La Idea de Naturaleza de Pascal

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Pascal's Idea of NatureAuthor(s): A.W.S. Baird

Source: Isis, Vol. 61, No. 3 (Autumn, 1970), pp. 296-320Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of The History of Science Society

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Pasca l ' s I d e a o f N a t u r e

By A. W. S. Baird*

N HIS STUDY of Blaise Pascal's contemporary Marin Mersenne, the AbbeI Lenoble distinguishes between the idea of nature as an active principle, which

Aristotelianphysicshas as its object, and nature viewed as an ensembledephe'nomenes,

with which mechanisticphysics is "correlative."' Pascal, unlike Mersenne, is not con-

tent simply to relegate the former conception to the realm of metaphysics and reduce

the scope of physical science to investigating and describing the empirical connections

between the phenomena which go to make up nature in the second sense.2 On the

contrary, in Pascal's case, which does not seem as clear-cut, the term nature, construed

as an active principle, is found in a wide variety of contexts throughout his writings.

This is not to say that Pascal believes it is nature as an active principle that physical

science is concerned with. But it does suggest that his curiously ambivalent attitude to

the mechanistic worldview may result in part from a conviction that it fails to take

account of this aspect of nature.

I. NATURE AS AN ENSEMBLE DE PHENOMENES

Pascal's fullest treatment of nature as an ensemble de phe'nomenesoccurs in the

"Disproportion de l'homme" fragment in the Pense'es.There he insists on both the

vastness of the natural scheme, which swallows up man's power even of imagination,so that he is reduced to merely contemplating its wonder, and the whole worlds, the

"merveilles aussi etonnantes dans leur petitesse que les autres par leur etendue,"which escape his perception at the other end of the scale.3 This emphasis on the im-

mensity and complexity of nature is designed, as the title of the fragment suggests, to

servePascal's apologetic purpose-to induce a mood of humility and self-depreciation

in his reader by showing how far the dimensions and wonders of nature exceed the

bounds of human comprehension.Yet despite this fact, and however great may be the

"disproportion" between nature and man's power of perception, the very exampleswhich Pascal chooses to bring this out make it plain that he does conceive of nature as

constitutingan ordered scheme of things.

When he claims, for instance, that the end of things and theirprinciplesare for man

* Department of Romance Languages, Univer-sity of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand.

1 Robert Lenoble, Mersenne ou la naissance dumicanisme (Paris:J. Vrin, 1943), pp. 380-381.The change in the conception of nature in the17th century, and the "psychological revolution"

which helped to produce it, are also treated byLenoble in his article "L'evolution de l'idee de'nature' du XVIe au XVIIIe siecle," Revue dem!taphysique et de morale, 1953, 58:108-129.

2 Lenoble, Mersenne, pp. 312, 323.

I BlaisePascal,Oeuvres completes, ed. JacquesChevalier (Paris:Biblioth6que de la Pl1iade,Gallimard,1957), pp. 1105-1106.Brunschvicg'snumeration 72. References throughout are toChevalier'sedition. Alternativereferencesgivenare to the fragment number in Brunschvicg's

classification for the Penseies (B) and to theGrands Ecrivains de la France edition of theOeuvres completes, eds. L. Brunschvicg, P.Boutroux, F. Gazier, 14 vols. (Paris:Hachette,1908-1925), orall otherwritings G.E.).

297







4t

N

Diagram or an experimenton atmospheric

pressure. (Pascal, Traite'de la pesanteurde la

masse de 1l'ai, 1663.)







298 A. W. S. BAIRD

hopelessly hidden in an impenetrable secret, Pascal assumes that there are principles

and ends in terms of which the things that go to make up the world of nature find ex-

planation. These principlesand ends may be such as to elude the human intellect, but

that has no bearing upon their objective existence. Similarly when he goes on to

describethe presumptionof those inquirerswho have attemptedto graspthe principlesof things and from there have attempted to understandthe whole, Pascal again takes

for grantedthat thereis an all-embracingscheme.4And two further passages from the

fragment clearly illustrate that this skepticism about man's capacity nevertheless

implies the conception of the world as an orderedwhole:

... les partiesdu monde ont toutes un tel rapportet un tel enchainement'une avecl'autre,quejecrois mpossibledeconnaitre'unesans 'autreet sans e tout.

.toutes choses etant causeesct causantes,aideeset aidantes,mediateset immediates,et toutess'entretenant arun lien naturelet insensiblequi lie les pluseloigneeset les plus

diff6rentes,e tiens impossiblede connaitre es partiessans connaitre e tout, non plusquedeconnaitree tout sansconnaitreparticulierementesparties.5

The same nature, therefore, whose wonders and immensity should arouse in the be-

holder an attitude of reverent awe, has a further title to respect because of the con-

tinuity it exhibits in the causal connection binding all things together. The apologetic

characterof the fragmentobviously precludesPascal from taking the final step, which

seems to follow logically from this conception of the universe as a whole made up of

interconnectedparts. However, the existence of a network of uniformities throughout

phenomena,which will enable laws and generalmodes of occurrenceto be discovered

and formulated,is at least clearly impliedhere.

II. THE PRINCIPLEOF UNIFORMITY

The important role played by this assumption-that nature acts according to

regular laws-in Pascal's two treatises on statics is apparent from the extensive use

which he makes there of "thought-experiments."For it appears that only one of the

numerous experiments referred to was actually performed: Pierre Gassendi's testi-

mony to the experiment with the flaccid balloon is held by commentators to be

sufficientevidence for its having been carriedout.6

As earlyas 1666Robert Boyle, in his HydrostaticalParadoxes, affirmsthat althoughhe is in agreement n the main with the conclusions arrivedat by Pascal in his treatises,

he has no mind to make use of his experimentalproofs. Three principal reasons are

given for rejectingthese:

First,Because houghtheExperiments e mentionsbe deliveredn sucha manner,as isusualin mentioningmattersof fact; yet I remembernot thathe expresslysays that heactually ry'dthem,and thereforehe might possiblyhaveset themdownas thingsthatmusthappen,uponajustconfidence hathewasnotmistakennhisRatiocinations.7

4 Chevalier, . 1107;B. 72.6

Chevalier, p. 1110; B. 72. The skepticaltwistwhich Pascalgiveshereto the idea that allthingsin natureare connected-so that to knowanyone thingwe shouldhaveto knoweverything-may well have been suggested,as Brunschvicgnotes, by Montaigne's Apologie de Raimond

Sebond.Essais,Vol. II, ed. MauriceRat (Paris:Editions Gamier Fr&res,1958). See esp. pp.

264 ff., 308ff.6 Theletter n whichGassendigivesan account

of this experimentis reproducedin G.E. III,p. 200, n. 1.

I Robert Boyle, Hydrostatical Paradoxes,

made olt by new experiments, for the most part

physical and easie (Oxford: William Hall, for

RichardDavis, 1666),pp.4-5.







PASCAL'S IDEA OF NATURE 299

Boyle's two remaining objections stem from what he considers are insuperable tech-

nical difficultieswhich would be encountered in attempting to performthe experiments

as Pascal has described them. And it is significant that about one of these he notes.

"they requireBrass Cylinders, or Pluggs, made with an exactness, that, though easily

supposed by a Mathematician, will scarce be found obtainable from a Tradesman."8He concludes that these difficultiesare such as to make Pascal's alleged experiments

''moreingenious than practicable."

Now if, as Boyle maintains, the experimentsset out in the two treatises are no more

than thought-experiments,then Pascal is basing his conclusions here on principlesof a

verydifferentkind from those which he describeselsewhere as "les seuls principesde la

physique."9Boyle's contention-that the experiments could not have been carried

out-has been vindicated by subsequent writers;10 and in any case, as he points out,

Pascal nowhereexpressly declaresthat he did performthem. It appearslikely therefore

that Boyle is correct when he suggests that Pascal merely set down the purported ex-perimentalresults "as things that must happen, upon a just confidencethat he was not

mistakenin his Ratiocinations."

The most notable example of this is the principle of the hydraulic press-Pascal's

most significant contribution to the science of statics-formulated in the opening

chaptersof the first treatise.He envisagesa numberof experiments(the ones requiring

the "BrassCylinders,or Pluggs," alleged by Boyle to be unprocurable)to demonstrate

that fluids have weight in proportion to their depth. The results of these, he claims,

make it plain that the force required to prevent the water from flowing out of an in-

vertedtube is proportional to the height of the waterin the tube and not to the area of

its base, and furthermore that a mere thread of water will sufficeto counterbalance a

great weight. Then in the course of determining what causes this multiplication of

force, Pascal considers a vessel of water, closed on all sides, with two openings, one a

hundred times larger than the other. If a piston is carefully fitted to each of these, a

man pressing the small piston will match the strength of a hundred men pressing the

piston in the hundredfold-greateropening. It is evident from this, Pascal maintains,

that given the continuity and the fluidityof the water: ". . . un vaisseau plein d'eau est

un nouveau principe de mecanique, et une machine nouvelle pour multiplier les

forces.... 11

Furtherproof is then derived for the new principle by pointing out how it links upwith other previously established principles of statics, the principle of virtual dis-

placements, and Torricelli's principle of the center of gravity. It is also explained in

hydrostaticaltermsby showing how, in virtue of the "continuite"and "fluidite"of the

liquid contained in the vessel, pressure exerted on any portion of its surface will be

transmitted undiminished throughout.12 Having reached this point, Pascal considers

8 Ibid.;cf. pp. 63-64.9Chevalier, p. 532; G.E. II, p. 136. Cf.

Chevalier,p. 462; G.E. III, p. 266.

10 Charles Thurot notes that "Pascal. . . (cequi est curieuxde la part d'un homme qui pro-fesse que les experiences ont les seuls principesde la physique) invoque des exp6riencesqu'iln'avait pas faites, et meme qui ne peuvent pasetre faites, . ." ("Recherches sur le principe

d'Archimede," Revue Archeologique, 1869, 20:

19). Cf. Alexandre Koyre, Pascal savant, in Blaise

Pascal, I'homme et l'oeuvre, Cahiers de Royau-mont, Philosophie No. 1 (Paris:Editions deMinuit,1956),p. 276.

11Chevalier,p. 414; G.E. III, p. 163.12 Chevalier,pp. 414-416; G.E. III, pp. 163 ff.

