G.R. No. 197539 June 2, 2014PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff-Appellee,vs.ANGELITA I. DAUD, HANELITA M. GALLEMIT and RODERICK GALLEMIT y TOLENTINO,Accused.RODERICK GALLEMIT y TOLENTINO,Accused-appellant.D E C I S I O NLEONARDO-DE CASTRO,J.:For Our consideration is an appeal from the Decision1dated March 18, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03168, which affirmed the Joint Decision2dated January 15, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Paraaque City, Branch 195, in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0122 to 30, finding accused-appellant Roderick Gallemit y Tolentino guilty of the crimes of ( 1) illegal recruitment in large scale, as defined and penalized under Article II, Section 6, in relation to Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995;" and (2) estafa, as defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, but modified the penalties imposed upon appellant for said crimes.In an Information dated January 3, 2003, docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-0122, Angelita I. Daud (Daud), Hanelita M. Gallemit (Hanelita), and appellant Roderick Gallemit y Tolentino were charged before the RTC with illegal recruitment in large scale, allegedly committed as follows:That on or about or sometime during the period from February 5, 2001 to August 2001, in the City of Paraaque, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, representing themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, for a fee, recruit and promise employment abroad to complainantsMarcelo De Guzman, Evangeline Relox, Maricel Rayo, Brigida Rayo, Gina Decena, Nenita Policarpio, Myrna Crisostomo and Francisco Poserio,without first securing the required license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment thus deemed committed in large scale and therefore amounting to economic sabotage.3Eight more Informations, all dated January 3, 2003, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 03-0123 to 03-0130, charged Daud, Hanelita, and appellant before the RTC with eight counts of Estafa, committed separately upon eight private complainants, namely, Marcelo I. De Guzman (De Guzman), Evangeline I. Relox, Marcelo E. Rayo, Brigada A. Rayo, Gina T. Decena (Decena), Nenita F. Policarpio, Myrna S. Crisostomo and Francisco S. Poserio (Poserio), respectively.The Information in Criminal Case No. 03-0123 alleged:That on or about covering the period from February 2001 up to March 2001, in the City of Paraaque, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and there willfully and feloniously defraud Marcelo de Guzman y Ignacio pertinent to his overseas job employment if he would deliver to them the amount ofP545,000.00 by means of other similar deceit knowing it to be false and only made to induce the aforementioned complainant to give and deliver the said amount ofP545,000.00 and accused once in possession of the same, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misapply and misappropriate the said amount to their own personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the said MARCELODE GUZMAN y IGNACIO in the aforementioned amount.4The seven other Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0124 to 03-0130 were similarly worded as the aforequoted Information, except as to the name of the private complainant and the amount purportedly collected from him/her, to wit:Docket No.Private ComplainantAmount Collected

Crim. Case No. 03-01245Evangeline I. Relox,P25,000.00

Crim. Case No. 03-01256Marcelo E. RayoP45,000.00

Crim. Case No. 03-01267Brigada A. RayoP28,000.00

Crim. Case No. 03-01278Gina T. DecenaP70,000.00

Crim. Case No. 03-01289Nenita F. PolicarpioP50,000.00

Crim. Case No. 03-012910Myrna S. CrisostomoP24,500.00

Crim. Case No. 03-013011Francisco S. PoserioP70,000.00

Only appellant was apprehended, while his co-accused Daud and Hanelita eluded arrest and remained at large.The nine criminal cases against appellant before the RTC were consolidated. When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to all the charges against him. Thereafter, joint trial of the nine criminal cases ensued.The prosecution offered as evidence the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Certification dated September 19, 2002 stating that Green Pasture Worldwide Tour and Consultancy, with address at India St., Don Bosco, Paraaque City, set up and operated by appellant and his co-accused, is not licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment.12Of all the private complainants, only De Guzman, Decena, and Poserio testified against Gallem it. The presentation of a POEA representative was dispensed with after the defense admitted the due execution and genuineness of the POEA Certification dated September 19, 2002.13Evidence for the defense consisted solely of appellants testimony.After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision dated January 15, 2007 finding appellant guilty of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and Estafa on three (3) counts. The dispositive portion of the judgment reads:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:(1) In Criminal Case No. 03-0122, the Court finds accused Roderick Gallemit y Tolentino, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as principal of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale in violation of Section 6 in relation to Section 7 of RA 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 and hereby sentences him to a penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).(2) In Criminal Case No. 03-0123, the Court finds accused Roderick Gallemit y Tolentino GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as principal of the crime of Estafa under Article 315 paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer the Indeterminate Penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months as minimum to thirteen (13) years as maximum which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. The accused is further sentenced to pay complaining witness Marcelo De Guzman y Ignacio the amount of Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00) plus twelve percent (12%) interest from the date of the filing of the Information on February 3, 2003, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, plus the costs of suit;(3) In Criminal Case No. 03-0127,the Court finds accused Roderick Gallemit y Tolentino GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as principal of the crime of Estafa under Article 315 paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate Penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months as minimum to nine (9) years as maximum which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. The accused is further sentenced to pay the costs of suit; and(4) In Criminal Case No. 03-0130, the Court finds accused Roderick Gallemit y Tolentino GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as principal of the crime of Estafa under Article 315 paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer the Indeterminate Penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months as minimum to twelve (12) years and two (2) months as maximum which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. The accused is further sentenced to pay costs of suit.(5) Criminal Case Nos. 03-0124, 03-0125, 03-0126, 03-0128, and 03-0129, for failure to prosecute, are hereby ordered Dismissed, as against accused Roderick Gallemit.Considering that accused ANGELITA I. DAUD and HANELITA M. GALLEMIT remain at large for more than six (6) months since the issuance and delivery of the warrant of arrest to the proper police or peace officer, the cases against them are hereby ordered ARCHIVED pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92. Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against them.14Following the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration by the RTC in an Order15dated April 3, 2007, appellant filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals.The Court of Appeals summarized the private complainants testimonies against appellant, viz:Marcelo de Guzman[(De Guzman)], a dentist by profession with a clinic in Bulacan, testified that sometime in January 2001, he was introduced by his patient Modesta Marqueda to her cousin, accused [Daud]. [Daud] encouraged [De Guzman] to apply for work abroad and convinced him that she would be able to send him to Korea. To prove to [De Guzman] that she was capable of sending workers abroad, [Daud] invited him to visit her office located at Taft Avenue, Manila.A month later, [De Guzman] and his cousins Maricel Rayo, Brigida Rayo, Myrna Crisostomo, Francisco Poserio, Evangeline Relox, [Decena] and Nenita Policarpio, wentto see [Daud] at the Jemimah International Manpower Services, located at Taft Avenue, Manila where the latter was then working as a liaison officer. The group was shown job orders and photos of [Daud] with Korean employees to prove that she was indeed sending workers abroad. It was at this office that [De Guzman] first met [appellant] and [Hanelita].Meanwhile, [Daud], together with [Hanelita] and [appellant], put up their own business named Green Pastures Worldwide Tours and Consultancy Corporation in their residence at No. 4 Sta. Maria Apartment, India St., Better Living Subdivision, Barangay Don Bosco, Paraaque City.Having been convinced by the documents shown to him at the Taft Avenue office, [De Guzman] paid [Daud] the amount ofP35,000[.]00 as initial payment for his placement fee at the latters office and residence in Paraaque City on February 2, 2001. On February 5, 2001, [De Guzman] gave [Daud] the amount ofP15,000[.]00 which was witnessed by Hanelita. He gave anotherP15,000.00 on February 22, 2001. However, he lost the original receipts.On March 3, 6 and 7, 2001, [De Guzman] again gave [Daud] x x x different amounts consisting ofP35,000.00,P30,000.00 andP15,000.00, respectively, at her office in Paraaque City (Exhibits "A" to "C"). In [De Guzman]s presence, [Daud] counted the money, issued receipts therefor as "processing fees of Nike applicants", affixed her signature after signing the receipts in the name of "Nimfa Min". [Daud] explained to him that "Nimfa Min" was her contact who happened to be the wife of a Korean national. [De Guzman] trusted [Daud] and accepted her explanation. Whenever he gave his payment to [Daud], it was in the presence of Hanelita and [appellant] but he did not require the two to sign as witnesses because he trusted them as they were members of the same family. [De Guzman] was told by [Daud] and [appellant] that he and his group would be leaving in two weeks time.