Labor Cases Full Text (E-SCRA)

8/9/2019 Labor Cases Full Text (E-SCRA)

1/25

Cebu Royal Plant vs. Deputy Minister of LaborNo. L-58639. Auust !"# !98$.%C&'( R)*AL PLAN+ ,AN M/(&L C)RP)RA+)N0# petitioner# vs. +1&1)N)RA'L& D&P(+* MN+&R )2 LA')R an RAM)N PL)N responents.

Labor; Illegal Dismissal; Probationary Period; An employee who is allowed to work after aprobationary period shall be considered a regular employee.As there is no mention of thebasis of the above order we may assume it was the temporary payroll authority submittedby the petitioner showing that the private respondent was employed on probation on!ebruary "# "$%&. 'ven supposing that it is not self(serving we find nevertheless that it isself(defeating. )he si*(month period of probation started from the said date of appointment

and so ended on August "% "$%& but it is not shown that the private respondent+semployment also ended then; on the contrary he continued working as usual. ,nder Article-&- of the Labor ode /an employee who is allowed to work after a probationary periodshall be considered a regular employee./ 0ence Pilones was already on permanent statuswhen he was dismissed on August -" "$%& or four days after he ceased to be aprobationer.1ame; 1ame; 2einstatement; 'mployer+s protestations that reinstatement of the employeewould pre3udice public health not believed.)he petitioner claims it could not havedismissed the private respondent earlier because the *(ray e*amination was made only onAugust "% "$%& and the results were not immediately available. )hat e*cuse is untenable.4e note that when the petitioner had all of si* months during which to conduct suche*amination it chose to wait until e*actly the last day of the probation period. In the light ofsuch delay its protestations now that reinstatement of Pilones would pre3udice public

health cannot but sound hollow and hypocritical. 5y its own implied admission thepetitioner had e*posed its customers to the employee+s disease because of its failure toe*amine him before entrusting him with the functions of a /syrup man./ Its belated concernfor the consuming public is hardly persuasive if not clearly insincere and self(righteous.1ame; 1ame; 1ame; onstitution; 1ecurity of tenure; 1ince the private respondent wasalready a regular employee when he was dismissed he could validly claim the security oftenure guaranteed to him by the onstitution and the Labor ode.4e are satisfied thatwhether his employment began on !ebruary "# "$%& or even earlier as he claims theprivate respondent was already a regular employee when he was dismissed on August -""$%&. As such he could validly claim the security of tenure guaranteed to him by theonstitution and the Labor ode.1ame; 1ame; Absence of a medical certificate from a competent public health authorityindicates that the employee+s disease is not of such a nature that it will not be cured withina period of # months even with proper medical treatment and thus his dismissal was asevere and unlawful sanction.)he record does not contain the certification re6uired bythe above rule. )he medical certificate offered by the petitioner came from its ownphysician who was not a /competent public health authority/ and merely stated theemployee+s disease without more. 4e may surmise that if the re6uired certification wasnot presented it was because the disease was not of such a nature or seriousness that itcould not be cured within a period of si* months even with proper medical treatment. If sodismissal was un6uestionably a severe and unlawful sanction.1ame; 1ame; Prior clearance rule in force at the time re6uires that it must be obtained priorto the operative act of termination of an employee.It is also worth noting that thepetitioner+s application for clearance to terminate the employment of the private respondentwas filed with the 7inistry of Labor only on August -& "$%& or seven days after hisdismissal. As the 8L2 has repeatedly and correctly said the prior clearance rule 9whichwas in force at that time: was not a /trivial technicality./ It re6uired /not 3ust the mere filing

of a petition or the mere attempt to procure a clearance/ but that /the said clearance beobtained prior to the operative act of termination./

1ame; 1ame; 1ame; 2einstatement; 'mployer+s attempt to circumvent the law byseparating the employee after months service to prevent him from becoming a regularemployee and then rehiring him on probation again without security of tenure contrary tothe mandate of social 3ustice; 2einstatement of employee conditioned on his fitness toresume his work as certified by competent authority.4e agree that there was here anattempt to circumvent the law by separating the employee after five months+ service toprevent him from becoming a regular employee and then rehiring him on probation againwithout security of tenure. 4e cannot permit this subterfuge if we are to be true to the spiritand mandate of social 3ustice.


2/25

period he underwent medical e*amination for 6ualification as regular employee but theresults showed that he is suffering from P)5 minimal. onse6uently he was informed ofthe termination of his employment by respondent./ )he order then concluded that thetermination was /3ustified./ )hat was all.As there is no mention of the basis of the above order we may assume it was thetemporary payroll authority submitted by the petitioner showing that the private respondentwas employed on probation on !ebruary "# "$%&. 'ven supposing that it is not self(serving we find nevertheless that it is self(defeating. )he si*(month period of probationstarted from the said date of appointment and so ended on August "% "$%& but it is notshown that the private respondent+s employment also ended then; on the contrary hecontinued working as usual. ,nder Article -&- of the Labor ode /an employee who is

allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee./0ence Pilones was already on permanent status when he was dismissed on August -""$%& or four days after he ceased to be a probationer.)he petitioner claims it could not have dismissed the private respondent earlier becausethe *(ray e*amination was made only on August "% "$%& and the results were notimmediately available. )hat e*cuse is untenable. 4e note that when the petitioner had allof si* months during which to conduct such e*amination it chose to wait until e*actly thelast day of the probation period. In the light of such delay its protestations now thatreinstatement of Pilones would pre3udice public health cannot but sound hollow andhypocritical. 5y its own implied admission the petitioner had e*posed its customers to theemployee+s disease because of its failure to e*amine him before entrusting him with thefunctions of a /syrup man./ Its belated concern for the consuming public is hardlypersuasive if not clearly insincere and self(righteous.

