Labor Shiz

7/29/2019 Labor Shiz

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PHILIPPINE AIRLINES vs LIGAN Case Digest

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. v. ENRIQUE LIGAN, et al.

G.R. No. 146408, 30 April 2009

FACTS: Enrique Ligan, et al. and the other respondents wereemployees of Synergy Services Corporation (Synergy) which provides

manpower for Philippine Airlines. It was later discovered that Synergyis a labor-only contractor. They were dismissed by Philippine Airlineson several grounds, one of which is in the guise of retrenchment. Thelegality of the dismissal of the Ligan, et al. has been pending beforethe Court of Appeals.

Philippine Airlines paid the wages of the Ligan, et al. but contested theemployment status of Roque Pilapil for he is already terminated andBenedicto Auxtero who signed the Release and Quitclaim andWaiver". Philippine Airlines therefore pleads to the court to reconsider

its first Decision on the payment of wages and benefits.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court shall overrule its first

decision regarding the grant of wages and benefits to Ligan, et al.

HELD: In light of these recent manifestations-informations of theparties, the Court finds that a modification of the Decision is in order,the claims with respect to Pilapil and Auxtero having been deemedextinguished even before the promulgation of the Decision. ThatPilapil was a regular employee yields to the final finding of a valid

dismissal in the supervening case involving his own misconduct, whileAuxteros attempt at forum-shopping should not be countenanced.

IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS, the Court finds no sufficient reason todeviate from its Decision, but proceeds, nonetheless, to clarify a few

points. While this Courts Decision ruled on the regular status ofLigan, et al., it must be deemed to be without prejudice to theresolution of the issue of illegal dismissal in the proper case.

Notably, subject of the Decision was Ligan, et al.s complaints for

regularization and under-/non-payment of benefits. The Court did notand could not take cognizance of the validity of the eventual dismissal

of Ligan, et al. because the matter of just or authorized cause is beyondthe issues of the case. That is why the Court did not orderreinstatement for such relief presupposes a finding of illegal dismissalin the proper case which, as the parties now manifest, pends before theappellate court.

All told, the pending illegal dismissal case in CA-G.R. SP No. 00922

may now take its course. The Courts finding that Ligan, et al. areregular employees of PAL neither frustrates nor preempts the appellatecourts proceedings in resolving the issue of retrenchment as anauthorized cause for termination. If an authorized cause for dismissalis later found to exist, PAL would still have to pay Ligan, et al. theircorresponding benefits and salary differential up to June 30, 1998.Otherwise, if there is a finding of illegal dismissal, an order forreinstatement with full backwages does not conflict with the Courtsdeclaration of the regular employee status of Ligan, et al.


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Eparwa v. Liceo de CagayanD E C I S I O N

CARPIO,J.:

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari[1] of the Decision[2] dated 20April 2001 and the Resolution dated 21 September 2001 of the Courtof Appeals (appellate court) in CA-G.R. SP No. 59120, Liceo deCagayan University v. The Hon. National Labor RelationsCommission, Fifth Division, Eparwa Security and Janitorial Services,

Inc., et al. The appellate court reinstated the 18 August 1999decision[3] of the Labor Arbiter and remanded the case to theRegional Arbitration Board, Branch No. 10 of Cagayan de Oro City tocompute what is due to Liceo de Cagayan University (LDCU) fromEparwa Security and Janitorial Services, Inc. (Eparwa).

The Facts

On 1 December 1997, Eparwa and LDCU, through theirrepresentatives, entered into a Contract for Security Services. Thepertinent portion of the contract provides that:

5. For and in consideration of this security,protective and safety services, [LDCU] agrees topay [Eparwa] FIVE THOUSAND PESOS ONLY

(P5,000.00), Philippine Currency per guard amonth payable within fifteen (15) days after[Eparwa] presents its service invoice. [Eparwa]shall furnish [LDCU] a monthly copy of SSScontribution of guards and monthly payroll of each

guard assigned at [LDCUs] premises on amonthly basis[.][4]

Eparwa allocated the contracted amount of P5,000 per security guardper month in the following manner:

Basic Pay (P104.50 x 391.5/12) P3,409.31

Night Diff. Pay13

t mo. Pay5 day incentive leaveUniform allowanceEmployers SSS, Medicare, ECC contributionAgency shareVAT

CONTRACT RATE(rounded off to P5,000.00)[5]

On 21 December 1998, 11 security guards (security guards)whom Eparwa assigned to LDCU from 1 December 1997 to 30November 1998 filed a complaint before the National Labor RelationsCommissions (NLRC) Regional Arbitration Branch No. 10 inCagayan de Oro City. Docketed as NLRC-RABX Case No. 10-01-

00102-99, the complaint was filed against both Eparwa and LDCU forunderpayment of salary, legal holiday pay, 13th month pay, rest day,service incentive leave, night shift differential, overtime pay, and

payment for attorneys fees.

LDCU made a cross-claim and prayed that Eparwa shouldreimburse LDCU for any payment to the security guards.

The Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

In its decision dated 18 August 1999, the Labor Arbiter foundthat the security guards are entitled to wage differentials and premiumfor holiday and rest day work. The Labor Arbiter held Eparwa andLDCU solidarily liable pursuant to Article 109 of the Labor

Code. The dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiters decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered[:]

1. Ordering respondents [LDCU] and

[Eparwa] solidarily liable to pay [thesecurity guards] for underpayment,


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holiday and rest day, as follows:

N a m e Amount1. Casiero , Jovencio P 46,819.952. Villarino , Leonardo 46,819.953. Lumbab , Adriano 46,819.954. Caballero , Gregorio, Jr. 46,819.95

5. Cajilla , Delfin, Jr. 37,918.956. Paduanga , Arnold 20,321.107. Dungog , Achimedes 46,819.958. Magallanes , Eduardo 46,819.959. Dungog , Luigi 46,819.9510. Dungog , Telford 46,819.9511. Bahian , Wilfredo 30,741.30

P 463,540.95

2. Denying the claim of unpaid 13thmonth pay, service incentive leave andnight shift premium pay for lack of

merit;

3. Ordering respondent [Eparwa] toreimburse respondent [LDCU] forwhatever amount the latter may berequired to pay [the security guards];

4. Ordering respondent [Eparwa] to payrespondent [LDCU] P20,000.00 andP5,000.00 each of the [security guards],moral and exemplary damages;

5. Ordering [Eparwa] to pay 10% ofattorneys fee[s][;]

6. The rest of the claims are denied forlack of merit.

So Ordered.[6]

LDCU filed an appeal before the NLRC. LDCU agreed with theLabor Arbiters decision on the security guards entitlement to salarydifferential but challenged the propriety of the amount of theaward. LDCU alleged that security guards not similarly situated weregranted uniform monetary awards and that the decision did not include

the basis of the computation of the amount of the award.

Eparwa also filed an appeal before the NLRC. For its part,Eparwa questioned its liability for the security guards claims and theawarded cross-claim amounts.

The Ruling of the NLRC

The Fifth Division of the NLRC resolved Eparwa and LDCUs

separate appeals in its Resolution[7] dated 19 January 2000. TheNLRC found that the security guards are entitled to wage differentialsand premium for holiday and rest day work. Although the NLRC heldEparwa and LDCU solidarily liable for the wage differentials andpremium for holiday and rest day work, the NLRC did not requireEparwa to reimburse LDCU for its payments to the securityguards. The NLRC also ordered the recomputation of the monetary

awards according to the dates actually worked by each securityguard. The dispositive portion of the NLRC Resolution reads thus:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision isAFFIRMED, subject to the modification that the

portions thereof directing respondent EPARWASecurity Agency and Janitorial Services, Inc. toreimburse respondent Liceo de CagayanUniversity for whatever amount the latter mayhave paid complainants and to pay respondent

Liceo de Cagayan University the sum [sic] [of]P20,000.00 and P5,000.00, representing moral and


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exemplary damages, respectively, of eachcomplainants [sic], are deleted for lack of legalbasis. Further the monetary awards for wagedifferential and premiums for holiday and rest dayworks shall be recomputed by the RegionalArbitration Branch of origin at the execution stageof the proceedings.

Co[n]formably, the award of Attorneysfee[s] is equivalent to ten (10%) percent of theaggregate monetary award as finally adjusted.

SO ORDERED.[8]

Eparwa and LDCU again filed separate motions for partialreconsideration of the 19 January 2000 NLRC Resolution. LDCUquestioned the NLRCs deletion of LDCUs entitlement toreimbursement by Eparwa. Eparwa, on the other hand, prayed thatLDCU be made to reimburse Eparwa for whatever amount it may pay

to the security guards.In its Resolution dated 14 March 2000, the NLRC declared that

although Eparwa and LDCU are solidarily liable to the security guards

for the monetary award, LDCU alone is ultimately liable. The NLRCresolved the issue thus:

WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution,dated 19 January 2000, is MODIFIED in thatrespondent Liceo de Cagayan University (LICEO)is ordered to reimburse respondent Eparwa

Security and Janitorial Services, Inc. (EPARWA)for whatever amount the latter may have paid tocomplainants arising from this case.

