Kusch Hackings Historical Epistemology 2010

7/25/2019 Kusch Hackings Historical Epistemology 2010

1/16

Hackings historical epistemology: a critique of styles of reasoning

Martin Kusch

Department of Philosophy, University of Vienna, Universittsstrae 7 (NIG), 1010 Vienna, Austria

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:

Received 6 June 2009

Received in revised form 16 August 2009

Keywords:

Styles of reasoning

Historical epistemology

Ian Hacking

Alistair Crombie

Relativism

Sociology of scientific knowledge

a b s t r a c t

The paper begins with a detailed reconstruction of the development of Ian Hackings theory of scientific

styles of reasoning, paying particular attention to Alistair Crombies influence, and suggesting that Hack-

ings theory deserves to come under the title historical epistemology. Subsequently, the paper seeks toestablish three critical theses. First, Hackings reliance on Crombie leads him to adopt an outdated histor-

iographical position; second, Hacking is unsuccessful in his attempt to distance historical epistemology

from epistemic relativism; and third, Hacking has not (yet) offered convincing criteria for individuating

styles of reasoning.

2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

When citing this paper, please use the full journal title Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

1. Introduction

One of the recent success stories in history and philosophy of

science is the expression historical epistemology. An ever-increas-

ing number of historians of science uses this label for their own

and others work; and Hans-Jrg Rheinberger has recently charac-

terised much of twentieth-century philosophy of sciencefrom

Ernst Mach to Ian Hackingemploying the same terms (Rheinber-

ger, 2007). I am a little puzzled by the great variety of projects and

positions called historical epistemology, and thus struggle to form

a clear view of the category itself. Fortunately, there is one author

philosopher and historian of science par excellencewho often is

mentioned as one of the most important contributors to, or at leastinfluences behind, historical epistemology: the already mentioned

Ian Hacking. Lorraine Daston once called Hacking one of the [two]

most able practitioners of historical epistemology, and went on to

use him in defending her own token of the type ( Daston, 1989, p.

283). The second name on Dastons list of most able practitioners

was Arnold Davidson, whose historical epistemology of psychiatry

takes its central terms from Hacking (Davidson, 2001). And Rhein-

bergers history of the historicising of epistemology treats Hacking

as one of the termini ad quem (Rheinberger, 2007, pp. 121125).

Daston and Davidson also indicate which part of Hackings large

and diverse oeuvre is most appropriately treated as central to

historical epistemology: his work on styles of (scientific) reason-

ing. Interestingly enough, although a frequent commentator on

the category of historical epistemology, Hacking himself has never

presented any aspect of his work as falling within it. Indeed, Hack-

ing has even stressed thedifferencesbetween his own and Dastons

investigations (Hacking, 1999a, p. 69). For Dastons historical stud-

ies of the concept of objectivity, Hacking proposes the title histor-

ical meta-epistemologymodelled on meta-ethicsand for his

own research on styles of reasoning he has experimented with ti-

tles such as philosophical technology (Hacking, 2002c [1992], p.

198) or philosophical anthropology (Hacking, 2005/2006). Never-theless, Daston and Davidson have a point. Hackings analysis of

styles of reasoning is both historical and philosophical. He makes

historical claims about the emergence and development of such

styles,and he advances philosophical claims concerning the impli-

cations of styles for our understanding of reason, scientific propo-

sitions, and scientific entities. Although these claims go beyond the

narrow limits of epistemology, they nevertheless derive more or

less directly from certain views on what it is to reason and what

it is to gain knowledge. Thus epistemology is obviously the core

0039-3681/$ - see front matter 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2010.03.007

E-mail address:[email protected]

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 41 (2010) 158173

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : w w w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / s h p s a
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2010.03.007mailto:[email protected]://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00393681http://www.elsevier.com/locate/shpsahttp://www.elsevier.com/locate/shpsahttp://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00393681mailto:[email protected]://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2010.03.007


2/16

of Hackings account. And this epistemology is historical since

styles of reasoning come to be, change, and pass away. That is to

say, Hackings analysishistoricisesreason, historicises what counts

as a scientific proposition, and historicises what passes for a scien-

tific entity. For me this is reason enough to speak of his theory of

styles of reasoning as Hackings historical epistemology.

It is odd to note that for all its influence upon historians of sci-

enceand to the above one should add at least James Elwick(2007), John Forrester (1996), and Geoffrey Lloyd (2004, 2007)

Hackings historical epistemology has never been systematically

and critically discussed from historiographical, philosophical or

sociological perspectives. This is what I shall try to do in this pa-

per. I shall begin by explaining Hackings historical epistemology

in some detail, giving attention both to its background in the

work of Alistair Crombie, and to the development of Hackings

views over the past twenty-five years. This seems a useful exer-

cise in itself, since the pieces of Hackings historical-epistemolog-

ical puzzle are distributed over more than a dozen books and

papers. Subsequently I shall turn from exposition to criticism. I

shall focus on three issues in particular: Hackings debt to Crom-

bie; his attempts to distance historical epistemology from relativ-

ism; and his suggestions concerning the number and social bases

of styles. Much of my criticism will be motivated by others, and

my own, investigations into (relativistic) communitarian episte-

mology and the sociology of knowledge. I shall try to show that

Hackings theory is unsatisfactory at least when measured against

this body of work. Historical epistemology of the kind proposed

by Hacking is neither a promising successor project, nor a vital

complement, to better known forms of philosophy, history or

sociology of science.

Lest this assessment sound altogether too negative or even hos-

tile, I hurry to add the confession that there is probably no contem-

porary philosopher of science who has influenced my own thought

as much as Hacking has. Hacking and I are amongst the handful of

philosophers who explicitly seek to work out the ideas, or use the

tool boxes, ofbothFoucault and Wittgenstein. If it had not been for

his model, I might not have had the courage to pursue this coursemyself.

2. Hackings historical epistemology: a summary

Hacking has written about styles of reasoning on and off for

more than twenty-five years, and in at least fifteen different books

and papers. Unsurprisingly, his position has developed consider-

ably over this period. Even though I cannot here document every

variation in detail, it will be useful in what follows to give at least

a rough sense of the more important changes in both emphasis and

substance. I shall begin by summarising separately two early pro-

grammatic papers (from 1982 and 1992).

2.1. Language, truth, and reason (1982)

Hackings best-known paper on styles of reasoning was also his

first: Language, truth, and reason (Hacking, 2002b [1982]). It was

published in the influential volumeRationality and relativism (Hol-

lis & Lukes, 1982). The two terms of the book title frame Hackings

discussion: I wish to pose a relativist question from within the

heartland of rationality (Hacking, 2002b [1982], p. 159). Hacking

begins by giving credit to the Oxford historian of science Alistair

C. Crombie (19151996); styles of reasoning is Hackings term

for what Crombie calls styles of scientific thinking. Crombiesopus

magnum, Styles of scientific thinking in the European tradition, was

not published until 1994, but Hacking reports reading early drafts

(Hacking, 2002b [1982], p. 159), and goes on to quote at length one

of Crombies anticipatory papers. I can do no better than repeat

this crucial passage here(a) to (f) below are Crombies six styles

of scientific thinking:

The active promotion and diversification of the scientific meth-

ods of late medieval and early modern Europe reflected the gen-

eral growth of a research mentality in European society, a

mentality conditioned and increasingly committed by its cir-

cumstances to expect and to look actively for problems to for-

mulate and solve, rather than for an accepted consensuswithout argument. The varieties of scientific method so brought

into play may be distinguished as:

(a) the simple postulation established in the mathematical

sciences,

(b) the experimental exploration and measurement of more

complex observable relations,

(c) the hypothetical construction of analogical models,

(d) the ordering of variety by comparison and taxonomy,

(e) the statistical analysis of regularities of populations and the

calculus of probabilities, and

(f) the historical derivation of genetic development.

The first three of these methods concern essentially the sci-

ence of individual regularities, and the second three the science

of the regularities of populations ordered in space and time.

(Crombie, 1981, p. 284; quoted in Hacking, 2002b [1982], p.

161)

Hacking argues that the existence of Crombies styles poses a

fundamental challenge to so-called arch-rationalism. The arch-

rationalist is convinced that good or bad reasons for propositions

about natureare notrelativeto anythingand donot dependon con-

text. The arch-rationalist accepts that our forms of reasoning are a

product ofhistory.And yet, he deniesthatthis opensa door to relativ-

ism. The history of reasoning is a history of progress. Our scientific

culture today represents the most advanced form of reasoning to

date. Hackings attempt to undermine this viewpoint is premised

on theclaim that positivism is themostimportant form ofarch-ratio-nalism (Hacking, 2002b [1982], pp. 162164). He shows that three

keypositivisticthinkers haveput forwardproposals thatlend support

to a relativistic rendering of styles of reasoning.