)here is proof in fact that the private respondent was first hired not on !ebruary "# "$%&but earlier in "$%%. )his is the "$%% withholding ta* statement issued for him by thepetitioner itself which it does not and cannot deny. )he petitioner stresses that this is theonly evidence of the private respondent+s earlier service and notes that he has notpresented any co(worker to substantiate his claim. )his is perfectly understandable. Biventhe natural reluctance of many workers to antagoniCe their employers we need not wonderwhy none of them testified against the petitioner.4e are satisfied that whether his employment began on !ebruary "# "$%& or even earlieras he claims the private respondent was already a regular employee when he wasdismissed on August -" "$%&. As such he could validly claim the security of tenureguaranteed to him by the onstitution and the Labor ode.)he applicable rule on the ground for dismissal invoked against him is 1ection & 2ule I5ook I of the 2ules and 2egulations Implementing the Labor ode reading as follows

/1ec. &. Disease as a ground for dismissal.4here the employee suffers from adisease and his continued employment is prohibited by law or pre3udicial to his healthor to the health of his co(employees the employer shall not terminate his employmentunless there is a certification by a competent public health authority that the disease isof such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of si* 9#:months even with proper medical treatment. If the disease or ailment can be curedwithin the period the employer shall not terminate the employee but shall ask theemployee to take a leave. )he employer shall reinstate such employee to his formerposition immediately upon the restoration of his normal health./

)he record does not contain the certification re6uired by the above rule. )he medicalcertificate offered by the petitioner came f rom its own physician who was not a /competentpublic health authority/ and merely stated the employee+s disease without more. 4e may

surmise that if the re6uired certification was not presented it was because the disease wasnot of such a nature or seriousness that it could not be cured within a period of si* months

even with proper medical treatment. If so dismissal was un6uestionably a severe andunlawful sanction.It is also worth noting that the petitioner+s application for clearance to terminate theemployment of the private respondent was filed with the 7inistry of Labor only on August-& "$%& or seven days after his dismissal.# As the 8L2 has repeatedly and correctlysaid the prior clearance rule 9which was in force at that time: was not a /trivial technicality./It re6uired /not 3ust the mere filing of a petition or the mere attempt to procure a clearance/but that /the said clearance be obtained prior to the operative act of termination. /4e agree that there was here an attempt to circumvent the law by separating theemployee after five months+ service to prevent him from becoming a regular employee andthen rehiring him on probation again without security of tenure. 4e cannot permit this

subterfuge if we are to be true to the spirit and mandate of social 3ustice.


3/25

the rule that 3ustice is in every case for the deserving to be dispensed in the light of theestablished f acts and the applicable law and doctrine.1ame; 1ame; ompassionate measure offered by the company deserves commendationand support.4e note that under the law then in force the private respondent could havevalidly reduced its work force because of its financial reverses without the obligation togrant separation pay. )his was permitted under the original Article -%-9a: of the Laborode which was in force at the time. )o its credit however the company voluntarily offeredgratuities to those who would agree to be phased out pursuant to the terms and conditionsof its retrenchment program in recognition of their loyalty and to tide them over their ownfinancial difficulties. )he ourt feels that such compassionate measure deservescommendation and support but at the same time rules that it should be available only to

those who are 6ualified therefor. 4e hold that the petitioner is not one of them.

P')I)I.4e gave due course to this petition and re6uired the parties to file simultaneousmemoranda on the sole 6uestion of whether or not the petitioner is entitled to separationpay under the retrenchment program of the private respondent.)he facts are as followsPetitioner 7anuel 1osito was employed in "$#? by the private respondent a loggingcompany and was in charge of logging importation with a monthly salary of P#%.EEwhen he went on indefinite leave with the consent of the company on >anuary "# "$%#.-uly -E "$%# the private respondent through its president announced a retrenchment

program and offered separation pay to employees in the active service as of >une =E"$%# who would tender their resignations not later than >uly =" "$%#. )he petitionerdecided to accept this offer and so submitted his resignation on >uly -$ "$%# /to availhimself of the gratuity benefits/ promised. 0owever his resignation was not acted upon andhe was never given the separation pay he e*pected. )he petitioner complained to theDepartment of Labor where he was sustained by the labor arbiter. )he company wasordered to pay 1osito the sum of P?=&%.E representing his salary for si* and a halfmonths. uly -E "$%#/7emorandum )o ALL '7PLuly =" "$%#. )hose whose resignations areaccepted shall be informed accordingly and shall be paid their separation benefits./After >uly =" "$%# this offer of payment of separation benefits will no longer be available.)hereafter the ompany shall apply for a clearance to terminate the services of suchnumber of employees as may be necessary in order to reduce the manpower strength tosuch desired level as to prevent further losses.

/91BD.: >


4/25

and upheld his cause in his conflicts with the employer. 1uch favoritism however has notblinded us to the rule that 3ustice is in every case for the deserving to be dispensed in thelight of the established facts and the applicable law and doctrine.40'2'!


5/25

?. In not declaring that private respondent forfeited all her benefits for havingabandoned her 3ob on >une - to = "$ and for insubordination.In her comment to the petition the private respondent argued that she was dismissedwithout due process because she was not given the opportunity to be heard concerning thecauses of her transfer.,pon a careful consideration of the petition and the documents anne*ed thereto as well asprivate respondentKs comment 4e find the petition to be meritorious.

