qcajj

D a c . N t . 2 _

r i i , ' ;1 *f*.", '* ' : ; ; ' f f i :";": ; i l ; ; ' -"-* ' '" 'o€n'� imen'�ror

L I ' l

l l t ;l ; 1 l -pea.e at snv Pticei r '

I l l l l I : ' l. ',

lzt i r"q,p"ti,,s .riso?'rers on' and emanating r!or+' the camPu'es; '

: t l '

i : . i i ' ' ; l

i {r) rro"raiag t igher Pav to disadvaataged vouthe'u;hoae oPportunit i€' '

, ' '

1 l r I l l . , . l : I o r ' c i u l i an emp lovmen t a r€ l im l tod ; ' no I

] ' . , l i t,l 1 ,.1 i ' ,,,,iot unrtrng the coqrrtry thlough a move ttiat nii onrv'iau be warmlv

ii,r ll :lll I i i r' : '1''

trli'ffi1i:'"""1T"t.t'-xnlffi'll I'"""";x"jlll','"""l l l i l i l t . i ] l i . r 1, that wae rlceived with skeetidsm'

l l Il*'||lllif lll I ,, i' on'io'r. \ ""'"""; three wavs, arr resuirrne cfncrelstonar acrio.' thar'

i '

l l i l: l l I ' i l

"o t--"tt"teimove toward cndtns the dran car b€ ilaoer lt

l . 1 ' l J l ' I I r ' I ' i \ , u ' , * o n o m o r e d r a r t e e s , " r i " t " i f { , " r ' " ' r : " : . t - . , i l l l l

ii lTl I ill I I, . .,ffff\i;i ;ii.#.nTrfrr"::.i1;r'irrt[:,T;'"rx';,1*r;1l , l i l l l l l , i , 1 ,1 , .

' , i l ; ' ; l ; ; ; * ;orserv ice, " "h l t t ' " " [n tberowest I

|- "r"'-ili l , ' l {I.l I .il I . r"rrJor,to"r srEps rowhr!j]ElIg-!l!!g!34l9'I ' l

\ - r / i , i | ' ! N L N L ' " ' ^ ' " - ' - ' - ' t

, Ll: . . . cosTs. .: . A maio! 'move towald encling the draft ' excePt a6'standby machinerv'

'l tl !/ ,, ";ilu" mad€ al'no-!t imm€diatelv' even berorc the ",a! end6' at a cost in FY

' i l I I ; ; i ; ; ; ' ; ; ; , . ;J""".o'""qof i iJ"r;"orgr 'sburteninrni l i ta'vpavthatI ' ' :" already i ' Planbed' I, l !

t / / ' " " i d :] I : - ' J . , ( B E N E F I

l , i ' l l i , i l TnI

r ' ' . ' a r r e 5 d y i . 1 , f * : " ' , , ' . . , i . , . 1 . , r i l

: | , ut"ltt t. ' \ '

* '"u"o"'u . ' ' io* 'q-p.'"a 'o the b€neflts:

, l, i1 ll-r1 st""sthening out hand ia tbe Paris talks bv reducing .€ntiment ror' l

l l f ; l : 1 1 - P e a . e a t a n y P c e i r '

l l l l : I 1' l . ' ,,

lz1 i r"+,netins .riso?.rers on, and emanating r!or+' the camPu'es; '

I I , i . ; i . , . ' ; l i ' - ' -

.^ , r i . : , rw^. taqed voutha,$;hose oPportuni t i€6 ' .

I' lllf I ill I I r ., ffili;I,*'::,x*xiir"::.j?:ltd[:,T;Lll1%1,11l1,:I I i l l | | ,

! , 1 : . ' , , ' " " i i " , i " " t . . ' - o l s e r v i c e ' a n h l t h u s t n t b e r o ' ! ' / e . t' " l l : . 1 I I : . l . i , l 1 l l en l i a t ed s radee '

. " , r l l " " r oae ( " . v i " t , "m .

