Labor Relations

1.Kiok Loy vs. NLRC,141 SCRA 179, January 22, 1986 (preconditions)

Facts: In a certification election, the Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa (Union for short), a legitimate labor federation, won and was subsequently certified in a resolution by the Bureau of Labor Relations as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Sweden Ice Cream Plant (Company for short). The Companys motion for reconsideration of the said resolution was denied.

Thereafter, the Union furnished the Company with two copies of its proposed collective bargaining agreement but the same were ignored and remained unacted upon by the Company.Left with no other alternative in its attempt to bring the Company to the bargaining table, the Union, on filed a Notice of Strike, with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) on ground of unresolved economic issues in collective bargaining.

Petitioner Company now maintains that its right to procedural due process has been violated when it was precluded from presenting further evidence in support of its stand and when its request for further postponement was denied. Petitioner further contends that the NLRCs finding of unfair labor practice for refusal to bargain is not supported by law and the evidence considering that it was only on May 24, 1979 when the Union furnished them with a copy of the proposed Collective Bargaining Agreement and it was only then that they came to know of the Unions demands; and finally, that the CBA approved and adopted by the NLRC is unreasonable and lacks legal basis.

Issue: Whether Sweden Ice Cream is guilty of ULP for unjustified refusal to bargain

Ruling: yes. While it is a mutual obligation of the parties to bargain, the employer, however, is not under any legal duty to initiate contract negotiation. The mechanics of collective bargaining is set in motion only when the following jurisdictional preconditions are present, namely, (1) possession of the status of majority representation of the employees representative in accordance with any of the means of selection or designation provided for by the Labor Code; (2) proof of majority representation; and (3) a demand to bargain under Article 251, par. (a) of the New Labor Code . . . . all of which preconditions are undisputedly present in the instant case.

From the over-all conduct of petitioner company in relation to the task of negotiation, there can be no doubt that the Union has a valid cause to complain against its (Companys) attitude, the totality of which is indicative of the latters disregard of, and failure to live up to, what is enjoined by the Labor Codeto bargain in good faith.

In the case at bar, the Companys refusal to make counter proposal if considered in relation to the entire bargaining process, may indicate bad faith and this is specially true where the Unions request for a counter proposal is left unanswered. Even during the period of compulsory arbitration before the NLRC, petitioner Companys approach and attitudestalling the negotiation by a series of postponements, non-appearance at the hearing conducted, and undue delay in submitting its financial statements, lead to no other conclusion except that it is unwilling to negotiate and reach an agreement with the Union.

2. P.I. Manufacturing, Incorporated, vs. P.I. Manufacturing Supervisors and Foremen Association,543 SCRA 613, February 04, 2008

Facts: Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of household appliances. On the other hand, respondent (PIMASUFA) is an organization of petitioners supervisors and foremen, joined in this case by its federation, the National Labor Union (NLU).

On December 10, 1987, the President signed into law (R.A.) No. 66402 providing an increase in the statutory minimum wage and salary rates of employees and workers in the private sector.Thereafter, petitioner and respondent PIMASUFA entered into a new Collective Bargaining Agreement (1987 CBA) whereby the supervisors were granted an increase of P625.00 per month and the foremen, P475.00 per month. The increases were made retroactive to May 12, 1987, or prior to the passage of R.A. No. 6640, and every year thereafter until July 26, 1989.

On January 26, 1989, respondents PIMASUFA and NLU filed a complaint with the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), charging petitioner with violation of R.A. No. 6640.

Issue: whether the implementation of R.A. No. 6640 resulted in a wage distortion and whether such distortion was cured or remedied by the 1987 CBA

Ruling: The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that a wage distortion occurred due to the implementation of R.A. No. 6640. However, the same were cured or remedied when respondent PIMASUFA entered into the 1987 CBA with petitioner after the effectivity of R.A. No. 6640. The 1987 CBA increased the monthly salaries of the supervisors by P625.00 and the foremen, by P475.00, effective May 12, 1987. These increases re-established and broadened the gap, not only between the supervisors and the foremen, but also between them and the rank-and-file employees.

Such gap as re-established by virtue of the CBA is more than a substantial compliance with R.A. No. 6640. The Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in not taking into account the provisions of the CBA vis--vis the wage.

At this juncture, it must be stressed that a CBA constitutes the law between the parties when freely and voluntarily entered into. Here, it has not been shown that respondent PIMASUFA was coerced or forced by petitioner to sign the 1987 CBA. All of its thirteen (13) officers signed the CBA with the assistance of respondent NLU. They signed it fully aware of the passage of R.A. No. 6640. The duty to bargain requires that the parties deal with each other with open and fair minds. A sincere endeavor to overcome obstacles and difficulties that may arise, so that employer-employee relations may be stabilized and industrial strife eliminated, must be apparent. Respondents cannot invoke the beneficial provisions of the 1987 CBA but disregard the concessions it voluntary extended to petitioner. The goal of collective bargaining is the making of agreements that will stabilize business conditions and fix fair standards of working conditions. Definitely, respondents posture contravenes this goal.

3.Faculty Association of Mapua Institute of Technology (FAMIT) vs. Court of Appeals,524 SCRA 709, June 15, 2007

Facts: On January 29, 2001, in the 5th CBA negotiation meeting, private respondent MIT presented the new faculty ranking instrument to petitioner Faculty Association of Mapua Institute of Technology (FAMIT) to which the latter agreed.

On April 17, 2001, FAMIT and MIT entered into a new CBA effective June 1, 2001.4 It incorporated the new ranking for the college faculty in Section 8 of Article V which states that, A new faculty ranking shall be implemented in June 2001. However, there shall be no diminution in the existing rank and the policy same rank, same pay shall apply.

After a month, MIT called FAMITs attention to what it perceived to be flaws or omissions in the CBA signed by the parties. But the latter rejected the proposed amendment to the CBA. It argued that the proposed amendment in the ranking system for the college faculty revised the point ranges earlier agreed upon by the parties and expands the 19 faculty ranks to 23.

Meanwhile, MIT instituted some changes in the curriculum during the school year 2000-2001 which resulted in changes in the number of hours for certain subjects. Thus, MIT adopted a new formula for determining the pay rates of the high school faculty. Hence, together with the issue pertaining to the ranking of the college faculty, FAMIT brought the matter to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board for mediation.

Issue/s: whether MITs new proposal, regarding faculty ranking and evaluation, lawful and consistent with the ratified CBA? And Whether the MITs development of a new pay formula for the high school department, without the knowledge of FAMIT, lawful and consistent with the ratified CBA?

Ruling: The new point range system proposed by MIT is an unauthorized modification of Annex C of the 2001 CBA. It is made up of a faculty classification that is substantially different from the one originally incorporated in the current CBA between the parties. Thus, the proposed system contravenes the existing provisions of the CBA, hence, violative of the law between the parties.

ART. 253. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a collective bargaining agreement.When there is a collective bargaining agreement, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that neither party shall terminate nor modify such agreement during its lifetime. However, either party can serve a written notice to terminate or modify the agreement at least sixty (60) days prior to its expiration date. It shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties.

Until a new CBA is executed by and between the parties, they are duty-bound to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement. The law does not provide for any exception nor qualification on which economic provisions of the existing agreement are to retain its force and effect. Therefore, it must be understood as encompassing all the terms and conditions in the said agreement.

The CBA during its lifetime binds all the parties. The provisions of the CBA must be respected since its terms and conditions constitute the law between the parties. Those who are entitled to its benefits can invoke its provisions. In the event that an obligation therein imposed is not fulfilled, the aggrieved party has the right to go to court and ask redress. The CBA is the norm of conduct between petitioner and private respondent and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law.

On the second issue, the Court ruled that MIT cannot adopt its unilateral interpretation of terms in the CBA. It is clear from the provisions of the 2001 CBA that the salary of a high school faculty member is based on a rate per load and not on a rate per hour basis.

Thus, there is no room for unilateral change of the formula by MIT. Needless to stress, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor. The appellate court committed a grave error in the interpretation of the CBA provision and the governing law.

4.UST Faculty Union vs. University of Santo Tomas,584 SCRA 648, April 07, 2009

Facts: University of Santo Tomas Faculty Union (USTFU) wrote a letter to all its members informing them of a General Assembly (GA). The letter contained an agenda for the GA which included an election of officers. The then incumbent president of the USTFU was Atty. Eduardo J. Mario, Jr.

