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LABOR LAW 2 A2010 235 Disini(The CASE UNDER CIVIL REMEDIES)

NUEVA ECIJA I ELECTRIC COOP, INC.,(NEECO I) EMPLOYEES ASSO. V NLRC

323 SCRA 86QUISUMBING; January 24, 2000

FACTS-Petitioners Reynaldo Fajardo, Ernesto Marin, Ever Guevarra, Petronilo

Baguisa, Victorino Carillo, and Erdie Javate were permanent employeesof respondent Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative (NEECO I). They weremembers of petitioner NEECO I Employees Association, a labororganization established for the mutual aid and protection of itsmembers. Petitioner Rodolfo Jimenez was the president of theassociation.-Respondent NEECO I is an electric cooperative under the generalsupervision and control of the National Electrification Administration(NEA). The management of NEECO I is vested on the Board ofDirectors. Respondent Patricio dela Pea was NEECO's generalmanager on detail from NEA.-The Board of Directors adopted Policy No. 3-33, which set theguidelines for NEECO I's retirement benefits. All regular employeeswere ordered by NEECO I to accomplish applications for eitherretirement, resignation, or separation from service.-The applications of Baguisa and Guevarra were approved; they werepaid the appropriate separation pay. These successive events, followed

by the promotion of certain union officers to supervisory rank, causedapprehension in the labor association. They were considered asharassment threatening the union members, and circumventing theemployees' security of tenure. To strengthen and neutralizemanagement's arbitrary moves, the union held a "snap election" ofofficers.-Petitioner labor association passed a resolution withdrawing theapplications for retirement of all its members, but petitioners Marin,Fajardo and Carillo were compulsorily retired by management. Theyreceived their separation pay under protest. Javate was terminated fromemployment allegedly due to misappropriation of funds and dishonesty.He was not paid separation or retirement benefits.-Petitioners and Erdie Javate instituted a complaint for illegal dismissaland damages with the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch in SanFernando. They alleged they were purposely singled out for retirementfrom a listing of employees who were made to submit retirement forms,even if they were not on top of the list because they were union officers,past officers or active members of the association. Further, petitionersclaimed that their acceptance of the money offered by NEECO I did notconstitute estoppel nor waiver, since their acceptances were withvehement objections and without prejudice to all their rights resultingfrom an illegal dismissal. Additionally, Javate averred he was framed upand dismissed without due process.-The labor arbiter rendered judgment declaring the employer guilty ofillegal dismissal and unfair labor practice act, as charged; orderingrespondents to reinstate individual complainants to their former positionswithout loss of seniority rights and other privileges, either physically or inthe payroll, at the option of the respondents, with payment of fullbackwages; and ordering respondents to pay complainants moral andexemplary damages, attorneys fees and the costs of litigation.-Private respondents appealed to the NLRC and posted a surety bond(P244,891.93). But herein petitioners filed an omnibus motion to dismisson the ground of late appeal, claiming that insufficient bond was filed by

NEECO I only on January 5, 1993. The bond excluded the award ofmoral and exemplary damages, attorneys' fees and costs of li tigation.-Respondent NLRC denied the motion and instead gave due course tothe appeal, and later modified the decision, by deleting the awards ofmoral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and cost of litigation; andruling that the amounts of retirement benefits received by the individualcomplainants are to be applied to the backwages that may be due tothem.-Meanwhile, petitioners were reinstated by NEECO I pending appeal.Erdie Javate withdrew his complaint and opted to receive his retirementbenefits (P42,114.09).-Both parties filed MFRs, which were both denied, Hence this specialcivil action under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, by thepetitioners.

ISSUES:1. WON the appeal taken by the NEECO I from the NLRC-RAB-III DOLE to NLRC Manila was perfected within the reglementaryperiod2. WON NLRC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction when itresolved to delete en toto moral damages, exemplary damages,attorney's fees and costs of litigation the factual basis of whichwere ascertained by the labor arbiter below3. WON the order to apply and deduct receivable backwages

from received benefits is unrealistic and arbitrary.

HELD1. NO, but there was substantial compliance.Indisputable is the legal doctrine that the appeal of a decisioninvolving a monetary award in labor cases may be perfected"only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond. (see Art. 223 ofthe Labor Code, as amended by RA 6715). Also, the perfectionof an appeal within the reglementary period and in the mannerprescribed by law is jurisdictional, and noncompliance with suchlegal requirement is fatal and effectively renders the judgmentfinal and executory.-However, in a number of cases, this Court relaxed the rule toresolve controversies on the merits, specifically, when there arespecial meritorious circumstances and issues, such as whenthere was substantial compliance with the rule, so that on

balance, SC made technical considerations to give way to equityand justice.-In this case, the decision of the labor arbiter was issued onDec21,92. Respondents filed their appeal on Dec28,92 barelyseven days from receipt thereof. The bonding company issuedthe bond dated Jan4,93 the last day for filing an appeal.However, it was forwarded to NLRC only on the following day,Jan5,93. Considering these and the holiday season, SC finds itequitable to ease the rules.-As to the amount of bond, we note that there had been changesin the Rules promulgated by the NLRC. Previously thecomputation of the cash or surety bond to be posted by anemployer who wishes to appeal contained in the original ruleswas "exclusive of moral and exemplary damages and attorney'sfees". It was later deleted sometime in 1991 and 1992, thenrestored on Nov20,93. It may be noted that while NLRC in itsResolution No. 11-01-91 dated Nov7,91 deleted the phrase

"exclusive of moral and exemplary damages as well asattorney's fees" in the determination of the amount of the bond, itprovided a safeguard against the imposition of excessive bondsproviding "(T)he Commission may, in meritorious cases andupon Motion of the Appellant, reduce the amount of the bond."-The unreasonable and excessive amount of bond would beoppressive and unjust and would have the effect of depriving aparty of his right to appeal. Besides, private respondents stressthat the petitioners were paid their retirement benefits and thatthe cooperative has sufficient assets from which the other claimsfor damages and attorney's fees may be obtained.

2. YES. But the award given by the Labor Arbiter, beingexcessive, is reduced.-To warrant an award of moral damages, it must be shown thatthe dismissal of the employee was attended to by bad faith, orconstituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a mannercontrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The LaborArbiter ruled that there was unfair labor practice.-Unfair labor practices violate the constitutional rights ofworkers and employees to self-organization, are inimical tothe legitimate interests of both labor and management,including their right to bargain collectively and otherwisedeal with each other in an atmosphere of freedom andmutual respect; and disrupt industrial peace and hinder thepromotion of healthy and stable labor-managementrelations. As the conscience of the government, it is theCourt's sworn duty to ensure that none trifles with laborrights.


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LABOR LAW 2 A2010 236 Disini-For this reason, we find it proper in this case to impose moral andexemplary damages on private respondent. However, the damagesawarded by the labor arbiter, to our mind, are excessive. In determiningthe amount of damages recoverable, the business, social and financialposition of the offended parties and the business and financial positionof the offender are taken into account. It is our view that herein privaterespondents had not fully acted in good faith. However, we arecognizant that a cooperative promotes the welfare of its own members.The economic benefits filter to the cooperative members. Either equallyor proportionally, they are distributed among members in correlation with

the resources of the association utilized. Cooperatives help promoteeconomic democracy and support community development. Under thesecircumstances, we deem it proper to reduce the award for moral andexemplary damages.

3. NO.-Having been illegally dismissed, individual petitioners are entitled toreinstatement from the time they were illegally dismissed, until they werereinstated on March 16, 1993. For that period they are likewise entitledto backwages minus the amount petitioners were forced to receive as"retirement" pay. A recomputation is therefore proper and in the eventthat the amount of "retirement" pay received by an individual petitionerexceeds the amount of his backwages, the excess should be deemed asadvances of salary which should be refundable until fully repaid by him.Disposition Petition partially granted.

PART 9CONCERTED ACTIVITIES

9.01 BASIS OF RIGHT TO ENGAGE INCONCERTED ACTIVITIES

1. CONSTITUTION- ART XIII, SEC. 3

LABOR

Section 3. The State shall afford full protection tolabor, local and overseas, organized and

unorganized, and promote full employment andequality of employment opportunities for all.

It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, andpeaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike inaccordance with law. They shall be entitled to security oftenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. Theyshall also participate in policy and decision-making processesaffecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.

The State shall promote the principle of sharedresponsibility between workers and employers and

the preferential use of voluntary modes in settlingdisputes, including conciliation, and shall enforcetheir mutual compliance therewith to foster

industrial peace.The State shall regulate the relations betweenworkers and employers, recognizing the right oflabor to its just share in the fruits of productionand the right of enterprises to reasonable returnsto investments, and to expansion and growth.

LUZON MARINE DEPT., UNION V ROLDAN(LUZON STEVEDORING CO.)

86 PHIL 507OZAETA; MAY 30, 1950

NATUREPetition for certiorari to review a resolution of theCourt of Industrial Relations.