SO ORDERED.[9]

LDCU filed a petition for certiorari[10] before the appellatecourt assailing the NLRCs decision. LDCU took issue with theNLRCs order that LDCU should reimburse Eparwa. LDCU statedthat this would free Eparwa from any liability for payment of thesecurity guards money claims.

The Ruling of the Appellate Court

In its Decision promulgated on 20 April 2001, the appellatecourt granted LDCUs petition and reinstated the Labor Arbitersdecision. The appellate court also allowed LDCU to claimreimbursement from Eparwa. The appellate courts decision readsthus:

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, thepetition is hereby GRANTED. The decision datedAugust 18, 1999 of Labor Arbiter Celenito N.Daing is REINSTATED. The case is hereby

REMANDED to the Regional Arbitration Board,Branch No. 10 of Cagayan de Oro City to computewhat is due to LDCU from EPARWA.

SO ORDERED.[11]

Eparwa filed a motion for reconsideration of the appellatecourts decision. Eparwa stressed that jurisprudence is consistent inruling that the ultimate liability for the payment of the monetary award

rests with LDCU alone.

The appellate court denied Eparwas motion for reconsiderationfor lack of merit.

Hence, this petition.

The Issue

The petition raises this sole legal issue: Is LDCU aloneultimately liable to the security guards for the wage differentials andpremium for holiday and rest day pay?

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has merit.

Eparwa and LDCUs Solidary Liability andLDCUs Ultimate Liability


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Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code read:

Art. 106. Contractor or subcontractor. Whenever an employer enters into a contract with

another person for the performance of the formers

work, the employees of the contractor and of thelatters subcontractor, if any, shall be paid inaccordance with the provisions of this Code.

In the event that the contractor orsubcontractor fails to pay the wages of hisemployees in accordance with this Code, theemployer shall be jointly and severally liable withhis contractor or subcontractor to such employeesto the extent of the work performed under the

contract, in the same manner and extent that he isliable to employees directly employed by him.

The Secretary of Labor may, by

appropriate regulations, restrict or prohibit thecontracting out of labor to protect the rights ofworkers established under this Code. In soprohibiting or restricting, he may make appropriatedistinctions between labor-only contracting andjob contracting as well as differentiations withinthese types of contracting and determine who

among the parties involved shall be considered theemployer for purposes of this Code, to prevent anyviolation or circumvention of any provision of thisCode.

There is labor-only contracting where the

person supplying workers to an employer does nothave substantial capital or investment in the formof tools, equipment, machineries, work premises,among others, and the workers recruited andplaced by such persons are performing activities

which are directly related to the principal businessof the employer. In such cases, the person or

intermediary shall be considered merely as anagent of the employer who shall be responsible tothe workers in the same manner and extent as ifthe latter were directly employed by him.

Article 107. Indirect employer. Theprovisions of the immediately preceding Articleshall likewise apply to any person, partnership,

association or corporation which, not being anemployer, contracts with an independentcontractor for the performance of any work, task,job or project.

Article 109. Solidary liability. Theprovisions of existing laws to the contrarynotwithstanding, every employer or indirectemployer shall be held responsible with hiscontractor or subcontractor for any violation ofany provision of this Code. For purposes of

determining the extent of their civil liability underthis Chapter, they shall be considered as directemployers.

This Courts ruling in Eagle Security Agency, Inc. v. NLRC[12]squarely applies to the present case. InEagle, we ruled that:

This joint and several liability of thecontractor and the principal is mandated by theLabor Code to assure compliance of the provisions

therein including the statutory minimum wage[Article 99, Labor Code]. The contractor is madeliable by virtue of his status as direct employer.The principal, on the other hand, is made theindirect employer of the contractors employees

for purposes of paying the employees their wagesshould the contractor be unable to pay them. Thisjoint and several liability facilitates, if notguarantees, payment of the workers performanceof any work, task, job or project, thus giving the

workers ample protection as mandated by the 1987Constitution [See Article II Sec. 18 and Article


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XIII Sec. 3].In the case at bar, it is beyond dispute that

the security guards are the employees of EAGLE[See Article VII Sec. 2 of the Contract for SecurityServices; G.R. No. 81447, Rollo, p. 34]. That theywere assigned to guard the premises of PTSIpursuant to the latters contract with EAGLE and

that neither of these two entities paid their wageand allowance increases under the subject wageorders are also admitted [See Labor ArbitersDecision, p. 2; G.R. No. 81447, Rollo, p. 75].Thus, the application of the aforecited provisionsof the Labor Code on joint and several liability ofthe principal and contractor is appropriate [See DelRosario & Sons Logging Enterprises, Inc. v.NLRC, G.R. No. 64204, May 31, 1985, 136 SCRA669].

The solidary liability of PTSI and EAGLE,however, does not preclude the right ofreimbursement from his co-debtor by the one who

paid [See Article 1217, Civil Code]. It is withrespect to this right of reimbursement thatpetitioners can find support in the aforecitedcontractual stipulation and Wage Order provision.

The Wage Orders are explicit that paymentof the increases are to be borne by the principalor client. To be borne, however, does not mean

that the principal, PTSI in this case, would directlypay the security guards the wage and allowanceincreases because there is no privity of contractbetween them. The security guards contractualrelationship is with their immediate employer,

EAGLE. As an employer, EAGLE is tasked,among others, with the payment of their wages[See Article VII Sec. 3 of the Contract for SecurityServices, supra and Bautista v. Inciong, G.R. No.52824, March 16, 1988, 158 SCRA 665].

On the other hand, there existed acontractual agreement between PTSI and EAGLE

wherein the former availed of the security servicesprovided by the latter. In return, the securityagency collects from its client payment for itssecurity services. This payment covers the wagesfor the security guards and also expenses for theirsupervision and training, the guards bonds,firearms with ammunitions, uniforms and other

equipments, accessories, tools, materials andsupplies necessary for the maintenance of asecurity force.

Premises considered, the security guardsimmediate recourse for the payment of the

increases is with their direct employer, EAGLE.However, in order for the security agency tocomply with the new wage and allowance rates ithas to pay the security guards, the Wage Ordersmade specific provision to amend existing

contracts for security services by allowing theadjustment of the consideration paid by theprincipal to the security agency concerned. What

the Wage Orders require, therefore, is theamendment of the contract as to the considerationto cover the service contractors payment of theincreases mandated. In the end, therefore, ultimateliability for the payment of the increases rests withthe principal.

In view of the foregoing, the security

guards should claim the amount of the increasesfrom EAGLE. Under the Labor Code, in case theagency fails to pay them the amounts claimed,PTSI should be held solidarily liable with EAGLE[Articles 106,107 and 109]. Should EAGLE pay, it

can claim an adjustment from PTSI for an increasein consideration to cover the increases payable tothe security guards.

However, in the instant case, the contractfor security services had already expired without

being amended consonant with the Wage Orders.It is also apparent from a reading of a record that


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EAGLE does not now demand from PTSI anyadjustment in the contract price and its mainconcern is freeing itself from liability. Given thesepeculiar circumstances, if PTSI pays the securityguards, it cannot claim reimbursement from

EAGLE. But in case it is EAGLE that pays

them, the latter can claim reimbursement from

PTSI in lieu of an adjustment, considering thatthe contract, [sic] had expired and had not beenrenewed.[13](Emphasis added)

We repeatedly upheld our ruling in Eagle regardingreimbursement in the subsequent cases of Spartan Security &Detective Agency, Inc. v. NLRC,[14] Development Bank of the

Philippines v. NLRC,[15] Alpha Investigation and Security Agency,Inc. v. NLRC,[16] Helpmate, Inc. v. NLRC, et al.,[17] and LapandayAgricultural Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals.[18]

For the security guards, the actual source of the payment of theirwage differentials and premium for holiday and rest day work does

not matter as long as they are paid. This is the import of Eparwa andLDCUs solidary liability. Creditors, such as the security guards, maycollect from anyone of the solidary debtors. Solidary liability does notmean that, as between themselves, two solidary debtors are liable foronly half of the payment.

LDCUs ultimate liability comes into play because of the

expiration of the Contract for Security Services. There is no privity ofcontract between the security guards and LDCU, but LDCUs liabilityto the security guards remains because of Articles 106, 107 and 109 ofthe Labor Code. Eparwa is already precluded from asking LDCU foran adjustment in the contract price because of the expiration of the

contract, but Eparwas liability to the security guards remains becauseof their employer-employee relationship. In lieu of an adjustment inthe contract price, Eparwa may claim reimbursement from LDCU forany payment it may make to the security guards. However, LDCUcannot claim any reimbursement from Eparwa for any payment it may

make to the security guards.

WHEREFORE,we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE theDecision dated 20 April 2001 and the Resolution dated 21 September2001 of the Court of Appeals. We REINSTATE the Resolutionsdated 19 January 2000 and 14 March 2000 of the National LaborRelations Commission.

SO ORDERED.


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UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION V CATAPANG473 SCRA 189 CALLEJO, SR; October 14, 2005

FACTS- Petitioner Universal Robina Corporation is a corporation dulyorganized and existing under the Philippine laws, while petitionerRandy Gregorio is the manager of the petitioner companys duck farmin Calauan, Laguna.