An election was conducted among those present, and Gil Gamilla and other faculty members (Gamilla Group) were elected as the president and officers, respectively, of the union. Such election was communicated to the UST administration. Thus, there were two (2) groups claiming to be the USTFU: the Gamilla Group and the group led by Atty. Mario, Jr. (Mario Group).

The Mario Group then filed a complaint for ULP against the UST praying for the nullification of the election of the Gamilla Group as officers of the USTFU. On December 3, 1996, a CBA was entered into by the Gamilla Group and the UST which superseded an existing CBA entered into by the UST and USTFU which was intended for the period of June 1, 1993 to May 31, 1998.

On February 11, 1997, the med-arbiter issued a Resolution, declaring the election of the Gamilla group as null and void and ordering that this group cease and desist from performing the duties and responsibilities of USTFU officers.

Thus, USTFU filed a Manifestation with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC informing it of the Decision of the Court but the same was dismissed on the ground that USTFU failed to establish with clear and convincing evidence that indeed UST was guilty of ULP. The acts of UST which USTFU complained of as ULP were the following: (1) allegedly calling for a convocation of faculty members which turned out to be an election of officers for the faculty union; (2) subsequently dealing with the Gamilla Group in establishing a new CBA; and (3) the assistance to the Gamilla Group in padlocking the USTFU office.

Issue: whether UST is guilty of unfair labor practice.

Ruling: No. In the instant case, until the decision that the Gamilla Group was not validly elected into office, there was no reason to believe that the members of the Gamilla Group were not the validly elected officers and directors of USTFU.

More important though is the fact that the records are bereft of any evidence to show that the Mario Group informed the UST of their objections to the election of the Gamilla Group. In fact, there is even no evidence to show that the scheduled elections that was supposed to be presided over by the Mario Group ever pushed through. Instead, petitioner filed a complaint with the med-arbiter praying for the nullification of the election of the Gamilla Group.

As such, there was no reason not to recognize the Gamilla Group as the new officers and directors of USTFU. The UST was obligated to deal with the USTFU, as the recognized representative of the bargaining unit, through the Gamilla Group. USTs failure to negotiate with the USTFU would have constituted ULP.

It is not the duty or obligation of respondents to inquire into the validity of the election of the Gamilla Group. Such issue is properly an intra-union controversy subject to the jurisdiction of the med-arbiter of the DOLE. Respondents could not have been expected to stop dealing with the Gamilla Group on the mere accusation of the Mario Group that the former was not validly elected into office.

The subsequent ruling that the Gamilla Group was not validly elected into office cannot support petitioners allegation of ULP. As the CA ruled correctly, until the validity of the election of the Gamilla Group is resolved with finality, respondents could not be faulted for negotiating with said group.

5.Union of Filipro Employees-Drug, Food and Allied Industries Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno vs. Nestl Philippines, Incorporated,547 SCRA 323, March 03, 2008

Facts: UFE-DFA-KMU was the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Nestl belonging to the latters Alabang and Cabuyao plants.

On 4 April 2001, as the existing CBA was to end on 5 June 2001, UFE-DFA-KMU informed Nestl of their intent to open new Collective Bargaining Negotiation for the year 2001-2004 xxx as early as June 2001.In response thereto, Nestl informed them that it was also preparing its own counter-proposal and proposed ground rules to govern the impending conduct of the CBA negotiations.

On 29 May 2001, in another letter to the UFE-DFA-KMU (Cabuyao Division only), Nestl reiterated its stance that unilateral grants, one-time company grants, company-initiated policies and programs, which include, but are not limited to the Retirement Plan, Incidental Straight Duty Pay and Calling Pay Premium, are by their very nature not proper subjects of CBA negotiations and therefore shall be excluded therefrom.

Conciliation proceedings proved ineffective,the UFE-DFA-KMU filed a Notice of Strike complaining, in essence, of a bargaining deadlock pertaining to economic issues, i.e., retirement (plan), panel composition, costs and attendance, and CBA. and another Notice of Strike, this time predicated on Nestls alleged unfair labor practices, that is, bargaining in bad faith by setting pre-conditions in the ground rules and/or refusing to include the issue of the Retirement Plan in the CBA negotiations.

Issue: whether Nestls refusal to bargain on a very important CBA economic provision constitutes unfair labor practice.

Ruling: Nestle never refused to bargain collectively with UFE-DFA-KMU. The corporation simply wanted to exclude the Retirement Plan from the issues to be taken up during CBA negotiations, on the postulation that such was in the nature of a unilaterally granted benefit.

The purpose of collective bargaining is the reaching of an agreement resulting in a contract binding on the parties; but the failure to reach an agreement after negotiations have continued for a reasonable period does not establish a lack of good faith. The statutes invite and contemplate a collective bargaining contract, but they do not compel one. The duty to bargain does not include the obligation to reach an agreement.

The crucial question, therefore, of whether or not a party has met his statutory duty to bargain in good faith typically turns on the facts of the individual case. There is no per se test of good faith in bargaining. Good faith or bad faith is an inference to be drawn from the facts. To some degree, the question of good faith may be a question of credibility. The effect of an employers or a unions individual actions is not the test of good-faith bargaining, but the impact of all such occasions or actions, considered as a whole, and the inferences fairly drawn therefrom collectively may offer a basis for the finding of the NLRC.For a charge of unfair labor practice to prosper, it must be shown that Nestl was motivated by ill will, bad faith, or fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy, and, of course, that social humiliation, wounded feelings, or grave anxiety resulted xxx in disclaiming unilateral grants as proper subjects in their collective bargaining negotiations. While the law makes it an obligation for the employer and the employees to bargain collectively with each other, such compulsion does not include the commitment to precipitately accept or agree to the proposals of the other. All it contemplates is that both parties should approach the negotiation with an open mind and make reasonable effort to reach a common ground of agreement.

6.MERALCO V. QUISUMBING GR. NO. 127598 JANUARY 27, 1999YNARES-SANTIAGO, J:.

FACTS: The court directed the parties to execute a CBA incorporating the terms among which are the following modifications among others: Wages: PhP 1,900 for 1995-1996; Retroactivity: December 28, 1996-Dec. 1999, etc. Dissatisfied, some members of the union filed a motion for intervention/reconsideration. Petitioner warns that is the wage increase of Php2,000.00 per month as ordered is allowed, it would pass the cost covering such increase to the consumers through an increase rate of electricity. On the retroactivity of the CBA arbitral award, the parties reckon the period as when retroaction shall commence.

ISSUE: Whether retroactivity of arbitral awards shall commence at such time as granted by Secretary.

RULING: In St. Lukes Medical vs Torres, a deadlock developed during CBA negotiations between management unions. The Secretary assumed jurisdiction and ordered the retroaction of the CBA to the date of expiration of the previous CBS. The Court ratiocinated thus: In the absence of a specific provision of law prohibiting retroactive of the effectivity of arbitral awards issued by the Secretary pursuant to article 263(g) of the Labor Code, public respondent is deemed vested with the plenary and discretionary powers to determine the effectivity thereof.

In general, a CBA negotiated within six months after the expiration of the existing CBA retroacts to the day immediately following such date and if agreed thereafter, the effectivity depends on the agreement of the parties. On the other hand, the law is silent as to the retroactivity of a CBA arbitral award or that granted not by virtue of the mutual agreement of the parties but by intervention of the government. In the absence of a CBA, the Secretarys determination of the date of retroactivity as part of his discretionary powers over arbitral awards shall control.

7.RIVERA V. ESPIRITUGR. NO. 135547 JANUARY 23, 2002QUISUMBING, J:

FACTS: PAL was suffering from a difficult financial situation in 1998. It was faced with bankruptcy and was forced to adopt a rehabilitation plan and downsized its labor force by more than 1/3. PALEA (PAL Employees Association) went on a four-day strike to protest retrenchment measures in July 1998. PAL ceased operations on Sep 23, 1998.

PALEA board again wrote the President on Sep 28, 1998. Among others, it proposed the suspension of the PAL-PALEA CBA for a period of ten years, subject to certain conditions. PALEA members accepted such terms through a referendum on Oct 2, 1998. PAL resumed domestic operations on Oct 7, 1998. Seven officers and members of PALEA filed instant petition to annul the Sep 27, 1998 agreement entered into between PAL and PALEA.

ISSUE:Whether negotiations may be suspended for 10 years.

RULING: YES. CBA negotiations may be suspended for 10 years.