FACTS- June 17, 1948: Petitioner Luzon Marine Union (UNION)presented to respondent Luzon Stevedoring Co. (LSC) a petitioncontaining demands, including that it be granted of fullrecognition with the right to collective bargaining, closed-shopand check-off. The Union initiated the petition in the CIR prayingthat LSC be directed to comply immediately with the demands.- The Union de Obreros Estivadores de Filipinas (UOEF) a labororganization divided into units of which Universal Marine Union isa part, intervened on behalf of the Union because it alleged thatthe demand of the Union for recognition with the right tocollective bargaining, closed-shop, etc. would violate anagreement entered into between LSC and UOEF, where thecompany recognized UOEF as the labor organization of theworkers rendering services to LSC., with full right of collectivebargaining.- UOEF moved for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, on the

ground that the Union did not count with more than 30 membersemployed in the LSC. Judge Bautista issued an order denyingthe motion to dismiss. Before the receipt of the order, 65 allegedmembers of the Union initiated a strike without notice (July 19). Itwas only on July 21 that the LSC received the notice of strike.- July 20, 1948: Union filed with CIR a petition alleging that all itsmembers (more than 300) went on strike on July 19 due to therefusal of LSC to grant their demands, and prayed for theissuance of a restraining order to prevent the respondent fromemploying strike breakers.- August 16, 1948: Judge Bautista issued an order directing thestrikers to return to work, and the LSC to reinstate them in theirprevious positions. Acting on a motion for reconsideration, thecourt set said order aside on the ground that the strike wasunjustified and illegal.- Judges Roldan and Castillo held that although Sec. 19 ofCommonwealth Act 103 provides that pending award or

decision by the CIR, the employee, tenant or laborer shallnot strike or walk out of his employment when so enjoinedby the Court, and although the Court had not enjoined thepetitioner NOT TO STRIKE, it does not necessarily followthat the strike was legal and justified xxx Although the Actrecognizes the laborers right to strike, it also creates all themeans by which a resort thereto may be avoided, becausea strike is a remedy essentially coercive in character andgeneral in its disturbing effects upon the social order andthe public interests.- The CIR found out that the reason the members wenton strike was because the opposite party claims orasserts that they had no members inside the company,and because they were becoming impatient. From Thecourt concluded that the purpose of the strike was toinfluence the decision and to compel the Court to decide

promptly. The union insists that the strike was called fora lawful purpose: 1) to show they had more than 30members; 2) to answer the challenge of Alejo Villanuevathat he will dismiss the members from the company.

ISSUESWON the strike was called for a lawful purpose.

HELD1. NORatio In cases not falling within the prohibition against strikes,the legality or illegality of a strike depends upon the 1) purpose


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LABOR LAW 2 A2010 237 Disinifor which it is maintained, and 2) upon the means employed in carrying iton.- The law does not look with favor upon strikes and lockouts because oftheir disturbing and pernicious effects upon the social order and thepublic interests.Reasoning The reasons presented by the Union do not justify thedrastic measure of a strike, which necessarily entails perniciousconsequences not only to the company but also to the laborersthemselves and public.- If the purpose of a strike is trivial, unreasonable or unjust, or if violence

was committed, the strike, although not prohibited by injunction, may bedeclared by the court illegal, with adverse consequences to the strikers.- If the laborers resort to a strike to enforce their demands (instead ofexhausting legal processes first) they do so at their own risk, and shouldthe court find the strike was unjustified, the strikers would suffer theadverse consequences.DISPOSITION The petition appealed from is affirmed.

STANFORD MARKETING CORP V JULIANBLT BUS CO V NLRC

212 SCRA 792CRUZ; August 21, 1992

NATURE Special civil action for certiorari

FACTS- Tinig at Lakas ng Manggagawa sa BLTB Co. NAFLU, an affiliate ofNAFLU, filed a Notice of Strike against the Batangas Laguna TayabasBus Company (BLTB Co.) on the grounds of unfair labor practice andviolation of the CBA.- BLTB Co. asked the Sec. of Labor to assume jurisdiction or to certify itto the NLRC. The Acting Sec of Labor later certified it to the NLRC. Acopy of the certification order was served upon NAFLU. The unionsecretary, however, refused to receive it.- The officers and members of TLM-BLTBCo-NAFLU went on strike. TheNLRC issued a resolution ordering the employees to stop the strike.BLTBCo caused the publication of the resolution and called on allstriking workers to return to work.- Of the some 1,730 BLTBCo employees who went on strike, only 1,116reported back for work. Seventeen others were later re-admitted.Subsequently, about 614 employees, including those who were

allegedly dismissed for causes other than the strike, filed individualcomplaints for illegal dismissal. Their common ground was that theywere refused admission when they reported back for work.- The NLRC issued a resolution ordering the reinstatement of the unionmembers.

ISSUE/S1. WON the union members who participated in the illegal strike shouldbe reinstated

HELD1. YES.

Reasoning- First, there was inadequate service of the certification order on theunion as of the date the strike was declared and there was no showing

that the striking members had been apprised of such order by theNAFLU.- Second, by virtue of the priniciple of vicarious liability, only the unionofficers deserve not to be reinstated. The leaders of the union are themoving force in the declaration of the strike and the Rank-in-fileemployees merely followed. Likewise, viewed in the light of Article 264,paragraph (e), those who participated in the commission of illegal actswho stood charged criminally thereof in court must be penalized- The contention of the petitioner that the private respondentsabandoned their position is also not acceptable. An employee whoforthwith takes steps to protest his lay-off cannot by any logic be said tohave abandoned his work.-The loss of employment status of striking union members is limited tothose "who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts."

(Article 264, Labor Code) Evidence must be presented tosubstantiate the commission thereof and not merely anunsubstantiated allegation- The right to strike is one of the rights recognized and guaranteed bythe Constitution as an instrument of labor for its protection againsexploitation by management. By virtue of this right, the workers areable to press their demands for better terms of employment with moreenergy and persuasiveness, poising the threat to strike as theireaction to the employer's intransigence. The strike is indeed apowerful weapon of the working class. But precisely because of this, i

must be handled carefully, like a sensitive explosive, lest it blow up inthe workers' own hands. Thus, it must be declared only after the mosthoughtful consultation among them, conducted in the only wayallowed, that is, peacefully, and in every case conformably toreasonable regulation. Any violation of the legal requirements andstrictures, such as a defiance of a return-to-work order in industriesaffected with public interest, will render the strike illegal, to thedetriment of the very workers it is supposed to protect

DispositionPetition dismissed

2. STATUTORY- 263 (b)

STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS

ART. 263. Strikes, picketing and lockouts. - (a)xxx

(b) Workers shall have the right to engage inconcerted activities for purposes of collectivebargaining or for their mutual benefit andprotection. The right of legitimate labororganizations to strike and picket and of employersto lockout, consistent with the national interest,shall continue to be recognized and respected.However, no labor union may strike and noemployer may declare a lockout on groundsinvolving inter-union and intra-union disputes.

BLT BUS CO V NLRC



FACTS- Tinig at Lakas ng Manggagawa sa BLTB Co. NAFLU, anaffiliate of NAFLU, filed a Notice of Strike against the BatangasLaguna Tayabas Bus Company (BLTB Co.) on the grounds ofunfair labor practice and violation of the CBA.- BLTB Co. asked the Sec. of Labor to assume jurisdiction or tocertify it to the NLRC. The Acting Sec of Labor later certified it tothe NLRC. A copy of the certification order was served uponNAFLU. The union secretary, however, refused to receive it.- The off icers and members of TL M-BLTBCo-NAFLUwent on strike. The NLRC issued a resolution ordering the

employees to stop the strike. BLTBCo caused the publication ofthe resolution and called on all striking workers to return to work.- Of the some 1,730 BLTBCo employees who went on strike,only 1,116 reported back for work. Seventeen others were laterre-admitted. Subsequently, about 614 employees, includingthose who were allegedly dismissed for causes other than thestrike, filed individual complaints for illegal dismissal. Theircommon ground was that they were refused admission whenthey reported back for work.- The NLRC issued a resolution ordering the reinstatement of theunion members.

