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La diplomatie de détente: la CSCE, d'Helsinki à Vienne (1973-1989) by Victor-Yves Ghebali Review by: Klaus Samson Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Aug., 1991), pp. 428-431 Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/762630 . Accessed: 28/06/2014 18:10 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . The Johns Hopkins University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Human Rights Quarterly. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 141.101.201.31 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 18:10:02 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

La diplomatie de detente: la CSCE, d'Helsinki a Vienne (1973-1989)

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La diplomatie de détente: la CSCE, d'Helsinki à Vienne (1973-1989) by Victor-Yves GhebaliReview by: Klaus SamsonHuman Rights Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Aug., 1991), pp. 428-431Published by: The Johns Hopkins University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/762630 .

Accessed: 28/06/2014 18:10

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

The Johns Hopkins University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access toHuman Rights Quarterly.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 141.101.201.31 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 18:10:02 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

BOOK REVIEWS

LA DIPLOMATIE DE DETENTE: LA CSCE, D'HELSINKI A VIENNE (1973-1989), by Victor-Yves Ghe- bali, with an introduction by Benoit d'Aboville, a forward by Helene Car- rbre d'Encausse, and a preface by Jean Klein (Brussels: tablissements Emile Bruylant, 1989), 444 pp.

For many years, Victor-Yves Ghebali has been an attentive observer of the dis- cussions of the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe; the CSCE being a product of the Helsinki Final Act. Ghebali has previously published a large number of articles in learned journals, and now he has produced a general study of the subject, in which he seeks to assess the effects of the first sixteen years of the Helsinki process. Tracing the process through the conclusion of the Vienna Fol- low-Up Meeting of 1987-1989, the book provides a valuable background to un- derstanding the radical transformation of Europe that was set in motion during 1989.

The author recalls the great skepticism and predominantly negative reactions of Western public opinion during the early stages of the CSCE process. Critics saw the Helsinki Final Act as exchanging rec- ognition of the post-World War II fron- tiers for derisory concessions. The author refutes that assessment. He maintains that the CSCE has become a dynamic force in East-West relations that has brought benefit to all concerned. It has contrib- uted to greater diplomatic coherence among the countries of the European Economic Community and has helped consolidate and legitimize the United States and Canada's political ties to Eu-

rope. Common values of liberal democ- racy have been established for the whole of Europe. The neutral and nonaligned countries have been able to participate in the discussions on an equal footing with the members of NATO and the War- saw Pact, thus exerting a constructive moderating influence. For the countries of Eastern Europe, in addition to holding out the prospect of a general European peace settlement, the CSCE provided a means for attenuating, without loss of face, the severity of their laws and prac- tices limiting the fundamental freedoms of their citizens. The CSCE has also pro- vided additional legitimacy for the efforts launched during the Gorbachev era to transform Soviet society with an eye to- ward creating a "common European home."

The author observes that the criticisms leveled at the CSCE have resulted not only from doubts about the "illusion of detente," but also from a lack of knowl- edge of the rules, decisions, and results of a rather esoteric process. His book is therefore aimed at providing a compre- hensive account of all the stages of this process, from the preliminary discussions in 1972-1973 to the recent Vienna Fol- low-Up Meeting. In six chapters, the book reviews: the institutional setting; the principles guiding relations among participating states (the so-called "Dec- alogue of Detente"); the search for means to peacefully settle disputes; confidence- building measures; the economic "bas- ket"; the "third basket," relating to the free movement of persons, information, and ideas; and security and cooperation in the Mediterranean area. Under each of these headings, the author analyzes the origins of the measures agreed upon

Human Rights Quarterly 13 (1991) 428-434 c 1991 by The Johns Hopkins University Press

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1991 Book Reviews 429

at Helsinki, the approaches and objec- tives of the different groups of partici- pating states, and the further develop- ments agreed upon at successive follow- up meetings. In the preface, Jean Klein observes that, while the author has not hidden his favorable views of a process which he considers to have already pro- duced positive results, he has been con- cerned above all with setting out the facts objectively, admitting the limitations of the exercise.