The assailed PAL-PALEA agreement was the result of voluntary collective bargaining negotiations undertaken in the light of the severe financial situation faced by the employer, with the peculiar and unique intention of not merely promoting industrial peace at PAL, but preventing the latters closure.There is no conflict between said agreement and Article 253-A of the Labor Code. CBA under Article 253-A of the Labor Code has a two-fold purpose. One is to promote industrial stability and predictability. Inasmuch as the agreement sought to promote industrial peace, at the PAL during its rehabilitation, said agreement satisfied the first purpose of said article. The other purpose is to assign specific timetable, wherein negotiations become a matter of right and requirement. Nothing in Article 253-A prohibits the parties from waiving or suspending the mandatory timetable and agreeing on the remedies to enforce the same.

8.PICOP RESOURCES, INC. V. TANECAGR NO. 160828 AUGUST 9, 2010MENDOZA, J:

FACTS: Respondents were regular rank-and-file employees of PRI andbona fidemembers ofNagkahiusang Mamumuo saPRI Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (NAMAPRI-SPFL), which is the collective bargaining agent for the rank-and-file employees of petitioner PRI. PRI has a collective bargaining agreement with NAMAPRI-SPFL for a period of five years from May 22, 1995 until May 22, 2000. The CBA contained the following union security provisions:Article II- Union Security and Check-OffSection 6.Maintenance of membership.

6.1All employees within the appropriate bargaining unit who are members of the UNION at the time of the signing of this AGREEMENT shall, as a condition of continued employment by the COMPANY, maintain their membership in the UNION in good standing during the effectivity of this AGREEMENT.6.3The COMPANY, upon the written request of the UNION and after compliance with the requirements of the New Labor Code, shall give notice of termination of services of any employee who shall fail to fulfill the condition provided in Section 6.1 and 6.2 of this Article

Atty. Fuentes sent a letter to the management of PRI demanding the termination of employees who allegedly campaigned for, supported and signed the Petition for Certification Election of the Federation of Free Workers Union (FFW) during the effectivity of the CBA. NAMAPRI-SPFL considered said act of campaigning for and signing the petition for certification election of FFW as an act of disloyalty and a valid basis for termination for a cause in accordance with its Constitution and By-Laws, and the terms and conditions of the CBA, specifically Article II, Sections 6.1 and 6.2 on Union Security Clause.

On October 16, 2000, PRI served notices of termination for causes to employees whom NAMAPRIL-SPFL sought to be terminated on the ground of acts of disloyalty committed against it when respondents allegedly supported and signed the Petition for Certification Election of FFW before the freedom period during the effectivity of the CBA. A Notice dated October 21, 2000 was also served on the DOLE, Caraga Region.

Respondents argued that at the time NAMAPRI-SPFL demanded their termination, it was no longer the bargaining representative of the rank-and-file workers of PRI, because the CBA had already expired on May 22, 2000. Hence, there could be no justification in PRIs act of dismissing respondents due to acts of disloyalty.

Citing Article 253 of the Labor Code, PRI contends that as parties to the CBA, they are enjoined to keep the status quoand continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing CBA during the 60-day period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties.

ISSUE: Whether the existing CBA can be given its full force and effect in all its terms and condition including its union security clause, even beyond the 5-year period when no new CBA has yet been entered into.

RULING: No. Petitioner's reliance on Article 253 is misplaced. Article 256 of the Labor Codeprovides that the employer shall continue to recognize the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent where no petition for certification election is filed at the expiration of the freedom period.

Applying the same provision, it can be said that while it is incumbent for the employer to continue to recognize the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent even after the expiration of the freedom period, they could only do so when no petition for certification election was filed. The reason is, with a pending petition for certification, any such agreement entered into by management with a labor organization is fraught with the risk that such a labor union may not be chosen thereafter as the collective bargaining representative. The provision for status quo is conditioned on the fact that no certification election was filed during the freedom period. Any other view would render nugatory the clear statutory policy to favor certification election as the means of ascertaining the true expression of the will of the workers as to which labor organization would represent them.

Moreover, the last sentence of Article 253 which provides for automatic renewal pertains only to the economic provisions of the CBA, and does not include representational aspect of the CBA. An existing CBA cannot constitute a bar to a filing of a petition for certification election. When there is a representational issue, the statusquo provision in so far as the need to await the creation of a new agreement will not apply.

9.FVCLU V. SANAMAG.R. NO. 176249 NOVEMBER 27, 2009BRION, J.:

FACTS: FVCLU-PTGWO, the recognized bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of the FVC Philippines, renegotiated their CBA extending the original five-year period of the CBA by four (4) months. Nine days before the expiration of the originally-agreed five-year CBA term, the respondent SamaSamang Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa FVC-Solidarity of Independent and General Labor Organizations filed before DOLE a petition for certification election for the same rank-and-file unit covered by the FVCLU CBA. FVCLU moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the certification election petition was filed outside the freedom period or outside of the 60 days before the expiration of the CBA. The Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed outside the 60-day period counted from the day of the expiration of the amended CBA. On appeal, DOLE Secretary set aside the ruling of the Med-Arbiter and ordered the conduct of a certification election in the company. The DOLE Acting Secretary granted the motion for reconsideration of petitioners. On appeal, CA ruled that while the parties may renegotiate the other provisions of the CBA, this should not affect the five-year representation aspect of the original CBA. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether extension of the CBA term also changed the unions exclusive bargaining representation status and effectively moved the reckoning point of the 60-day freedom period from January 30, 2003 to May 30, 2003.

RULING: While SANAMA-SIGLO has manifested its abandonment of its challenge to the exclusive bargaining representation status of FVCLU-PTGWO, the SC will resolve the question of law raised in the case.

Article 253-A (1) of the Labor Code provides that any Collective Bargaining Agreement that the parties may enter into, shall, insofar as the representation aspect is concerned, be for a term of five (5) years. No petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent shall be entertained and no certification election shall be conducted by the Department of Labor and Employment outside of the sixty day period immediately before the date of expiry of such five-year term of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. All other provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement shall be renegotiated not later than three (3) years after its execution.

This Labor Code provision is implemented through Book V, Rule VIII of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code which states that the Med-Arbiter may dismiss the petition when the it was filed before or after the freedom period of a duly registered collective bargaining agreement; provided that the sixty-day period based on the original collective bargaining agreement shall not be affected by any amendment, extension or renewal of the collective bargaining agreement.

By express provision of the above-quoted Article 253-A, the exclusive bargaining status cannot go beyond five years and the representation status is a legal matter not for the workplace parties to agree upon. In other words, despite an agreement for a CBA with a life of more than five years, either as an original provision or by amendment, the bargaining unions exclusive bargaining status is effective only for five years and can be challenged within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the CBAs first five years.

10.ELISCO-ELIROL V. NORIELG.R. NO. L-41955 DECEMBER 29, 1977TEEHANKEE, J.:

FACTS:Elisco-Elirol Labor Union (NAFLU) negotiated and executed a CBA with Elizalde Steel Consolidated Inc. However, Elisco-Elirol then was not yet aregisteredunion. In order to be able to execute the CBA, they had the unionregistered, which was granted. They likewise moved to disaffiliate themselves with their mother union, NAFLU. Elizalde, however, refused to recognize them as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent and it dismissed the officers of the union because of the union security clause in the CBA. Elisco-Elirol filed a complaint for unfair labor practice with the BLR. The BLR dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether Elisco-Elirol Labor Union is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent

RULING: YES.The error of BLR is not perceiving that the employees and members of the local union did not form a new union but merely registered the local union as was their right. Petitioner Elisco-Elirol Labor Union-NAFLU, consisting of employees and members of the local union was the principal party to the agreement. NAFLU as the mother union" in participating in the execution of the bargaining agreement with respondent company acted merely as agent of the local union, which remained the basic unit of the association existing principally and freely to serve the common interest of all its members, including the freedom to disaffiliate when the circumstances so warranted as in the present case.

"(T)he locals are separate and distinct units primarily designed to secure and maintain an equality of bargaining power between the employer and their employee-members in the economic struggle for the fruits of the joint productive effort of labor and capital; and the association of the locals into the national union (as PAFLU) was in furtherance of the same end. These associations are consensual entities capable of entering into such legal relations with their members. The essential purpose was the affiliation of the local unions into a common enterprise to increase by collective action the common bargaining power in respect of the terms and conditions of labor. Yet the locals remained the basic units of association, free to serve their own and the common interest of all, subject to the restraints imposed by the Constitution and By-Laws of the Association, and free also to renounce the affiliation for mutual welfare upon the terms laid down in the agreement which brought it into existence."