For a detailed analysis of these treatises seeIsabel Leavenworth, A Methodological Analysis

of the Physics of Pascal (New York: Columbia

Univ. Press,1930).







300 A. W. S. BAIRD

himself justified in assuming the truth of his basic principle: "Prenons donc pour tres

veritable, qu'un vaisseau plein d'eau, ayant des ouvertures, et des forces 'aces ouver-

tures qui leur soient proportionnees, elles sont en equilibre; et c'est le fondement et la

raison de l'equilibredes liqueurs,dont nous allons donner plusieursexemples."'13

The way in which Pascal describes the experimentsdesigned to prove and illustratethis principle makes it clear that what he assumes as the basis of his argument, on

which"thejust confidencethat he was not mistaken in his Ratiocinations" is grounded,

is the uniform behavior of the natural forces whose effects he is engaged in tracing and

correlating.The method which he adopts is simply to state that if certain experiments

areperformed,the phenomena under investigation will be found to behave in a certain

way. Such predictions, which anticipate conclusions not directly observed, are no

doubt based on and suggested by previously observed cases-for example, the experi-

ments concerning the vacuum'4 and everyday observation of the behavior of fluids.

They nevertheless take for granted, as an underlying principle, that natural processesaregoverned by a uniformity of law. And the confidence with which Pascal propounds

the basic principle of statics arrived at in this way, together with the fact that the two

ensuing treatisescomprise little more than an elaboration of it, amply attests the trust

he places in this notion of nature's uniformity.

PresumablyPascal sees fit here to overlook the idea (which he develops elsewhere)

that there is an element of indeterminacyin nature whose subtlety is suchas to render

quite vain any attempt to reduce her processes to a formula.15Moreover, this pro-

cedure of drawinginferences from the data of experimentsnever actually performed,

and claiming a wide range of application for their conclusions, runs directlycounter to

his professed attitude toward induction. Indeed, in the conclusion to these very

treatises Pascal appears to dispute the legitimacy of any inference beyond immediate

experience based on the assumption that the regularitiesobserved in one segment of

naturewill hold good over all the rest. 6

However, the method of reasoning by analogy used in the second treatise provides

further evidence that Pascal does base his own inquiries on the assumption that there

is a network of uniformities underlying phenomena. In order to demonstrate that the

effectspreviouslyattributedto nature'shorrorvacuifollow from laws alreadyshown to

apply in the equilibrium of fluids, Pascal emphasizes the obvious analogies between

these two classes of phenomena. The explanation of the phenomena that relate to thesupposed horror vacui rests almost entirely therefore on the way in which they are

integratedinto a system of establishedlaws.

In the letter to Florin Perier included in the Recit de la grande experiencePascal is

already inclined to explain the horror vacui phenomena in terms of atmospheric

pressure,becausehe regardsthem as simply "particularcases of a universalproposition

on the equilibriumof fluids."'7 In the second of the two treatises, having established

as a result of the experimentwith the flaccidballoon that airhas certaincharacteristics

in common with water and all other fluids, Pascal enumerates the effects usually as-

13 Chevalier, p. 416-417; G.E. III, p. 168.14 Koyr6 argues that many of these experi-

ments could not have been performed in themanner or with the results that Pascal alleges(Pascal savant, pp. 275-278).

15 Chevalier,p. 1121;B. 91.

"OChevalier, p. 460; G.E. III, p. 262. Cf.Chevalier, p. 535; G.E. II, p. 144, and myarticle "Inconsistencies n Pascal's Conceptionof ScientificKnowledge,"Aumla, 1965,24:220-238.

17 Chevalier,p. 393; G.E. II, p. 154.








cribed to the horror vacui.'8 The argument which is to be elaborated in the ensuing

section is then set down in brief outline:

Si l'on a bien compris,dans le Traite' e l'equilibre es liqueurs, e quellemaniereelles

font impressionparleurs poids contreles corps qui y sont, on n'aurapoint de peine 'acomprendreomment e poidsde la masse de l'air, agissantsurtous les corps, y produittousleseffetsqu'onavaitattribues a1'horreuruvide; carils sont tout 'a aitsemblables,commenousl'allonsmontrer urchacun.19

Not only does this statement set the board as it were, but it illustrates clearly that the

method of argument to be followed-bringing out the analogies between the two

differentclasses of phenomena-takes for granted the central fact of nature's unifor-

mity.

The first example to be treated is the difficulty experienced in opening a bellows

with all its aperturesstopped. In order to demonstratehow the weight of the mass ofair causes this difficulty,Pascal points to the parallel case of resistance caused by the

weight of water. Clearlywhen a bellows is immersedin water, with the tube emerging

into the air, it would be ridiculous to attribute the resistance to the horrorvacui. And

since what is said of water is to be understood of any fluid, a "general law" can be

propounded: the resistance encountered in opening a bellows with its apertures

stopped in any fluid is caused by and is proportionate to the weight of fluid which

must be raised. If this general law is applied to the particular case of air, it will be

found to be true that the weight of the mass of air causes the resistancefelt in opening

the bellows. Having applied this method of reasoning by analogy to the remaining

eight examples of effectspreviously attributed to the horrorvacui, formulating in eachinstance the general law of which this is the particular case, Pascal concludes the

chapteras follows:

Voilade quellesorte e poidsdel'airproduit ous les effetsqu'onavait usqu'iciattribues'a1'horreur u vide.20 'enviensd'expliqueres principaux; 'il en restequelqu'un,l estsi aisede 1'entendrensuitedeceux-ci, .. et onpeutmemedirequ'on es avaitdej'aousvus,commeen leursource,dans le Traiteprecedent,puisque ous ces effetsne sont quedes casparticuliers elareglegeneralede1'equilibreesliqueurs.21

The method which Pascal adopts in this part of the treatiseconsists essentially there-fore in relating the particular effect in question ascribed to the horror vacui to the

analogous case in the treatment of the equilibrium of fluids. In this way the horror

vacuiis made to appear superfluousas an explanation, since the relevant phenomena

are shown to constitute a particular case of a general law already established. The

mode of cause and effect which has been found to hold good in one set of phenomena

is thus extended by analogy to another quite separate set. And the assumption under-

lying this procedure-that the conditions under which phenomena will occur are pre-

dictable-rests in turn upon the belief that nature's processes are governed by a far-

reaching uniformity of law.

18 Chevalier,pp. 429-434; G.E. III, pp. 194-206.

19Chevalier,p. 434; G.E.III, p. 206.

20In a further fragmentPascal extends this

conclusion,again makingthe basic assumptionthatnature sregular,actingaccordingo uniformlaws throughoutdifferentclassesof phenomena.Chevalier,pp. 463ff.;G.E. II,pp. 515ff.

21 Chevalier,p. 443;G.E.III,p. 225.







302 A. W. S. BAIRD

The principle of uniformity, which Pascal assumes throughout the two treatises on

statics, is further illustrated by the constancy which in his view characterizesthe ac-

tivity of nature-a conception which he shares with such contemporaries as Francis

Bacon and Gilles de Roberval.22The context of Pascal's assertion in the Preface pour le

traite'du vide-that experiments are the only legitimate principles in physics-showsthat he believes that the necessity for such an empirical approach is dictated by the

face which nature itself presentsto the investigator:

Les secretsde la nature sont caches; quoiqu'elleagisse toujours, on ne decouvrepastoujoursses effets: le tempsles revvled'age en age, et quoique toujoursegaleen elle-meme,elle n'est pas toujoursegalementconnue. Les experiencesqui nous en donnentl'intelligencemultiplient ontinuellement;. .23

The constancy of nature is described here in terms of a continuous process, hidden

from our directinspection and hence often eluding us since its effects are too subtle forour senses to detect.

In the "Disproportion de l'homme" fragment of the Pensees, Pascal contrasts

nature and human nature in the following way: "L'immobilite fixe et constante de la

nature, comparaison au changement continuel qui se passe en nous, ... *"24 An earlier

variant, as well as the comparison drawn, shows that the expression "immobilite

fixe," which gives the impression that nature constitutes a homogeneous mass which

admits of no motion, is intended here merely to emphasize nature's constancy.

"Voila une partie des causes qui rendentl'homme si imbecile 'aconnaltrela nature....

Elle dure et se maintientperpetuellementen son etre: il passe et est mortel1."25

The constancy of nature is again illustrated in the description of an experiment

designedto prove the effects of airpressure.The airis preventedfrom exerting pressure

on the mercury lying in the elbow of a curved tube, because the experimenter has

placed his finger over the opening at the point where the curve joins the straight

portion of the tube.26

Maiscom.me ienne se perddansla nature,si le vif-argentquiest dansla recourbure esentpasle poidsde 1'air, arcequele doigt quiboucheson ouverture 'engarde, l arrive,en recompense, uele doigtsouffrebeaucoupde douleurcaril portetoutle poidsde 1'airquilepressepar-dessus, t rienne le soutientpar-dessous.27

22Accordingto Roberval, "[la nature]n'est

jamais contraire a elle-mesme quoy qu'elleproduise des effets contraires, ou qui nous

semblent tels.... la nature demeure tousjourstelle qu'elle est constante en son estre veri-

table:...," Fragmentin6dit, in G.E. II, pp.

49-50. Cf. Des principes du debvoir et desconnoissancesumaines,n Fragments ephiloso-phie carte'sienne,ed. Victor Cousin (Paris:

Charpentier,1845), p. 247.On Roberval see

LeonAuger,Unsavantm6connu:GillesPersonnede Roberval(1602-1675)(Paris:LibrairieScien-tifique A. Blanchard, 1962). Pierre Guiffartdescribesnature n similartermsin his Discoursde Vuide urles experiencesde MonsieurPaschalet le traictede Mr Pierius (Rouen, 1648), pp.4849. Bacon's conception of nature operating

by "aprocessperfectlycontinuous,whichfor themost part escapes the sense," is set out in theNovum organurn,II, 5-6. ThePhilosophical Worksof FrancisBacon,ed. John M. Robertson(Lon-don:Routledge&Sons,1905),pp. 304-305.

23 Chevalier,p. 532;G.E.II,p. 136.24 Chevalier,p. 1110;B. 72.25 Chevalier,p. 1112;B. 72.26 Cf. diagram,Chevalier,p. 450 (reproduced

as the frontispiece); G.E. III, p. 237. ForMersenne'sanalogous views on nature's con-stancywhich led him to formulatein a similarcontext "ce principe de l'universelle, compen-sation'des forces dans la nature,"see Lenoble,Mersenne, pp. 428-429.

