Topic: TRANSFER1. Zafra (hindi ko alam yung citation) (Pacheck)MELANIEp22.ABBOTT vs. NLRC (G.R. No. 76959 October 12, 1987)JOEYp113. PHILIPPINE TELEGRAM vs. LAPLANA (G.R. No. 76645 July 23, 1991)JOIDAp164.ALLIED BANK vs. CA (G.R. No. 144412; November 18, 2003)ROLEXp23

PROMOTION:6. ERASMO vs. HOME INSURANCE (G.R. No. 139251; August 29, 2002)ANNAp387. BOSCH vs. NLRC (208 Phil 259) (Pacheck)LAWRENCEp438. ARRIETA vs.NLRC (G.R. No. 126230 September 18, 1997)ZALDYp609. BLUE DAIRY CORP vs. NLRC (G.R. No. 129843 September 14, 1999)SHEERAp66

RIGHT OF EMPLOYER TO DISCIPLINE:10. ASSOCIATED LABOR vs. NLRC (G.R. No. 120450 February 10, 1999)KRISLYNp7211. FARROL vs. CA (G.R. No. 133259 February 10, 2000)SHERYLp7812. SAGALES vs. RUSTAN (G.R. No. 166554 November 27, 2008)LESLIEp83

SECOND DIVISION[G.R. No. 139013.September 17, 2002]ZEL T. ZAFRA and EDWIN B. ECARMA,petitioners, vs. HON.COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINELONG DISTANCE TELEPHONECO., INC., AUGUSTO COTELO, and ERIBERTO MELLIZA,respondents.D E C I S I O NQUISUMBING,J.:For review on certiorari is the decision[1]of the Court of Appeals dated December 22, 1998, in CA-G.R. SP. No. 48578, reversing that of the voluntary arbitrator which ordered respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. (PLDT) to reinstate petitioners.Also impugned is the resolution dated May 24, 1999, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.The undisputed facts, as set forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals, are as follows:Petitioner Zel T. Zafra was hired by PLDT on October 1, 1984 as Operations Analyst II with a monthly salary of P14,382 while co-petitioner Edwin B. Ecarma was hired as Junior Operations Analyst I on September 16, 1987 at a monthly rate of P12,032.Both were regular rank-and-file employees assigned at the Regional Operations and Maintenance Control Center (ROMCC) of PLDTs Cebu Provincial Division. They were tasked to maintain the operations and maintenance of the telephone exchanges in the Visayas and Mindanao areas.[2]In March 1995, petitioners were chosen for the OMC Specialist andSystem SoftwareAcceptance Training Program in Germany in preparation for ALCATEL 1000 S12, a World Bank-financed PLDT project in line with its Zero Backlog Program. ALCATEL, the foreign supplier, shouldered the cost of their training and travel expenses.Petitioners left for Germany on April 10, 1995 and stayed there until July 21, 1995.[3]On July 12, 1995, while petitioners were in Germany, a certain Mr. R. Relucio, SwitchNet Division Manager, requested advice, through an inter-office memorandum, from the Cebu and Davao Provincial Managers if any of the training participants were interested to transfer to the Sampaloc ROMCC to address the operational requirements therein.The transfer was to be made before the ALCATEL exchanges and operations and maintenance center in Sampaloc would become operational.Upon petitioners return from Germany, a certain Mr. W.P. Acantillado, Senior Manager of the PLDT Cebu Plant, informed them about the memorandum.They balked at the idea, but PLDT, through an inter-office memorandum dated December 21, 1995, proceeded to transfer petitioners to the Sampaloc ROMCC effective January 3, 1996.[4]Petitioners left Cebu for Manila on December 27, 1995 to air their grievance to PLDT and to seek assistance from their union head office in Mandaluyong. PLDT ordered petitioners to report for work on January 16, 1996, but they asked for a deferment to February 1, 1996.Petitioners reported for work at the Sampaloc office on January 29, 1996.Meanwhile PLDT moved the effectivity date of their transfer to March 1, 1996. On March 13, 1996, petitioners again appealed to PLDT to no avail.And, because all their appeals fell on deaf ears, petitioners, while in Manila, tendered their resignation letters on March 21, 1996. Consequently, the expenses for their training in Germany were deducted from petitioners final pay.On September 11, 1996, petitioners filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission Regional Arbitration Branch No. 7 for alleged constructive dismissal and non-payment of benefits under the Collective Bargaining Agreement.[5]In an order dated November 10, 1996, the presiding labor arbiter referred the complaint to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board, Cebu City, for appropriate action.[6]On January 17, 1997, the parties agreed to designate lawyer Rolando M. Lim as their voluntary arbitrator.[7]In their complaint, petitioners prayed that their dismissal from employment be declared illegal.They also asked for reinstatement with full backwages, refund of unauthorized deductions from their final pay, including damages, costs of litigation, and attorneys fees.[8]Respondent PLDT, for its part, averred that petitioners agreed to accept any assignment within PLDT in their application for employment[9]and also in the undertaking[10]they executed prior to their training in Germany.It prayed that petitioners complaint be dismissed.After submission of their respective position papers and admission of facts, the case was set for hearing.Petitioners presented their witnesses and made their formal offer of documentary evidence. PLDT, however, requested for a re-setting of the hearing from October 9 and 10, 1997 to November 10 and 11, 1997.[11]But on those dates PLDT did not appear.Nor did it file any notice of postponement or motion to cancel the hearings.[12]Upon petitioners motion and pursuant to Article 262-A of the Labor Code,[13]the voluntary arbitrator issued an order admitting all documentary exhibits offered in evidence by petitioners and submitting the case for resolution.[14]In said order, PLDT was declared to have waived its right to present evidence on account of its unjustified failure to appear in the November 10 to 11 hearings.On December 1, 1997, the voluntary arbitrator issued a decision which reads:IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby rendered in the above case, in favor of complainants Zel Zafra and Edwin Ecarma and against respondent PLDT, as follows:1. Declaring that complainants were illegally dismissed by reason of the forced resignations or constructive discharge from their respective employment with PLDT;2. Ordering the reinstatement of complainants without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, and granting the award of full backwages from April 22, 1996, inclusive of allowances granted in the CBA or their monetary equivalent computed from the time complainants compensation were withheld up to the time of their actual reinstatement, or in lieu thereof, ordering the payment of separation pay with full backwages;3. Ordering the refund of P35,721.81 to complainant Zafra and P24,186.67 to complainant Ecarma, which amounts constitute as unauthorized deductions from their final pay;4. Ordering payment of P50,000.00 as moral damages; P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and P20,000.00 as refund for litigation expenses;5. Ordering payment of 10% Attorneys Fees computed on all adjudicated claims.SO ORDERED.[15]PLDTs motion for reconsideration of the above decision was denied on July 10, 1998.[16]On August 7, 1998, PLDT initiated a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,[17]which was treated as a petition for review.[18]On December 22, 1998, the CA ruled in favor of PLDT and reversed the voluntary arbitrators decision, in this wise:WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby given due course.Accordingly, the assailed Order is hereby REVERSED with the exception of the refund, which is hereby ordered, of the amount of P35,721.81 to respondent Zafra and P24,186.67 to respondent Ecarma representing unauthorized deductions from their final pay.SO ORDERED.[19]Zafra and Ecarma as respondents below moved for reconsideration of the CA decision which, however, was denied on May 24, 1999.[20]Petitioners now anchor their petition on the following grounds:I. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN THE RESPONDENTS PETITION IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW OR THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT.A. THE COURT A QUO, INSTEAD OF RESOLVING ERRORS OF JURISDICTION ALLEGED IN THE RESPONDENTS PETITION ERRED IN RENDERING THE DECISION ON ITS MERITS, IN EFFECT NOT ACCORDING RESPECT AND SETTING ASIDE THE VOLUNTARY ARBITRATORS EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE AND FACTUAL FINDINGS BASED THEREON.B. THE COURT A QUO, IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE RESPONDENTS PETITION ERRED IN PROCEEDING TO RESOLVE THE SAME ON THE MERITS, WITHOUT FIRST REVIEWING THE ENTIRE RECORD OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR.II. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, AS TO CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURTS SUPERVISION.A. THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RENDERING THE DECISION THROUGH ITS UTTER DISREGARD OF THE APPROPRIATE MODE OF APPEAL TO BE TAKEN BY THE RESPONDENTS FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR.B. THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF ITS DISCRETION IN TREATING JOINTLY THE RESPONDENTS PETITION EITHER AS AN APPEAL UNDER RULE 43, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65.C. THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO DISMISS THE RESPONDENTS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI OUTRIGHTLY FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE STRICT REQUIREMENTS IN THE FILING THEREOF.[21]Briefly, the issues in this case may be restated as follows: (1) whether or not the CA erred in treating the special civil action for certiorari filed by respondent as a petition for review, and (2) whether or not the CA erred in its appreciation of facts and the decision it rendered.Petitioners invokeLuzon Development Bank vs. Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees, et al.[22]and Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure[23]in arguing that an appeal and not a petition for certiorari should be the proper remedy to question the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator.Even assuming that Rule 65 applies, petitioners argue that PLDT, nevertheless, erred in not including the voluntary arbitrator as one of the respondents in the petition and in not serving him a copy thereof.[24]These procedural flaws, they aver, merit the outright dismissal by the CA of the petition.[25]A perusal of the petition before the CA shows that the mode chosen by PLDT was a petition for review under Rule 43 and not a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.While it was captioned as a petition for certiorari, it is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations therein that determine the nature of the action.[26]The appellate court was not precluded from granting relief as warranted by PLDTs allegations in the petition and the evidence it had presented to support the petition.A perusal of the petition before the CA discloses the following:First, under the heading Nature of the Action, the PLDT averred it was a petition for review on certiorariof the Decision dated December 1, 1997 and Order dated July 10, 1998 of Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Rolando M. Lim.