I l i i |l ri \, l' I i \.,' l" i1.""1i#iil':;i',;;;lfrIry'"r:r;;rT*' I llll ;1 ' l': l, i I (') """1111"";ii:'[?'il::T:Tiiffffi:i::* II l : l l r l l l . . l t l : . . ' : - * - , ' : - - " , " , - , - . , " " " " ' l ! , u ' * " r v p a 1 i o F Y ? r ,

1' ri fll l i l i l : i l''ri'l:,iiiil1TJ'LT,'""X1',1';l iI,i1I ,\,1

'1 j:ias",r.,i,i,',*"".'f""1::tT:fi,ilJ::"1'ri[:'.",T;:'fi,1j]*' .ilif ll ;,1 i, Ii"1 .,,r,:,' 'i1*".** 'ffi":J"i:T:"'+11""'i;x:,ti'r;'

dreaa| ir pranbea' I

i ..",i.*'".'\ *.,

i '"'i'ri:ihl t .

' l . r I I r l' l r . l r , l

l i rI t iitr ill:j iti,

llill

t i l , i i l 'i t l l ' l . ' : i l ' , " i i . " t t " " " " " " ' r h e v c o u l d p e r t r a { o b € u 6 e d ' t P a r r 8 rit- I i, l: '": -,Bt ll : .ii"ii .s"*'lent €nemv torc e le{uctions

't ' 1 , i ' l

' " :1 i i :1. i t

- - ' : r - t , r^- Dr: - - n ; - . .J t l tut because oI the

t , ' , 1 , i ,

' 1 f i : 11,,1 i i [ 1u' i",i, -+:- i:,::Tf j"",ffJ:f Ei I: i''li;t1"

ort unie{ (z} rr $1.7 biuion',d. U"bdr (51, th,c PaY inclea3---..,ltti t" Gv.i therP€r tbanh.rP€r than

od: ; l 'sLi::'f-- ' --t;=1-

' :We consi i le i

q!:,IJ

DISCUSSION

l. Policy OPtions Othe! than the Th!ee Mentioned

Ptans A, B, and C aPPea! to be the most appeal ing l rom among a largel

set of al te.nat ives. Two of the rejected al ternat iveb are worth mentioningl

(i) End the dralt on June 30' f969' with no reduction in militaly rnan-

power. This oPtion woulil tequite a total Dudget incleas€ in Iiscal l9?0 of about

,t, Orrrron. This amount aeem6 out ol the que6tion''[ii)

Cooti"ot the draft until the end of the Vietnam War' and then

' tasy from the buttgetary stan'lPoint' becaus€phase it out ' Thia Procedure t" t-, .-^..L-

--; nr rhF war wil l rnake possibre.it ,". ttr; reduction in rnarPower that t}te end o{ the wa! will rnake possible '

However, lwaiting until the end of the war means detayinC eo7ilt€ imrnediate

step3 to$ard ending the d"aft, "-gl-g3g-9!=Eg ,/

Z. VoluntPers Due to Draft Pressure L

iThe studies comrnisBioned by P!esident 'fohnsofr in 1964 included survey

egtimates ol rnen who woul'l not have volunteere'l in tbe afsence of the draft' Latel

analysis of actual errlistments aB a firnctiotr o{ vatiatione f

*tt-t.:t"" ,",:jtYl,.

'po""iut" Lr.po'n tr d€ficit wheD tbe draft i6 reduc€d or efiminatea'

Ii .I

."-t"t"ti "."r" Lowea figure' TheBe estlmates r""et ["ott'

z47o to 44%' de-pend'

ine on trte lmit i t"ry 6ervice receiving t le volunteers' t tre fentaf

categ )ry ot.tne L

"rir"r"", lrra the source oI the estimate ' We feel safe inluBing the inlermeorare:

,r*."" "rirul, for the Army and 30% foi the other aervicja' asLapPlied to pre- I

Vietnam €FLigtments l

: igures oIlr5% for the Army and 30{o for the other BervrclE

iVietnam €hligtments l""" '- "

l ; ; ; t . crearlv show that when d'an calls incfeaee eri lrstrnente also l

{,'.".."",1 rhus the above estimateB have to be """"::if" ll llt

t*""""" - I

[.-"ri:;;t+ r"o- rs56 onwards' .In

fiscar le6a some.6:aeflo:t:::-" rge I?'5 vdars

to 20.5 ydars in mental categolres I-Ul enlisted tt"r ' f""f; t",:t"""t t:",1" -tt ' :: �[:,:to 20' 5 tf ars in mentar """ ""';j