The first proposal is Auguste Comtes concept of positivity.

Comte believed that branches of knowledge acquire positivity

only once they become associated with what, in hindsight, we

now recognise as styles of reasoning. Hacking suggests translating

positivity as being up for grabs as true-or-false. Taken in this

way, Comte held that a new style of reasoning constitutes a new

kind of propositions. Put differently, many propositions are possi-

ble only within, or linked to, specific styles of reasoning. Only by

using a style can we decide which truth-value the propositions

should receive (ibid., p. 164).

The second positivist idea is Moritz Schlicks dictum the mean-

ing of a sentence is its method of verification (1936; quoted in

Hacking, 2002b [1982], p. 165). Hacking regards this dictum as

close kin to Comtes positivity. Combining Comte and Schlick, the

central insight can be put as follows: which propositions a sen-

tence expresses depends on the style of reasoning that is used

for verifying it.

Finally, the third key positivist contribution in the present con-

text is Michael Dummetts work on meaning and bivalence. Dum-

mett argues that a statement can be meaningful for us if, and only

if, we know of a method for settle its truth value. Dummetts biva-

lence condition is related to, but stronger than, the reconstructed

Comtean positivity. For Dummett a sentence is bivalent if, and only

if, we have a proof of it being true or false; for Comte a sentence is

positive if, and only if, there is a style of reasoning with which it is

associated (Hacking, 2002b [1982], p. 167).

M. Kusch / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 41 (2010) 158173 159


3/16

Hacking submits that his combination of ideas from Crombie,

Comte, Schlick and Dummett results in a form of relativism. Styles

of reasoning constitute sentences as meaningful, and hence as

expressing propositions and possessing truth values. No style of

reasoning, no meaning (at least for sentences bound to styles).

And, what is more, since styles determine what counts as rational

or irrational, there is no obvious vantage point from which a style

itself could be judged as rational or irrational: the rationality of astyle of reasoning. . . does not seem open for independent criti-

cism, because the very sense of what can be established by that

style depends upon the style itself (ibid.).

The remainder of Language, truth, and reason consists of brief

further elaborations and clarifications.

(1) Induction and deduction are not styles of reasoning: induc-

tion and deduction preserve truth, styles of reasoning create the

possibility of truth values (ibid., p. 168).

(2) Styles can die out and become inaccessible to later genera-

tionsshort of extensive historical study. An example of a dead

style is the Renaissance medicine of Paracelsus. Paracelsus texts

are not difficult because we find them hard to translate into mod-

ern English. They are difficult since we cannot easily make sense of

the underlying reasoning. To signal that the issue is not one of

translatability, Hacking prefers not to use the term incommensu-

rability (ibid., p. 171).

(3) Styles of reasoning must be distinguished from W. V. Quines

conceptual schemes. The main difference is that one and the same

sentence can be true in one scheme and false in another. In the case

of styles this is impossible: one and the same sentence cannot

occur in more than one style. A (style-dependent) sentence can

be true or false in one, and only one, style (ibid., pp. 171172).

(4) Donald Davidson is right to regard as senseless the idea that

onelanguagemightbe totallyuntranslatableinto another.Hackings

reasonfor agreeing is hisbelief that notall sentencesor propositions

are associated with styles of reasoning. A style-independent com-

mon human core of verbal performances secures that all human

languages are fairly easily partially translatable (ibid., p. 172).

(5) Davidson goes too far, however, in ruling out relativism alto-gether. Someone who fails to understand the style of reasoning with

which a given sentence is associated cannot possibly make sense of

it. For all Davidsons anti-relativist arguments fromtranslationthere

remains room for a relativist fear [:]. . .there might be whole other

categories of truth-or-falsehood than ours (ibid., p. 174).

(6) The relativism of historical epistemology must be distin-

guished from subjectivity, that is, from the view that we can turn

any falsehood into a truth by picking an appropriate style. Subjec-

tivity is incompatible with the claim that no style-dependent sen-

tence or proposition can be associated with more than one style.

Despite his earlier insistence that styles do not answer to criteria

of rationality, Hacking is also willing to leave room for the possibil-

ity of a meta-reason justifying a style of reasoning. Meta-reasons

might come from Imre Lakatos work on research programmes orKarl Poppers method of conjecture and refutation (ibid., p. 175).

(7) Hacking himself however opts for a view he dubs anarcho-

rationalism. It combines firm commitments to ones own styles

with tolerancebut no more than tolerancefor other styles. The

anarcho-rationalist accepts the historicity of his rationality with-

out surrendering to scepticism (ibid., p. 177).

2.2. Style for historians and philosophers (1992)

In his second important programmatic paper, published ten

years after Language, truth, and reason, Hacking takes a number

of important new steps. For instance, as far as the very concept

of style is concerned, Hacking now explains why he shifts from

Crombies styles of scientific thinking to styles of reasoning:thinking is too much in the head; thinking leaves out the manip-

ulative hand and the attentive eye; and reasoning recalls theCritique of pure reason. That last-mentioned point is crucial since

Hackings historical epistemology is a continuation of Kants pro-

ject of explaining how objectivity is possible (Hacking, 2002c

[1992], pp. 180181). This marks a change of compared with the

1982 paper. There Hacking tried to defend his historical epistemol-

ogy as a form of relativism; here he is much more concerned to

stress its conception of objectivity.In 1992 Hacking is also more willing to modify Crombies the-

ory, if only in emphasis (ibid., p. 186). Hacking does not wish to fol-

low Crombies practice of following the development of a given

style only up to the time when the style has become firmly in-

stalled. Hackings goal is a history of the present: he wants to

understand why we today reason the way we do. For the same rea-

son, Hacking is not interested in the historical succession between

Crombies styles. Moreover, Hacking finds it important to investi-

gate both styles that have disappeared, and new styles that result

from fusing two elements from Crombies list. Such fusions are not

a mixture but a compound, in the chemists sense of the worda

new intellectual substance (ibid., pp. 182183).

The most important such fusion is what Hacking calls the lab-

oratory style: it results from merging the experimental style (b on

Crombies list) with the hypothetical construction of analogical

models (c). The laboratory style involves building of apparatus

in order to produce phenomena to which hypothetical modelling

may be true or false, but using another layer of modelling, namely

models of how the apparatus and instruments themselves work

(ibid., p. 184). The emergence of the laboratory style does not mean

that Crombies stylesbandchave disappeared: experimental work

in the social sciences does not involve hypothetical modelling; and

hypothetical modelling in cognitive science is not always con-

trolled by experiment. Hacking also notes that every style comes

with its popular myth of origin; Althusser for instance remarked

that Thales discovered the continent of mathematics. The origin

myth of the laboratory style is set out inSteve Shapins and Simon

Schaffers Leviathan and the air-pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the exper-

imental life (1985).Shapins and Schaffers book is of coursea classic in thesociology

of scientific knowledge. This raises the question of how Hackings

historical epistemology stands relative to social studies of science

onthe onehand, andmainstreamphilosophy ofscienceon the other.

Hacking wishes to steer a middle course. He sees the sociology of

knowledge as preoccupied with short time frames, and as directing

thehistory of science towards the fleeting. At theotherend of time

frames, philosophers are far too preoccupied with quasi-timeless

ends, for instance, the ideal end of inquiry (Hacking, 2002c

[1992], p. 187). Studying styles of reasoning enables the historian

and philosopher to keep a distance from both of these extremes.

The core of Style for historians and philosophers is a philo-

sophical analysis of Crombies styles. Again it seems most econom-

ical to sum it up in the form of short and numbered theses.(1) Although every style is born in microsocial interactions and

negotiations, it eventually becomes autonomous, independent of

its own history, and a rather timeless canon of objectivity. For in-

stance, we no longer question the laboratory style, we take it for

granted (ibid., p. 188).

(2) It is a necessary condition of something being a style of rea-

soning that it introduces new types of objects, evidence, sentences

(new ways of being a candidate for truth or falsehood), laws, or at

any rate modalities, [and] possibilities (ibid., p. 189). Moreover,

each style leads to its own characteristic ontological debate: the

laboratory style has its debate over unobservable theoretical enti-

ties; the taxonomic style has its controversy over the existence of

taxa (ibid., p. 190).