ISSUE/S1. WON the union members who participated in the illegal strike


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LABOR LAW 2 A2010 238 Disinishould be reinstated

HELD1. YES.Reasoning- First, there was inadequate service of the certification order on theunion as of the date the strike was declared and there was no showingthat the striking members had been apprised of such order by theNAFLU.- Second, by virtue of the priniciple of vicarious liability, only the union

officers deserve not to be reinstated. The leaders of the union are themoving force in the declaration of the strike and the Rank-in-fileemployees merely followed. Likewise, viewed in the light of Article 264,paragraph (e), those who participated in the commission of illegal actswho stood charged criminally thereof in court must be penalized- The contention of the petitioner that the private respondentsabandoned their position is also not acceptable. An employee whoforthwith takes steps to protest his lay-off cannot by any logic be said tohave abandoned his work.-The loss of employment status of striking union members is limited tothose "who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts."(Article 264, Labor Code) Evidence must be presented to substantiatethe commission thereof and not merely an unsubstantiated allegation- The right to strike is one of the rights recognized and guaranteed bythe Constitution as an instrument of labor for its protection againstexploitation by management. By virtue of this right, the workers are able

to press their demands for better terms of employment with more energyand persuasiveness, poising the threat to strike as their reaction to theemployer's intransigence. The strike is indeed a powerful weapon of theworking class. But precisely because of this, it must be handledcarefully, like a sensitive explosive, lest it blow up in the workers' ownhands. Thus, it must be declared only after the most thoughtfulconsultation among them, conducted in the only way allowed, that is,peacefully, and in every case conformably to reasonable regulation. Anyviolation of the legal requirements and strictures, such as a defiance of areturn-to-work order in industries affected with public interest, will renderthe strike illegal, to the detriment of the very workers it is supposed toprotect

Lapanday Workers Union v. NLRC248 SCRA 95

Puno ; Sept. 7, 1995

Facts-Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation and CADECOAgro Development Philippines Inc. (Private respondents) are sistercompanies. Lapanday Workers Union (Union) is the duly certifiedbargaining agent of the rank and file employees of private respondent.The Union is affiliated with the KMU-ANGLO.-Union has a collective bargaining agreement. A few months before theexpiration of their CBA, private respondent initiated certain managementpolicies which disrupted the relationship of the parties- 1. Contracting ofPhilippine Eagle Protectors and Security Agency Inc., the Union brandedthe security guards posted within the company premises as privaterespondents' "goons" and "special forces." It also accused the guards ofintimidating and harassing their members. 2. The Union claimed that themodule on the Philippines political spectrum lumped the ANGLO(Alliance of Nationalist and Genuine Labor Organization), with otheroutlawed labor organization such as the National Democratic Front orother leftist groups.-These issues were discussed during a labor-management meeting, theUnion agreed to allow its members to attend the HDIR seminar for therank-and-filers but the Union directed its members not to attend theseminars scheduled on said dates. They picketed the premises of thePhilippine Eagle Protectors to show their displeasure on the hiring of theguards. Union filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation andMediation Board (NCMB). NCMB called conciliation conference. Theconference yielded the agreements that Union officers, including theofficials of KMU-ANGLO, and the Executive Director of the NMB wouldattend the HDIR seminar and a committee shall convene to establishguidelines governing the guards. With the apparent settlement of their

difference, private respondents notified the NCMB that therewere no more base for the notice of strike.-Danilo Martinez. a member of the Board of Directors of theUnion, was gunned down in his house in the presence of his wifeand children. The gunman was later identified as Eledio Samson,an alleged member of security forces of private respondent. Afterthe killing, most of the members of the Union refused to reportfor work. They returned to work the following day but they did notcomply with the "quota system" adopted by the management tobolster production output. Allegedly, the Union instructed the

workers to reduce their production to thirty percent (30%) Privaterespondents charged the Union with economic sabotage throughslowdown. Private respondents filed separate charged againstthe Union and it member for illegal strike. unfair labor practiceand damages, with prayer for injunction. Petitioners skippedwork to pay their last respect to the slain Danilo Martinez. whowas laid to rest. Again on another date petitioner did not reportfor work. Instead, they proceeded to private respondents' officeat Lanang, carrying placards and posters which called for theremoval of the security guards. the ouster of certainmanagement officials, and the approval of their mass leaveapplication. Their mass action did not succeed.-Labor Arbiter decision: Illegal strike and employees have losttheir employment status and order to desist. NLRC limited thepenalty of dismissal only to the leaders of the illegal strikeespecially the officers of the union who served as its major

player and union members were merely instigated to participatein the illegal strike and should be treated differently from theirleaders. Petitioners claim that public respondent NLRC gravelyabused it discretion.

Issue WON the strike is legalHeldNo. The applicable law are Articles 263 and 264 of the LaborCode, as amended by E.O. No. 111, dated December 24. 1986.Paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the Labor Code, asamended by E.O. 111, provides.

"c) In cases of bargaining deadlocks. the duly certified orrecognized bargaining agent may file a notice of strike or theemployer may file a notice of lockout with the Ministry atleast 30 days before the intended date thereof. In cases ofunfair labor practice, the notice shall be 15 days and in theabsence of a duly certified or recognized bargaining agent,the notice of strike may be filed by any legitimate labororganization in behalf of its member. However, in case ofdismissal from employment of union officer duly elected inaccordance with the union constitution and by-laws, whichmay constitute union busting where the existence of theunion is threatened, the 15-day cooling-off period shall notapply and the union may take action immediately.xxx xxx xxx"f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by amajority of the total union membership in the bargaining unitconcerned, obtained by secret ballot in meetings orreferenda called for that purpose. A decision to declare alockout must be approved by a majority of the board ofdirector of the corporation or association or of the partner ina partnership, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called

for that purpose. The decision shall be valid for the durationof the dispute based on substantially the same groundsconsidered when the strike or lockout vote was taken. TheMinistry may, at its own initiative or upon the request of anyaffected party, supervise the conduct of secret ballot In everycase the union or the employer shall furnish the Ministry theresult of the voting at least seven (7) days before theintended strike or lockout subject to the cooling-off periodherein provided.

Article 264 of the same Code reads:"Art 264. Prohibited activities. - (a) No labororganization or employer shall declared a strike or


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LABOR LAW 2 A2010 239 Disinilockout without first having bargained collectively inaccordance with Title VII of this Book or without first havingfiled the notice required in the preceding Article or without thenecessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained andreported to the Ministry.xxx xxx xxx". . . Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike andany worker or union officer who knowingly participates in thecommission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have losthis employment status: Provided that mere participation of a worker in alawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of hisemployment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employerduring such lawful strike."A strike is "any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action ofemployees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute." It is the mostpreeminent of the economic weapons or workers which they unsheatheto force management to agree to an equitable sharing of the pointproduct of labor and capital. Undeniably, strikes exert some disquietingeffects not only on the relationship between labor and management butalso on the general peace and progress of society. Our laws thusregulate their exercise within reasons by balancing the interests of laborand management together with the overarching public interest.

Some of the limitations on the exercise of the right of strike are providedfor in paragraph (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the labor Code, as amended,supra. They provide for the procedural steps to be followed before

staging a strike - filing of notice of strike, taking of strike vote, andreporting of the strike vote result to the Department of Labor andEmployment. In National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW) vs.Overseas, et al., we ruled that these steps are mandatory incharacter. thus:

"If only the filing of the strike notice and the strike-vote report would bedeemed mandatory. but not the waiting periods so specifically andemphatically prescribed by law, the purposes (hereafter discussed) forwhich the filing of the strike notice and strike-vote report is requiredcannot be achieved . . .xxx xxx xxx"So too, the 7 day strike-vote report is not without a purpose. As pointedout by the Solicitor General -'. . . The submission of the report gives assurance that a strike vote hasbeen taken and that, if the report concerning it is false, the majority ofthe members can take appropriate remedy before it is too late.'

The seven (7) day waiting period is intended to give the Department ofLabor and Employment an opportunity to verify whether the projectedstrike really carries the imprimatur of the majority of the union members.The need for assurance that majority of the union members support thestrike cannot be gainsaid. Strike is usually the last weapon of labor to begainsaid. Strike compel capital to concede to its bargaining demands orto defend itself against unfair labor practices of management. It is aweapon that can either breathe life to or destroy the union and itsmembers in their struggle with management for a more equitable due oftheir labors. The decision to wield the weapon of strike must, therefore,rest on a rational basis, free from emotionalism. unswayed by thetempers and tantrums of a few hothead, and firmly focused on thelegitimate interest of the union which should not, however, be antitheticalto the public welfare. Thus, our laws require the decision to strike to bethe consensus of the majority for while majority is not infallible, still, it is

the best hedge against haste and error. In addition, a majority voteassures the union it will go to war against management with the strengthderived from unity and hence, with better chance to succeed. InBatangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company vs. NLRC, we held:xxx xxx xxx"The right to strike is one of the right recognized and guaranteed by theConstitution as an instrument of labor for it protection againstexploitation by management. by virtue of his right. the workers are ableto press their demands for better terms of employment with more energyand persuasiveness. poising the threat to strike at their reaction toemployer s intransigence. The strike is indeed a powerful weapon of theworking class. But precisely because of this, it must be handled carefullylike a sensitive explosive, but it blow up in the workers' own hands.Thus. it must de declared only after the most thoughtful consultation

among them, conducted in the only was allowed that is,peacefully, and in every case conformably to reasonableregulation. Any violation of the legal requirements andstrictures, . . . will render the strike illegal. to the detriment of thevery workers it is supposed to protect."Every war must be lawfully waged. A labor dispute demands noless observance of the rules. for the benefit of all concerned."Applying the law to the case at bar, we rule that strike conductedby the union on October 12, 1988 is plainly illegal as it was heldwithin the seven (7) day waiting period provided for by paragraph

(f), Article 263 of the Labor Code. as amended. The haste inholding the strike prevented the Department of Labor andEmployment from verifying whether it carried the approval of themajority of the union members. It set to naught an importantpolicy consideration of our law on strike. Considering this finding,we need not exhaustively rule on the legality of the workstoppage conducted by the union and some of their members onSeptember 9 and 23, 1988. Suffice to state, that the ruling of thepublic respondent on the matter is supported by substantialevidence.