"li r.'"::::."d; F", f"..," ;;'-,."'" l**

::":::f::,til;" lJ'.,'l"l"""ive optimism we as.lrme that the entrre. rncreas

*^" ao" tL incteas'd draft PreBsure' Thi6 leads to an ltBide

€stirnate or lne I

APPIying the above est imateB of draft- induced volurteel6 ' pre-vietnam

and po6t-Vietnam, we estimate tllat volunteels lrom the above age and mental

groups would be I .40% Ior the Arrny a d Z.9l1" Ior the other 6e"vi{es ' Ior a total

of 4.3L1o, aorrre 56% of the recent past total tate ol1 '6501o' , These Percentageg

generate Jxpected enlistments in f iscal I9?0, in the absence of draft plessure'

ol Sl,400 for the Army and 156,?00 lor the othet selvices' We assume that

mental group IV enliEtrnerrts would continue at Pres€nt leeels ' becaus€ t}ey are

contro[ed by Policyl aPplicants for €nligtment in tlni6 rnental grouP are tulneo

l La n f } rF r se rw i r"*ay. D,l"y add 53,400 enlistments to the Army and 68'4oo to the othe! servicee'

The proieited totalB of l34,8OO for the Army and 235' 100 for the ot} ler serv:cea

.o'no"". i"rr l , 201,400 and 3l?,900, respectively' in the Presence o{ the draft '

3.. Volunleers 1I Dlaftees Are ExemPted Irom vietnam s

selJice can onIY be

y, ! f draft caUs con- j

t i r rrr" o" i l " t"""" , the pressule to volunteer and not wait o! the draft will conti le

lThe eftecte of exempting dlaftees ftom vietnar

eueseed, !ecause thele i6 no experience with such a Poli

in terrns ol i ts el f€ct on the colrvenieDce, choice oI ge

potent iaL draftee ' Howeve!, the Possible draft- i t lduced

to hesitate, because he can avoid Vietnam aervrce Dy

gol icy would idcrease his chance6 of going to V

e, and so on ol the L

and woul

him.

In the absence of mole definite knoitledge oI

can do is fina the upper bound on the effect ol tllis Iactor

ting the effect on lequi.ed draft caus ' To 3

{rrat aU aJatt-lnauced voluntsers vtould decide not to vol

wait to berdralted if dtaftees were exemPted lrom V

3 policy plesag"e an en'l to the draft' we consider ttris

f. r,'""The mititary Pay use4 in this study fol fiscal

1969 in ways. f irst, combjt pay waa increased' Se

w€re increased in Or€ filst and eecond-*etmg of 6elYice '

reduce the scope of occuPational choice the rn

nteer wi l l have reason

to be d![Ited; mord_

etnam i{ he volunteeis

taty tetvic(

catr offer

1-rq'f.'- nl'.lf_" ' '

se el fects, the best we

n edl istments, to avoid' -_-T- _- : Ittris bound we assurnei

:er and would insteadl

service. i l lhe!e suclt

be a. reason rble e8timjte.

,O *"" r"""ao"aU a"a"]

;:,'#iJ::::"1

L

4 -

I r€l!

, l

l

t 6

,,rnnLrrlr'c - uli,t' ,^ anc'-th a,' r /'n; a"/:'t{ '' , 0

bne-third of the forces in Vietnam with the rnost hazardous duty assiglrnents was

incleased by $150 per rnonth, Combat Pay for the remaining two_thirds oI the fo!ce

in vietnam was increased by $50 per moath ' (Present combat Pr.y is $65 per month

for aU mil i tary personnel in the cornbat zone.)