[27]Second, while the assigned errors alleged that the voluntary arbitrator acted with grave abuse of discretion, nevertheless, the issue set forth waswhether or not there existed sufficient evidence to show that complainants [herein petitioners] were constructively dismissed, and whether they were entitled to reinstatement, back wages and other monetary awards.[28]Clearly, the issue was factual and not limited to questions of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion.Third, the petition was filed within the 15-day period to perfect an appeal and did not implead the voluntary arbitrator as a respondent. All of these indicate that the petition below was indeed one for review.Moreover, contrary to petitioners contention that the voluntary arbitrator was not furnished a copy of the petition, the records reveal otherwise.Attached to the petition filed before the appellate court was a registry receipt of the copy sent to the voluntary arbitrator.[29]Coming now to the substantive merits of the petition before us.Considering that the CAs findings of fact clash with those of the voluntary arbitrator, with contradictory results, this Court is compelled to go over the records of the case as well as the submissions of the parties.Having done so carefully, we are not convinced that the voluntary arbitrator erred in his factual conclusions so as to justify reversal thereof by the appellate court.We are persuaded to rule in favor of the complaining workers, herein petitioners, following the well-established doctrine in labor-management relations that in case of doubt, labor should prevail.The fact that petitioners, in their application for employment,[30]agreed to be transferred or assigned to any branch[31]should not be taken in isolation, but rather in conjunction with the established company practice in PLDT.The standard operating procedure in PLDT is to inform personnel regarding the nature and location of their future assignments after training abroad.This prevailing company practice is evidenced by the inter-office memorandum[32]of a certain PLDTs First Vice President (Reyes), dated May 3, 1996 to PLDTs Chief Operating Officer (Perez), duly-acknowledged by private respondents:x x xTo:Atty. E.D. Perez, SEVP & COOThru:J.P. de Jesus, EVP - Meet Demand GroupFrom:FVP - Program Planning & Engineering SectorSubject:NON-ASSIGNABLE TRAINED PERSONNEL=====================================================During the Group Heads Meeting on 03 April 1996, Mr. R.R. Zarate reported on the case of some provincial personnel who had foreign training for functions intended for Manila Operations but refused to be relocated and assigned to Manila, and who eventually resigned on account of the said transfer.In view of this situation, two (2) issues were raised as follows:1.Network Services to be involved in the planning of facilities, specially when this involves trainees from Network.2.Actual training to be undertaken only after the sites where such training will be utilized have been determined.x x xA total of 53 slots (for the Exchange O&M, System Software/Acceptance Engineering and OMC Specialist Courses) were allocated to Network Services by the Steering Committee composed of representatives from ProgPlan and TechTrain.The O&M slots were equally distributed to Provincial Operations on the basis where Alcatel switches will be geographically installed.With regards to NSC, since the contract has defined its location to be in Sampaloc and considering that its monitoring function would focus on provincial exchanges, slots were opened both for Provincial and Metro Manila Operations.Please note that all these relevant informations were disseminated to concerned parties as inputs, to enable them to recommend the appropriate training participants.The choice of trainees were made by Network and, therefore, it is incumbent upon them to brief the participants or trainees they selected on the nature and assignment of their employment after training.To prevent similar instances in the future, we strongly recommend the following:1.Prior to the training, all concerned groups should conform with the standard practice of informing personnel regarding the nature and/or location of their future assignments after the training.2.The contractual obligation of the trainees should include a provision on their willingness and commitment to perform the related training functionalities required by the company.x x x (Underscoring supplied.)The want of notice of transfer to petitioners was the subject of another inter-office memorandum dated November 24, 1995, from one Mr. Relucio, SwitchNet Division Manager, to a certain Mr. Albania, First Vice President-Regional & Toll Network. It states:As the cheaper option is to relocate personnel who have attended the training already, we have solicited the desire of the Cebu and Davao-based provincial personnel to transfer to SwitchNet Sampaloc ROMCC which they declined, x x xWe should note that these personnel were not made aware prior to start of training, that they will be transferred to Manila.[33]A third inter-office memorandum dated November 29, 1995 confirmed this procedural flaw, thus:Alternative 1: Require the four Jones and Davao ROMCC personnel to transfer [to] the Sampaloc ROMCC, as service requirement.This is the least cost alternative. x x xWe should note however, that these personnel were not aware that they would relocate after training.[34]Under these circumstances, the need for the dissemination of notice of transfer to employees before sending them abroad for training should be deemed necessary and later to have ripened into a company practice or policy that could no longer be peremptorily withdrawn, discontinued, or eliminated by the employer.Fairness at the workplace and settled expectations among employees require that we honor this practice and commend this policy.The appellate courts justification that petitioners transfer was a management prerogative did not quite square with the preceding evidence on record, which are not disputed.To say that petitioners were not constructively dismissed inasmuch as the transfer was effected without demotion in rank or diminution of salary benefits is, to our mind, inaccurate. It is well to remember that constructive dismissal does not always involve forthright dismissal or diminution in rank, compensation, benefits, and privileges. For an act of clear discrimination,insensibility, or disdain by an employer may become sounbearableon the part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued employment.[35]The insensibility of private respondents is at once deducible from the foregoing circumstances.Despite their knowledge that the lone operations and maintenance center of the 33 ALCATEL 1000 S12 Exchanges would be homed in Sampaloc,[36]PLDT officials neglected to disclose this vital piece of information to petitioners before they acceded to be trained abroad. On arriving home, they did not give complaining workers any other option but placed them in an either/or straightjacket, that appeared too oppressive for those concerned.As pointed out in the abovementioned inter-office memorandum by Mr. Reyes:All sites where training will be utilized are already pre-determined and pinpointed in the contract documents and technical protocols signed by PLDT and the contractor. Hence, there should be no reason or cause for the misappointment of the training participants.[37]Needless to say, had they known about their pre-planned reassignments, petitioners could have declined the foreign training intended for personnel assigned to the Manila office.The lure of a foreign trip is fleeting while a reassignment from Cebu to Manila entails major and permanent readjustments for petitioners and their families.We are not unaware that the transfer of an employee ordinarily lies within the ambit of management prerogatives.However, a transfer amounts to constructive dismissal when the transfer isunreasonable, inconvenient,orprejudicialto the employee, and involves a demotion in rank or diminution of salaries, benefits, and other privileges.[38]In the present case, petitioners were unceremoniously transferred, necessitating their families relocation from Cebu to Manila.This act of management appears to be arbitrary without the usual notice that should have been done even prior to their training abroad.From the employees viewpoint, such action affecting their families are burdensome, economically and emotionally.It is no exaggeration to say that their forced transfer is not only unreasonable, inconvenient, and prejudicial, but to our mind, also in defiance of basic due process and fair play in employment relations.WHEREFORE,this petition for review is GRANTED.The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 48578, dated December 22, 1998, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.The decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator dated December 1, 1997, is REINSTATED.No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 76959 October 12, 1987ABBOTT LABORATORIES (PHILIPPINES), INC., and JAIME C. VICTApetitioners,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISISON and ALBERT BOBADILLArespondents.GUTIERREZ, JR.,J.:This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of respondentNational Labor RelationsCommission (NLRC) which set aside the Labor Arbiter's decision dismissing the complaint and instead entered a new decision ordering the complainant's reinstatement with full backwages from the date of his termination until his actual reinstatement.The antecedent facts as found by the labor Arbiter and reiterated in the NLRC decision are undisputed:Complainant Bobadilla started his employment with respondent company sometime in May 1982. After undergoing training, in September, 1982, competent was designated professional medical representative (PMR) and was assigned to cover the sales territory comprising of Sta. Cruz, Binondo and a part of Quiapo and Divisoria, of the Metro Manila district. In connection with the respondent company'smarketing and salesoperations, it has been its policy and established practice of undertaking employment movements and/or reassignments from one territorial area to another as the exigencies of its operations require and to hire only applicant salesmen, including professional medical representatives (PMRs) who are willing to take provincial assignments, at least insofar as male applicants were concerned. Likewise, respondent company had made reassignments or transfers of sales personnel which included PMRs from one territorial area of responsibility to another on a more or less regular basis.In complainant's application for employment with respondent company, he agreed to the following: 1) that if employed he win accept assignment in the provinces and/or cities anywhere in the Philippines; 2) he is willing and can move into and live in the territory assigned to him; and (3) that should any answer or statement in his application for employment be found false or incorrect, he will be subject to immediate dismissal, if then employed.On 22 July 1983, respondent Victa