EN BANCG.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC.,petitioner,vs.HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration,respondents.Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner.SARMIENTO,J.:The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement,"1challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;"2that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;"3and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character.In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution, providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law."4Department Order No. 1, it is contended, was passed in the absence of prior consultations. It is claimed, finally, to be in violation of the Charter's non-impairment clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI members face should the Order be further enforced.On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a Comment informing the Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland.*In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police power of the Philippine State.It is admitted that Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of a police power measure. The only question is whether or not it is valid under the Constitution.The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare."5As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace."Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits."6It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the Charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited,7refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the State "to govern its citizens."8"The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with self- protection, and it is not inaptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society."9It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is "rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to ensure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare."10Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties "Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's will."11It is subject to the far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number.Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations. For all its awesome consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to advance the public good. Thus, when the power is used to further private interests at the expense of the citizenry, there is a clear misuse of the power.12In the light of the foregoing, the petition must be dismissed.As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed vahdity.13In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands.The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers,"14but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution15does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.16The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers rests on substantial distinctions.As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts.The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is no evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with an Identical predicament. The petitioner has proffered no argument that the Government should act similarly with respect to male workers. The Court, of course, is not impressing some male chauvinistic notion that men are superior to women. What the Court is saying is that it was largely a matter of evidence (that women domestic workers are being ill-treated abroad in massive instances) and not upon some fanciful or arbitrary yardstick that the Government acted in this case. It is evidence capable indeed of unquestionable demonstration and evidence this Court accepts. The Court cannot, however, say the same thing as far as men are concerned. There is simply no evidence to justify such an inference. Suffice it to state, then, that insofar as classifications are concerned, this Court is content that distinctions are borne by the evidence. Discrimination in this case is justified.As we have furthermore indicated, executive determinations are generally final on the Court. Under a republican regime, it is the executive branch that enforces policy. For their part, the courts decide, in the proper cases, whether that policy, or the manner by which it is implemented, agrees with the Constitution or the laws, but it is not for them to question its wisdom. As a co-equal body, the judiciary has great respect for determinations of the Chief Executive or his subalterns, especially when the legislature itself has specifically given them enough room on how the law should be effectively enforced. In the case at bar, there is no gainsaying the fact, and the Court will deal with this at greater length shortly, that Department Order No. 1 implements the rule-making powers granted by the Labor Code. But what should be noted is the fact that in spite of such a fiction of finality, the Court is on its own persuaded that prevailing conditions indeed call for a deployment ban.There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind the measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the protection for Filipino female overseas workers"17this Court has no quarrel that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good and welfare.The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself ("Pending review of the administrative and legal measures, in the Philippines and in the host countries . . ."18), meaning to say that should the authorities arrive at a means impressed with a greater degree of permanency, the ban shall be lifted. As a stop-gap measure, it is possessed of a necessary malleability, depending on the circumstances of each case. Accordingly, it provides:9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION. The Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) may, upon recommendation of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), lift the suspension in countries where there are:1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the Philippines, and/or,2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of Filipino workers.19The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic overseas workers. That it does not apply to "all Filipina workers"20is not an argument for unconstitutionality. Had the ban been given universal applicability, then it would have been unreasonable and arbitrary. For obvious reasons, not all of them are similarly circumstanced. What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of persons within an existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or group of persons. To apply the ban, say exclusively to workers deployed by A, but not to those recruited by B, would obviously clash with the equal protection clause of the Charter. It would be a classic case of what Chase refers to as a law that "takes property from A and gives it to B."21It would be an unlawful invasion of property rights and freedom of contract and needless to state, an invalid act.22(Fernando says: "Where the classification is based on such distinctions that make a real difference as infancy, sex, and stage of civilization of minority groups, the better rule, it would seem, is to recognize its validity only if the young, the women, and the cultural minorities are singled out for favorable treatment. There would be an element of unreasonableness if on the contrary their status that calls for the law ministering to their needs is made the basis of discriminatory legislation against them. If such be the case, it would be difficult to refute the assertion of denial of equal protection."23In the case at bar, the assailed Order clearly accords protection to certain women workers, and not the contrary.)It is incorrect to say that Department Order No. 1 prescribes a total ban on overseas deployment. From scattered provisions of the Order, it is evident that such a total ban has hot been contemplated. We quote:5. AUTHORIZED DEPLOYMENT-The deployment of domestic helpers and workers of similar skills defined herein to the following [sic] are authorized under these guidelines and are exempted from the suspension.5.1 Hirings by immediate members of the family of Heads of State and Government;5.2 Hirings by Minister, Deputy Minister and the other senior government officials; and5.3 Hirings by senior officials of the diplomatic corps and duly accredited international organizations.5.4 Hirings by employers in countries with whom the Philippines have [sic] bilateral labor agreements or understanding.xxx xxx xxx7. VACATIONING DOMESTIC HELPERS AND WORKERS OF SIMILAR SKILLS--Vacationing domestic helpers and/or workers of similar skills shall be allowed to process with the POEA and leave for worksite only if they are returning to the same employer to finish an existing or partially served employment contract. Those workers returning to worksite to serve a new employer shall be covered by the suspension and the provision of these guidelines.xxx xxx xxx9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION-The Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) may, upon recommendation of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), lift the suspension in countries where there are:1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the Philippines, and/or,2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of Filipino workers.24xxx xxx xxxThe consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided by law."25Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to labor,"26pursuant to the respondent Department of Labor's rule-making authority vested in it by the Labor Code.27The petitioner assumes that it is unreasonable simply because of its impact on the right to travel, but as we have stated, the right itself is not absolute. The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto.Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcement whereof.28The petitioners's reliance on the Constitutional guaranty of worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits"29is not well-taken. The right granted by this provision, again, must submit to the demands and necessities of the State's power of regulation.The Constitution declares that:Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.30"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection, personally and economically, while away from home. In this case, the Government has evidence, an evidence the petitioner cannot seriously dispute, of the lack or inadequacy of such protection, and as part of its duty, it has precisely ordered an indefinite ban on deployment.The Court finds furthermore that the Government has not indiscriminately made use of its authority. It is not contested that it has in fact removed the prohibition with respect to certain countries as manifested by the Solicitor General.The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must yield to the loftier purposes targetted by the Government.31Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all other freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction, wherelaissez fairehas never been fully accepted as a controlling economic way of life.This Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order has on the business of recruitment. The concern of the Government, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of Government regulation. The interest of the State is to provide a decent living to its citizens. The Government has convinced the Court in this case that this is its intent. We do not find the impugned Order to be tainted with a grave abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary relief prayed for.WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.SO ORDERED.Yap, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.Gutierrez, Jr. and Medialdea, JJ., are on leave.Footnotes1 Rollo, 3.2 Id., 12.3 Id., 13.4 CONST., Art XIII, Sec. 3.* Per reports, on June 14, 1988, the Government is said to have lifted the ban on five more countries: New Zealand Australia, Sweden, Spain, and West Germany. ("Maid export ban lifted in 5 states,"The Manila Chronicle, June 14, 1988, p. 17, col. 2.)5 Edu v. Ericta, No. L-32096, October 24, 1970, 35 SCRA 481, 487.6 Supra, 488.7 TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 323 (1978).8 Id.9 Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708 (1919).10 Edu v. Ericta,supra.11 Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra, 704.12 It is generally presumed, notwithstanding the plenary character of the lawmaking power, that the legislature must act for public purposes. InPascual v. Secretary of Public Works[110 Phil. 331 (1960)], the Court nullified an act of Congress appropriating funds for a private purpose. The prohibition was not embodied in the Constitution then in force, however, it was presumed that Congress could not do it.13 Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, No. L-24693, July 31, 1967, 20 SCRA 849.14 Dept. Order No. 1 (DOLE), February 10, 1988.15 CONST.,supra, Art. III, Sec. 1.16 People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12 (1939).17 Dept. Order No. 1,supra.18 Supra.19 Supra.20 Rollo, Id., 13.21 See TRIBE, Id., citing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798).22 Id.23 FERNANDO, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES 549-550 (1977).24 Dept. Order No. 1,supra.25 CONST.,supra, Art. Ill, Sec. 6.26 Pres. Decree No. 442, Art. 3.27 Supra, Art. 5.28 Supra.29 CONST.,supra, Art. XIII, Sec. 3.30 Supra.31 Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, Nos. L-60549, 60553-60555, October 26, 1983, 125 SCRA 220.