The genelal salary increases used are del iberately concent lated on the

f i rst term gervice categol ies tor both enl isted meD and of l icelB ' Salar ies of

f i !€t term enl isted men are incleased an avelage of aPProxirrrately $1,000 annualty '

In any ef lort to el i rninate o! reduce draft caus, the re6Ponse of enl ist-

rnents to Fhanges in pay is ct i t ical. I I small increases ir i pay fesuft

in faree

increaseel in €nListments ' we can move towald a voluntelr forCe with modest in

creaaes i1i the brdget and vice versa. The estirniates of {eePonse

used in this

study ale]derived frorn earl ie! !esearch ori that questionl lor the DePartment of I

Defense. I The pay package u€ed Provided a 42% increaae lfor l i rot term Personnel '

and result€al in a 4?% change ia enlistments lrom f34,80{ to 198 ,4OO or approxi

ma te l y 64 ;000 ,

t rni

We have argued that t}Ie President can either a

will be seirt to Vietnam, while he obtains passage of a pa

volunteer! up to the necessaly level to maintain forces i

or that he]can enil dlaft calls with thi6 Pay package and

ol militarf marrPower. He can also do one after the othe

t ir^r, ."otiJn, But he doesnrtL I

wadch and 6ee i f tbe requirement does in fact disa

ended tbe dlaft without the risli ol embarrassmentI

. He could wait to announce

had al

who might

ernents and Their Eflects

l. , 1

/ l

e tbat no drafteed

package that wi l l keePL

rlatil it was obvious thit h

y among hi6 advisera '

dra{t 60 quickly, but

for aecoird term enl isted men the increa€e is.$230 annual ly; whi le salar ies oI

I i rst terrh comrnissioned ott icers ale increased by $800 annuat ly.

who would have to accePt tbe accomPqJrhed fact'

' , I

-

19!rl!

.l I t Eelrion in tlE-e_9-esqggegslq9lls il aPero&ggl:--!99*ggl{":hgJ"ggi€qge.;[[l

a*-r*er*-,]r-*rJ-!car.-!--el**pi:,-gll:s,E "lgli:l$:** discussed above in sections

^yt '2

and 3. ln addit ion, there may b. rea""" fo. c""ce!nl {e-L j- nesotiat ins posture and, c re-q:bi l l tv before the enemv Ll:9\ u l " -

before publ ic opinion in the-United State6.

Ai, though Iorces can be reduced without reducing combat e{tect iveness'

it may not be expedient to say so' On the contrary, ihe President might wish to

publ ic ire the reduct ions as a gesture toqard peace, and permit or even encourage

strong object ione Irorn the mi l i ta ly services and their supporte!s ' This would / /

provide albargaining counter in Paris and would imptove the U'S' poeiure before

world opiirion; it rnight also bolstet political suPPort at home frorn the broad rniddle

group oI V. S. public oPinion. Il it was Part of a tregotiated '[eal with the enemy'

matching conceB6ions; ure can safely agsume that tha e habn't been able to

waste rneh alrd resourcea as f leely as the U 'S. has, andL6o canrt PuII alry back

without reducing his effect iveness.

Both the desirable effects ol the reduct ion are

dratt. Any appearance of weakness that the leduction

bv the end of reliance on drafted men. The opposing treg

improvement this would give our baigaining

reinlorced by ending the

ght give would te orrset 2 I

notice, they would soon see the irnProvement

the Preg

arlxreEy young men ol diattable age, and so tn'ould '

youthful si t ion to the wa!.

ct of Pol icy Choices lor r . i6cal l9?0

U. 51 ptrbl i(: suPPort fon

majdr sour ce of Personal

)tiatols coulil not fail to

sition; and eYen if they

€ the head ,rf steam behi

i le sending volunteers '

adopted for J iscal l9 '10

ite diffe!eIrt imPlicatlotts

V. L^ter

t - It ttre war contitrues iD fiscal 19? I and the P(

alao conti[rueg, the two Policy options for that year have

for the fa{er year. I l force levela canrbe beld constant

Ln,r ' ,o ViLrrr"- in f iscal t9?0, i t can be done again inlf ir

Lf a pay i{tc..a"" to keeP in step with civilian pay ircrea

induced u| tle general Pay increase ProPosed for Iiscal

ai' t9l t *itl' only enough

rs, The f lo 'v of volunteei

?O vould in ttrat case li

voluntary assignmentl

ose, Thus the two Yeairscontinue iln 19?1, as would any llow oftour extetr6idns an

to Vietnam induced by the combat and theatie pay we Pro

Iook alike under this Policy oPtion'