(3) Although the correspondence theory provides an adequateanalysis for the truth or falsehood of style-independentsentences

160 M. Kusch/ Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 41 (2010) 158173


4/16

and propositions, the verification theory is most successful when it

comes to understanding the truth or falsity of style-dependentsen-

tences or propositions (ibid.).

(4) Styles are self-authenticating: we become convinced that a

style gets at the truth only by using that very style itself (ibid., p.

191). Self-authentication is not the same, however, as social con-

struction. As Hacking has it, the social constructivist alleges that

facts come to be only if and when a social community agrees ontheir discovery. Historical epistemology allows for greater objec-

tivity and stability: if a sentence is a candidate for truth or false-

hood, then by using the appropriate style of reasoning we may

find out whether it is true or false (ibid., p. 192).

(5) The phenomenon of self-authentication enables us to under-

stand the stability of the sciences. Each style has its characteristic

self-stabilizing techniques. One such technique in the laboratory

style is the adjustment of auxiliary hypotheses to save a theory

(ibid., p. 193). It is precisely such techniques of self-stabilisation

that constitute[..] something as a style of reasoning (ibid., p.

194). The existence of such techniques does not prevent the death

or fusion of styles; but it signals that explaining such events is no

easy matter. Indeed, Hacking is doubtful that either purely inter-

nal or purely external explanations can succeed (ibid., p. 195).

(6) Even in our current culture there might well be many more

styles of reasoning than Crombie has on his list: Historical

reasoning? Legal reasoning? Mystical reasoning? Magical reason-

ing?. . . the case in psychoanalysis[?]. . . the whole of psychia-

try[?]. At this stage, however, Hacking abstains from assessing

these candidates in any detail (ibid.).

(7) Historical epistemology stands not only halfway between

sociological contextualism and philosophical quasi-timelessness;

it also is the moderate middle ground between Richard Rorty

who (allegedly) claims that science is just a form of conversation,

and Bernard Williams who holds that science leads us to an abso-

lute conception of reality. Historical epistemology makes proper

allowances for the plurality of the sciencesstyles are many, not

onewhile also highlighting what distinguishes the sciences from

other pursuits: there is a set of styles that uniquely picks out thesciences (ibid., p. 196).

(8) Philosophical investigation must address the question how

stabilisation techniques are possible. But the answer can be brief

and banal: all we can offer are some brute conditions about peo-

ple and their place in nature (ibid.). Wittgenstein called such

investigation philosophical anthropology. Hacking prefers philo-

sophical technology for an investigation into self-stabilising tech-

niques and their conditions of possibility (ibid., p. 198).

2.3. Later texts

I now turn to identifying the main further developments of his-

torical epistemology in Hackings many other, subsequent texts

some unpublished, some published on the internet only. The mostimportant texts are the following:

The taming of chance (1990)

Statistical language, statistical truth and statistical reason: The

self-authentication of a style of scientific reasoning (1992a)

The self-vindication of the laboratory sciences (1992b)

The disunity of the sciences (1996)

Historical meta-epistemology (1999a)

The social construction of what? (1999b)

How inevitable are the results of successful science? (2000)

Inaugural lecture: Chair of Philosophy and History of Scientific

Concepts at the Collge de France, 16 January 2001 (2002)

Rsum des cours (2002/2003)

Critical notice of Bernard Williams,Truth and truthfulness

(2004)

Raison et vracit: Les choses, les gens, la raison (A nine-hour

lecture course at the Collge de France) (2005/2006)

Finding out: Prolegomena to a theory of truthfulness and rea-

soning in the sciences (2007)

2.4. Two case studies: the statistical style and the laboratory style

I shall not attempt to summarise Hackings important historical

work on the emergence of probability and the development of sta-

tistics. But it is worth noting that the introduction to The taming of

chance presents the book as an epistemological study into the

emergence of a new style of reasoning (Hacking, 1990, pp. 78).

This further supports my use of the label historical epistemology.

The main chapters ofThe taming of chancedo not use the terminol-

ogy of styles and stabilisation techniques. The argument of the

book is reconstructed in these terms only in a subsequent paper

(Hacking, 1992a). Here the emergence of the statistical style of rea-

soning is divided into seven phases:

16401693 the emergence of probability

16931756 the doctrine of chances

17561821 the theory of error, and moral sciences I

18211844 the avalanche of printed numbers, and moralsciencesII

18441875 the creation of statistical objects

18751897 the autonomy of statistical law

18971933 the era of modelling and fitting. (Ibid., p. 141)

Hacking provides plenty of examples of the new kinds of entities

that the statistical style brought with it. New sentences: The gross

national product of Wrttemberg in 1817 was 76.3 million adjusted

to 1820 crowns did not have a truth value before 1821 because

there was no procedure of reasoning about the relevant idea (ibid.,

p. 143).New classes: Statistical bureaus always produce new clas-

sifications, for instance the class of those with a high risk of

succumbing to a certain disease (ibid., p. 144).New law-like sen-

tences: An example is probabilistic laws of disease (ibid.).Newexplanations: . . .regression towards the mean is deducible from

the supposition that the population has a normal distribution (ibid.,

p. 150).New criteria: An example are criteria for the goodness of fit

(ibid., pp. 150151).New intersubjectivity: New forms of intersub-

jectivity are constituted by general protocols that allow for compar-

isons between statistical studies (ibid., p. 152).

Hackings investigation into the self-vindication of the labora-

tory sciences (Hacking, 1992b) analyses the laboratory style with a

special eye to its self-stabilizing techniques. As already mentioned,

the laboratory style results from a fusion of experimentation with

hypothetical modelling. At times Hacking chooses a different char-

acterisation as well: laboratory sciences. . .study phenomena that

seldom or never occur in a pure state before people have brought

themunder surveillance (ibid., p. 33).In other words, the laboratory

style involves apparatus and techniques that allow for the isolation

of, and controlled interference in, natural process. By this criterion,

Hacking insist, the psychological and social sciences have not yet

learntto use the laboratory style:There is too littleof that appara-

tus used in isolation to interfere. . . (ibid., p. 34).

Two important qualifications of Hackings analysis of the labo-

ratory style are that laboratory science includes all the theoretical

superstructure and intellectual achievements that in the end an-

swer to what happens in the laboratory (ibid., p. 36), and that

his analysis is only meant to cover stable laboratory science. That

is to say, it is not intended to illuminate research at the frontiers of

inquiry. . . even when it is what Kuhn called normal science . . .

(ibid., p. 37).

The self-stabilizing techniques in the laboratory must be

understood on the basis of the coherence between elements of



5/16

three categoriesideas, things, marks and the manipulation of

marks. Each of these main categories has five sub-categories. Since

these are largely self-explanatory, I confine myself to listing them

here:

Ideas:(1) Questions; (2) Background knowledge; (3) Systematic

theory; (4) Topical hypotheses; (5) Modelling of the

apparatus;Things:(6) Target; (7) Source of modification; (8) Detectors; (9)

Tools; (10) Data generatorsMarks and the Manipulation of Marks: (11) Data; (12) Data

assessment; (13) Data reduction; (14) Data analysis; (15)

Interpretation. (Ibid., pp. 4449)

Each of these fifteen items usually participates in determining a

specific outcome of a piece of laboratory work. Although all of the

fifteen items can be modified, in a stable laboratory science they

are adjusted to each other (ibid., p. 55). Coherence thus is the cen-

tral constraint: there evolves a curious tailor-made fit between our

ideas, our apparatus, and our observations. A coherence theory of

truth? No, a coherence theory of thought, action, materials, and

marks (ibid., pp. 5758).

Styles of reasoning are not included in this list, Hacking writes,since they are rather rigid during the time span of even the most

extended experiment: experimenters do not literally use them

(ibid., p. 50). Finally, Hacking is happy to grant that his list is a tax-

onomy of elements internal to an experiment only. External fac-

tors like social relations or funding are left out (ibid., p. 51).

2.5. Ancestors and allies

Hacking continues to see his project as part of an attempt to

historicise Kant (ibid., p. 137). Most recently he has also begun

to invoke Leibniz as the spiritual ancestor for his project (Hacking,

2007, p. 1): Hacking believes that his historical epistemology is

profoundly rationalist in character (ibid., p. 8).