Disposition Reinstating rank-and-file workers who were merelymisled in supporting illegal strikes but not be entitled tobackwages as they should not be compensated for servicesskipped during the illegal strike. Dismissed.

GRAND BOULEVARD HOTEL V GENUINELABORERS ORGANIZATION406 SCRA 688

CALLEJO; July 18, 2003

NATUREPetition for review on certiorari

FACTS- Respondent Genuine Labor Organization of Workers in Hotel,Restaurant and Allied Industries Silahis International HotelChapter (Union) and the petitioner Grand Boulevard Hotel (thenSilahis International Hotel, Inc.) executed a CBA covering theperiod from July 10, 1985 up to July 9, 1988.- Thereafter, Union filed several notices of strike on account ofalleged violations of CBA, illegal dismissal and suspension of

EEs. In these instances, SOLE issued a status quo ante bellumorder certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsoryarbitration pursuant to Article 263(g) of LC. After notice wasgiven by Hotel re its decision to implement retrenchmentprogram, Union informed the DOLE that the union will conduct astrike vote referendum. The members of the Union voted tostage a strike. Union informed the DOLE of the results of thestrike vote referendum. SOLE issued another status quo antebellum order certifying the case to the NLRC for compulsoryarbitration and enjoining the parties from engaging in any strikeor lockout. Then, another notice of strike was filed by Union onaccount of the illegal dismissal of EEs pusrsuant to Hotels act ofretrenching around 171 EEs. Officers of the respondent unionand some members staged a picket in the premises of the hotel,obstructing the free ingress and egress thereto. Because of this,they were terminated.- Hotel filed a complaint with NLRC for illegal strike against theunion, its members and officers. Petitioner Hotel alleged interalia that the union members and officers staged a strike onNovember 16, 1990 which lasted until November 29, 1990without complying with the requirements provided under Articles263 and 264 of the Labor Code. It further alleged that the officersand members of the respondent union blocked the main ingressto and egress from the hotel.- The respondent Union denied the material allegations of thecomplaint and alleged that the petitioner committed ULP prior tothe filing of the Nov. 16, 1990 notice of strike. Hence, there wasno need for the union to comply with A263 and 264 of LC, as thenotice


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LABOR LAW 2 A2010 240 Disini- LA Linsangans Ruling: Unions failure to comply with the requirementslaid down in A263 and 264 of LC, the strike that was staged was illegal.Considering the admissions of the individual respondents that theyparticipated in the said strike, the termination of their employment by thepetitioner was legal. LA noted that if as alleged by the respondent unionthe petitioner was guilty of ULP, it should have filed a complaint thereforagainst the Hotel and/or its officials for which the latter could have beenmeted penal and administrative sanctions as provided for in A272 of LC.The Union failed.- Appeal by Union to NLRC: that it had complied with the requirements

laid down in A263 and 264 of LC because its Nov 16, 1990 notice ofstrike was a mere reiteration of its Sept 27, 1990 notice of strike, which,in turn, complied with all the requirements of the aforementionedarticles, i.e., the cooling-off period, the strike ban, the strike vote and thestrike vote report.- NLRC affirmed LA Decision. Compliance of the requirements laid downin A263 and 264 of LC respecting the Sept 27, 1990 notice of strike filedby the union cannot be carried over to the Nov 16, 1990 notice of strike.Resultantly, for failure of the union to comply with the requirements, thestrike staged on November 16 up to November 29, 1990 was illegal.- CA reversed NLRC and LA: It took into account the observation of theSol-Gen that the Hotel retrenched EEs pending the resolution of thecertified cases respecting the alleged illegal suspension and dismissalseffected by Hotel during and prior to the notices of strike filed by Union.Sol-Gen opined that even if the strike was staged without the propernotice and compliance with the cooling-off period, resort thereto was

simply triggered by the petitioners' belief in good faith that Hotel wasengaged in ULP. Hence, this petition

ISSUES1 WON the strike staged by the respondent union on Nov16-29, 1990is legal2 WON the dismissals of the officers and some members of the Unionas a consequence of the strike on Nov16-29, 1990 are valid.

HELD1. NORe: Procedural Requirements- Under A263 (c) and (f) of LC, the requisites for a valid strike are asfollows: (a) a notice of strike fled with the DOLE 30 days before theintended date thereof or 15 days in case of ULP; (b) strike voteapproved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargainingunit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that

purpose; (c) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least7 days before the intended strike. The requisite 7-day period is intendedto give the DOLE an opportunity to verify whether the projected strikereally carries the approval of the majority of the union members. Thenotice of strike and the cooling-off period were intended to provide anopportunity for mediation and conciliation. The requirements aremandatory and failure of a union to comply therewith renders the strikeillegal. A strike simultaneously with or immediately after a notice of strikewill render the requisite periods nugatory.

- In this case, union filed its notice of strike with the DOLE on Nov 16,1990 and on the same day, staged a picket on the premises of the hotel,in violation of the law. Union cannot argue that since the notice of strikeon Nov 16, 1990 were for the same grounds as those contained in theirnotice of strike on September 27, 1990 which complied with therequirements of the law on the cooling-off period, strike ban, strike voteand strike vote report, the strike staged by them on Nov16, 1990 waslawful. The matters contained in the notice of strike of Sept 27, 1990 hadalready been taken cognizance of by the SOLE when he issued on Oct31, 1990 a status quo ante bellum order enjoining union from intendingor staging a strike. Despite SOLE order, the union nevertheless staged astrike on Nov16, 1990 simultaneously with its notice of strike, thusviolating A264(a) LC

Grounds- A strike that is undertaken, despite the issuance by the SOLE of anassumption or certification order, becomes a prohibited activity and,thus, illegal pursuant to A264 of LC: No strike or lockout shall bedeclared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or theSecretary or after certification or submission of the dispute to

compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency ofcases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.- Even if the union acted in good faith in the belief that thecompany was committing an unfair labor practice, if no notice ofstrike and a strike vote were conducted, the said strike is illegal.

2. YESRe: Effect of IllegalityRatio Since a strike that is undertaken, despite the issuance bythe SOLE of an assumption or certification order, becomes a

prohibited activity and, thus, illegal pursuant to A264 of LC, theunion officers and members, as a result, are deemed to havelost their employment status for having knowingly participated inan illegal act.

Disposition Petition is GRANTED. LA Decision REINSTATED.

3. INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ONECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURALRIGHTS ART. 8 (d)

INTL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND

CULTURAL RIGHTSArticle 8

1. The States Parties to the present Covenantundertake to ensure:

-xxx-(d) The right to strike, provided that it is exercisedin conformity with the laws of the particularcountry.

4. LIMITATIONS

PHILIPPINE DIAMOND HOTEL AND RESORTINC (MANILA DIAMOND HOTEL v MANILA

DIAMOND HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION494 SCRA 195CARPIO MORALES; June 30, 2006

FACTS-Union filed a petition for certification election to be declared theexclusive bargaining representative of the Hotels employees.This petition was dismissed by DOLE for lack of legalrequirements.-after a few months, Union sent a letter to Hotel informing it of itsdesire to negotiate for a collective bargaining agreement. Thiswas rejected by the Hotel stating that the Union was not theemployees bargaining agent as their petition for certificationelection was denied.-Union filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB alleging the Hotelrefusal to bargain and for acts of unfair labor practices. NCMB

summoned both parties and held series of dialogues. Unionhowever suddenly went on strike-Secretary of DOLE assumed jurisdiction and orderedcompulsory arbitrationpursuant to art. 263 (g) of LC. And Unionmembers were directed to return to work and for Hotel to acceptthem back. Hotel refused to accept the employees return. Theorder was modified (by a different Secretary) such thatreinstatement was to be done only in the payroll.-Union filed for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion. Casewas referred to the CA. CA affirmed that the payrollreinstatement was not a grave abuse of discretion. On appeal, itmodified NLRC decision ordering reinstatement with back wagesof union members.


