Hellenic Phil INC vs. SIETE

FACTS:

Capt. Epifanio Siete was employed as Master of M/V Houda G by Sultan Shipping Co., Ltd., Sometime later, Capt. Wilfredo Lim boarded the vessel and advised Siete that he had instructions from the owners to take over its command for unexplained reason Siete filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Petitioner alleged in its answer that Siete had been dismissed because of his failure to comply with the instruction of Sultan Shipping to erase the timber load line on the vessel and for his negligence in the discharge of the cargo at Tripoli that endangered the vessel and stevedores. POEA: dismissed the complaint, holding that there was valid cause for Sietes removal. Siete appealed to the NLRC contending that he was dismissed without even being informed of the charges against him or given an opportunity to refute them. NLRC: reversed the POEA holding that the dismissal violated due process and that the documents submitted by the petitioner were hearsay, self-serving, and not verified. Hellenic argues that whatever defects might have tainted the EEs dismissal were subsequently cured when the charges against him were specified and sufficiently discussed in the position papers submitted by the parties to the POEA.

Issue: Whether due process was observed by the ER

HELD:

NOThe law requires that the investigation be conducted before the dismissal, not after. That omission cannot be corrected by the investigation later conducted by the POEA. As the Solicitor General correctly maintained, the due process requirement in the dismissal process is different from the due process requirement in the POEA proceeding. Both requirements must be separately observed.

While it is true that in Wenphil Corp. vs. NLRC and Rubberworld (Phils.) vs. NLRC, the lack of due process before the dismissal of the employee was deemed corrected by the subsequent administrative proceedings where the dismissed employee was given a chance to be heard, those cases involved dismissals that were later proved to be for a valid cause. The doctrine in those cases is not applicable to the case at bar because our findings here is that the dismissal was not justified.

People v Panis142 SCRA 664 1986

Facts:

Four informations were filed on January 9, 1981, in the Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City alleging that SerapioAbug, private respondent herein, "without first securing a license from the Ministry of Labor as a holder of authority to operate a fee-charging employment agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally operate a private fee-charging employment agency by charging fees and expenses (from) and promising employment in Saudi Arabia" to four separate individuals named therein, in violation of Article 16 in relation to Article 39 of the Labor Code.

Abug filed a motion to quash on the ground that the informations did not charge an offense because he was accused of illegally recruiting only one person in each of the four informations. Under the proviso in Article 13(b), he claimed, there would be illegal recruitment only "whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee."

The posture of the petitioner is that the private respondent is being prosecuted under Article 39 in relation to Article 16 of the Labor Code; hence, Article 13(b) is not applicable. However, as the first two cited articles penalize acts of recruitment and placement without proper authority, which is the charge embodied in the informations, application of the definition of recruitment and placement in Article 13(b) is unavoidable.

Issue

Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of violating Article 13(b) of P. D. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code.

Held:

Article 13(b) of P. D. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code, states that, "(b) 'Recruitment and placement' refers to any act of canvassing, 'enlisting, contracting, transporting, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement."

As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to provide an exception thereto but merely to create a presumption. The presumption is that the individual or entity is engaged in recruitment and placement whenever he or it is dealing with two or more persons to whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of employment is made in the course of the "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers."

At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give more force to the campaign against illegal recruitment and placement, which has victimized many Filipino workers seeking a better life in a foreign land, and investing hard-earned savings or even borrowed funds in pursuit of their dream, only to be awakened to the reality of a cynical deception at the hands of their own countrymen.

PNOC ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and MARCELINO TONGCO, , vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and MANUEL S. PINEDA,.G.R. No. 100947 May 31, 1993Facts:

Manuel Pineda was an employee of the Philippine National Oil Co.-Energy Development Corp. (PNOC-EDC) he was hired as clerk, to January 26, 1989 Pineda decided to run for councilor of the Municipality of Kananga, Leyte, in the local elections scheduled in January, 1988, and filed the corresponding certificate of candidacy for the position .