A constructive discharge is defined as A 6uitting because continued employment isrendered impossible unreasonable or unlikely; as an offer involving a demotion in rankand a diminution in pay.J

In this case the private respondentKs assignment as Production 1ecretary of theProduction Department was not unreasonable as it did not involve a demotion in rank 9herrank was still that of a department secretary: nor a change in her place of work 9the officeis in the same building: nor a diminution in pay benefits and privileges. It did notconstitute a constructive dismissal.It is the employerKs prerogative based on its assessment and perception of its employeesK6ualifications aptitudes and competence to move them around in the various areas of itsbusiness operations in order to ascertain where they will function with ma*imum benefit tothe company. An employeeKs right to security of tenure does not give him such a vestedright in his position as would deprive the company of its prerogative to change hisassignment or transfer him where he will be most useful. 4hen his transfer is notunreasonable nor inconvenient nor pre3udicial to him and it does not involve a demotionin rank or a diminution of his salaries benefits and other privileges the employee may not

complain that it amounts to a constructive dismissal.une - to >une = "$ constituted an abandonment of her 3ob in thecompany resulting in the forfeiture of the benefits due her. 4hile she was guilty ofinsubordination for having refused to move out of her position as '*ecutive 1ecretary tothe '*ecutive ice(President and Beneral 7anager of the company dismissal from theservice would be a draconian punishment for it as her complaint for illegal dismissal wasfiled in good faith.40'2'!


6/25

/uly "$&= respondent icta called complainant to his office and informedthe latter that he was being transferred effective " August "$&= to the newly openedagayan territory comprising the provinces of agayan 8ueva iCcaya and Isabela. )hetransfer order was made formal in a memorandum dated -$ >uly "$&=. Among thereasons given for complainant+s selection as P72 for the agayan territory were +)heterritory re6uired a veteran and seasoned P72 who can operate immediately withminimum training and supervision. Likewise a P72 who can immediately e*ploit the vastbusiness potential of the area.

/In a letter dated " August "$&= which was received by Abbott on ? August "$&=complainant thru his lawyer ob3ected to the transfer on the grounds that it was notonly a demotion but also personal and punitive in nature without basis legally and

factually./aime icta the Director for Administration !rancisco Lim andthe Beneral 7anager A. . 5out has been proven by respondents.

/It appearing therefore that the order to transfer complainant is based upon a

3udgment of his employer Abbott which 3udgment to transfer is in line with a companypractice which is not contrary to law morals or public policy. hence beyond the


7/25

competence of this office to 6uestion the refusal of complainant to obey the lawfulorder of Abbott is gross insubordinationa valid cause for dismissal.

/omplainant asserted that the true reason for his transfer was the personal illmotives on the part of respondent icta who resented the derogatory remarks attributedto him as purportedly shown in icta+s memoranda dated -E December "$&- and -#April "$&=. 0owever a cursory reading of said memoranda in 6uestion will show thatthe same were legitimately issued by icta in the e*ercise of his functions as P'D7anager. And the fact that complainant never lifted a finger to formally 6uestion saidmemoranda is a mute admission on his part that the allegations therein are true.

/omplainant also alleged that his transfer was a demotion. 0owever noe*planation was given much less any evidence presented in support of the allegation.

. no part. !ormer firm is counsel for one party.

Petition granted.

8otes.'mployer company in dismissing the employee has the prerogative to prescribe

reasonable rules and regulations necessary for the conduct of its business and to providedisciplinary rules to implement said rules and to assure that the same would be followed.91oco vs. 7ercantile orporation of Davao "?& 12A -#.:

Dismissed employee granted separation pay for e6uitable considerations for his "& yearsof service. 91oco vs 7ercantile orporation of Davao "?& 12A -#.: QAbbottLaboratories 9Phils.: Inc. vs. 8L2 "? 12A %"=9"$&%:R

R(RAL 'AN )2 CAN+LAN# NC.# an ames 2eserva for respondent.

1A8D.!or our resolution is the instant Petition for 2eview on ertiorari assailing the Decision ofthe ourt of Appeals 9)wenty 1econd Division agayan de


8/25

uly "& -EE" 0otchkiss sent respondent a memorandum stating that he has beenappointed bookkeeper I at the bankKs branch in 7adrid 1urigao del 1ur effectiveimmediately with the same salary corresponding to his old position. Initially respondentagreed to accept the appointment but eventually he changed his mind and made thefollowing notation on 0otchkissK memorandum thus

I am withdrawing my signature on this appointment because I feel that this is ademotion 9on t he position itself and allowances: and not a lateral transfer as what thePresident told me yesterday. I believe I do not deserve a demotion.

)hank you.J


9/25

!inally we note that despite respondentKs refusal to accept the new appointmentpetitioners did not dismiss him. 2ather it was he who opted to terminate his employmentwhen he purposely failed to report for work.In fine we hold that the ourt of Appeals erred when it concluded that respondent wasconstructively dismissed from employment.40'2'!r. vs. 8ationalLabor 2elations ommission =-% 12A ?E Q-EEER: Q2ural 5ank of antilan Inc. vs.>ulve "% 12A "%9-EE%:R

'L(& DAR* C)RP)RA+)N an>or &D)N +. A4/(&+&R) an P&DR) /.M/(&L# petitioners# vs. NA+)NAL LA')R R&LA+)N C)MM)N an &L4RAR. R&CALD responents./.R. No. !"983. epte?ber !# !999.%

Labor Law; 7anagement Prerogatives; )ransfers; It is the prerogative of management totransfer an employee from one office to another within the business establishment basedon its assessment and perception of the employeeKs 6ualifications aptitudes andcompetence and in order to ascertain where he can function with ma*imum benefit to thecompany.8o grave abuse of discretion was committed by the 8L2. Indeed it is theprerogative of management to transfer an employee from one office to another within thebusiness establishment based on its assessment and perception of the employeeKs6ualifications aptitudes and competence and in order to ascertain where he can functionwith ma*imum benefit to the company. )his is a privilege inherent in the employerKs right tocontrol and manage his enterprise effectively. )he freedom of management to conduct itsbusiness operations to achieve its purpose cannot be denied.1ame; 1ame; 1ame; )he managerial prerogative to transfer personnel must be e*ercisedwithout grave abuse of discretion bearing in mind the basic elements of 3ustice and fairplayit cannot be used as a subterfuge by the employer to rid himself of an undesirableworker.5ut like other rights there are limits thereto. )he managerial prerogative totransfer personnel must be e*ercised without grave abuse of discretion bearing in mindthe basic elements of 3ustice and fair play. 0aving the right should not be confused with themanner in which that right is e*ercised. )hus it cannot be used as a subterfuge by theemployer to rid himself of an undesirable worker.1ame; 1ame; 1ame; onstructive Dismissal; 4ords and Phrases; )he employer must beable to show that the transfer is not unreasonable inconvenient or pre3udicial to theemployee; nor does it involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries privileges