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LABOR LAW 2 A2010 241 DisiniISSUE1) WON the Union can bargain only in behalf of its members and not forall the employees of the Hotel.2) WON the strike conducted by the Union was illegal.3) WON those employees who participated in the strike should be givenback wages

HELD1) No.-As provided by art 255 of the LC only the labor organization designated

or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate collectivebargaining unit is the exclusive representative of the employees in suchunit for the purpose of collective bargaining.-The Unions petition for certificate election was denied by the DOLE.The union thus is admittedly not the exclusive representative of themajority of the employees of petitioner, hence, i t could not demand frompetitioner the right to bargain collectively in their behalf-Respondent insists, however, that it could validly bargain in behalf of"its members," relying on Article 242 of the Labor Code.-the CA ruled that what [respondent] will be achieving is to divide theemployees, more particularly, the rank-and-file employees of[petitioner] . . . the other workers who are not members are at a seriousdisadvantage, because if the same shall be allowed, employees who arenon-union members will be economically impaired and will not be able tonegotiate their terms and conditions of work, thus defeating the veryessence and reason of collective bargaining, which is an effective

safeguard against the evil schemes of employers in terms andconditions of work- Petitioners refusal to bargain then with respondent can not beconsidered a ULP to justify the staging of the strike.TOPICS: Union registration and procedure, factors, majority union

2) yes.-as was mentioned, the first ground mentioned by the Union- the Hotelsrefusal to bargain- was not a valid ground to stage the strike.-The second ground that petitioner prevented or intimidated someworkers from joining the union before, during or after the strike wascorrectly discredited by the appellate court.. Since it is the union whoalleges that unfair labor practices were committed by the Hotel, theburden of proof is on the union to prove its allegations by substantialevidence. the facts and the evidence did not establish events [sic] leasta rational basis why the union would [wield] a strike based on allegedunfair labor practices it did not even bother to substantiate.

-It is doctrinal that the exercise of the right of private sector employeesto strike is not absolute. Thus Section 3 of Article XIII of the Constitution,provides:SECTION 3. x x xIt shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collectivebargaining and negotiations and peaceful concerted activities, includingthe right to strike in accordance with law-Even if the purpose of a strike is valid, the strike may still be held illegalwhere the means employed are illegal. Thus, the employment ofviolence, intimidation, restraint or coercion in carrying out concertedactivities which are injurious to the rights to property renders a strikeillegal. Evidence show s that some of the workers-strikers who joined thestrike indeed committed illegal acts blocking the free ingress to andegress from the Hotel, holding noise barrage, threatening guests, andthe like.TOPICS: right to engage in concerted activities-limitations

3) No.-The general rule is that backwages shall not be awarded in aneconomic strike on the principle that "a fair days wage" accrues only fora "fair days labor. If there is no work performed by the employee therecan be no wage or pay, unless of course, the laborer was able, willingand ready to work but was illegally locked out, dismissed or suspended."when employees voluntarily go on strike, even if in protest againstunfair labor practices," no back wages during the strike is awarded.-The Court ruled that only those members of the union who did notcommit illegal acts during the course of the illegal strike should bereinstated but without back wagesTOPIC: illegal strikes- burden of economic loss

BISIG NG MANGGAGAWA SA CONCRETEAGGREGATES, INC. V NLRC

G.R. No. 105090PUNO; September 16, 1993

NATUREPetition for certiorari and mandamus

FACTS- The labor conflict between the parties broke out in the openwhen the petitioner union struck on April 6, 1992 protestingissues ranging from unfair labor practices and union bustingallegedly committed by the private respondent. The unionpicketed the premises of the private respondent in Quezon City,Rizal, Pampanga and Laguna.- On April 8, 1992, private respondent filed with the NLRC apetition for injunction to stop the strike which it denounced asillegal.- The petition was set for hearing but the union claimed that itwas not furnished a copy of the petition. Allegedly, the companymisrepresented its address to be at Rm. 205-6 Herald Bldg.,Muralla St., Intramuros, Manila.- On April 13, 1992, the NLRC heard the evidence of thecompany alone. Before the day was over, the respondent NLRCissued a temporary restraining order against the union. No copy

of this Order was furnished the union. The union learned of theOrder only when it was posted on April 15, 1992 at the premisesof the company..- On April 24, 1992, the union also filed its own Petition forInjunction to enjoin the company "from asking the aid of thepolice and the military officer in escorting scabs to enter thestruck establishment." The records show that the case washeard on April 24 and 30, May 4 and 5, 1992 by respondentLabor Arbiter Enrilo Pealosa. On April 30, 1992, the companyfiled a Motion for the Immediate Issuance of PreliminaryInjunction, which the union opposed. On May 5, 1992, however,the respondent NLRC issued its disputed Order granting thecompany's motion for preliminary injunction.

ISSUE WON Order of the NLRC infringes petitioners' right tostrike and must be struck down

HELD YES- The records will show that the respondent NLRC failed tocomply with the letter and spirit of Article 218 (e), (4) and (5) ofthe Labor Code in issuing its Order of May 5, 1992. Article 218(e) of the Labor Code provides both the procedural andsubstantive requirements which must strictly be complied withbefore a temporary or permanent injunction can issue in a labordispute, viz:

"ART. 218. Powers of the Commission. -- The Commissionshall have the power and authority:

xxx xxx xxx

(e) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission ofany or all prohibited or unlawful acts or to require the

performance of a particular act in any labor dispute which, if notrestrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave orirreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual anydecision in favor of such party: Provided, That no temporary orpermanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of alabor dispute as defined in this Code shall be issued except afterhearing the testimony of witnesses, with opportunity for cross-examination, in support of the allegations of a complaint madeunder oath, and testimony in opposition thereto, if offered, andonly after a finding of fact by the commission, to the effect:

"(1) That prohibited or unlawful acts have been threatened andwill be committed and will be continued unless restrained but noinjunction or temporary restraining order shall be issued on


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LABOR LAW 2 A2010 242 Disiniaccount of any threat, prohibited or unlawful act, except against theperson or persons, association or organization making the threat orcommitting the prohibited or unlawful act or actually authorizing orratifying the same after actual knowledge thereof;

"(2) That substantial and irreparable injury to complainants property willfollow;

"(3) That as to each item of relief to be granted, greater injury will beinflicted upon complainant by the denial of relief than will be inflicted

upon defendants by the granting of relief;

"(4) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and"(5) That thepublic officers charged with the duty to protect complainants propertyare unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection.

"Such hearing shall be held after due and personal notice thereof hasbeen served, in such manner as the Commission shall direct, to allknown persons against whom relief is sought, and also to the ChiefExecutive and other public officials of the province or city within whichthe unlawful have been threatened or committed charged with the dutyto protect complainant's property: . . ."

- In his Comment, the Solicitor General cited various evidence on recordshowing the failure of public respondents to fulfill the requirements,especially of paragraphs four and five of the above cited law. The

factual circumstances proven by the evidence show that there was noconcurrence of the five prerequisites mandated by Art. 218(e) of theLabor Code. Thus there is no justification for the issuance of thequestioned Order of preliminary injunction.- Moreover, the records reveal the continuing misuse of unfair strategiesto secure ex parte temporary restraining orders against strikingemployees. Petitioner union did not receive any copy of privaterespondent's petition for injunction. Its address, as alleged by the privaterespondent, turned out to be "erroneous". Consequently, the petitionerwas denied the right to attend the hearing while the private respondentenjoyed a field day presenting its evidence ex parte. On the basis ofuncontested evidence, the public respondent temporarily enjoined thepetitioner from committing certain alleged illegal acts. Again, a copy ofthe Order was sent to the wrong address of the petitioner. Knowledge ofthe Order came to the petitioner only when its striking members read itafter it was posted at the struck areas of the private respondent.- To be sure, the issuance of an ex parte temporary restraining order in

a labor dispute is not per se prohibited. Its issuance, however, should becharacterized by care and caution for the law requires that it be clearly

justified by considerations of extreme necessity, i.e., when thecommission of unlawful acts is causing substantial and irreparable injuryto company properties and the company is, for the moment, bereft of anadequate remedy at law. This is as i t ought to be, for imprudently issuedtemporary restraining orders can break the back of employees engagedin a legal strike. Often times, they unduly tilt the balance of a laborwarfare in favor of capital. When that happens, the deleterious effects ofa wrongfully issued, ex parte temporary restraining order on the rights ofstriking employees can no longer be repaired for they defy simplemonetization. Moreover, experience shows that ex parte applications forrestraining orders are often based on fabricated facts and concealedtruths. A more becoming sense of fairness, therefore, demands thatsuch ex parte applications should be more minutely examined byhearing officers, lest, our constitutional policy of protecting laborbecomes nothing but a synthetic shibboleth. The immediate need tohear and resolve these ex parte applications do not provide any excuseto lower our vigilance in protecting labor against the issuance ofindiscriminate injunctions. Stated otherwise, it behooves hearing officersreceiving evidence in support of ex parte injunctions against employeesin strike to take a more active stance in seeing to it that their right tosocial justice is in no way violated despite their absence. This equalizingstance was nottaken in the case at bar by the public respondents.

Disposition The petition is granted.

