and its employee?HELD: Yes, the Labor Code applies to employees of government owned and/or controlledcorporation, provided that such corporation is without original charter such as NASECO in thecase at bar. Therefore, the provisions of the Labor Code applies in this case and the NLRC hasthe jurisdiction to decide over the case.Unlike in the case of NCH vs. NLRC, which wasgoverned by the 1973 Constitution, it is the 1987 constitution that governs the instant case. The1987 Constitution provides that The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlledcorporations with original charter, hence, by clear implication, the Civil Service does notinclude government-owned or controlled corporations which are organized as subsidiaries ofgovernment-owned or controlled corporations under the general corporation law.G.R. No. L-41182-3April 16, 1988DR. CARLOS L. SEVILLA and LINA O. SEVILLA, petitioners-appellants, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, TOURIST WORLD SERVICE, INC., ELISEO S.CANILAO, and SEGUNDINA NOGUERA, respondents-appellees.FACTS:A contract was entered into by and between Segundina Noguera Noguera and TouristWorld Service (TWS), represented by Eliseo Canilao (Canilao), wherein TWS leased the premisesbelonging to Noguera as branch ofce of TWS, with Lina Sevilla (Sevilla) holdind herselfsolidarily liable with TWS in the payment of rent. When the branch ofce was opened, it was runby appellant Sevilla with the proceeds payable to TWS by any airline for any fare brought in onthe eforts of Mrs. Sevilla, 4% was to go to Sevilla and 3% was to be withheld by the TWS. Later,TWS was informed that Sevilla was connected with rival frm, and since the branch ofce waslosing, TWS considered closing down its ofce. Subsequently, the contract with appellee for theuse of the branch ofce premises was terminated and while the efectivity thereof was January31, 1962, the appellees no longer used it. Because of this, Canilao, the secretary of TWS, wentover to the branch ofce, and fnding the premises locked, he padlocked the premises, allegedlyto protect the interest of TWS.When neither appellant Sevilla nor any of his employees couldenter, a complaint was fled by the appellants against the appellees. TWS insisted that Sevillawas a mere employee, being the branch manager of its branch ofce and that she had no righton the lease executed with the private respondent, Noguera.ISSUE:Did there exist an employer-employee relationship between TWS and Sevilla so as to makethe Labor Code applicable in the case and exempt TWS from the damages claimed by Sevilla?HELD:No, there was no employer-employee relationship between TWS and Sevilla. The recordsshow that petitioner, Sevilla, was not subject to control by the private respondent TWS. First,under the contract of lease, she had bound herself in solidum as and for rental payments, anarrangement that would belie claims of a master-servant relationship. That does not make heran employee of TWS, since a true employee cannot be made to part with his own money inpursuance of his employers business, or otherwise, assume any liability thereof. Second, whenthe branch ofce was opened, the same was run by the Sevilla with the proceeds payable to TWSby any airline for any fare brought in on the efort of Sevilla. Thus, it cannot be said that Sevillawas under the control of TWS. Sevilla in pursuing the business, relied on her own capabilities. Itis further admitted that Sevilla was not in the companys payroll. For her eforts, she retained4% incommissions from airline bookings, the remaining 3% going to TWS. Unlike an employee,who earns a fxed salary, she earned compensation in fuctuating amount depending on herbooking successes. The fact that Sevilla had been designated branch manager does not makeher a TWS employee. It appears that Sevilla is a bona fde travel agent herself, and she acquiredan interest in the business entrusted to her. She also had assumed personal obligation for theoperation thereof, holding herself solidary liable for the payment of rentals. In view thereof, itcould be concluded that the relationship that existed between TWS and Sevilla was that of aprincipal-agent relationship. Wherefore, for its unwarranted revocation of the contract of agency,TWS should pay Seivilla for damages; and Canilao as a joint tortfeasor, is also liable in a solidarycapacity, in indemnifying the petitioner.