More importantly, Hacking seems to have become a little moreambivalent about Crombies work. In one texthis inaugural lec-

ture at the Collge de France (Hacking, 2002a)Hacking even goes

so far as to credit Ludwik Fleck with being the key influence behind

his work on styles of reasoning, leaving poor Crombie without a

mention. In subsequent published and unpublished work Crombie

is back, but with positive as well as negative overtones. On the neg-

ative side, we learn that Crombies three volumes are three curious

and obsessive tomes that no one else has made much use of (Hack-

ing, 2007, p. 3); that Crombies main work is a little eccentric and

old-fashioned (Hacking, 2005/2006, L. 2, p. 4); that Hacking is al-

most the only philosopher who takes Crombies framework seri-

ously (ibid., p. 5); that Crombies emphasis on continuityan

emphasis he shares with Pierre Duhem (another great historian

of the sciences who was also very catholic)does not fit well withHackings own revolutionary temperament (I am interested in

ruptures that radically transform our methods of reasoning . . .;

Hacking, 2005/2006, L. 3, p. 9); and that Hacking disagrees with

Crombies goal of organising a global history of science on an ency-

clopaedic scale (Hacking, 2007, p. 3).

These more critical comments alternate with many positive re-

marks: Crombie has open[ed] our eyes to the existence of styles of

reasoning (Hacking, 1996, p. 66); his volumes are truly an encyclo-

paedia of the Western sciences (Hacking, 2005/2006, L. 2, p. 4);

Hacking first encountered Crombies ideas in 1979 and has never

looked back (Hacking, 2007, p. 3); Crombies stress on continuity

is compatible with Hackings interest in discontinuityit all de-

pends on the level of analysis (Hacking, 2005/2006, L. 3, p. 10);

Hacking is happy to justify his choiceof certain styles of thoughton the basis of Crombies historical work; and he is willing to treat

Crombies list as given and canonicalsmall modifications not-

withstanding. More generally, Hacking dismissed the question

why start with Crombie? as not right, and calls on his readers

to focus instead on what I can do with [his] list [of styles] (ibid.,

L. 2, p. 4).

In most recent work,Hacking presents Bernard Williamss bookTruth and truthfulness (2002)as a new and important ally. One of

Williamss central aims is to provide a genealogy of truthfulnessquatelling the truth about something. Williams claims, for exam-

ple, that Thucydides transformed the Western conception of telling

the truth about the historical past, and thereby operated in a new

style (Williams, 2002, p. 170; Hacking, 2007, p. 12). This involved

the invention of the idea of objective historical time as a rigid and

determinate structure for the past (Williams, 2002, p. 162; Hack-

ing, 2007, p. 12). Williams is adamant that the advocates of the

new style of reporting were not more rational than older genera-

tions of historians, and that the new conception of history defined

new criteria of what counts as rational and true reporting (Wil-

liams, 2002, p. 170; Hacking, 2007, p. 12). Hacking sums up the

idea by saying that the new historical style brought with it a

new conception of the past, and correspondingly new kinds of

statements to make about a new idea of the past (ibid., p. 10).

2.6. Styles: their number and relationships

Hacking does not tell his readers whether he regards Williamss

historical style as a style of reasoning or style of scientific think-

ing in his own or Crombies sense. In general, Hacking has not

shown much interest in going beyond Crombies list of styles.

And this despite the fact that Hacking has repeatedly attempted

to define style of reasoning and thereby to put himself and us into

a position from which we can notice styles not in Crombies initial

list (Hacking, 1996, p. 65). The laboratory style is said to owe its

identification to exactly this procedure. As we saw above, in

1992, necessary conditions of a style were that it introduces new

types of objects, evidence, sentences (. . .), laws, or at any rate

modalities, [and] possibilities (Hacking, 2002c [1992], p. 189). Afurther, different, criterion in the same paper demanded that a

style must have its own techniques of self-stabilisation (ibid., p.

194).

In the texts of the 1990s the emphasis upon techniques of sta-

bilisation is maintained. For instance, in one place Hacking submits

that styles of reasoning provide an answer to the question

why. . .Feyerabend [was] so manifestly wrong when he said,

Anything goes[.] The answer lies in a study of the techniques

that enable a style to stabilise itself. I believe one can set forth

a series of such techniques, each characteristic of a style, and in

the end serving to characterise and indeed to constitute the

style. (Hacking, 1996, pp. 7273)

In the same context Hacking also proposes that self-stabilisationcan serve as a criterion for distinguishing between styles of

scientific reasoning and other form of conversation: Only some

conversations are part of a discourse that has developed techniques

of self-authentication. There does not exist a set of self-stabilising

techniques for the larger parts of morality and humanistic thought

(ibid., p. 74).

In his writings of the present millennium however, Hacking

rejects the suggestion that all the six-plus-one styles (Crombies

six and Hackingslaboratorystyle) haveadequate techniques of sta-

bilisation. Now he believes that only the mathematical and thelab-

oratory styles possess adequate such techniques (Hacking, 2005/

2006, L.8, p.3). Butthis does notlead Hacking to deny that theother

styles really arestyles.Instead he proposeschangingthe criteria. The

new criterion is that a style must be based on human cognitivecapacities (ibid.). I shall return to this idea in Section2.8. below.



6/16

At this point it is more important to register Hackings contin-

uing urging that a style is different from a paradigm, a field of sci-

ence, or a form of logic. Compared with a Kuhnian paradigm, a

style is a phenomenon of the dure longue; one and the same field

of science can involve several styles; and logic is universal and

plays a role in all styles (ibid., L. 2, pp. 67, L. 3, p. 6).

Concerning Crombies list of six styles, Hacking insists that they

are interwoven and that they can all be called upon in a single re-search project (Hacking, 1992a, p. 137). Moreover, Crombies

styles are universal in the senses that they have spread through-

out the world, and that they are based upon universally shared in-

nate capacities (Hacking, 2005/2006, L. 8, p. 4). Styles have both

cognitive and historical foundations, though Hacking is happy to

allow for the possibility that some styles owe more to innate hu-

man cognitive capacities (the geometrical style) and others more

to social development (the laboratory style) (ibid., p. 5).

I have already noted that Hacking likes to stick closely to Crom-

bies list, entertaining only small alterations. A couple of para-

graphs ago we saw how he uses the criterion of self-stabilising

techniques to rule out moral and humanistic styles of reasoning.

In other places, and later writings, Hacking uses further arguments

against the latter. For instance, he denies that psychoanalysis can

be thought of as having established a new style of reasoningan

idea mooted byJohn Forrester (1996). As Hacking sees it, psycho-

analysis and dialectical materialism should not be counted as sci-

ences even though they use Crombies sixth style, the historical

derivation of genetic development. On the one hand, Hacking sus-

pects that this style is verging towards extinction anyway (Hack-

ing, 2007, p. 6). On the other hand, he suggests that psychoanalysis

and dialectical materialism rely excessively on the the method of

authority of the father. In other words, the authority method gives

only a defective kind of stability (Hacking, 2005/2006, L. 9, p. 4).

In other places Hacking is more tolerant towards possible fur-

ther styles. For instance, he pleads no contest to Barry Allens sug-

gestion according to which the witchcraft trials and the inquisition

of the early modern period constituted, by Hackings own criteria, a

distinct style of scientific reasoning (Allen, 1993). And he continuesto consider Paracelsus medicine as a now dead style of reasoning

albeit that some remnants of it survive in homeopathic medicine

(Hacking, 2007, p. 6).

2.7. Relativism, constructivism, objectivity

Although Hackings very first paper on styles of reasoning posed

a relativist question from within the heartland of rationality

(Hacking, 2002b [1982], p. 159), his subsequent studies have

moved away from this perspective. In the more recent texts one

searches in vain for an outspoken defence of even a moderate form

of relativism: the stress is now on insisting that Hackings histori-

cal epistemology has nothing to do with relativism or constructiv-

ism. One element of Hackings anti-relativism we have alreadyencountered in the last section, to wit, the notion that styles of

scientific reasoning are universal. A second element is the remark

that a style of reasoning, once in place is not relative to anything

(Hacking, 1992a, pp. 135, 155). And a third consideration, also

already familiar, is that identifying a style is identifying a set of

propositions that are true or false, not a set of proposition that

are true. Hacking expresses this idea by saying that the actual

truth value of style-dependent sentences is external to the style:

what is true in no way depends upon the style of reasoning. The

truth does not depend on how we think (ibid.). A fourth anti-rela-

tivist idea is the thought that although a style introduces ob-

jects. . .it does not create themto say that would be foolish.

Although the objects have existence only within the style, the rela-

tion between style and its domain is too closetoo internal onemight sayfor the style to create its objects (Hacking, 2007, p. 7).

Hackings general anti-relativistic stance comes out most

clearly in writings that are not primarily devoted to styles of rea-

soning. For instance, in his book The social construction of what?