27 Chevalier,p. 450;G.E.III,p. 240.








Since the sensation of pain is alleged to result as "recompense," it is clear that the

notion of constancy is simply taken for granted here as a real, objective principle of

nature,adequateto account for the occurrence of phenomena.

However, the constancy of nature'sprocess does not consist primarilyfor Pascal, as

it appears to for Bacon,28 in the given quantity of basic material remaining the samedespite the changes undergone by the individual phenomena sharing in the process.

Such a conception would scarcely be adequate to account for the principle of the un-

ceasing activity of nature postulated in the passage from the Preface. Nature there

representsessentially this continuous activity, expressing itself in individual embodi-

ments (effets), and not simply a given amount of matter which remains uniform

throughout all time.

It is this sort of view that predominates in the scattered fragments of the Pensees

bearingupon the subject:

Lanatures'imite:unegraine eteeen bonne terre,produit;unprincipe ete dans un bonesprit,produit; esnombres mitent1'espace, uisontdenature i diff6rente. outest faitet conduitpar un meme maltre: a racine, es branches,es fruits; es principes,es con-sequences.29

La nature recomnmenceoujours es memes choses, les ans, les jours, les heures; lesespacesde meme,et les nombres ont bout a bout 'a a suitel'unde I'autre.Ainsise faituneespeced'infini td'eternel. ..30

Thus Pascal describesthe continuity, the uniformity,discerniblethroughout the world

of nature, not in terms of any underlyingmaterial substance, but in terms of the pro-cesses of growth and change which take place according to the same sequence in such

diverse fields as plant life and the mental life of man. This unity of patternis extended

to include numbers and space, which conform to identical laws of increase, despite the

fact that one is a mere mode imposed by the mind on objectivereality while the other

is an entity encompassing the whole of that reality. The use of the reflexive verb

s'imiter in the first extract indicates that for Pascal, in contrast to the Aristotelian

tradition,31 nature's model is immanent and not transcendent. It is the ordered re-

production of its own inherentprocessesthat s'imitersuggests.

The continuity and uniformity which Pascal sees in nature lead him to the point of

view from which everything in the physical world appears in reciprocal action: "Le

moindre mouvement importe "a oute la nature; la mer entiere change pour une

pierre."32This sensitivityof nature to change in any of its partsmeans that every point

of the physical universe will react, in however slight degree,to everythingthat happens

anywhere throughout the whole universe. And Pascal's sense of the proximity ofdifferent "worlds" comes into play even in his essays on pure mathematics. In con-

clusion to the treatise on the sum of the numerical powers, after enunciating the

general law that a continuous magnitude of a given order is not increased by the

additionto it ofany numberof magnitudesof a lowerorder-so that points add nothing

28 "For there is nothing more true in naturethan the twin propositionsthat 'nothing is pro-ducedfromnothing',and 'nothing s reduced onothing',but that the absolutequantumor sumtotal of matter remains unchanged, withoutincreaseor diminution."Novumorganum, I, 40,

PhilosophicalWorks,p. 354.29 Chevalier,p. 1096;B. 119.30 Chevalier,p. 1123;B. 121.31 See R. G. Collingwood,TheIdeaof Nature

(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1945),p. 95.32 Chevalier,p. 1296;B. 505.







304 A. W. S. BAIRD

to lines, lines nothing to surfaces, and so forth-he makes the following observation:

J'aitenu'aajouterces quelquesremarques,amilieresaceux qui pratiquentes indivisi-bles,afinde faire ressortir a liaison,toujoursadmirable,que la nature,eprise d'unite,

etablitentre es choses espluseloigneesen

apparence.Elleapparaltdanscetexemple,oii

nous voyons e calculdesdimensionsdes grandeursontinues e rattachera a sommationdes puissancesnumeriques.33

Now it may well be that the notion of heterogeneous orders, as Pascal sets it out in

this context, is as banal as Koyre would have us believe.3' However, what is significant

for the present purpose is Pascal's conviction that in geometry and arithmetic com-

ponents are governed in certain relations by the selfsame principle, and this unifor-

mity is the result of nature being "eprised'unite."35

III. THE UNDERLYINGGEOMETRICAL TRUCTUREOF NATURE

Pascal outlines the philosophy of nature36 n which this principle of uniformity is

expressed in the treatise De l'esprit geometrique.After showing that the concepts

motion, number, and space comprise the proper object of geometry, he goes on to

describethe geometricalstructureunderlyingobservedphenomena:

Cestroischoses, quicomprennentoutl'univers, elonces paroles:"Deusfecit omnia npondere, n numero,et mensura",ont une liaison reciproque t necessaire.Car on nepeutimaginerde mouvement ansquelquechosequise meuve;et cettechose etantune,cetteuniteest l'originede tous les nombres37 enfin e mouvementne pouvantetresansespace,on voit ces trois chosesenfermeesdansla premiere.Le temps memey est aussi

compris:car le mouvement t le tempssont relatifs 'un 'a 'autre; a promptitude t lalenteur, qui sont les differencesdes mouvements,ayantun rapportnecessaireavec letemps.

Ainsiil y a desproprietes ommunes"aouteschoses,dontla connaissance uvre1'espritauxplus grandesmerveillesdelanature.38

Although elsewherein this treatisePascal prescribesadmiration and contemplation as

man's appropriateresponse in the face of nature and its wonders,39 n this passage at

least he implies that nature is intelligible. Indeed he appears to endorse Galileo's

conviction that the universe really representsa book which can be read, but only by

33Chevalier,pp. 171,1432;G.E.III,p. 366.34 Pascalsavant,pp.265-266.35 For an historicalaccountof the principleof

continuity see Arthur 0. Lovejoy, The GreatChainof Being(New York:HarperTorchbooks,1960),passim.

36 By this I mean what A. C. Crombiealsocalls "the investigator's . . 'regulativebeliefs',... that will determine his conception of the

real subjectof his inquiiry,of the directionin

whichthe truthhidden n the appearanceswillbefound." Augustine o Galileo(2nd ed., London:Mercury Books, Heinemann, 1961), Vol. II,pp. 287-288.

37 The assertionthat one is the origin of allnumbersmight be taken to imply that Pascalinvests it with some peculiarmystical or meta-

physical significance,as earlier metaphysicianslike Bruno had done. See the passagesquotedfrom Bruno'sDe Minimo,for example,by J. R.Charbonnel, La pensee italienne au XVIe siecle etle courant libertin (Paris:Champion, 1919), pp.543-554.However, aterremarksmade by Pascalin the samesection of thistreatisediscountsuchapossibility: ". . . puisque l'unite peut, etantmultipliee plusieurs fois, surpasser quelquenombre que ce soit, elle est de meme genre queles nombresprecisementpar son essenceet parsa nature immuable,..." (Chevalier, p. 589;G.E.IX, pp.265-266).

38 Chevalier,p. 583; G.E.IX, pp. 255-256.

39 Chevalier,pp. 590-591; G.E. IX, pp. 268-270.








those who are acquainted with nature's handwriting and hence able to interpret her

text. For those unversedin mathematics this book must remain forever closed. Pascal

has alreadypointed out that the differentbranchesinto which "geometry"is divided-

mechanics, arithmetic, geometry-stem directlyfrom the particularconcept-motion,

number, space-which forms the specific subject matter of each. And the underlyingconnectedness of these basic elements, which in another context explains man's in-

abilityto understandnature,40here enableshim to discoverthe real structureof nature.

Pascal's mechanistic affinities are underlined in this extract, not only by the claim

that everything in the physical world falls within the grasp of geometry, but more

especiallyby the way in which he reduces the fundamental nature of things to motion

taking place in empty Euclidean space. The kinematic measure of velocity is clearly

intended when he asserts that rates of motion are proportional to time, thus disre-

gardingthe basic law of Aristotelian dynamics. According to this law from Aristotle's

Physics, "velocity is proportional to the power of the mover divided by the resistanceof the medium."'41

But although it follows from the approach adopted here that nature is mathe-

matical-that it is intelligible insofar as it can be considered under the aspects of

motion, number, and space-Pascal disappoints any hopes which may have been

formed of seeing this synopsis of the whole of nature filled out. The remainderof the

first part of the treatise is taken up with demonstrating that the basic concepts are

potentially infinite in respect to addition and division, while the second part is con-

cerned solely with questions of methodology. It might of course be argued that when

Pascal goes to such lengths to demonstrate that motion, number, and space are

potentially infinite in respectto addition and division, he does so in the belief that he is

furtheringhis reader's knowledge of the ftnndamentalcharacteristicsof the material

universe. However, he nowhere undertakes ever to show how he arrived at the con-

clusion that these simple concepts, the subjectmatter of geometry, representthe basic

constituents of nature.42 n this instance, then, Pascal is apparentlycontent to take for

granted in his reader a thoroughly mechanistic attitude toward questions relating to

the nature of the physicalworld.

In the only other context outside the present work where he treats of the relation

betweenmotion, number,and space, Pascal is primarilyconcerned with a rathermore

specificproblem-that of the vacuum. The Jesuit Noel, replying to Pascal's carefullyworded refutation of his attack on the preliminaryExperiencesnouvelles touchantle

vide,had in desperationresorted to a feeble reductioad absurdum.This took the form

of a list of mutuallyexclusivepropertiesattributed at various times to void space, one

of which was that it is "immuableet se transporteavec le tube." The parts of Pascal's

resolution of this particular antithesis which bear upon the present inquiry run as

follows:

. . l'immobiliteest aussi naturelle al'espace que le mouvement1'est au corps. Pourrendre etteveriteevidente, l fautremarquer ue1'espace,ngeneral, omprend ous les

corpsde la nature,dont chacunenparticuliern occupeune certainepartie;maisqu'en-corequ'ilssoienttousmobiles, 'espacequ'ilsremplissent e 1'estpas;. . . soit ou vide ou

40Cf.discussionabove,Sec. I.41 A. C. Crombie,RobertGrossetesteand the

Originsof Experimental cience(2ndimpression,Oxford:ClarendonPress,1962),p. 179.

42In the passagequotedhe doesno more thanbringout the threadof implication hatconnectstheseconcepts.