[De Guzman] and his companions were instructed to appear before the Korean Embassy and were promised that they would be able to leave on March 11, 2001 as trainee workers in Korea where they would earn a monthly salary of US$400, overtime pay, with benefits of free board and lodging and 30-day leave within a year. De Guzmans group were shown photocopies of their passport and stamped visas for Korea. However, they were not given their working permits and job contracts.When their departure date was getting near, [Daud] postponed it thrice. Eventually, [De Guzman] asked from accused [Daud] a photocopy of his passport with a stamped Korean Visa. Upon inquiry with the Korean Embassy, [De Guzman] was told that it was fake. He proceeded to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and verified the registration of Green Pastures Worldwide Tour and Consultancy Corporation. The POEA informed them that it was not registered with the POEA and gave[De Guzman] a certification to the effect that the said agency was not licensed to recruit employees for abroad (Exhibit D).Embarrassed because of the money given by his cousins, [De Guzman] verbally asked [Daud], Hanelita and [appellant] to return the money. They promised him that they would settle the matter but they failed to return the money. x x x.Gina Decena, for her part testified that sometime in January 2001, she was introduced by her cousin, Maricel Rayo, to accused [Daud], [Hanelita] and [appellant], at the Makati Medical Towers where Maricel had her medical examination. [Decena] again met the three accused at their office at No. 4 Sta. Maria Apartment, Better Living Subdivision, Paraaque City when Maricel obtained a copy of her medical certificate. They enticed [Decena] to apply at their agency by showing her job orders that offered $400 [a] month salary, 150% overtime pay, free board and lodging as well as photographs of prospective Korean employers. [Appellant] even gave her a copy of the job order. The three accused assured [Decena] that they had already sent several applicants for employment abroad. Convinced, [Decena] and her husband Marcelo Rayo applied at their agency. They were instructed to undergo medical examination, to attend a Korean Language seminar, and to payP70,000.00 processing fee.Thus, on February 15, 2001, [Decena] and her husband each gave accused [Daud] the amount ofP35,000.00 as placement fees. During trial, [Decena] presented her receipt forP35,000.00 which was received and signed by [Daud].Thereafter, the couple were told to wait for two weeks for the processing of their visas. As two weeks have passed and nothing happened to their applications, [Decena] and her husband went to the POEA to verify the status of the agency. They were informed to the effect that said agency was not licensed to send workers abroad. [Decena] and her husband went back to the agency and tried to look for the accused but they were all gone. They later came to know, through [De Guzman], that [appellant] was apprehended. She identified her sworn statement in court.Sometime in January 2001, Francisco Poserio [(Poserio)] was brought along by his cousin [De Guzman] to No. 4 Sta. Maria Apt., India St., Better Living Subdivision, Barangay Don Bosco, Paraaque City. While thereat, [De Guzman] introduced [Daud], Hanelita and [appellant] as the owners of Green Pastures Worldwide Tours and Consultancy and that they were sending workers to Korea. The three accused encouraged [Poserio] to apply for work in Korea where he could get a job which offered a monthly salary of US$400 with free meals and housing, 150% pay on overtime work and vacation leave of thirty (30) days in a two-year contract. To convince [Poserio] that they can send workers to Korea, they showed him job orders from Hyundai Group and Nike requiring workers for Korea, a copy of a Korean visa of one of their job applicants, and photos of [Daud] in Korea with a Korean national who would be [Poserio]s prospective employer if he applied with their agency. Further, he would be able to earn back his placement fee in three months work.Enticed, [Poserio] mortgaged his property to get funds for his job application. [Daud] and Hanelita informed him to undergo a medical examination and seminar and even gave him a referral. On January 27, 2001, he gave his passport, medical examination result, seminar result and certification for employment. He was then told to payP100,000.00 as processing fee for his job application. On March 3, 2001, he gave his down payment ofP25,000.00 to [Daud] in the presence of Hanelita and [appellant]. He was told to wait for two weeks for the processing of his papers. On July 2001, he was informed that additional amount was needed to process his papers. Thus, on July 5, 2001, he gaveP45,000.00 as additional payment to [Daud] in the presence of Hanelita. He was again told to wait for another three weeks. He was even promised that they would return his money if he would notbe sent abroad. A year after his payment, [Poserio] was still not able to leave the country. Upon verification with the POEA, he and the other job applicants discovered that the said agency was not licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment. He talked over the phone with the accused and demanded the return of his money. When they failed to return his money, he filed a complaint with the Paraaque police.All three complainants positively identified [appellant] in court.16(Citations omitted.)The Court of Appeals similarly provided a gist of appellants testimony, thus:Roderick Gallemit[(appellant)] denied owning the agency, undertaking any recruitment act or receiving any amount from the complainants considering that his name did not appear in the receipts. He admitted that he is married to co-accused [Hanelita] and that co-accused [Daud] is his mother-in-law.He knew private complainants [De Guzman] and [Poserio] who were introduced to him by [Daud] who was then working as a liaison officer at Jemimah International Manpower Services located in Taft Avenue, Manila. [Appellant] denied knowing the other complainants. He was just brought along by [Daud] since he was also one of the job seekers applying at the Jemimah International Manpower Services where [Daud] worked. [Daud] told him that private complainant [De Guzman] is her business partner. [Poserio] was one of those applying for a job abroad and [De Guzman] would refer them to [Daud]. Thus, [De Guzman] frequented their apartment in Paraaque.He admitted that, from February 2001 to August 2001, he had been staying at the apartment in India Street, Better Living Subdivision, Paraaque City he shared with his wife Hanelita, their child and his mother-in-law [Daud]. He and his wife were not employed since they were applying for a job abroad. His siblings help him out by sending him money for his job application. He was aware that his mother-in-law [Daud] was a recruiter and owned an agency named Green Pasture Worldwide Travel and Tours which she operated in the same apartment.He claimed that [Daud] has only one employee, a certain Badjong, who processed documents. At first he did not apply with [Daud] because her business was still new. He applied with her when she convinced him that she could process his passport and papers to Korea.He denied he was present when the complainants gave their payments to [Daud]. He insisted that he was not involved with [Daud]s business and that he was always out of the house as he would often go to Cavite to ask for financial help from his siblings. x x x.17(Citations omitted.)In its Decision dated March 18, 2011,the Court of Appeals affirmed appellants conviction by the RTC, but modified the indeterminate penalties imposed on appellant for the three counts of estafa. The appellate court decreed:WHEREFORE, the appealed decision finding accused-appellant RODERICK GALLEMIT y TOLENTINO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and of Estafa is AFFIRMED with modification with respect to the indeterminate penalties imposed on appellant for the three counts of estafa, to wit:(1) In Criminal Case No. 03-0123, appellant is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional as minimum to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.(2) In Criminal Case No. 03-0127, appellant is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional as minimum to nine (9) years of prision mayor as maximum.(3) In Criminal Case No. 03-0130, appellant is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional as minimum to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum.In all other respects, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED.18Hence, appellant comes before us via the instant appeal with the same assignment of errors which he raised before the Court of Appeals:ITHE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF LARGE-SCALE ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT AND ESTAFA DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.IITHE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF ESTAFADESPITE THE ABSENCE [OF] THE ELEMENT OF DECEIT.Illegal recruitment in large scaleAppellant anchors his bid for acquittal on the failure of the prosecution to prove that he gave private complainants the distinct impression that he had the power or ability to send them abroad for work such that they were convinced to part with their money. Any encouragement or promise of employment abroad was solely made by Daud. Appellant points out that it was only his alleged presence at the time private complainants were making their payments to Daud that led said private complainants to believe that appellant participated in the recruitment scheme.The Office of the Solicitor General, as counsel for the appellee, insists that appellant acted in conspiracy with his co-accused in engaging in illegal recruitment activities, specifically performing the following acts: (1) Appellant, together with his co-accused, owned and operated Green Pasture Worldwide Tour and Consultancy Corporation; (2) Appellant, together with his co-accused, encouraged private complainants to apply for jobs abroad with their agency, promising private complainants salary of US$400.00, 150% overtime pay, and free board and lodging; (3) Appellant, together with his co-accused, assured private complainants that they could leave for Korea within a short period after paying their placement fees; and (4) Appellant was present everytime private complainants made payments to his co-accused Daud. In addition, private complainants De Guzman, Decena, and Poserio positively identified and pointed to appellant in court as one of the persons who recruited them for work abroad.19Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as "any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers; and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not." In the simplest terms, illegal recruitment is committed by persons who, without authority from the government, give the impression that they have the power to send workers abroad for employment purposes.20Republic Act No. 8042 broadened the concept of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and provided stiffer penalties, especially for those that constitute economic sabotage, i.e., Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and Illegal Recruitment Committed by a Syndicate.Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 defined illegal recruitment as follows:SEC. 6. Definition. - For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include the following acts, whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority:x x x x(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without the workers fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage.Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.To constitute illegal recruitment in large scale, three elements must concur: (a) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; (b) the offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of"recruitment and placement" under Article13(b) of the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the said Code (now Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042); and (c) the offender committed the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group.21Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals ruled that all the foregoing elements of illegal recruitment in large scale are present in the case at bar. As the Court of Appeals discussed in detail:First, neither the agency "Green Pastures World Wide Tours and Consultancy" nor appellant himself had a valid license or authority to engage in the recruitment and placement of workers. This was established by the POEA certification stating that the said agency located in that apartment was not licensed to recruit employees for abroad. A license is a document issued by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) authorizing a person or entity to operate a private employment agency, while an authority is a document issued by the DOLE authorizing a person or association to engage in recruitment and placement activities as a private recruitment entity. It is the lack of the necessary license or authority that renders the recruitment activity, as in this case, unlawful or criminal.Second, despite not having such authority, appellant, along with his co-accused, nevertheless engaged in recruitment activities, offering and promising jobs to private complainants and collecting from them various amounts as placement fees. This is substantiated by the respective testimonies of the three private complainants who fell victim to their illegal activities. Marcelo de Guzman testified that appellant was physically present during the time that he and his companions were being shown job orders and while he was paying for the fees for himself and in behalf of his companions. Francisco Poserio testified that appellant was one of those who apprised him of job benefits and tried to convince him to apply for overseas employment through their agency. Gina Decena mentioned that [appellant] even gave her a copy of the job order.We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the lower court that there was conspiracy among the accused in the commission of the offense. Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused which point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. Conspiracy exists where the participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as unmistakably to indicate a common purpose or design in committing the crime.The testimonies of the complainants on the matter are affirmative in nature and sufficiently corroborative of each other to be less than credible. It would be contrary to human nature and experience for several persons to conspire and accuse appellant of a crime and send him to prison just to appease their feeling of rejection and vindicate the frustration of their dreams to work abroad if all he did was just to reside in the same apartment where his mother-in-law [Daud] operated her recruitment agency. It is in this light that We find any inconsistencies that accused-appellant harps on in the tesimonines of the complainants to be inconsequential. What is important is that they have positively identified accused-appellant as one of those who enticed them to part with their money in exchange for promised jobs abroad.The crime of illegal recruitment, according to the Supreme Court is committed when, among other things, a person, who without being duly authorized according to law, represents or gives the distinct impression that he or she has the power or the ability to provide work abroad convincing those to whom the representation is made or to whom the impression is given to thereupon part with their money in order to be assured of that employment. This is what obtains in this case.Contrary to appellants mistaken notion, it is not the issuance or signing of receipts for the placement fees that makes a case for illegal recruitment, but rather the undertaking of recruitment activities without the necessary license or authority. The absence of receipts to evidence payment is not necessarily fatal to the prosecutions cause. A person charged with the illegal recruitment may be convicted on the strength of the testimony of the complainants, if found to be credible and convincing.Considering the evidence on record, We agree with the trial court that accused-appellant engaged in recruitment of workers which was illegal and in large scale. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three or more persons individually or as a group. In this case, three complainants testified against appellants acts of illegal recruitment.22(Citations omitted.)The Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the findings and conclusions of the RTC and the Court of Appeals. The prosecution witnesses were positive and categorical in their testimonies that they personally met appellant; that they knew appellant was associated with Green Pasture Worldwide Tour and Consultancy; and that appellant had performed recruitment activities such as promising employment abroad, encouraging job applications, and providing copies of job orders. The private complainants testimonies are consistent and corroborate one another on material points, such as the amount of the placement fees asked, and the purported country of destination and nature of work.It was not necessary for the prosecution to still prove that appellant himself received the placement fees from private complainants and issued receipts for the same, given the finding of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals of the existence of conspiracy among appellant and his co-accused Hanelita and Daud, appellants wife and mother-in-law, respectively. When there is conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.23It is not essential that there be actual proof that all the conspirators took a direct part in every act. It is sufficient that they acted in concert pursuant to the same objective.24Between the categorical statements of the private complainants, on the one hand, and the bare denial of appellant, on the other hand, the former must perforce prevail. An affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony especially when the former comes from the mouth of a credible witness. Denial, same as an alibi, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. It is considered with suspicion and always received with caution, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable, but also because it is easily fabricated and concocted.25Furthermore, without any evidence to show that private complainants were propelled by any ill motive to testify falsely against appellant, their testimonies deserve full faith and credit. After all, the doctrinal rule is that findings of fact made by the trial court, which had the opportunity to directly observe the witnesses and to determine the probative value of the other testimonies, are entitled to great weight and respect because the trial court is in a better position to assess the same, an opportunity not equally open to the appellate court. The absence of any showing that the trial court plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case, or that its assessment was arbitrary, impels us to defer to the trial courts determination according credibility to the prosecution evidence.26This is more true if the findings of the trial court were affirmed by the appellate court, since it is settled that when the trial courts findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court.27Given the foregoing, we uphold the conviction of appellant for illegal recruitment in a large scale, which constitutes economic sabotage. The penalty of life imprisonment and the fine ofP500,000.00, imposed upon appellant for the said offense by the RTC, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is in accord with Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042, which provides:Sec. 7. Penalties.