11.ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS-VIMCONTU, THE CEBU OIL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, represented by its Acting President, MIGUEL C. ALIVIADO, and THE MOBIL DAVAO/ COTABATO CHAPTER-ALU, represented by its President, DAVID C. ONDEVILLA vs. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), MOBIL OIL PHILIPPINES, INC., JEAN PIERRE BAILLEUX, CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC., and MOBIL PHILIPPINES, INC. [G.R. No. 74841 December 20, 1991]

Facts: A collective bargaining agreement was entered into between the Associated Labor Unions-VIMCONTU and Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc. for a period of three years. During the lifetime of the CBA, On August 5, 1983, Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc. sent letters to the employees, notifying of (sic) the termination of their services because of the sale of the respondent firm to Caltex Philippines, Inc. Complainant employees accepted their checks for separation pay and signed quit-claims under protest and subject to the outcome of this case, a complaint for unfair labor practice and breach of contract filed in the NLRC against MOPI and Caltex. LA dismissed the case and affirmed by the NLRC on the ground that the CBA was not violated by MOPI as the record shows and from the admission of complainants-union that the latter has (sic) knowledge of the impending sales and closure of the firm in a series of negotiations/meetings and that as between complainants and respondent MOPI, the situation is one of closure and not redundancy, and therefore, Sec. 3 of Article XI is not applicable.

Issue: Whether labor contracts (CBA) enforceable against transferee of enterprise?

Ruling: No. We stated the rule that unless expressly assumed, labor contracts such as employment contracts and collective bargaining agreements are not enforceable against a transferee of an enterprise, labor contracts beingin personam,thus binding only between the parties.26As a general rule, there is no law requiring abona fidepurchaser of the assets of an on-going concern to absorb in its employ the employees of the latter.However, although the purchaser of the assets or enterprise is not legally bound to absorb in its employ the employees of the seller of such assets or enterprise, the parties are reliable to the employees if the transaction between the parties is colored or clothed with bad faith.The sale or disposition must be motivated by good faith as an element of exemption from liability.

Other Syllabus:Termination of employment due to sale of respondent firm.The issues presently raised have already been passed upon and resolved by this Court in another almost identical case,Mobil Employees Association, et al. vs. NLRC, et al.,ma petition which challenged the decision dated 6 April 1987 of the NLRC Second Division, upholding a labor arbiter's finding that MOPI was not guilty of unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal and that the termination was accused by cessation of MOPI's business operations in the country.

Requirements under Art. 284 of the LGC as it existed in 1983 provided as follows:Art. 284.Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment top prevent lossesor the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking, unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this title by serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof.In case of termination due to the installation of labor-saving devices or redundany, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to least his one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses andin cases of closure or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or least one-half () month pay for every year of service,whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year.

12.BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC.vs.BCI EMPLOYEES and WORKERS UNION-PAFLU, PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS, CIPRIANO CID and JUANITO GARCIA [G.R. No. L-24711, April 30, 1968]Facts:The Benguet-Balatoc Workers Union (BBWU), for and in behalf of all Benguet Consolidated, Inc (BENGUET) employees in its mines and milling establishment located at Balatoc, Antamok and Acupan, Mt. Province, entered into a Collective Bargaining Contract (CONTRACT) with BENGUET. The CONTRACT was stipulated to be effective for a period of 4-1/2 years. It likewise embodied a No-Strike, No-Lockout clause. 3 years later, a certification election was conducted by the Department of Labor among all the rank and file employees of BENGUET in the same collective bargaining units. BCI EMPLOYEES & WORKERS UNION (UNION) won over BBWU. Later on, the UNION filed a notice of strike against BENGUET. UNION members who were BENGUET employees in the mining camps at Acupan, Antamok and Balatoc, went on strike. The strike was attended by violence, some of the workers and executives of the BENGUET were prevented from entering the premises and some of the properties of the BENGUET were damaged as a result of the strike. Eventually, the parties agreed to end the dispute. BENGUET and UNION executed the AGREEMENT. PAFLU placed its conformity thereto. About a year later, a collective bargaining contract was finally executed between UNION-PAFLU and BENGUET.Meanwhile, BENGUET sued UNION, PAFLU and their Presidents to recover the amount the former incurred for the repair of the damaged properties resulting from the strike. BENGUET also argued that the UNION violated the CONTRACT which has a stipulation not to strike during the effectivity thereof.Defendants unions and their presidents defended that: (1) they were not bound by the CONTRACT which BBWU, the defeated union, had executed with BENGUET; (2) the strike was due, among others, to unfair labor practices of BENGUET; and (3) the strike was lawful and in the exercise of the legitimate rights of UNION-PAFLU under Republic Act 875.The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the CONTRACT, particularly the No-Strike clause, did not bind defendants. BENGUET interposed the present appeal.Issue: Whetherthe Collective Bargaining Contract executed between Benguet and BBWU automatically bind UNION-PAFLU upon its certification as sole bargaining representative of all BENGUET employeesthree years after?Ruling:No.New collective bargaining agent does not automatically assume all personal undertakings of deposed union. Substitutionary doctrine doctrine, held, inapplicable.Where the defendants are not signatories to the contract, nor are they participants thereof, there can be no liability on their own.Syllabus:

Principle of Substitution.This principle, formulated by the NLRB7as its initial compromise solution to the problem facing it when there occurs a shift in employees' union allegiance after the execution of a bargaining contract with their employer, merely states that even during the effectivity of a collective bargaining agreement executed between employer and employees thru their agent, the employees can change said agentbut the contract continues to bind them up to its expiration date. They may bargain however for the shortening of said expiration date.Under subsitutionary doctrine, employees can not renege on their collective bargaining contract.In formulating the "substitutionary" doctrine, the only consideration involved was the employees' interest in the existing bargaining agreement. The agent's interest never entered the picture.the "substitutionary" doctrine only provides that the employees cannot revoke the validly executed collective bargaining contract with their employer by the simple expedient of changing their bargaining agent. And it is in the light of this that the phrase "said new agent would have to respect said contract" must be understood. It only means that the employees, thru their new bargaining agent, cannot renege on their collective bargaining contract, except of course to negotiate with management for the shortening thereof.New collective bargaining agent does not automatically assume all personal undertakings of deposed union. Substitutionary doctrine doctrine, held, inapplicable.The "substitutionary" doctrine, therefore, cannot be invoked to support the contention that a newly certified collective bargaining agent automatically assumes all the personal undertakings like the no-strike stipulation here in the collective bargaining agreement made by the deposed union. When BBWU bound itself and its officers not to strike, it could not have validly bound also all the other rival unions existing in the bargaining units in question. BBWU was the agent of the employees, not of the other unions which possess distinct personalities. To consider UNION contractually bound to the no-strike stipulation would therefore violate the legal maxim thatres inter alios nec prodest nec nocet.Liability of labor union or board or committee members for non-fullfillment of collective bargaining contract.Under Art. 1704 of the Civil Code, in collective bargaining, the labor union or members of the board or committee signing the contract shall be liable for non-fulfillment thereof. Where the defendants are not signatories to the contract, nor are they participants thereof, there can be no liability on their own.No liability for damages of labor union, officers or members, in absence of clear proof; Rule of vicarious liability, Repealed.The rule now is that for a labor union and/or its officers and members to be liable, there must be clear proof of actual participation in, or authorization or ratification of the illegal acts. The rule of vicarious liability has since the passage of Republic Act 875 been expressly legilated out.Agency; Everthing binding on agent duly authorized binds principal, not vice-vera.Everything that is binding on a duly authorized agent, acting as such, is binding on the prinicipal; not vice-versa, unless there is a mutual agency, or unless the agent expressly binds himself of the party with whom he contracts, Art. 1897, Civil Cpde. As here, BBWU the previous agent was the one that expressly bound itself to the other party, Benguet, Union, the new agent did not assume the undertaking of BBWU.13. NUWHRAIN v. NLRC [NOTE: ETONG SUSUNOD NA KASO E NAKAKALITO. BAKIT? HINDI TUGMAG YUNG TITLE SA CITATION. DINIGEST KO NA LANG YUNG NAKALAGAY NA TITLE (NUWHRAIN v. NLRC) SAKA YUNG KASO NA TUGMA SA CITATION (Victoriano v. Elizalde Roper Workers Union)]

NATIONALUNIONOF WORKERS IN HOTELS, RESTAURANTS AND ALLIED INDUSTRIESMANILA PAVILLION HOTEL CHAPTER v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ACESITE PHILIPPINES HOTEL CORPORATION [G.R. No. 179402,September 30, 2008]Facts:National Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants and Allied Industries-Manila Pavilion Hotel (NUWHRAIN)is a legitimate labor organization composed of rank-and-file employees of the Manila Pavillion Hotel, while respondent Acesite Philippines Hotel Corporation is the owner and operator of said Hotel. The Hotel entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement with HI-MANILA PAVILION HOTEL LABOR UNION (HIMPHLU), the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of the Hotel. During the 60-day freedom period which preceded the expiration of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, HIMPHLU negotiated the extension of the provisions of the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement for two years which the parties agreed and the employees ratified. The same was allowed by DOLE to have it registered. NUWHRAIN was accorded by the Labor Relations Division of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) the status of a legitimate labor organization and the former filed a petition for certification election.