called competent to his office and informed the latter that he was being transferred effective 1 August 1983 to the newly opened Cagayan territory comprising the provinces of Cagayan, Nueva Vizcaya and Isabela. The transfer order was made formal in a memorandum dated 29 July 1983. Among the reasons given for complainant's selection as PMR for the Cagayan territory were: The territory required a veteran and seasoned PMR who can operate immediately with minimum training and supervision. Likewise, a PMR who can immediately exploit the vast business potential of the area.In a letter dated 1 August 1983, which was received by Abbott on 4 August 1983, competent, thru his lawyer, objected to the transfer on the grounds that it was not only a demotion but also personal and punitive in nature without basis legally and factually.On 8 August 1983, Victa issued another inter-office correspondence to competent, giving the latter up to 15 August 1983 within which to comply with the transfer order, otherwise his would be dropped from the payroll for having abandoned his job. When competent failed to report to his new assignment, Abbott assigned thereat Fausto Antonio T. Tibi another PED PMR who was priorly covering the provinces of Nueva Ecija and Tarlac.Meanwhile, complainant filed applications for vacation leave from 2 to 9 August 1983, and then from 10 to 13 August 1983. And on 18 August 1983, he filed the present complaint.After due consideration of the evidence adduced by the parties, the Arbiter below ruled for the respondent on the ground that the complainant is guilty of gross insubordination. (pp. 17-19, Rollo; pp. 1-3, NLRC decision)On appeal, the respondent NationalLabor RelationsCommission reversed the Arbiter's decision and held that herein petitioners had no valid and justifiable reason to dismiss the complainant. The National Labor Relations Commission ordered the latter's reinstatement with backwages.A motion for reconsideration subsequently filed by the petitioners was denied.On September 8, 1986, the petitioners filed their second motion for reconsideration which was not favorably acted upon by respondent National Labor Relations Commission as the record of the case had already been transmitted to the labor arbiter for the execution of its decision.On December 16, 1986, the petitioners and the private respondent agreed before the labor arbiter that the former would bring the case before this Court.Hence, this present petition.Petitioners assigned as errors the following:... [R]espondent NLRC acted in excess of jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion in that a] Respondent NLRC disregarded settled law and altered the parties' contract when it stated that private respondent's prior consent was necessary for the validity of his transfer, rendering his consequent dismissal for insubordination illegal.b] Grantingarguendothat prior consent of an employee is required for the validity of his transfer to another territory, private respondent had explicitly given such prior consent as a condition for his hiring and continued employment by petitioner Abbott,c] Respondent NLRC abused its discretion when it declared private respondent's dismissal illegal despite his clear and willfull insubordination. (pp. 7, 10 and 11, Rollo).When asked to comment on the petition as counsel for NLRC, the Solicitor General, assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Zoilo A. Andin and Trial Attorney Alexander Q. Gesmundo, agreed with the petitioners' stand that the dismissal of the private respondent from his employment was for valid reasons.The main issue in this case is whether or not Albert Bobadilla could be validly dismissed from his employment on the ground of insubordination for refusing to accept his new assignment.We are constrained to answer in the affirmative.The hiring, firing, transfer, demotion, and promotion of employees has been traditionally Identified as a management prerogative subject to limitations found in law, a collective bargaining agreement, or general principles of fair play and justice. This is a function associated with the employer's inherent right to control and manage effectively its enterprise. Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of employees, it must also protect the right of an employer to exercise what are clearly management prerogatives. The free who of management to conduct its own business affairs to achieve its purpose cannot be denied. (See Dangan vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 127 SCRA 706).As a general rule, the right to transfer or reassign an employee is recognized as an employer's exclusive right and the prerogative of management.We agree with the Labor Arbiter's conclusions that:Settled is the rule in this regard that an employer, except when cited by special laws, has the right to regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, which includes, among others, hiring, work assignments, place and manner of work,working regulations and transfer of employeesin accordance with his operational demands and requirements. This right flows from ownership and from the established rule that labor law does not authorize the substitution of judgment of the employer in the conduct of his business, unless it is shown to be contrary to law, morals or public policy (NLU vs. Insular-Yebana Tobacco Corp., 2 SCRA 924, 931; and Republic Savings Bank vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 21 SCRA 226, 235).... Abbott, in accordance with the demands and requirements of its marketing and sales operations, adopted a policy to hire only sales applicants who are willing to accept assignments in the provinces anywhere in the Philippines, and to move into and live in the territory assigned to them.The existence and implementation of this policy are clearly discernible from the questions appearing in the application form under the heading:"TO BE FILLED BY SALES APPLICANTS ONLY," and the fact that Abbott, depending upon the needs of its marketing and sales operations, periodically made transfers or reassignment of its sales people.Complainant was precisely hired because he manifested at the outset as a job applicant his willingness to follow the conditions of his employment. In line with the policy, as practiced, Abbott, thru Jaime Victa, issued an inter-office correspondence transferring complainant to a newly opened sales territory-the Cagayan Region, comprising the provinces of Cagayan, Nueva Vizcaya and Isabela. According to respondents, complainant was selected as PMR for the region primarily because he was a veteran and seasoned PMR who can operate immediately with minimum training and supervision.That complainant is a veteran and seasoned PMR is admitted. In fact, it is even conceded by respondents that complainant was the leader of his peers in PED as indicated in the letter dated 20 December 1982 of Jaime Victa to complainant. That the Cagayan Region is relatively inaccessible cannot be debated. That the territory needed a responsible PMR who could work under the least supervision is a judgment of respondents. And that this judgment was arrived at upon consultations among the PED Marketing Manager Jaime Victa, the Director for Administration Francisco Lim, and the General Manager A. C. Bout has been proven by respondents.It appearing, therefore, that the order to transfer complainant is based upon a judgment of his employer Abbott, which judgment to transfer is in the with a company practice which is not contrary to law, morals or public policy, hence, beyond the competence of this office to question, the refusal of complainant to obey the lawful order of Abbott is gross insubordination a valid cause for dismissal.Complainant asserted that the true reason for his transfer was the personal ill motives on the part of respondent Victa who resented the derogatory remarks attributed to him, as purportedly shown in Victa's memoranda dated 20 December 1982 and 26 April 1983. However, a cursory reading of said memoranda in question who show that the same were legitimately issued by Victa in the exercise of his functions as PED Manager. And the fact that complainant never lifted a finger to formally question said memoranda is a mute admission on his part that the allegations therein are true.Complainant also alleged that his transfer was a demotion. However, no explanation was given much less any evidence presented in support of the allegation. On the other hand, it is clear that there was no change in complainant's position and salary, privileges and benefits he was receiving while in Manila. With respect to the sales commission, Abbott claimed that had complainant accepted the assignment, he could have earned more because the sales prospects in the Cagayan Territory, which comprises Nueva Vizcaya, Isabela and Cagayan Province were much higher than the territory assigned to him in Manila. Besides, the assignment offered an important avenue for future promotion, respondent concluded. (pp. 6-9, Labor Arbiter's decision).Therefore, Bobadilla had no valid reason to disobey the order of transfer. He had tacitly given his consent thereto when he acceded to the petitioners' policy of hiring sales staff who are willing to be assigned anywhere in the Philippines which is demanded by the petitioners' business.By the very nature of his employment, a drug salesman or medical representative is expected to travel. He should anticipate reassignment according to the demands of their business. It would be a poor drug corporation which cannot even assign its representatives or detail men to new markets calling for opening or expansion or to areas where the need for pushing its products is great. More so if such reassignments are part of the employment contract.WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is SET ASIDE. The decision of the labor Arbiter dated April 16,1985 is REINSTATED.SO ORDERED.Fernan (Chairman), Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concurG.R. No. 76645 July 23, 1991PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE CORPORATION,petitioner,vs.ALICIA LAPLANA, Hon. RICARDO ENCARNACION, and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,respondents.D.P. Mercado & Associates for petitioner.NARVASA,J.:pAlicia Laplana was the cashier of the Baguio City Branch Office of the Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (hereafter, simply PT & T). Sometime in March 1984, PT & T's treasurer, Mrs. Alicia A. Arogo, directed Laplana to transfer to the company's branch office at Laoag City. Laplana refused the reassignment and proposed instead that qualified clerks in the Baguio Branch be trained for the purpose. She set out her reasons therefor in her letter to Mrs. Arogo dated March 27, 1984,viz.:1. I have established Baguio City as my permanent residence. Working in Laoag will involve additional expenses like for my board and lodgingly, fare, and other miscellaneous expenses. My salary alone will not be enough there will be no savings and my family will spend more on account of my transfer.2. I will be away from my family. A far assignment would be a big sacrifice on my part keeping me away from my husband and family which might affect