and other benefits.)he employer must be able to show that the transfer is notunreasonable inconvenient or pre3udicial to the employee; nor does it involve a demotionin rank or a diminution of his salaries privileges and other benefits. 1hould the employer

fail to overcome this burden of proof the employeeKs transfer shall be tantamount toconstructive dismissal which has been defined as a 6uitting because continuedemployment is rendered impossible unreasonable or unlikely; as an offer involving ademotion in rank and diminution in pay. Likewise constructive dismissal e*ists when an actof clear discrimination insensibility or disdain by an employer has become so unbearableto the employee leaving him with no option but to forego with his continued employment.1ame; 1ame; 1ame; 1ame; Demotion; Due Process; 4hile due process re6uired by law isapplied in dismissals the same is also applicable to demotions as demotions likewiseaffect the employment of a worker whose right to continued employment under the sameterms and conditions is also protected by law.Petitioners failed to 3ustify 2ecaldeKstransfer from the position of food technologist in the laboratory to a worker in the vegetable

processing section. 4e recall that what triggered 2ecaldeKs transfer was the -"


10/25

a demeaning and humiliating work condition. )he transfer was a demotion in rank beyonddoubt.1ame; 1ame; 1ame; 1ame; A transfer from a workplace where only highly trustedauthoriCed personnel are allowed access to a workplace that is not as critical is anotherreason enough for an employee to howl a protest.)he laboratory is the place where the6uality of the totality of petitionersK products such as dairy 3uices chocolates andvegetables is tested.


11/25

5ut like other rights there are limits thereto. )he managerial prerogative to transferpersonnel must be e*ercised without grave abuse of discretion bearing in mind the basicelements of 3ustice and fair play. 0aving the right should not be confused with the mannerin which that right is e*ercised. )hus it cannot be used as a subterfuge by the employer torid himself of an undesirable worker.$ In particular the employer must be able to show thatthe transfer is not unreasonable inconvenient or pre3udicial to the employee; nor does itinvolve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries privileges and other benefits."E1hould the employer fail to overcome this burden of proof the employeeKs transfer shall betantamount to constructive dismissal which has been defined as a 6uitting becausecontinued employment is rendered impossible unreasonable or unlikely; as an offerinvolving a demotion in rank and diminution in pay. Likewise constructive dismissal e*ists

when an act of clear discrimination insensibility or disdain by an employer has become sounbearable to the employee leaving him with no option but to forego with his continuedemployment.In the present case petitioners failed to 3ustify 2ecaldeKs transfer from the position of foodtechnologist in the laboratory to a worker in the vegetable processing section. 4e recallthat what triggered 2ecaldeKs transfer was the -" . concur.Petition dismissed; Muestioned decision affirmed.8otes.5eing sidelined temporarily is a standard stipulation in employment contracts asthe availability of assignment for security guards is primarily dependent on the contractsentered into by the agency with third parties; In security agency parlance being placed offdetailJ or on floatingJ status means waiting to be posted.J 91entinel 1ecurity Agency Inc.vs. 8ational Labor 2elations ommission -$ 12A "-= Q"$$&R:


12/25

Q5lue Dairy orporation vs. 8L2 ="? 12A ?E"9"$$$:R

P1LPPN& +&L&/RAP1 AND +&L&P1)N& C)RP)RA+)N# petitioner# vs. ALCALAPLANA# 1on. RCARD) &NCARNAC)N# an NA+)NAL LA')R R&LA+)NC)MM)N# responents./.R. No. $665. 7uly "3# !99!.%

Labor Law; Illegal Dismissal; 'mployer has the inherent right to transfer or assign anemployee in the pursuit of its legitimate business interest sub3ect only to the condition thatit be not motivated by discrimination or bad faith.)here can be no 6uarrel with theArbiterKs formulation of the general principle governing an employerKs prerogative to

transfer his employees from place to place or from one position to another. )he Arbiteracknowledges the inherent right of an employer to transfer or assign an employee in thepursuit of its legitimate business interestsJ sub3ect only to the condition that it be notmotivated by discrimination or 9made: in bad faith or ** effected as a form of punishmentor demotion without sufficient cause.J )his is a principle uniformly adhered to by this ourt.1ame; 1ame; 1ecurity of )enure; An employeeKs right to security of tenure does not givehim such a vested right in his position as would deprive the company of its prerogative tochange his assignment or transfer him.It is the employerKs prerogative based on itsassessment and perception of its employeesK 6ualifications aptitudes and competence tomove them around in the various areas of its business operations in order to ascertainwhere they will function with ma*imum benefit to the company. An employeeKs right tosecurity of tenure does not give him such a vested right in his position as would deprive thecompany of its prerogative to change his assignment or transfer him where he will be most

useful. 4hen his transfer is not unreasonable nor inconvenient nor pre3udicial to him andit does not involve a demotion in rank or diminution of his salaries benefits and otherprivileges the employee may not complain that it amounts to a constructive dismissal.1ame; 1ame; 1ame; )he employee 9Laplana: had to all intents and purposes resignedfrom her position.In this case the employee 9Laplana: had to all intents and purposesresigned from her position. 1he had une6uivocally asked that she be considereddismissed herself suggesting the reason thereforretrenchment. 4hen so dismissed sheaccepted separation pay. F


13/25

)ermination of LaplanaKs employment on account of retrenchment thereupon followed.