After the lapse of the 60-day freedom period, but pending the disposition of thePetition for Certification Election filed by NUWHRAIN, HIMPHLU demanded the hotel to dismiss 36 employees following their explusion from HIMPHLU for alleged acts of disloyalty and violationof its Constitution, by-laws and CBA, paticularly the union securtiy clause. The said employees were alleged to have joined NUWHRAIN. They were sent notices for explanation.

Section 2, Article IV of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, which provided for a union security clause that reads:Section 2. DISMISSAL PURSUANT TO UNION SECURITY CLAUSE.Accordingly, failure to join the UNION within the period specified in the immediately preceding section or failure to maintain membership with the UNION in good standing either through resignation or expulsion from the UNION in accordance with theUNIONsConstitution and by-laws due todisloyalty, joining another unionor non-payment of UNION dues shall be aground for the UNION to demand the dismissalfrom the HOTEL of the employee concerned.The demand shall be accompanied by theUNIONsinvestigation report and the HOTEL shall act accordingly subject to existing laws and jurisprudence on the matter, provided, however, that the UNION shall hold the HOTEL free and harmless from any and all liabilities that may arise should the dismissed employee question in any manner the dismissal.The HOTEL shall not, however, be compelled to act on any such UNION demand if made within a period of sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of this agreement.(Emphasis provided)

NUWHRAIN proceeded to file a Notice of Strike before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on the ground of unfair labor practice wherein the Secretary of Labor intervened and certified the case for compulsory arbitration with the NLRC.NLRC decided that there was no unfair labor practice. NUWHRAIN appealed.

In the meantime, HIMPHLU won in thethe Certification Election for regular rank and fileemployees. The CA upheld the Resolution of the NLRC. It declared that the Hotel had acted prudently when it issued the Notices to the 36 employees after HIMPHLU demanded their dismissal. It clarified that these Notices did not amount to the termination of the employees concerned but merely sought their explanation on why the union security clause should not be applied to them. Hence, the present Petition.Issue: Whether the dismissal of the subject employees in accordance with CBAs UnionSecurity Clause deemed unfair labor practice? Ruling: No. The law allows stipulations for union shop and closed shop as a means of encouraging workers to join and support the union of their choice in the protection of their rights and interests vis--vis the employer.the dismissal of an employee by the company pursuant to a labor unions demand in accordance with a union security agreement does not constitute unfair labor practice.

Syllabus:

Collective Bargaining Agreements; Union Security Clause; Closed Shop Clause; Maintenance of Membership Clause.Union security is a generic term which is applied to and comprehends closed shop, union shop, maintenance of membership or any other form of agreement which imposes upon employees the obligation to acquire or retain union membership as a condition affecting employment.Article 248(e) of the Labor Code recognizes theeffectivityof a union shop clause:

Art. 248.Unfair labor practices of employers.(e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.Nothing in this Code or in any other law shall prevent the parties from requiring membership in a recognized collective bargaining agent as a condition for employment, except of those employees who are already members of another union at the time of the signing of the collective bargaining agreementxxx. (Emphasis supplied.)

Union Shop Clause.The law allows stipulations for union shop and closed shop as a means of encouraging workers to join and support the union of their choice in the protection of their rights and interests vis--vis the employer.By thus promoting unionism, workers are able to negotiate with management on an even playing field and with more persuasiveness than if they were to individually and separately bargain with the employer.InVillarv.Inciong,this Court held that employees have the right to disaffiliate from their union and form a new organization of their own; however, they must suffer the consequences of their separation from the union under the security clause of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

Unfair Labor Practice; Termination of Employment.This Court, inMalayangSamahanngManggagawasaM. Greenfield v. Ramosclearly stated the general rule: the dismissal of an employee by the company pursuant to a labor unions demand in accordance with a union security agreement does not constitute unfair labor practice. An employer is not considered guilty of unfair labor practice if it merely complied in good faith with the request of the certified union for the dismissal of employees expelled from the union pursuant to the union security clause in the Collective Bargaining Agreement.In the case at bar, there is even less possibility of sustaining a finding of guilt for unfair labor practice where respondent did not dismiss the 36 employees, despite the insistence of HIMPHLU, the sole bargaining agent for the rank and file employees of the Hotel, on the basis of the union security clause of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.The only act attributed to the respondent is its issuance of the Notices which, contrary to being an unfair labor practice, even afforded the employees involved a chance to be heard.

Evidence; Affidavits.The members of NUWHRAIN would owe their loyalty to their union, a natural bias which somewhat puts into question their credibility as witnesses, especially since the success of this case would also redound to their benefit. The fact that six members of the union signed a single statement, instead of each member presenting their sincere and individual narrations of events, gives the impression that it was signed in a perfunctory manner and motivated by a sense of union solidarity.The self-serving statement signed by six ofNUWHRAINsmembers have very little weight, even if made under oath, absent any other independent evidence which indicates that the officers of the respondent and the Hotel made such hostile and coercive utterances that tend to interfere or influence the employees exercise of the right to self-organization.

BENJAMIN VICTORIANO vs.ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION and ELIZALDE ROPE FACTORY, INC., defendants, ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION [G.R. No. L-25246 September 12, 1974]

Facts: Plaintiff is a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers Union who later resigned from his affiliation to the said union by reason of the prohibition of his religion for its members to becomeaffiliatedwith any labor organization. The union has subsisting closed shop agreement in theircollective bargainingagreement with their employer that allpermanentemployees of the company must be a member of the union and later wasamendedbyRepublic Act No. 3350 with the provision stating "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization". By his resignation, the union wrotea letterto the company to separate the plaintiff from theserviceafterwhich he was informed by the company that unless he makes a satisfactory arrangement with the union he will be dismissed from theservice. The union contends that RA 3350 impairs obligation of contract stipulated in their CBA and discriminatorily favors religious sects in providing exemption to beaffiliatedwith anylabor unions.

Issue: WON RA 3350 impairs the right to formassociation?

Ruling: No. Republic Act 3350 providing for exemption from close shop agreements does not violate the impairment of contract clause of the constitution. Freedom of religion takes precedent over the right against the impairment of contracts.

Syllabus: (medyo madami to. Mahaba din yung kaso e. sama ko lang ha baka may matanong e)

There is a presumtion of constitutionality in statues.All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt, that a law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger must negate all possible bases; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted.

Right to form or join association; An employee has the right to join or not join a labor union.What the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize and guarantee is the "right" to form or join associations. Notwithstanding the different theories propounded by the different schools of jurisprudence regarding the nature and contents of a "right", it can be safely said that whatever theory one subscribes to, a right comprehends at least two broad notions, namely: first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself without being prevented by law; and second, power, whereby an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from Joining an association. It is, therefore, the employee who should decide for himself whether he should join or not an association; and should he choose to join, he himself makes up his mind as to which association he would join; and even after he has joined, he still retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his membership with said organization at any time.It is clear, therefore, that the right to join a union includes the right to abstain from joining any union.

Impairment of Contracts; Prohibition against Impairment of Contracts is not absolute.The right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act is, however, limited. The legal protection granted to such right to refrain from joining is withdrawn by operation of law, where a labor union and an employer have agreed on a closed shop, by virtue of which the employer may employ only member of the collective bargaining union, and the employees must continue to be members of the union for the duration of the contract in order to keep their jobs. Thus Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act, before its amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, provides that although it would be an unfair labor practice for an employer "to discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization" the employer is, however, not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees". By virtue, therefore, of a closed shop agreement, before the enactment of Republic Act No. 3350, if any person, regardless of his religious beliefs, wishes to be employed or to keep his employment, he must become a member of the collective bargaining union. Hence, the right of said employee not to join the labor union is curtailed and withdrawn.