THIRD DIVISION[G.R. No. 138193.March 5, 2003]OSM SHIPPING PHILIPPINES, INC.,petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Third Division) and FERMIN F. GUERRERO,respondents.D E C I S I O NPANGANIBAN, J.:The Rules of Court do not require that all supporting papers and documents accompanying a petition for certiorari should be duplicate originals or certified true copies. Furthermore, unilateral decisions to alter the use of a vessel from overseas service to coastwise shipping will not affect the validity of an existing employment contract validly executed. Workers should not be prejudiced by actions done solely by employers without the formers consent or participation.The CaseBefore us is a Petition for Review onCertiorari[1]under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the February 11, 1999 and the March 26, 1999 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 50667. The assailed Resolutions dismissed a Petition filed in the CA, challenging an adverse ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The first Resolution disposed as follows:We resolve to OUTRIGHTLY DISMISS the petition.[2]The second Resolution[3]denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.On the other hand, the NLRC Decision disposed in this wise:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED in that respondents OSM Shipping Phils. Inc. and its principal, Philippine Carrier Shipping Agency Services Co. are jointly and severally ordered to pay complainant the sum of ELEVEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FIFTY NINE and 65/100 [US dollars] (US$11,359.65) or its peso equivalent at the time of payment representing complainants unpaid salaries, accrued fixed overtime pay, allowance, vacation leave pay and termination pay.[4]The FactsThis case originated from a Complaint filed by Fermin F. Guerrero against OSM Shipping Philippines, Inc.; and its principal, Philippine Carrier Shipping Agency Services Co. The Complaint was for illegal dismissal and non-payment of salaries, overtime pay and vacation pay. The facts are summarized in the NLRC Decision as follows:[Private respondent] was hired by [Petitioner] OSM for and in behalf of its principal, Phil Carrier Shipping Agency Services Co. (PC-SLC) to board its vessel M/V [Princess] Hoa as a Master Mariner for a contract period of ten (10) months. Under the said contract, his basic monthly salary isUS$1,070.00, US$220.00 allowance, US$321.00 fixed overtime, US$89 vacation leave pay per month for x x x 44 hours f] work per week. He boarded the vessel on July 21, 1994 and complied faithfully with the duties assigned to him.[Private respondent] alleged that from the start of his work with M/V Princess Hoa, he was not paid any compensation at all and was forced to disembark the vessel sometime in January 1995 because he cannot even buy his basic personal necessities. For almost seven (7) months, i.e. from July 1994 to January 1995, despite the services he rendered, no compensation or remuneration was ever paid to him. Hence, this case for illegal dismissal, [non-payment] of salaries, overtime pay and vacation pay.[Petitioner] OSM, for its part, alleged that on July 26, 1994, Concorde Pacific, an American company which owns M/V Princess Hoa, then a foreign registered vessel, appointed x x x Philippine Carrier Shipping Agency Services Co. (PC-SASCO) as ship manager particularly to negotiate, transact and deal with any third persons, entities or corporations in the planning of crewing selection or determination of qualifications of Filipino Seamen. On the same date, [Petitioner] OSM entered into a Crew Agreement with x x x PC-SASCO for the purpose of processing the documents of crew members of M/VPrincess Hoa. The initial plan of the [s]hip-owner was to use the vessel in the overseas trade, particularly the East Asian Growth Area. Thereafter, the contract of [private respondent] was processed before the POEA on September 20, 1994.OSM alleged further that the shipowner changed its plans on the use of the vessel. Instead of using it for overseas trade, it decided to use it in the coastwise trade, thus, the crewmembers hired never left the Philippines and were merely used by the shipowner in the coastwise trade. Considering that the M/V Princess Hoa was a foreign registered vessel and could not be used in the coastwise trade, the shipowner converted the vessel to Philippine registry on September 28, 1994 by way of bareboat chartering it out to another entity named Philippine Carrier Shipping Lines Co. (PCSLC). To do this, the shipowner through Conrado V. Tendido had to terminate its management agreement with x x x PC-SASCO on September 28, 1994 by a letter of termination dated September 20, 1994. In the same letter of termination, the ship owner stated that it has bareboat chartered out the vessel to said [PCSLC] and converted it into Philippine registry. Consequently, x x x PC-SASCO terminated its crew agreement with OSM in a letter dated December 5, 1994. Because of the bareboat charter of the vessel to PCSLC and its subsequent conversion to Philippine registry and use in coastwise trade as well as to the termination of the management agreement and crew agency agreement, a termination of contract ensued whereby PCSLC, the bareboat charterer, became the disponent owner/employer of the crew.As a disponent owner/employer, PCSLC is now responsible for the payment of complainants wages. x x x.[5]Labor Arbiter (LA) Manuel R. Caday rendered a Decision[6]in favor of Private Respondent Guerrero. Petitioner and its principal, Philippine Carrier Shipping Agency Services, Co. (PC-SASCO), were ordered to jointly and severally pay Guerrero his unpaid salaries and allowances, accrued fixed overtime pay, vacation leave pay and termination pay. The Decision held that there was a constructive dismissal of private respondent, since he had not been paid his salary for seven months. It also dismissed petitioners contention that there was a novation of the employment contract.On appeal, the NLRC (Third Division) affirmed the LAs Decision, with a modification as to the amount of liability. On January 28, 1999, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition[7]to set aside the NLRC judgment. The petition was dismissed, because petitioner had allegedly failed to comply with the requirements of Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. Specifically, petitioner had attached to its Petition, not a duplicate original or a certified true copy of the LAs Decision, but a mere machine copy thereof. Further, it had not indicated the actual address of Private Respondent Fermin F. Guerrero.[8]Hence, this Petition.[9]The IssuesIn its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for the Courts consideration:1. Did not the Court of Appeals err in interpreting and applying the 1997 Rules when it required as attachment to the Petition for Certiorari the duplicate original of another Decision which is not-the subject of the said Petition?2. Did not the Court of Appeals err in interpreting and applying the 1997 Rules when it disregarded the subsequent compliance made by petitioner?3. Did not the Court of Appeals err in interpreting and applying the 1997 Rules when it did not consider the Notice to private respondent Guerrero through his counsel as Notice to Guerrero himself?