(a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than twelve (12) years and a fine of not less than Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) nor more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein. (Emphasis ours.)EstafaWe likewise affirm the conviction of appellant for three counts of estafa committed against the private complainants in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0123, 03-0127, and 03-0130, based on the very same evidence that proved appellants criminal liability for illegal recruitment.It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under Republic Act No. 8042, in relation to the Labor Code, and estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a)of the Revised Penal Code. As we explained in People v. Cortez and Yabut28:In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The offense of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is crucial for conviction. Conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does not bar conviction for offenses punishable by other laws.Conversely, conviction for estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code does not bar a conviction for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code. It follows that ones acquittal of the crime of estafa will not necessarily result in his acquittal of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, and vice versa. (Citations omitted.)Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code defines estafa as:Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow x x x:x x x x2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:(a) By using a fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.The elements of estafa are: (a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.29Appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of estafa because the element of deceit is lacking. He insists on the absence of proof that he made any false statement or fraudulent representation to private complainants.We are not persuaded. As we had previously discussed herein, private complainants were able to establish, through their positive and credible testimonies, that appellant acted in conspiracy with his co-accused to mislead private complainants into believing that appellant and his co-accused, for a fee, can deploy private complainants abroad for employment. Decena testified that appellant gave her a copy of the purported job order for Korea, while Poserio avowed that appellant encouraged him to apply for work abroad. Daud, appellants fellow conspirator, accepted placement fees from private complainants, even issuing receipts for some; instructed private complainants to undergo medical examination; and took private complainants passports. The representations made by appellant and his co-accused to private complainants were actually false and fraudulent, not only because they were not duly authorized to undertake recruitment for overseas employment, but also because there were no actual jobs waiting for private complainants in Korea and private complainants never had a chance to leave for work abroad.Appellant also argues that the second element of estafa, which is prejudice or pecuniary loss, was not established during trial as the prosecution was unable to present any receipt signed by appellant proving that he received money from private complainants.We disagree once more with appellant. We reiterate that when conspiracy has been established, the act of one conspirator is the act of all. All three private complainants testified that they paid placement fees to Daud, who issued receipts for some amounts either in her name or in the name of one "Nimfa Min." Moreover, the payment of placement fees to illegal recruiters is not evidenced by receipts alone; it can also be established by testimonies of witnesses. In People v. Pabalan,30we held:Although not all of the amounts testified to by complainants were covered by receipts, the fact that there were no receipts for some of the amounts delivered to him does not mean that appellant did not accept or receive such payments. This Court has ruled in several cases that the absence of receipts in a criminal case for illegal recruitment does not warrant the acquittal of the accused and is not fatal to the case of the prosecution. As long as the witnesses had positively shown through their respective testimonies that the accused is the one involved in the prohibited recruitment, he may be convicted of the offense despite the want of receipts.The Statute of Frauds and the rules of evidence do not require the presentations of receipts in order to prove the existence of a recruitment agreement and the procurement of fees in illegal recruitment cases. The amounts may consequently be proved by the testimony of witnesses. (Citation omitted.)Again, there is no cogent reason for us to disturb the finding of the RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that both elements of estafa are present in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0123, 03-0127, and 03-0130. Thus, we sustain appellants conviction for estafa, punishable under Article 315, paragraph 2(a), of the Revised Penal Code.The penalty for estafa depends on the amount of defraudation.1wphi1Per Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code:Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be[.]The prescribed penalty for estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, when the amount of the fraud is overP12,000.00 but not exceedingP22,000.00, is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum (i.e., from 4 years, 2 months, and 1 day to 8 years). Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, or anywhere within prision correccional minimum and medium (i.e., from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).31Consequently, the minimum terms in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0123,03-127, and 03-0130 were correctly fixed by the RTC, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, at 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional.The maximum term under the Indeterminate Sentence Law shall be that which, in view of attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code. To compute the minimum, medium, and maximum periods of the prescribed penalty for estafa when the amount of fraud exceedsP12,000.00, the time included in prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum shall be divided into three equal portions, with each portion forming a period. Following this computation, the minimum period for prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum is from 4 years, 2 months, and 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, and 10 days; the medium period is from 5 years, 5 months, and 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, and 20 days; and the maximum period is from 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8 years. Any incremental penalty (i.e., one year for everyP10,000.00 in excess ofP22,000.00) shall thus be added to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8 years, at the discretion of the court, provided that the total penalty does not exceed 20 years.32In Criminal Case Nos. 03-0123, 03-127, and 03-0130, the maximum term shall be taken from the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, which is 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8 years. The Court of Appeals fixed the maximum term at 8 years.But then, since private complainants were defrauded in the amounts exceedingP22,000.00, incremental penalty shall be imposed upon appellant, determined as follows:1wphi1Criminal CaseNo. (PrivateComplainant)AmountDefraudedDifference AfterSubtractingP22,000.00Quotient AfterDividing byP10,000.00IncrementalPenalty33

03-0123 (De Guzman)P80,000.00P58,000.005.85 years

03-0127 (Decena)P35,000.00P13,000.001.31 year

03-130 (Poserio)P70,000.00P48,000.004.84 years

The incremental penalty shall be added to the maximum term of 8 years fixed by the Court of Appeals. Thus, we agree with the Court of Appeals in imposing the maximum penalty in Criminal Case No. 03-0123at thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal; in Criminal Case No. 03-0127 at nine (9) years of prision mayor; and in Criminal Case No. 03-0130 at twelve (12) years of prision mayor.Lastly, it is still incumbent upon appellant to indemnify private complainants for the amounts paid to him and his conspirators, with legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum, from the time of demand, which, in this case, shall be deemed as the same day the Informations were filed against appellant, until the said amounts are fully paid.34WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the Decision dated March 18, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03168, to read as follows:1. In Criminal Case No. 03-0122, appellant Roderick T. Gallemit is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment in large scale, constituting economic sabotage, as defined and penalized in Section 6, in relation to Section 7(b), of Republic Act No. 8042, for which he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and is ordered to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500.000.00);2. In Criminal Case No. 03-0123, appellant Roderick T. Gallemit is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized in Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, for which he is sentenced to a prison term of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to thirteen years (13) of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordered to indemnify private complainant Marcelo I. De Guzman in the amount of Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages, with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from January 3, 2003, until the said amount is fully paid;3. In Criminal Case No. 03-0127, appellant Roderick T. Gallemit is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized in Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal C ode, for which he is sentenced to a prison term of two (2) years and four(4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years of prision mayor, as maximum, ordered to indemnify private complainant Gina T. Decena in the amount of Thirty-Five Thousand Pesos (P35,000.00) as actual damages, with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from January 3, 2003, until the said amount is fully paid; and4. In Criminal Case No. 03-0130, appellant Roderick T. Gallemit is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized in Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, for which he is sentenced to a prison term of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and ordered to indemnify private complainant Francisco S. Poserio in the amount of Seventy Thousand Pesos (P70,000.00) as actual damages, with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from January 3, 2003, until the said amount is fully paid.