- The individual respondents were hired by the petitioner company onvarious dates from 1991 to 1993 to work at its duck farm in BarangaySto. Tomas, Calauan, Laguna. The respondents were hired under anemployment contract which provided for a five-month period. Afterthe expiration of the said employment contracts, the petitionercompany would renew them and re-employ the respondents. Thispractice continued until sometime in 1996, when the petitionersinformed the respondents that they were no longer renewing theiremployment contracts.- In October 1996, the respondents filed separate complaints for illegal

dismissal, reinstatement, backwages, damages and attorneys feesagainst the petitioners. The complaints were later consolidated. OnMarch 30, 1999, after due proceedings, the Labor Arbiter rendered a

decision in favor of the respondents, which NLRC and the CAaffirmed.- On appeal, the petitioners submit that the respondents are not regularemployees. They aver that it is of no moment that the respondentshave rendered service for more than a year since they were covered bythe five-month individual contracts to which they duly acquiesced. Thepetitioners contend that they were free to terminate the services of the

respondents at the expiration of their individual contracts. Thepetitioners maintain that, in doing so, they merely implemented theterms of the contracts.- The petitioners assert that the respondents contracts of employmentwere not intended to circumvent security of tenure. They point out that

the respondents knowingly and voluntarily agreed to sign the contractswithout the petitioners having exercised any undue advantage overthem. Moreover, there is no evidence showing that the petitionersexerted moral dominance on the respondents.[\

ISSUE

WON the respondent employees of the corporation are regularemployees and therefore their termination for causes outside of the

Labor Code is patently illegalHELDYESRatio An employee shall be deemed to be of regular status whenhe has been performing a job for at least one year even if theperformance is not continuous and merely intermittent.Reasoning- Inany case, we find that the CA, the NLRC and the Labor Arbitercorrectly categorized the respondents as regular employees of the

petitioner company. In Abasolo v. National Labor RelationsCommission, the Court reiterated the test in determining whether oneis a regular employee: - The primary standard, therefore, of

determining regular employment is the reasonable connectionbetween the particular activity performed by the employee in relation

to the usual trade or business of the employer. The test is whether

the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or

trade of the employer. The connection can be determined by

considering the nature of work performed and its relation to the

scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also, if the

employee has been performing the job for at least a year, even if theperformance is not continuous and merely intermittent, the law

deems repeated and continuing need for its performance as

sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that

activity to the business. Hence, the employment is considered

regular, but only with respect to such activity and while such activityexists. - It is obvious that the said five-month contract of employmentwas used by petitioners as a convenient subterfuge to prevent privaterespondents from becoming regular employees. Such contractualarrangement should be struck down or disregarded as contrary to

public policy or morals. To uphold the same would, in effect, permitpetitioners to avoid hiring permanent or regular employees by simplyhiring them on a temporary or casual basis, thereby violating theemployees security of tenure in their jobs. Petitioners act ofrepeatedly and continuously hiring private respondents in a span of ...

3 to 5 years to do the same kind of work negates their contention thatprivate respondents were hired for a specific project or undertakingonly.- Further, factual findings of labor officials who are deemed to haveacquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdiction are

generally accorded not only respect but even finality, and bind uswhen supported by substantial evidence. Disposition petition is


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DENIED DUE COURSE. The Decision of the Court of Appeals isAFFIRMED.

PAUL V. SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. CF SHARP CREWMANAGEMENT, INC., respondent.

G.R. No. 162419July 10, 2007

TINGA,J.:

FACTS:Petitioner had been working as a seafarer for Smith Bell Management,Inc. (respondent) for about five (5) years. He signed a new contract ofemployment with the duration of 9 months on Feb 3 1998 and he wasto be deployed 10 days after. This contract was approved by POEA. Aweek before the date of departure, the respondent received a phone callfrom petitioners wife and some unknown callers asking not to sendthe latter off because if allowed, he will jump ship in Canada.

Because of the said information, petitioner was told that he would notbe leaving for Canada anymore. This prompted him to file a complaintfor illegal dismissal against the respondent. The LA held the latter

responsible. On appeal, the NLRC ruled that there is no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent, hence, theclaims should be dismissed. The CA agreed with the NLRCs findingthat since petitioner had not departed from the Port of Manila, noemployer-employee relationship between the parties arose and anyclaim for damages against the so-called employer could have no leg tostand on.

ISSUE: When does the employer-employee relationship involvingseafarers commence?

RULING:

A distinction must be made between the perfection of the employmentcontract and the commencement of the employer-employeerelationship. The perfection of the contract, which in this casecoincided with the date of execution thereof, occurred when petitioner

and respondent agreed on the object and the cause, as well as the restof the terms and conditions therein. The commencement of the


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employer-employee relationship, as earlier discussed, would havetaken place had petitioner been actually deployed from the point ofhire. Thus, even before the start of any employer-employeerelationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the employmentcontract was the birth of certain rights and obligations, the breach ofwhich may give rise to a cause of action against the erring party. Thus,if the reverse had happened, that is the seafarer failed or refused to be

deployed as agreed upon, he would be liable for damages.

Respondents act of preventing petitioner from departing the port ofManila and boarding "MSV Seaspread" constitutes a breach ofcontract, giving rise to petitioners cause of action. Respondentunilaterally and unreasonably reneged on its obligation to deploypetitioner and must therefore answer for the actual damages hesuffered.

PNOC-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. NLRC222 SCRA 831

Facts: In November, 1987, while holding the position of GeothermalConstruction Secretary, Engineering and Construction Department, atTongonan Geothermal Project, Ormoc City, Manuel S. Pineda decidedto run for councilor of the Municipality of Kananga, Leyte, in the local

elections scheduled in January, 1988, and filed the correspondingcertificate of candidacy for the position. Objection to Pinedas being acandidate while retaining his job in the PNOC-EDC was shortlythereafter registered by Mayor Arturo Cornejos of Kananga, Leyte.

Section 66 of the Election Code provides among others that officersand employees of GOCCs are considered as ipso facto resigned uponthe filing of their certificate of candidacy.

It was the argument of Pineda that PNOC-EDC was not created

through a special law, it is not covered by the Civil Service Law and,therefore, not contemplated under Section 66 of the Election Code.

Issue: Whether or not an employee in a government- owned orcontrolled corporation without an original charter falls within thescope of Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Held: Yes. If a corporations capital stock is owned by theGovernment, or it is operated and managed by officers charged withthe mission of fulfilling the public objectives for which it has been

organized, it is a government-owned or controlled corporation even iforganized under the Corporation Code and not under a special statute.Employees thereof, even if not covered by the Civil Service but by theLabor Code, are nonetheless employees in government-owned orcontrolled corporation, and come within the letter of Section 66 of the

Omnibus Election Code, declaring them ipso facto resigned from theiroffice upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy.


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PNOC-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (ThirdDivision) and DANILO MERCADO, respondents.Bacorro & Associates for petitioner.

Alberto L. Dalmacion for private respondent.

PARAS,J.:p

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the Resolution * dated July3, 1987 of respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRCfor brevity) which affirmed the decision dated April 30, 1986 of LaborArbiter Vito J. Minoria of the NLRC, Regional Arbitration Branch No.VII at Cebu City in Case No. RAB-VII-0556-85 entitled "DaniloMercado, Complainant, vs. Philippine National Oil Company-EnergyDevelopment Corporation, Respondent", ordering the reinstatement ofcomplainant Danilo Mercado and the award of various monetaryclaims.The factual background of this case is as follows:

Private respondent Danilo Mercado was first employed by hereinpetitioner Philippine National Oil Company-Energy DevelopmentCorporation (PNOC-EDC for brevity) on August 13, 1979. He held

various positions ranging from clerk, general clerk to shipping clerkduring his employment at its Cebu office until his transfer to itsestablishment at Palimpinon, Dumaguete, Oriental Negros onSeptember 5, 1984. On June 30, 1985, private respondent Mercadowas dismissed. His last salary was P1,585.00 a month basic pay plusP800.00 living allowance (Labor Arbiter's Decision, Annex "E" ofPetition, Rollo, p. 52).

The grounds for the dismissal of Mercado are allegedly serious acts ofdishonesty committed as follows:1. On ApriI 12, 1985, Danilo Mercado was ordered to purchase 1,400pieces of nipa shingles from Mrs. Leonardo Nodado of Banilad,Dumaguete City, for the total purchase price of Pl,680.00. Against

company policy, regulations and specific orders, Danilo Mercadowithdrew the nipa shingles from the supplier but paid the amount ofP1,000.00 only. Danilo Mercado appropriated the balance of P680.00for his personal use;2. In the same transaction stated above, the supplier agreed to give the

company a discount of P70.00 which Danilo Mercado did not report tothe company;

3. On March 28, 1985, Danilo Mercado was instructed to contract theservices of Fred R. Melon of Dumaguete City, for the fabrication ofrubber stamps, for the total amount of P28.66. Danilo Mercado paidthe amount of P20.00 to Fred R. Melon and appropriated for hispersonal use the balance of P8.66.In addition, private respondent, Danilo Mercado violated companyrules and regulations in the following instances:

1. On June 5, 1985, Danilo Mercado was absent from work withoutleave, without proper turn-over of his work, causing disruption anddelay of company work activities;2. On June 15, 1985, Danilo Mercado went on vacation leave withoutprior leave, against company policy, rules and regulations. (Petitioner'sMemorandum, Rollo, p. 195).On September 23, 1985, private respondent Mercado filed a complaintfor illegal dismissal, retirement benefits, separation pay, unpaid wages,etc. against petitioner PNOC-EDC before the NLRC RegionalArbitration Branch No. VII docketed as Case No. RAB-VII-0556-85.