[10]The foregoing issues all refer to the question of whether, procedurally, petitioner has complied with Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. Additionally and in the interest of speedy justice, this Court will also resolve the substantive issue brought before the CA: did the NLRC commit grave abuse of discretion in ruling in favor of private respondent?The Courts RulingWhile petitioner is procedurally correct, the case should nonetheless be decided on the merits in favor of private respondent.Procedural Issue:Compliance with the Rules of CourtPetitioner puts at issue the proper interpretation of Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court.[11]Specifically, was petitioner required to attach a certified true copy of the LAs Decision to its Petition forCertiorarichallenging the NLRC judgment?Section 3 of Rule 46 does not require that all supporting papers and documents accompanying a petition be duplicate originals or certified true copies. Even under Rule 65 on certiorari and prohibition, petitions need to be accompanied only by duplicate originals or certified true copies of thequestionedjudgment, order or resolution. Other relevant documents and pleadings attached to it may be mere machine copies thereof.[12]Numerous decisions issued by this Court emphasize that in appeals under Rule 45 and in original civil actions for certiorari under Rule 65 in relation to Rules 46 and 56, what is required to be certified is the copy of thequestionedjudgment, final order or resolution.[13]Since the LAs Decision was not the questioned ruling, it did not have to be certified. What had to be certified was the NLRC Decision. And indeed it was.As to the alleged missing address of private respondent, the indication by petitioner that Guerrero could be served with process care of his counsel was substantial compliance with the Rules.This Court has held that the sending of pleadings to a party is not required, provided that the party is represented by counsel.[14]This rule is founded on considerations of fair play, inasmuch as an attorney of record is engaged precisely because a party does not feel competent to deal with the intricacies of law and procedure.[15]Both jurisprudence[16]and the basics of procedure[17]provide that when a party has appeared through counsel, service is to be made upon the latter, unless the court specifically orders that it be upon the party.We also note that from the inception of the case at the LAs office, all pleadings addressed to private respondent had always been sent to his counsel, Atty. Danilo G. Macalino. Note that private respondent, who was employed as a seaman, was often out of his home. The service of pleadings and other court processes upon him personally would have been futile, as he would not have been around to receive them.This Court has repeatedly held that while courts should meticulously observe the Rules, they should not be overly strict about procedural lapses that do not impair the proper administration of justice.[18]Rather, procedural rules should be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.[19]Substantive Issue:Liability of Petitioner for Unpaid SalariesIt is worthwhile to note that what is involved in this case is the recovery of unpaid salaries and other monetary benefits. The Court is mindful of the plight of private respondent and, indeed, of workers in general who are seeking to recover wages that are being unlawfully withheld from them. Such recovery should not be needlessly delayed at the expense of their survival. This case is now on its ninth year since its inception at the LAs office. Its remand to the CA will only unduly delay its disposition. In the interest of substantial justice,[20]this Court will decide the case on the merits based upon the records of the case, particularly those relating to the OSM Shipping Philippines Petition before the CA.On behalf of its principal, PC-SASCO, petitioner does not deny hiring Private Respondent Guerrero as master mariner. However, it argues that since he was not deployed overseas, his employment contract became ineffective, because its object was allegedly absent. Petitioner contends that using the vessel in coastwise trade and subsequently chartering it to another principal had the effect of novating the employment contract. We are not persuaded.As approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA), petitioner was the legitimate manning agent of PC-SASCO.[21]As such, it was allowed to select, recruit, hire and deploy seamen on board the vesselM/V Princess Hoa,which was managed by its principal, PC-SASCO.[22]It was in this capacity that petitioner hired private respondent as master mariner. They then executed and agreed upon an employment contract.An employment contract, like any other contract, is perfected at the moment (1) the parties come to agree upon its terms; and (2) concur in the essential elements thereof: (a) consent of the contracting parties, (b) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract and (c) cause of the obligation.[23]Based on the perfected contract, Private Respondent Guerrero complied with his obligations thereunder and rendered his services on board the vessel. Contrary to petitioners contention, the contract had an object, which was the rendition of service by private respondent on board the vessel. The non-deployment of the ship overseas did not affect the validity of the perfected employment contract. After all, the decision to use the vessel for coastwise shipping was made by petitioner only and did not bear the written conformity of private respondent. A contract cannot be novated by the will of only one party.[24]The claim of petitioner that it processed the contract of private respondent with the POEA only after he had started working is also without merit. Petitioner cannot use its own misfeasance to defeat his claim.Petitioner, as manning agent, is jointly and severally liable with its principal,[25]PC-SASCO, for private respondents claim.This conclusion is in accordance with Section 1 of Rule II of the POEA Rules and Regulations.[26]Joint and solidary liability is meant to assure aggrieved workers of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due them.[27]The fact that petitioner and its principal have already terminated their agency agreement does not relieve the former of its liability. The reason for this ruling was given by this Court inCatan National Labor Relations Commission,[28]which we reproduce in part as follows:This must be so, because the obligations covenanted in the [manning] agreement between the local agent and its foreign principal are not coterminus with the term of such agreement so that if either or both of the parties decide to end the agreement, the responsibilities of such parties towards the contracted employees under the agreement do not at all end, but the same extends up to and until the expiration of the, employment contracts of the employees recruited and employed pursuant to the said recruitment agreement. Otherwise, this will render nugatory the very purpose for which the law governing the employment of workers for foreign jobs abroad was enacted.[29]WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolutions are herebySET ASIDE,and the September 10, 1998 NLRC DecisionREINSTATEDandAFFIRMED.Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.Puno,(Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez,andCarpio-Morales, JJ.,concur.Corona, J.,on leave.