my efficiency.3. Since I have been with PT & T for more than six years already, I have learned to work with my co-employees here more effectively. Working in another place with entirely different environment will require long adjustment period, thereby affecting performance of my job.On April 12, 1984, Mrs. Arogo reiterated her directive for Laplana's transfer to the Laoag Branch, this time in the form of a written Memorandum, informing Laplana that "effective April 16, 1984, you will be reassigned to Laoag branch assuming the same position of branch cashier," and ordering her "to turn over your accountabilities such as PCF, undeposited collections, used and unused official receipts, other accountable forms and files to Rose Caysido who will be in charge of cashiering in Baguio."Apparently Laplana was not allowed to resume her work as Cashier of the Baguio Branch when April 16, 1984 came. She thereupon wrote again to Mrs. Arogo advising that the directed transfer was unacceptable, reiterating the reasons already given by her in her first letter dated March 27, 1984. On April 30, 1984, Laplana received a telegram from Mrs. Arogo reading as follows:PLEASE REPORT TO MANILA ON MAY 2, 1984 FOR NEW JOB ASSIGNMENTIF YOU DON'T REPORT ON MAY 2, 1984, WE WILL CONSIDER THIS AS ABANDONMENT OF YOUR JOB AND THIS MIGHT CONSTRAIN US TO IMPOSE DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST YOUYOU CAN GET YOURCASH ADVANCEFOR TRANSPORTATION PETITION FROM MRS. BAUTISTA TODAY.On May 8, 1984, Laplana in turn sent a telex message to Mrs. Arogo which reads as follows:I LOVE WORKING FOR OUR COMPANY HOWEVER I AM SORRY I CANNOT ACCEPT YOUR JOB OFFER IN MANIIA THANK YOU AND RETRENCH ME INSTEAD. MY BEST REGARDS.Thereafter, Laplana sent a letter to Mrs. Arogo on May 15, 1984, expatiating on her telex message and reiterating her request to be retrenched, as follows:Dear Mrs. Arogo:Thank you for the job in Manila. However, I cannot accept the said offer because I have established Baguio City as my permanent residence. Considering the highcost of livingin Manila it will surely involve additional expenses on my part. My salary alone will not be enough to sustain my expenses. Furthermore, a far assignment will be a big sacrifice on my part keeping me away from my husband which might affect my health due to an entirely new environment and climate, thereby affecting my efficiency.In view of the above reasons, I hereby request management to retrench me.xxx xxx xxxTermination of Laplana's employment on account of retrenchment thereupon followed. On May 19, 1984, PT & T issued an "Employees's Service Report" which contained the following remarks regarding Laplana: "Services terminated due to retrenchment with corresponding termination pay effective May 16, 1984. " And on June 30, 1984, Mrs. Arogo sent a Memorandum to the company's Baguio Branch Manager embodying the computation of the separation and 13th month pay due to Laplana, together with a check for the amount thereof, P2,512.50 and a quitclaim deed, and instructing said manager to "have the quitclaim signed by Alicia Laplana before releasing the check and return all copies of said form . . . immediately." On July 4, 1984, Laplana signed the quitclaim and received the check representing her 13th month and separation pay.On October 9, 1984, Laplana filed with the Labor Arbiters' Office at Baguio City, thru the CLAO, a complaint against PT & T its "Baguio Northwestern Luzon Branch, Baguio City," and Paraluman Bautista, Area Manager. In her complaint, she set forth substantially the facts just narrated, and alleged, as right of action, that "when she insisted on her right of refusing to be transferred, the Defendants made good its warning by terminating her services on May 16, 1984 on alleged ground of "retrenchment," although the truth is, she was forced to be terminated and that there was no ground at all for the retrenchment;" that the company's "act of transferring is not only without any valid ground but also arbitrary and without any purpose but to harass and force . . . (her) to eventually resign."In answer, the defendants alleged that 1) Laplana "was being transferred to Laoag City because of increase in sales due to the additional installations of vodex line;"2) in connection with her transfer, Laplana had been informed "that she would be given ten (10) days. relocation allowance and transportation expense from Baguio to Laoag City;"3) the company "was exercising management prerogatives in transferring complainant . . . and there is no showing that this exercise was arbitrarily and whimsically done;"4) Laplana's services were terminated on her explicit declaration that "she was willing to be retrenched rather than be assigned to Laoag City or Manila;"5) in any event, the company had been actually suffering losses; in fact, in June, 1984, several employees "were retrenched because of losses incurred due to rising costs in wages, rentals, production supplies and other operational costs."Upon the issues thus raised, judgment was rendered on March 28, 1985 by the Labor Arbiter in Laplana's favor.1The Arbiter's verdict was made to rest essentially on the following pronouncements (made avowedly in reliance on the doctrine laid down by this Court in Helmut Dosch v. NLRC and NorthwestAirlines, Inc., G.R. No. 51182, July 5, 19832), to wit:Transferring an employee from one place to another is not by itself unlawful. It is within the inherent right of an employer to transfer or assign an employee in the pursuit of its legitimate business interests. However, this right is not absolute.Transfer becomes unlawful where it is motivated by discrimination or in bad faith, or is effected as a form of punishment or demonition without sufficient cause.The transfer of the complainant from Baguio City to Laoag City or to Manila is patently a demotion and a form of punishment without just cause and would cause untold suffering on the part of the complainant. . . .With these premises in mind, the Arbiter ruled "that the complainant was illegally dismissed . . . (and her) acceptance of separation pay . . . cannot cure the illegality of her dismissed because it was forced upon her she was compelled to accept the lesser evil," and that there was "no evidence to show that the complainant was retrenched to prevent losses," but that on the contrary, "it is continuously expanding and improving its facilities, and hiring new employees." Accordingly, he ordered 1) PT & T "to reinstate immediately the complainant, Alicia R. Laplana, to her former position or equivalent position without loss of seniority rights and benefits earned with full backwages and benefits less P2,512.50, the amount she received as separation, from the time her compensation was suspended until reinstated;"2) the dismissal of the claim for moral and exemplary damages for lack of merit; and3) the dismissal of the case against Mrs. Paraluman Bautista also for lack of merit.TheNational Labor RelationsCommission affirmed the Arbiter's judgment and dismissed the respondents' appeal, by Resolution dated August 5, 1986.3There can be no quarrel with the Arbiter's formulation of the general principle governing an employer's prerogative to transfer his employees from place to place or from one position to another. The Arbiter acknowledges "the inherent right of an employer to transfer or assign an employee in the pursuit of its legitimate business interests" subject only to the condition that it be not "motivated by discrimination or (made) in bad faith, or . . . effected as a form of punishment or demotion without sufficient cause." This is a principle uniformly adhered to by this Court.4The case law on the matter is succinctly set out by a noted commentator on Labor Relations Law as follows:5. . . Except as limited by special laws, the employer is free to regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, working methods, time, place and manner of work, tools to be used, processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers, and the discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. This flows from the established rule that labor law does not authorize the substitution of the judgment of the employer in the conduct of his business and does not deprive the employer of the right to select or dismiss his employees for any cause, except in cases of unlawful discrimination (NLU v. Insular-Yebana Tobacco Corp., 2 SCRA 924, 931; Republic Savings Bank v. CIR, 21 SCRA 226, 235).. . . The employer has the prerogative of making transfers and reassignment of employees to meet the requirements of the business. Thus, where the rotation of employees from the day shift to the night shift was a standard operating procedure of management, an employee who had been on the day shift for some time may be transferred to the night shift (Castillo v. CIR, 39 SCRA 81). Similarly, transfers effected pursuant to a company policy to transfer employees from one theater to other theaters operated by the employer, in order to prevent connivance among them, was sustained (Cinema, Stage and Radio Entertainment Free Workers v. CIR, 18 SCRA 1071). Similar transfers and re-assignments of employees have been upheld such as the re-assignment of one from a position of supervisor to that of engineer at the power house (Interwood Employees Assn. v. Interwood, 99 Phil. 82), or the transfer of the union president from his position of messenger clerk in a hotel to purely office work and two other unionists from the position of hotel guard to line and elevator men, without diminution of pay or other employee's rights (Bay View Hotel Employees Union v. Bay View Hotel, L-10393, March 30, 1960), or the temporary assignment of a sales clerk to another section of the store (Marcaida v. PECO, 63 O.G. 8559).Subsequent decisions of this Court have made no deviation from the doctrine. In Philippine Japan Active Carbon Corp. v. NLRC, promulgated on March 8, 19896this Court made the following pronouncement, to wit:It is the employer's prerogative, based on its assessment and perception of its employees' qualifications, aptitudes, and competence, to move them around in the various areas of its business operations in order to ascertain where they will function with maximum benefit to the company. An employee's right to security of tenure does not give him such a vested right in his position as would deprive the company of its prerogative to change his assignment or transfer him where he will be most useful. When his transfer is not unreasonable, nor inconvenient, nor prejudicial to him, and it does not involve a demotion in rank or diminution of his salaries, benefits, and other privileges, the employee may not complain that it amounts to a constructive dismissal.InYuco Chemical Industries, Inc.v.MOLE et al. (judgment promulgated on May 28, 1990)7the same "general principles on transfer" were re-stated. The Court said:. . . In a number of cases, the Court has recognized and upheld the prerogative of management to transfer an employee from one office to another within the business establishment provided that there is no demotion in rank or diminution of his salary, benefits and other privileges. This is a privilege inherent