14/25

various areas of its business operations in order to ascertain where they willfunction with ma*imum benefit to the company. An employeeKs right to security oftenure does not give him such a vested right in his position as would deprive thecompany of its prerogative to change his assignment or transfer him where he willbe most useful. 4hen his transfer is not unreasonable nor inconvenient norpre3udicial to him and it does not involve a demotion in rank or diminution of hissalaries benefits and other privileges the employee may not complain that itamounts to a constructive dismissal.

In Fuco hemical Industries Inc. v. 7. concur.4rit granted. 2esolution nullified and set aside.8ote.'mployeeKs right to security of tenure does not give him a vested right in hisposition as would deprive the company of its prerogative to change his assignment ortransfer him where he will be most useful. 9Phil(>apan Active arbon orp. vs. 8ationalLabor 2elations ommission "%" 12A "#?.:

ARMAND) /. *RA(&/(# petitioner# vs. P1LPPN& ARLN NC. # responent./.R. No. !68=8!. )tober !$# "==8.%

Labor Law; )ermination of 'mployment; ommon arriers; Air )ransportation; 4eight1tandards;


15/25

standards does not fall under Article -&-9a: whose e*press terms re6uire the element ofwillfulness in order to be a ground for dismissal. )he failure to meet the employerKs6ualifying standards is in fact a ground that does not s6uarely fall under grounds 9a: to 9d:and is therefore one that falls under Article -&-9e:the other causes analogous to theforegoing.J 5y its nature these 6ualifying standardsJ are norms that apply prior to andafter an employee is hired. )hey apply prior to employment because these are thestandards a 3ob applicant must initially meet in order to be hired. )hey apply after hiringbecause an employee must continue to meet these standards while on the 3ob in order tokeep his 3ob. ,nder this perspective a violation is not one of the faults for which anemployee can be dismissed pursuant to pars. 9a: to 9d: of Article -&-; the employee can bedismissed simply because he no longer 6ualifiesJ for his 3ob irrespective of whether or not

the failure to 6ualify was willful or intentional. * * *1ame; 1ame; 1ame; 1ame; 1ame; 1ame; )he obesity of a cabin crew when placed in theconte*t of his work as flight attendant becomes an analogous cause under Article -&-9e:of the Labor ode that 3ustifies his dismissal from the servicehis obesity may not beunintended but is nonetheless voluntary.In fine 4e hold that the obesity of petitionerwhen placed in the conte*t of his work as flight attendant becomes an analogous causeunder Article -&-9e: of the Labor ode that 3ustifies his dismissal from the service. 0isobesity may not be unintended but is nonetheless voluntary. As the A correctly puts itQvRoluntariness basically means that the 3ust cause is solely attributable to the employeewithout any e*ternal force influencing or controlling his actions. )his element runs throughall 3ust causes under Article -&- whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action oromission. Bross and habitual neglect a recogniCed 3ust cause is considered voluntaryalthough it lacks the element of intent found in Article -&-9a: 9c: and 9d:.J

1ame; 1ame; 1ame; 1ame; 1ame; 1ame; 5ona !ide


16/25

important factors to consider in case of emergency. Aircrafts have constricted cabin spaceand narrow aisles and e*it doors. )hus the arguments of respondent that QwRhether theairlineKs flight attendants are overweight or not has no direct relation to its mission oftransporting passengers to their destinationJ; and that the weight standards has nothing todo with airworthiness of respondentKs airlinesJ must fail.1ame; 1ame; 1ame; 1ame; >udicial 8otice; )hat an obese cabin attendant occupies morespace than a slim one is an un6uestionable fact which courts can 3udicially recogniCewithout introduction of evidenceit would also be absurd to re6uire airline companies toreconfigure the aircraft in order to widen the aisles and e*it doors 3ust to accommodateoverweight cabin attendants; )he biggest problem with an overweight cabin attendant isthe possibility of impeding passengers from evacuating the aircraft should the occasion

call for itbeing overweight necessarily impedes mobility.)here is no need to individuallyevaluate their ability to perform their task. )hat an obese cabin attendant occupies morespace than a slim one is an un6uestionable fact which courts can 3udicially recogniCewithout introduction of evidence. It would also be absurd to re6uire airline companies toreconfigure the aircraft in order to widen the aisles and e*it doors 3ust to accommodateoverweight cabin attendants like petitioner. )he biggest problem with an overweight cabinattendant is the possibility of impeding passengers from evacuating the aircraft should theoccasion call for it. )he 3ob of a cabin attendant during emergencies is to speedily get thepassengers out of the aircraft safely. 5eing overweight necessarily impedes mobility.Indeed in an emergency situation seconds are what cabin attendants are dealing with notminutes. )hree lost seconds can translate into three lost lives. 'vacuation might slow down3ust because a wide(bodied cabin attendant is blocking the narrow aisles. )hesepossibilities are not remote.'stoppel; Bood faith demands that what is agreed upon shall be done.Petitioner is alsoin estoppel. 0e does not dispute that the weight standards of PAL were made known to himprior to his employment. 0e is presumed to know the weight limit that he must maintain atall times. In fact never did he 6uestion the authority of PAL when he was repeatedly askedto trim down his weight. 5ona fides e*igit ut 6uod convenit fiat. Bood faith demands thatwhat is agreed upon shall be done. Uung ang tao ay tapat kanyang tutuparin angnapagkasunduan.Administrative Law; Appeals; !actual findings of administrative agencies do not haveinfallibility and must be set aside when they fail the test of arbitrariness.4e are notunmindful that findings of facts of administrative agencies like the Labor Arbiter and the8L2 are accorded respect even finality. )he reason is simple administrative agenciesare e*perts in matters within their specific and specialiCed 3urisdiction. 5ut the principle isnot a hard and fast rule. It only applies if the findings of facts are duly supported bysubstantial evidence. If it can be shown that administrative bodies grossly misappreciated