After private respondent Mercado filed his position paper onDecember 16, 1985 (Annex "B" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 28-40),petitioner PNOC-EDC filed its Position Paper/Motion to Dismiss on

January 15, 1986, praying for the dismissal of the case on the groundthat the Labor Arbiter and/or the NLRC had no jurisdiction over thecase (Annex "C" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 41-45), which was assailedby private respondent Mercado in his Opposition to the PositionPaper/Motion to Dismiss dated March 12, 1986 (Annex "D" of thePetition, Rollo, pp. 46-50).The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of private respondent Mercado. The

dispositive onion of said decision reads as follows:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondents are herebyordered:1) To reinstate complainant to his former position with full back wagesfrom the date of his dismissal up to the time of his actual reinstatement

without loss of seniority rights and other privileges;2) To pay complainant the amount of P10,000.00 representing hispersonal share of his savings account with the respondents;3) To pay complainants the amount of P30,000.00 moral damages;P20,000.00 exemplary damages and P5,000.00 attorney's fees;

4) To pay complainant the amount of P792.50 as his proportionate13th month pay for 1985.


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Respondents are hereby further ordered to deposit the aforementionedamounts with this Office within ten days from receipt of a copy of thisdecision for further disposition.SO ORDERED. (Labor Arbiter's Decision, Rollo, p. 56)The appeal to the NLRC was dismissed for lack of merit on July 3,1987 and the assailed decision was affirmed.Hence, this petition.

The issues raised by petitioner in this instant petition are:1. Whether or not matters of employment affecting the PNOC-EDC, agovernment-owned and controlled corporation, are within thejurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.2. Assuming the affirmative, whether or not the Labor Arbiter and theNLRC are justified in ordering the reinstatement of private respondent,payment of his savings, and proportionate 13th month pay andpayment of damages as well as attorney's fee.Petitioner PNOC-EDC alleges that it is a corporation wholly ownedand controlled by the government; that the Energy Development

Corporation is a subsidiary of the Philippine National Oil Companywhich is a government entity created under Presidential Decree No.334, as amended; that being a government-owned and controlled

corporation, it is governed by the Civil Service Law as provided for inSection 1, Article XII-B of the 1973 Constitution, Section 56 ofPresidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree) and Article 277 ofPresidential Decree No. 442, as amended (Labor Code).The 1973 Constitution provides:The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision andinstrumentality of the government including government-owned or

controlled corporations.Petitioner PNOC-EDC argued that since Labor Arbiter Minoriarendered the decision at the time when the 1973 Constitution was inforce, said decision is null and void because under the 1973Constitution, government-owned and controlled corporations were

governed by the Civil Service Law. Even assuming that PNOC-EDChas no original or special charter and Section 2(i), Article IX-B of the1987 Constitution provides that:The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivision, instrumentalitiesand agencies of the Government, including government-owned or

controlled corporations with original charters.such circumstances cannot give validity to the decision of the Labor

Arbiter (Ibid., pp. 192-193).This issue has already been laid to rest in the case ofPNOC-EDC vs.

Leogardo, 175 SCRA 26 (July 5, 1989), involving the same petitionerand the same issue, where this Court ruled that the doctrine thatemployees of government-owned and/or con controlled corporations,whether created by special law or formed as subsidiaries under theGeneral Corporation law are governed by the Civil Service Law and

not by the Labor Code, has been supplanted by the presentConstitution. "Thus, under the present state of the law, the test indetermining whether a government-owned or controlled corporation issubject to the Civil Service Law are the manner of its creation, suchthat government corporations created by special charter are subject toits provisions while those incorporated under the General CorporationLaw are not within its coverage."Specifically, the PNOC-EDC having been incorporated under theGeneral Corporation Law was held to be a government owned orcontrolled corporation whose employees are subject to the provisions

of the Labor Code (Ibid.).The fact that the case arose at the time when the 1973 Constitution wasstill in effect, does not deprive the NLRC of jurisdiction on the

premise that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs because it is theConstitution in place at the time of the decision (NASECO v. NLRC,G.R. No. 69870, 168 SCRA 122 [1988]).In the case at bar, the decision of the NLRC was promulgated on July3, 1987. Accordingly, this case falls squarely under the rulings of theaforementioned cases.As regards the second issue, the record shows that PNOC-EDC's

accusations of dishonesty and violations of company rules are notsupported by evidence. Nonetheless, while acknowledging the rule thatadministrative bodies are not governed by the strict rules of evidence,petitioner PNOC-EDC alleges that the labor arbiter's propensity todecide the case through the position papers submitted by the parties is

violative of due process thereby rendering the decision null and void(Ibid., p. 196).On the other hand, private respondent contends that as can be seenfrom petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and/or Appeal dated July28, 1986 (Annex "F" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 57- 64), the latter never

questioned the findings of facts of the Labor Arbiter but simply limitedits objection to the lack of legal basis in view of its stand that the


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NLRC had no jurisdiction over the case (Private Respondent'sMemorandum, Rollo, p. 104).Petitioner PNOC-EDC filed its Position Paper/Motion to Dismissdated January 15, 1986 (Annex "C" of the Petition Rollo, pp. 41-45)before the Regional Arbitration Branch No. VII of Cebu City and itsMotion for Reconsideration and/or Appeal dated July 28, 1986 (Annex"F" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 57-64) before the NLRC of Cebu City.

Indisputably, the requirements of due process are satisfied when theparties are given an opportunity to submit position papers. What thefundamental law abhors is not the absence of previous notice butrather the absolute lack of opportunity to ventilate a party's side. Thereis no denial of due process where the party submitted its position paperand flied its motion for reconsideration (Odin Security Agency vs. Dela Serna, 182 SCRA 472 [February 21, 1990]). Petitioner's subsequentMotion for Reconsideration and/or Appeal has the effect of curingwhatever irregularity might have been committed in the proceedingsbelow (T.H. Valderama and Sons, Inc. vs. Drilon, 181 SCRA 308

[January 22, 1990]).Furthermore, it has been consistently held that findings ofadministrative agencies which have acquired expertise because their

jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are accorded not onlyrespect but even finality (Asian Construction and DevelopmentCorporation vs. NLRC, 187 SCRA 784 [July 27, 1990]; Lopez SugarCorporation vs. Federation of Free Workers, 189 SCRA 179 [August30, 1990]). Judicial review by this Court does not go so far as toevaluate the sufficiency of the evidence but is limited to issues ofjurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion (Filipinas Manufacturers Bank

vs. NLRC, 182 SCRA 848 [February 28, 1990]). A careful study of therecords shows no substantive reason to depart from these establishedprinciples.While it is true that loss of trust or breach of confidence is a validground for dismissing an employee, such loss or breach of trust must

have some basis (Gubac v. NLRC, 187 SCRA 412 [July 13, 1990]). Asfound by the Labor Arbiter, the accusations of petitioner PNOC-EDCagainst private respondent Mercado have no basis. Mrs. LeonardoNodado, from whom the nipa shingles were purchased, sufficientlyexplained in her affidavit (Rollo, p. 36) that the total purchase price of

P1,680.00 was paid by respondent Mercado as agreed upon. Thealleged discount given by Mrs. Nodado is not supported by evidence

as well as the alleged appropriation of P8.66 from the cost offabrication of rubber stamps. The Labor Arbiter, likewise, found noevidence to support the alleged violation of company rules. On thecontrary, he found respondent Mercado's explanation in his affidavit(Rollo, pp. 38-40) as to the alleged violations to be satisfactory.Moreover, these findings were never contradicted by petitionerpetitioner PNOC-EDC.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DENIED and theresolution of respondent NLRC dated July 3, 1987 is AFFIRMED withthe modification that the moral damages are reduced to Ten Thousand(P10,000.00) Pesos, and the exemplary damages reduced to FiveThousand (P5,000.00) Pesos.SO ORDERED.


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GLORY v. VERGARADECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:

This petition[1] for review on certiorari assails the September

18, 2006 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.73377 which set aside the December 20, 2001 Decision and July 22,2002 Order of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRCNCR CA No. 022914-00 and declared that respondents BuenaventuraB. Vergara and Roselyn T. Tumasis were illegally dismissed; and theFebruary 6, 2007 Resolution[3] denying the motion forreconsideration.

Petitioner Glory Philippines, Inc. manufactures money-countingmachines. In June 1998, it created a Parts Inspection Section (PIS)

tasked to inspect the machine parts for exportation to its exclusivebuyer, Glory Limited Japan (Glory Japan).