in the employer's right to control and manage its enterprise effectively. Even as the law is solicitous of the employees' welfare, it cannot ignore the right of the employer to exercise what are clearly and obviously management prerogatives. The freedom of management to conduct its business operations to achieve its purpose cannot be denied.But like all other rights, there are limits. The managerial prerogative to transfer personnel must be exercised without grave abuse of discretion and putting to mind the basic elements of justice and fair play. Having the right should not be confused with the manner in which that right must be exercised. Thus it cannot be used as a subterfuge by the employer to rid himself of an undesirable worker. Nor when the real reason is to penalize an employee for his union activities and thereby defeat his right to self-organization. But the transfer can be upheld when there is no showing that it is unnecessary, inconvenient and prejudicial to the displaced employee.The acceptability of the proposition that transfers made by an employer for an illicit or underhanded purpose e.g., to evade the duty to bargain collectively, or to defeat the welfare, right of collective bargaining, or discriminate against one or some of them on account of their union activities is self-evident and cannot be gainsaid. The difficulty lies in the situation where no such illicit, improper or underhanded purpose can be ascribed to the employer, the objection to the transfer being ground solely upon the, personal inconvenience or hardship that will be caused to the employee by reason of the transfer. What then?InDosch v.NLRC, supra, this Court found itself unable to agree with the NLRC that the petitioner employee was guilty of disobedience and insubordination in refuse to accept his transfer from the Philippines to anoverseas post. Said the Court:. . . The only piece of evidence on which (respondent employer) Northwest bases the charge of contumacious refusal is petitioner's letter dated August 28, 1975 to R.C. Jenkins wherein petitioner acknowledged receipt of the former's memorandum dated August 18, 1975, appreciated his promotion to Director of International Sales but at the same time regretted "that at this time for personal reasons and reasons of my family, I am unable to accept the transfer from the Philippines' and thereafter expressed his preference to remain in my Position of Manager-Philippines until such time that my services in that capacity are no longer required by Northwest Airlines." From this evidence, We cannot discern even the slightest hint of defiance, much less imply insubordination on the part of petitioner.Withal, it is evident that the courteous tone of the employee's letter did not alter the actuality of his refusal to accept the transfer decreed by his employer in the exercise of its sound business judgment and discretion; and that the transfer of an employee to an overseas post cannot be likened to a transfer from a city to another within the country, as in the case at bar.In this case, the employee (Laplana) had to all intents and purposes resigned from her position. She had unequivocally asked that she be considered dismissed, herself suggesting the reason therefor retrenchment. When so dismissed, she accepted separation pay. On the other hand, the employer has not been shown to be acting otherwise than in good faith, and in the legitimate pursuit of what it considered its best interests, in deciding to transfer her to another office. There is no showing whatever that the employer was transferring Laplana to another work place, not because she would be more useful there, but merely "as a subterfuge to rid . . . (itself) of an undesirable worker," or "to penalize an employee for . . . union activities. . . ." The employer was moreover not unmindful of Laplana's initial plea for reconsideration of the directive for her transfer to Laoag; in fact, in response to that plea not to be moved to the Laoag Office, the employer opted instead to transfer her to Manila, the main office, offering at the same time the normal benefits attendant upon transfers from an office to another.The situation here presented is of an employer transferring an employee to another office in the exercise of what it took to be sound business judgment and in accordance with pre-determined and established office policy and practice, and of the latter having what was believed to be legitimate reasons for declining that transfer, rooted in considerations of personal convenience and difficulties for the family. Under these circumstances, the solution proposed by the employee herself, of her voluntary termination of her employment and the delivery to her of corresponding separation pay, would appear to be the most equitable. Certainly, the Court cannot accept the proposition that when an employee opposes his employer's decision to transfer him to another work place, there being no bad faith or underhanded motives on the part of either party, it is the employee's wishes that should be made to prevail. In adopting that proposition by way of resolving the controversy, the respondent NLRC gravely abused its discretion.WHEREFORE, the writ ofcertiorariprayed for is GRANTED and the Resolution of August 5, 1986 of respondent NLRC is thereby nullified and set aside, and the termination of services of private respondent is declared legal and proper. No costs.SO ORDERED.Cruz, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

.[G.R. No. 144412.November 18, 2003]ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION,petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALSand POTENCIANO L. GALANIDA,respondents.D E C I S I O NCARPIO,J.:The CaseBefore the Court is a petition for review[1]assailing the Decision[2]of27 April 2000and the Resolution of8 August 2000of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51451.The Court of Appeals upheld the Decision[3]of18 September 1998and the Resolution of24 December 1998of theNational Labor RelationsCommission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. V-000180-98.The NLRC modified the Decision dated23 December 1997of Labor Arbiter DominadorA.Almirante(Labor Arbiter) in NLRC Case No. RAB VII-05-0545-94 holding that Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank) illegally dismissed Potenciano L. Galanida (Galanida). The NLRC awarded Galanida separation pay, backwages, moral andexemplary damages, and other amounts totalingP1,264,933.33.Antecedent FactsFor a background of this case, we quote in part from the Decision of the Court of Appeals:Private respondentPotencianoGalanida was hired by petitioner Allied Banking Corporation on11 January 1978and rose from accountant-book(k)eeper to assistant manager in 1991.His appointment was covered by a Notice of Personnel Action which provides as one of the conditions of employment the provision on petitioners right to transfer employees:REGULAR APPOINTMENT: xxx It is understood that the bank reserves the right to transfer or assign you to other departments or branches of the bank as the need arises and in the interest of maintaining smooth and uninterrupted service to the public.Private respondent was promoted several times and was transferred to several branches as follows:a)January, 1978 to March, 1982 TagbilaranCityBranchb)April, 1982 to May, 1984 LapulapuCityBranchc)June, 1984 MandaueCityBranchd)July, 1984 to April, 1986 TagbilaranCityBranche)May, 1986 to May, 1987 DumagueteCityBranchf)June, 1987 to August, 1987 Carbon Branch,CebuCityg)September, 1987 to Sept. 1989 LapulapuCityBranch,Cebuh)October, 1989 to Sept. 1992 Carbon Branch,CebuCityi)October 1992 to Sept. 1994 JakosalemRegional Branch,CebuCity (Rollo, p. 47)Effecting a rotation/movement of officers assigned in theCebuhomebase, petitioner listed respondent as second in the order of priority of assistant managers to be assigned outside ofCebuCityhaving been stationed inCebufor seven years already.Private respondent manifested his refusal to be transferred toBacolodCityin a letter dated19 April 1994citing as reason parental obligations, expenses, and the anguish that would result if he is away from his family.He then filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for constructive dismissal.Subsequently, petitioner bank informed private respondent (Rollo, p. 86) that he was to report to the Tagbilaran City Branch effective23 May 1994.Private respondent refused.In a letter dated13 June 1994, petitioner warned and required of private respondent as follows:There is no discrimination in your transfer.In fact, among the officers mentioned, only you have refused the new assignment citing difficulty of working away from your family as if the other officers concerned do not suffer the same predicament.To exempt you from the officer transfer would result in favoritism in your favor and discrimination as against the other officers concerned.In furtherance of maintaining a smooth and uninterrupted service to the public, and in accordance with the Banks order of priority of rotating its accountants places of assignments, you are well aware that Roberto Isla, AM/Accountant, assigned in Cebu for more than ten (10) years, was, on February 14, 1994, reassigned to Iligan City Branch and then to Cagayan de Oro City Branch on June 8, 1994.Hence, your objection on the ground of your length of service is without merit.xxxAs discussed, your refusal to follow instruction concerningyour transfer and reassignment to Bacolod City and to Tagbilaran City is penalized under Article XII of the Banks Employee Discipline Policy and Procedure [which] provides:XII Transfer and ReassignmentRefusal to follow instruction concerning transfers and reassignments.First and subsequent offenses The penalty may range from suspension to dismissal as determined by management.The employee shall be required to comply with the order of transfer and reassignment, if the penalty is not termination of employment.In view of the foregoing, please explain in writing within three (3) days from receipt hereof why no disciplinaryaction should be meted against you foryour having refused to follow instructions concerning the foregoing transfer and reassignment. xxx[4]On16 June 1994, Galanida replied that (w)hether the banks penalty for my refusal be Suspension or Dismissal xxx it will all the more establish and fortify my complaint now pending at NLRC, RAB 7.