306 A. W. S. BAIRD

plein, toujoursdansunpareilrepos, ce vaste espace,dontl'amplitude mbrasse out, estaussistableet immobile nchacunede sesparties,comme l1'est n son total.43

Space, therefore, is perfectly immobile both as a whole and in all its parts. It can be

considered universal, however, in the sense claimed for it in the extract analyzedearlier, since it encompasses the sum total of physical things. Moreover, it shows the

necessary relation to motion ascribed to it in that context. Motion is here a state of

bodies, equivalent in them to the immobile state of the space which they occupy, so

that motion will always take place in space. The numerical concept, insisted upon as

the other basic constituent of the physical world in the passage treated first, is accoun-

ted for by the fact that each particularthing in spaceis a singleunit.

In this letter the conception of the basic structure of the universe as a complex of

mutually implicatedelements is at least clearly implied in Pascal's arguments, although

no mention is made of geometry's role in enabling the mind to appreciate everything

under this aspect. However, the motion described here obviously belongs to the

seventeenth-century dynamics of inertia, and the passage is significant also since it

confirmsthat Pascal accepts the "mathematizationof physical space."44Pascal follows

Gassendi here in identifying physical space with the abstract and infinite space of

geometry.45 When he claims that space is the immovable supporter of all material

things Pascal refers to absolute space, a reality that must be inferred; but he makes

no distinction between this and the space of the real world, which is occupied by par-

ticularphysical objects. And the mathematical character of this space is clearfrom the

description of space in another fragment intended for an introduction to geometry.

Pascal there lists among his "firstprinciples":

Principe 1. L'objetde la pure geometrie st l'espace,dont elle considere a tripleetendueen troissens diversqu'onappelledimensions, . .

Principe2. L'espace stinfini elon toutes es dimensions.

Principe3.... et immobile ntout et enchacunede sesparties.46

43Chevalier,p. 383; G.E. II, p. 190. This viewof space as an entity in its own right, havinga

claim equalto that of substance o the qualityofbeing per se, is of considerable ontologicalsignificance. t cuts across the traditionalphilo-sophical divisionof all beinginto substanceandaccident. Furthermore,when he maintainsthatmotionless space and the mobile bodies whichoccupyit formtwo quitedifferent hings,Pascalopenly disavows the orthodox Cartesian viewthat extension is peculiar to the corporeal. Hisdefinition, n an earlier etter,of a vacuumshowsthathe regards mpenetrability, ot extension,asthe distinguishingmark of material substance.Chevalier,p. 376; G.E. II, pp. 103-104.For theCartesian view see Descartes' Principes de laphilosophie, I, 10, n Descartes,Oeuvrest lettres,ed. Andre Bridoux (Paris:Biblioth6que de laPle'ade,Gallimard,1958),p. 616, and AlexandreKoyre, From the Closed Worldto the InfiniteUniverse NewYork:HarperTorchbooks,1958),pp. 101-104.

44Koyre quoted by E. J. Dijksterhuis, TheMechanizationof the WorldPicture, trans. C.

Dikshoorn (Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1961), p.377. According to Dijksterhuis the expression"essentially . . means that natural phenomenamust be assumed o take place in the empty spaceof geometry."

45' Gassendidefinesspace in the section in hisSyntagmadevoted to physicsas infinite in threedimensions,motionlessin itself,andthe place ofall things which move about freelyin it. PetrusGassendi Opera Omnia (Stuttgart: riedrichFrommann, 1964; facsim.reprint of 1658 Lyoned.), Vol. I, p. 183 A+ B. On this aspect of

Gassendi'sthought see P. F. Thomas,La philo-sophie de Gassendi(Paris:Alcan, 1889), p. 50,and Gaston Sortais, La philosophie modernedepuisBaconjusqu'aLeibniz(Paris:Lethielleux,1922),Vol. 11, pp. 97-99.

46Chevalier,pp. 602-603; G.E. IX, pp. 291-292.








There is an almost word-for-wordparallelbetween the third principleand the last two

lines of the previous quotation: "aussi immobile en chacune de ses parties, comme il

1'esten son total." And the identity of the space in question is plain also because it is

infinitein both contexts.

IV. PASCAL'S ATTITUDETO MECHANISTICCOSMOLOGIES

In view of these mechanistic leanings it is strikinghow unconvinced Pascal remains

by the seventeenth-century attempts to elaborate an overall mechanistic worldview.

What scattered referencesto the cosmological speculations of his contemporaries and

immediate predecessorshis writings contain reveal an extremelytentative attitude, at

times verging on skepticism, to any conclusions posited - a hesitancywhich the con-

texts show cannot be ascribedsimplyto motives of prudence.

Thus in the eighteenth Provinciale, after enumerating the three "principles" of

human knowledge each of which has its own special subject matter, Pascal concludesthat since "les choses de fait ne se prouvent que par les sens," mere authority, regard-

less of the sanctions with which it may armitself, can have no influencein this domain.

He then adds by way of illustration:

Cefutaussien vainquevous obtintescontreGalileece decretde Rome, qui condamnaitson opiniontouchant e mouvementde la terre.Cene serapascela qui prouveraqu'elledemeure n repos;et si l'on avaitdes observations onstantesqui prouvassentque c'estelle qui tourne, tous les hommes ensemblene l'empecheraient as de tourner, et nes'empecheraientasdetourneravecelle.47

Since this statement constitutes an attack upon the validity of the whole procedure

according to which Galileo was condemned, and actually calls in question the papal

right to pronounce on matters of fact, it represents a far more significant act of

defiance in the face of ecclesiastical authority than would any mere declaration of

agreement with the condemned views. Clearly the requirements of the inductive

method, as Pascal sees it, and not the dictates of prudence, determinehis attitude to-

ward Galileo's "opinion." In his view insufficient "observations constantes" have as

yet been adducedin supportof the theory to justify acceptingits conclusions.48

47Chevalier, p. 900; G.E. VII, pp. 53-54. The"Disproportionde l'homme" fragmentin thePenseescontainsa descriptionof the sunmovingon a "vaste our"roundan apparentlytationaryearth, with an implied contrast between the"objets bas" of the sublunarysphere and thenoblerelementsof the higherspheres.How farthis can be taken to show that Pascal is stillclinginghere, n partat least,to theoldgeocentriccosmology has been much debated. It seemsregrettable o me that too little notice has beentaken of Allix's early and eminentlyplausible

suggestion:Peut-ondire qu'en parlantainsi aux gens dumonde, Pascal a opte pour le systeme dePtol6mee?Mais tous les jours les expressionsrelativesaumouvementapparent ontcouram-ment employees par les astronomes eux-memesaussibienquepar esprofanes.Lorsque

nous disons que le Soleil se leve, qu'il montedans le ciel, puis qu'il se couche et s'abaisseau-dessous de l'horizon, est-ce que nousabjurons'opiniondeCopernic

M. G. Allix, "Pascalet le systemede Copernic,"Bulletindel'Acade'mie elphinale, 904,18:279.

48 Concerninghis"extremelyeservedattitudetowards the Copernican system" Dijksterhuiswrites that "thoughthe so-calledproofs whichGalileohad advanced or the Copernican ystemhad been perfectlyconvincingto their author,they by no means satisfied the very rigorousdemands that Pascal made on a scientificproof; .. ." (Mechanization of the World Pic-ture, p. 450). For Pascal's views on inductionandhypotheseswhich determinehis attitudehereandin the subsequentpassagesto be quoted,seemy article n Aumla,1965,pp. 227ff.







308 A. W. S. BAIRD

In a letter to Noel in October 1647, in answer to his supposition of a "matiere

subtile" to account for the results of his own experiments pointing to the apparent

existence of a vacuum, Pascal sets out a method for evaluating such hypotheses ad-

vanced as explanations of observed phenomena. One of the reasons he gives for the

need of such a test is that just as a single cause may produce a number of differenteffects,so a singleeffectmay derive from a varietyof causes.

C'est ainsi que, quandon discourthumainementdu mouvement,de la stabilitede laterre,tous les phenomenesdes mouvements t retrogradations es planetess'ensuiventparfaitement eshypothesesdePtolemee,de Tycho,de Copernict debeaucoupd'autresqu'onpeut faire,de touteslesquellesune seulepeutetre veritable.Maisqui oserafaireunsi granddiscernement,t quipourra, ansdangerd'erreur,outenir 'uneauprejudicedesautres....49

None of the various cosmological schemes so far proposed can claim universal ac-

ceptance, then, since all remain mere hypotheses, explaining equally well the observed

facts. The point of view adopted here is similar to that of Descartes in the Principesde

la philosophie.50Although he omits Ptolemy's name from the list of "possibles,"

Descartes maintains that provided they are regarded simply as hypotheses, the ex-

planations put forward by Copernicus and Tycho both account equally well for the

actual phenomena. However, it is clear from the proviso included here, as well as from

Descartes' other writings, that his position is a purely politic one, assumed in order

to avoid compromising himself.51Both the context of Pascal's statement and other

evidence alreadyconsidered make it gratuitousto suppose his motives to be other than

genuine lack of intellectual conviction. The test which he proposes for deciding be-tween equally possible rivalhypotheseshas not been satisfied n this instance.

Again in the same letter-this time in connection with Noel's tactics of taking for

granted in his "demonstrations" the existence and the properties of the very element

49Chevalier,p. 374-375;G.E.II, pp. 100-101.

60Principes,II, 15-19, Oeuvresde Descartes,ed. C. Adam and P. Tannery (2nd ed., Paris:J. Vrin, 1964), Vol. IX-2, pp. 108-110. In theforwardto his Aristarchus,which appearedin

the third volumeof Mersenne'sNovae observa-

tiones Paris,1647),Robervalargues hatnoneofthe cosmologicalhypothesescan claim universalacceptanceuntil either a cleardemonstrationonthe one side or a convincingrefutationon theotheris forthcoming.However,he goes on to saythat the simplestexplanation,and the one whichaccords best with established natural laws, isthat formulatedby Aristarchus.Although notconstrained to assent to this hypothesis byabsolutelyconvincingproof, he inclinestowardit with much greater weight than toward theothers (ibid., no pagination). Thus Roberval

advocates he same tentativeapproachas Pascaltoward cosmological explanationsbut is readyto advancefrom there to a sort of probabilismon thisquestionwhichhas no parallel n Pascal'swritings.