[1]Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 14-23.[2]Id., p. 89. Written by Justice Renato C. Dacudao, member of the Special Tenth Division; concurred in by Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez (now SC justice and Division chairman) and Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico (acting member).[3]Id., p. 104. Written by Justice Renato C. Dacudao, member of the former Special Tenth Division; concurred in by Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Eloy R. Bello Jr., members.[4]NLRC Decision, p. 17;rollo, Vol. I, p. 78. Written by Commissioner Tito F. Genilo and concurred in by Presiding Commissioner Lourdes C. Javier and Commissioner Ireneo B. Bernardo.[5]Id., pp. 3-6 and 65-68.[6]Rollo, vol. I, pp. 53-61.[7]Id., pp. 27-35.[8]Assailed CA Resolution, p. 1;rollo, Vol. I, p. 88.[9]This case was deemed submitted for decision on July 2, 2002, upon the Courts receipt of private respondents Reply to petitioners Memorandum, and signed by Atty. Danilo G. Macalino of D.G. Macalino & Associates.Public respondents Memorandum, filed on April 16, 2001, was signed by Assistant Solicitor General Carlos N. Ortega, Assistant Solicitor General Roman G. del Rosario and Associate Solicitor Beatrice A. Caunan-Medina of the Office of the Solicitor General.Petitioners Memorandum, filed on March 14, 2001, was signed by Atty. Victor B. Roque.[10]Petitioners Memorandum, p. 4;rollo, Vol. II, p. 79.Original in upper case.[11]SEC. 3.Contents and filing of petition, effect of non-compliance with requirements.- The petition shall contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of the matters involved, the factual background of the case, and the grounds relied upon for the relief prayed for.In actions filed under Rule 65, the petition shall further indicate the material dates showing when notice of judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was received.It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service thereof on the respondent with the original copy intended for the court indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the record as are referred to therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto. The certification shall be accomplished by the proper clerk of court or by his duly authorized representative, or by the proper officer of the court, tribunal, agency or office involved or by his duly authorized representative. The other requisite number of copies of the petition shall be accompanied by clearly legible plain copies of all documents attached to the original.The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a sworn certification that he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom.The petitioner shall pay the corresponding docket and other lawful fees to the clerk of court and deposit the amount of P500.00 for costs at the time of the filing of the petition.The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.[12]1 and 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[13]Cadayonav. Court of Appeals, 324 SCRA 619, February 3, 2000, citing the following cases: Martinetv. Magallanes, GR No. 133766, January 13, 1999; Borjav. Judge Hontanosas Jr., GR No. 134748, January 13, 1999; Regalado et al.v. NLRC, GR No. 134671, January 13, 1999; G and M [Phils.], Inc.v. NLRC, GR No. 133836, January 13, 1999; Dimalantav. People, GR No. 134798, November 9, 1998.[14]Zoletav. Drilon, 166 SCRA 548, October 18, 1988.[15]Id., p. 554, citing JM Javier Logging Corporationv. Mardo,24 SCRA 776, August 27, 1968.[16]Ramosv. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 584, December 29, 1999; Galangv. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 683, July 29, 1991; Salenv. Dinglasan, 198 SCRA 623, June 28, 1991.[17]2, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Court.[18]Director of Landsv. Court of Appeals, 303 SCRA 495, February 23, 1999; Uy Jr.v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 275, November 9, 1990; Rinconada Telephone Company, Inc.v. Buenviaje, 184 SCRA 701, April 27, 1990; Seriav. Court of Appeals, 170 SCRA 421, February 21, 1989.[19]6, Rule I of the 1997 Rules of Court.[20]Bascov. Court of Appeals, 326 SCRA 768, February 29, 2000; Beutifont Inc.,v. Court of Appeals, 157 SCRA 481, January 29, 1988; Lianga Bqy Logging Co., Inc.v. Court of Appeals, 157 SCRA 357, January 28, 1988; Franciscov. City of Davao, 12 SCRA 628, December 24, 1964; Magno-Adamosv. Bagasao, 162 SCRA 747, June 28, 1988.[21]NLRC Decision, p. 7;rollo, Vol. I, p. 69.[22]Crew Agency Agreement, pp. 1-3;rollo, pp. 42-44.[23]Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc.v. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 523, December 1, 1995; Ang Yu Asuncionv. Court of Appeals, 238 SCRA 602, December 2, 1994.[24]Security Bank and Trust Company, Inc.v. Cuenca, 341 SCRA 781, October 3, 2000;Cruzv. Court of Appeals, 293 SCRA 239, July 27, 1998; Tiu Siucov. Habana, 45 Phil. 707, February 21, 1924.[25]Philippine Integrated Labor Assistance Corporationv. NLRC, 264 SCRA 418, November 19, 1996; Chavezv. Bonto-Perez, 242 SCRA 73, March 1, 1995; Teknika Skills and Trade Services, Inc.v. NLRC,212 SCRA 132, August 4, 1992.[26]SEC. 1.Requirements for Issuance of License.Every applicant for license to operate a private employment agency or manning agency shall submit a written application together with the following requirements:xxxxxxxxxf. Averified undertakingstating that the applicant:xxxxxxxxx(3)Shall assume joint and solidary liability with the employer for all claims and liabilities which may arise in connection with the implementation of the contract; including but not limited to payment of wages, health and disability compensation and reparation[.][27]PI Manpower Placements, Inc.v. NLRC (Second Division), 276 SCRA 451, July 31, 1997.[28]160 SCRA 691, April 15, 1988.[29]Id., p. 695, citing NLRC Resolution in the same case, per Cortes, J.

FIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. 120095.August 5, 1996]JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, INC., and KARY INTERNATIONAL, INC.,petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MA. NIEVES CONFESSOR, then Secretary of the Department of the Labor and Employment, HON. JOSE BRILLANTES, in his capacity as acting Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment and HON.FELICISIMO JOSON, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration,respondents.D E C I S I O NKAPUNAN,J.:The limits of government regulation under the State's Police Power are once again at the vortex of the instant controversy.Assailed is the government's power to control deployment of female entertainers to Japan by requiring an Artist Record Book (ARB) as a precondition to the processing by the POEA of any contract for overseas employment.By contending that the right to overseas employment, is a property right within the meaning of the Constitution, petitioners vigorously aver that deprivation thereof allegedly through the onerous requirement of an ARB violates the due process clause and constitutes an invalid exercise of the police power.The factual antecedents are undisputed.Following the much-publicized death of Maricris Sioson in 1991, former President Corazon C. Aquino ordered a total ban against the deployment of performing artists to Japan and other foreign destinations.The ban was, however, rescinded after leaders of the overseas employment industry promised to extend full support for a program aimed at removing kinks in the system of deployment.In its place, the government, through the Secretary of Labor and Employment, subsequently issued Department Order No. 28, creating the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council (EIAC), which was tasked with issuing guidelines on the training, testing certification and deployment of performing artists abroad.Pursuant to the EIAC's recommendations,[1]the Secretary of Labor, on January 6, 1994, issued Department Order No. 3 establishing various procedures and requirements for screening performing artists under a new system of training, testing, certification and deployment of the former.Performing artists successfully hurdling the test, training and certification requirement were to be issued an Artist's Record Book (ARB), a necessary prerequisite to processing of any contract of employment by the POEA.Upon request of the industry, implementation of the process, originally scheduled for April 1, 1994, was moved to October 1, 1994.Thereafter, the Department of Labor, following the EIAC's recommendation, issued a series of orders fine-tuning and implementing the new system.Prominent among these orders were the following issuances:1.Department Order No. 3-A, providing for additional guidelines on the training, testing, certification and deployment of performing artists.2.Department Order No. 3-B, pertaining to the Artist Record Book (ARB) requirement, which could be processed only after the artist could show proof of academic and skills training and has passed the required tests.3.Department Order No. 3-E, providing the minimum salary a performing artist ought to receive (not less than US$600.00 for those bound for Japan) and the authorized deductions therefrom.4.Department Order No. 3-F, providing for the guidelines on the issuance and use of the ARB by returning performing artists who, unlike new artists, shall only undergo a Special Orientation Program (shorter than the basic program) although they must pass the academic test.In Civil Case No. 95-72750, the Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the Philippines (FETMOP), on January 27, 1995 filed a class suit assailing these department orders, principally contending that said orders 1) violated the constitutional right to travel; 2) abridged existing contracts for employment; and 3) deprived individual artists of their licenses without due process of law.FETMOP, likewise, averred that the issuance of the Artist Record Book (ARB) was discriminatory and illegal and "in gross violation of the constitutional right... to life liberty and property." Said Federation consequently prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the aforestated orders.On February 2, 1992, JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. and Kary International, Inc., herein petitioners, filed a Motion for Intervention in said civil case, which was granted by the trial court in an Order dated 15 February, 1995.However, on February 21, 1995, the trial court issued an Order denying petitioners' prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the complaint.On appeal from the trial court's Order, respondent court, in CA G.R. SP No. 36713 dismissed the same.Tracing the circumstances which led to the issuance of the ARB requirement and the assailed Department Order, respondent court concluded that the issuances constituted a valid exercise by the state of the police power.We agree.The latin maximsalus populi est suprema lexembodies the character of the entire spectrum of public laws aimed at promoting the general welfare of the people under the State's police power.As an inherent attribute of sovereignty which virtually "extends to all public needs,"[2]this "least limitable"[3]of governmental powers grants a wide panoply of instruments through which the state, asparens patriaegives effect to a host of its regulatory powers.Describing the nature and scope of the police power, Justice Malcolm, in the early case ofRubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro[4]wrote:"The police power of the State," one court has said...'is a power coextensive with self-protection, and is not inaptly termed 'the law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.' Carried onward by the current of legislature, the judiciary rarely attempts to dam the onrushing power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual."[5]Thus, police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare or the common good.As the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably.A thorough review of the facts and circumstances leading to the issuance of the assailed orders compels us to rule that the Artist Record Book requirement and the questioned Department Order related to its issuance were issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of the police power.In 1984, the Philippines emerged as the largest labor sending country in Asia dwarfing the labor export of countries with mammoth populations such as India and China.According to the National Statistics Office, thisdiasporawas augmented annually by over 450,000 documented and clandestine or illegal (undocumented) workers who left the country for various destinations abroad, lured by higher salaries, better work opportunities and sometimes better living conditions.Of the hundreds of thousands of workers who left the country for greener pastures in the last few years, women composed slightly close to half of those deployed, constituting 47% between 1987-1991, exceeding this proportion (58%) by the end of 1991,[6]the year former President Aquino instituted the ban on deployment of performing artists to Japan and other countries as a result of the gruesome death of Filipino entertainer Maricris Sioson.It was during the same period that this Court took judicial notice not only of the trend, but also of the fact that most of our women, a large number employed as domestic helpers and entertainers, worked under exploitative conditions "marked by physical and personal abuse."[7]Even then, we noted that "[t]he sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers" compelled "urgent government action."[8]Pursuant to the alarming number of reports that a significant number of Filipina performing artists ended up as prostitutes abroad (many of whom were beaten, drugged and forced into prostitution), and following the deaths of a number of these women, the government began instituting measures aimed at deploying only those individuals who met set standards which would qualify them as legitimate performing artists.In spite of these measures, however, a number of our countrymen have nonetheless fallen victim to unscrupulous recruiters, ending up as virtual slaves controlled by foreign crime syndicates and forced into jobs other than those indicated in their employment contracts.Worse, some of our women have been forced into prostitution.Thus, after a number of inadequate and failed accreditation schemes, the Secretary of Labor issued on August 16, 1993, D.O. No. 28, establishing the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council (EIAC), the policy advisory body of DOLE on entertainment industry matters.[9]Acting on the recommendations of the said body, the Secretary of Labor, on January 6, 1994, issued the assailed orders.These orders embodied EIAC's Resolution No. 1, which called for guidelines on screening, testing and accrediting performing overseas Filipino artists.Significantly, as the respondent court noted, petitioners were duly represented in the EIAC,[10]which gave the recommendations on which the ARB and other requirements were based.Clearly, the welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3.Short of a total and absolute ban against the deployment of performing artists to "high risk" destinations, a measure which would only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very least rationalizes the method of screening performing artists by requiring reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and limits deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad.It cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies.Moreover, here or abroad, selection of performing artists is usually accomplished by auditions, where those deemed unfit are usually weeded out through a process which is inherently subjective and vulnerable to bias and differences in taste.The ARB requirement goes one step further, however, attempting to minimize the subjectivity of the process by defining the minimum skills required from entertainers and performing artists.As the Solicitor General observed, this should be easily met by experienced artists possessing merely basic skills.The tests are aimed at segregating real artists or performers from those passing themselves off as such, eager to acceptany available job and therefore exposing themselves to possible exploitation.As to the other provisions of Department Order No. 3 questioned by petitioners, we see nothing wrong with the requirement for document and booking confirmation (D.O. 3-C), a minimum salary scale (D.O. 3-E), or the requirement for registration of returning performers.The requirement for a venue certificate or other documents evidencing the place and nature of work allows the government closer monitoring of foreign employers and helps keep our entertainers away from prostitution fronts and other worksites associated with unsavory, immoral, illegal or exploitative practices.Parenthetically, none of these issuances appear to us, by any stretch of the imagination, even remotely unreasonable or arbitrary.They address a felt need of according greater protection for an oft-exploited segment of our OCW's.They respond to the industry's demand for clearer and more practicable rules and guidelines.Many of these provisions were fleshed out following recommendations by, and after consultations with, the affected sectors and non-government organizations.On the whole, they are aimed at enhancing the safety and security of entertainers and artists bound for Japan and other destinations, without stifling the industry's concerns for expansion and growth.In any event, apart from the State's police power, the Constitution itself mandates government to extend the fullest protection to our overseas workers.The basic constitutional statement on labor, embodied in Section 18 of Article II of the Constitution provides:Sec. 18.The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force.It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.More emphatically, the social justice provision on labor of the 1987 Constitution in its first paragraph states:The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.Obviously, protection to labor does not indicate promotion of employment alone.Under the welfare and social justice provisions of the Constitution, the promotion of full employment, while desirable, cannot take a backseat to the government's constitutional duty to provide mechanisms for the protection of our workforce, local or overseas.As this Court explained inPhilippine Association of Service Exporters(PASEI) v. Drilon,[11]in reference to the recurring problems faced by our overseas workers:What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and humane.It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home.Under these circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection, personally and economically, while away from home.We now go to petitioners' assertion that the police power cannot, nevertheless, abridge the right of our performing workers to return to work abroad after having earlier qualified under the old process, because, having previously been accredited, their accreditation became a property right," protected by the due process clause.We find this contention untenable.A profession, trade or calling is a property right within the meaning of our constitutional guarantees.One cannot be deprived of the right to work and the right to make a living because these rights are property rights, the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes an actionable wrong.[12]Nevertheless, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power by the state particularly when their conduct affects either the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the public health and welfare and public morals.According to the maxim,sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, it must of course be within the legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in which every one may so use his own property so as not to pose injury to himself or others.[13]In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is certainly much wider.[14]To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violates the due process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or professions.Professionals leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid written and practical exams before they are deemed fit to practice their trade.Seamen are required to take tests determining their seamanship.Locally, the Professional Regulation Commission has began to require previously licensed doctors and other professionals to furnish documentary proof that they had either re-trained or had undertaken continuing education courses as a requirement for renewal of their licenses.It is not claimed that these requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a property right under the due process clause.So long as Professionals and other workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no such deprivation exists.Finally, it is a futile gesture on the part of petitioners to invoke the non-impairment clause of the Constitution to support their argument that the government cannot enact the assailed regulatory measures because they abridge the freedom to contract.InPhilippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Drilon, we held that "[t]he non-impairment clause of the Constitution... must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the government."[15]Equally important, into every contract is read provisions of existing law, and always, a reservation of the police power for so long as the agreement deals with a subject impressed with the public welfare.A last point.Petitioners suggest that the singling out of entertainers and performing artists under the assailed department orders constitutes class legislation which violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.We do not agree.The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or class privilege.It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate.It does not require absolute equality, but merely that all persons be treated alike under like conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.[16]We have held, time and again, that the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification for so long as such classification is based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation.[17]If classification is germane to the purpose of the law, concerns all members of the class, and applies equally to present and future conditions, the classification does not violate the equal protection guarantee.In the case at bar, the challenged Department Order clearly applies to all performing artists and entertainers destined for jobs abroad.These orders, we stressed hereinbefore, further the Constitutional mandate requiring Government to protect our workforce, particularly those who may be prone to abuse and exploitation as they are beyond the physical reach of government regulatory agencies.The tragic incidents must somehow stop, but short of absolutely curtailing the right of these performers and entertainers to work abroad, the assailed measures enable our government to assume a measure of control.WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision sought to be reviewed, petition is hereby DENIED.SO ORDERED.Padilla (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug,andHermosisima, Jr., JJ.,concur.