Petitioner hired respondents on July 6, 1998, allegedly asmembers of the PIS. However, the employment contracts[4] whichthey signed only on August 18, 1998, indicated them as ProductionOperators in the Production Section with a daily wage ofPhp188.00. The contracts covered the period from July 31 to August30, 1998.

Thereafter, respondents employment contracts were extendedon a monthly basis. For the periods from August 31 to October 20,1998, and October 21 to November 30, 1998, respondents signed theirrespective employment contracts designating them as members of thePIS. From December 1, 1998 to April 27, 1999, respondents

performed the same duties and responsibilities despite the absence ofemployment contracts. On April 27, 1999, however, they were eachmade to sign employment contracts[5] covering the period fromFebruary 28 to April 30, 1999.

On April 26, 1999,[6] petitioners President, Mr. TakeoOshima, informed the Assistant Manager that the contractual

employees in the PIS would no longer be needed by the company asGlory Japan had cancelled its orders.

Nevertheless, despite the alleged lack of need forrespondents services, petitioner claimed that it reluctantly agreed toextend respondents employment due to their insistent pleas. Thus, forthe period from May 1 to May 15, 1999, respondents signed

employment contracts with a higher wage of Php200.00 a day.

Respondents claimed that they continued to work until May25, 1999 when, at the close of working hours, petitioners securityguard advised them that their employment had been terminated andthat they would no longer be allowed to enter thepremises. Consequently, on May 27, 1999, they filed separatecomplaints for illegal dismissal with the Department of Labor andEmployment, Region IV. The cases were subsequently referred to theNational Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for resolution.

On October 29, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered adecision[7] finding that respondents were regular employees because

they performed activities desirable to the usual business or trade ofpetitioner for almost eleven (11) months; and that they were illegallydismissed for lack of just cause and non-observance of dueprocess. Thus:

Hence, in accordance with Art. 280, webelieve as we ought to believe that complainants

[herein respondents] were regular employees sincetheir engagement was not fixed for a specificproject or undertaking for a particular season. Asregular employees, complainants had all the rightsto security of tenure.

x x x x

After a careful perusal of the record ofthis case, we could not find any glimpse of just

cause and the observance of due process beforeand during the termination of complainants


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services. In this case, only general allegationswere asserted by respondent such as decliningorder from Glory Japan coupled with poor workperformance of complainants to justify thedismissal of the latter. This afterthought averment,in the absence of any substantial evidence to proverespondents defense, should be considered as

empty allegation and must miserably fail.

Thus, we declare as we ought to declarethat the dismissal of complainants Vergara andTumasis were (sic) illegal in the absence of anyjust cause as enunciated in Art. 282 and the non-observance of due process in the termination ofcomplainants services.[8]

On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor

Arbiter. However, upon motion for reconsideration, the NLRCreversed and set aside its earlier decision[9] and dismissed thecomplaint for lack of merit. The NLRC ruled that respondents were

project employees and that their employment was terminated uponexpiration of their employment contracts. Respondents motion forreconsideration was denied hence, they filed a petition for certioraribefore the Court of Appeals. On September 18, 2006, the appellatecourt granted the petition, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the PETITION FOR

CERTIORARIIS GRANTED.

The DECISION dated December 20,2001 and the ORDER dated July 22, 2002 are SETASIDE and the DECISION of Labor Arbiter

Dominador B. Medroso, Jr. dated October 29,1999 is REINSTATED subject to the followingMODIFICATIONS:

1. Should the reinstatement of the petitioners

[herein respondents] be no longerfeasible because the section/division to

which they used to be assigned no longerexists, separation pay equivalent to 1month salary for every year of servicefrom the time of dismissal until finalityof this DECISION shall be paid;

2. Full backwages to be paid to the petitioners

shall be from the time of dismissal untilactual reinstatement or, in caseseparation pay is proper, until finality ofthis DECISION; and

3. Other monetary awards granted in theDECISION dated October 29, 1999 shallbe paid reckoned from the start of theiremployment until their actualreinstatement or, in case separation pay

is proper, until finality of thisDECISION.

The case is remanded to the LaborArbiter for the prompt computation of the benefitsin favor of the petitioners as hereby determined.

The private respondent shall pay costs ofsuit.

SO ORDERED.[10]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied hence,this petition raising the following issues:[11]

A.THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTEDSERIOUS AND MANIFEST ERROR INAFFIRMING THE LABOR ARBITERSDECISION FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS

ARE REGULAR EMPLOYEES OF THEPETITIONER


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B.THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTEDSERIOUS AND MANIFEST ERROR INAFFIRMING THE LABOR ARBITERSDECISION FINDING THAT RESPONDENTSWERE ILLEGALLY DISMISSED

C.THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTEDSERIOUS AND MANIFEST ERROR INAFFIRMING THE LABOR ARBITERSDECISION FINDING THAT RESPONDENTSARE ENTITLED TO BACKWAGES,SEPARATION PAY, 13TH MONTH PAY ANDSERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE PAY

Petitioner claims that respondents were contractual and/orproject employees because their employment was dependent on thetransaction with Glory Japan. Respondents, on the other hand, claim

that they were regular employees and that they were dismissed withoutjust or authorized cause and due process of law.

The issues for resolution are: 1) whether respondents wereregular employees; and 2) whether respondents were illegallydismissed.

The petition lacks merit.

In Perpetual Help Credit Cooperative, Inc. v.Faburada,[12] we explained that there are three kinds of employeesas provided under Article 280 of the Labor Code, thus:

Article 280 of the Labor Code provides for threekinds of employees: (1) regular employees orthose who have been engaged to perform activitieswhich are usually necessary or desirable in the

usual business or trade of the employer; (2) projectemployees or those whose employment has been

fixed for a specific project or undertaking, thecompletion or termination of which has beendetermined at the time of the engagement of theemployee or where the work or service to beperformed is seasonal in nature and theemployment is for the duration of the season; and(3) casual employees or those who are neither

regular nor project employees x x x.[13]

There is no merit in petitioners claim that respondents wereproject employees whose employment was coterminous with thetransaction with Glory Japan.

In Grandspan Development Corporation v. Bernardo,[14]the Court held that the principal test for determining whether particularemployees are properly characterized as project employees, asdistinguished from regular employees, is whether or not the project

employees were assigned to carry out a specific project orundertaking, the duration and scope of which were specified at thetime the employees were engaged for that project. As defined, project

employees are those workers hired (1) for a specific project orundertaking, and (2) the completion or termination of such project orundertaking has been determined at the time of engagement of theemployee.[15]

In the instant case, respondents employment contracts failedto state the specific project or undertaking for which they were

allegedly engaged. While petitioner claims that respondents werehired for the transaction with Glory Japan, the same was not indicatedin the contracts. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals,nothing therein suggested or even hinted that their employment wasdependent on the continuous patronage of Glory Japan.[16]

Further, the employment contracts did not indicate theduration and scope of the project or undertaking as required by law. Itis not enough that an employee is hired for a specific project or phaseof work to qualify as a project employee. There must also be a

determination of, or a clear agreement on, the completion ortermination of the project at the time the employee was


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engaged,[17] which is absent in this case.

Respondents were given pro forma employment contractswhich were repeatedly renewed upon petitioners behest. Respondentswere hired on July 6, 1998 but signed their initial employmentcontracts only on August 18, 1998. The contracts covered the periodfrom July 31 to August 30, 1998 and respondents were designated

therein as Production Operators. Thereafter, respondents were hired asmembers of the PIS and their employment contracts were extendedseveral times, to wit: from August 31 to October 20, 1998; fromOctober 21 to November 30, 1998; from February 28 to April 30,1999; and, from May 1 to May 15, 1999.

It bears stressing that from December 1, 1998 to April 27,1999, respondents reported for work despite the absence ofemployment contracts. On April 27, 1999, however, they werebelatedly made to sign employment contracts for the period from

February 28 to April 30, 1999. Although petitioners transaction withGlory Japan was terminated sometime in April 1999, yet respondentswere allowed to work without interruption until May 25, 1999. In fact,

petitioner even paid them higher salaries of Php200.00 a day.

To our mind, the foregoing factual circumstances negatepetitioners claim that respondents were project employees. We quotewith approval the ruling of the Court of Appeals, as follows:

The manner by which the private

respondent [herein petitioner] dealt with thepetitioners [herein respondents] was obviouslyplagued with basic irregularities. Although theywere supposedly hired as PSI staff and startedworking on July 6, 1998, they were still made to

sign individual pro forma employment contractsonly much lateri.e., on August 18, 1999, with theiremployment position being stated therein asproduction operators in the Production Sectionbeing purportedly extended from July 31, 1998 to

August 30, 1998. From then until October 20,1998, they were made to sign employment

contracts on more or less month-to-month termsfor the position of PSI staff. Thereafter, theycontinued working for the private respondent fromDecember 1, 1998 until April 27, 1999 even ifthey had [not] signed any written contract for suchemployment period. We are baffled why theywere once again made to signify on April 27, 1999

their conformity to an employment contract for theperiod from February 28, 1999 to April 30, 1999and later to another contract for the period fromMay 1, 1999 to May 15, 1999.