61Afterrejecting he Ptolemaicsystemas con-trary to some recently recorded observations,

Descartes then defineshis attitudeto the othertwo explanations: ". . sans estre en rien differentde ces deux, excepte en cela seul, que j'aurayplus de soin que Copernicde ne point attribuerde mouvementa la Terre,et que je tascheraydefaire que mes raisons, sur ce sujet, soient plus

vrayes que celles de Tycho: je proposerayicyl'hypothesequi me semble estre la plus simpledetouteset la pluscommode, . . . maisseulemnentcomme une hypothese, ou supposition qui peutestre fausse." Principes, III, 19, Oeuvres, ed.Adam and Tannery, Vol. IX, pp. 109-110(Descartes' own italics). Gilson, in his com-mentaryon Descartes'reference n the Discoursde la mdthode to the unpublishedtreatise LeMonde,describesthis approach n the Principesas: ". . . 'artifice d'exposition qui permit. . aDescartesde soutenirla translation de la Terre

tout en niant son mouvement, . . I1 n'y a pasl'ombred'un doute que Descartes n'ait , d&sle debut,unpartisan onvaincudumouvementdela Terre,..." Etienne Gilson, Rene'Descartes,Discours de la m6thode, Texte et commentaire(4th ed., Paris: J. Vrin, 1967), pp. 440-441.Gilson cites further passages from Descartes'writings o support hisstatement.








to be proved-Pascal remarks that if this method of demonstration,by mere question

begging, were to become accepted scientific practice, there would be no difficulty in

solving even the most elusive problems: "Et le flux de la mer et l'attraction de l'aimant

deviendront aises 'acomprendre, s'il est permis de faire des matieres et des qualites

expres."52This comment, made in passing, implies that in Pascal's opinion no satis-

factory theory has yet been formulated to account for magnetic attraction and the

related phenomena of gravity. Pascal therefore rejects, as not adequately answering

the facts, Descartes' attempt to explain in mathematical and mechanistic terms the

resultsof earlier nvestigationslike those of Gilbert and Kepler.53

It is noteworthy that the theories which evoke this cautious response from Pascal

are examples of the reduction of physical phenomena to the categories of geometry.

Yet it is just such an approach which seems to have Pascal's sanction in the passage

from the De 1'espritge'ome'trique.his rather curious inconsistency, coupled with the

fact that despite his several opportunities to do so, he nowhere bothers to explore theramificationsof inertial motion54-a fact all the more striking since it is the unifying

principle upon which his system of mutually implicated concepts hinges-highlights

the ambivalent position into which Pascal'sexcessiveempiricismleadshim.

The attitude which he adopts toward Descartes' conception of a mathematically

interlocking universe, with an infallible "vera mathesis" to match, provides further

evidence of this. MargueritePerier, in her account of her uncle's life, records that in

regard to Descartes' philosophy Pascal ". . . ne pouvait souffrir sa maniere d'expliquer

la formation de toutes choses.... 55 The accuracy of this testimony is borne out in

several fragmentsfrom the Pense'es,wherePascalmakeshis criticismquite explicit:.ces titres si ordinaires,"Des principesdes choses","Des principesde la philoso-

phie",56 . . aussifastueuxen effet, quoiquemoinsen apparence,quecet autrequicrevelesyeux,"Deomni scibili."

Ecrire ontreceuxquiapprofondissentrop essciences.Descartes.

Descartes nutileet incertain.

Descartes-I1 faut dire en gros: "Celase fait par figureet mouvement";car cela estvrai.Mais de direquelset composer a machine,celaest ridicule;car cela est inutileetincertain t penible.Et quandcela seraitvrai,nous n'estimonspas quetoutela philoso-phievailleune heuredepeine.57

Descartes then was right: broadly speaking, things are composed in terms of shape

and motion. But his plan to proceed further to a detailed analysis of the whole struc-

ture of the world of nature on the basis of these geometric concepts, and to try to

62 Chevalier,p. 373; G.E.II, p. 96.53 Commentatorshave pointed out that the

real targetfor Pascal'scriticismhereis not Noelbut Descartes,and Dijksterhuis laims hat: "Theallusion to Descartes is unmistakable, or it isprecisely the two phenomena mentioned herewhichhad beenexplained n the PrincipiaPhilo-sophiaeby an accumulationof hypotheses,andno one else had exhibitedso much virtuosity ndevisinghidden mechanisms n orderto explainnaturalphenomena."Mechanizationf the WorldPicture,p. 449.

54 Lenoble emphasizes he importanceof thisprinciple for the mechanistic worldview: ". . . le

principe d'inertie, c'est le gage d'une scienceclairedelivree nfindesqualitesoccultes, emoyende se representera nature comme une immensemachine dont la magie est chassee" (Mersenne,p. 360).

65 Chevalier,p. 41. Thisclearlyrefers o some-thing more than Pascal's objectionto Descartes'"chiquenaude,"o whichMargueriteWrier henalludes.

5 Descartes'Principiaphilosophiae,at whichthis remark s chieflydirected,was published n1643and first appeared n Frenchtranslation n1647.

5 Chevalier,pp. 1108, 1137;B. 72, 76, 78, 79.







310 A. W. S. BAIRD

explain its manifold processes by means of a cosmic "machine"functioning according

to laws which admit of precisemathematical formulation-all this is in Pascal's eyes a

complete waste of time. Fleeting though these referencesare, it is significantthat Pascal

concedes that Descartes is justifiedin postulating his initial principle,while at the same

time he denies any value to the subsequent project of formulating a universal science58

which should both embrace the whole of the physical world and be applicable to the

relations of particularphenomena with each other. Although it is necessary in the case

of the fragments from the Pense'es o take into account the apologetic factor-and in

the final sentencequoted the apologetic factor noticeably obtrudes-when looked at in

the light of the extracts treated earlier they are seen to express a consistent point of

view. For Pascal, systems of nature in which all phenomena find detailed explanation

are on a par with the hypotheses formulated by Noel: they can never advance beyond

the realmof the "douteux"and the "vraisemblable."'59

And Pascal's writings betray no tendency simply to reduce physics to geometry, aswas Descartes' declared aim.60In fact he draws a sharp distinction between the fields

in which the two operate. Thus near the end of the letter to Noel, having defined what

he means by a vacuum-a motionless space having length, breadth, and depth,

capable of receiving and containing within itself a body of like length and shape-he

adds: . . et c'est ce qu'on appelle solide en geometrie, oZu'on ne considere que les

choses abstraites et immaterielles."'61Geometry moves therefore in a nonexisting

world of abstractions; it has no access to the real, physical world. Pascal follows

Roberval here in maintaining the traditional Aristotelian distinction between the

subjectmattersof the two disciplines.62This conception of the restrictedscope of geometry is the complete opposite of that

of Descartes. Convinced of the universality of his "vera mathesis," Descartes is led

to the position of excluding, at least in theory, from the interpretationof nature what-

ever is not amenable to mathematical treatment.The heading to the last section of the

second part of thePrincipesde laphilosophie s a notable illustration of this tendency.

58 Pascal, it might be said, is preparedto gohalfwaywithDescartes: he analyticalpartof theprogram outlined in the Regles pour la direction

de l'espritapparentlymeets with his approval.What he rejects is the synthesis by means ofwhich Descartesattempts"a progressiverecon-structionbeginningfrom the simple and goingthrough the increasing degrees of complexityuntil it ends in the originalcomplexfromwhichthe analysis started." Harold H. Joachim,Descartes's Rules for the Direction of the Mind,

ed. Errol E. Harris (London:Allen & Unwin,1957), p. 66. Cf. Ch. II, passim, and NormanKemp Smnith,New Studies in the Philosophy of

Descartes(London:Macmillan,1953), Ch. III,

passim.59 Cf. Chevalier,pp. 374-375, G.E. II, pp. 98-101.IsabelLeavenworthalso pointsout that theconclusions which Pascal draws from the ex-perimentsperformed n the vacuum controversydo not presupposeany cosmologicaltheory.Theonly cosmological assumption that Pascalappears o make is when he attemptsto prove a

vacuum on the basis of the phenomena of rare-faction and condensation. This argument, MissLeavenworthnotes, holds good only for a world

composed of atoms (A Methodological Analysis,p. 78).

6 In a letter to Mersenne July 17, 1638),refer-ring to Desargues, Descartes writes: ". . . s'il luiplait de considererce que j'ai ecrit du sel, dela neige, de l'arc-en-ciel,etc., il connaitrabienque toute ma Physique n'est autre chose queGeometrie." Quoted by Leon Brunschvicg,L'experience humaine et la causalite' physique(Paris:Presses Universitairesde France, 1949),p. 186.

61 Chevalier,p. 376;G.E.II, p. 103.62 Roberval draws a hard and fast division

between he domainsof mathematics ndphysicsin a letterto Des Noyers (May 15, 1648).G.E. II,pp. 337-338. For Gassendi'ssimilar views seeBernard Rochot, Les travaux de Gassendi surEpicure et sur l'atomisme, 1619-1658 (Paris:J. Vrin, 1944),pp. 152-153.








Que e neregoispoint de principes nphysique,quinesoientaussiregusenmathematique,afin de pouvoirprouverpar demonstrationout ce quej'en deduirai; t quecesprincipessuffisent,d'autantque tous les phenomernese la naturepeuventetreexpliquesparleurmoyen.63

But perhaps the passage which serves best to bring out the difference in point of view

between Pascal and Descartes is the following one from the Entretien avec Burman,

whereDescartes is recorded as saying:

A.toutes les demonstrations es mathematiciensortentsur des etreset sur des objetsvraiset ... l'objettoutentierdesmath6matiques,vectout ce qu'ellesy considerent, stun etrevrai et reel et a une vraie et reelle nature,non moinsque l'objetde la physiqueele-mame.

The differencebetweenthe two disciplinesresidessolely in the fact that:

... laphysique onsidere onobjetnonseulement ommeunetrevraietreel,mais commeuneftren acte, et, en tantque tel, existant; es mathematiquesu contraire eulement ntantque possible,n'existantpointenacte dans 'espace,pouvant outefoisexister.64

When considered in the light of the previous ones this last extract shows how com-

pletely indifferent Descartes is to what exists in the physical world, so obsessed is he

with his fetish of "conformityto mathematical type."65

Contrasting sharply with this a priorism, and far from taking geometry as the yard-

stick of reality, Pascal expressly denies reality to geometrical concepts; to him they

representmere abstractions from the real. Indeed in the Pense'eshe shows himself in-clined to attribute their simplicity, and the immediacy with which they confront the

mind, to the circumstancesof the mind's embodiment:

Notre ame estjetee dans e corps,oiu lletrouvenombre, emps,dimensions.Elleraisonnela-dessus, tappellecelanature,necessite, t nepeutcroireautrechose.