[1]EIAC, Res. No. 1.[2]Noble State Bankv.Haskel, 219 US 112 (1911).[3]Smith, Bell and Co.v.Natividad, 40 Phil. 136 (1919).[4]39 Phil 660, 708 (1919).[5]Id., at 708-709.[6]Source: National Statistics Office, 1992.[7]Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc.v.Drilon 163 SCRA 386, 392 (1988).[8]Id.[9]Department Order No. 28 vests the EIAC with the following principal functions:a) recommend to the DOLE policies, plans and programs for the development of the entertainment industry, local and overseas, including but not limited to talents training and upgrading, employment standards and other internationally acceptable trade practices;b) promote ethical business standards and dignified workplaces;c) act as the coordinating body for all training programs and technical assistance to the entertainment industry;d) advise the DOLE on the institutionalization of an internationally acceptable system of manpower development, talent protection and welfare;e) assist the appropriate agencies, private or public in the implementation of a trainors and training and upgrading program;f) review existing issuances on the industry including the system of training, testing and accreditation of performing artists/talents and recommend to the Secretary such measures or schemes as are deemed necessary for its proper compliance xxx xxx.[10]The EIAC is chaired by an Undersecretary of Labor and is composed of 3 representatives from the government, 2 representatives from the employers' sector, one representative from the talent developers, 2 representatives from the workers' sector and one representative from the Non-government Organizations.[11]Id.[12]Phil. Movie Workers' Assn.v.Premier Productions, Inc., 92 Phil. 8423 (1953); National Labor Unionvs.Court of Industrial Relations, 68 Phil. 732 (1939).[13]Casevs.Board of Helath, 24 Phil. 250, 280 (1913).[14]Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operatorsvs.City of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 (1967).[15]Supra, note 6, at 397.[16]Itchong,etc.,et al.vs.Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 (1957).SECOND DIVISION[G.R. No. 131719.May 25, 2004]THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, AND THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, OWWA ADMINISTRATOR, and POEA ADMINISTRATOR,petitioners,vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ASIAN RECRUITMENT COUNCIL PHILIPPINE CHAPTER (ARCO-PHIL.), INC., representing its members: Worldcare Services Internationale, Inc., Steadfast International Recruitment Corporation, Dragon International Manpower Services Corporation, Verdant Manpower Mobilization Corporation, Brent Overseas Personnel, Inc., ARL Manpower Services, Inc., Dahlzhen International Services, Inc., Interworld Placement Center, Inc., Lakas Tao Contract Services, Ltd. Co., and SSC Multiservices,respondents.D E C I S I O NCALLEJO, SR.,J.:In this petition for review oncertiorari, the Executive Secretary of the President of the Philippines, the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of Labor and Employment, the POEA Administrator and the OWWA Administrator, through the Office of the Solicitor General, assail the Decision[1]of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 38815 affirming the Order[2]of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City dated August 21, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-24401, granting the plea of the petitioners therein for a writ of preliminary injunction and of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court on August 24, 1995.The AntecedentsRepublic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, took effect on July 15, 1995.The Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995 was, thereafter, published in the April 7, 1996 issue of the Manila Bulletin.However, even before the law took effect, the Asian Recruitment Council Philippine Chapter, Inc. (ARCO-Phil.) filed, on July 17, 1995, a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to declare as unconstitutional Section 2, paragraph (g), Section 6, paragraphs (a) to (j), (l) and (m), Section 7, paragraphs (a) and (b), and Sections 9 and 10 of the law, with a plea for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the respondents therein from enforcing the assailed provisions of the law.In a supplement to its petition, the ARCO-Phil. alleged that Rep. Act No. 8042 was self-executory and that no implementing rules were needed.It prayed that the court issue a temporary restraining order to enjoin the enforcement of Section 6, paragraphs (a) to (m) on illegal recruitment, Section 7 on penalties for illegal recruitment, and Section 9 on venue of criminal actions for illegal recruitments,viz:Viewed in the light of the foregoing discussions, there appears to be urgent an imperative need for this Honorable Court to maintain the statusquoby enjoining the implementation or effectivity of the questioned provisions of RA 8042, by way of a restraining order otherwise, the member recruitment agencies of the petitioner will suffer grave or irreparable damage or injury.With the effectivity of RA 8042, a great majority of the duly licensed recruitment agencies have stopped or suspended their operations for fear of being prosecuted under the provisions of a law that are unjust and unconstitutional.This Honorable Court may take judicial notice of the fact that processing of deployment papers of overseas workers for the past weeks have come to a standstill at the POEA and this has affected thousands of workers everyday just because of the enactment of RA 8042.Indeed, this has far reaching effects not only to survival of the overseas manpower supply industry and the active participating recruitment agencies, the countrys economy which has survived mainly due to the dollar remittances of the overseas workers but more importantly, to the poor and the needy who are in dire need of income-generating jobs which can only be obtained from abroad.The loss or injury that the recruitment agencies will suffer will then be immeasurable and irreparable.As of now, even foreign employers have already reduced their manpower requirements from the Philippines due to their knowledge that RA 8042 prejudiced and adversely affected the local recruitment agencies.[3]On August 1, 1995, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order effective for a period of only twenty (20) days therefrom.After the petitioners filed their comment on the petition, the ARCO-Phil. filed an amended petition, the amendments consisting in the inclusion in the caption thereof eleven (11) other corporations which it alleged were its members and which it represented in the suit, and a plea for a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing Section 6 subsection (i), Section 6 subsection (k) and paragraphs 15 and 16 thereof, Section 8, Section 10, paragraphs 1 and 2, and Sections 11 and 40 of Rep. Act No. 8042.The respondent ARCO-Phil. assailed Section 2(g) and (i), Section 6 subsection (a) to (m), Section 7(a) to (b), and Section 10 paragraphs (1) and (2), quoted as follows:(g)THE STATE RECOGNIZES THAT THE ULTIMATE PROTECTION TO ALL MIGRANT WORKERS IS THE POSSESSION OF SKILLS.PURSUANT TO THIS AND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE, THE GOVERNMENT SHALL DEPLOY AND/OR ALLOW THE DEPLOYMENT ONLY OF SKILLED FILIPINO WORKERS.[4]Sec. 2 subsection (i, 2nd par.)Nonetheless, the deployment of Filipino overseas workers, whether land-based or sea-based, by local service contractors and manning agents employing them shall be encourages (sic).Appropriate incentives may be extended to them.II.ILLEGAL RECRUITMENTSEC. 6. Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged.It shall, likewise, include the following acts, whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority:(a)To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater than that specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, or to make a worker pay any amount greater than that actually received by him as a loan or advance;(b)To furnish or publish any false notice or information or document in relation to recruitment or employment;(c)To give any false notice, testimony, information or document or commit any act of misrepresentation for the purpose of securing a license or authority under the Labor Code;(d)To induce or attempt to induce a worker already employed to quit his employment in order to offer him another unless the transfer is designed to liberate a worker from oppressive terms and conditions of employment;(e)To influence or attempt to influence any person or entity not to employ any worker who has not applied for employment through his agency;(f)To engage in the recruitment or placement of workers in jobs harmful to public health or morality or to the dignity of the Republic of the Philippines;(g)To obstruct or attempt to obstruct inspection by the Secretary of Labor and Employment or by his duly authorized representative;(h)To fail to submit reports on the status of employment, placement vacancies, remittance of foreign exchange earnings, separation from jobs, departures and such other matters or information as may be required by the Secretary of Labor and Employment;(i)To substitute or alter to the prejudice of the worker, employment contracts approved and verified by the Department of Labor and Employment from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of the expiration of the same without the approval of the Department of Labor and Employment;(j)For an officer or agent of a recruitment or placement agency to become an officer or member of the Board of any corporation engaged in travel agency or to be engaged directly or indirectly in the management of a travel agency;(k)To withhold or deny travel documents from applicant workers before departure for monetary or financial considerations other than those authorized under the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations;(l)Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as determined by the Department of Labor and Employment; and(m)Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without the workers fault.Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage.Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another.It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals, accomplices and accessories.In case of juridical persons, the officers having control, management or direction of their business shall be liable.SEC. 7. Penalties. (a)Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than twelve (12) years and a fine of not less than two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) nor more than five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).(b)The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than one million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein.Provided, however, That the maximum penalty shall be imposed if the person illegally recruited is less than eighteen (18) years of age or committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority.Sec. 8.Prohibition on Officials and Employees. It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of the Department of Labor and Employment, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), or the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA), or the Department of Foreign Affairs, or other government agencies involved in the implementation of this Act, or their relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, to engage, directly or indirectly, in the business of recruiting migrant workers as defined in this Act.The penalties provided in the immediate preceding paragraph shall be imposed upon them.(underscoring supplied)Sec. 10, pars. 1 & 2.Money Claims. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this section shall be joint and several.This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval.The performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers.If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.SEC. 11. Mandatory Periods for Resolution of Illegal Recruitment Cases. The preliminary investigations of cases under this Act shall be terminated within a period of thirty (30) calendar days from the date of their filing.Where the preliminary investigation is conducted by a prosecution officer and aprima faciecase is established, the corresponding information shall be filed in court within twenty-four (24) hours from the termination of the investigation.If the preliminary investigation is conducted by a judge and aprima faciecase is found to exist, the corresponding information shall be filed by the proper prosecution officer within forty-eight (48) hours from the date of receipt of the records of the case.The respondent averred that the aforequoted provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.[5]According to the respondent, Section 6(g) and (i) discriminated against unskilled workers and their families and, as such, violated the equal protection clause, as well as Article II, Section 12[6]and Article XV, Sections 1[7]and 3(3) of the Constitution.[8]As the law encouraged the deployment of skilled Filipino workers, only overseas skilled workers are granted rights.The respondent stressed that unskilled workers also have the right to seek employment abroad.According to the respondent, the right of unskilled workers to due process is violated because they are prevented from finding employment and earning a living abroad.It cannot be argued that skilled workers are immune from abuses by employers, while unskilled workers are merely prone to such abuses.It was pointed out that both skilled and unskilled workers are subjected to abuses by foreign employers.Furthermore, the prohibition of the deployment of unskilled workers abroad would only encourage fly-by-night illegal recruiters.According to the respondent, the grant of incentives to service contractors and manning agencies to the exclusion of all other licensed and authorized recruiters is an invalid classification.Licensed and authorized recruiters are thus deprived of their right to property and due process and to the equality of the person. It is understandable for the law to prohibit illegal recruiters, but to discriminate against licensed and registered recruiters is unconstitutional.The respondent, likewise, alleged that Section 6, subsections (a) to (m) is unconstitutional because licensed and authorized recruitment agencies are placed on equal footing with illegal recruiters.It contended that while the Labor Code distinguished between recruiters who are holders of licenses and non-holders thereof in the imposition of penalties, Rep. Act No. 8042 does not make any distinction.The penalties in Section 7(a) and (b) being based on an invalid classification are, therefore, repugnant to the equal protection clause, besides being excessive; hence, such penalties are violative of Section 19(1), Article III of the Constitution.[9]It was also pointed out that the penalty for officers/officials/employees of recruitment agencies who are found guilty of economic sabotage or large-scale illegal recruitment under Rep. Act No. 8042 is life imprisonment.Since recruitment agencies usually operate with a manpower of more than three persons, such agencies are forced to shut down, lest their officers and/or employees be charged with large scale illegal recruitment or economic sabotage and sentenced to life imprisonment.Thus, the penalty imposed by law, being disproportionate to the prohibited acts, discourages the business of licensed and registered recruitment agencies.The respondent also posited that Section 6(m) and paragraphs (15) and (16), Sections 8, 9 and 10, paragraph 2 of the law violate Section 22, Article III of the Constitution[10]prohibitingex-post factolaws and bills of attainder.This is because the provisions presume that a licensed and registered recruitment agency is guilty of illegal recruitment involving economic sabotage, upon a finding that it committed any of the prohibited acts under the law.Furthermore, officials, employees and their relatives are presumed guilty of illegal recruitment involving economic sabotage upon such finding that they committed any of the said prohibited acts.The respondent further argued that the 90-day period in Section 10, paragraph (1) within which a labor arbiter should decide a money claim is relatively short, and could deprive licensed and registered recruiters of their right to due process.The period within which the summons and the complaint would be served on foreign employees and, thereafter, the filing of the answer to the complaint would take more than 90 days.This would thereby shift on local licensed and authorized recruiters the burden of proving the defense of foreign employers.Furthermore, the respondent asserted, Section 10, paragraph 2 of the law, which provides for the joint and several liability of the officers and employees, is a bill of attainder and a violation of the right of the said corporate officers and employees to due process.Considering that such corporate officers and employees act with prior approval of the board of directors of such corporation, they should not be liable, jointly and severally, for such corporate acts.The respondent asserted that the following provisions of the law are unconstitutional:SEC. 9. Venue. A criminal action arising from illegal recruitment as defined herein shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the offense was committed or where the offended party actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense:Provided, That the court where the criminal action is first filed shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts:Provided, however, That the aforestated provisions shall also apply to those criminal actions that have already been filed in court at the time of the effectivity of this Act.SEC. 10. Money Claims. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.Sec. 40.The departments and agencies charged with carrying out the provisions of this Act shall, within ninety (90) days after the effectiviy of this Act, formulate the necessary rules and regulations for its effective implementation.According to the respondent, the said provisions violate Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution[11]because they impair the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure.In their answer to the petition, the petitioners alleged,inter alia, that (a) the respondent has no cause of action for a declaratory relief;(b) the petition was premature as the rules implementing Rep. Act No. 8042 not having been released as yet; (c) the assailed provisions do not violate any provisions of the Constitution; and, (d) the law was approved by Congress in the exercise of the police power of the State.In opposition to the respondents plea for injunctive relief, the petitioners averred that:As earlier shown, the amended petition for declaratory relief is devoid of merit for failure of petitioner to demonstrate convincingly that the assailed law is unconstitutional, apart from the defect and impropriety of the petition.One who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond reasonable doubt (Caleon v. Agus Development Corporation, 207 SCRA 748).All reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56).This presumption of constitutionality is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoin upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments (Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, 204 SCRA 516 [1991]).Necessarily, the ancillary remedy of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction prayed for must fall.Besides, an act of legislature approved by the executive is presumed to be within constitutional bounds (National Press Club v. Commission on Elections, 207 SCRA 1).[12]After the respective counsels of the parties were heard on oral arguments, the trial court issued on August 21, 1995, an order granting the petitioners plea for a writ of preliminary injunction upon a bond ofP50,000.The petitioner posted the requisite bond and on August 24, 1995, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the following provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 pending the termination of the proceedings: Section 2, subsections (g) and (i, 2nd par.); Section 6, subsections (a) to (m), and pars. 15 & 16; Section 7, subsections (a) & (b); Section 8; Section 9; Section 10; pars. 1 & 2; Section 11; and Section 40 of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. [13]The petitioners filed a petition forcertiorariwith the Court of Appeals assailing the order and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court on the following grounds:1.Respondent ARCO-PHIL. had utterly failed to show its clear right/s or that of its member-agencies to be protected by the injunctive relief and/or violation of said rights by the enforcement of the assailed sections of R.A. 8042;2.Respondent Judge fixed aP50,000 injunction bond which is grossly inadequate to answer for the damage which petitioner-officials may sustain, should respondent ARCO-PHIL. be finally adjudged as not being entitled thereto.[14]The petitioners asserted that the respondent is not the real party-in-interest as petitioner in the trial court.It is inconceivable how the respondent, a non-stock and non-profit corporation, could sustain direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the law.They argued that if, at all, any damage would result in the implementation of the law, it is the licensed and registered recruitment agencies and/or the unskilled Filipino migrant workers discriminated against who would sustain the said injury or damage, not the respondent.The respondent, as petitioner in the trial court, was burdened to adduce preponderant evidence of such irreparable injury, but failed to do so.The petitioners further insisted that the petitiona quowas premature since the rules and regulations implementing the law had yet to be promulgated when such petition was filed.Finally, the petitioners averred that the respondent failed to establish the requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the law and the rules and regulations issued implementing the same.On December 5, 1997, the appellate court came out with a four-page decision dismissing the petition and affirming the assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court.The appellate court, likewise, denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the said decision.The petitioners now come to this Court in a petition for review oncertiorarion the following grounds:1.Private respondent ARCO-PHIL. had utterly failed to show its clear right/s or that of its member-agencies to be protected by the injunctive relief and/or violation of said rights by the enforcement of the assailed sections of R.A. 8042;2.TheP50,000 injunction bond fixed by the courta quoand sustained by the Court of Appeals is grossly inadequate to answer for the damage which petitioners-officials may sustain, should private respondent ARCO-PHIL. be finally adjudged as not being entitled thereto.[15]On February 16, 1998, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing the assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction.The IssuesThe core issue in this case is whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed order and the writ of preliminary injunction on a bond of onlyP50,000 and whether or not the appellate court erred in affirming the trial courts order and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by it.The petitioners contend that the respondent has nolocus standi.It is a non-stock, non-profit organization; hence, not the real party-in-interest as petitioner in the action.Although the respondent filed the petition in the Regional Trial Court in behalf of licensed and registered recruitment agencies, it failed to adduce in evidence a certified copy of its Articles of Incorporation and the resolutions of the said members authorizing it to represent the said agencies in the proceedings.Neither is the suit of the respondent a class suit so as to vest in it a personality to assail Rep. Act No. 8042; the respondent is service-oriented while the recruitment agencies it purports to represent are profit-oriented.The petitioners assert that the law is presumed constitutional and, as such, the respondent was burdened to make a case strong enough to overcome such presumption and establish a clear right to injunctive relief.The petitioners bewail theP50,000 bond fixed by the trial court for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and affirmed by the appellate court.They assert that the amount is grossly inadequate to answer for any damages that the general public may suffer by reason of the non-enforcement of the assailed provisions of the law.The trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion in granting the respondents plea for injunctive relief, and the appellate court erred in affirming the order and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court.The respondent, for its part, asserts that it has duly established itslocus standiand its right to injunctive relief as gleaned from its pleadings and the appendages thereto.Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, it was incumbent on the petitioners, as respondents in the RTC, to show cause why no injunction should issue.It avers that the injunction bond posted by the respondent was more than adequate to answer for any injury or damage the petitioners may suffer, if any, by reason of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC.In any event, the assailed provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 exposed its members to the immediate and irreparable damage of being deprived of their right to a livelihood without due process, a property right protected under the Constitution.The respondent contends that the commendable purpose of the law to eradicate illegal recruiters should not be done at the expense and to the prejudice of licensed and authorized recruitment agencies.The writ of preliminary injunction was necessitated by the great number of duly licensed recruitment agencies that had stopped or suspended their business operations for fear that their officers and employees would be indicted and prosecuted under the assailed oppressive penal provisions of the law, and meted excessive penalties.The respondent, likewise, urges that the Court should take judicial notice that the processing of deployment papers of overseas workers have come to a virtual standstill at the POEA.The Courts RulingThe petition is meritorious.The Respondent Has Locus StandiTo File the Petition in the RTC inRepresentation of the ElevenLicensed and RegisteredRecruitment Agencies Impleadedin the Amended PetitionThe modern view is that an association has standing to complain of injuries to its members.This view fuses the legal identity of an association with that of its members.[16]An association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest if its members are affected by the action.An organization has standing to assert the concerns of its constituents.[17]InTelecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections,[18]we held that standingjus tertiiwould be recognized only if it can be shown that the party suing has some substantial relati