BLT BUS CO V NLRC



FACTS- Tinig at Lakas ng Manggagawa sa BLTB Co. NAFLU, anaffiliate of NAFLU, filed a Notice of Strike against the BatangasLaguna Tayabas Bus Company (BLTB Co.) on the grounds of

unfair labor practice and violation of the CBA.- BLTB Co. asked the Sec. of Labor to assume jurisdiction or tocertify it to the NLRC. The Acting Sec of Labor later certified it tothe NLRC. A copy of the certification order was served uponNAFLU. The union secretary, however, refused to receive it.- The off icers and members of TL M-BLTBCo-NAFLUwent on strike. The NLRC issued a resolution ordering theemployees to stop the strike. BLTBCo caused the publication ofthe resolution and called on all striking workers to return to work.- Of the some 1,730 BLTBCo employees who went on strike,only 1,116 reported back for work. Seventeen others were laterre-admitted. Subsequently, about 614 employees, includingthose who were allegedly dismissed for causes other than thestrike, filed individual complaints for illegal dismissal. Theircommon ground was that they were refused admission whenthey reported back for work.- The NLRC issued a resolution ordering the reinstatement of theunion members.

ISSUE/S1. WON the union members who participated in the illegal strikeshould be reinstated

HELD1. YES.Reasoning- First, there was inadequate service of the certification order onthe union as of the date the strike was declared and there wasno showing that the striking members had been apprised of suchorder by the NAFLU.- Second, by virtue of the priniciple of vicarious liability, only theunion officers deserve not to be reinstated. The leaders of theunion are the moving force in the declaration of the strike and

the Rank-in-file employees merely followed. Likewise, viewed inthe light of Article 264, paragraph (e), those who participated inthe commission of illegal acts who stood charged criminallythereof in court must be penalized- The contention of the petitioner that the private respondentsabandoned their position is also not acceptable. An employeewho forthwith takes steps to protest his lay-off cannot by anylogic be said to have abandoned his work.-The loss of employment status of striking union members islimited to those "who knowingly participates in the commission ofillegal acts." (Article 264, Labor Code) Evidence must bepresented to substantiate the commission thereof and not merelyan unsubstantiated allegation- The right to strike is one of the rights recognized andguaranteed by the Constitution as an instrument of labor for itsprotection against exploitation by management. By virtue of thisright, the workers are able to press their demands for better

terms of employment with more energy and persuasiveness,poising the threat to strike as their reaction to the employer'sintransigence. The strike is indeed a powerful weapon of theworking class. But precisely because of this, it must be handledcarefully, like a sensitive explosive, lest it blow up in the workers'own hands. Thus, it must be declared only after the mostthoughtful consultation among them, conducted in the only wayallowed, that is, peacefully, and in every case conformably toreasonable regulation. Any violation of the legal requirementsand strictures, such as a defiance of a return-to-work order inindustries affected with public interest, will render the strikeillegal, to the detriment of the very workers it is supposed toprotect


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LABOR LAW 2 A2010 243 Disini

Disposition Petition dismissed

Lapanday Workers Union v. NLRC248 SCRA 95

Puno ; Sept. 7, 1995

Facts-Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation and CADECOAgro Development Philippines Inc. (Private respondents) are sistercompanies. Lapanday Workers Union (Union) is the duly certifiedbargaining agent of the rank and file employees of private respondent.The Union is affiliated with the KMU-ANGLO.-Union has a collective bargaining agreement. A few months before theexpiration of their CBA, private respondent initiated certain managementpolicies which disrupted the relationship of the parties- 1. Contracting ofPhilippine Eagle Protectors and Security Agency Inc., the Union brandedthe security guards posted within the company premises as privaterespondents' "goons" and "special forces." It also accused the guards ofintimidating and harassing their members. 2. The Union claimed that themodule on the Philippines political spectrum lumped the ANGLO(Alliance of Nationalist and Genuine Labor Organization), with otheroutlawed labor organization such as the National Democratic Front orother leftist groups.-These issues were discussed during a labor-management meeting, the

Union agreed to allow its members to attend the HDIR seminar for therank-and-filers but the Union directed its members not to attend theseminars scheduled on said dates. They picketed the premises of thePhilippine Eagle Protectors to show their displeasure on the hiring of theguards. Union filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation andMediation Board (NCMB). NCMB called conciliation conference. Theconference yielded the agreements that Union officers, including theofficials of KMU-ANGLO, and the Executive Director of the NMB wouldattend the HDIR seminar and a committee shall convene to establishguidelines governing the guards. With the apparent settlement of theirdifference, private respondents notified the NCMB that there were nomore base for the notice of strike.-Danilo Martinez. a member of the Board of Directors of the Union, wasgunned down in his house in the presence of his wife and children. Thegunman was later identified as Eledio Samson, an alleged member ofsecurity forces of private respondent. After the killing, most of themembers of the Union refused to report for work. They returned to work

the following day but they did not comply with the "quota system"adopted by the management to bolster production output. Allegedly, theUnion instructed the workers to reduce their production to thirty percent(30%) Private respondents charged the Union with economic sabotagethrough slowdown. Private respondents filed separate charged againstthe Union and it member for illegal strike. unfair labor practice anddamages, with prayer for injunction. Petitioners skipped work to pay theirlast respect to the slain Danilo Martinez. who was laid to rest. Again onanother date petitioner did not report for work. Instead, they proceededto private respondents' office at Lanang, carrying placards and posterswhich called for the removal of the security guards. the ouster of certainmanagement officials, and the approval of their mass leave application.Their mass action did not succeed.-Labor Arbiter decision: Illegal strike and employees have lost theiremployment status and order to desist. NLRC limited the penalty ofdismissal only to the leaders of the illegal strike especially the officers of

the union who served as its major player and union members weremerely instigated to participate in the illegal strike and should be treateddifferently from their leaders. Petitioners claim that public respondentNLRC gravely abused it discretion.

IssuesWON the strike is legal

HeldNo. The applicable law are Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code, asamended by E.O. No. 111, dated December 24. 1986.Paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended byE.O. 111, provides.

"c) In cases of bargaining deadlocks. the duly certified orrecognized bargaining agent may file a notice of strike or theemployer may file a notice of lockout with the Ministry at least 30days before the intended date thereof. In cases of unfair laborpractice, the notice shall be 15 days and in the absence of a dulycertified or recognized bargaining agent, the notice of strike maybe filed by any legitimate labor organization in behalf of itsmember. However, in case of dismissal from employment ofunion officer duly elected in accordance with the unionconstitution and by-laws, which may constitute union busting

where the existence of the union is threatened, the 15-daycooling-off period shall not apply and the union may take actionimmediately.xxx xxx xxx"f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majorityof the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned,obtained by secret ballot in meetings or referenda called for thatpurpose. A decision to declare a lockout must be approved by amajority of the board of director of the corporation or associationor of the partner in a partnership, obtained by secret ballot in ameeting called for that purpose. The decision shall be valid forthe duration of the dispute based on substantially the samegrounds considered when the strike or lockout vote was taken.The Ministry may, at its own initiative or upon the request of anyaffected party, supervise the conduct of secret ballot In everycase the union or the employer shall furnish the Ministry the

result of the voting at least seven (7) days before the intendedstrike or lockout subject to the cooling-off period herein provided.

Article 264 of the same Code reads:"Art 264. Prohibited activities. - (a) No labor organization oremployer shall declared a strike or lockout without first havingbargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book orwithout first having filed the notice required in the precedingArticle or without the necessary strike or lockout vote first havingbeen obtained and reported to the Ministry.xxx xxx xxx". . . Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegalstrike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participatesin the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declaredto have lost his employment status: Provided that mereparticipation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitutesufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a

replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawfulstrike."A strike is "any temporary stoppage of work by the concertedaction of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute."It is the most preeminent of the economic weapons or workerswhich they unsheathe to force management to agree to anequitable sharing of the point product of labor and capital.Undeniably, strikes exert some disquieting effects not only onthe relationship between labor and management but also on thegeneral peace and progress of society. Our laws thus regulatetheir exercise within reasons by balancing the interests of laborand management together with the overarching public interest.

Some of the limitations on the exercise of the right of strike areprovided for in paragraph (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the laborCode, as amended, supra. They provide for the procedural stepsto be followed before staging a strike - filing of notice of strike,taking of strike vote, and reporting of the strike vote result to theDepartment of Labor and Employment. In National Federation ofSugar Workers (NFSW) vs. Overseas, et al., we ruled that thesesteps are mandatory in character. thus:

"If only the filing of the strike notice and the strike-vote reportwould be deemed mandatory. but not the waiting periods sospecifically and emphatically prescribed by law, the purposes

ART. 212. Definitions. (o) "Strike" meantemporary stoppage of work by the conaction of employees as a result of an industlabor dispute.


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LABOR LAW 2 A2010 244 Disini(hereafter discussed) for which the filing of the strike notice and strike-vote report is required cannot be achieved . . .xxx xxx xxx

"So too, the 7 day strike-vote report is not without a purpose. As pointedout by the Solicitor General -'. . . The submission of the report gives assurance that a strike vote hasbeen taken and that, if the report concerning it is false, the majority ofthe members can take appropriate remedy before it is too late.'