evidence of such nature so as to compel a conclusion to the contrary their findings of factsmust necessarily be reversed. !actual findings of administrative agencies do not haveinfallibility and must be set aside when they fail the test of arbitrariness.5ill of 2ights; '6ual Protection lause; In the absence of governmental interference theliberties guaranteed by the onstitution cannot be invokedthe 5ill of 2ights is not meantto be invoked against acts of private individuals.)o make his claim more believablepetitioner invokes the e6ual protection clause guaranty of the onstitution. 0owever in theabsence of governmental interference the liberties guaranteed by the onstitution cannotbe invoked. Put differently the 5ill of 2ights is not meant to be invoked against acts ofprivate individuals. Indeed the ,nited 1tates 1upreme ourt in interpreting the !ourteenthAmendment which is the source of our e6ual protection guarantee is consistent in sayingthat the e6ual protection erects no shield against private conduct however discriminatoryor wrongful. Private actions no matter how egregious cannot violate the e6ual protection

guarantee.Labor Law; Payroll 2einstatement; )he option to e*ercise actual reinstatement or payrollreinstatement belongs to the employer.)he law is very clear. Although an award or order

of reinstatement is self(e*ecutory and does not re6uire a writ of e*ecution the option toe*ercise actual reinstatement or payroll reinstatement belongs to the employer. It does notbelong to the employee to the labor tribunals or even to the courts.1ame; 1eparation Pay; '*ceptionally separation pay is granted to a legally dismissedemployee as an act social 3usticeJ or based on e6uityJin both instances it is re6uiredthat the dismissal 9": was not for serious misconduct and 9-: does not reflect on the moralcharacter of the employee.A legally dismissed employee is not entitled to separation pay.)his may be deduced from the language of Article -%$ of the Labor ode that QaRnemployee who is un3ustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement withoutloss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages inclusive ofallowances and to his other benefits or their monetary e6uivalent computed from the time

his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.J Luckilyfor petitioner this is not an ironclad rule. '*ceptionally separation pay is granted to alegally dismissed employee as an act social 3usticeJ or based on e6uity.J In bothinstances it is re6uired that the dismissal 9": was not for serious misconduct; and 9-: doesnot reflect on the moral character of the employee. 0ere 4e grant petitioner separationpay e6uivalent to one(half 9"G-: monthKs pay for every year of service. It should includeregular allowances which he might have been receiving. 4e are not blind to the fact that hewas not dismissed for any serious misconduct or to any act which would reflect on hismoral character. 4e also recogniCe that his employment with PAL lasted for more or less adecade.

P')I)Iamoralin >r. for respondent.2'F'1 2.). >.)0I1 case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who was dismissedbecause of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline company.0e is now before this ourt via a petition for review on certiorari claiming that he wasillegally dismissed. )o buttress his stance he argues that 9": his dismissal does not fallunder -&-9e: of the Labor ode; 9-: continuing adherence to the weight standards of thecompany is not a bona fide occupational 6ualification; and 9=: he was discriminated againstbecause other overweight employees were promoted instead of being disciplined.

After a meticulous consideration of all arguments pro and con 4e uphold the legality ofdismissal. 1eparation pay however should be awarded in favor of the employee as an actof social 3ustice or based on e6uity. )his is so because his dismissal is not for serious

misconduct. 8either is it reflective of his moral character.+;e 2atsPetitioner Armando B. Frasuegui was a former international flight steward of PhilippineAirlines Inc. 9PAL:. 0e stands five feet and eight inches 9K&J: with a large body frame. )heproper weight for a man of his height and body structure is from "?% to "## pounds theideal weight being "## pounds as mandated by the abin and rew Administration7anual of PAL.)he weight problem of petitioner dates back to "$&?. 5ack then PAL advised him to go onan e*tended vacation leave from December -$ "$&? to 7arch ? "$& to address hisweight concerns. Apparently petitioner failed to meet the companyKs weight standardsprompting another leave without pay from 7arch "$& to 8ovember "$&.After meeting the re6uired weight petitioner was allowed to return to work. 5ut petitionerKsweight problem recurred. 0e again went on leave without pay from


17/25

"$&$. 0e was formally re6uested to trim down to his ideal weight and report for weightchecks on several dates. 0e was also told that he may avail of the services of the companyphysician should he wish to do so. 0e was advised that his case will be evaluated on >uly= "$&$.uly =E "$$E he weighed at -"- pounds. learly hewas still way over his ideal weight of "## pounds.!rom then on nothing was heard from petitioner until he followed up his case re6uestingfor leniency on the latter part of "$$-. 0e weighed at -"$ pounds on August -E "$$- and-E pounds on 8ovember "$$-.


18/25

PAL moved for reconsideration to no avail. )hus PAL elevated the matter to the ourt ofAppeals 9A: via a petition for certiorari under 2ule # of the "$$% 2ules of ivilProcedure.5y Decision dated August =" -EE? the A reversed=" the 8L2

40'2'!


19/25

repeatedly failed to report when re6uired to undergo weight checks without offering a valide*planation. )hus his fluctuating weight indicates absence of willpower rather than anillness.Petitioner cites 5onnie ook v. 1tate of 2hode Island Department of 7ental 0ealth2etardation and 0ospitals decided by the ,nited 1tates ourt of Appeals 9!irst ircuit:. Inthat case ook worked from "$%& to "$&E and from "$&" to "$ as an institutionalattendant for the mentally retarded at the Ladd enter that was being operated byrespondent. 1he twice resigned voluntarily with an unblemished record. 'ven respondentadmitted that her performance met the enterKs legitimate e*pectations. In "$&& ook re(applied for a similar position. At that time she stood K-J tall and weighed over =-Epounds.J 2espondent claimed that the morbid obesity of plaintiff compromised her ability to