In discussing the negotiating frame- work of the CSCE process, the author em- phasizes the originality of these arrange- ments as a diplomatic exercise half way between the methods of traditional in- ternational organizations and those of arms control conferences. Although there is no permanent infrastructure, there are a number of procedural rules intended to implement a continuing process of dis- cussion. The Helsinki Final Act and the documents approved at follow-up meet- ings are likewise of an original character. While they are not intended to create legally binding obligations, the docu- ments nevertheless use language similar to that found in treaties and express a consensus among the participating states as to the program of measures to be pur- sued. The author observes that the Hel- sinki Final Act reaffirms rules derived from generally recognized principles of international law requiring interpretation using legal reasoning and techniques, es- pecially those principles guiding rela- tions among participating states. Many developments have taken place at the follow-up meetings with regard to the amplification of the commitments ac- cepted under Principle VII relating to hu- man rights and fundamental freedoms. These are especially interesting, in rela- tion to both the substantive standards and the arrangements permitting evaluation of compliance with those commitments and discussion of problems and short-

comings. The author observes that the implementation of the Decalogue has proved to be a remarkable instrument for the promotion of human rights, as well as a catalyst of polemics. Of particular significance has been the growth of a variety of groups, in both East and West, monitoring the observance of the com- mitments undertaken in the Helsinki Fi- nal Act. While initially, in Eastern Europe, such groups were the subject of severe repression, the situation has improved markedly in the Gorbachev era. Greater responsiveness to the role of public opin- ion is reflected in the increased access given the press and public to the discus- sions at the Vienna Follow-Up Meeting, and in the provisions of the Concluding Document of the Vienna meeting re- garding the publication and dissemina- tion of human rights documents and the right of citizens, individually or in as- sociation, to contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights.

Historians will continue to debate whether the changes in the political structure of Europe and the supersession of the arrangements decreed at Yalta re- sulted largely from the CSCE process or from the realization of the need for reform in the Soviet Union following the acces- sion of Gorbachev to power. The author shows how, in the years following the Helsinki Final Act (coinciding with the last sterile years of the Brezhnev regime), the atmosphere for East-West relations deteriorated, with continuing human rights abuses and the repression of hu- man rights activists in Eastern Europe, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the proc- lamation of martial law and suppression of trade unions in Poland, and the shoot- ing down by Soviet forces of a Korean civilian aircraft. Thus, the first follow-up meeting at Belgrade in 1977-1978 failed to approve any of the proposals submit- ted by the participating states, without agreement on Western concerns regard-

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430 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY Vol. 13

ing human rights and Soviet aims in the field of military d6tente. The author ob- serves that, although the meeting was generally considered a failure, it never- theless made possible a review of the action taken on the Helsinki recommen- dations and showed the determination, in spite of all the difficulties, to maintain a dialogue. A gradual change of political climate resulted in more positive results at the second follow-up meeting in Ma- drid between 1980 and 1983, but it was the Vienna meeting from 1987 to 1989 which benefitted from the new situation in the Soviet Union, as exhibited by, among other things, the release from ex- ile and prison of prominent dissidents. The author observes that, at the Vienna meeting, the Soviet Union was clearly concerned about its international image. As a result, the meeting for the first time properly accomplished its fundamental task of reviewing action taken upon the Helsinki Final Act, without taboos or dis- putes about nonintervention in domestic matters. The meeting adopted a con- cluding document of major importance that substantially amplifies earlier com- mitments and establishes new proce- dures for the exchange of information and discussion through diplomatic chan- nels. The document also establishes the four general follow-up meetings to be held in Helsinki beginning March 1992.

The full implications of this new cli- mate in East-West relations have become evident in events that have occurred since the Vienna meeting (and therefore also following the period covered in Pro- fessor Ghebali's book): the generally peaceful transformation of the political regimes of almost all the countries of Eastern Europe, the acceptance of the unification of the two Germanies, the ter- mination of rights retained by the allied powers, and major new disarmament agreements. These developments cul- minated in the signing of the Paris Charter

of November 1990 by the leaders of CSCE states, declaring an end to the era of confrontation and division in Europe, affirming commitment to the Helsinki principles as a guide to future relations based on respect and cooperation, and undertaking to build and strengthen de- mocracy as the only system of govern- ment of their nations, with respect for the human person and the rule of law as its foundation.