His employment with the PNOC-EDC was questioned because under Section 66 of the Election Code it provides that: Sec. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.PNOC-EDC terminated his employment pursuant to Section 66 of the Election Code and Pineda filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Pineda and was affirmed by the NLRC upon appeal hence this petition for certiorari.

Issue:Whether or not the the section 66 of the Election Code applicable to all employees of government-owned or controlled corporations?

Ruling:Yes, The court held that that Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code applies to officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, even those organized under the general laws on incorporation and therefore not having an original or legislative charter, and even if they do not fall under the Civil Service Law but under the Labor Code. Therefore section 66 of the Election Code is applicable to all employees of government-owned or controlled corporations. Section 66 constitutes just cause for termination of employment in addition to those set forth in the Labor Code.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL OIL COMPANY-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.HON. VICENTE T. LEOGARDO, DEPUTY MINISTER OF LABOR AND VICENTE D. ELLELINA, respondents. G.R. No. L-58494 July 5, 1989Facts: Petitioner PNOC-EDC is a subsidiary of the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC). On 20 January 1978, it filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment a clearance application to dismiss/ terminate the services of private respondent, Vicente D. Ellelina for the alleged commission of a crime (Alarm or Public Scandal).The Clearance was granted but later it was revoked with an order for Ellelinas reinstatement. PNOC-EDC appealed the decision but it was affirmed hence this petition for Certiorari.PNOC-EDC allege that A) Under Article 277 of the Labor Code, the Ministry of Labor and Employment has no jurisdiction over petitioner because it is a government-owned or controlled corporation; B) Ellelina's dismissal is valid and just because it is based upon the commission of a crime. Minister of Labor contends that A) While the petitioner is a subsidiary of the PNOC, it is still covered by the Labor Code and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Labor as petitioner was organized as a private corporation under the Corporation Law and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission; B) Petitioner is estopped from assailing the Labor Department's jurisdiction, having subjected itself to the latter when it filed the application for clearance to terminate Ellelina's services; and C) Dismissal is too harsh a penalty.Issue:Whether or not employees of Philippine National Oil Company-Energy Development Corporation covered by the Labor Code even it is a government-owned or controlled corporations.Ruling:Yes, employees of government-owned and/or controlled corporations were governed by the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code. Thus, Article 277 of the Labor Code (PD 442) then provided: The terms and conditions of employment of all government employees, including employees of government- owned and controlled corporations shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.Those Company incorporated under the general Corporation Law are not within its coverage of the Civil Service .However, under the present state of the law, the test in determining whether a government-owned or controlled corporation is subject to the Civil Service Law is the manner of its creation such that government corporations created by special charter are subject to its provisions. Therefore, PNOC-EDC having been incorporated under the general Corporation Law, is a government-owned or controlled corporation whose employees are subject to the provisions of the Labor Code.

REPUBLIC VS COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No.87676December 20, 1989

Petitioner:Republic of the Philippines, represented by the National Parks Development Committee

Respondents:The Hon. Court of Appeals and the national Parks Development Supervisory Association &their Members

FACTS:

The NPDC was originally created in 1963 under Executive Order No. 30, as the Executive Committee for the development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and other national parks, and later renamed as the National Parks Development Committee under Executive Order No. 68, on September21, 1967, it was registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a non-stock and non-profit corporation, known as "The National Parks Development Committee, Inc. "However, in August, 1987, the NPDC was ordered by the SEC to show cause why its Certificate of Registration should not be suspended for. The NPDC Chairman, Amado Lansang, Jr., informed SEC that his Office had no objection to the suspension, cancellation, or revocation of the Certificate of Registration of NPDC. By virtue of Executive Order No. 120, the NPDC was attached to the Ministry (later Department)of Tourism and provided with a separate budget subject to audit by the Commission on Audit and pursuant to Executive Order No. 120, all appointments and other personnel actions shall be submitted through the Civil Service Commission Commission. Meanwhile, the Rizal Park Supervisory Employees Association, consisting of employees holdingsupervisory positions in the different areas of the parks, was organized and it affiliated with the Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) under Certificate No. 1206. Two collective bargaining agreements were entered into between NPDC and NPDCEA (TUPAS local Chapter No. 967)and NPDC and NPDCSA (TUPAS Chapter No. 1206), for a period of two years or until June 30, 1989. On March 20, 1988, these unions staged a stake at the Rizal Park, Fort Santiago, Paco Park, and Pook ni Mariang Makiling at Los Banos, Laguna, alleging unfair labor practices by NPDC. On March 21, 1988, NPDC filed in the Regional Trial Court in Manila, Branch III, a complaint against the union to declare the strike illegal and to restrain it on the ground that the strikers, being government employees, have no right to strike although they may form a union. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch III, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner's complaint in Civil Case No. 88-44048 praying for a declaration of illegality of the strike of the private respondents and to restrain the same. The Court of Appeals denied the petitioner's petition for certiorari, hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE:Whether the petitioner, National Parks Development Committee (NPDC), is a government agency, or a private corporation, for on this issue depends the right of its employees to strike.

HELD:

NPDC is a government agency, its employees are covered by civil service rules and regulations(Sec. 2, Article IX, 1987 Constitution). Its employees are civil service employees (Sec. 14, Executive Order No. 180).While NPDC employees are allowed under the 1987 Constitution to organize and join unions of their choice, there is as yet no law permitting them to strike. In case of a Labor dispute between the employees and the government, Section 15 of Executive Order No. 180 dated June 1, 1987 provides that the Public Sector Labor- Management Council, not the Department of Labor and Employment, shall hear the dispute. Clearly, the Court of Appeals and the lower court erred in holding that the labor dispute between the NPDC and the members of the NPDSA is cognizable by the Department of Labor and Employment. The petition for review is granted. The private respondents' complaint should be filed in the Public Sector Labor-Management Council as provided in Section 15 of Executive Order No. 180.

ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 14-93TO: ALL REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTSSUBJECT: GUIDELINES ON THE KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY CONCILIATION PROCEDURE TO PREVENT CIRCUMVENTION OF THE REVISED KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY LAW [SECTIONS 399-422, CHAPTER VII, TITLE I, BOOK III, R. A. 7160, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991].

The Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law under R. A. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, effective on January 1, 1992 and which repealed P. D. 1508, introduced substantial changes not only in the authority granted to the Lupong Tagapamayapa but also in the procedure to be observed in the settlement of disputes within the authority of the Lupon.cralawIn order that the laudable purpose of the law may not be subverted and its effectiveness undermined by indiscriminate, improper and/or premature issuance of certifications to file actions in court by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretaries, attested by the Lupon/Pangkat Chairmen, respectively, the following guidelines are hereby issued for the information of trial court judges in cases brought before them coming from the Barangays:chanrobles virtual law library

I. All disputes are subject to Barangay conciliation pursuant to the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law [formerly P. D. 1508, repealed and now replaced by Secs. 399-422, Chapter VII, Title I, Book III, and Sec. 515, Title I, Book IV, R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991], and prior recourse thereto is a pre-condition before filing a complaint in court or any government offices,exceptin the following disputes:chanrobles virtual law library

[1] Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;[2] Where one party is a public officer or employee and the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions;[3] Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities and municipalities, unless the parties thereto agree to submit their difference to amicable settlement by an appropriate Lupon;[4] Any complaint by or against corporations, partnerships or juridical entities, since only individuals shall be parties to Barangay conciliation proceedings either as complainants or respondents [Sec. 1, Rule VI, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules];[5] Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate Lupon;[6] Offenses for which the law prescribes a maximum penalty of imprisonment exceeding one [1] year or a fine of over five thousand pesos (P5,000.00);[7] Offenses where there is no private offended party;