Test for determining whether statute violates the impairment of contract.In order to determine whether legislation unconstitutionally impairs contract obligations, no unchanging yardstick, applicable at all times and under all circumstances, by which the validity of each statute may be measured or determined, has been fashioned, but every case must be determined upon its own circumstances. Legislation impairing the obligation of contracts can be sustained when it is enacted for the promotion of the general good of the people, and when the means adopted to secure that end are reasonable. Both the end sought and the means adopted must be legitimate, i.e., within the scope of the reserved power of the state construed in harmony with the constitutional limitation of that power.

Republic Act 3350 providing for exemption from close shop agreements does not violate the impairment of contract clause of the constition.What then was the purpose sought to be achieved by Republic Act No. 3350? Its purpose was to insure freedom of belief and religion, and to promote the general welfare by preventing discrimination against those members of religious sects which prohibit their members from joining labor unions, confirming thereby their natural, statutory and constitutional right to work, the fruits of which work are usually the only means whereby they can maintain their own life and the life of their dependents. It cannot be gainsaid that said purpose is legitimate.

The questioned Act also provides protection to members of said religious sects against two aggregates of group strength from which the individual needs protection. The individual employee, at various times in his working life, is confronted by two aggregates of power collective labor, directed by a union, and collective capital, directed by management. The union, an institution developed to organize labor into a collective force and thus protect the individual employee from the power of collective capital, is, paradoxically, both the champion of employee rights, and a new source of their frustration. Moreover, when the Union interacts with management, it produces yet a third aggregate of group strength from which the individual also needs protection the collective bargaining relationship.

The aforementioned purpose of the amendatory law is clearly seen in the Explanatory Note to House Bill No. 5859, which later became Republic Act No. 3350, as follows:

It would be unthinkable indeed to refuse employing a person who, on account of his religious beliefs and convictions, cannot accept membership in a labor organization although he possesses all the qualifications for the job. This is tantamount to punishing such person for believing in a doctrine he has a right under the law to believe in. The law would not allow discrimination to flourish to the detriment of those whose religion discards membership in any labor organization. Likewise, the law would not commend the deprivation of their right to work and pursue a modest means of livelihood, without in any manner violating their religious faith and/or belief.

It cannot be denied, furthermore, that the means adopted by the Act to achieve that purpose exempting the members of said religious sects from coverage of union security agreements is reasonable.

Religious freedom; Freedom of religion takes precedent over the right against the impairment of contracts.It may not be amiss to point out here that the free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter must, therefore, yield to the former. The Supreme Court of the United States has also declared on several occasions that the rights in the First Amendment, which include freedom of religion, enjoy a preferred position in the constitutional system.Religious freedom, although not unlimited, is a fundamental personal right and liberty,and has a preferred position in the hierarchy of values. Contractual rights, therefore, must yield to freedom of religion. It is only where unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger.

Equal protection of the law; Republic Act 3350 does not violate equal protection of law clause of the Constitution.We believe that Republic Act No. 3350 satisfies the aforementioned requirements. The Act classifies employees and workers, as to the effect and coverage of union shop security agreements, into those who by reason of their religious beliefs and convictions cannot sign up with a labor union, and those whose religion does not prohibit membership in labor unions. Tile classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions.The classification introduced by said Act is also germane to its purpose. The purpose of the law is precisely to avoid those who cannot, because of their religious belief, join labor unions, from being deprived of their right to work and from being dismissed from their work because of union shop security agreements. We believe that Republic Act No. 3350 satisfies the aforementioned requirements. The Act classifies employees and workers, as to the effect and coverage of union shop security agreements, into those who by reason of their religious beliefs and convictions cannot sign up with a labor union, and those whose religion does not prohibit membership in labor unions. Tile classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions.

Social Justice; Republic Act 3350 does not violate the concept of social justice contained in the Consitution.Appellant's further contention that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional provision on social justice is also baseless. Social justice is intended to promote the welfare of all the people.Republic Act No. 3350 promotes that welfare insofar as it looks after the welfare of those who, because of their religious belief, cannot join labor unions; the Act prevents their being deprived of work and of the means of livelihood. In determining whether any particular measure is for public advantage, it is not necessary that the entire state be directly benefited it is sufficient that a portion of the state be benefited thereby.

Republic Act 3350 does not diminish protection to labor.There is, however, the question of whether such an exception possesses an implication that lessens the effectiveness of state efforts to protect labor, likewise, as noted, constitutionally ordained. Such a view, on the surface, may not be lacking in plausibility, but upon closer analysis, it cannot stand scrutiny. Thought must be given to the freedom of association, likewise an aspect of intellectual liberty. For the late Professor Howe a constitutionalist and in his lifetime the biographer of the great Holmes, it even partakes of the political theory of pluralistic sovereignty. So great is the respect for the autonomy accorded voluntary societies.11Such a right implies at the very least that one can determine for himself whether or not he should join or refrain from joining a labor organization, an institutional device for promoting the welfare of the working man. A closed shop, on the other hand, is inherently coercive. That is why, as is unmistakably reflected in our decisions, the latest of which isGuijarno v. Court of Industrial Relations,12it is far from being a favorite of the law. For a statutory provision then to further curtail its operation, is precisely to follow the dictates of sound public policy.

14.PAQUITO V. ANDO v. ANDRESITO Y. CAMPO, ET AL [G.R. No. 184007, February 16, 2011]

Facts: Paquito Ando (petitioner) was the president of Premier Allied and Contracting Services, Inc. (PACSI), an independent labor contractor. Andresito Campo and the other respondents were hired by PACSI as pilers or haulers. Respondents were dismissed from employment. Consequently filing a case for illegal dismissal and some money claims with the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter ruled in respondents favor. PACSI and Ando were directed to pay a total of P422,702.28 (for separation pay and award of attorneys fees). PACSI and Ando appealed to NLRC, which affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision. Respondents moved for its execution. To answer for the reward, the NLRC acting sheriff issued a Notice of Sale on Execution of Personal Property over a property in the name of Paquito V. Ando xxx married to Erlinda S. Ando. Prompting Ando to file an action for prohibition before the RTC. Ando claims that the property belonged to him and his wife and not the corporation, and hence, could not be the subject of the execution sale. RTC denied the prayer for TRO and directed him to file a claim with the NLRC Sheriff. Instead, Ando filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. Ando argued that the property to be levied belonged to him and his wife in their personal capacity and thus the execution should not prosper. It was likewise denied.

Issue: Whether the RTC has the power to issue TRO in cases involving labor disputes?

Ruling: No. There is no denying that the present controversy arose from the complaint for illegal dismissal. The subject matter of petitioners complaint is the execution of the NLRC decision. Execution is an essential part of the proceedings before the NLRC. Jurisdiction, once acquired, continues untilthe case is finally terminated,and there can be no end to the controversy without the full and proper implementation of the commissions directives. Further underscoring the RTCs lack of jurisdiction over petitioners complaint is Article 254 of the Labor Code, to wit: ART. 254.INJUNCTION PROHIBITED. No temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order in any case involving or growing out of labor disputes shall be issued by any court or other entity, except as otherwise provided in Articles 218 and 264 of this Code.

Syllabus:

Execution of Judgements; Jurisdiction;The Court has long recognized that regular courts have no jurisdiction to hear and decide questions which arise from and are incidental to the enforcement of decisions, orders, or awards rendered in laborcases by appropriate officers and tribunals of the Department of Labor and Employment. To hold otherwise is to sanction splitting of jurisdictionwhich is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice. Thus, it is, first and foremost, theNLRCManual on the Execution of Judgmentthat governs any question on the execution of a judgment of that body. Petitioner need not look further than that. The Rules of Court apply only by analogy or in a suppletory character.

Third Party Claims.There is no doubt in our mind that petitioners complaint is a third- party claim within the cognizance of the NLRC. Petitioner may indeed be considered a third partyin relation to the propertysubject of the execution vis--vis the Labor Arbiters decision. There is no question that the property belongs to petitioner and his wife, and not to the corporation. It can be said that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership, not to petitioner alone. Thus, the property belongs to a third party,i.e., the conjugal partnership. At the very least, the Court can consider that petitioners wife is a third party within contemplation of the law.