Lacoutumeest notrenature.Quis'accoutumea a foi la croit.

. . . Qui doutedoncque,notreame etant accoutumeeavoirnombre,espace,mouvement,croiecela et rienquecela 66

The mind, therefore, in Pascal's view is necessarily conditioned since it is united in

some way with, and functions in, the body; and it is this that accounts for the constant

presence, to the mind, of the concepts space, time, number, motion, and explainswhy

it comes to regardthem as the basic constituents of nature. This impression is further

reinforced by the requirements of physical existence: "L'homme a besoin de lieu pour

63 Oeuvres t letters,ed. Bridoux,p. 652.64 Ibid., p. 1374. Cf. the passage quoted from

Le monde by Etienne Gilson, Etudes sur le r6le dela pense'e medievale dans la formation du systemecarte'sienParis:J. Vrin, 1951), p. 181, n. 1. ForMersenne's contrasting attitude see Lenoble,Mersenne, pp. 353-356.

65 Leon Roth, Descartes' Discourse on Method(2nd ed., Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1948), p. 87.

Gilson refers to: ". . . 'indifference souveraineprofesseeparDescartesa l'egarddu faitbrut....

A un ph6nom6ner6el qu'il ne pourraitpas ex-pliquer s'il le connaissait,Descartesprefere debeaucoupun phenomene qui n'existe peut-etrepas, mais qu'il peut expliquerdans le cas oii cephenomeneexisterait" Etudes,pp. 136-137; cf.p. 180).

66 Chevalier,p. 1212;B. 233,89.







312 A. W. S. BAIRD

le contenir, de temps pour durer,de mouvementpour vivre, .. 67

Thus the wheel of Pascal's thought has revolvedin its full circle from the conception

outlined in the De l'esprit ge'ome'trique, here these mathematical concepts are con-

sideredto be the fundamentalprinciplesof the structure of reality. In these passages he

is clearly sounding a warning not to impose a priori on reality the limitations of themodes of human perception. We have no guaranteethat the universe has been shaped

according to the capacity of our perception. And since the modes to which the mind

becomes conditioned act as blinkerson our awareness,our mode of perception cannot

be the measure of things.68To assert therefore, as Galileo and Descartes do and as

Pascal himself seems to in De l'esprit geomnetrique,hat nature is mathematical, is to

overlook precisely that fact-it is to shape the external world of nature in conformity

with the mind's subjective modes. And this predominantly subjective element in

Descartes'approach,as Pascal sees it, promptshim to describethe former'sphilosophy

as:"... le romande la nature, semblable'apeu pres 'a 'histoire de Don Quichot."69

V. PASCAL'SANTI-MECHANISM

It is noteworthy that Pascal describes the creative process which runs through and

connects the various aspects of the natural world in the following terms: "La nature

agit par progres, 'itus et reditus'.Elle passe et revient, puis va plus loin, puis deux fois

moins, puis plus que jamais, etc., le flux de la mer se fait ainsi, le soleil semble

marcherainsi."70The human temperamentbehaves in this way, as do also the passage

of a fever, the inventive spiritof man, human motives of altruism and their reverse, the

rules of eloquence, and the principle of "divertissement."However, what is important

for the present purpose is that the process of nature should be delineated as one of

advancethrough rhythmical change-an overall movement of progresswhich includes

and allows for a measureof periodicregression.Nature so conceived cannot be thought

of as in any sense a closed system; and if it is progressive, as Pascal claims, then it

cannot be pictured as a machine. As R. G. Collingwood has pointed out, "it is impos-

sible to describeone and the same thing in the same breath as a machine and asdevelop-

ing......"71 The one characteristicwhich a mechanistic system necessarily excludes is

development; purposelessand unprogressivechange is all that it has room for.

Any doubts as to Pascal's final attitude toward a thoroughgoing mechanistic view

of naturearedispelled by his recognition of an element of the unpredictablein nature'soperations:

67 Chevalier,p. 1110;B. 72.68 Elsewhere in the PensedesPascal insists:

"II ne faut pas juger de la nature selon nous,mais selon elle" (Chevalier,p. 1127; B. 457).Bacon adopts a similarpoint of view when heattributeshe originof the "Idolsof theTribe" ohuman nature itself: ". . . it is a false assertion

thatthe sense of man is the measureof things.Onthe contrary, all perceptions as well of thesense as of the mind are according o themeasureof theindividualandnotaccordingo themeasureof the universe"(Novumorganum, , 41, Philo-sophicalWorks,. 264).

69 Related by AntoineMenjot in a letterto hiscolleaguePuerari.Opusculesosthumes Amster-

dam, 1697),p. 115.Quotedby Chevalier,p. 1504,n.; G.E. X, p. 45. A similarcomparison s madeby Christiaan Huygens in a letter to Boyle in1693.Quoted by Dijksterhuis,Mechanization fthe WorldPicture, . 408. Gaston Milhaudechoesthis judgment: "Ses Principesde 1644,au pointde vue scientifique, ont, bien plut6t quele cadre

ofi se mouvra desormaisla sciencemodeme, ledernier des magnifiques romans qui se sontappeles ... tantot le Timee, tantot de naturarerum....." Descartes savant (Paris: Alcan,1921),p. 246.

70 Chevalier,pp. 1168-1169; B. 355.

71 TheIdea of Nature, p. 14.







PASCAL'S DEA OF NATURE 313

"Spongia olis".-Quand nousvoyonsun effetarriver oujoursde mdme,nous en con-cluonsunenecessit6naturelle, omnmeu'ilserademain our,etc. Maissouvent a naturenousdement, t nes'assujettit as 'a espropres 6gles.72

It is particularly significant here that whereas the idea of necessity is ascribed to theagency of the human mind, the indeterminacy does not depend on any human in-

ability but is inherent in the nature of things. Such a view is completely incompatible

with the conception of the physical world as a mechanistic system functioning accord-

ing to invariable laws. The secretof nature'suniform behavior, upon which any mech-

anistic worldview ultimately rests, consists in the invariable sequences of cause and

effect which Pascalhere declares are requently disregarded.

The idea of nature as process, growth, and development, which seems to survive in

Pascal's thinking as a relic of the conceptions of the previous century, is strangely out

of tune with the Cartesiantendency dominant in the thought of his period. Yet in one

important respect Pascal does appear deeply influenced by this Cartesianmechanism.

Several fragments from the Pensees show him in substantialagreementwith Descartes'

doctrine of animal automata.

Je puis bien concevoirun hommesansmains, pieds, tete, . . . Mais e ne puis concevoirl'homme anspens6e:ceseraitunepierreou une brute.

L'histoiredu brochetet de la grenouillede Liancourt:73ils le font toujours,et jamaisautrement, i autrechosed'esprit.

Lebec du perroquetqu'ilessuie,quoiqu'il oitnet.

Si un animalfaisaitpar espritce qu'il fait par instinct,et s'il parlaitpar espritce qu'ilparle par instinct,pourla chasse,et pouravertir es camaradesquela proieest trouveeou perdue, l parleraitaussipourdes chosesoiu l a plus d'affection, ommepourdire:"Rongezcettecordequimeblesse,oiujenepuisatteindre."74

In this last fragment in particular Pascal seems to be echoing Descartes' contention

that it is the ability to communicategenuine thought, whether by the use of articulate

speech or some other means, that differentiatesman from beast, rational intellect from

animal instinct.75The testimonies of Adrien Baillet that it was this aspect of Descartes'

philosophy which Pascal esteemed most, and of Marguerite Perier, who relates that"IIetait de son sentimentsurl'automate. . . ,"76 apparentlybearthis out.

The foregoing evidence, together with the fact that this view was generally accepted

72 Chevalier,p. 1121;B. 91.73ErnestJovyhas traceda probablesourceof

the anecdote to which Pascal alludes here.Etudes pascaliennes (Paris: J. Vrin, 1928), Vol.

IV, pp. 58-66.74Chevalier,p. 1156;B. 339,341, 343,342.

75In a letter to Henry More (Feb. 5, 1649)Descarteswrites:

. . jamais jusqu'ace jour on n'a pu observerqu'aucunanimal en soit venu a ce point deperfectiond'userd'un veritable angage,c'est-A-dired'exprimer oit par la voix, soit par lesgestesquelquechose qui puissese rapportera

la seule penseeet non 'a 'impulsionnaturelle.Le langage est en effet le seul signe certaind'une pensee latente dans le corps,. . . c'estpourquoi il est permisde prendrele langagepour la vraie differenceentre les hommes etlesbetes.

Oeuvres et lettres, ed. Bridoux, p. 1320. Cf. theletter to the Marquis of Newcastle (Nov. 23,1646), pp. 1255-1256.