[8] Disputes where urgent legal action is necessary to prevent injustice from being committed or further continued, specifically the following:chanrobles virtual law library[a] Criminal cases where accused is under police custody or detention [See Sec. 412 (b) (1), Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law];[b] Petitions for habeas corpus by a person illegally deprived of his rightful custody over another or a person illegally deprived of or on acting in his behalf;[c] Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property and support during the pendency of the action; andcralaw[d] Actions which may be barred by the Statute of Limitations.[9] Any class of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice;[10] Where the dispute arises from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) [Secs. 46 & 47, R. A. 6657];[11] Labor disputes or controversies arising from employer-employee relations [Montoya vs. Escayo, et al., 171 SCRA 442; Art. 226, Labor Code, as amended, which grants original and exclusive jurisdiction over conciliation and mediation of disputes, grievances or problems to certain offices of the Department of Labor and Employment];[12] Actions to annul judgment upon a compromise which may be filed directly in court [See Sanchez vs. Tupaz, 158 SCRA 459].cralaw

II. Under the provisions of R. A. 7160 on Katarungang Pambarangay conciliation, as implemented by the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Justice, the certification for filing a complaint in court or any government office shall be issued by Barangay authorities only upon compliance with the following requirements:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary[1] Issued by the Lupon Secretary and attested by the Lupon Chairman (Punong Barangay), certifying that a confrontation of the parties has taken place and that a conciliation settlement has been reached, but the same has been subsequently repudiated (Sec. 412, Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law; Sec. 2[h], Rule III, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules);[2] Issued by the Pangkat Secretary and attested by the Pangkat Chairman certifying that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary[a] a confrontation of the parties took place but no conciliation/settlement has been reached (Sec. 4[f], Rule III, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules); or[b] that no personal confrontation took place before the Pangkat through no fault of the complainant (Sec. 4[f], Rule III, Katarungang pambarangay Rules).

[3] Issued by the Punong Barangay as requested by the proper party on the ground of failure of settlement where the dispute involves members of the same indigenous cultural community, which shall be settled in accordance with the customs and traditions of that particular cultural community, or where one or more of the parties to the aforesaid dispute belong to the minority and the parties mutually agreed to submit their dispute to the indigenous system of amicable settlement, and there has been no settlement as certified by the datu or tribal leader or elder to the Punong Barangay of place of settlement (Secs. 1,4 & 5, Rule IX, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules); and

[4] If mediation or conciliation efforts before the Punong Barangay proved unsuccessful, there having been no agreement to arbitrate (Sec. 410 [b], Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law; Sec. 1, c. (1), Rule III, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules), or where the respondent fails to appear at the mediation proceeding before the Punong Barangay (3rd par. Sec. 8, a, Rule VI, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules), the Punong Barangay shall not cause the issuance at this stage of a certification to file action, because it is now mandatory for him to constitute the Pangkat before whom mediation, conciliation, or arbitration proceedings shall be held.cralaw

III. All complaints and/or informations filed or raffled to your sala/branch of the Regional Trial Court shall be carefully read and scrutinized to determine if there has been compliance with prior Barangay conciliation procedure under the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations as a pre-condition to judicial action, particularly whether the certification to file action attached to the records of the case comply with the requirements hereinabove enumerated in Par. II;IV. A case filed in court without compliance with prior Barangay conciliation which is a pre-condition for formal adjudication (Sec. 412 [a] of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law) may be dismissed upon motion of defendant/s, not for lack of jurisdiction of the court but for failure to state a cause of action or prematurity (Royales vs. IAC, 127 SCRA 470; Gonzales vs. CA, 151 SCRA 289), or the court may suspend proceedings upon petition of any party under Sec. 1, Rule 21 of the Rules of Court; and refer the casemotu proprioto the appropriate Barangay authority applying by analogy Sec. 408 [g], 2nd par., of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law which reads as follows:chanrobles virtual law library

"The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the Lupon under this Code are filed may, at any time before trial,motu propriorefer case to the Lupon concerned for amicable settlement.Strict observance of these guidelines is enjoined. This Administrative Circular shall be effective immediately.

Manila, Philippines; July 15, 1993.