€

In col l t rast, f iscal l9?I looks gr irn i f the Presidentuses a non-recurrrng

manpower reduction to end draft catLa in I9?0 and if the wal continues ' Either he

must spread the manPower reduct ion ovet the two f iscal years and,suPPlernent i t

by enough civi l ianizat ion of jobs among the suPPort ing trooPs in th€ U'S' to avoid

f u r t h e r d r a ' t c a l l s , o r h e m u s t r a i s e P a y b y s o m e $ l 0 b i u i o n a b o v e t h e P r o P o s e d

I9?O package. From this standpoint the Push toward civilianization looks much

rnore att;active' as it can be done almost wit}rout co6t. Then, iI the draft can be

hel.d otf for two years by thoae meana, in. t} le third year the problem is easy because

th.r. .""irro rnole tllaftees requiring rePlacement' but only the normal llow of /'/

vo lun teerb , . , ,1. u1n4 fi. ncn ,f..1\t'ii^',yi *"rn4"

Vietnarn RePlacernerltg , U . S . A r m

New enlistments are aow nearly enough to meet the annual rePlacedentI

requiremlnt for Vietnam for soldiers i t t their f irst yearl of seFvice' The Army's

total strepgth ol 350,000 in Viett lam consists ol about tZt ' OOO "ft ictts and senior

NCOrs ard about 240,0o0 t irst term enliEtei l rnen. Total l enl istrnents run at about

2OO,OOO, and woulal cont inue to alo so under the propoeedlpay Package i f draftees

ice' Thus we need abdut 40'000 exernpted rnenwere exempted from Vietnam ael- t - _

volunteel for Vietnam aelvrce each year' including both PralteeB and rnen who are

ending thqir requiretl one-year tour6 there ' W" SI!g! t|'tt *ttattt pe y and combat

Reduction to End the Draft

1 l ' e e s t i r n a . t e t h a t t h e P r o P o s e d P a y P a c k a g e w o $ t a j . . " t o f f s e t t h e a n n o u 4 c e

m"nt of ttfe end of draft caLle, llaving enlistments at arofnd z0o'000 per yeat for

,rr" e.,nyl, To holal strength constant' the 4lgy neetle afs'ooo "t* t''en in {i:cll

l9?O and 434,000 in l9?1. Th€refore the s '";"1;;";,.." to .na ar"irt

calls would be ebout 2?5,OOO !n fiscal l??O and 234'0oO f

tfrt ' i t t1e Pre:ideT

Pay !o asi

thafl l0%,

a 25% bon

attractrng

voluntaril

lvoluntary

lduring lV,

Navy a33

f tle

l , F

a l a

at leaEt this number of volunteers lor Vietl

e exempteal grouP; the theatre and combat I

ver regular comPensation' This much of a

ugh volunteers for Vietnam t]:at no one wor

For comParison, the Eubmarine and air aer

an average Pay advantage of 50% over 6urfi

lrirar II, aubmaline and air duty wad far Frc

rentB, o! than Vietnam i6 now'

aIn. lThis

l ,gule is Iess

ry wo[ ld av( tage almost

bomre bas a chance of I

ld be fequir ,)d

to go in l

v ice ha6 always been ] .

ce Navy agsignments i

.e hazalalou6 tltan surf{c

I. t' i

3\l

diai reduce unilorrned manPower by lhes€ amount6 ' the Problem would be taken

woultl be out of the torce. RePlacement needs would therefore dl€lt to equality with

tl1e norrnal flow of volunteere. , '

I We suggest tlte following way to reduce atmy rtlanPower by lhe abov€I

Reduced Arrny 'nanpower ln ttalnltrg. r35 ,000

7 5 , 0 0 0100,000200,000

5 1 0 , 0 0 0

qi

Reduced Arlny elB€wber€ iGivilianizatiott

t lo,, lufr ' l i*a-,4ttll tfo,&nrw*ists

) h ' n d

0 ollad Af +

, .

I

li

j

IlI' II