To us, the private respondents illegalintention became clearer from such acts. Itsmaking the petitioners sign written employmentcontracts a few days before the purported end oftheir employment periods (as stated in such

contracts) was a diaphanous ploy to set periodswith a view for their possible severance fromemployment should the private respondent so

willed it. If the term of the employment was trulydetermined at the beginning of the employment,why was there delay in the signing of the ready-made contracts that were entirely prepared by theemployer? Also, the changes in the positionssupposedly held by the petitioners in the companybelied the private respondents adamant contention

that the petitioners were hired solely for thepurpose of manning PIS during its alleged dry runperiod that ended on October 20, 1998. We viewsuch situation as a very obvious ploy of the privaterespondent to evade the petitioners eventual

regularization.[18]

Likewise, we cannot give credence to petitioners claim thatrespondents were fixed term employees. Petitioners reliance on ourruling in Philippine Village Hotel v. National Labor Relations

Commission[19] is misplaced because the facts in the said case are notin all fours with the case at bar. In said case, the employees were hired


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only for a one-month period and their employment contracts werenever renewed. In the instant case, respondents original employmentcontracts were renewed four times. In the last instance, their contractswere extended despite the cessation of petitioners alleged transactionwith Glory Japan. Thus, respondents were continuously under theemploy of petitioner, performing the same duties and responsibilities,from July 6, 1998 to May 25, 1999.

In Philips Semiconductors (Phils.), Inc. v. Fadriquela,[20]we held that such a continuing need for respondents services issufficient evidence of the necessity and indispensability of theirservices to petitioners business.[21] Consequently, we find thatrespondents were regular employees defined under Article 280 of theLabor Code as those who have been engaged to perform activitieswhich are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or tradeof petitioner.

Respondents are entitled to security of tenurenotwithstanding the contrary provisions of their employmentcontracts. Under the Labor Code, the requirements for the lawful

dismissal of an employee are two-fold, the substantive and theprocedural aspects. Not only must the dismissal be for a valid orauthorized cause, the rudimentary requirements of due process - noticeand hearing must, likewise, be observed before an employee may bedismissed. Without the concurrence of the two, the termination would,in the eyes of the law, be illegal.[22]

As an employer, petitioner has the burden of proving thatrespondents dismissal was for a cause allowed under the law and thatthey were afforded due process. However, it failed to discharge thisburden. While it claims that the dismissal was due to the expiration ofrespondents employment contracts and the termination of the

transaction with Glory Japan, the facts and evidence showotherwise. Indeed, the periods of employment were imposed incircumvention of respondents right to security of tenure. Time andagain, we held that the practice of imposing a limited period in anemployment contract to circumvent the constitutional guarantee on

security of tenure should be struck down or disregarded as contrary topublic policy or morals.[23] So it is in this case.

In sum, we find no reason to deviate from the findings of theCourt of Appeals that respondents were regular employees and thatthey were illegally dismissed by petitioner.

Under Article 279[24] of the Labor Code, an employee whowas illegally dismissed from work is entitled to reinstatement without

loss of seniority rights, and other privileges and to his full backwages,inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetaryequivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheldfrom him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. Wherereinstatement is no longer feasible, separation pay shall be granted inlieu of reinstatement.[25]

It appears that respondents were paid the amount ofPhp91,015.15 corresponding to their payroll reinstatement from March29, 1999 up to November 30, 2000.[26] The said amount should thus

be deducted from the computation for respondents backwages.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September

18, 2006 Decision and the February 6, 2007 Resolution of the Court ofAppeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 73377 are AFFIRMED with

MODIFICATIONS. Respondents are entitled to: a) reinstatement,and if reinstatement is no longer feasible, separation pay equivalent toone (1) month pay for every year of service; b) full backwages fromthe time the compensation was withheld until actual reinstatement or,in case separation pay is proper, until finality of this Decision less the

amount of Php90,015.15; and c) 13th

Month Pay and Service IncentiveLeave Pay reckoned from the start of their employment until actualreinstatement or, in case separation pay is proper, until finality of thisDecision.

SO ORDERED.


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Espina v. CA

FACTS

Respondent MY San informed its employees and union that theyintend to sell the company to respondent Monde and that MY San willterminate their employment and payment of their separation pay willbe in accordance with the law. In connection with this event, the union

and MY San agreed that a list of MY San employees will be submittedto respondent Monde purposes of rehiring if said employee applies andqualifies, subject to such criteria as the new corporation mayimpose. Respondent Monde then commenced its operations. All theformer employees of respondent M.Y. San who were terminated uponits closure and who applied and qualified for probationaryemployment, including petitioners herein, started working forrespondent Monde on a contractual basis for a period of six months.Subsequently, petitioners were terminated on various dates.

Thus, petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal andunderpayment, damages and attorneys fees and litigation cost with the

NLRC- RAB.

Petitioners alleged that respondent My San stopped its operations, butthree days after, resumed its operation with the same top managementrunning the business; the union officers, in exchange for being re-hired, acceded to bust the union; and the sale of respondent M.Y. Santo respondent Monde was merely a ploy to circumvent the provisions

of the Labor Code.

Respondent M.Y. San insisted that its employer-employee relationshipwith petitioners had ceased to exist, thus, the complaint for illegaldismissal against it could no longer prosper. It further contended that

the power to hire and fire employees is now lodged in the newbusiness owner, respondent Monde.

On the other hand, respondent Monde alleged that petitioners had nocause of action against it. Monde claimed that the respective

supervisors of Monde conducted an evaluation of the performance ofall its probationary employees, including herein complainants, to

determine their fitness to qualify as regular employees therein. Theprobationary employees of Monde who passed the performanceappraisal and who qualified as regular employees thereof wereaccordingly appointed as such. Out of the one hundred sixteen (116)probationary employees engaged by respondent Monde, a total ofseventy-four employees qualified for regular employment. For thosewho did not qualify for regular employment, including herein

complainants, respondent Monde gave complainants the remainder oftheir probationary period within which to prove their qualification forregular employment therewith. Notwithstanding the opportunity givento herein complainants to improve their performance to qualify forregular employment with Monde, complainants either: (a) resignedfrom their employment with Monde; (b) refused to report for work on02 May 2001 and on the days following; or (c) failed to qualify forregular employment at the expiration of the period of theirprobationary employment.

ISSUE

Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed.

HELD

The SC held that petitioners were validly dismissed. Petitioners werevalidly separated from respondent MY San.

Work is a necessity that has economic significance deserving legal

protection. The provisions on social justice and protection to labor inthe Constitution dictate so. However, employers are also accordedrights and privileges to assure their self-determination andindependence and reasonable return of capital. This mass of privilegescomprises the so-called management prerogatives. One of the rights

accorded an employer is the right to close an establishment orundertaking. Just as no law forces anyone to go into business, no lawcan compel anybody to continue the same. The right to close theoperations of an establishment or undertaking is explicitly recognizedunder the Labor Code as one of the authorized causes in terminating

employment of workers, the only limitation being that the closure mustnot be for the purpose of circumventing the provisions on terminations


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of employment embodied in article 283 of the Labor Code.

Under Article 283 of the Labor Code, three requirements are necessaryfor a valid cessation of business operations, namely:(1) service of a written notice to the employees and to the DOLE atleast one (1) month before the intended date thereof;(2) the cessation must be bona fide in character; and

(3) payment to the employees of termination pay amounting to at leastone half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, or one (1) monthpay, whichever is higher.

The records reveal that private respondent M.Y. San complied with theaforecited requirements. M.Y. San employees were adequatelyinformed of the intended business closure and a written notice to theRegional Director of DOLE was filed by respondent M.Y. San,informing the DOLE that M.Y. San will be closed effective 31 January2001.

The ultimate test of the validity of closure or cessation ofestablishment or undertaking is that it must be bona fide in

character. And the burden of proving such falls upon the employer.

Respondent M.Y. San in good faith complied with the requirementsfor closure; sold and conveyed all its assets to respondent Monde forvaluable consideration; and there were no previous labor problems. Ithas been ruled that an employer may adopt policies or changes oradjustments in the operations to insure profit to itself or protect the

investments of its stockholders, and in the exercise of suchmanagement prerogative, the employer may merge or consolidate itsbusiness with another, or sell or dispose all or substantially all of itsassets and properties which may bring about the dismissal ortermination of its employees in the process.

Petitioners were also validly dismissed by respondent Monde.

There is no dispute that petitioners were probationary employees asstated in their individual contracts of employment with respondent

Monde. While petitioners were only probationary employees who donot enjoy permanent status, nonetheless, they were still entitled to the

constitutional protection of security of tenure. As may be gleaned inarticle 281 of the Labor Code, their employment may only beterminated for a valid and just cause or for failing to qualify as aregular employee in accordance with the reasonable standards madeknown to him by the employer at the time of engagement and afterbeing accorded due process.

Procedural due process requires that the employee be given twowritten notices before he is terminated, consisting of a notice whichapprises the employee of the particular acts/omissions for which thedismissal is sought and the subsequent notice which informs theemployee of the employers decision to dismiss him.