[5]In the same letter, he charged Allied Bank with discrimination and favoritism in ordering his transfer, thus:xxx What I cannot decipher now under the headship ofMr. Olvedais managements discriminatory act of transferring only the long staying accountants of Cebu in the guise of its exercise of management prerogative when in truth and in fact, the ulterior motive is to accommodate some new officers who happen to enjoy favorable connection with management.How can the bank ever justify the transfer of Melinda T. Co, a new officer who had experienced being assigned outside ofCebufor more than a year only to Tabunok Branch?If the purpose is for check and balance, is management implying that Melinda Co can better carry out such function over Mr. Larry Sabelino, who is a seasoned and experienced accountant or any of the Metro Cebu accountants for that matter?Isnt this act of management an obvious display of favoritism? xxx[6]On5 October 1994, Galanida received an inter-office communication[7](Memo) dated8 September 1994from Allied Banks Vice-President for Personnel, Mr. Leonso C. Pe.The Memo informed Galanida that Allied Bank had terminated his services effective1 September 1994.The reasons given for the dismissal were:(1) Galanidas continued refusal to be transferred from the Jakosalem,CebuCitybranch; and (2) his refusal to report for work despite the denial of his application for additional vacation leave.The salient portion of the Memo reads:Therefore, your refusal to follow instruction concerning your transfer and reassignment toBacolodCityand toTagbilaranCityis without any justifiable reason and constituted violations of Article XII of the Banks EDPP xxxIn view of the foregoing,please be informed that the Bank has terminated your services effective September 1, 1994and considered whatever benefit, if any, that you are entitled as forfeited in accordance with 04, V Administrative Penalties, page 6 of the Banks EDPP which provides as follows:04. Dismissal.Dismissal is a permanent separation for cause xxxNotice of termination shall be issued by the Investigation Committee subject to the confirmation of the President or his authorized representative as officer/employee who is terminated for cause shall not be eligible to receive any benefit arising from her/his employment with the Bank or to termination pay.It is understood that the termination of your service shall be without prejudice to whatever legal remedies which the Bank may have already undertaken and/or will undertake against you.Please be guided accordingly.(Emphasis supplied)[8]The Ruling of the Labor ArbiterAfter several hearings, the Labor Arbiter held that Allied Bank had abused its management prerogative in ordering the transfer of Galanida to itsBacolodand Tagbilaran branches.In ruling that Galanidas refusal to transfer did not amount to insubordination, the Labor Arbitermisquotedthis Courts decision inDosch v. NLRC,[9]thus:As a general rule, the right to transfer or reassign an employee is recognized as an employers exclusive right and the prerogative of management (Abbott Laboratories vs. NLRC, 154 SCRA 713 [1987]).The exercise of this right, is not however, absolute.It has certain limitations.Thus, in Helmut Dosch vs. NLRC, et al. 123 SCRA 296 (1983), the Supreme Court, ruled:While it may be true that the right to transfer or reassign an employee is an employers exclusive right and the prerogative of management,such right is not absolute. The right of an employer to freely select or discharge his employee is limited by the paramount police power xxx for the relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual but impressed with public interest. xxx And neither capital nor labor shall act oppressively against each other.Refusal to obey a transfer order cannot be considered insubordination where employee cited reason for said refusal, such (sic) as that of being away from the family.[10](Underscoring supplied by the Labor Arbiter)The Labor Arbiter reasoned that Galanidas transfer was inconvenient and prejudicial because Galanida would have to incur additional expenses for board, lodging and travel.On the other hand, the Labor Arbiter held that Allied Bank failed to show any business urgency that would justify the transfer.The Labor Arbiter also gave credence to Galanidas claim that Allied Bank gave Ms. Co special treatment.The Labor Arbiter stated that Allied Bank deliberately left out Ms. Cos name from the list of accountants transferred toCebuas contained in Allied Banks letter dated13 June 1994.However, Mr. Regidor Olveda, Allied Banks Vice President for Operations Accounting, testified that the bank transferred Ms. Co to the Tabunok,Cebubranch within the first half of 1994.Still, the Labor Arbiter declined to award Galanida back wages because he was not entirely free from blame.Since another bank had already employed Galanida, the Labor Arbiter granted Galanida separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.The dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiters Decision of23 December 1997provides:WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondent Allied Banking Corporation to pay complainant the aggregate total amount of Three Hundred Twenty Four Thousand Pesos (P324,000.00) representing the following awards:a)Separation pay forP272,000.00;b)Quarter bonus for 1994 P16,000.00;c)13thmonth pay for 1994 P16,000.00;d)Refund of contribution to Provident Fund -P20,000.00.SO ORDERED.[11]The Ruling of the NLRCOn appeal, the NLRC likewise ruled that Allied Bank terminated Galanida without just cause.The NLRC agreed that the transfer order was unreasonable and unjustified, considering the family considerations mentioned by Galanida.The NLRC characterized the transfer as a demotion since theBacolodand Tagbilaran branches were smaller than the Jakosalem branch, a regional office, and because the bank wanted Galanida, an assistant manager, to replace an assistant accountant in the Tagbilaran branch.The NLRC found unlawful discrimination since Allied Bank did not transfer several junior accountants inCebu.The NLRC also held that Allied Bank gave Ms. Co special treatment by assigning her toCebueven though she had worked for the bank for less than two years.The NLRC ruled that Galanidas termination was illegal for lack of due process.The NLRC stated that Allied Bank did not conduct any hearing.The NLRC declared that Allied Bank failed to send a termination notice, as required by law for a valid termination.The Memo merely stated that Allied Bank would issue a notice of termination, but the bank did not issue any notice.The NLRC concluded that Allied Bank dismissed Galanida in bad faith, tantamount to an unfair labor practice as the dismissal undermined Galanidas right to security of tenure and equal protection of the laws.On these grounds, the NLRC promulgated its Decision of18 September 1998, the relevant portion of which states:In this particular case, We view as impractical, unrealistic and no longer advantageous to both parties to order reinstatement of the complainant.xxxFor lack of sufficient basis, We deny the claim for 1994 quarter bonus.Likewise, no attorneys fees is awarded as counsels for complainant-appellee are from the City Prosecutors Office of Cebu.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Labor Arbiter datedDecember 23, 1997is hereby MODIFIED by increasing the award of separation pay and granting in addition thereto backwages, moral and exemplary damages.The respondent-appellant, ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, is thus ordered to pay to herein complainant-appellee, POTENCIANO L. GALANIDA, the following amounts:a)P336,000.00, representing separation payb)P833,600.00, representingbackwagesc)P5,333.23representing proportional 1994 13thmonth payd)P20,000.00representing refund of Provident Fund Contributione)P50,000.00representing moral damagesf)P20,000.00representing exemplary damages===========P1,264,933.33 TOTAL AWARDAll other claims are dismissed for lack of basis.The other respondents are dropped for lack of sufficient basis that they acted in excess of their corporate powers.SO ORDERED.[12]Allied Bank filed a motion for reconsideration which the NLRC denied in its Resolution of24 December 1998.[13]Dissatisfied, Allied Bank filed a petition for review questioning the Decision and Resolution of the NLRC before the Court of Appeals.The Ruling of the Court of AppealsCitingDoschv. NLRC,[14]the Court of Appeals held that Galanidas refusal to comply with the transfer orders did not warrant his dismissal.The appellate court ruled that the transfer from a regional office to the smallerBacolodor Tagbilaran branches was effectively a demotion.The appellate court agreed that Allied Bank did not afford Galanida procedural due process because there was no hearing and no notice of termination.The Memo merely stated that the bank would issue a notice of termination but there was no such notice.The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the NLRC in its Decision of27 April 2000, thus:WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is DISMISSED and the assailed Decision of public respondent NLRC is AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.[15]Allied Bank filed a motion for reconsideration which the appellate court denied in its Resolution of8 August 2000.[16]On26 April 2001, Allied Bank appealed the appellate courts decision and resolution to the Supreme Court.Allied Bank prayed that the Supreme Court:(1) issue a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunctionex parteto restrain the implementation or execution of the questioned Decision and Resolution; (2) declare Galanidas termination as valid and legal; (3) set aside the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution; (4) make permanent the restraining order or preliminary injunction; (5) order Galanida to pay the costs; and (6) order other equitablereliefs.The IssuesAllied Bank raises the following issues:1.WHETHER UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED THERE IS LEGAL BASIS IN PETITIONERS EXERCISE OF ITS MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE.2.WHETHER PRIVATE RESPONDENTS VIOLATIONS OF COMPANY RULES CONSTITUTE A GROUND TO WARRANT THE PENALTY OF DISMISSAL.3.WHETHER UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED, THERE IS LEGAL BASIS TO HOLD THAT ALLIED BANK AFFORDED PRIVATE RESPONDENT THE REQUIRED DUE PROCESS.4.WHETHER UNDER THE FACTS, THERE IS LEGAL BASIS TO HOLD THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT CANNOT RECOVER ANY MONETARY AWARD.[17]In sum, Allied Bank argues that the transfer of Galanida was a valid exercise of its management prerogative.Allied Bank contends that Galanidas continued refusal to obey the transfer orders constituted willful disobedience or insubordination, which is a just cause for termination under the Labor Code.On the other hand, Galanida defended his right to refuse the transfer order.The memorandum for Galanida filed with this Court, prepared by Atty. Loreto M. Durano, againmisquotedthe Courts ruling inDosch v. NLRC, thus:xxxHis [Galanidas] refusal to transfer falls well within the ruling of the Supreme Court in Helmut Dosch vs. NLRC, et. al., 123 SCRA 296 (1983) quoted as follows:xxxRefusal to obey a transfer order cannot be considered insubordination where employee cited reason for said refusal, such as that of being away from the family.