(1999), Hacking explains his position in terms of questions and an-

swers (cf.Jardine, 1991). The questions science asks are historically

variable and changing. But once, in a given historical context, the

questions are fixed, then so are the correct answers (Hacking,

1999, p. 165). Relativism regarding questions, yes; relativismregarding answers, no. Or as Hacking puts it in a related paper:

The fact that a certain body of questions about some topic is live,

makes sense, [is] the consequence of human history and inter-

ests. . .Butthere should be little inclination to talk about the social

construction of the actual answers to well-asked questions (Hack-

ing, 2000, p. 569). Here styles of reasoning are of course most nat-

urally put on the side of questions.

At times Hacking describes his position also in terms of objec-

tivity and historicism. Historicism in no way induces relativism

(Hacking, 2004, p. 142), and Objectivity is not the less massive,

impenetrable, resistant, because it is the product of our history

(Hacking, 1992a, p. 155). In another important passage Hacking de-

fines objectivity as the idea that the truths discovered in the sci-

ences are simply true, independent of what we think, or of how we

discover them. And he maintains that such objectivity is wholly

consistent with saying that their truth conditions are products of

the styles of thinking in whose domain they fall (Hacking, 2007,

p. 7).

For all his insistence on anti-relativism and anti-constructivism,

Hacking nevertheless leaves room for some limited forms of rela-

tivism and relativistic debunking. On the one hand, Hacking allows

that there are many different ways in which a laboratory science

could have stabilised. There was nothing inevitable about the

ways in which our laboratory sciences have developed. And he sug-

gests that such imaginary stable sciences would be incommensu-

rable insofar as they would not share a common body of

instruments to make common measurements (Hacking, 1992b,

p. 31). On the other hand, Hacking suggests that historical episte-

mology can undo the interminable ontological debates charac-teristic of different styles (Hacking, 2007, pp. 5, 7, 17). It is hard

to see what undoing here could mean unless it involves some

form of relativisation.

2.8. Cognitive foundations

Hacking has become increasingly interested in what he now

calls philosophical anthropology: attempts to explain different

styles of reasoning as the outcomes of an interplay of innate cogni-

tive capacities and social-historical environments. He is particu-

larly impressed with the work of Scott Atran who has argued for

the idea that some basic principles of taxonomy are innate. To date

Hackings efforts in this area have remained wholly programmatic.

Nevertheless, the following central claims can be listed: Crombiesstyles of scientific reasoning are built on fundamental cognitive

capacities (Hacking, 2007, p. 6); no single module corresponds

to each style of reasoning; each [style] demands many, and mod-

ules of different types (ibid., p. 12); and cognitive science and neu-

roscience are proper attempts to understand the capacities

underlying our styles of reasoning (ibid., p. 16).

2.9. Styles and the social order

Hacking has always been adamant that although a style of rea-

soning comes into being through little local interactions (Hacking,

1999a, p. 132), it subsequently achieves a certain degree of inde-

pendence: when it becomes fixed as a new way to truth, it needs

no support or rhetoric, for as it assumes self-confidence it gener-ates its own standard of objectivity and its own ideology. A mature



7/16

style becomes an unquestionable resource upon which any inter-

est must draw, if it ever hopes for the accolade of objectivity; it be-

comes available as a neutral tool for any project or ideology that

seeks to deploy it (ibid., pp. 132133). Only in one place does

Hacking briefly raise the question whether a style might not re-

main tied to its origins: Is statistical thought intrinsically dedi-

cated to normalisation and control of people? Must it be so, as

part of a historical a priori

resulting from its initial conditions ofpossibility? (ibid., p. 154). Alas, Hacking does not attempt an

answer.

In his latest writings Hacking stresses that styles are not static

but develop over time: They persist in the dure longue, not be-

cause they remain immobile through the centuries, like the Alps,

but because they evolve, because they react to new problems

and criticisms, both internal and from outside (Hacking, 2005/

2006, L. 2, p. 6).

And finally, Hacking displays an increasing sensitivity for the

need to anchor or root styles in a social mediumnot just early

on, but throughout the styles life. A style needs to be supported

by and in social institutions. Hacking focuses on this issue in par-

ticular when discussing the laboratory style. As we saw above, he

credits Simon Schaffer and Steve Shapin with having greatly con-

tributed to our understanding of the history of this style. Of course

Schaffer and Shapin do not themselves speak of the emergence of a

new style of scientific reasoning; their language is more sociologi-

cally orientated, and uses the Wittgensteinian term form of life.

While Hacking is not entirely happy with this use of Wittgenstein,

he nevertheless praises the two authors for showing that the insti-

tutionalisation of the laboratory style needed a new social order

with its scientific societies, academies, and architectural arrange-

ments (Hacking, 2005/2006, L. 5, pp. 1316). Precisely because

styles of reasoning are dependent upon specific forms of social

organisation, there is no better way to attack a style than to target

its institutional base (Hacking, 2007, p. 7).

3. Critical evaluation

Time has come to turn from exposition and summary to critical

evaluation. As already indicated in the introduction, my criticism

will be informed by others, and my own, work in (relativistic)

communitarian epistemology and the sociology of scientific

knowledge. I shall try to argue for the following theses: (1) Con-

trary to what Hacking alleges, there is every reason to ask whether

Crombies work is the appropriate starting point for a theory of

styles of reasoning. (2) Hackings historical epistemology is a form

of epistemic relativism, and his anti-relativistic arguments are

unconvincing. (3) Hacking has not offered a satisfactory rationale

for individuating styles; and he lacks a plausible account of the

relationship between styles and the social order.

3.1. Historical epistemology and the sociology of historical knowledge

Although Hacking occasionally distances himself from some of

Crombies claims, his admiration for the latters overall conception

is nevertheless obvious. Hackings preferred explanation for the

current lack of interest in Crombies work fits with this highly po-

sitive sentiment: what stands between Crombie and contemporary

history of science is nothing but the historiographical fashion that

prizes the momentary and fleeting above thedure longueand the

enduring (Hacking, 2005/2006, L. 1, p. 10). I take it that fashion

here signals an absence of good arguments. Note also that Hacking

sometimes suggests a division of labour between Crombie and

himself: Crombie is the historian of styles of reasoning, Hacking

their philosopher. The former assembles historical evidence forthe existence of such styles, the latter provides philosophical anal-

ysis both of specific styles and of their epistemological and onto-

logical implications (Hacking, 2002c [1992]).

I find Hackings admiring attitude towards Crombies work a bit

out of character. Indeed, I cannot think of another set of historical

or philosophical ideas towards which Hacking relates in the same

uncritical wayignoring both its socialpolitical context and exist-

ing criticisms. It is particularly odd that Hacking relates to Crom-

bies writings as if they had produced hard incontrovertiblehistorical datarather than highly contentious and controversial

interpretations. How else are we to understand Hackings insis-

tence that Crombies list of styles can be treated as canonical, that

we do not need to ask whether Crombie is the right starting point,

and that Hackings choice of styles can be justified on the basis of

Crombies history?

One aim of this section is to give a slightly more nuanced picture

both of Crombies context and of contemporary responses towards

his styles. The natural starting point is the observation that conven-

tional historiography of the Scientific Revolution unanimously situ-

ates Crombie in the internalist and continuist camp. Put in a

nutshell, an internalist believes that we can explain the Scientific

Revolution by attending to developments in the realm of ideas

alonesocial, political and economic causes can be ignored without

much explanatory loss. Externalism sees the latter types of causes

as crucial. Continuism holds that Scientific Revolution is really a

misnomer: most of the natural-philosophical (or scientific) work

of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was the outcome of a

slowevolutionofthought, an evolution that began at least a millen-

nium earlier. Anti-continuism defends the idea of scientific revolu-

tions. The two dimensions can of course criss-cross: a continuist

does notneedto bean internalist, and anexternalist can defendcon-

tinuity.Toputsomenamestothefourcategories,CrombieandPierre

Duhem were internalist-continuists; Alexandre Koyr was an inter-

nalist-discontinuist; Boris Hessen an externalist-discontinuist

(changes in modes of production cause radical changes in method

and subject matter), and Edgar Zilsel an externalist-continuist (the

Scientific Revolution was caused by changes in mode of production,

butthe new scientific forms of investigation were merelynew com-binations of already existing modes of investigation).