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 177498 January 18, 2012STOLT-NIELSEN TRANSPORTATION GROUP, INC. AND CHUNG GAI SHIP MANAGEMENT,Petitioners,vs.SULPECIO MEDEQUILLO, JR.,Respondent.D E C I S I O NPEREZ,J.:1.Civil Law;Obligations;Novation;Novation is the extinguishment of an obligation by the substitution or change of the obligation by a subsequent one which extinguishes or modifies the first, either by changing the object or principal conditions, or, by substituting another in place of the debtor, or by subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor.-Novation is the extinguishment of an obligation by the substitution or change of the obligation by a subsequent one which extinguishes or modifies the first, either by changing the object or principal conditions, or, by substituting another in place of the debtor, or by subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor. In order for novation to take place, the concurrence of the following requisites is indispensable: 1. There must be a previous valid obligation, 2. There must be an agreement of the parties concerned to a new contract, 3. There must be the extinguishment of the old contract, and 4. There must be the validity of the new contract.2.Civil Law;Damages;Actual Damages;One is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved.-Applying the rules on actual damages, Article 2199 of the New Civil Code provides that one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Respondent is thus liable to pay petitioner actual damages in the form of the loss of nine (9) months worth of salary as provided in the contract. This is but proper because of the non-deployment of respondent without just cause.3.Same;Same;Same;Migrant Workers Act (R.A. No. 8042);The absence of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Rules with regard to the payment of damages to the affected seafarer does not mean that the seafarer is precluded from claiming the same, the Supreme Court decreed the applicability of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers Act) which provides for money claims by reason of a contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment.-The POEA Rules Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Seafarers do not provide for the award of damages to be given in favor of the employees. The claim provided by the same law refers to a valid contractual claim for compensation or benefits arising from employer-employee relationship or for any personal injury, illness or death at levels provided for within the terms and conditions of employment of seafarers. However, the absence of the POEA Rules with regard to the payment of damages to the affected seafarer does not mean that the seafarer is precluded from claiming the same. The sanctions provided for non-deployment do not end with the suspension or cancellation of license or fine and the return of all documents at no cost to the worker. As earlier discussed, they do not forfend a seafarer from instituting an action for damages against the employer or agency which has failed to deploy him. We thus decree the application of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers Act) which provides for money claims by reason of a contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment. The law provides: Sec. 10. Money Claims.Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages. x x x (Underscoring supplied)4.Same;Same;Same;Penalties;Failure of the agency to deploy a worker within the prescribed period without valid reasons shall be a cause for suspension or cancellation of license or fine. In addition, the agency shall return all documents at no cost to the worker.-The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment dated 31 May 1991 provides for the consequence and penalty against in case of non-deployment of the seafarer without any valid reason. It reads: Section 4. Workers Deployment.An agency shall deploy its recruits within the deployment period as indicated below: xxx b. Thirty (30) calendar days from the date of processing by the administration of the employment contracts of seafarers. Failure of the agency to deploy a worker within the prescribed period without valid reasons shall be a cause for suspension or cancellation of license or fine. In addition, the agency shall return all documents at no cost to the worker. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The appellate court correctly ruled that the penalty of reprimand provided under Rule IV, Part VI of the POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-based Overseas Workers is not applicable in this case. The breach of contract happened on February 1992 and the law applicable at that time was the 1991 POEA Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment. The penalty for non-deployment as discussed is suspension or cancellation of license or fine.5.Same;Same;Same;Employer-Employee Relationship;Even before the start of any employer-employee relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment contract was the birth of certain rights and obligations, the breach of which may give rise to a cause of action against the erring party.-We rule that distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment contract and the commencement of the employer-employee relationship. The perfection of the contract, which in this case coincided with the date of execution thereof, occurred when petitioner and respondent agreed on the object and the cause, as well as the rest of the terms and conditions therein. The commencement of the employer-employee relationship, as earlier discussed, would have taken place had petitioner been actually deployed from the point of hire. Thus, even before the start of any employer-employee relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment contract was the birth of certain rights and obligations, the breach of which may give rise to a cause of action against the erring party. Thus, if the reverse had happened, that is the seafarer failed or refused to be deployed as agreed upon, he would be liable for damages.6.Same;Seafarers;Recruitment;Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Standard Employment Contract;The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Standard Employment Contract provides that employment shall commence upon the actual departure of the seafarer from the airport or seaport in the port of hire.-The POEA Standard Employment Contract provides that employment shall commence upon the actual departure of the seafarer from the airport or seaport in the port of hire. We adhere to the terms and conditions of the contract so as to credit the valid prior stipulations of the parties before the controversy started. Else, the obligatory force of every contract will be useless. Parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law.7.Labor Law;Evidence;Substantial Evidence;Factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality by the courts when supported by substantial evidence.-Equally settled is the rule that factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality by the courts when supported by substantial evidence, i.e., the amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. But these findings are not infallible. When there is a showing that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record, they may be examined by the courts. In this case, there was no showing of any arbitrariness on the part of the lower courts in their findings of facts. Hence, we follow the settled rule.Before the Court is a Petition for Review onCertiorari1of the Decision2of the First Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91632 dated 31 January 2007, denying the petition forcertiorarifiled by Stolt-Nielsen Transportation Group, Inc. and Chung Gai Ship Management (petitioners) and affirming the Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:WHEREFORE,the petition is herebyDENIED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision promulgated on February 28, 2003 and the Resolution dated July 27, 2005 areAFFIRMED.3The facts as gathered by this Court follow:On 6 March 1995, Sulpecio Madequillo (respondent) filed a complaint before the Adjudication Office of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) against the petitioners for illegal dismissal under a first contract and for failure to deploy under a second contract. In his complaint-affidavit,4respondent alleged that:1. On 6 November 1991(First Contract), he was hired by Stolt-Nielsen Marine Services, Inc on behalf of its principal Chung-Gai Ship Management of Panama as Third Assistant Engineer on board the vessel "Stolt Aspiration" for a period of nine (9) months;2. He would be paid with a monthly basic salary of $808.00 and a fixed overtime pay of $404.00 or a total of $1,212.00 per month during the employment period commencing on 6 November 1991;3. On 8 November 1991, he joined the vessel MV "Stolt Aspiration";4. On February 1992 or for nearly three (3) months of rendering service and while the vessel was at Batangas, he was ordered by the ships master to disembark the vessel and repatriated back to Manila for no reason or explanation;5. Upon his return to Manila, he immediately proceeded to the petitioners office where he was transferred employment with another vessel named MV "Stolt Pride" under the same terms and conditions of the First Contract;6. On 23 April 1992, the Second Contract was noted and approved by the POEA;7. The POEA, without knowledge that he was not deployed with the vessel, certified the Second Employment Contract on 18 September 1992.8. Despite the commencement of the Second Contract on 21 April 1992, petitioners failed to deploy him with the vessel MV "Stolt Pride";9. He made a follow-up with the petitioner but the same refused to comply with the Second Employment Contract.10. On 22 December 1994, he demanded for his passport, seamans book and other employment documents. However, he was only allowed to claim the said documents in exchange of his signing a document;11. He was constrained to sign the document involuntarily because without these documents, he could not seek employment from other agencies.He prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees for his illegal dismissal and in view of the Petitioners bad faith in not complying with the Second Contract.The case was transferred to the Labor Arbiter of the DOLE upon the effectivity of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.The parties were required to submit their respective position papers before the Labor Arbiter. However, petitioners failed to submit their respective pleadings despite the opportunity given to them.5On 21 July 2000, Labor Arbiter Vicente R. Layawen rendered a judgment6finding that the respondent was constructively dismissed by the petitioners. The dispositive portion reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the respondents guilty of constructively dismissing the complainant by not honoring the employment contract. Accordingly, respondents are hereby ordered jointly and solidarily to pay complainant the following:1. $12,537.