Due Process.The TCT of the property bears out that, indeed, it belongs to petitioner and his wife. Thus, even if we consider petitioner as an agent of the corporation and, therefore, not a stranger to the case such that the provision on third-party claims will not apply to him, the property was registered not only in the name of petitioner but also of his wife. She stands to lose the property subject of execution without ever being a party to the case. This will be tantamount to deprivation of property without due process.Power of NLRC to execute judgment.The power of the NLRC, or the courts, to execute its judgment extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone.[29]A sheriff, therefore, has no authority to attach the property of any person except that of the judgment debtor.Likewise, there is no showing that the sheriff ever tried to execute on the properties of the corporation.

15.CULILI v. EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS (ETPI)

FACTS: Nelson Culili was employed as a Technician, and was promoted to Senior Technician after 15 years. In 1998, due to business troubles and losses, ETPI implemented a two-phased Right-Sizing Program: reduction of ETPIs workforce, then a company-wide reorganization (transfer, merger, absorption or abolition of departments). ETPI offered a Special Retirement Program to employees who have been in service for at least 15 years. Of all the employees who qualified, only Culili rejected the offer. The functions of Culilis unit were absorbed by another department, and his position was abolished (and was eventually absorbed by another employee) due to redundancy. Culili wrote to the union president in protest. He was informed of his termination from employment through a letter from the ETPI AVP. This letter was similar to the memo shown to Culili by the union president weeks before Culili was dismissed.

Culili claims that ETPI contracted out the services he used to perform to a labor-only contractor, which not only proved that his functions had not become unnecessary, but which also violated the CBA and LC. In addition, neither he nor the DOLE were formally notified of his termination. He found out about it when he was handed a copy of the letter, after he was barred from entering ETPIs premises. ETPI already decided to dismiss him even prior to the AVPs letter, as evidenced by an earlier version of the letter.

ETPI denied hiring outside contractors to perform Culilis work. It also denied singling Culili out for termination. The abolition of Culilis department and the absorption of its functions by another department were in line with the Right-Sizing Programs goals. Since Culili did not avail of the Special Retirement Program and his position was subsequently declared redundant, ETPI had no choice but to terminate Culili. Because there was no more work for him, it was constrained to serve a final notice of termination, which Culili ignored. Culili filed a complaint for ULP, illegal dismissal, and money claims before the LA. LA rendered ETPI guilty of illegal dismissal and ULP (affirmed by nlrc) The contracting out of Culilis functions to non-union members violated his rights as a union member; ETPI was not able to dispute Culilis claims of discrimination and subcontracting. The earlier version of the letter was a telling sign of the intention to dismiss even before declaration of redundancy. The ground that ETPI was actually invoking was retrenchment, but ETPI stuck to redundancy since it was easier to prove. ETPI failed to present reasonable criteria to justify declaration of redundancy.on appeal, CA rendred a valid dismissal and no ULP. Mere contracting out of services being performed by union members does not per se amount to ULP unless it interferes with the employees right to self-organization. Culilis position validly abolished due to redundancy. ETPI officers cannot be held liable absent a showing of bad faith of malice. HOWEVER, ETPI failed to observe due process when it failed to notify both Culili and DOLE of the termination.

ISSUE: Whether Culilis dismissal can be considered as ULP

RULING: NO. However, ETPI has to pay nominal damages for non-compliance with statutory due process, in addition to the mandatory separation pay [LC 283].

Article 247. Concept of unfair labor practice and procedure for prosecution thereof. -- Unfair labor practices violate the constitutional right of workers and employees to self-organization, are inimical to the legitimate interest of both labor and management, including their right to bargain collectively and otherwise deal with each other in an atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect, disrupt industrial peace and hinder the promotion of healthy and stable labor-management relations.

In the past, we have ruled that unfair labor practice refers to acts that violate the workers' right to organize. The prohibited acts are related to the workers' right to self-organization and to the observance of a CBA. We have likewise declared that there should be no dispute that all the prohibited acts constituting unfair labor practice in essence relate to the workers' right to self-organization. Thus, an employer may only be held liable for unfair labor practice if it can be shown that his acts affect in whatever manner the right of his employees to self-organize.

There is no showing that ETPI, in implementing its Right-Sizing Program, was motivated by ill will, bad faith or malice, or that it was aimed at interfering with its employees right to self-organization. In fact, ETPI negotiated and consulted with the SEBA before implementing the program. By imputing bad faith to ETPIs actuations, Culili has the burden of proof to present substantial evidence to support the allegation of ULP. Culili failed to discharge this burden and his bare allegations deserve no credit.

16. Union of Filipino Employees Supra (case No. 5)

17.NESTLE V. UNION AUGUST 22, 2006 G.R. NO. G.R. NO. 158944-45

FACTS: In consideration of the impending expiration of the existing CBA between Nestl and UFE-DFA-KMU a letter was sent by the Presidents of the Alabang and Cabuyao Divisions of UFE-DFA-KMU, Ernesto Pasco and Diosdado Fortuna, respectively, informed Nestl of their intent to "open our new CBA for the year 2001-2004 x x x as early as June 2001. Nestle informed UFE-DFA-KMU that it was preparing its own counter-proposal and proposed ground rules that shall govern the conduct of the collective bargaining negotiations. In another letter, Nestl underscored its position that "unilateral grants, one-time company grants, company-initiated policies and programs, which include, but are not limited to the Retirement Plan, Incidental Straight Duty Pay and Calling Pay Premium, are by their very nature not proper subjects of CBA negotiations and therefore shall be excluded therefrom." In addition, it clarified that with the closure of the Alabang Plant, the CBA negotiations will only be applicable to the covered employees of the Cabuyao Plant; hence, the Cabuyao Division of UFE-DFA-KMU became the sole bargaining unit involved in the subject CBA negotiations.

Thereafter, dialogue between the company and the union ensued.

Nestl, claiming to have reached an impasse in said dialogue, requested the NCMB, Regional Office No. IV, Imus, Cavite, to conduct preventive mediation proceedings between it and UFE-DFA-KMU. Nestl alleged that despite fifteen (15) meetings between them, the parties failed to reach any agreement on the proposed CBA. Conciliation proceedings nevertheless proved ineffective. Complaining, in essence, of bargaining deadlock - pertaining to economic issues, i.e., "retirement (plan), panel composition, costs and attendance, and CBA," UFE-DFA-KMU filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB. One week later, another Notice of Strike was filed by the UFE-DFA-KMU, this time predicated on Nestl's alleged unfair labor practices i.e., bargaining in bad faith in that it was setting pre-conditions in the ground rules by refusing to include the issue of the Retirement Plan in the CBA negotiations. A strike vote was then conducted by UFE-DFA-KMU which result was an overwhelming approval of the decision to hold a strike. In view of the looming strike, Nestl filed with the DOLE a Petition for Assumption of Jurisdiction, fundamentally praying that the Secretary of the DOLE, Hon. Patricia A. Sto. Tomas, assume jurisdiction over the current labor dispute. Accordingly, Sec. Sto Tomas assumes jurisdiction, she ordered the strike or lockout is hereby enjoined and further directed to meet and convene for the discussion of the union proposals and company counter-proposals before NCMB. UFE-DFA-KMU sought reconsideration but it was denied.

An injunction from holding a strike was ordered against UFE-DFA-KMU in Sec. Sto. Tomas' Assumption of Jurisdiction Order and conciliation efforts by the NCMB, the employee members of UFE-DFA-KMU at the Nestl Cabuyao Plant went on strike. Notwithstanding the Return-To-Work Order, the members of UFE-DFA-KMU continued with their strike and refused to go back to work as instructed. Frustrated with the foregoing turn of events, UFE-DFA-KMU filed a Petition for Certiorari with application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals.

Meanwhile, in an attempt to finally resolve the crippling labor dispute between the parties, then Acting Secretary of the DOLE, Hon. Arturo D. Brion, came out with an Order. UFE-DFA-KMU moved to reconsider the aforequoted position of the DOLE. Sto. Tomas, issued the last of the assailed Orders. This order resolved to deny the preceding motion for reconsideration of UFE-DFA-KMU. Undaunted still, UFE-DFA-KMU, for the second time, went to the Court of Appeals likewise via a Petition for Certiorari seeking to annul, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. CA ordered Private respondent to resume the CBA negotiations with the petitioner. Dissatisfied, both parties separately moved for the reconsideration of the abovequoted decision - with Nestl basically assailing that part of the decision finding the DOLE Secretary to have gravely abused her discretion when she ruled that the Retirement Plan is not a valid issue for collective bargaining negotiations; while UFE-DFA-KMU questions, in essence, the appellate court's decision in absolving Nestl of the charge of unfair labor practice.