Crombies continuism is older than his use of the term style of

scientific thinking. In fact, Crombie was a continuist throughout

his long career, going back at least as far as his classic booksAugus-

tine to Galileo: The history of science, AD 4001650(1952) andRobert

Grosseteste and the origins of experimental science, 11001700

(1953). In these studies Crombie argued for the idea of a continu-

ous methodological argument from Augustine to Grosseteste and

Galileo. And he claimed that the idea of an experimental and math-

ematical science was first formed in medieval texts.Crombiesopus

magnum,Styles of scientific thinking in the European tradition (1994)

is closely related to these earlier books: it is easy to agree with Rob

Iliffe thatStylesis really a more sophisticated version ofAugustine

to Galileo (Iliffe, 1998, p. 347). Crombies own intellectual trajec-tory fits well with even the strongest continuist commitments.

Some aspects of continuism can be illuminated from the per-

spective of the sociology of knowledge, or more specifically the

sociology of historical knowledge. Continuism is often associated

with Catholicism. This association is particular clear in Duhems

work (cf.Kusch, 1991, pp. 2426). Duhems continuism is well ex-

pressed in the following lines:

The mechanical and physical science, of which modern times is

rightfully so proud, derives, in a hardly perceptible manner,

from an uninterrupted series of improvements of doctrines pro-

fessed in the womb of medieval schools; the alleged intellectual

revolutions wee most often nothing but slow and long-prepared

evolutions; the self-proclaimed renaissances frequently nothingbut unjust and sterile reactions. (Duhem, 1905, p. iv)



8/16

Duhems downgrading of Galileos achievements is informed by his

strong Catholicism and his positivism. Or rather, his positivismthe

sharp distinction between physicalmathematical theory and meta-

physicsis his device for saving the achievements of medieval

scholasticism. Duhems religious preference comes to the fore not

only in peculiar asides like Kepler was a Protestant and yetdeeply

religious (Duhem, 1969, p. 100, my emphasis), but also in Duhems

overall strategy of replacing the scientific by a theological revolu-

tion. As Duhem would have it, it was the Church Fathers attack

on the pagan philosophers, their rejection of the notion of eternal

prime matter and the belief in the domination of planets over sub-

lunary events, that cleared the ground for modern science; it was

necessary that a theological revolution take place, and this revolu-

tion was the work of Christian theology (Duhem, 1914, p. 453).

Thus, what Duhem denies the scientists, he readily concedes to

the theologians: the making of a revolution in thought.

One does not need to dig very deep to show that Crombie

follows Duhem to a surprising degree. There is first Crombies

own strong Catholicism. Crombie converted to Catholicism in

1944, and he stayed an active member of the church throughout

his life. Moreover, Crombies Catholicism was pronounced and

public enough for some Oxford dons to be concerned about the

way in which he was structuring the teaching programme inhistory of science. Some dons feared a Catholic plot to infiltrate

the curriculum (North, 2004). And in 1994, two years before his

death, Crombie was elected to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences

in Rome. As one of his Oxford colleagues, Robert Fox, put it in his

obituary for Crombie: no recognition could have been more fitting

(Fox, 1997, p. 185).

What is more, Crombie shares Duhems belief that instead of

speaking of a Scientific Revolution in the sixteenth century, we

should focus on the theologicalrevolution in late antiquity. Crom-

bie does not use the term theological revolution, but his expres-

sion of radical replacement of ideas is close:

Theradical replacementof the Greek rationally knowable divine

first principle by the Hebrew and Christian God as the inscruta-ble creator of the world utterly distinct from himself gave rise

within this context, from the Jewish philosopher Philo of Alex-

andria and the Christian theologian Lactantius to Descartes,

Boyle and Newton, to the conception of laws of nature as the

objects of scientific inquiry and to a new style of freedom in cos-

mological speculation. (Crombie, 1994, Vol. 1, p. 80; my

emphasis)

Equally Duhemian is Crombies fierce and personal criticism of

Protestant propagandistsMax Weber and Robert Mertonwho

suggested that certain strains of Protestantism, and Puritanism in

particular, contributed to the rise of modern science:

there is no unequivocal evidence for any explicit and distinctive

Puritan demand for science, no identifiable original Puritan con-

tribution either to scientific ideas or discoveries, or to social

theory, or to scientific education or administrative organisation

as put into practice. Subsequent promotions of [these theses],

mostly in English, variously Marxist, industriously derivative,

tell us more about the motivations of their authors than about

the period supposedly being presented. They exemplify the

continuing role of historical politics as a relict of theology.

(Crombie, 1994, Vol. 1, p. 79)

The last sentence is not, of course, without irony in the present con-

text: Crombie suggests that authors who allowing Protestantism an

important role in the Scientific Revolution are influenced by their

religious beliefsand I am suggesting something similar for Crom-

bies own commitment to continuism. Needless to say, I readilyadmit that these few citations do not make for a watertight case.

But they are suggestive nonetheless. Crombies continuismand

thus his conception of styles of scientific thinkingis inseparable

from his denial of any specific Protestant contribution to

the Scientific Revolution, and closely related to his praise for the

JewishChristian conception of God as an inscrutable creator.

The suggestion that Crombies continuism is linked to his

Catholicism is not of course meant to discredit his styles of scien-

tific thinking. To identify a link between an idea and social group

(for example a religious community) is not to undermine the idea.

Nevertheless, the existence of such a link might, or should, provide

one with an additional reason to note what other historians of the

Scientific Revolution have made of Crombies claims. I disagree

with Hacking when he alleges that historians scepticism towards

continuism and styles is a question of fashion. It is very much a

question of argument and reason.

To start us off, note that Hacking sometimes presents Crombie

as a student or follower of Koyr. This is misleading: Koyr was

in fact decidedly critical of Crombies ideas. Koyr was dead by

the time Crombie published hisopus magnum, but he had been able

to respond to Crombies earlier books. In Koyrs view, Crombies

continuism seems plausible and defensible only if one gives exag-

gerated weight to methodological discussions and fails to link

them to actual scientific discovery. Methodological debate was in-deed in some ways continuous from Aristotle down to seventeenth

century. And yet, only in the seventeenth century did this debate

actually lead to significant and groundbreaking scientific advances.

In Koyrs opinion, the true lesson of Crombies work is discontinu-

ity: purely methodological reflections are of relatively minor

importancewhat is really significant are fundamental changes

in metaphysical outlook (Koyr, 1956). Many historians of the Sci-

entific Revolution have sided with Koyr against Crombie. For in-

stance, a recent overview of the historiography of the Scientific

Revolution states that Crombies [continuist] thesis has gained

considerable respect rather than acceptance (Cohen, 1994, p. 107).

A quick look at historians responses toCrombiesStyles of scien-

tific thinking in the European tradition (1994) supports this state-

ment. Rob Iliffes extensive critical review laments the deeplyidealist strain [of] his argument, expressed. . .in the view that it

is the methods of procedure and the questions addressed to nature

that characterise types of scientific activity (Iliffe, 1998, p. 347).

Iliffe suspects that Crombie underestimates the difficulties in

establishing continuities between enterprises and practices over

decades, let alone the millennia which Crombie takes as his field

of study. Moreover, Iliffe predicts that many historians of science

will baulk at the idea that there is some style or spirit about Wes-

tern science that has expressed itself in so many different ways

over the last several hundred years. Iliffe also criticises that Crom-

bie fails to fully relate[..] the scientific work of any period to its

moral, social and economic conditions (ibid., p. 348); that he oper-

ates with too undifferentiated a conception of style; and that his

periodisations jar[..] with more recent studies in the history of sci-ence (ibid., p. 351). Other reviewers have worried that in general

the historical actors involved in the scientific activities described

would not have recognised either the particular style attributed

to them or the distinctions that Crombie wishes to detail among

the various styles (Ariew, 1995, p. 82); that Crombie misses impor-

tant forms of scientific activity, such as observation and fieldwork

(Meadows, 1994); that, quite generally, styles seem to lie in the

eye of the beholder (Magruder, 1995, p. 409); and that Crombies

history is dominated by philosophical concerns (ibid., p. 408).