In the case at bar, petitioners were notified of the standards they haveto meet to qualify as regular employees of respondent Monde when thelatter apprised them, at the start of their employment.

Some of the petitioners in this case voluntarily resigned (Barnuevo,Reyes, Ollorsa, and Cerbito), some were validly dismissed because ofAbsence Without Leave (Espina, Aquino, Bandino, Petalio, Jr., Ebreo,

B. Paz, Deocareza and L. Paz), while some others were terminatedbecause they failed to qualify as regular employees in accordance withthe terms and conditions of their probationary employment withrespondent Monde (Celis, Fernandez, Rodriguez, Punzalan, LourdesAlfonso Q., Panlilio, Arceo, Pascual, Bajo, Blanco, Abela, Fajanilag,and Wong).

It must be noted that petitioners were terminated prior to the expirationof their probationary contracts. As probationary employees, theyenjoyed only temporary employment status. In general terms, thismeant that they were terminable anytime, permanent employment nothaving been attained in the meantime. The employer could well

decide if he no longer needed the probationarys service or hisperformance fell short of expectations, as a probationary employee isone who, for a given period of time, is under observation andevaluation to determine whether or not he is qualified for permanentemployment. During the probationary period, the employer is given

the opportunity to observe the skill, competence and attitude of theemployee to determine if he has the qualification to meet the


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reasonable standards for permanent employment. The length of timeis immaterial in determining the correlative rights of both the employerand the employee in dealing with each other during said period. Thus,as long as the termination was made before the expiration of the six-month probationary period, the employer was well within his rights tosever the employer-employee relationship. A contrary interpretationwould defeat the clear meaning of the term probationary.

Terminating employment is one of respondent Mondesprerogatives. As an employer, respondent Monde has the right toregulate, according to its discretion and best judgment, including workassignment, working methods, processes to be followed, workingregulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off ofworkers and the discipline, dismissal and recall of workers.Management has the prerogative to discipline its employees and toimpose appropriate penalties on erring workers pursuant to companyrules and regulations.

This Court has upheld a companys management prerogatives so longas they are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the

employers interest and not for the purpose of defeating orcircumventing the rights of the employees under special laws and validagreements.

The law imposes many obligations on the employer such as providingjust compensation to workers, observance of the proceduralrequirements of notice and hearing in the termination of employment.

On the other hand, the law recognizes the right of the employer toexpect from its workers not only good performance, adequate workand diligence, but also good conduct and loyalty. The employer maynot be compelled to continue to employ such persons whosecontinuance in the service will patently be inimical to his interest.

Thus, respondent Monde exercised in good faith its managementprerogative as there is no dispute that petitioners had been habituallyabsent, neglectful of their work, and rendered unsatisfactory service,to the damage and prejudice of the company.

ICMC v. NLRCFACTS- Petitioner International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC), anon-profit organization dedicated to refugee service at the PhilippineRefugee Processing Center in Morong, Bataan engaged the services ofprivate respondent Bernadette Galang as a probationary culturalorientation teacher with a monthly salary of P2,000.00.

- Three (3) months thereafter, private respondent was informed, orallyand in writing, that her services were being terminated for her failureto meet the prescribed standards of petitioner as reflected in theperformance evaluation of her supervisors- Private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair laborpractice and unpaid wages against petitioner with the then Ministry ofLabor and Employment, praying for reinstatement with backwages,exemplary and moral damages. - Labor Arbiter Pelagio A. Carpiorendered his decision dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal aswell as the complaint for moral and exemplary damages but ordering

the petitioner to pay private respondent the sum of P6,000.00 aspayment for the last three (3) months of the agreed employment periodpursuant to her verbal contract of employment.

- Both parties appealed the decision to the National Labor RelationsCommission. - The NLRC, by a majority vote, sustained the decisionof the Labor Arbiter and thus dismissed both appeals for lack of merit.- Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition.

ISSUEWON an employee who was terminated during the probationaryperiod of her employment is entitled to her salary for the unexpired

portion of her six-month probationary employmentHELDNO - There is justifiable basis for the reversal of public respondent'saward of salary for the unexpired three-month portion of privaterespondent's six-month probationary employment in the light of its

express finding that there was no illegal dismissal - There is no disputethat private respondent was terminated during her probationary periodof employment for failure to qualify as a regular member ofpetitioner's teaching staff in accordance with its reasonable standards:private respondent was found by petitioner to be deficient in classroom

management, teacher-student relationship and teaching techniques. -Failure to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with the


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reasonable standards of the employer is a just cause for terminating aprobationary employee specifically recognized under Article 282 (now

Article 2813) of the Labor Code. - It must be noted thatnotwithstanding the finding of legality of the termination of private

respondent, public respondent justified the award of salary for theunexpired portion of the probationary employment on the ground that

a probationary employment for six (6) months is an employment for a

"definite period" which requires the employer to exhaust the entireprobationary period to give the employee the opportunity to meet therequired standards. - The legal basis of public respondent is erroneous.A probationary employee, as understood under Article 282(nowArticle 281) of the Labor Code, is one who is on trial by anemployer during which the employer determines whether or not he isqualified for permanent employment. A probationary appointment ismade to afford the employer an opportunity to observe the fitness of aprobationer while at work, and to ascertain whether he will become a

proper and efficient employee.

- The word "probationary", as used to describe the period ofemployment, implies the purpose of the term or period, but not itslength. - Being in the nature of a "trial period" the essence of aprobationary period of employment fundamentally lies in the purposeor objective sought to be attained by both the employer and theemployee during said period. The length of time is immaterial indetermining the correlative rights of both in dealing with each otherduring said period.- A281 LC gives ample authority to the employer to terminate aprobationary employee for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a

regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards madeknown by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement.- There is nothing under Article 281 of the Labor Code that would

preclude the employer from extending a regular or a permanentappointment to an employee once the employer finds that theemployee is qualified for regular employment even before theexpiration of the probationary period. Conversely, Article 281 of theLabor Code does not likewise preclude the employer from terminatingthe probationary employment on justifiable causes as in the instantcase.

- There was no showing, as borne out by the records, that there was

circumvention of the rights of private respondent when she wasinformed of her termination. Private respondent was duly notified,orally and in writing, that her services as cultural orientation teacherwere terminated for failure to meet the prescribed standards ofpetitioner.- The dissatisfaction of petitioner over the performance of privaterespondent in this regard is a legitimate exercise of its prerogative to

select whom to hire or refuse employment for the success of itsprogram or undertaking.- It was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent toorder petitioner to pay private respondent her salary for the unexpiredthree-month portion of her six-month probationary employment whenshe was validly terminated during her probationary employment. Tosanction such action would not only be unjust, but oppressive on thepart of the employerDisposition Petition granted.


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DELA CRUZ V NLRC (LO)290 SCRA 1 DAVIDE JR; November 20, 1998

NATURESpecial Civil Action.CertiorariFACTS- Petitioner started working for Emmanuel Lo as a crew hand in the

latters fishing boat. He was over several years promoted to be thePatron of the boat until he was dismissed. From the case, it was shownthat respondent was the one who hired, paid salary to, and eventuallyfired dela Cruz.- Respondent claims that he was in joint venture with the petitionerand hence there was no employer-employee relationship betweenthem. As pointed out by the Labor Arbiter, however, Lo exercised thecontrol in the activities and that therefore there was in fact anemployer-employee relationship. - The Labor arbiter found thedismissal not to be justified and ordered Lo to pay separation pay bu

not back wages as the same, he opines ws not prayed for. Petitionerwas however found to be a managerial employee and hence was henceexcluded from the coverage of the law as regards conditions of

employment.- Both parties appealed the decision.

ISSUEWON NLRC committed rave abuse of discretion amounting to lack orexcess of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioners claim for separationpay, back wages, allowances, and damages

HELD

YES - Article 279 of the Labor Code mandates that petitioner who wasunjustly dismissed from work is entitled to reinstatement without lossof seniority rights and other privileges and to full back pay, inclusiveof allowances, and to other benefits or their monetary equivalentcomputed from the time compensation was withheld up to time of

actual reinstatement. The grant of back wages allows the unjustly andillegally dismissed employee to recover from the employer that whichthe former lost by way of wages as a result of his dismissal fromemployment.

Reasoning

- Apparently, the form used in filing the case did not include a box forback wages and hence the petitioner had to particular item to tick off.

The court ruled that award of back wages resulting from the illegaldismissal of an employee is a substantial right. Thus, the failure toclaim back wages in a complaint is a mere procedural lapse whichcannot defeat a right granted under substantive law.

Disposition Petition granted with modification as to back wages.


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G.R. No. 155903 September 14, 2007C.F. SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC., petitioner, vs. HON.UNDERSECRETARY JOSE M. ESPANOL, JR., HON.

SECRETARY LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING and RIZAL

INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING SERVICES, respondents.D E C I S I O N

NACHURA,J.:

The petitioner C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. (C.F. Sharp)appeals by certiorari the April 30, 2002 Decision1 of the Court ofAppeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 53747 and the November 5, 2002Resolution2 denying its reconsideration.In 1991, Louis Cruise Lines (LCL), a foreign corporation dulyorganized and existing under the laws of Cyprus, entered into aCrewing Agreement3 with Papadopolous Shipping, Ltd. (PAPASHIP).PAPASHIP in turn appointed private respondent Rizal InternationalShipping Services (Rizal) as manning agency in the Philippines,recruiting Filipino seamen for LCLs vessel.