evacuate patients in case of emergency and it also put her at greater risk of seriousdiseases.ook contended that the action of respondent amounted to discrimination on the basis of ahandicap. )his was in direct violation of 1ection E?9a: of the 2ehabilitation Act of "$%=which incorporates the remedies contained in )itle I of the ivil 2ights Act of "$#?.2espondent claimed however that morbid obesity could never constitute a handicapwithin the purview of the 2ehabilitation Act. Among others obesity is a mutable conditionthus plaintiff could simply lose weight and rid herself of concomitant disability.)he appellate ourt disagreed and held that morbid obesity is a disability under the2ehabilitation Act and that respondent discriminated against ook based on perceivedJdisability. )he evidence included e*pert testimony that morbid obesity is a physiologicaldisorder. It involves a dysfunction of both the metabolic system and the neurologicalappetitesuppressing signal system which is capable of causing adverse effects withinthe musculoskeletal respiratory and cardiovascular systems. 8otably the ourt stated thatmutability is relevant only in determining the substantiality of the limitation flowing from agiven impairmentJ thus mutability only precludes those conditions that an individual caneasily and 6uickly reverse by behavioral alteration.J,nlike ook however petitioner is not morbidly obese. In the words of the District ourt forthe District of 2hode Island ook was sometime before "$%& at least one hundredpounds more than what is considered appropriate of her height.J According to the ircuit>udge ook weighed over =-E poundsJ in "$&&. learly that is not the case here. At hisheaviest petitioner was only less than E pounds over his ideal weight.In fine 4e hold that the obesity of petitioner when placed in the conte*t of his work asflight attendant becomes an analogous cause under Article -&-9e: of the Labor ode that3ustifies his dismissal from the service. 0is obesity may not be unintended but isnonetheless voluntary. As the A correctly puts it QvRoluntariness basically means that the3ust cause is solely attributable to the employee without any e*ternal force influencing or

controlling his actions. )his element runs through all 3ust causes under Article -&- whetherthey be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission. Bross and habitual neglect arecogniCed 3ust cause is considered voluntary although it lacks the element of intent foundin Article -&-9a: 9c: and 9d:.J . +;e is?issal of petitioner an be preiate on t;e bona fie oupational@ualifiation efense.'mployment in particular 3obs may not be limited to persons of a particular se* religion ornational origin unless the employer can show that se* religion or national origin is anactual 6ualification for performing the 3ob. )he 6ualification is called a bona fideoccupational 6ualification 95!


20/25

and e*it doors. )hus the arguments of respondent that QwRhether the airlineKs flightattendants are overweight or not has no direct relation to its mission of transportingpassengers to their destinationJ; and that the weight standards has nothing to do withairworthiness of respondentKs airlinesJ must fail.)he rationale in 4estern Air Lines v. riswell relied upon by petitioner cannot apply to hiscase. 4hat was involved there were two 9-: airline pilots who were denied reassignment asflight engineers upon reaching the age of #E and a flight engineer who was forced to retireat age #E. )hey sued the airline company alleging that the age(#E retirement for flightengineers violated the Age Discrimination in 'mployment Act of "$#%. Age(based 5!


21/25

In insisting that he be reinstated to his actual position despite being overweight petitionerin effect wants to render the issues in the present case moot. 0e asks PAL to comply withthe impossible. )ime and again the ourt ruled that the law does not e*act compliancewith the impossible.4. Petitioner is entitle to separation pay.5e that as it may all is not lost for petitioner.8ormally a legally dismissed employee is not entitled to separation pay. )his may bededuced from the language of Article -%$ of the Labor ode that QaRn employee who isun3ustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniorityrights and other privileges and to his full back wages inclusive of allowances and to hisother benefits or their monetary e6uivalent computed from the time his compensation was

withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.J Luckily for petitioner this isnot an ironclad rule.'*ceptionally separation pay is granted to a legally dismissed employee as an act social3usticeJ or based on e6uity.J In both instances it is re6uired that the dismissal 9": was notfor serious misconduct; and 9-: does not reflect on the moral character of the employee.0ere 4e grant petitioner separation pay e6uivalent to one(half 9"G-: monthKs pay for everyyear of service. It should include regular allowances which he might have been receiving.4e are not blind to the fact that he was not dismissed for any serious misconduct or to anyact which would reflect on his moral character. 4e also recogniCe that his employment withPAL lasted for more or less a decade.40'2'!


22/25

practice. )o 3ustify a bona fide occupational 6ualification the employer must prove twofactors 9": that the employment 6ualification is reasonably related to the essentialoperation of the 3ob involved; and 9-: that there is a factual basis for believing that all orsubstantially all persons meeting the 6ualification would be unable to properly perform theduties of the 3ob. )he concept of a bona fide occupational 6ualification is not foreign in our3urisdiction. 4e employ the standard of reasonableness of the company policy which isparallel to the bona fide occupational 6ualification re6uirement. In the recent case ofDuncan Association of Detailman(P)B4< and Pedro )ecson v. Bla*o 4ellcomePhilippines Inc. we passed on the validity of the policy of a pharmaceutical companyprohibiting its employees from marrying employees of any competitor company.1ame; 1ame; 1ame; 1ame; 1ame; )he cases of Duncan Association of Detailment(