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment.7The Labor Arbiter found the first contract entered into by and between the complainant and the respondents to have been novated by the execution of the second contract. In other words, respondents cannot be held liable for the first contract but are clearly and definitely liable for the breach of the second contract.8However, he ruled that there was no substantial evidence to grant the prayer for moral and exemplary damages.9The petitioners appealed the adverse decision before the National Labor Relations Commission assailing that they were denied due process, that the respondent cannot be considered as dismissed from employment because he was not even deployed yet and the monetary award in favor of the respondent was exorbitant and not in accordance with law.10On 28 February 2003, the NLRC affirmed with modification the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. The dispositive portion reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision under review is hereby, MODIFIED BY DELETING the award of overtime pay in the total amount of Three Thousand Six Hundred Thirty Six US Dollars (US $3,636.00).In all other respects, the assailed decision so stands as, AFFIRMED.11Before the NLRC, the petitioners assailed that they were not properly notified of the hearings that were conducted before the Labor Arbiter. They further alleged that after the suspension of proceedings before the POEA, the only notice they received was a copy of the decision of the Labor Arbiter.12The NLRC ruled that records showed that attempts to serve the various notices of hearing were made on petitioners counsel on record but these failed on account of their failure to furnish the Office of the Labor Arbiter a copy of any notice of change of address. There was also no evidence that a service of notice of change of address was served on the POEA.13The NLRC upheld the finding of unjustified termination of contract for failure on the part of the petitioners to present evidence that would justify their non-deployment of the respondent.14It denied the claim of the petitioners that the monetary award should be limited only to three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term of the contract. It ruled that the factual incidents material to the case transpired within 1991-1992 or before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 which provides for such limitation.15However, the NLRC upheld the reduction of the monetary award with respect to the deletion of the overtime pay due to the non-deployment of the respondent.16The Partial Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied by the NLRC in its Resolution dated 27 July 2005.17The petitioners filed a Petition forCertioraribefore the Court of Appeals alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of NLRC when it affirmed with modification the ruling of the Labor Arbiter. They prayed that the Decision and Resolution promulgated by the NLRC be vacated and another one be issued dismissing the complaint of the respondent.Finding no grave abuse of discretion, the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the Decision of the labor tribunal.The Courts RulingThe following are the assignment of errors presented before this Court:I.THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE SECOND CONTRACT NOVATED THE FIRST CONTRACT.1. THERE WAS NO NOVATION OF THE FIRST CONTRACT BY THE SECOND CONTRACT; THE ALLEGATION OF ILLEGAL DISMISSAL UNDER THE FIRST CONTRACT MUST BE RESOLVED SEPARATELY FROM THE ALLEGATION OF FAILURE TO DEPLOY UNDER THE SECOND CONTRACT.2. THE ALLEGED ILLEGAL DISMISSAL UNDER THE FIRST CONTRACT TRANSPIRED MORE THAN THREE (3) YEARS AFTER THE CASE WAS FILED AND THEREFORE HIS CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED FOR BEING BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION.II.THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL UNDER THE SECOND CONTRACT.1. IT IS LEGALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO HAVE CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL WHEN THE EMPLOYMENT HAS NOT YET COMMENCED.2. ASSUMING THERE WAS OMISSION UNDER THE SECOND CONTRACT, PETITIONERS CAN ONLY BE FOUND AS HAVING FAILED IN DEPLOYING PRIVATE RESPONDENT BUT WITH VALID REASON.III.THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT EVEN ASSUMING THERE WAS BASIS FOR HOLDING PETITIONER LIABLE FOR "FAILURE TO DEPLOY" RESPONDENT, THE POEA RULES PENALIZES SUCH OMISSION WITH A MERE "REPRIMAND."18The petitioners contend that the first employment contract between them and the private respondent is different from and independent of the second contract subsequently executed upon repatriation of respondent to Manila.We do not agree.Novation is the extinguishment of an obligation by the substitution or change of the obligation by a subsequent one which extinguishes or modifies the first, either by changing the object or principal conditions, or, by substituting another in place of the debtor, or by subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor. In order for novation to take place, the concurrence of the following requisites is indispensable:1. There must be a previous valid obligation,2. There must be an agreement of the parties concerned to a new contract,3. There must be the extinguishment of the old contract, and4. There must be the validity of the new contract.19In its ruling, the Labor Arbiter clarified that novation had set in between the first and second contract. To quote:xxx [T]his office would like to make it clear that the first contract entered into by and between the complainant and the respondents is deemed to have been novated by the execution of the second contract. In other words, respondents cannot be held liable for the first contract but are clearly and definitely liable for the breach of the second contract.20This ruling was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its decision ruling that:Guided by the foregoing legal precepts, it is evident that novation took place in this particular case. The parties impliedly extinguished the first contract by agreeing to enter into the second contract to placate Medequillo, Jr. who was unexpectedly dismissed and repatriated to Manila. The second contract would not have been necessary if the petitioners abided by the terms and conditions of Madequillo, Jr.s employment under the first contract. The records also reveal that the 2nd contract extinguished the first contract by changing its object or principal. These contracts were for overseas employment aboard different vessels. The first contract was for employment aboard the MV "Stolt Aspiration" while the second contract involved working in another vessel, the MV "Stolt Pride." Petitioners and Madequillo, Jr. accepted the terms and conditions of the second contract. Contrary to petitioners assertion, the first contract was a "previous valid contract" since it had not yet been terminated at the time of Medequillo, Jr.s repatriation to Manila. The legality of his dismissal had not yet been resolved with finality. Undoubtedly, he was still employed under the first contract when he negotiated with petitioners on the second contract. As such, the NLRC correctly ruled that petitioners could only be held liable under the second contract.21We concur with the finding that there was a novation of the first employment contract.We reiterate once more and emphasize the ruling inReyes v. National Labor Relations Commission,22to wit:x x x [F]indings of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals in due course, are conclusive on this Court, which is not a trier of facts.x x x xx x x Findingsof fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but finality when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Such findings deserve full respect and, without justifiable reason, ought not to be altered, modified or reversed.