On October 3, 1996, LCL terminated the Crewing Agreement withPAPASHIP to take effect on December 31, 1996. It then appointedC.F. Sharp as crewing agent in the Philippines. C.F. Sharp requested

for accreditation as the new manning agency of LCL with thePhilippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), but Rizalobjected on the ground that its accreditation still existed and wouldonly expire on December 31, 1996.Pending approval of the accreditation, Theodoros Savva and AdriasTjiakouris of LCL arrived in the Philippines and conducted a series ofinterviews for seafarers at C.F. Sharps office. Rizal reported LCLs

recruitment activities to the POEA on December 9, 1996, andrequested an ocular inspection of C.F. Sharps premises.On December 17, 1996, POEA representatives conducted aninspection and found Savva and Tjiakouris at C.F. Sharp interviewingand recruiting hotel staffs, cooks, and chefs for M/V Cyprus, with

scheduled deployment in January 1997.4 The Inspection Report5signed by Corazon Aquino of the POEA and countersigned by Mr.Reynaldo Banawis of C.F. Sharp was thereafter submitted to thePOEA.On January 2, 1997, Rizal filed a complaint6 for illegal recruitment,

cancellation or revocation of license, and blacklisting against LCL andC.F. Sharp with the POEA, docketed as POEA Case No. RV-97-01-

004. Then, on January 31, 1997, Rizal filed a SupplementalComplaint7 adding violation of Section 29 of the Labor Code of thePhilippines, for designating and/or appointing agents, representativesand employees, without prior approval from the POEA.For its part, C.F. Sharp admitted that Savva and Tjiakouris conductedinterviews at C.F. Sharps office, but denied that they were forrecruitment and selection purposes. According to C.F. Sharp, the

interviews were held for LCLs ex-crew members who had variouscomplaints against Rizal. It belittled the inspection report of the POEAinspection team claiming that it simply stated that interviews andrecruitment were undertaken, without reference to who wereconducting the interview and for what vessels.8 C.F. Sharp alsoaverred that Rizal was guilty of forum shopping, and prayed for thedismissal of the complaint on this ground and for its lack of merit. 9The POEA Administrator was not persuaded and found C.F. Sharpliable for illegal recruitment. According to the Administrator, theinspection report of Ms. Aquino established that Savva and Tjiakouris

had conducted, and, at the time of the inspection, had been conductinginterviews, selection and hiring for LCL, without any authority fromthe POEA. The Administrator also held that C.F. Sharp violated

Section 29 of the Labor Code when it designated officers and agentswithout prior approval of the POEA. 10Thus, the Administrator disposed:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent CF SharpAgency is as it is hereby ordered suspended for a period of six (6)months or in lieu thereof, it is ordered to pay a fine of P50,000.00 forviolation of Art. 29 of the Labor Code, as amended in relation to Sec.

6(b), Rule II, Book II of the Rules and Regulations GoverningOverseas Employment in accordance with the schedule of penalties.Further, the respondent CF Sharp is as it is hereby ordered suspendedfor another period of [eighteen] (18) months or to pay the fine ofP180,000.00 for committing 9 counts of violation of Article 29 of the

Labor Code as amended in relation to Sec. 2(k), Rule I, Book VI of theRules and Regulations governing Overseas Employment.The period of suspension shall be served cummulatively (sic).The charges of violation of Sec. 6(b) of RA 8042 are hereby referredto the Anti-Illegal Recruitment Branch for appropriate action.

SO ORDERED.

11

C.F. Sharp elevated the Administrators ruling to the Department of


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Labor and Employment (DOLE). On December 19, 1997, the thenSecretary of Labor, Leonardo A. Quisumbing,12 issued an Order,13ruling that:WHEREFORE, except as above MODIFIED, the Order dated March13, 1997 of the POEA Administrator is AFFIRMED.Accordingly, the C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. is hereby foundguilty of having violated Sec. 6, R.A. 8042 in relation to Article 13 (b)

and (f), and Article 16 of the Labor Code as amended; Rule II (jj),Book I and Sec 1 and 6, Rule I, Book II, POEA Rules and RegulationsGoverning Overseas Employment, for having conspired andconfederated with the [Louis] Cruise Lines, Theodorus Savva andAndrias (sic) Tjiakouris in the recruitment of seafarers for LCLsships, before it was duly accredited by POEA as the manning agencyof LCL, thus a non-holder of authority at the time. The penaltyimposed against it of suspension of its license for six (6) months or inlieu thereof, to pay a fine of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), isAFFIRMED.

Further, C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. is hereby found guilty ofone (1) count of violation of Art. 29 of the Labor Code in relation toSec. 2 (k), Rule I, Book VI of the Rules and Regulations Governing

Overseas Employment, and is imposed the penalty of two (2) monthssuspension of its license or in lieu thereof, to pay a fine of P20,000.00.The penalties of suspension for both violations shall be servedcumulatively.Out of the P230,000.00 cash supersedeas bond posted by thepetitioner-appellant, let the amount of P160,000.00 be released andrefunded to it, retaining P70,000.00 to be applied to the payment of the

fines as imposed above, should the petitioner opt to pay the fineinstead of undergoing suspension of its license. However, thesuspension shall remain in force until such fine is paid, or in the eventthat the petitioner-appellant further appeals this Order.The charge and finding of violation of Sec. 6 (b) of R.A. 8042 are

hereby referred to the Anti-Illegal Recruitment Branch for appropriateaction.

SO ORDERED.14

C.F. Sharps motion for reconsideration having been denied onFebruary 5, 1999 by the then Undersecretary, Jose M. Espanol, Jr.,15 it

elevated the case to this Court on petition forcertiorari, with the casedocketed as G.R. No. 137573. But, in the June 16, 1999 Resolution,

this Court referred the petition to the CA.In the meantime, on April 15, 1999, C.F. Sharp requested the lifting ofthe suspension decreed by the Secretary of Labor in his December 19,1997 Order,16 which was granted by Deputy Administrator forLicensing and Adjudication Valentin C. Guanio. C.F. Sharp wasallowed to deploy seafarers for its principals.Consequently, on April 30, 2002, the CA denied C.F. Sharps petition

for certiorari,17

holding that C.F. Sharp was already estopped fromassailing the Secretary of Labors ruling because it had manifested itsoption to have the cash bond posted answer for the alternative finesimposed upon it. By paying the adjudged fines, C.F. Sharp effectivelyexecuted the judgment, having acquiesced to, and ratified theexecution of the assailed Orders of the Secretary of Labor. The CAalso agreed with the POEA Administrator and the Secretary of Laborthat Savva and Tjiakouris of LCL, along with C.F. Sharp, undertookrecruitment activities on December 7, 9 to 12, 1996, sans anyauthority. Finally, it affirmed both labor officials finding that C.F.

Sharp violated Article 29 of the Labor Code and Section 2(k), Rule I,Book VI of the POEA Rules when it appointed Henry Desiderio asagent, without prior approval from the POEA. Thus, the appellate

court declared that the Secretary of Labor acted well within hisdiscretion in holding C.F. Sharp liable for illegal recruitment.C.F. Sharp filed a motion for reconsideration,18 but the CA denied iton November 25, 2002.19Hence, this appeal, positing these issues:A. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLYERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER IS IN ESTOPPEL IN

QUESTIONING THE ORDER DATED DECEMBER 19, 1997 ANDTHE RESOLUTION DATED FEBRUARY 5, 1999.B. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLYERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER IS LIABLE FORVIOLATION OF SECTION 6[,] R.A. NO. 8042 IN RELATION TO

ARTICLE 13 (b) and (f) AND ARTICLE 66 (sic) OF THE LABORCODE AS AMENDED; RULE II (jj) BOOK I; AND SECTIONS 1AND 6, RULE I, BOOK III POEA RULES AND REGULATIONSGOVERNING OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY

ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER IS LIABLE FORVIOLATION OF ARTICLE 29 OF THE LABOR CODE, AS


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AMENDED, IN RELATION TO SECTION II (k)[,] RULE I, BOOKVI OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNINGOVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT.20C.F. Sharp faults the CA for ruling that petitioner is estopped fromquestioning the resolutions of the Secretary of Labor. It denied that itvoluntarily executed, or acquiesced to, the assailed resolutions of theSecretary.

The general rule is that when a judgment has been satisfied, it passesbeyond review, satisfaction being the last act and the end of theproceedings, and payment or satisfaction of the obligation therebyestablished produces permanent and irrevocable discharge; hence, ajudgment debtor who acquiesces to and voluntarily complies with thejudgment is estopped from taking an appeal therefrom.21In holding C.F. Sharp in estoppel, the CA apparently relied on theApril 15, 1999 Order of the POEA, and, thus, declared:[P]etitioner C.F. Sharp had already manifested its option to have thecash bond posted as an answer for the alternative fines imposed in the

Orders dated December

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