[18]The Ruling of the CourtThe petition is partly meritorious.Preliminary Matter: Misquoting Decisions of the Supreme CourtThe memorandum prepared by Atty. Durano and, worse, the assailed Decision of the Labor Arbiter, bothmisquotedthe Supreme Courts ruling inDosch v. NLRC.The Court held inDosch:We cannot agree to Northwests submission that petitioner was guilty of disobedience and insubordination which respondent Commission sustained.The only piece of evidence on which Northwest bases the charge of contumacious refusal is petitioners letter dated August 28, 1975 to R.C. Jenkins wherein petitioner acknowledged receipt of the formers memorandum dated August 18, 1975, appreciated his promotion to Director of International Sales but at the same time regretted that at this time for personal reasons and reasons of my family, I am unable to accept the transfer from the Philippines and thereafter expressed his preference to remain in his position, saying: I would, therefore, prefer to remain in my position of Manager-Philippines until such time that my services in that capacity are no longer required by Northwest Airlines.From this evidence, We cannot discern even the slightest hint of defiance, much less imply insubordination on the part of petitioner.[19]The phrase [r]efusalto obey a transfer order cannot be considered insubordination where employee cited reason for said refusal, such as that of being away from the family does not appear anywhere in theDoschdecision.Galanidas counsel lifted the erroneous phrase from one of the italicized lines in thesyllabusofDoschfound in the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA).The syllabus of cases in official or unofficial reports of Supreme Court decisions or resolutions is not the work of the Court, nor does it state this Courts decision.The syllabus is simply the work of the reporter who gives his understanding of the decision.The reporter writes the syllabus for the convenience of lawyers in reading the reports. A syllabus is not a part of the courts decision.[20]A counsel should not cite a syllabus in place of the carefully considered text in the decision of the Court.In the present case, Labor Arbiter Almirante and Atty. Durano began by quoting fromDosch, but substituteda portion of the decision with a headnote from the SCRA syllabus, which they even underscored.In short, they deliberately made the quote from the SCRA syllabus appear as the words of the Supreme Court.We admonish them for what is at the least patent carelessness, if not an outright attempt to mislead the parties and the courts taking cognizance of this case.Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the text of a decision or authority.It is the duty of all officers of the court to cite the rulings and decisions of the Supreme Court accurately.[21]WhetherGalanidawas dismissed for just causeWe accord great weight and even finality to the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, particularly when they affirm the findings of the NLRC or the lower courts.However, there are recognized exceptions to this rule.These exceptions are: (1) when the findings are grounded on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts are conflicting; (5) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, has gone beyond the issues of the case and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) when the judgment of the appellate court is premised on a misapprehension of facts or when it has failed to consider certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; (7) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;and (8) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence but are contradicted by the evidence on record.[22]After a scrutiny of the records, we find that some of these exceptions obtain in the present case.The rule is that the transfer of an employee ordinarily lies within the ambit of the employers prerogatives.[23]The employer exercises the prerogative to transfer an employee for valid reasons and according to the requirement of its business, provided the transfer does not result in demotion in rank or diminution of the employees salary, benefits and other privileges.[24]In illegal dismissal cases, the employer has the burden of showing that the transfer is not unnecessary, inconvenient and prejudicial to the displaced employee.[25]The constant transfer of bank officers and personnel with accounting responsibilities from one branch to another is a standard practice of Allied Bank, which has more than a hundred branches throughout the country.[26]Allied Bank does this primarily for internal control.It also enables bank employees to gain the necessary experience for eventual promotion.TheBangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,in its Manual of Regulations for Banks and Other Financial Intermediaries,[27]requires the rotation of these personnel.The Manual directs that the duties of personnel handling cash, securities and bookkeeping records should be rotated and that such rotation should be irregular, unannounced and long enough to permit disclosure of any irregularities or manipulations.[28]Galanidawas well aware of Allied Banks policy of periodically transferring personnel to different branches.As the Court of Appeals found, assignment to the different branches of Allied Bank was a condition of Galanidas employment.Galanida consented to this condition when he signed the Notice of Personnel Action.[29]The evidence on record contradicts the charge that Allied Bank discriminated against Galanida and was in bad faith when it ordered his transfer.Allied Banks letter of13 June 1994[30]showed that at least 14 accounting officers and personnel from various branches, including Galanida, were transferred to other branches.Allied Bank did not single out Galanida.The same letter explained that Galanida was second in line for assignment outsideCebubecause he had been inCebufor seven years already.The person first in line, Assistant Manager Roberto Isla, who had been inCebufor more than ten years, had already transferred to a branch in Cagayan de Oro City.We note that none of the other transferees joined Galanida in his complaint or corroborated his allegations of widespread discrimination and favoritism.As regards Ms. Co, Galanidas letter of16 June 1994itself showed that her assignment toCebuwas not in any way related to Galanidas transfer.Ms. Co was supposed to replace a certain Larry Sabelino in the Tabunok branch.The employer has the prerogative, based on its assessment of the employees qualifications and competence, to rotate them in the various areas of its business operations to ascertain where they will function with maximum benefit to the company.[31]Neither wasGalanidastransfer in the nature of a demotion.Galanida did not present evidence showing that the transfer would diminish his salary, benefits or other privileges.Instead, Allied Banks letter of13 June 1994assured Galanida that he would not suffer any reduction in rank or grade, and that the transfer would involve the same rank, duties and obligations.Mr.Olvedaexplained this further in the affidavit he submitted to the Labor Arbiter, thus:19.There is no demotion in position/rank or diminution of complainants salary, benefits and other privileges as the transfer/assignment of branch officers is premised on the role/functions that they will assume in the management and operations of the branch, as shown below:(a)The Branch Accountant, as controller of the branch is responsible for the proper discharge of the functions of the accounting section of the branch, review of documentation/proper accounting and control of transaction.As such, the accounting functions in the branch can be assumed by any of the following officers with the rank of:Senior Manager/Acctg.; Manager/ Acctg.; Senior Asst. Manager/Acctg.; Asst. Manager/Acctg.; Accountant or Asst. Accountant.xxx20.The transfer/assignment of branch officer from one branch, to another branch/office is lateral in nature and carries with it the same position/rank, salary, benefits and other privileges.The assignment/transfer is for the officer to assume the functions relative to his job and NOT the position/rank of the officer to be replaced.There is also no basis for the finding that Allied Bank was guilty of unfair labor practice in dismissing Galanida. Unfair labor practices relate only to violations of the constitutional right of workers and employees to self-organization[32]and are limited to the acts enumerated in Article 248 of the Labor Code, none of which applies to the present case.There is no evidence that Galanida took part in forming a union, or even that a union existed in Allied Bank.This leaves the issue of whether Galanida could validly refuse the transfer orders on the ground of parental obligations, additional expenses, and the anguish he would suffer if assigned away from his family.The Court has ruled on this issue before.In the case ofHomeowners Savings and Loan Association, Inc. v. NLRC,[33]we held:The acceptability of the proposition that transfer made by an employer for an illicit or underhanded purpose i.e., to defeat an employees right to self-organization, to rid himself of an undesirable worker, or to penalize an employee for union activities cannot be upheld is self-evident and cannot be gainsaid.The difficulty lies in the situation where no such illicit, improper or underhanded purpose can be ascribed to the employer, the objection to the transfer being grounded solely upon the personal inconvenience or hardship that will be caused to the employee by reason of the transfer.What then?This was the very same situation we faced inPhil. Telegraph and Telephone Corp. v. Laplana.In that case, the employee, Alicia Laplana, was a cashier at the Baguio City Branch of PT&T who was directed to transfer to the companys branch office atLaoagCity.In refusing the transfer, the employee averred that she had establishedBaguioCityas her permanent residence and that such transfer will involve additional expenses on her part, plus the fact that an assignment to a far place will be a big sacrifice for her as she will be kept away from her family which might adversely affect her efficiency.In ruling for the employer, the Court upheld the transfer from one city to another within the country as valid as long as there is no bad faith on the part of the employer.We held then:Certainly the Court cannot accept the proposition that when an employee opposes his employers decision to transfer him to another work place, there being no bad faith or underhanded motives on the part of either party, it is the employees wishes that should be made to prevail.Galanida, through counsel, invokes the Courts ruling inDosch v. NLRC.[34]Dosch,however, is not applicable to the present case. Helmut Doschrefused a transfer consequential to a promotion.We upheld the refusal because no law compels an employee to accept a promotion, and because the position Dosch was supposed to be promoted to did not even exist at that time.[35]This left as the only basis for the charge of insubordination a letter from Dosch in which the Court found not even the slightest hint of defiance, much less xxx insubordination.[36]Moreover, the transfer of an employee to an overseas post, as in theDoschcase, cannot be likened to a transfer from one city to another within the country,[37]which is the situation in the present case.The distance fromCebuCitytoBacolodCityor fromCebuCitytoTagbilaranCitydoes not exceed the distance fromBaguioCitytoLaoagCityor fromBaguioCitytoManila, which the Court considered a reasonable distance inPT&T v. Laplana.[38]The refusal to obey a valid transfer order constitutes willful disobedience of a lawful order of an employer.