Iliffes objection according to which Crombie fails to fully

relate scientific work to social and economic conditions naturally

leads to a consideration of Crombies internalism. With respect to

this issue Crombie and Koyr are indeed inseparable. For Crombie

the history of science in the European tradition is the history of vi-sion and argument (Crombie, 1994, Vol. 1, p. 3), and styles and



9/16

methods of scientific thinking followed a broadly chronological se-

quence in which the later were generated logically from their ante-

cedents (ibid., p. 88). Concerning the sociology of knowledge

Crombie tells his readers that

[not] much [is] illuminated by an unsophisticated sociological

relativism which fails to distinguish the specific history of

science, as a problem-solving activity, from a general history

of ideas lacking its identifying modes of self-correction andcriteria of acceptability. (Ibid., p. 15)

Crombies internalism is linked to his continuism. Precisely because

scientific thought has its own long-term logic of development, there

is little left for social causes to explain. The perhaps most interest-

ing criticism of Crombies internalism picks up on this link, and

offers sociological analysis as a way of diffusing the debate between

internalism and externalism:

The sociology of scientific knowledge and contextualist history

of science show how, within a given field, scientists struggle to

impose significant revisions of the existing conceptual fabric on

their peers. This involves bids to reinterpret parts of the existing

fabric and often necessitates the importation of conceptual

resources from other realms of discourse. Any such process ofrevision, reinterpretation, negotiation and consensus formation

can be variously glossed as involving revolutionary and merely

continuous alterations of the conceptual fabric. . . In other

words, no revisions are inherently and essentially revolutionary

or continuous in nature; rather, these are terms deployed by

interested parties, historical actors of historians, seeking to

explain the process. (Schuster, 1990, p. 223)

Lest I am misunderstood, I am not proposing that we treat

Koyr, Iliffe or Schuster in the way in which Hacking treats Crom-

bie; I am not offering them as unquestioned authorities. My point

is rather that their criticism deserves a hearingat least if one

wishes to take ones lead from Crombies work. No historical epis-

temology can be convincing unless it is based upon the state of the

art in historical scholarship today.In passing I note that it would not be a satisfactory answer to

the above to insist on a division of labour: there Crombie the his-

torian, here Hacking the philosopher. For all his tongue-in-cheek

disclaimers, Hacking is as much a historian as he is a philosopher

of science. More importantly, it misrepresents Crombies ambitions

and influences to put him on the side of history only. Let us not for-

get that Crombie was the founder and, between 1949 and 1954, the

first editor of the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. And

the first hundred pages of hisopus magnumare full of philosophical

and historiographical reflections. More generally, historians of his-

toriography have shown that the very focus on methods as the key

stratum of sciencea focus that largely defines Crombies work

was very much a legacy of nineteenth-century philosophical posi-

tivism (Cunningham & Williams, 1993, p. 411).Here it will perhaps be suggested that Hacking actually has a

different and more forceful reply to the considerations of this sec-

tion. Can Hacking not simply respond that, so far from taking on

board substantive commitments to internalism and continuism,

he is merely adopting Crombies style-concept and integrating it

into a radically discontinuist and even partially externalist histor-

iography? After all, is not Hacking elsewhere confessing to a Kuhn-

inspired revolutionary temperament and trying to integrate his

own work with that of Shapin and Schaffer (Hacking, 2005/2006,

L. 3, p. 9)?

I am not convinced. Crombies organising concept is not neutral

between continuity and discontinuity or between internalism and

externalism. One cannot both follow Crombies lead and be a his-

toriographical revolutionary. Hackings very own writings providethe best evidence for my contention. At times Hacking does indeed

write as if new styles could come about overnight (I like to tell the

story of each style of thinking as having a sharp beginning, Hack-

ing, 2007, p. 2), and he provides dates that he hopes are so exact

that no one will take them seriously, except as markers (Hacking,

1992a, p. 141). And yet, it is hard to know what to make of such

statements since Hacking also keeps reminding useven within a

seemingly historical study like The taming of chancethat he is

not doing history but philosophical analysis (Hacking, 1990, p.6) and that his philosophical purposes are best served by myths

(Hacking, 2005/2006, L. 1, p. 8; L. 5, p. 16 ):

Here then is my myth: the air-pump marks the beginning of a

form of life, the beginning of academies of the sciences, the

beginning of a space that is called the laboratory, peopled by

technical arrangements that are the true inhabitants of labora-

toriesand the beginning of a style of scientific thinking that I

call the style of the laboratory.

As I see it, Hacking escapes Crombies continuism only by way of

historiographical violence, that is, by way of a sudden jump into

an altogether different form of inquiry. And as if this were not prob-

lematic enough, for all his occasional talk of discontinuity, Hacking

is always ready to repeat and endorse Crombies basic idea accord-

ing to which six (or more) accumulating styles of reasoning define

Western scientific thought throughout its history. It also sits badly

with Hackings alleged revolutionary temperament that, according

to his own happy confession, his analysis of the laboratory style

does not apply to research at the frontiers of inquiry . . .even when

it is what Kuhn called normal science. . . (Hacking, 1992b, p. 37).

The toolbox of Crombie-inspired styles contains no ingredients for

understanding radical change. (It also does not have instruments

for reaching a sophisticated understanding of the relationship be-

tween internal and external dimensions of science. But this is a

topic to which I shall return in Section3.3 below.)

3.2. (Anti-)Relativism and finitism

The following discussion of the links between Hackings histor-ical epistemology and epistemological relativism takes us from his-

torical into philosophical waters. Contrary to a widespread and

entrenched misconception, the issues surrounding relativism are

complex and intricate, and very hard to present in a short space.

Alas, since relativism is only one of three topics I wish to discuss

here, I shall to have to act against my better judgement, and paint

with a broad brush. Fortunately, at least as concerns the present to-

pic, so do Crombie and Hackingand thus at least I cannot be ac-

cused of lowering the tone too much.

Crombies attitude towards relativism is ambivalent. It seems

that he is endorsing a form ofmethodologicalrelativism in the fol-

lowing passage:

When we read a text we must ask to what questions the author

was giving an answer. . .

We must approach our subject with anexplicit cultural relativism. As ourselves products of a particular

time and culture, we may then expose ourselves to the surprise

that effective thinking could be based on assumptions and have

aims and motivations so various and so different from our own.

(Crombie, 1994, Vol. 1, p. 5; my emphasis)

Crombies cultural relativism seems to be the methodological prin-

ciple according to which rational creatures can faultlessly disagree

over which questions to ask and which assumptions to make. Crom-

bies relativism is however controlled and constrained by three

beliefs: that there is only one objective scientific truth; that there

is only one moral commitment to truth which survives the relativity

of many other varietiesof human discourse and behaviour; and that

the basic rationality of our scientific andscholarly tradition has re-mained essentially stable. Moreover, although Crombie accepts



10/16

that the deliveries of different styles in our tradition cannot always

be combined andreconciled he is still willing to speak of the gradual

accumulation of scientific results (ibid., p. 7). Indeed, Crombie ulti-

mately believes that scientific problems are stabledespite the cul-

tural variation in questionsand that this continuity . . .survives

the relativity of culture (ibid., p. 9). Crombie says little about differ-

ences in styles of thinking between different major civilisations,

though he warns that they might be difficult to compare and impos-

sible without violence to reduce to one another. For all that, Crom-

bie is no friend of incommensurability: the achievements of one

[cultures style] may be translated into the style of another, and that

has happened historically when scientific results from elsewhere

have been taken into the Western tradition (ibid., p. 22). Finally,

Crombie leaves little doubt that only the Western tradition has

achieved scientific rationality. This is because only the European

style established by the ancient Greeks. . .has been based

on. . .[the] principles of causality and proof (ibid., p. 22).

Crombie does not spend much timearguingfor his partially rel-

ativistic, partially anti-relativistic views. Hacking of course does. I

am doubtful though whether his arguments are successful. In the

interest of clarity, I shall focus on the question whether Hackings

historical epistemology involves a form epistemic relativism. By

epistemic relativism I mean the view that the properties pickedout by the predicates rational and justified are relative to episte-

mic systems (that is, systems of epistemic principles) and that dif-

ferent epistemic systems are, in some sense equally valid. An

epistemic relativist is someone who claims to have discovered that

facts we previously thought of as absolute, are actually relative to

something else: in this case, that epistemic judgements are relative

to epistemic systems (Boghossian, 2006a,b). As I have argued

elsewhere (Kusch, 2009a), adopting the position of epistemic rela-

tivism can be a natural and rational response to certain kinds of

irresolvable epistemic disagreement, and thus a natural response

to difference in (fundamental) epistemic principles. Fundamental

disagreements over the rationality and justification of beliefs can

motivate a reaction of epistemic ambivalence: we recognise

that our interlocutor on the other side hasseen from herperspectiveperfectly legitimate and rational reasons for her

judgements, and we appreciate that we can argue for the superior-

ity of our position only by begging the question against her. This

does not mean that we abandon our own judgements, but it means

that we come to see them in a new light: as relative to our episte-

mic system (cf.Wong, 2006).

Now, to see if, and to what extent, the encounter with a differ-

ent style of reasoning can engender epistemic ambivalence it is

important to pay close attention to Hackings formulation of the

semantics of style-dependent and style-independent sentences.