76 Adrien Baillet, La Vie de Monsieur Des-Cartes(Paris:DanielHorthemels,1961), Vol. I,p. 52. Chevalier,p. 41.







314 A. W. S. BAIRD

at Port-Royal,77has led L. C. Rosenfield, in her study of the subject, to lump Pascal

in with the "solitaires," to swell the ranks of the advocates of the Cartesian beast-

machine theory in the first half of the seventeenth century.78However, she overlooks

the crucial fragment: "La machine d'arithmetiquefait des effets qui approchent plus

de la pensee que tout ce que font les animaux; mais elle ne fait rien qui puisse fairedire qu'elle a de la volonte, comme les animaux."79Mrs. Rosenfield also seems un-

awareof the conclusion reachedby G. Desgrippes, after a very careful examination of

all the relevantfragmentsin the light of the Cartesian doctrine, that there is insufficient

conclusive evidence to justify making a decision either way.80And it is difficultto see

how a further passage, adduced in support of her thesis, can have given rise to her

claim that it "testifies to the sameattitude'81:

. . qu'ya-t-ilde plusabsurdeque de direque des corpsinanim6sont des passions,descraintes,des horreurs?que des corpsinsensibles, ans vie, et meme incapablesde vie,

aientdespassions,qui pr6supposentneameau moinssensitivepour esrecevoir? 2

Pascal expresslystates that it is to inorganic substance,not to a "living organism,"that

he is concerned to deny "passions, fears and horrors." If Rosenfield interprets the

passage to mean that he accords a mere "sensitive"soul to animals, as opposed to the

conscious intelligence which characterizes the human species, even this cannot be

taken as evidence of Pascal's espousal of the Cartesianview. Descartes maintains, in

the final sentence of his Traitede l'homme,that it is unnecessary in order to account

for the presenceof passions in any animal, not excepting man, to envisage any

.ame vegetative,ni sensitive,ni aucunautreprincipede mouvement t devie, quesonsanget ses esprits,agitesparla chaleurdu feu quibrfilecontinuellement ans son coeur,et quin'estpointd'autrenaturequetous les feuxquisont dans escorps nanimes.83

And Pascal's colleagues at Port-Royal justified their indifference to the pain inflicted

on animals in anatomical experimentson the groundsthat animals are entirelywithout

feeling of any kind.84

Brunschvicg's attempt to explain away the fragment contrasting the arithmetical

machine with animals is both implausible and self-contradictory. He maintains that

it would be rash to conclude from this fragment that Pascal attributes the power of

volition to animals, in opposition to the Cartesian view established at Port-Royalwhich he himself seems to accept elsewhere. He continues: "Peut-etre ne convient-il

de voir la qu'un exemple destine 'amettre en lumiere la differencedes operations de

1'entendementpur et des tendances de la volonte."85 But such "tendances de la

volonte" surely presuppose the existence of a "volonte" in whatever is alleged to ex-

hibit them-in this case, animals. In whatever light this extract is considered, the fact

Cf. Sainte-Beuve,Port Royal, Vol. II, ed.MaximeLeroy (Paris:Biblioth6quede la Pleiade,

Gallimard,1954),pp.757-758.78 L. C. Rosenfield, From Beast-Machine to

Man-Machine. Animal Soul in FrenchLettersfrom

Descartes to La Mettrie (New York: Oxford

Univ.Press,1941),pp.281-284.79Chevalier,p. 1156;B. 340.80 G. Desgrippes, Etudes sur Pascal: De

l'automatisme a' la foi (Paris: Tequi, 1935), pp.

103-121.Desgrippes himself inclines toward thenegativeview.

81 From Beast-Machine, p. 216, n. 37.82 Chevalier,pp. 1136-1137;B. 75.83 Oeuvres et letters, ed. Bridoux,p. 873.84 Cf Sainte-Beuve,Port-Royal, Vol. II, pp.

757-758, andthe passagequotedfromFontaine'sMemoires by Jovy, Etudespascaliennes, p. 58.

85 Blaise Pascal, Pensees et Opuscules (7th ed.,Paris:Hachette,1914),p. 486,n. 2.








remains,as Desgrippespoints out,86 hat it is hard to imagine a more apt contemporary

example of an automaton, to which to assimilate animal behavior, than the arith-

metical machine. Yet in the one context where Pascal does compare the two, it is to

bring out the differencesbetweenthem.

Furthermore, this recognition of a will in animals tallies with the singularly un-mechanistic language used by Pascal in describing animal instinct in the Prefacepour

le traite du vide. He contrasts there its essentially static character with the ever-

increasing body of knowledge which the human mind is capable of embracing. In

illustration he quotes the stock example of the beehive, which has not varied in shape

or size over a period of a thousand years, and adds: "Il en est de meme de tout ce que

les animaux produisent par ce mouvement occulte."87But according to Descartes

there is no need to have recourse to any such "occult movement" to explain the

behavior of animals, since the motive force in them is in no way different from that of

inanimatebodies. VI. NATURE AS AN ACTIVE PRINCIPLE

In contrast with Cartesianmechanism, then, Pascal sees natureas not merely active

and developing, but as generativeand regulativeas well. In the Preface, after showing

how animals always act accordingto instinct, he continues:

La nature es instruit amesureque la necessite es presse; ... la naturen'ayantpourobjetquede maintenires animauxdansun ordrede perfectionbornee,elle leurinspirecettesciencenecessaire,oujours gale,depeur qu'ilsne tombentdans e deperissement,et ne permet pas qu'ils y ajoutent,de peur qu'ilsne passentles limites qu'elleleur a

prescrites.88

However, it is not only in the life of animals that nature plays this role of ordaining

principle,but, as many fragmentsfrom the Pensees attest, in the life of men as well. In

the "Disproportion de l'homme" passage Pascal claims that once their position be-

tween the two infinites, with all that it entails, is brought home to men, they will be

content to make the most of what it presents "chacun dans l'etat ou la nature l'a

place."89 n another fragmentan inquireris imagined asking, "Pourquoi ma connais-

sance est-elle bornee? ma taille? ma duree 'acent ans plutot qu'a mille? Quelle raison

a eue la naturede me la donner telle . . . ?

Again, in the course of illustratingthe effects produced on anyone's attitude by the

imagination, Pascal shows how even a venerablemagistrate,who seems tojudge things

on their intrinsic merits without allowing himself to be influenced by other factors, is

distractedby the grotesque appearanceof the preacherat a sermon: "Que le predica-

teur vienne 'aparaltre, que la nature lui ait donne une voix enrouee et un tour de

visage bizarre, . . ."91It is nature too that ensures the concurrence of the appropriate

emotions with the various states of health through which men pass: "La nature donne

alors des passions et des desirs conformes a l'etat present."92Even in the case of the

two distinct types of cognition, after expressing the wish that all knowledge derived

from the "coeur"as opposed to the "raison,"Pascal adds in regretfultones: "Mais la

86Etudes urPascal,pp. 117-119.87 Chevalier,p. 533;G.E.II,p. 138.88 Ibid.89 Chevalier,p. 1109;B. 72.

90Chevalier,p. 1113;B. 208.

91Chevalier, p. 1117; B. 82.

92 Chevalier,p. 1131;B. 109.







316 A. W. S. BAIRD

nature nous a refuse ce bien; elle ne nous a au contraire donne que tres peu de con-

naissancesde cette sorte...."93

Nature's regulative capacity is thus clearly acknowledged. Yet this conception of

nature as both active and regulativecannot be taken to imply a revivalof the sixteenth-

century notion of an animamundi,since Pascal emphatically rejects any form of ani-mism. In the letterto Perier,includedin the Recit de la grande experience,he states that

one of his reasons for doubting the truth of the belief that nature abhors a vacuum is

that ". . .j'ai peine 'a croire que la nature, qui n'est point animee, ni sensible, soit

susceptible d'horreur, puisque les passions presupposent une ame capable de les

ressentir....4 In the final section of the Recit he points out that the horror vacui is a

pure fiction invented simply to conceal man's ignorance. Pascal then goes on to say

that this is by no means the first time that men, when unable to discover the true

causes of phenomena, have substituted imaginary ones, couched in specious terms

which satisfy the ear rather than the mind:

... c'est ainsi que l'on dit que la sympathieet l'antipathiedes corps naturelssont lescauses efficientes t univoquesde plusieurseffets,comme si des corpsinanimesetaientcapablesdesympathie t antipathie....95

Opposition to any form of animism appears also in two fragments from the Pensees.

The untenableposition of those who defend the horrorvacuithesis is demonstrated by

a reductioadabsurdum:

... pourl'examiner n elle-mime, qu'y a-t-ilde plus absurdeque de dire que des corpsinanimesont des passions,des craintes,des horreurs?. . de plus, que l'objetde cettehorreurffut e vide?.. .Ce n'est pas tout: qu'ils aient en eux-memesun principedemouvementpoureviter evide.96

Elsewhere Pascal alleges that men's readiness to account for phenomena by such

spurious reasons results from their own composite nature of body and mind, which

precludes them from perfect knowledge of any "simple" object, whether corporeal or

spiritual.

De la vientque presque ous les philosophesconfondent es ideesdes choses, et parlentdeschosescorporelles pirituellement.... Car ls disenthardimentque les corpstendentenbas, qu'ilsaspirenta leurcentre,qu'ilsfuient eurdestruction,qu'ilscraignent e vide,... quisonttouteschosesqui n'appartiennent u'auxesprits.97

Assertions like these-that the world of nature is entirely devoid of psychical

properties and innate energies-are final enough. It is no longer possible, in Pascal's

view, to resort to the scholastic device of explaining the effects of phenomena like air

pressurein terms of various "passions." But since such statements also imply that the

movements of physical things are imposed upon them from without, how do they tally

with the conception of nature as not merely active but self-ordering and progressive,

having the capacity for change and development? A passage from the conclusion to

93 Chevalier,p. 1222;B. 282.94 Chevalier,p. 393;G.E.II, p. 154.95 Chevalier,p. 400; G.E. II, pp. 370-371.For

Mersenne'sparallelviewssee Lenoble,Mersenne,

pp. 352, 371-372.

96 Chevalier, pp. 1136-1137; B. 75.

97 Chevalier, p. 1111; B. 72.








the two treatises on statics is to the point here. Pascal contends that since he has shown

that atmospheric pressure alone is the true cause of effects normally ascribed to the

horrorvacui,it is now clear that nature produces nothing with a view to avoiding a

vacuum. He claims that it would be easy to pass on from here to show that it has no

horror of one either: "car cette fagon de parler n'est pas propre, puisque la naturecreee, qui est celle dont il s'agit, n'etant pas animee, n'est pas capable de passion...."98

The proviso included here, which makes an implicit contrast between an active and a

passive side of nature, suggests that Pascal maintains the scholastic distinction be-

tween a naturanaturansand a natura naturata.And the apparent inconsistency in his

position is resolved if nature as active process is to be distinguished from nature as the

effects that result from the process.