(Emphasis supplied)23With the finding that respondent "was still employed under the first contract when he negotiated with petitioners on the second contract",24novation became an unavoidable conclusion.Equally settled is the rule that factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality by the courts when supported by substantial evidence,i.e., the amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.25But these findings are not infallible. When there is a showing that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record, they may be examined by the courts.26In this case, there was no showing of any arbitrariness on the part of the lower courts in their findings of facts. Hence, we follow the settled rule.We need not dwell on the issue of prescription. It was settled by the Court of Appeals with its ruling that recovery of damages under the first contract was already time-barred. Thus:Accordingly, the prescriptive period of three (3) years within which Medequillo Jr. may initiate money claims under the 1st contract commenced on the date of his repatriation. xxx The start of the three (3) year prescriptive period must therefore be reckoned on February 1992, which by Medequillo Jr.s own admission was the date of his repatriation to Manila. It was at this point in time that Medequillo Jr.s cause of action already accrued under the first contract. He had until February 1995 to pursue a case for illegal dismissal and damages arising from the 1st contract. With the filing of his Complaint-Affidavit on March 6, 1995, which was clearly beyond the prescriptive period, the cause of action under the 1st contract was already time-barred.27The issue that proceeds from the fact of novation is the consequence of the non-deployment of respondent.The petitioners argue that under the POEA Contract, actual deployment of the seafarer is a suspensive condition for the commencement of the employment.28We agree with petitioners on such point. However, even without actual deployment, the perfected contract gives rise to obligations on the part of petitioners.A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service.29The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.30The POEA Standard Employment Contract provides that employment shall commence "upon the actual departure of the seafarer from the airport or seaport in the port of hire."31We adhere to the terms and conditions of the contract so as to credit the valid prior stipulations of the parties before the controversy started. Else, the obligatory force of every contract will be useless. Parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law.32Thus, even if by the standard contract employment commences only "upon actual departure of the seafarer", this does not mean that the seafarer has no remedy in case of non-deployment without any valid reason. Parenthetically, the contention of the petitioners of the alleged poor performance of respondent while on board the first ship MV "Stolt Aspiration" cannot be sustained to justify the non-deployment, for no evidence to prove the same was presented.33We rule that distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment contract and the commencement of the employer-employee relationship. The perfection of the contract, which in this case coincided with the date of execution thereof, occurred when petitioner and respondent agreed on the object and the cause, as well as the rest of the terms and conditions therein. The commencement of the employer-employee relationship, as earlier discussed, would have taken place had petitioner been actually deployed from the point of hire. Thus, even before the start of any employer-employee relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment contract was the birth of certain rights and obligations, the breach of which may give rise to a cause of action against the erring party. Thus, if the reverse had happened, that is the seafarer failed or refused to be deployed as agreed upon, he would be liable for damages.34Further, we do not agree with the contention of the petitioners that the penalty is a mere reprimand.The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment35dated 31 May 1991 provides for the consequence and penalty against in case of non-deployment of the seafarer without any valid reason. It reads:Section 4. Workers Deployment. An agency shall deploy its recruits within the deployment period as indicated below:xxxb. Thirty (30) calendar days from the date of processing by the administration of the employment contracts of seafarers.Failure of the agency to deploy a worker within the prescribed period without valid reasons shall be a cause forsuspension or cancellation of license or fine.In addition, the agency shall return all documents at no cost to the worker.(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)The appellate court correctly ruled that the penalty of reprimand36provided under Rule IV, Part VI of the POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-based Overseas Workers is not applicable in this case. The breach of contract happened on February 1992 and the law applicable at that time was the 1991 POEA Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment. The penalty for non-deployment as discussed is suspension or cancellation of license or fine.Now, the question to be dealt with is how will the seafarer be compensated by reason of the unreasonable non-deployment of the petitioners?The POEA Rules Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Seafarers do not provide for the award of damages to be given in favor of the employees. The claim provided by the same law refers to a valid contractual claim for compensation or benefitsarising from employer-employee relationshipor for any personal injury, illness or death at levels provided for within the terms and conditions of employment of seafarers. However, the absence of the POEA Rules with regard to the payment of damages to the affected seafarer does not mean that the seafarer is precluded from claiming the same. The sanctions provided for non-deployment do not end with the suspension or cancellation of license or fine and the return of all documents at no cost to the worker. As earlier discussed, they do not forfend a seafarer from instituting an action for damages against the employer or agency which has failed to deploy him.37We thus decree the application of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers Act) which provides for money claims by reason of a contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment.lavvphilThe law provides:Sec. 10.Money Claims. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationshipor by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.x x x (Underscoring supplied)Following the law, the claim is still cognizable by the labor arbiters of the NLRC under the second phrase of the provision.Applying the rules on actual damages, Article 2199 of the New Civil Code provides that one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Respondent is thus liable to pay petitioner actual damages in the form of the loss of nine (9) months worth of salary as provided in the contract.38This is but proper because of the non-deployment of respondent without just cause.WHEREFORE, the appeal isDENIED. The 31 January 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 91632 is herebyAFFIRMED. The Petitioners are hereby ordered to pay Sulpecio Medequillo, Jr., the award of actual damages equivalent to his salary for nine (9) months as provided by the Second Employment Contract.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 197303 June 4, 2014APQ SHIPMANAGEMENT CO., LTD., and APQ CREW MANAGEMENT USA, INC.,Petitioners,vs.ANGELITO L. CASEAS,Respondent.D E C I S I O N1.Labor Law;Seafarers;Disability Benefits;Temporary Total Disability;For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable to work. He receives his basic wage during this period until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be permanent, either partially or totally.-In Magsaysay Maritime Corporation vs. NLRC, 699 SCRA 197 (2013), citing Vergara vs. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., 567 scra 610 (2008), the Court reiterated that the seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable to work. He receives his basic wage during this period until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA-SEC and by applicable Philippine laws. If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within this period that a partial or total disability already exists. The seaman may, of course, also be declared fit to work at any time such declaration is justified by his medical condition.2.Remedial Law;Civil Procedure;Appeals;Supreme Court;The Supreme Court (SC) is not a trier of facts and, thus, its jurisdiction is limited only to reviewing errors of law.-At the outset, it is to be emphasized that the Court is not a trier of facts and, thus, its jurisdiction is limited only to reviewing errors of law. The rule, however, admits of certain exceptions, one of which is where the findings of fact of the lower tribunals and the appellate court are contradictory. Such is the case here. Thus, the Court is constrained to review and resolve the factual issue in order to settle the controversy.3.Labor Law;Seafarers;Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract;While the seafarer and his employer are governed by their mutual agreement, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Rules and Regulations require that the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) be integrated in every seafarers contract.-Employment contracts of seafarers on board foreign ocean-going vessels are not ordinary contracts. They are regulated and an imprimatur by the State is necessary. While the seafarer and his employer are governed by their mutual agreement, the POEA Rules and Regulations require that the POEA-SEC be integrated in every seafarers contract. In this case, there is no dispute that Caseas employment contract was duly approved by the POEA and that it incorporated the provisions of the POEA-SEC.4.Remedial Law;Evidence;Theory of Imputed Knowledge;Agency;The theory of imputed knowledge ascribed the knowledge of the agent to the principal, not the other way around.-In Sunace International Management Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 480 SCRA 146 (2006), the Court ruled that the theory of imputed knowledge ascribed the knowledge of the agent to the principal, not the other way around. The knowledge of the principal-foreign employer could not, therefore, be imputed to its agent. As there was no substantial proof that Sunace knew of, and consented to be bound under, the 2-year employment contract extension, it could not be said to be privy thereto. As such, it and its owner were not held solidarily liable for any of the complainants claims arising from the 2-year employment extension.5.Labor Law;Seafarers;Termination of Employment;In a nutshell, there are three (3) requirements necessary for the complete termination of the employment contract: 1] termination due to expiration or other reasons/causes;2] signing off from the vessel;and 3] arrival at the point of hire.