The seven (7) day waiting period is intended to give the Department ofLabor and Employment an opportunity to verify whether the projectedstrike really carries the imprimatur of the majority of the union members.The need for assurance that majority of the union members support thestrike cannot be gainsaid. Strike is usually the last weapon of labor to begainsaid. Strike compel capital to concede to its bargaining demands orto defend itself against unfair labor practices of management. It is aweapon that can either breathe life to or destroy the union and itsmembers in their struggle with management for a more equitable due oftheir labors. The decision to wield the weapon of strike must, therefore,rest on a rational basis, free from emotionalism. unswayed by thetempers and tantrums of a few hothead, and firmly focused on thelegitimate interest of the union which should not, however, be antitheticalto the public welfare. Thus, our laws require the decision to strike to bethe consensus of the majority for while majority is not infallible, still, it isthe best hedge against haste and error. In addition, a majority vote

assures the union it will go to war against management with the strengthderived from unity and hence, with better chance to succeed. InBatangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company vs. NLRC, we held:xxx xxx xxx

"The right to strike is one of the right recognized and guaranteed by theConstitution as an instrument of labor for it protection againstexploitation by management. by virtue of his right. the workers are ableto press their demands for better terms of employment with more energyand persuasiveness. poising the threat to strike at their reaction toemployer s intransigence. The strike is indeed a powerful weapon of theworking class. But precisely because of this, it must be handled carefullylike a sensitive explosive, but it blow up in the workers' own hands.Thus. it must de declared only after the most thoughtful consultationamong them, conducted in the only was allowed that is, peacefully, andin every case conformably to reasonable regulation. Any violation of thelegal requirements and strictures, . . . will render the strike illegal. to the

detriment of the very workers it is supposed to protect.

"Every war must be lawfully waged. A labor dispute demands no lessobservance of the rules. for the benefit of all concerned."Applying the law to the case at bar, we rule that strike conducted by theunion on October 12, 1988 is plainly illegal as it was held within theseven (7) day waiting period provided for by paragraph (f), Article 263 ofthe Labor Code. as amended. The haste in holding the strike preventedthe Department of Labor and Employment from verifying whether itcarried the approval of the majority of the union members. It set tonaught an important policy consideration of our law on strike.Considering this finding, we need not exhaustively rule on the legality ofthe work stoppage conducted by the union and some of their memberson September 9 and 23, 1988. Suffice to state, that the ruling of thepublic respondent on the matter is supported by substantial evidence.

DispositionReinstating rank-and-file workers who were merely misled in supportingillegal strikes but not be entitled to backwages as they should not becompensated for services skipped during the illegal strike. Dismissed.

9.02 STRIKE ACTIVITY1. DEFINITION- 212 (O)

BUKLURAN NG MANGGAGAWA SACLOTHMAN KNITTING CORPORATION

SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINESFOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (BMC-

SUPER) vs. CA (CLOTHMAN KNITTING

CORPORATION)448 SCRA 642CALLEJO, SR.; Jan 17, 2005

NATUREPetition for review

FACTS- Clothman Knitting Corporation (CKC), a domestic corporationengaged in knitting/textiles, issued a Memorandum informing itsemployees at the Dyeing and Finishing Division that a temporaryshutdown of the operations therein would be effected for oneweek due to change in the schedule brought about by thedecrease in the orders from the customers.- Petitioner Tomaroy, with sixteen (16) members of the petitioner

union, staged a picket in front of the respondents compound,carrying placards with slogans.- CKC filed a petition to declare the strike illegal for failure tocomply with the procedural requirements for staging a strike.The petition was granted and the employees who participatedlost their employment status with CKC.

ISSUEWON the stage is illegal for failure of the petitioners tocomply with the procedural requirements

HELD YESRatio In order for a strike to be valid, the following requirementslaid down in paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the LaborCode must be complied with: (a) a notice of strike must be filed;(b) a strike-vote must be taken; and(c) the results of the strike-vote must be reported to the DOLE.

It bears stressing that these requirements are mandatory,meaning, non-compliance therewith makes the strike illegal. Theevident intention of the law in requiring the strike notice andstrike-vote report is to reasonably regulate the right to strike,which is essential to the attainment of legitimate policy objectivesembodied in the law.Reasoninga. The strikers/picketers did not conduct a strike vote and nocooling-off period was observed;b. The strikers/picketers did not file a notice of strike;c. The reasons for the strike/picket involve a non-strikeableissue;d. It was not based on a valid factual ground, either based onCollective Bargaining Deadlock and/or Unfair Labor Practice;e. There was no strike-vote report submitted to the DOLE atleast seven (7) daysbefore the intended date of the strike;f. The 7-day visiting period after submission of the strike vote

report was not fully observed.

DISPOSITIONPetition DENIED.AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION v CIR

76 SCRA 274CASTRO, April 15, 1977

FACTS:On 2 January 1971, Gomez, who claimed to be the President ofthe Air Line Pilots Association of the Philippines (ALPAP) filed apetition with the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) praying forcertification as sole and exclusive bargaining representative of


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LABOR LAW 2 A2010 245 Disiniall pilots under employment of Philippine Airlines and are on activeflights or operational assignments. ALPAP led by Gaston, who alsoclaimed to be its President, opposed said petition on the ground that theCIR had no jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof. However, prior tothe filing of the said certification petitition, an ALPAP meeting was heldon 30 October 1970 where 221 out of 270 members adapted a sectionwhich amended ALPAPs constitution and by-laws, it provided that anymember who shall be forced to retire or to resign or otherwiseterminated for union activities may either continue his membership, orresign from the association. During this time, PAL and ALPAP where

locked in a labor dispute as certified to the CIR. A return-to-work orderwas then issued by the CIR to all participants of the strike while PALwas ordered not to dismiss or terminate any employee. On 12December 1970, despite of a no-work-stoppage order of the CIR, amajority of ALPAP members filed resignation / retirement letters. PALaccepted the said letters with the caveat that the pilots will not beentitled to any of the benefits / privileges since their acts constitutedviolation of the order of the CIR. Thereafter, Gaston was elected asPresident of ALPAP on the election held on 18-22 December 1970 by181 votes. Meanwhile, 45 pilots who did not resign / retire from PALelected Gomez as President on 23 December 1970. The CIR grantedthe certification petition filed by Gomez and thus, he was declared asPresident of ALPAP and entitled ALPAP to all the rights and privileges ofa legitimate labor organization. Among the grounds cited by the CIR that

justified said decision were (1) the PAL pilots belonging to the GastonGroup retired / resigned en masse from PAL and accompanied this with

actual acts of not reporting, (2) that the pilots associtated with theGaston group tried to relieve their deposits from the ALPAP Credit Unionon the ground that they had resigned /retired from PAL. HoweverGaston and some of the pilots who retired sought reinstatement sayingthat their retirement was a form of a strike. And that they were made tobelieve that it was a legitimate action thus they should be reinstated.

ISSUE: WON Gaston Groups action of retiring was a legitimateconcerted activity.

HELD:NO-Parenthetically, contrary to ALPAP (Gaston)'s argument that the pilots'retirement' resignation was a legitimate concerted activity , citing Section2(1) of the Industrial Peace Act which defines "strike" as "any temporarystoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of anindustrial dispute," it is worthwhile to observe that as the law defines it, astrike means only a "temporary stoppage of work." What the mentioned

pilots did, however, cannot be considered, in the opinion of this Court,as mere "temporary stoppage of work." What they contemplated wasevidently a permanent cut-off of employment relationship with theirerstwhile employer, the Philippine Air Lines. In any event, the disputebelow having been certified as existing in an industry indispensable tothe national interest, the said pilots' rank disregard for the compulsoryorders of the industrial court and their daring and calculating venture todisengage themselves from that court's jurisdiction, for the obviouspurpose of satisfying their narrow economic demands to the prejudice ofthe public interest, are evident badges of bad faith.

ENRIQUE V ZAMORA146 SCRA 393

FERNAN; December 29, 1986

NATUREIn this petition for certiorari and mandamus, pilots Rafael Enriquezand Virgilio Ecarma seek the restoration of their seniority rights andother privileges which the Philippine Air Lines [PAL] declared asforfeited by the pilots who joined the mass retirement/resignation ofthe members of the Air Lines Pilot Association of the Philippines[ALPAP] to protest the dismissal of their president, Captain FelixGaston.