[39]Employees may object to, negotiate and seek redress against employers for rules or orders that they regard as unjust or illegal.However, until and unless these rules or orders are declared illegal or improper by competent authority, the employees ignore or disobey them at their peril.[40]ForGalanidascontinued refusal to obey Allied Banks transfer orders, we hold that the bank dismissed Galanida for just cause in accordance with Article 282 (a) of the Labor Code.[41]Galanidais thus not entitled to reinstatement or to separation pay.WhetherGalanidasdismissal violated therequirement of notice and hearingTo be effective, a dismissal must comply with Section 2 (d), Rule 1, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code (Omnibus Rules), which provides:For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of the Labor Code:(i)A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds of termination, and giving said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side.(ii)A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if he so desires is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence, or rebut the evidence presented against him.(iii)A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination.The first written notice was embodied in Allied Banks letter of13 June 1994.The first notice required Galanida to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for his refusal to comply with the transfer orders.On the requirement of a hearing, this Court has held that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard.[42]An actual hearing is not necessary. The exchange of several letters, in which Galanidas wife, a lawyer with the City Prosecutors Office, assisted him, gave Galanida an opportunity to respond to the charges against him.The remaining issue is whether the Memo dated8 September 1994sent to Galanida constitutes the written notice of termination required by the Omnibus Rules. In finding that it did not, the Court of Appeals and the NLRC cited Allied Banks rule on dismissals, quoted in the Memo, that, Notice of termination shall be issued by the Investigation Committee subject to the confirmation of the President or his authorized representative.[43]The appellate court and NLRC held that Allied Bank did not send any notice of termination to Galanida.The Memo, with the heading Transfer and Reassignment, was not the termination notice required by law.We do not agree.Even a cursory reading of the Memo will show that it unequivocally informed Galanida of Allied Banks decision to dismiss him.The statement, please be informed thatthe Bank has terminated your serviceseffectiveSeptember 1, 1994and considered whatever benefit, if any, that you are entitled [to] as forfeited xxx[44]is plainly worded and needs no interpretation.The Memo also discussed the findings of the Investigation Committee that served as grounds for Galanidas dismissal.The Memo referred to Galanidas open defiance and refusal to transfer first to theBacolodCity branch and then to theTagbilaranCitybranch.The Memo also mentioned his continued refusal to report for work despite the denial of his application for additional vacation leave.[45]The Memo also refuted Galanidas charges of discrimination and demotion, and concluded that he had violated Article XII of the banks Employee Discipline Policy and Procedure.The Memo, although captioned Transfer and Reassignment, did not preclude it from being a notice of termination.The Court has held that the nature of an instrument is characterized not by the title given to it but by its body and contents.[46]Moreover, it appears that Galanida himself regarded the Memo as a notice of termination.We quote from the Memorandum for Private Respondent-Appellee, as follows:The proceedings may be capsulized as follows:1.OnMarch 13, 1994[47]Private Respondent-Appellee filed before the Region VII Arbitration Branch a Complaint for Constructive Dismissal. A copy of the Complaint is attached to the Petition as Annex H;xxx5.OnSeptember 8, 1994, Petitioner-Appellant issued him a Letter of Termination.A copy of said letter is attached to the Petition as Annex N;6.Private Respondent-Appellee filed an Amended/ Supplemental Complaint wherein he alleged illegal dismissal.A copy of the Amended/Supplemental Complaint is attached to the Petition as Annex O; xxx[48](Emphasis supplied)The Memorandum for Private Respondent-Appellee refers to the Memo as a Letter of Termination.Further, Galanida amended his complaint for constructive dismissal[49]to one for illegal dismissal[50]after he received the Memo.Clearly, Galanida had understood the Memo to mean that Allied Bank had terminated his services.The Memo complied with Allied Banks internal rules which required the banks Presidentorhis authorized representativeto confirm the notice of termination.The banks Vice-President for Personnel, as the head of the department that handles the movement of personnel within Allied Bank, can certainly represent the bank president in cases involving the dismissal of employees.Nevertheless, we agree that the Memo suffered from certain errors.Although the Memo stated that Allied Bank terminated Galanidas services as of1 September 1994, the Memo bore the date8 September 1994.More importantly, Galanida only received a copy of the Memo on5 October 1994, or more than a month after the supposed date of his dismissal.To be effective, a written notice of termination must beservedon the employee.[51]Allied Bank could not terminate Galanida on1 September 1994because he had not received as of that date the notice of Allied Banks decision to dismiss him.Galanidas dismissal could only take effect on5 October 1994, upon his receipt of the Memo. For this reason, Galanida is entitled to backwages for the period from1 September 1994to4 October 1994.Under the circumstances, we also find an award ofP10,000 in nominal damages proper.Courts award nominal damages to recognize or vindicate the right of a person that another has violated.[52]The law entitles Galanida to receive timely notice of Allied Banks decision to dismiss him.Allied Bank should have exercised more care in issuing the notice of termination.WHEREFORE, the Decision of 27 April 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51451 upholding the Decision of 18 September 1998 of the NLRC in NLRC Case No. V-000180-98 isAFFIRMED, with the followingMODIFICATIONS:1)The awards of separation pay, moral damages and exemplary damages are hereby deleted for lack of basis;2)Reducing the award of backwages to cover only the period from1 September 1994to4 October 1994; and3)Awarding nominal damages to private respondent forP10,000.This case isREMANDEDto the Labor Arbiter for the computation, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Decision, of the backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits, due to Potenciano L. Galanida for the time his dismissal was ineffectual from1 September 1994until4 October 1994.Labor ArbiterDominadorA. Almirante and Atty. Loreto M. Durano areADMONISHEDto be more careful in citing the decisions of the Supreme Court in the future.SO ORDERED.Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago,andAzcuna, JJ.,concur.

[G.R. No. 139251.August 29, 2002]MA. ERLY P. ERASMO,petitioner, vs.HOME INSURANCE& GUARANTY CORPORATION,respondent.D E C I S I O NAUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,J.:Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of theRules of Courtcontesting the Decision of theCourt of Appealsdated June 30, 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 47037 which affirmed the decision of the Civil Service Commission dismissing the appeal of petitioner Ma. Erly P. Erasmo and denying her request for reinstatement, payment of back wages and other benefits.[1]Petitioner started working with respondent Home Insurance & Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) in 1982 as a consultant on the Project Evaluation Department,[2]and held various positions therein, including Manager of Project Evaluation Department (April 1, 1982 to December 31, 1985),[3]Manager of Accounts Management (January 1, 1986 to April 1987),[4]Assistant Vice-President of Accounts Management (May 1987 to July 1988),[5]Manager II of Guaranty and Credit Insurance Department (August 1988 to March 15, 1992),[6]and Officer-in-Charge of Technical Service/Guaranty and Credit Insurance Group (TS/GCIG) (March 16 to June 14, 1992),[7]until finally, she was promoted to Vice-President of TS/GCIG on June 15, 1992.[8]The nature of her appointment was promotion and her employment status was "temporary," since the position is a Career Executive Service Office (CESO) and petitioner lacks the required CES eligibility.[9]On February 24, 1993 petitioner was administratively charged with: (1) neglect of duty, (2) incompetence in the performance of official duties, (3) conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and (4) directly or indirectly having financial and material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of her office.[10]In the meantime, petitioner appealed the status of her temporary appointment to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which on March 12, 1993, issued Resolution No. 93-990, holding that a CES eligibility is required to a CES position, and even if one possesses such eligibility, still the appointment cannot be considered permanent unless an appointment to the rank has been granted by the President of the Philippines.[11]On June 10, 1993, respondent, through its President, Fernando M. Miranda, Jr., wrote petitioner, informing her thatby operation of law, your appointment shall be deemed terminated and shall automatically cease to have further force and effect at the close of office hours on the expiration of your appointment.She was also advised that the pendency of the administrative case against her precludes any renewal of her appointment.[12]Petitioner, through counsel, then sought the opinion of the Executive Director of the Career Executive Service Board who, on August 31, 1993, replied that a temporary appointment to a CES position can be revoked at any time by the appointing authority, without waiting for a specific period to lapse; that the filing of an administrative case does not automatically revoke the appointment nor does it affect the validity of the temporary appointment; and that for the termination to be effective, there must be a categorical and/or positive act of termination of service.[13]Encouraged by said opinion, petitioner wrote respondent seeking reinstatement to her previous position with back wages, but her request was denied.She was also informed that the position that she vacated has already been filled up and approved by the CSC on a permanent basis.[14]When the investigating committee of the HIGC recommended the dismissal of the charges against petitioner on June 29, 1995,[15]the latter again wrote respondent asking that she be allowed to continue to discharge her duties and responsibilities as VP for TS/GCIG, alleging that respondent furnished her with a copy of the report of the investigation committee only eight (8) months thereafter.Again, respondent denied her demands.[16]One (1) year after, petitioner wrote the Chairperson