-It is to be observed that both provisions require the seafarer to arrive at the point of hire as it signifies the completion of the employment contract, and not merely its expiration. Similarly, a seafarers employment contract is terminated even before the contract expires as soon as he arrives at the point of hire and signs off for medical reasons, due to shipwreck, voluntary resignation or for other just causes. In a nutshell, there are three (3) requirements necessary for the complete termination of the employment contract: 1] termination due to expiration or other reasons/causes; 2] signing off from the vessel; and 3] arrival at the point of hire. In this case, there was no clear showing that Caseas signed off from the vessel upon the expiration of his employment contract, which was in February or April 2005. He did not arrive either in Manila, his point of hire, because he was still on board the vessel MV Haitien Pride on the supposed date of expiration of his contract. It was only on August 14, 2006 that he signed off from MV Haitien Pride and arrived in Manila on August 30, 2006. In Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRC, 261 SCRA 757 (1996), the Court held that the obligations and liabilities of the local agency and its foreign principal do not end upon the expiration of the contracted period as they were duty bound to repatriate the seaman to the point of hire to effectively terminate the contract of employment.6.Maritime Law;Seaworthiness;While seaworthiness is commonly equated with the physical aspect and condition of the vessel for voyage as its ability to withstand the rigors of the sea, it must not be forgotten that a vessel should be armed with the necessary documents required by the maritime rules and regulations, both local and international.-Caseas claimed that his transfer was due to the fact that MV Perseverance could not leave port because of incomplete documents for its operation. This was not disputed. To the mind of the Court, having incomplete documents for the vessels operation renders it unseaworthy. While seaworthiness is commonly equated with the physical aspect and condition of the vessel for voyage as its ability to withstand the rigors of the sea, it must not be forgotten that a vessel should be armed with the necessary documents required by the maritime rules and regulations, both local and international. It has been written that vessel seaworthiness further extends to cover the documents required to ensure that the vessel can enter and leave ports without problems. Accordingly, Caseas contract should have been terminated and he should have been repatriated to the Philippines because a seafarer cannot be forced to sail with an unseaworthy vessel, pursuant to Section 24 of the POEA-SEC. There was, however, no showing that his contract was terminated by reason of such transfer. It is necessary to reiterate that MV Haitien Pride appears to be manned by, and accredited with, the same principal/agency. His joining the said vessel could only mean that it was for the purpose of completing his contract as the transfer was made well within the period of his employment contract on board MV Perseverance.MENDOZA,J.:This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to review, reverse and set aside the January 24, 2011 Decision1and the June 1, 2011 Resolution2of the Court of Appeals (CA). in CA-GR. SP No. 112997, which annulled and set aside the October 14, 2009 Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRCJ in NLRC LAC No. 04-000220-09, where respondent Angelito L. Caseas (Caseas) was seeking disability and other benefits against petitioner APQ Shipmanagement Co., Ltd. (APQ) and petitioner-principal APQ Crew Management USA, Inc. (Crew Management).3It appears from the records that in June 2004, Casenas was hired by APQ, acting for and in behalf of its principal, Crew Management, as Chief Mate for vessel MV Perseverance for a period of eight (8) months starting from June 16, 2004 to February 16, 2005,with a basic monthly salary of US$840.00, for forty-eight (48) hours a week, with US$329.00 as overtime pay.In his Position Paper,4Casenas further alleged that on June 16, 2004, he left Manila to join his assigned vessel in Miami, Florida, USA, though the vessel could not leave the Florida port because of its incomplete documents for operation; that consequently, he was transferred to another vessel, MV HAITIEN PRIDE, which was in Haiti, although again because of incomplete documents, the vessel could not leave the port and remained at Cap Haitien; that together with the rest of the vessel's officers and crew, he was left to fend for himself; that they were not provided food and water and had to fish for their own food and were not paid their salaries; that he suffered extreme stress and anxiety because of the uncertainty of the situation; that his employment contract was extended by APQ from the original eight (8) months to twenty-six (26) months; that the vessel eventually left for Bahamas; that he felt he became weaker and got tired easily; that despite his unpaid wages and weakened condition, he performed his duties as Chief Mate diligently; that in August 2006, he began to suffer shortness of breath, headache and chest pains; that he was then brought to the Grand Bahamas Health Services and was diagnosed with hypertension and was given medicines; that he was then repatriated due to his condition and he arrived in the Philippines on August 30, 2006; that within three (3) days thereafter, he reported to APQ for post-employment medical examination where the company-designated physician later diagnosed him with Ischemic Heart Disease; that a certain Dr. Ariel G. Domingo likewise examined him, confirming and certifying that he was suffering from Essential Hypertension and Ischemic Heart Disease; that he was declared "unfit for sea service"; that as a result, he was not able to work for more than 120 days from his repatriation; that another medical examination was conducted by Dr. Lina R. Cero, showing that he was suffering from Essential Hypertension with Cariomegally Ischemic Heart Disease and Indirect Inguinal Hernia Right; that he was then advised to take his maintenance medications for life; that APQ refused to provide him further medical attention, thus, he incurred medical expenses in the amount of 6,390.00 by November 2006; that he demanded payment of permanent total disability benefits, sickness allowance and medical expenses to which he was entitled under the POEA Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), but APQ refused to pay; that he, together with other crew members, sent a series of letters and e-mails to the representatives of the shipowners regarding their unpaid wages, but despite efforts, APQ still refused to pay their salaries; that demands for payment were also made to the president of APQ, but the same were refused; and that ultimately, he was compelled to seek redress and filed a complaint for permanent total disability benefits, reimbursement of medical expenses, sickness allowance, non-payment of salaries representing the extended portion of the employment contract, damages, and attorney's fees.APQ, on the other hand, alleged in its Position Paper5that upon expiration of the contract, Caseas refused to return to the Philippines until he finally did on August 30, 2006;6that thereafter, Caseas demanded payment of his wages, overtime and vacation pay for the alleged extended portion of the contract; that it could not be held liable for claims pertaining to the extended portion of the contract for it did not consent to it; that, in fact, as early as January 2005, it had been making arrangements, through American Airlines/American Eagle, for Caseas repatriation at the end of his contract in February 2005; that Caseas was fully paid of his wages and other benefits for the duration of his 8-month contract; and that Caseas suffered illness after the expiration of the contract, hence, it could not be made liable to pay him any benefits for his injury/illness.7Caseas, however, disputed the position of APQ, claiming that his contract of employment was duly extended.8He denied that APQ had been making arrangements for his repatriation as early as January 2005. To prove that his contract was extended, he submitted the following documents:1. Deck Logbook, dated 14 August 2006;2. Report of Mr. Steve Mastroropolous, dated 16 May 2006;3. Letter, dated 24 April 2006 of Mr. Alex P. Quillope, President of the respondent APQ to OWWA, admitting that there was no food and water for the crew of MV "HAITIEN PRIDE."9APQ countered that the abovementioned documents did not prove mutual consent of the parties as provided in Caseas employment contract. His contract expired on August 1, 2005 and, thus, he had no legal basis to claim any salary after the said period.10Caseas became ill in August 2006 or more than one (1) year after the expiration of his employment contract.11Labor Arbiter DecisionOn November 20, 2008, the Labor Arbiter (LA)rendered the Decision12dismissing Caseas' complaint. He was of the view that the employment contract was not extended pursuant to the terms and conditions of the contract. Caseas failed to prove mutual consent of the parties to the extension of the contract. He rendered services on MV Haitien Pride from August 1, 2005 to April 30, 2006, after the expiration of his contract with APQ on board the vessel MV Perseverance on February 15, 2005.The LA pointed out that the illness/disease suffered by Caseas was sustained while serving on board MVCap Haitien Pride, which was outside the period of his contractual employment. Thus, Caseas' claims could not be awarded.NLRC ResolutionOn June 22, 2009, the NLRC resolved the appeal by reversing and setting aside the LA decision. Based on the records, it found that the employment contract was extended. The illness, Essential Hypertension, suffered by Caseas was a compensable disease under Section 32-A, No. 20 of the POEA-SEC. Hence, NLRC ruled that Caseas was entitled to his claims because the illness was sustained within the duration of his employment contract.On October 14, 2009, the NLRC, acting on the motion for reconsideration filed by APQ, reconsidered and set aside the June 22, 2009 NLRC Resolution. It explained that the documentary evidence presented only proved the extension of contract but not the consent given to it by APQ. Caseas failed to present the new contract duly signed by APQ or Crew Management, or any proof that they consented to the extension. The NLRC explained that Caseas directly dealt with the shipowner to the exclusion of APQ and Crew Management, hence, his recourse was against the shipowner. Thus, APQ could not be held liable for the unpaid salaries, as well as the permanent disability benefits, because these were claims that accrued after the expiration of the employment contract.Caseas moved for a reconsideration, but the NLRC denied his motion in its R