The notion which Pascal develops of a relation between nature and God also bears

upon this question. God is of course conceived of as creator of the material universe.99

But when he becomes explicit as to the relation of the deity to the physical world,natureis seen to play a kind of intermediate role linking the two. Thus in the Entretien

avec M. de Saci Pascal is recorded as comparing how Epictetus and Montaigne have

succeeded in achieving some degree of resemblance in their writings to "la sagesse

veritable qu'ils ont essaye de connaitre," with the way in which nature strives to re-

produce God in all her works: ". . . il est agreable d'observer dans la nature le desir

qu'elle a de peindre Dieu dans tous ses ouvrages, oiu l'on en voit quelque caractere

parce qu'ils en sont les images...."100 The idea of a dual causality, which this curious

double tautology seems intended to convey, is more clearly illustrated in an extract

from the Pensees: "Quand on est instruit, on comprend que, la nature ayant grave son

image et celle de son auteur dans toutes choses...."101

All phenomenain the physicalworld therefore exhibit the image of nature and more

remotely that of nature's own author. And this relation holds good not only in the

physical world but even in the human sphere. In the letter to his sister Mme. Perier

and her husband, after the death of their father, Pascal writes: "Ne quittons donc pas

cet amour que la nature nous a donne pour la vie, puisque nous l'avons requ de

Dieu.... 1"102 The notion of God standing as it were at one remove from the world and

working through nature appears again in a letter to Mlle. de Roannez: "Les impies,

voyant les effets naturels, les attribuent a la nature, sans penser qu'il y en ait un autre

auteur."103

It is clear from this conception of dual authorship that it is through the agency of

nature, construed as an active and generative power in its own right, that God orders

the world and accomplishes his purpose. Nature in the sense of the physical world is to

be distinguished therefore from nature the active principle, whose activity is the

immediate cause of all the productions of that world. And this active nature strongly

resemblesthe Aristotelian concept of phiisis as it was taken over and developed by the

Schoolmen. Pascal falls with them between Renaissance hylozoism, which regards

98 Chevalier,p. 457;G.E. III, p. 254.99Cf. Chevalier, p. 1090; B. 185; Chevalier,

p. 583; G.E. IX, p. 255; Chevalier,p. 798; G.E.V, p. 373.

100Chevalier, p. 571; G.E. IV, pp. 51-52.101 Chevalier, p. 1107; B. 72.

102 Chevalier,p. 497; G.E. II, p. 553. Reproduced with slight verbal alterations by MmePerier in her Vie de Monsieur Pascal, Chevalier,p. 21. Cf. Chevalier,pp. 1200, 1265, 1334; B.580, 675, 876.

103 Chevalier, p. 510; G.E. VI, p. 89.







318 A. W. S. BAIRD

nature as something divine and self-creative,104 and the Cartesian idea of the world as

a sort of giant clockwork, which needs an initial push but can then be left to its own

devices. Marguerite Perier has recorded Pascal's comment on the Cartesian tendency

to dispense with God after his original act of setting the universe in motion, since it

can then be accounted for in terms of its own mechanical laws:

Je ne puis pardonner aDescartes; l voudraitbien, danstoutesa philosophie, e pouvoirpasser de Dieu, mais il n'a pu s'empecherde lui faire donnerune chiquenaudepourmettre e mondeen mouvement; prescelail n'a plus que fairede Dieu.105

Whetheror not this criticism does justice to Descartes' doctrine is unimportantfor the

present discussion, since it suffices to indicate Pascal's attitude toward the mechanistic

solution of the problem of divine interactionwith the world of nature.106

Nature interpreted in this way as a kind of active go-between linking the physical

world with God eliminates the need for God to intervene directly in all events. ButPascal is convinced nevertheless that God continues through the medium of nature to

direct the world, which everywhere exhibits his image. Here again there is a marked

divergence from the Cartesian view. As Koyre points out, "Descartes' God, in con-

tradistinction to most previous Gods, is not symbolized by the things He created; He

does not express Himself in them. There is no analogy between God and the world, no

'imagines' and 'vestigia Dei in mundo'; . . . Pascal, on the contrary, in an early

letter to Mme. Perier, refers to the "ressemblance que la nature creee ait avec son

Createur, .. . " and claims that: ". . . les moindres choses et les plus petites et les plus

viles parties du monde represententau moins par leur unite la parfaite unite qui ne setrouve qu'en Dieu, . . ."108 No mention is made here of nature as the tertiumquid

bridging the gap between God and the things that comprise the physical world. Yet

the expression "nature creee," used to designate what amount to "nature's works,"

elsewhere sharply differentiated from nature as a creative force, clearly points in this

direction.

104 Cf Collingwood, The Idea of Nature'

pp. 94-95.105 Chevalier,p. 41;B. 77.106 Pascal's idea of nature as a formative

principle strongly resembles Cudworth's con-ception of ". . . the Plastic Nature under [God],which as an InferiorandSubordinate nstrumentdoth drudginglyexecute that Part of his Provi-dence which consistsin the Regularand OrderlyMotion of Matter: ... it is a living Stamp orSignatureof the Divine Wisdom,..." Quotedfrom The True Intellectual System of the Universeby Ernst Cassirer, The Platonic Renaissance in

England, trans. James P. Pettegrove (London:Nelson, 1953), p. 141, n. 1. Cf. J. A. Passmore,Ralph Cudworth, An Interpretation (Cambridge:CambridgeUniv. Press, 1951), pp. 27-28, andLydia Gysi, Platonism and Cartesianism in thePhilosophy of Ralph Cudworth (Bern: Herbert

Lang, 1962), pp. 17-24. In contrast with bothDescartesand Pascal,Newton "believed hat the

continuous operation of God was an essential

part of the mechanicalsystem of the world."Crombie,Grosseteste, . 316,n. 4.

107 From the Closed World, p. 100.108 Chevalier,p. 485; G.E. II, pp. 250-251.The

ability to appreciatethis sacramentalaspect ofthe world of nature presupposes, in Pascal'sview, an eye enlightenedby supernatural aith.Cf. Chevalier, p. 484; G.E. IT, p. 250, andChevalier,p. 510; G.E. VI, p. 89. And althoughPascal believes that the world of sensiblephenomena, at least for the Christian, shouldbe symbolic,he does not on that accountrevert

to the Renaissance conception of physicalscience which, as Lenoble puts it, ". . . ne cherchepas des phenomenes,mais des signes." "L'evolu-tion de l'idee de 'nature' du XVIe au XVIIIesiecle,"p. 116. Cf.ErnstCassirer,TheIndividualand the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy, trans.MarioDomandi(NewYork:HarperTorchbooks,1964),pp. 53 if.








VII. TIE DIVERSITY OF NATURE

The conception of nature as an active process revealingitself in the continuity run-

ning all through the physical world which comprises its effects does not mean that the

world is therefore devoid of multiformity and characterized only by change and

development. Indeed, in a fragment from the Pensees, where he extends the idea ofnature's diversity to the individual members of the human species, Pascal expressly

states that uniformity is alien to nature as creative principle. He comments on the in-

fluence exerted on a person's choice of profession if he is continually subjected in

childhood to hearing certainme'tiers ecommendedand the rest derided:

Tantest grande a force de la coutume,que,de ceuxque la naturen'a faits qu'hommes,on fait toutes les conditionsdeshommes,car despays sont tout demagons,d'autres outde soldats,etc. Sansdoute que la naturen'est pas si uniforme.C'estla coutumequifaitdonccela,carellecontraintanature; .. 109

On the contrary, several further fragments from the Pense'es attest the inexhaustible

diversityof nature'seffects as Pascal sees them:

Ladiversite st si ample,que tous les tons de voix, tous lesmarchers, oussers,mouchers,eternuements.... Ondistinguedes fruits les raisins,et entreceux-la es muscats,et puisCondrieu,et puis Desargues,et puis cette ente. Est-ce tout? en a-t-ellejamais produitdeuxgrappespareilles etunegrappea-t-elledeuxgrainspareils?etc.

Diversite.-Un hommnest un supp6t; mais si on l'anatomise,sera-ce a tete, le coeur,

1'estomac, es veines, chaque veine, chaque portionde veine, le sang, chaquehumeurde sang?Uneville,unecampagne,de loin estuneville et unecampagne;mais,'amesurequ'on s'approche, e sont des maisons,des arbres,des tuiles, desfeuilles,desherbes,desfourmis,des ambesdefourmis,a l'infini.Tout celas'enveloppe ous e nomdecampagne.

Combien les lunettes nous ont-elles decouvert d'astres qui n'etaient point pour nosphilosophesd'auparavant!.. I1y a des herbes sur la terre; nous les voyons.-De lalune onneles verraitpas.-Et surcesherbesdespoils;et danscespoilsdepetitsanimaux:mais aprescela, plus rien. -O presomptueux!-les mixtes sont composes d'elements;et les6lements, on.- 0 presomptueux!Voiciun traitdelicat. 0

The last fragment here clearly impinges on the subject matter of the "Disproportion

de l'homme" passage, where the theme of the two infinites discernible on all sides is

more fully developed. There too Pascal emphasizes not only the boundless extent of

the firmamenthidden in the "ample sein de la nature," but also the fact that however

far we press in analyzingthe parts of even the most minute organism,we shall still find

that they are syntheses made up of complex component parts, and this as far as the

powers of seeingwill carryus.1 1

Despite his belief, therefore, that nature is "eprised'unite," Pascal has a deep sense

of the irreduciblecharacter of individual species and of the immense complexity of the

phenomena which go to make up the physical world. The way in which nature achieves

unity in and through such manifold diversityis contrasted, in a cryptic statement,withthe opposite mode of design followed by human art, which models all its productions

109 Chevalier, p. 1122-1123;B. 97.110 Chevalier, p. 1095; B. 114; Chevalier, pp.

1095-1096; B. 115; Chevalier, p. 1218; B. 266.II' Chevalier, p. 1106; B. 72.







320 A. W. S. BAIRD

on a single archetype: "Nature diversifie et imite, artifice imite et diversifie.""1l2 he

significance of this distinction becomes apparent in another short fragment: "La

nature a mis toutes ses verites chacune en soi-meme; notre art les renferme les unes

dans les autres, mais cela n'est pas naturel: chacune tient sa place.""ll3

Nature in Pascal's view does not respond to this sort of manhandling. Instead oftrying to classify things by explaining one property in terms of another, we must just

accept the world as we find it, with the various phenomena all enjoying separate ex-

istence. To seek to interpret it otherwise is to falsify nature, and Pascal's censure

would obviously fall with equal severity on an a priori scheme into which everything

is fitted willy nilly and on one which simply ignores recalcitrant elements. The con-

tinuity which runs all through its productions does not therefore prevent Pascal from

seeing nature as always saying something new, as growing ever more complex before

man's gaze.

112 Chevalier, p. 1095; B. 120. 113 Chevalier, p. 1102; B. 21.

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La Idea de Naturaleza de Pascal