Recall that not every sentence is style-dependent, though many

of the sentences in the sciences are. Since declarative sentences

express propositionsand since one and the same sentence can

express different propositionsit is natural to distinguish betweenstyle-dependent and style-independent propositions (D-proposi-

tions andI-propositions, respectively). According to Hackings the-

ory, every D-proposition belongs to the domain of one, and only

one, of Crombies (or Hackings) styles of reasoning. One and the

same D-proposition cannot belong to the domain of more than

one style of reasoning. For instance, the proposition expressed

by the sentence The average income is 16,000 belongs exclu-

sively to the domain of the statistical style; the sentence does

not express any proposition in, say, the domain of the laboratory

style.

The fact that one and the same proposition cannot appear in the

domain of more than one style might at first blush seem to rule

against the possibility of epistemic relativism. There cannot be

propositions that arejustifiedorrationalin the domain of one style,

and unjustified or irrational in the domain of another style. One

class of propositions is justified or unjustified, rational or irrational

in the domain of one style, and another class of propositions is jus-

tified or unjustified, rational or irrational in the domain of anotherstyle. This is of course precisely Hackings point when he insists

that his theory does not lead to relativism qua subjectivism.

Hacking has a pointbut only if we take epistemic relativism to

imply that for there to be faultless disagreement over a sentence s,

s must express propositions in both of the conflicting epistemic

systems. This seems too restrictive, however. The core of epistemic

relativism is the idea that facts about epistemic justification are

relative rather than absolute, and that different epistemic systems

are, in some sense, equally valid. And this definition fits the case of

styles of reasoning. Which propositions are justifiable depends on

the respective style of reasoning simply because only meaningful

propositions are candidates for being justifiable. Or, put differently,

in the present scenario there too can be epistemic disagreement

and epistemic ambivalence. The advocates of two different styles

of reasoning, R1 and R2, can reach conflicting verdicts on one and

the same sentence s, even though s expresses a proposition only

inR1and not in R2. The advocate ofR1might judges to be rational,

justified or true, while the advocate ofR2 might conclude that s,

precisely because it does not express a proposition in R2 is mean-

ingless.1 I see no reason why the two advocates of different styles

might not value each other as rational beings on grounds unrelated

to their current difference, and why they might not each come to

appreciate the internal coherence of each others reasoningand

without adopting the others style. If that possibility is granted, how-

ever, then we are back with the experience of epistemic ambiva-

lence, and thus back with the scenario in which the two advocates

of differing styles end up relativising their own their epistemic

judgements to their respective epistemic systems (in this case, their

respective style(s) of reasoning).2 Moreover, it is not only advocatesof two different styles who might react with epistemic ambivalence

to their fundamental disagreement. A similar outcome might result

from a conflict between one persons style-free, everyday reasoning

and another persons style-dependent thinking.

In the last paragraph I have tried to assimilate style-of-reason-

ing relativity to better known forms of epistemological relativism

by likening styles to systems of epistemic principles. In one impor-

tant respect this must now be modified. Familiar forms of episte-

mological relativism do not assume that one and the same

individual possesses more than one epistemic system. But Crombie

and Hacking repeatedly stress that their six (or seven) styles are

compatible and complementary. Thus one individual might reason

in accordance to all six (or seven) styles. For such an individual

each style constitutes a distinct domain of truthsbut thesedomains are not in conflict. For such individuals the fundamental

disagreements between styles of reasoning do not give rise to

interesting forms of epistemic ambivalence. In fact, such individu-

als might be die-hard realists and absolutists. We all now agree

that both social statistics and laboratory research are part and par-

cel of science, and are not turning into relativists just because the

sentence The average income is 16,000 does not appear in the

domain of the laboratory style.

Does this last consideration block the route from historical epis-

temology to epistemological relativism after all? No. We must not

1 Nick Jardine has suggested to me, in correspondence, that Hackings treatment overlooks also a further possibility: s is true-or-false in R1but lacks a truth value in R2since by

the latters standards, s s presuppositions (in R1) are false.

2 The relativism associated with styles of reasoning is not one of anything goes. For the moment we can grant Hacking that once a style of reasoning is in place, its epistemicprinciples determine whether a meaningful sentence is justified or unjustified, rational or irrational.



11/16

forget that there may be styles of reasoning that are not part and

parcel of currently accepted science. To adapt an example I have

discussed at length elsewhere (Kusch, 2009a), assume for the sake

of argument that by Hackings own criteria Christian theology is a

style of reasoning, and that the possibility of a mythical perception

of God is one of its central ingredients. The possibility of such

mythical perception has recently been defended in great detail

by the epistemologistWilliam Alston (1991). Now, Christian theol-ogy in general, and Alstons version in particular, are no styles of

mine, and the sentence God told me that I should do his will from

day to day, in humility and poverty (Alston, 1991, p. 12) does not

express either anI-proposition nor aD-proposition in my language.

For me, the Christian style of reasoning is incompatible with my

commitment to other, scientific (and philosophical) styles; though

clearly for Alston such incompatibility does not hold. This leaves

me with three options: (a) change my view about the incompatibil-

ity, (b) reject Alstons style as false or irrational, or (c) react with

epistemic ambivalence and adopt the relativistic view according

to which God told me that I should. . . is rational and justified

for Alston but not rational and justified for me. I see no good reason

why (c) should not be the most plausible responseespecially

since I value Alstons philosophical learnedness and acumen above

that of most other philosophers. And thus epistemological relativ-

ism is back in the picture.

To sum up my argument so far: Hacking is wrong to assume

that epistemic relativism is blocked just because D-propositions

belong to the domain of at most one style of reasoning. This leaves

me with the slightly easier task of rebutting Hackings five other

(anti-)relativist arguments.3

First, Hacking claims that at least our styles ofscientificreason-

ing are universal in the two senses of being ubiquitous and being

grounded in our innate cognitive capacities. This will not do. Rela-

tivists have no problems with ubiquitous phenomena. To use a

crass example: you do not disprove relativism about taste by mas-

sively advertisingCoca-Colauntil the whole world likes it. Western

scientific thought has indeed spread almost everywhere but that

does not show that there may not be other styles of reasoning thatare, in some sense, equally valid. Nor need relativists cave in when

confronted with innate cognitive constraints. Relativism is not the

view that our mind is completely plastic. If there really are styles of

reasoning, then surely they all must rest upon some innate cogni-

tive capacities or othersnever mind whether the styles in ques-

tion are those of Paracelsus medicine or those of high-energy

physics, those of Christian theology or those of psychoanalysis.

And yet, precisely because these highly diverse and incompatible

stylesall rest on innate cognitive capacities, the latter cannot adju-

dicate between the former. The best cognitive constraints can do is

to rule out certain styles as impossible for us. But as long as more

than one style remains, relativism remains a live option. Or con-

sider Scott Atrans work on folk-biological taxonomyHackings

favourite example of cognitive constraints. According to Atran,we have innate modules for such folk-biological classification

(e.g.Atran, 1998). This poses no problems for a sensible epistemic

relativism. Atrans work does not involve the claim that every-

where and at all times we find the same folk-biological taxono-

mies; he merely claims that all folk-biological taxonomies have

certain structural principles in common. The relativist can go along

with this and focus on the disagreements that exist beyond the

common principles. (I here leave aside the existing powerfulempir-

ical challenges to Atrans claims; for exampleLloyd, 2004.)

Second, Hacking sometimes quips that historical epistemology

is anti-relativistic, since a style of reasoning, once in place is not

relative to anything (Hacking, 1992a, pp. 135, 155). Maybe so,

but this misses the point. What makes Hackings historical episte-

mology relativistic is not thatstyles are relative to something, but

that judgements about justification and rationality

are relative tostyles. More generally, the epistemic relativist insists that episte-

mic evaluations are relative to epistemic systems, not that episte-

mic systems are relative.

Third, in an effort to distinguish historical epistemology from

constructivism, Hacking maintains that although a style intro-

duces objects it does not create them. This is a little too cryptic

for my taste. Perhaps what is meant is that the relationship be-

tween a style and its objects is internala bit like the relationship

between a rule and its applicationsand that therefore the lan-

guage of creation is misplaced. One cannot identify and understand

the style without identifying and understanding its objects, and

one cannot identify and understand the object of a given domain

without understanding the associated style. Fair enough, but does

this really dispel with constructivism? Why not say that we are

creating objects as we create the style and that we are creating

the style as we create t

Documents

Kusch Hackings Historical Epistemology 2010