FACTS- Enriquez and Ecarma were employed by PAL on October 2, 1961 andMarch 3, 1966, respectively. Consequently, they became members of

ALPAP. On October 3, 1970, Philippine Air Lines EmployeesAssociation [PALEA] and ALPAP staged a strike against PAL todemand pay increases, better working conditions on the Manila-Karachi and Rome-Amsterdam flights, and a better retirementplan.- The President of the Philippines certified the strike to the CIR.Said court issued an order dated October 7, 1970 directing theofficers and members of PALEA and ALPAP to call off the strike,lift the picket lines in all places of operation of PAL, and return towork not later than Friday, October 9, 1970. PAL management,

on the other hand, was ordered to admit the striking employees"back to work under the same terms and conditions ofemployment existing before the strikes" and "not to suspend,dismiss or lay-off any employee as a result" of said strikes. TheCIR further stated that failure to comply with its order wouldconstitute contempt of court and "the employee failing or refusingto return to work by October 9, 1970, without justifiable cause,shall immediately be replaced by PAL, and may not bereinstated without prior Court order and on justifiable grounds".- The strikers moved for a reconsideration of the order but after itwas denied by the court, they returned to work on October 22,1970. Five days later or on October 27, 1970, PAL dismissedstrike leader Captain Gaston.- On October 30, 1970, the board of directors of ALPAP adopteda resolution condemning PAL's alleged "continued acts ofharassment and other unfair labor practices" against the ALPAP

such as the attempted lockout of ten members, the actuallockout of three other members, the forced retirement of CaptainRegino Masias [Macias] and the dismissal of ALPAP leaderCaptain Gaston. The board resolved to undertake the groundingof all PAL planes and the filing of applications for "protestretirement" of members who had completed five years ofcontinuous service, and "protest resignation" for those who hadrendered less than five years of service in the company.- Upon learning that many members of the ALPAP had signedtheir respective "protest retirement/resignation" papers, and thatALPAP would submit them en masse to PAL at a time tocoincide with the then forthcoming Papal visit, PAL filed with theCIR an ex-parte urgent motion to enjoin ALPAP officers andmembers from retiring or resigning en masse from PAL.- Acting on said motion, the Court of Industrial Relations issuedan order on November 26, 1970 which states:

WHEREFORE, pending hearing of the subject motion, the

petitioner, its members and officers, and respondents and itsofficers are hereby ordered to maintain status quo; themembers and officers of said petitioner ALPAP, and ALPAPitself, are ordered not to strike or in any way cause anystoppage in the operation and service of PAL, under pain ofdismissal and forfeiture of rights and privileges accruing totheir respective employments should they disregard thisOrder; and PAL is also ordered not to lockout any of suchmembers and officers of ALPAP under pain of contempt andcancellation of its franchise.- Notwithstanding this order, some of the officers and majority ofthe members of ALPAP submitted their respective retirement orresignation letters to PAL on December 12, 1970. The pilotstendered their retirement or resignation individually.- Among the pilots whose "protest resignation/retirement" wasaccepted by PAL were petitioners Enriquez and Ecarma.

However, on January 12, 1971, Ecarma returned to PAL afterhaving been away for thirty days. Enriquez, who had, notreported to work for thirty-six days, followed suit on January 18,1971.- Before their re-admission, PAL required them to accept twoconditions, namely: that they sign conformity to PAL's letter ofacceptance of their retirement and/or resignation and that theysubmit an application for employment as new employees withoutprotest or reservation- On March 17, 1971, PAL issued a new seniority list for pilots.Enriquez's and Ecarmas new seniority dates were listed asJanuary 18, 1971 and January 12, 1971, respectively. Thus,


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LABOR LAW 2 A2010 246 DisiniEnriquez and Ecarma respectively lost their almost 10yeai and 5-yearseniority, and started from zero seniority.- Aggrieved by this action of PAL, Enriquez and Ecarma, together withtwenty-three other pilots, filed before the CIR a petition to restore theirseniority and other privileges.- PAL opposed the petition. It alleged that the massretirement/resignation of the pilots constituted contempt of court and thatthe returning pilots, who had filed applications for employment as newpilots, "were accepted on probationary basis for a period of six months".PAL added that as the pilots' retirement or resignation violated the

November 26, 1970 order of the CIR, said pilots lost whatever privilegesor benefits they had acquired as employees of PAL- During the pendency of the petition, the CIR was abolished, and thecase was turned over to the NLRC for adjudication. On March 31, 1975,Acting Labor Arbiter Lim issued an order denying the petition forrestoration of seniority and other privileges. Said order stated that theseniority ranking on March 17, 1971 should be respected to avoidinjustice and demoralization in the ranks of the pilots and to forestall thedisruption of the smooth operation of PAL. To eliminate sources ofirritants between PAL and its employees and "by way of mitigating thepenalty" on the returning pilots, they were allowed to receive "fiftypercent [50%] or one-half of the retirement benefits which they wouldhave received under the PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan, were it not forthe fact that their retirement/resignation was in violation of a court order".

ISSUE/S

1. WON the mass strike was a concerted action protected by law.HELD1. NORatio Strike means only a 'temporary stoppage of work'.Reasoning What the mentioned pilots did, however, cannot beconsidered as mere 'temporary stoppage of work'. What theycontemplated was evidently a permanent cut-off of employmentrelationship with their erstwhile employer, the Philippine Air Lines.

The pilots' mass action was not a strike because employees who goon strike do not quit their employment. Ordinarily, the relationship ofemployer and employee continues until one or the other of theparties acts to sever the relationship or they mutually act toaccomplish that purpose. As they did not assume the status ofstrikers, their "protest retirement/resignation" was not a concertedactivity which was protected by law. Petitioners cannot, therefore,validly claim that PAL committed an unfair labor practice because,

having voluntarily terminated their employment relationship withPAL, they were not dismissed.Disposition WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and mandamus ishereby dismissed. The public respondents' orders and decision arehereby affirmed subject to the modification that petitioners are grantedfull retirement and separation benefits with legal interest from theiraccrual until petitioners are fully paid. No costs.

PHIL. BLOOMING MILLS INC. V PBM EMPLOYEESORGANIZATION(mini bernardo)

Lapanday Workers Union v. NLRC248 SCRA 95Puno ; Sept. 7, 1995

Facts-Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation and CADECOAgro Development Philippines Inc. (Private respondents) are sistercompanies. Lapanday Workers Union (Union) is the duly certifiedbargaining agent of the rank and file employees of private respondent.The Union is affiliated with the KMU-ANGLO.-Union has a collective bargaining agreement. A few months before theexpiration of their CBA, private respondent initiated certain managementpolicies which disrupted the relationship of the parties- 1. Contracting of

Philippine Eagle Protectors and Security Agency Inc., the Unionbranded the security guards posted within the companypremises as private respondents' "goons" and "special forces." Italso accused the guards of intimidating and harassing theirmembers. 2. The Union claimed that the module on thePhilippines political spectrum lumped the ANGLO (Alliance ofNationalist and Genuine Labor Organization), with otheroutlawed labor organization such as the National DemocraticFront or other leftist groups.-These issues were discussed during a labor-management

meeting, the Union agreed to allow its members to attend theHDIR seminar for the rank-and-filers but the Union directed itsmembers not to attend the seminars scheduled on said dates.They picketed the premises of the Philippine Eagle Protectors toshow their displeasure on the hiring of the guards. Union filed aNotice of Strike with the National Conciliation and MediationBoard (NCMB). NCMB called conciliation conference. Theconference yielded the agreements that Union officers, includingthe officials of KMU-ANGLO, and the Executive Director of theNMB would attend the HDIR seminar and a committee shallconvene to establish guidelines governing the guards. With theapparent settlement of their difference, private respondentsnotified the NCMB that there were no more base for the notice ofstrike.-Danilo Martinez. a member of the Board of Directors of theUnion, was gunned down in his house in the presence of his wife

and children. The gunman was later identified as Eledio Samson,an alleged member of security forces of private respondent. Afterthe killing, most of the members of the Union refused to reportfor work. They returned to work the following day but they did notcomply with the "quota system" adopted by the management tobolster production output. Allegedly, the Union instructed theworkers to reduce their production to thirty percent (30%) Privaterespondents charged the Union with economic sabotage throughslowdown. Private respondents filed separate charged againstthe Union and it member for illegal strike. unfair labor practiceand damages, with prayer for injunction. Petitioners skippedwork to pay their last respect to the slain Danilo Martinez. whowas laid to rest. Again on another date petitioner did not reportfor work. Instead, they proceeded to private respondents' officeat Lanang, carrying placards and posters which called for theremoval of the security guards. the ouster of certainmanagement officials, and the approval of their mass leave

application. Their mass action did not succeed.-Labor Arbiter decision: Illegal strike and employees have losttheir employment status and order to desist. NLRC limited thepenalty of dismissal only to the leaders of the illegal strikeespecially the officers of the union who served as its majorplayer and union members were merely instigated to participatein the illegal strike and should be treated differently from theirleaders. Petitioners claim that public respondent NLRC gravelyabused it discretion.

IssuesWON the strike is legal

HeldNo. The applicable law are Articles 263 and 264 of the LaborCode, as amended by E.O. No. 111, dated December 24. 1986.Paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the Labor Code, asamended by E.O. 111, provides."c) In cases of bargaining deadlocks. the duly certified orrecognized bargaining agent may file a notice of strike or theemployer may file a notice of lockout with the Ministry at least 30days before the intended date thereof. In cases of unfair laborpractice, the notice shall be 15 days and in the absence of a dulycertified or recognized bargaining agent, the notice of strike maybe filed by any legitimate labor organization in behalf of itsmember. However, in case of dismissal from employment ofunion officer duly elected in accordance with the unionconstitution and by-laws, which may constitute union bustingwher

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