ISSUE: Whther the CA correctly ruled on the Unfair Labor Practice considering theobject of unfair labor practice should have been threshed out with the appropriate labor tribunal.

RULING: YES. The concept of "unfair labor practice" is defined by the Labor Code as:

ART. 247. CONCEPT OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE FOR PROSECUTION THEREOF. - Unfair labor practices violate the constitutional right of workers and employees to self-organization, are inimical to the legitimate interests of both labor and management, including their right to bargain collectively and otherwise deal with each other in an atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect, disrupt industrial peace and hinder the promotion of healthy and stable labor-management relations.x x x.

The same code likewise provides the acts constituting unfair labor practices committed by employers, to wit:

ART. 248. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES OF EMPLOYERS. - It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practices:

(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization;(b) To require as a condition of employment that a person or an employee shall not join a labor organization or shall withdraw from one to which he belongs;(c) To contract out services or functions being performed by union members when such will interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization;(d) To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization, including the giving of financial or other support to it or its organizers or supporters;(e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. Nothing in this Code or in any other law shall stop the parties from requiring membership in a recognized collective bargaining agent as a condition for employment, except those employees who are already members of another union at the time of the signing of the collective bargaining agreement.

18.Kiok Loy Supra (case No. 1)

19.GENERAL SANTOS COCA-COLA PLANT FREE WORKERS UNION-TUPAS, Petitioner, vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC. (GENERAL SANTOS CITY), THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, Respondents. [G.R. No. 178647, February 13, 2009]

FACTS: Sometime in the late 1990s, CCBPI experienced a significant decline in profitability due to the Asian economic crisis, decrease in sales, and tougher competition. To curb the negative effects on the company, it implemented three (3) waves of an Early Retirement Program and also there was an inter-office memorandum mandating to put on hold all requests for hiring to fill in vacancies in both regular and temporary positions in Head Office and in the Plants. This prompted petitioner to negotiate with the Labor Management Committee for filling up the vacancies with permanent employees. No resolution was reached on the matter. Faced with the "freeze hiring" directive, CCBPI Gen San engaged the services of JLBP Services Corporation, a company in the business of providing labor and manpower services, including janitorial services, messengers, and office workers to various private and government offices.Petitioner then filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board a Notice of Strike on the ground of alleged unfair labor practice committed by CCBPI Gen San for contracting-out services regularly performed by union members. The Secretary of Labor issued an Order enjoining the threatened strike and certifying the dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. The NLRC ruled that CCBPI was not guilty of unfair labor practice for contracting out jobs to JLBP. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the NLRC denied. The CA also denied the petition for certiorari as well as the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the act of contracting-out services from JLBP constitutes unfair labor practices?

RULING: NO. TIt is true that the NLRC erroneously concluded that the contracting- out of jobs in CCBPI Gen San was due to the Going-to-Market system, which actually affected CCBPIs sales and marketing departments, and had nothing to do with petitioners complaint. However, this does not diminish the NLRCs finding that JLBP was a legitimate, independent contractor and that CCBPI Gen San engaged the services of JLBP to meet business exigencies created by the freeze-hiring directive of the CCBPI Head Office.The lower court found, based on the evidence, that CCBPI did not engage in labor-only contracting and that the companys action to contract-out the services and functions performed by Union members was not directed at the members right to self-organization; therefore, it was not guilty of unfair labor practice.

Unfair labor practice refers to acts that violate the workers right to organize. The prohibited acts are related to the workers right to self-organization and to the observance of a CBA. Without that element, the acts, even if unfair, are not unfair labor practices. Both the NLRC and the CA found that petitioner was unable to prove its charge of unfair labor practice. It was the that had the burden of adducing substantial evidence to support its allegations of unfair labor practice, which burden it failed to discharge.

20.DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY and DR. CARMELITA I. QUEBENGCO v. DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (DLSUEA-NAFTEU)G.R. No. 177283 April 7, 2009

FACTS: In 2001, a splinter group of respondent led by one Belen Aliazas (Aliazas group) filed a petition for conduct of elections with DOLE alleging that the then incumbent officers of respondent had failed to call for a regular election since 1985. However, respondent claimed that an election was conducted in 1987 but by virtue of the enactment of RA 6715, which amended the Labor Code, the term of office of its officers was extended to 5 years or until 1992 during which a general assembly was held affirming their hold-over tenure until the termination of collective bargaining negotiations; and that a CBA was executed only on March 30, 2000. Acting on the petition for the conduct of election, the DOLE-NCR held, that the holdover authority of respondents incumbent set of officers had been extinguished by virtue of the execution of the CBA. It accordingly ordered the conduct of elections to be placed under the control and supervision of its Labor Relations Division and subject to pre-election conferences. These conditions for the conduct of election imposed by the DOLE-NCR notwithstanding, respondent called for a regular election on July 9, 2001, without prior notice to the DOLE and without the conduct of pre-election conference, prompted the Aliazas group to file an Urgent Motion for Intervention with the BLR of the DOLE. The BLR granted the Aliazas groups motion for intervention three days before the intended date of election or on July 6, 2001.

The Aliazas group thereupon, via letter to the President of petitioner DLSU, requested the University to please put on escrow all union dues/agency fees and whatever money considerations deducted from salaries of concerned co-academic personnel until such time that an election of union officials has been scheduled and subsequent elections has been held. Petitioners' move to drew respondent to file a complaint against petitioners for ULP complaint, claiming that petitioners unduly interfered with its internal affairs and discriminated against its members.

During the pendency of its ULP complaint respondent filed its First Notice of Strike with the Office of the Secretary of Labor charging petitioners for 1) gross violation of the CBA and 2) bargaining in bad faith which was certified for compulsory arbitration to the NLRC (certified case). In the meantime, Labor Arbiter dismissed respondents ULP complaint. Respondent appealed to the NLRC (second divison) Respondent thereafter filed in the certified case which was lodged at the NLRC Third Division a motion to have its four other cases and its ULP complaint then pending appeal before the NLRC Second Division to have these cases subsumed in the certified case. The NLRC Third Division granted respondents motion. Petitioners moved to reconsider this Order but it was denied, prompting petitioners to elevate the matter via certiorari to the Court of Appeals. This petition was raffled to the appellate courts Tenth Division. The NLRC Second Division, in the meantime, affirmed the dismissal by the Arbiter of respondents ULP complaint. Respondent thus elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via certiorar which was raffled to the appellate courts First Division. the Court of Appeals Tenth Division, to which petitioners certiorari challenging the Third Division Order subsuming respondents complaints including the ULP Complaint under the certified case, REVERSED the said Order of the NLRC Third Division with respect to the subsuming of respondents ULP complaint under the certified case, the ULP complaint having been, at the time the NLRC Third Division Order was issued, already disposed of (dismissed) by the Arbiter and was in fact pending appeal before the NLRC Second Division.

The Court of Appeals First Division subsequently resolving respondents petition for certiorari (which assailed the affirmance by the NLRC Second Division of the Arbiters dismissal of its ULP complaint), upon the sole issue of whether the NLRC [Second Division] committed grave abuse of discretion . . . in ignoring the order of the [NLRC] 3rd Division declaring subsumed or absorbed [herein respondents ULP complaint] in the certified case, answered the same in the affirmative. It thus set aside the NLRC Second Division Order affirming the dismissal of respondents ULP complaint and accordingly ordered said NLRC Second Division to transmit the entire records of the ULP complaint to the NLRC Third Division to which said ULP complaint had priorly been ordered consolidated by the latter Division with the certified case. Hence, petitioners petition for review on certiorari at bar.

ISSUE: Whether the acts of petitioner withholding union and agency dues and suspension of normal relations with respondents incumbent set of officers pending the intra-union dispute constitute interference.

RULING: NO. The acts of withholding union and agency dues and suspension of normal relations with respondents incumbent set of officers pending the intra-union dispute did not constitute interference, the Court finds for respondent.

Pending the final resolution of the intra-union dispute, respondents officers remained duly authorized to conduct union affairs. The clarification letter of May 16, 2003 issued by BLR Director Hans Leo J. Cacdac enlightens:We take this opportunity to clarify that there is no void in the DLSUEA leadership. The 19 March 2001 Decision of DOLE-NCR Regional Director should not