P)B4< v. Bla*o 4ellcome Philippines Inc. B.2. 8o. "#-$$? "% 1eptember -EE? ?=&12A =?= and Philippine )elegraphy and )elephone ompany v. 8ational Labor 2elationsommission B.2. 8o. ""&$%& -= 7ay "$$% -%- 12A $# instruct that the re6uirementof reasonableness must be clearly established to uphold a 6uestioned employment policy.)he cases of Duncan and P)H) instruct us that the re6uirement of reasonableness mustbe clearly established to uphold the 6uestioned employment policy. )he employer has theburden to prove the e*istence of a reasonable business necessity. )he burden wassuccessfully discharged in Duncan but not in P)H).1ame; 1ame; 1ame; 1ame; 1ame; )hat the company did not 3ust want to have two 9-: ormore of its employees related between the third degree by affinity andGor consanguinityJ islamethe policy is premised on the mere fear that employees married to each other will beless efficient; If the court were to uphold the 6uestioned rule without valid 3ustification theemployer can create policies based on an unproven presumption of a perceived danger atthe e*pense of an employeeKs right to security of tenure.PetitionersK sole contention thatthe company did not 3ust want to have two 9-: or more of its employees related betweenthe third degree by affinity andGor consanguinityJ is lame. )hat the second paragraph wasmeant to give teeth to the first paragraph of the 6uestioned rule is evidently not the validreasonable business necessity re6uired by the law. It is significant to note that in the caseat bar respondents were hired after they were found fit for the 3ob but were asked toresign when they married a co(employee. Petitioners failed to show how the marriage of1imbol then a 1heeting 7achine une -% "$$&. Prior to the marriageune -E "$$& pursuant to the company policy.


23/25

omia was hired by the company on !ebruary "$$%. 1he met 0oward omia a co(employee whom she married on >une " -EEE. une =E -EEE.'strella was hired on >uly -$ "$$?. 1he met Luisito @uOiga 9@uOiga: also a co(worker.Petitioners stated that @uOiga a married man got 'strella pregnant. )he companyallegedly could have terminated her services due to immorality but she opted to resign onDecember -" "$$$.)he respondents each signed a 2elease and onfirmation Agreement. )hey stated thereinthat they have no money and property accountabilities in the company and that theyrelease the latter of any claim or demand of whatever nature.

2espondents offer a different version of their dismissal. 1imbol and omia allege that theydid not resign voluntarily; they were compelled to resign in view of an illegal companypolicy. As to respondent 'strella she alleges that she had a relationship with co(worker@uOiga who misrepresented himself as a married but separated man. After he got herpregnant she discovered that he was not separated. )hus she severed her relationshipwith him to avoid dismissal due to the company policy.

-. N N N 2'1P


24/25

rather than upon their ability. )hese policies focus upon the potential employment problemsarising from the perception of favoritism e*hibited towards relatives.4ith more women entering the workforce employers are also enacting employmentpolicies specifically prohibiting spouses from working for the same company. 4e note thattwo types of employment policies involve spouses policies banning only spouses fromworking in the same company 9no(spouse employment policies: and those banning allimmediate family members including spouses from working in the same company 9anti(nepotism employment policies:.,nlike in our 3urisdiction where there is no e*press prohibition on marital discriminationthere are twenty state statutes in the ,nited 1tates prohibiting marital discrimination. 1omestate courts have been confronted with the issue of whether no(spouse policies violate their

laws prohibiting both marital status and se* discrimination.

In challenging the anti(nepotism employment policies in the ,nited 1tates complainantsutiliCe two theories of employment discrimination the disparate treatment and the disparateimpact. ,nder the disparate treatment analysis the plaintiff must prove that an employmentpolicy is discriminatory on its face. 8o(spouse employment policies re6uiring an employeeof a particular se* to either 6uit transfer or be fired are facially discriminatory. !ore*ample an employment policy prohibiting the employer from hiring wives of maleemployees but not husbands of female employees is discriminatory on its face.


25/25

Petitioners contend that their policy will apply only when one employee marries a co(employee but they are free to marry persons other than co(employees. )he 6uestionedpolicy may not facially violate Article "=# of the Labor ode but it creates adisproportionate effect and under the disparate impact theory the only way it could pass3udicial scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable despite the discriminatory albeitdisproportionate effect. )he failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern inimposing the 6uestioned policy cannot pre3udice the employeeKs right to be free fromarbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of married persons working together in onecompany.Lastly the absence of a statute e*pressly prohibiting marital discrimination in our3urisdiction cannot benefit the petitioners. )he protection given to labor in our 3urisdiction is

vast and e*tensive that we cannot prudently draw inferences from the legislatureKs silencethat married persons are not protected under our onstitution and declare valid a policybased on a pre3udice or stereotype. )hus for failure of petitioners to present undisputedproof of a reasonable business necessity we rule that the 6uestioned policy is an invalide*ercise of management prerogative. orollary the issue as to whether respondents1imbol and omia resigned voluntarily has become moot and academic.As to respondent 'strella the Labor Arbiter and the 8L2 based their ruling on thesingular fact that her resignation letter was written in her own handwriting. 5oth ruled thather resignation was voluntary and thus valid. )he respondent court failed to categoricallyrule whether 'strella voluntarily resigned but ordered that she be reinstated along with1imbol and omia.'strella claims that she was pressured to submit a resignation letter because she was indire need of money. 4e e*amined the records of the case and find 'strellaKs contention tobe more in accord with the evidence. 4hile findings of fact by administrative tribunals likethe 8L2 are generally given not only respect but at times finality this rule admits ofe*ceptions as in the case at bar.

'strella avers that she went back to work on December -" "$$$ but was dismissed due toher alleged immoral conduct. At first she did not want to sign the termination papers butshe was forced to tender her resignation letter in e*change for her thirteenth month pay.)he contention of petitioners that 'strella was pressured to resign because she gotimpregnated by a married man and she could not stand being looked upon or talked aboutas immoral is incredulous. If she really wanted to avoid embarrassment and humiliationshe would not have gone back to work at all. 8or would she have filed a suit for illegaldismissal and pleaded for reinstatement. 4e have held that in voluntary resignation theemployee is compelled by personal reason9s: to dissociate himself from employment. It isdone with the intention of relin6uishing an office accompanied by the act of abandonment.)hus it is illogical for 'strella to resign and then file a complaint for illegal dismissal. Biven

the lack of sufficient evidence on the part of petitioners that the resignation was voluntary'strellaKs dismissal is declared illegal.I8 I'4 40'2'

Documents

Labor Cases Full Text (E-SCRA)