These developments, far from consti- tuting the realization of the aims of the Helsinki Final Act, emphasize the need for an institutional framework in which to examine questions concerning secu- rity and cooperation in the newly de- veloping Europe. In this respect, the Paris Charter indeed marks a new stage in in- stitutionalizing the CSCE process. It pro- vides for a Council of Foreign Ministers to meet at least once a year as the central forum for political consultations, with a permanent secretariat based in Prague, as well as for creation of a Conflict Pre- vention Center in Vienna and an Office for Free Elections in Warsaw. It also pro- vides for the creation of a CSCE parlia- mentary assembly.

The question arises as to how far these arrangements can and should be coor- dinated with the work of the Council of Europe. This question is relevant for sev- eral reasons. A number of countries from the former Eastern bloc are in the process of becoming members of the Council, a process that may be expected to gener- alize itself. The Council is an organiza- tion directed towards cooperation on the basis of respect for human rights and the rule of law, with a highly developed con- vention-based system of protection of in- dividual rights and freedoms. It also has permanent organs, including a Commit- tee of Ministers and a Parliamentary As- sembly, as well as a long-established sec- retariat. The question may therefore be asked whether it is meaningful to have

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1991 Book Reviews 431

two parallel systems of European coop- eration. However, it is always difficult in practice to streamline arrangements that have developed gradually from different roots and through different processes. One must also bear in mind that the United States and Canada are partici- pants in the CSCE. Moreover, in the field of human rights significantly different ap- proaches have been adopted. Even though there is much concomitance in the substantive standards that have been proclaimed, the method of protection dif- fers; the Council of Europe Convention recognizes the right of individual victims to seek redress, whereas the CSCE relies on more traditional methods of diplo- matic intervention.

The optimism engendered by the re- sults of the Vienna CSCE meeting and the Paris summit meeting in November 1990 is tempered, at the time of writing of this review, by events in the Baltic Republics and the departure or removal from office of many of those associated with liberal and reformist policies in the Soviet Un- ion. These developments cast doubt on the continued adherence of the Soviet Union to the letter and the spirit of its CSCE commitments and are bound to ad- versely affect the prospects of East-West d6tente and cooperation. It remains to be seen to what extent the CSCE framework will prove its worth, in these less pro- pitious circumstances, as a means for evaluating the difficulties, devising col- lective responses, and bringing to bear considered and effective diplomatic pressures. The question also arises whether discussions with non-European states in the Mediterranean region under CSCE processes may serve to establish a new climate for diplomatic and eco- nomic relations in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf conflict. Professor Ghebali's book, with its analysis of the methods so far employed and the vicissitudes of the CSCE discussions during the first sixteen

years, should assist one in viewing, with a sense of perspective, the problems that lie ahead.

Klaus Samson The Graduate Institute of

International Studies, Geneva

IRAQ-OCCUPIED KUWAIT: THE HEALTH CARE SITUATION, a report by Physicians for Human Rights/ Denmark & USA. (Physicians for Human Rights, 58 Day Street, Suite 202, Somerville, MA, 02144) March 1991, 35 pp., $6.00.

Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) has produced a detailed account of the devastating effect the Iraqi invasion had on the health care system in Kuwait. Though the effect was understandably difficult to document without the ability to actually enter Kuwait, PHR inter- viewed thirty-four health workers, from fourteen different hospitals, who were in Kuwait at the time of and following the invasion. These interviews give testi- mony to the incredible atrocities com- mitted there. The report leaves no doubt that the devastation reached shocking proportions as it describes health care in Kuwait both before and after the inva- sion. The report discusses the presence of the Iraqi'military, the situation inside the health care facilities, and the inter- ference with and violence against med- ical personnel. Each violation illustrated in the report is also backed by a citation to the Fourth Geneva Convention.

Prior to the invasion, it is well-doc- umented that Kuwait maintained a so- phisticated health care system involving six general hospitals and thirteen spe- cialty hospitals, all run by the govern- ment. In addition, there were six private hospitals and seventy multidisciplinary

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